CC 6 3 8 7 8 2 OlEO u.S . Department of State Case No. ~1P-2015-07420 Doc No C06387820 Date: 08/30/2017

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0 01 0659Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7415 MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

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FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RICE FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O . 12958: DECL: 03/31/201 B TAGS: PREL, RS SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO SOCHI

Classified by: Ambassador William ,J. Burns; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Mr President: Your last meeting w1th Putin beforP- he leaves the Kremlin offers an opportunity to reorient our relationship in a direction that maximizes areas of cooperation. better manages differences. and reinforces some of the more promising long-term tre11ds in this tro~.<bled and endlessly-complicated society. It's a chance to draw a line under ou1· dispute over missile defense, and keep the door open tor Future regional cooperation. It's a chance to get off on the right foot with Dmitriy Mecvedev, and encourage him to focus less pugnaciously than his mentor on the 'enemies at the gate," and more ambitiously on the rule of law as the answer to Russia's huge domestic challenges. It's a chance not to paper over the very real difficulties betwee1 us. or conjure up a neat strategic partnership of interests and values that is beyond our reach, but rather to highlight the possibilities of partnership on key strategic issues-- issues in which U.S.-Russian leadership matters greatly not only to the two of us, but to the rest of the world.

2. (S) Assuming 110 MAP offe rs for Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest, I think you will find Putin ready to turn down the decibel level. He wants to ease Medvedev's entry onto the global stage, and he has his hands full organizing their new tandem experiment in governing Russia. While unsentimental about defending his own and Russia's interests, he genuinely respects you and would like your last visit during his Presidency to end on a positive note. And while cocky and combative as ever. still without a mellow bone in his body, Putin will likely soften his roughest edges in Sochi, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics, one of his proudest accomplishments.

3. (S) Following are a few brief thoughts on what's driving Putin and Medvedev on the eve of the Sochi S1.1mmit, and on how we can use the strategic framework document to lay the foundation for a little

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bit healthier and more realistic U.S.-Russian re1at.onsl1.p in 2008.

Putin's Legacy and the Tandem Experiment

4. (S) Russia is a mucl1 different place today than it was when you and Putin first met in 2001. Putin's view of his legacy, and the source of his popularity, is that he has restored order, prosperity and pride to a Russia sorely lacking in all three wher1 Boris Yeltsin stumbled out of office. In Putin's narrative, he raised up Yeltsin's prostrate Russia, exploited by the West abroad and by rapacious oligarchs at home, and liler·ally at war with itself in Chechnya. into an energy powerhouse and a respected global player. With an economy that might well become the fifth or sixth largest in the world by 2020, overtaking Germany and alongside India, Russia has paid off its deots anc! built up more tnan $500 billion in hard currency reserves. Poverty has declined from 40 percent of the population to under 15 percent; scenes of babushkas hocking their household goods on Moscow street corner::; are a dimming memory, replaced by tt1e conspicuous consumption of a new middle class; and Putin has rented a thug to tame Chechnya.

5 (S) In a certain sense, never in Russian history have so many Russians lived so well and so freely. That is obviously not a statement about political freedoms. whose space has been sharply diminished under Putin. Russia in 2008 is a deeply authoritmian and over-centralized state, whose dismal record an human rights and democratic freedoms deserves our criticism. But it is also impossible to ignore what captivates most Russians today, the surge oF individual freedoms unimaginable for the iast generation: the freedom to consume, to possess private property, to travel, to have access to lhe rest of the world. Those are not abstract concepts for tne 14 million Russians who traveled outside the country last year; For the 40 million Russians who log on every day to an unfettered and Jnfiltered internet: for the 3 million bloggers among tt1ern; or for the 30 percent of Russians wt10 make Jp the growing middle class As much as anything else, private property drives Russia today, and along with it a slowly increasing thirst for more reliable rule of law to protect property and how it is exchanged.

6. (S) Putin himself has i::ilways kept his enthusiasm for democratic institutiort-lJLilding tirmly u11der Gonlrol. But f)iS t:lloicc ur Medvedev to succeed him (among all the other politically-dependent, loyal. unthreatening, and charismatically-challenged alternatives he could have picked) is revealing. Imprisoned oligarch Mikhail K:hodorkovsl<y once wrote from jail that Putin was more liber·allhan 80 oercent of Russians; while at heart an autocrat himself, Putin may L<ndersland that the next prase of Russia's evolution is going to ;equire a somewhat more flexible approach, or at least a somewhat more progressive face. At 42, Medvedev will be the first truly post~Soviet leader of Russia - the first leader since 1917 wno was never a Communist Party member, a smart gnd ambitious lawyer who launched his career after the collapse of the soviet Union. 7. (3) LiktO Pulirl, Mt:n:lvl:lllt~v I.:Oilltlt; (r'Uiil S~. Pt~l<iiSl.Jury, but rruiriltH:l

other side of the tracks Pdin's worldview was shaped in urban

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schoolyards, where "the weak get beat." Medvedev grew up in a stable, well-educated, suburban family, who had escaped the purges and rejected atheism when it became politically possible. A star student, Medvedev married his elementary school sweetheart, and cultivates an "every man" image today, fond of rock music, surfing the internet and working out. Diminutive, polite and lawyerly in manner, Medvedev nevertheless has a spine, and no shortage of drive He would not have survived as long as he has in the dark and unforgiving corridors of the Kremlin if he did not. Medvedev will take office heavily dependent on Putin, who will in effect serve at least at the outset as Regent, but it's possible that Medvedev ave' time will discover his inner "little Tsar," and establish his own leadership and political circle.

8. (S) Assuming that he moves to the Prime Ministry (and the freshly-constructed gym and sauna suite just outside the Prime Minister's office suggests his planning is pretty far advanced), Putin faces ~No serious problems in his tandem experiment with Medvedev. The nrst is the sheer unwieldiness, in a very Kremlin-centl·ic political system, oF a double-headed wiring diagram. Putin and Medvedev may well manage their own rBiationship adeptly, along with the two or three big decisions that any government has to make every day. But on the thousand smaller issues that have to be sorted out every day too, all the other magnates in this greedy and suspicious system will be constan!ly testing the limits and angling for advantage. At an event in Moscow last week, I listened to longtime Mayor L.uzhkov pontificate at some length to a group about tne merits of the tandem experiment. When I asked him afterward if he really believed that, he laughed uproariously and said: "Of course not. It's the craziest thing I've ever heard."

9. (S) The other problem runs even deeper. Russia today is "dizzy From success." an old, Stalin-era slogan that is sadly applicable to a society intoxicated by petrodollars, and about to wake up on Medvedev's watch to the consequences of its excesses. Massive corruption, the costs of inefficient state corporations, vicious infighting among the elite, demographic decline, crumbling health and education systems, and Potemkin democracy leave Russia ill-prepared to take on the challenges of institutionalizing the individual freedoms to which a new generation of Russians has become so accustomed, and of diversifying the economy beyond hydrocarbons. Medvedev's campaign speeches offer some encouragement that he understands the practical benefits of the rule of law in the struggles that lie ahead. But he is an incrementalist by nature, and even with Putin's energetic backing it is an open question whether Russia will take advantage of its moment of energy-driven opportunity, or squander it.

10. (S) Russia is at a similar crossroads in foreign policy. It has felt good, after two decades of being as far down on their luck as a Great Power can go, for Russians to thump their chests and stick oul their chins. But however cathartic that may be, it's not a strategy. The question now for Russia is not so rnuch wllal it's aggrieved obou1, which Putin has made clear with much color and littte subtlety. The question is wrat is Russia going to do witll its revival of fortune-- what is it for, not just what is it against.

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11 . (S) It has been fashionable in Moscow in recent years lo downplay the significance of ties to the West. to argtJe that Russia should put more of its strategic eggs in Asian baskets. But tha t a1·gument rings a little 1ollow for the lonely 15 million Russians living east of the Urals, in all of Siberia alid the .~ussien Far East, sitting on huge quant ities of just about everything 1n the periodic table of elements . and loo l~ing across a very long border at a bi llion and a half Chinese. Looking south, Russia sees the dangers of Islamic extremism, and another cold-blooded reason to work with the West.

Gett1ng U.S.-Russian Rela tions Right

12. (S) Against this backdrop, !here's at least a cl1a11ce to put our relationship with Russia on a more solid footing . to consolidate some of lhe achievements of the last eight years and put a few of our differences behind us. On certain issues. especia lly MAP for Ukraine (and to a lesser extent Georgia). Putin will not give an inch . There is simply no way that Putin (or any other conceivable Russian leader) would view a MAP offer for Ukraine at this stage as anything other than a direct strategic challenge. Putin will lament Kosovo's independence and warn annoyingly of its consequences: he'll complain about missile defense plans in Central Europe: btJ t the question of Ukraine and NATO is of a whole different order of magnitude for the Russian elite. Med vedev will be no less adamant. although he may come across a bit like Putin with the sound turred down.

13. (S) If we are nat at the point this year of a MAP offer for Ukraine and Georgia . the strategic framework document is doable . and it can do some modest good . I'd highlight four or five areas in wh ich it can point us in a more constructive direction :

-- First, missile defense. The language which we are seeking is in some ways less important than the understanding beneath It: Russia doesn't have to li ke our plans in Poland and the Czech Republ ic, but il should acknowledge that the confidence-building measures that we've offered go a long way toward allaying their concerns, and keep the door open to more ambitious regional cooperation. Putin would essentially turn the page on mi5sile defense as a major irritant, and let Medvedev at some point in the future explore cooperative structures.

-- Second, the broader Middle East. Your vis it is an opportunity to chart the rnain lines of a more cooperative course in 2008, The Iranian nuclear issue tops the list; without Russian support for hard-nosed diplomacy, it's going to get harder and harder to affect the Iranian leadership's calculus . On the Arab-Israeli peace process, Putin and Lavrov are again pushing the idea of a Moscow meeting, probably in June , focused in part on regional issues like water and the environment. The Russians have finally forgiven Iraq's debt, and are now looking to do more economically in Iraq_ Beyond the transit agreement for Afghanistan that is likely to er11erge at 8tJcharest, there is more we can do with the Russians on

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counter-narcotics and borde1 security .

-- Third, civil nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation . The "123" ag1·eement provides a solid framework for cooperation in lhe safe expansion of nuclear power, and for our overlapping initiatives to manage access to the nuclear fuel cycle. These efforts in turn help anchor our diplomacy on Iran and North Korea in a wider cooperative web. And we continue to set a good example for the rest of the world in how we manage our own remaining nuclear arsenals, still on track to meet the Bratislava safety and security targets for nuclear materials at the end of 2008, and still committed to finding a legally-binding follow-011 agreement beyond the expiration of the START Treaty at the end of 2009 .

-- Fourth, counter-terrorism. Both the ongoing Global Initiative Against Nuclear Terrorism and the revival of the Counter-Terrorism Working Group offer a chance to show lender5tlip, and strengthen practical cooperation.

-- Finally, wro and economic interaction. Our continued willingness to support a serious Russian push to enter the INfO in 2008 is important, and we are building a more systematic structure for economic dialogue with the Russians, which fits the growth of Russia's economy and our own interests. All these steps help reinforce Medvedev's progressive instincts, and the long-term possibilities for building modern economic and political institutions in this very complicated place . ·

14. (S) Alongside the high policy Issues laid out in the strategic Framework document, we're also continuing to do all we can to deepen the connection between our two societies, especially with the next generation of Russians. In the last 15 years, we have sent more than 60,000 Russians to the U.S. on exchange programs. This summer's launching of the new U.S -Russia legacy foundation, drawing on the proceeds of The U.S.-Russian Investment Fund, could almost double our annual grant capacity. Meanwhile, we've also dramatically expanded the summer work/travel program in the U.S. for Russian universitl; students. This summer we expect as many as 40,000 young Russians to participate, making this the largest single program in the world. While nipping burgers in Rehoboth may not win over every heart and mind, it's a part of a long-term strategy for connecting us across generations for whom the Cold War is ancient history.

15. (S) It'll be a pleasure to welcome you and Mrs. Bush to Sochi. It's a town with more ambitions than infrastructure right now, and the Russians will need every day of the next six years to get ready for the Winter Olympics in 2014. But it's a source of great pride for Putin --and it may be the best brake against the Russians over-reaching over tr.e next few years in Abkhazia, only 25 kilometers to the southeast. Nice neighbornood. Best regards, Bill Burns.

!3URNS

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