casual factors underlying the dramatic decline of the sumatran … · orang-utan's survival in...

Oryx Vol 35 No 1 January 2001

Causal factors underlying the dramatic declineof the Sumatran orang-utan

J. M. Yarrow Robertson and Carel P. van Schaik

Abstract The Sumatran orang-utan is in dramaticdecline, including the population in its main stronghold,the Leuser Ecosystem, in Sumatra, Indonesia (C. P. vanSchaik et al. (2001) Oryx 35, 14-25). The major threats tothe survival of Sumatran orang-utans are identified ashabitat loss (mainly from conversion to oil palm plan-tations), habitat degradation and habitat fragmentation.The immediate causes of this are identified as weakcompliance with regulations and laws; weak lawenforcement and the weak legal environment. Corrup-tion is identified as the ultimate causal factor underlyingthese three immediate causal factors, along with afrontier mentality and bureaucratic constraints. Togeth-er, they have resulted in the destruction of primeorang-utan habitat. Several political actions are recom-

mended to improve the effectiveness of habitat con-servation for the orang-utan and several technicalchallenges are to be overcome once the policy contextis right. The most crucial problem to solve is the lack ofregular funds for enforcement operations and establish-ing a new system of enforcement that is effective. Inaddition, the Gunung Leuser National Park needs to beredesigned by enlarging it to cover all high biodiversityareas within the Leuser Ecosystem. Moreover, habitatcorridors between important forest tracts need to bere-established.

Keywords Corruption, illegal logging, Leuser Ecosys-tem, orang-utan, policy, Sumatra.

Introduction

The Sumatran orang-utan population has suffered 86per cent loss over the last 100 years (Rijksen & Meijaard,1999). In its main stronghold, the Leuser Ecosystem(Sumatra, Indonesia), the Sumatran orang-utan is cur-rently in dramatic decline, with a loss of over 1000orang-utans every year (van Schaik et al., 2001). Ifthis trend continues, the Sumatran orang-utan willbecome ecologically extinct in the wild within the next10 years (van Schaik et al., 2001).

In most areas and for many centuries, hunting forsubsistence or trade was the major threat to orang-utanpopulations (Rijksen & Meijaard, 1999; Delgado & vanSchaik, 2000). In the Leuser Ecosystem no aboriginaltribes lived in the forest during historic times. Peoplearound Leuser were primarily agriculturalists, whosevery limited impact on orang-utans was through timberextraction for subsistence needs, for houses and dugoutcanoes, and through habitat disturbance because ofshifting cultivation.

J. M. Yarrow Robertson (Correspondence) Wildlife Research Group,Department of Anatomy, Cambridge University, Downing Street,Cambridge CB2 3DY, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Carel P. van Schaik Department of Biological Anthropology andAnatomy, Duke University, Box 90383, Durham, NC 27708-0383, USA.,and Wildlife Conservation Society, Asia Program, Bronx, NY 10460, USA

Revised manuscript accepted for publication 7 September 2000

The serious threats in this area, as almost everywhereelse at present, come from commercial logging. Hence,efforts to protect orang-utans must focus on habitatprotection. In particular, conserving wild Sumatranorang-utans requires protecting tracts of unexploitedforest that are interconnected and contain a significantproportion of lowland and floodplain habitat (Delgado& van Schaik, 2000; van Schaik et al., 2001).

In this paper, we review current efforts to protect theSumatran orang-utan from extinction, and based on ananalysis of the causes for their continuing decline,develop a set of recommendations for conservation.

Before doing so, we should point out that thesedevelopments and conservation efforts take placeagainst a backdrop of economic and political turmoil.The Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia's economy sohard that, by 1998, violent demonstrations forced long-term president Soeharto to resign. This change usheredin a period of near-anarchy, during which illegalactivities became rampant. For instance, by 1999, illegallogging in Indonesia had overtaken legal loggingoperations (EIA/Telapak, 1999; Purnomo, 2000). ByOctober 1999, a new democratically-elected governmenthad taken office. Meanwhile, in the special province ofAceh in northern Sumatra, long-standing separatismhad escalated into large-scale armed conflict. Thelawlessness, especially in Aceh, clearly exacerbatedsome of the existing problems. The government hopedthat implementation of the new law on regional

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Factors underlying decline of Sumatran orang-utan 27

autonomy in 2001 would help resolve some of theseproblems. We believe, however, that the recommenda-tions developed here will be valid regardless of thedevelopments in this conflict.

Management of the Leuser Ecosystem

In the early 1990s, Leuser's orang-utans received insuf-ficient protection because of inadequate design of theoriginal protected area (Gunung Leuser National Park),and serious deficiencies in conservation and land-useplanning in the broader region. The park is large(c. 9000 sq km) and rich in endemics. It harbours theonly potentially viable population of the criticallyendangered Sumatran rhino (IUCN/SSC, 1997), nowthought to be the most endangered large mammal onearth due to a critically low and dispersed population(van Strien, pers. comm.). It contains mainly montaneareas which covers only a small proportion of primehabitat for orang-utans and many other lowland ele-ments, including the Sumatran elephant and theSumatran tiger (Rijksen & Griffiths, 1995). The parkwas insufficiently protected, with extensive illegalextraction of timber and poaching, as well as conversionand illegal settlements. Almost all the valuable areasoutside the park were being selectively logged orconverted into plantation or transmigration areas. Asthere is a trend toward systematic conversion of loggingconcessions into permanent agriculture, it was fearedthat very little prime habitat would remain within adecade or so.

To remedy these inadequacies, the Leuser Ecosystemwas proposed: an area of approximately 25,000 sq km innorthern Sumatra. It encompasses the designatedGunung Leuser National Park (see Fig. 1) and will con-tain a redesigned and enlarged future national park. Inrecognizing the global importance of the Leuser Eco-system, the Government of Indonesia and the EuropeanCommission (EC) entered into a 7-year partnership,integrated conservation and development project(ICDP), called Leuser Development Programme (LDP).The rationale for the programme and the detailedplanning which went into it are outlined in Rijksen &Griffiths (1995) and the LDP overall work plan (LeuserDevelopment Programme, 1997). The objective of theLDP is to conserve the Leuser Ecosystem, and in sodoing, secure the basis for sustainable development inthe surrounding regions.

The LDP is to achieve these objectives through twobroad sets of activities: (i) establishing and conservinga new nature conservation area within ecologicallysustainable boundaries, leaving its biodiversity intactto the full extent and (ii) facilitating sustainabledevelopment of buffer zones inside the ecosystem

and of the intensive production area surrounding it.Thus, encroachment or unsustainable exploitationaffecting the ecosystem will be redirected towardsalternative sustainable income-generating opportunitiesin the intensive production area. Quid pro quoagreements with local communities, whereby ecologi-cally-sound developments could be supported inexchange for conservation guarantees, were to beinstrumental in bringing about this shift in the natureof activities.

Key elements of the programme are the integrationof the ecosystem into the government's spatial land-use planning process (implemented by Bappeda, theprovincial- and regency-level development planningboard), as well as the involvement of local communities,local government and NGOs in implementing theprogramme's activities (Monk & Purba, in press). Amajor initiative is the development of eco-tourism,including orang-utan viewing. Further details can befound on LDP's website at www.ec-ldp.co.id.

The Government of Indonesia also recognized theopportunity to privatize management of the LeuserEcosystem. The threats to Leuser are a complex mix oflegal and illegal components, emanating from business,government and local interests, taking place in an ever-changing political landscape. Hence, privatized man-agement, less subject to bureaucratic constraints, shouldbe more creative, flexible and responsive. Accordingly,the right to manage the conservation of the LeuserEcosystem was granted to a local NGO, the LeuserInternational Foundation (LIF), for 30 years.

LDP is implemented by a technical managementbody, Leuser Management Unit (LMU), that imple-ments the LDP. After the programme ends, the man-agement will revert to LIF, which will retain animplementing body much like LMU. One of the tasksof LMU is to support the development of LIF to ensureits professional capacity to execute its mandate effec-tively. In the long run, the LIF needs to attain financialautonomy through a substantial trust fund establishedby international donors.

The programme has scored considerable conservationsuccesses (The World Bank, 1997; Griffiths & van Schaik,unpublished data), but it has not been able to preventthe many destructive developments that threaten theorang-utan's survival in the Leuser Ecosystem. The lossof orang-utan habitat has been quantified elsewhere(van Schaik et al., 2001). In this study, we describe theprocesses of habitat destruction and analyse theirunderlying causes. We will identify political factorsexternal to the programme as the major causes, thusexplaining LDP's inability to conserve Sumatran orang-utans fully in spite of achieving considerable politicalsupport.

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28 J. M. Y. Robertson and C. P. van Schaik

BANOA ACEH

': Leuser Ecosystem(Gunung Leuser

National Park20 40 60 80km

Fig. 1 Position of the designated GunungLeuser National Park within the LeuserEcosystem. The main areas and riversare shown in the companion article(van Schaik et at, 2001).

Destructive processes

The three main processes threatening populations oforang-utans and those of many other forest species arehabitat loss, degradation and fragmentation.

Habitat loss is caused by forest conversion topermanent agriculture, both legally or semi-legally forplantation estates and also illegally by local encroach-ment. Habitat degradation is mainly caused by timberextraction. Habitat fragmentation mainly comes in twodifferent forms. First, forest is being cleared up slopesleaving forest islands contouring tops and fringingridges. If only strips are cleared up slopes but beyondthe altitudinal limit of orang-utans, it can still lead tohabitat fragmentation although the forest is still con-tiguous at higher altitude. Second, roads in this regionare inevitably accompanied by forest clearing in a stripalong them, and sever links between major forestblocks. Fragmentation is a by-product of habitat lossand degradation. Thus, controlling the latter alsoreduces the former, but minimizing fragmentation alsorequires an emphasis on preventing the building ofroads through sensitive areas because encroachmentand settlement along them cannot be avoided. Re-establishing major habitat corridors, therefore, some-times necessitates either land purchase or compensa-tion packages. Further details of this are given inRobertson & van Schaik (in press). From here on, we

will focus on the processes producing habitat loss anddegradation.

The destructive processes occur throughout theLeuser Ecosystem, both within protected areas and inother forest categories on state forest land (Fig. 2). Theplayers in these processes are (i) companies operatinglegally in timber concessions or agricultural estates, (ii)companies that acquire forest land for conversion toagricultural estates without having completed the pro-cess of changing its land-use status fully, (iii) locallogging gangs controlled by local entrepreneurs withpowerful backing and (iv) local people opportunisticallyoccupying land for agriculture, sometimes encouragedby business interests. Thus, they come in two classes:legal or semi-legal (usually by formal business concernsor government agencies) and illegal (usually by informalindividuals or groups).

The threat from legal activities comes in three differ-ent shapes. First, areas are excised from the forest estateto convert to plantation agriculture. Examples includemost of the Tripa Swamp and parts of the SingkilSwamp, all prime orang-utan habitat (for locations, seevan Schaik et ah, 2001). Most of these decisions predatethe declaration of the Leuser Ecosystem in 1995.

Second, poor co-ordination between government agen-cies or lack of knowledge of the legal status of land maylead to decisions that contradict decisions made by othergovernment agencies. For instance, transmigration areas

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D Logging by gangs

• Conversion to estates

Logging by companies

Agricultural encroachment

Protected areas Non-protected regions

Fig. 2 Percentage of protected areas (n = 9) and of nonprotectedregions (n = 5) inside the Leuser Ecosystem affected by illegallogging by gangs or companies, illegal agricultural encroachment,and illegal or semilegal conversion to agricultural plantations.Protected areas include all wildlife reserves (Rawa Singkil, KluetSelatan, Gunung Leuser, Kapi, Sikundur, and Langkat), naturerecreation forest (TWA Gurah, TWA Bohorok), and protection forestinside the designated National Park (HL Serbolangit). Non-pro-tected regions cover the remaining area of the ecosystem in geo-graphical blocks, not related to legal categories, and include someprotection forest, though none are delineated or gazetted as such(Bengkung-Sembabala, Kluet Utara, Ie Merah-Krueng Meureubo,Bidin-Jambo Aye-Serbajadi-Lesten, Rawa Tripa-Kuala Batee).

are sometimes planned in forests on deep peat or steepslopes that should be protection forests under generallaws. The LMU is addressing this problem by improvinginteragency co-ordination on land-use decisions, but it isimportant to note that, although the Leuser Ecosystem isalmost entirely comprised of state forest land, about one-third of it can be legally logged or converted to agricul-tural estates. This comprises 7242 sq km of timberconcessions in non-swamp forest, 595 sq km of swampforest in the Tripa area (van Schaik et ah, 2001) and270 sq km in the Singkil swamp (Decree of the Ministerof Forestry No. 166/Kpts-II,1998). This total acreageassumes the reality that areas involved are not protectedas they should be, according to general laws.

The third and most common form is semi-legalconversion. This threat arises because the full procedurefor transforming land-use status of a tract of land wasnot followed, even though some local authorities sup-port conversion. The most widespread example of this isthe establishment of vast oil palm plantations, coming inon the back of legal logging concession and the roadsystem it created. First, it is common practice for semi-legal conversion to proceed on the basis of a letter ofapplication only to the Forestry service. Second, acompany obtains a licence legally to clear-fell an area,

but then uses it to deforest a much larger area,exploiting administrative weaknesses, as sketch mapsdo not define clearly the boundaries of their operations.Parts of the Gunung Leuser National Park in theLangkat regency were converted to oil palm plantationby this mechanism. Third, the local government some-times organizes a local transmigration project or allowsvillagers to open up agricultural fields on state forestland. All these activities create a fait accompli, and theMinister of Forestry is requested to release the land foragriculture after in fact it has already been converted.

A bizarre example of this semilegal threat concerns12,000 ha of lowland forest in the Sikundur WildlifeReserve of the Gunung Leuser National Park, illegallycut in the early 1970s and 1990s and left to regenerate.Although Sikundur has been a wildlife reserve since1935, during 1998-1999, a religious cultural organiza-tion began building a settlement within the park tohelp poor farmers acquire agricultural land, based onlyon a letter of application. In actual fact, the group wasoperating as a front for a local businessman whoplanned to obtain the land for plantation agriculture(Waspada, 10.08.1998).

The illegal threats come in a variety of forms:(a) commercial logging companies breaking the regula-

tions, i.e. over-logging; this can be carried out eitherinside or outside their designated logging concession;

(b) illegal (wildcat) logging inside approved loggingconcessions; this is usually perpetrated either bylocal people or by gangs of illegal loggers whoparasitize a logging company's concession;

(c) illegal logging by local people or specialized gangswho operate in state forest land outside loggingconcessions; this includes illegal logging of nationalparks, forest reserves and protection forest.

Immediate causes of forest destruction

It is clear from the above account that many processes,from the completely legal to the totally illegal, aredegrading the Leuser Ecosystem. Here, we address theimmediate causes. Once these are identified, we canfocus on the underlying causes and the recommendedcourses of action. The three most important proximatereasons explaining why orang-utan habitat in the LeuserEcosystem is being destroyed, in spite of the LMU'sefforts, are weak compliance with regulations, weak lawenforcement and weak legal environment.

Weak compliance with regulations

None of the logging concessions operating in the LeuserEcosystem have approved environmental impact assess-ments that would pass verification by independent

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experts. For instance, most of the concessions containedsignificant amounts of forest on slopes above 40 per centor swamps with peat layers more than 2 m thick, whichby law should be categorized as protection forest (HutanLindung). In fact, the majority of the acreage within theselegally granted concessions cannot technically be loggedor converted if these regulations were complied with(Monk & Purba, in press). Likewise, when loggingconcessionaires' annual work plans were officiallyapproved, there were no provisions for monitoring byindependent organizations to challenge the decisionsmade, although many violated the Forestry Depart-ment's own regulations. Additionally, logging of adja-cent protection forests by logging companies is rampant,despite press exposure (e.g. Medan Pos, 11.12.1998;Waspada, 09.02.1998, 07.07.1999; Serambi Indonesia,

02.12.1999a). Concessionaires are rarely fined officially,and none had their licences revoked in spite of majorviolations, but recently, the licences of some concession-aires have not been renewed.

Most of the saw mills around the Leuser Ecosytemoperate without proper permits, processing illegally cuttimber. Even those who do have permits, often processillegally cut timber. For example, of at least 46 saw millsprocessing illegally-felled timber in the Aceh Selatanregency during early 1999, only 18 had official permitsto operate in the first place (see Fig. 3 for locations ofregencies). Whilst in two districts of the Aceh Tenggararegency, eight saw mills existed solely from the pro-cessing of timber cut from the designated National Parkfor years without being closed down, despite an orderfrom the provincial Governor's office.

MALACCA STRAIT

INDIAN OCEAI

A20 40 km

Key:/ \ / Kabupaten boundaryA / Province boundaryj j j j } Leuser Ecosystem

LMU

Fig. 3 Map of the administrative bound-aries around the Leuser Ecosystem innorthern Sumatra, showing both the pro-vincial and regency (Kabupaten) bound-aries. (Note: a new regency proposed iscalled Gayo Lues that would comprisethe northern half of the current regencyof Aceh Tenggara).

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This shows that the local demand for timber is far inexcess of the legal supply. Nationally, between one-halfand two-thirds of the total log consumption is sourcedfrom illegal logging (Purnomo, 2000). In the pulp andpaper sub-sector, over 100 million cubic metre of woodwas consumed since 1987. Less than 5 per cent of thiscame from sustainable pulpwood plantations, with theremaining 95 per cent obtained from legal and illegallogging of natural forests (Purnomo, 2000). The govern-ment has shown its intent to handle this problem bythe formation of an Interdepartmental Committee onForests, as stipulated under Presidential Decree no.80/2000.

Weak law enforcement

During the last few years, the ineffectiveness of lawenforcement in the Leuser Ecosystem has been reportedwidely (e.g. see Serambi Indonesia, 11.02.1998; for AcehSingkil; Analisa, 09.12.1999; Prestasi, 11.12.1999; Waspada,08.12.1999; for Aceh Tenggara; Analisa, 31.12.1998 andSerambi Indonesia, 02.12.1999a; for Aceh Timur; see alsoEIA/Telapak, 1999). This ineffectiveness can also beseen easily from the results of enforcement operationssupported by the LMU during the 3 years till March1999. Only three of the 24 enforcement operations in theLeuser Ecosystem, executed at considerable cost,resulted in the perpetrators being held in custody bythe police (Table 1). Instead, most of those arrestedwere released after making a signed statement, none ofwhich resulted in summonses being issued (see also

Table 1 Summary of results of enforcement operations in theLeuser Ecosystem supported by the LDP from March 1996 to March1999.

Number of casesExpenditure Number of presented to

Area ($US) operations public prosecutor

AcehNorth Sumatra,

except LangkatLangkat

Total

29,9656095

11,855

47,915

173

4

24

00

3

3

Source: Leuser Development Programme (1999).Notes: 1. Original cost in rupiah (Rp). During the period, theexchange rate fluctuated wildly from Rp. 2250-15,000/$US. Forease of conversion back to rupiah, an average exchange rate ofRp. 6500/$ is used, corresponding roughly to the cost if convertedat date of each contract.2. About 70 per cent of the cost of each operation comprised perdiems for team members. As a result of low government salaries,this could amount to more than double their monthly salaries. Thebalance comprised vehicle hire, fuel, legal processing and admin-istration/reporting.

Serambi Indonesia, 02.12.1999b; for a different example).The only successful prosecutions were conducted inone regency where enforcement agencies and politicalauthorities supported enforcing conservation laws.Indeed, even when specific cases had been exposed tothe press, and letters from the offices of the provincialGovernor and the national Director-General for NatureConservation had been issued, logging often went onfor months or years (e.g. at Suaq Balimbing in AcehSelatan regency; and at Lak-Lak, Badar district, andLuk-Luk, Lawe Alas district, both in Aceh Tenggararegency).

The LMU also supported several community-basedprotection initiatives, but their effectiveness was sev-erely constrained by the obstruction of the law enforce-ment apparatus in collusion with the illegal operators(e.g. Waspada, 15.12.1999; Sinar Baru Indonesia, 13.01.2000;Robertson & van Schaik, in press). In a review ofIndonesia's ICDPs (The World Bank, 1997), it was con-cluded that ICDPs stand little chance of success withoutat least some effective provision for law enforcement.

Weak legal environment

The few cases that led to prosecutions did result inconvictions (see Table 1), suggesting that the judiciarysystem can be effective in upholding the law, butoverall, prosecutions are strikingly rare. There may beseveral reasons for this. First, individuals and organiza-tions alike may be discouraged from taking illegaloperators to court. Cases may drag on for years, andwhen forestry agencies prosecute perpetrators, thestandard funding allotments quickly run out. Second,prosecuting the organizers of illegal-logging operationsis difficult in the absence of a witness protectionprogramme (see The Jakarta Post, 30.04.1999b, for asimilar example). Activists, forestry officials, and LMUstaff regularly receive death threats and several recentkillings are widely thought to be related to illegallogging. Third, it is only since 1997, under Act no. 23,that NGOs can sue the government for breaching itsown regulations. This new law is now being tested incourt. Finally, as a general deterrent, public distrust inthe legal system has led to the assumption that thecourts only served the interests of the New Orderregime, whose main elements were still in place after thedownfall of Soeharto in 1998 (Soedjati, 1999; The JakartaPost, 04.02.2000; Unidjaja, 2000).

Underlying problems and theirpolitical solutions

Here we identify corruption, frontier mentality andbureaucratic constraints, in order of importance, as the

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major underlying causal factors for the destruction oforang-utan habitat in the Leuser Ecosystem. Thesefactors require political-level intervention and thereforelie outside the scope of the LMU's capability, makingit impossible for the LDP to solve the immediateconstraints identified above.

Corruption

Corruption, collusion and nepotism together form theultimate causal factor underlying the three majorimmediate factors outlined above that have resulted inthe destruction of prime orang-utan habitat in theLeuser Ecosystem. Corruption leads to a climate inwhich those in control can subvert the legal system,making them virtually untouchable. According to allnational newspapers, corruption had invaded almostthe whole of public life during the Soeharto and Habibieregimes (see also Colmey & Liebhold, 1999; The JakartaPost, 21.06.2000a, b; Winters, 1999). Not surprisingly,Indonesia was ranked as the sixth most corrupt countryin the world by Transparency International's CorruptionPerception Index for 1998 (The Jakarta Post, 30.04.1999a),and one of the two most corrupt countries in Asia byPolitical and Risk Consultancy Ltd (The Jakarta Post,26.03.1999; 23.03.2000). Whilst corruption is found invirtually all countries, the problem becomes debilitatingwhen it is so widespread. The World Bank, for instance,admitted in 1998 that about 30 per cent of all itsdevelopment aid money to Indonesia, calculated bysome analysts as amounting to about $US 10 billion, hadbeen siphoned off (The Jakarta Post, 15.04.1999,19.02.2000; Colmey & Liebhold, 1999). A former financeminister called on the government to dissolve theNational Development Planning Board (Bappenas) onthe grounds that 'the government has lost between 30and 50 per cent of the loans it got from overseas tofinance Bappenas' faulty projects' (The Jakarta Post,28.03.2000).

From the conservation perspective, there are wide-spread allegations of corruption by two major groups(see also EIA/Telapak, 1999), although few of theseallegations have been proven in court. First, the armedforces, a major part of the enforcement apparatus, hadtaken control of many illegal logging operations andtook rents for security guarantees from the legal ones(Serambi Indonesia, 11.02.1998, 28.04.2000; Cohen, 2000;The Jakarta Post, 22.04.2000b, 20.05.2000).

Second, corruption became a potent force withingovernment departments (The Jakarta Post, 24.04.1999,14.07.1999; Media Indonesia, 28.06.2000) including theDepartment of Forestry (Analisa, 13.12.1999; EIA/Tela-pak, 1999; Cohen, 2000; The Jakarta Post, 17.02.2000,24.02.2000, 07.04.2000, 22.04.2000a, 20.05.2000). A special

team established to investigate corruption in the forestrysector, headed by the Secretary-General of the Depart-ment of Forestry and Estate Crops, identified a misuse ofthe department's reforestation funds by concessionairesowned by former President Soeharto's family andcronies (The Jakarta Post, 08.02.2000). The Supreme AuditAgency exposed corruption amounting to Rp. 49.798billion (c. $US 7.6 million) in the Department of Forestry& Estate Crops for the financial year 1999-2000 (MediaIndonesia, 28.06.2000).

Forestry officials themselves have hastened thedestruction of orang-utan habitat by allowing/backingthe conversion of forest, including protected areas,mainly to oil palm plantations. In late 1999, for instance,a group of lawyers in Medan began court proceedings tosue the former Regional Head of Forestry and formerHead of the National Park for allegedly giving falseinformation in support of a proposal later approved bythe Minister of Forestry (Sinar Baru Indonesia,13.12.1999). As a result of this approval, a communitygroup backed by an army foundation obtained aconcession to log part of the National Park in Langkat(province of North Sumatra) and convert it to oil palmplantation (Prestasi, 02.11.1999; Sinar Baru Indonesia,02.11.1999).

After Indonesia installed its first democraticallyelected president in October 1999, a new era to rid thecountry of corruption began, but by late 1999, thesituation on the ground was worse than ever before inmany places (EIA/Telapak, 1999; Cohen, 2000). Despitesome inroads, corruption is so ingrained that the fewchanges at the top have as yet had little effect at thelower levels. Thus, action to combat corruption remainscritical for conservation. Key actions include creating thepolitical will, rescinding the dual role of the armedforces, creating transparency and accountability ofcentral and local government, linking international loansto progress in forest conservation and promotingawareness.

Political willMany integrated conservation and development pro-grammes do not succeed because political decisionsbeyond their sphere of influence override the localefforts. In the case of LDP, a major part of its earlysuccesses was because of its ability to lobby at theprovincial and national levels and affect specific policydecisions. For instance, this succeeded in prevent-ing further technically inappropriate transmigrationschemes in the Singkil Swamp and the Bengkung, andfurther official conversion of the Singkil Swamp foragricultural estates. The LMU could not cope, how-ever, with the sheer number of such destructivedevelopment proposals. The main obstacles to progress

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remain in the civil service and at the local politicallevel, both of which stand to lose lucrative sources ofincome. This resistance can be overcome if the politicalwill is strong enough for the government to unambig-uously declare its determination to conserve the LeuserEcosystem and ensure all destructive processes withinit are prevented.

The scale of the problem to be overcome washighlighted by the Secretary-General to the Ministerof Forestry and Estate Crops, Soeripto. After a 7-monthinvestigation, he concluded that the multi-billion illegallogging business involves not just local governmentofficials and businessmen but also central governmentofficials in Jakarta and members of their networksin Singapore and Hong Kong (The Jakarta Post,19.08.2000b). They were accused of purchasing logsstolen from both national parks and logging conces-sions, as well as playing significant roles in theabduction and assault of activists from several NGOs.It is widely thought that most of the major cases ofillegal logging in Leuser, also have links to legislatorsand political figures at all administrative levels. Thesefigures are at the forefront of anti-conservation decla-rations, using arguments to increase development forthe people as a front to protect their business interests.Thus, strengthening the political will for conservationefforts that take into account the long-term benefits,will require intensive efforts by national and interna-tional NGOs, scientific institutions and concernedindividuals.

The dual role of the armed forcesDuring the Soeharto regime, the armed forces had alegally-agreed dual function: security and politics.Under Law No. 4/1999, the armed forces were given38 unelected seats in the House of Representatives, areduction from their previous total of 75. They are alsogranted 10 per cent of the elected seats in provincial andregency legislatures. As a result of their role in politics,the army controlled most positions of power, whichextended into the forestry sector. They became involvedin forest exploitation and even officially had manylogging concessions. Their involvement in activities theywere supposed to be monitoring created a conflict ofinterest. Rogue members of the enforcement apparatus,especially at the district (Kecamatan) level, becameinvolved in controlling illegal logging operations. Thiscontinued throughout 1998 and 1999, although manycases were exposed by the newly unbridled press (e.g.Kompas, 20.04.2000 for Langkat; Analisa, 07.12.1999,09.12.1999; Prestasi, 11.12.1999; Waspada, 08.12.1999,09.12.1999, 15.12.1999; Sinar Baru Indonesia, 13.01.2000;for Aceh Tenggara; Serambi Indonesia, 02.12.1999b;28.04.2000 for Aceh Timur; Serambi Indonesia, 11.02.1998

for Aceh Selatan regencies; see also EIA/Telapak, 1999;Cohen, 2000).

During 1999, the armed forces issued a directiveinstructing all their personnel to choose between eitherstaying in the military and cutting off all their privatebusiness and political ties, or vice versa. Decrees issuedby the People's Consultative Assembly to take effectfrom 18 August 2000 will end the presence of themilitary and police at the House of Representatives,provincial and regency legislatures in 2004, but maintaintheir presence at the People's Consultative Assemblyuntil 2009 (The Jakarta Post, 19.08.2000a). These changesshould contribute strongly to orang-utan conservation,by eliminating the business involvement and the conflictof interest this entails, but reining in the rogue elementsat the lower levels may require strong political will anda good working relationship between their commandersand conservation bodies at the local level.

Transparency and accountabilityThe Indonesian government has identified increasedtransparency and accountability as major tools to eradi-cate corruption. Such steps will also have a majorpositive impact on orang-utan conservation. Implement-ing this at the local and regency level would also havebeneficial side-effects for conservation because there aremany projects that appear to serve no rational purposeother than providing income from the projects to theofficials involved. These plans particularly relate toroad-building and transmigration schemes, both ofwhich can destroy prime orang-utan habitat. The localtransmigration scheme executed in the Bengkung area,for example, placed 300 families some 60 km away fromthe main road. The only rational explanation for thisscheme is that it would require funds for a road-building project to upgrade the old logging road leadingto it.

The government has made major progress recently inapproving accountability and transparency through theabolition of the Ministry of Information and far greaterpress freedom. This can be improved further withindependent auditing and right of access to publicinformation (especially, regarding applications for forestuse permits three months before they are scheduled forapproval). Whilst the government and the press togetherare clearly exposing many more cases of corruption,progress over prosecution of perpetrators is slower,again highlighting the need to support reforms in thejudicial system.

Centralized powerIt is often argued that centralized power has stronglycontributed to power abuses and corruption, resulting inforest destruction, but although centralization certainly

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makes deforestation a more intractable problem, the realproblem is corruption. Regional government officials arejust as likely as central government officials to facilitateconversion of orang-utan habitat to oil palm planta-tions illegally. Thus, the solution is transparency andaccountability.

Whereas there may be strong arguments for localautonomy, conservation is not served by absolute localautonomy, especially because this would eliminaterepresentation of national (and through it the interna-tional) interests. For instance, the government of AcehTenggara regency has repeatedly proposed to de-gazette30,000 ha of prime orang-utan habitat in the nationalpark, in order to convert forest to agricultural lands. Inthe current proposals for regional autonomy, conserva-tion will remain under the control of the centralgovernment, whereas exploitation will have substantiallocal control. This is to satisfy demands for localcommunities to exploit what they perceive as 'their'forests, possibly based on traditional law (adat).

International loans and forest conservationAs part of the Supplementary Memorandum of Eco-nomic and Financial Policies, Fourth Review under theExtended Arrangement (for text see The Jakarta Post,17.03.1999), the Indonesian government reported to theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), significant progresstowards structural reforms in the forestry sector. None-theless, regardless of these structural achievements, theLeuser Ecosystem experienced an unprecedented waveof illegal logging throughout 1998 and 1999, and wasstill subjected to tens of thousands of hectares of orang-utan habitat being converted to oil palm plantations(van Schaik et al., 2001). This obviously poses a dilemmafor both parties. Whilst recognizing the importance ofstructural reforms, biodiversity conservation is betterserved with a more direct link. Consequently, wesuggest that disbursement of all major developmentloans (i.e. excluding humanitarian aid) should be linkedto verifiable progress in preventing degradation of allcurrent and proposed protected areas. This is easy tomonitor independently, especially with satellite imag-ery, corroborated by ground truthing by independentbodies led by local NGOs.

AwarenessThe abolition of the Ministry of Information in October,1999 signified the end of the old regime's control overpress freedom. This has increased the ability of the pressto expose corruption and cases of illegal destruction offorests. Increasing conservation awareness amongst thepublic at large is also a major tool to generate themomentum that will convince politicians to take con-servation issues seriously. In the long run, strong public

support for conservation will be the best guarantee forsafe protected areas.

Frontier mentalityAfter corruption, the next major underlying reason forhabitat destruction is that both local government andbusiness interests view a logging concession as the firststep in the development process, which involves landclearing, rather than as part of the permanent forestestate, as intended by the law. Local people and localgovernment alike, often believe that forested land is freeland (tanah kosong) that should be open to whoeversettles first (Rijksen & Meijaard, 1999). Accordingly, theysee the laws and regulations coming down from thecentral government as obstacles. The central govern-ment is seen, therefore as imposing an opportunity coston local development whenever it regulates access to,and use of, forested land. Hence, local government andlocal people feel justified to insist on receiving compen-sation for not converting forest to agricultural lands.When the central government weakened, following thefall of the Soeharto regime, illegal logging and encroach-ment increased dramatically.

This frontier mentality hampers development byencouraging unplanned exploitation and conversionwithout regard of the consequences for ecologicalservices or biodiversity, and without adherence tocarefully designed plans that optimize the outcome forthe region or nation as a whole.

A possible solution to this problem is to combine astrong emphasis on law enforcement with an equallystrong commitment to support appropriate local devel-opment through quid pro quo agreements with localcommunities and their leaders. The key action to set thisin motion is for nonemergency development aid to beprioritized to solving all the conservation versus devel-opment conflicts around protected areas. This meansminimizing, then eventually stopping, all unsustainableexploitation of protected areas. It also requires ensuringall boundaries are marked clearly in the field andlocal public awareness of protected area boundariesimproved.

Bureaucratic constraints

The third underlying reason for the habitat destructionis bureaucratic constraints. Bureaucratic institutions thatcontrol integrated conservation and development pro-jects are generally unable to respond promptly and havelimited capacity for adaptive flexibility of response (TheWorld Bank, 1997; The Rainforest Foundation, 1998).This problem can cripple any project through delays inthe release of funds and lengthy procedures that createinefficiencies (The World Bank, 1997). For instance,

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during 1998-1999, lack of funds from both donors of theLDP resulted in frequent grounding of field staff andstopping field projects before completion.

More delegation of responsibility and authority formonitoring and evaluating the programme to theappointed EC representation in the country wouldimprove the programme's continuity and therefore itscredibility in the field. It would also lead to a strongerinvolvement at the ambassadorial level and, thus, tostronger lobbying for removal of political obstacles toconservation. Finally, direct project monitoring by thecountry representation would speed up decision-mak-ing and thus lead to improved functional autonomy ofthe programme.

A further specific problem concerns enforcementoperations. The legally authorized personnel to conductenforcement operations in state forest land are rangersQagawana/Polisi Hutan) from the Department of Forestry(formerly the Department of Agriculture and Forestry),usually accompanied by an appointed police officer. Theteams must have funds for each operation. Thus, nofunds means no enforcement operation, and, as shownpreviously, no enforcement means no orang-utans. TheEC regulations prohibit re-allocation of their projectcontribution to finance enforcement. Funds from thegovernment, unfortunately, usually arrive severalmonths late in each financial year. For instance, noenforcement operations could be conducted aroundLeuser for the first six months of the financial years1999 and 2000 because of delays in the release ofgovernment funding. This was also a well-known fact toillegal loggers because of collusion. Consequently, theLMU could do nothing to stop major outbreaks of illegallogging of prime orang-utan habitat.

One long-term solution to this problem could be forthe designated management body, the Leuser Interna-tional Foundation, to be endowed with sufficient fundsfrom private donors to create an effective trust fund,which it then uses to work in partnership with thegovernment to help pre-finance any temporal shortfalls.The short-term solution is for the government toauthorize roll-over extensions to budgets.

As a result of special problems of law enforcement inAceh (see also Waspada, 02.03.2000), these measuresalone are unlikely to prevent the current large-scaleillegal logging in the Leuser region. Instead, thegovernment should consider establishing a specialarmed police unit attached to the management body(see Robertson & van Schaik, in press). In the shortterm, this requires authorization of part of the gov-ernment's contribution to the LDP from the state budgetto be channelled via the National Police Department.In the long term, this unit could be seconded to theLIF and all operational costs can be funded from

the trust fund, which international donors should helpestablish.

Recommendations

In this section, we make recommendations for actionsthat are vital for improving orang-utan conservation innorthern Sumatra. The review and analysis demonstratethat the major constraints on LDP's ability to conserveorang-utans are political rather than technical in nature.This by no means indicates that efforts to conserve theorang-utan are doomed to failure. On the contrary, wenote that Indonesia has made significant progress overthe last 2 years by any standards in history, going from32 years of military guidance to its first fully democrat-ically elected government, accompanied by major re-forms in all sectors. If these reforms were to continue intheir present course and the following recommendationsimplemented in full to allow the LDP to operateeffectively, we are optimistic that the Sumatran orang-utan's current collision course with extinction can beavoided (see scenario 1 in Fig. 4 of van Schaik et ah,2001). With an estimated 6500 orang-utans left inthe Leuser Ecosystem in 1999, and the current rate ofloss of 1000 individuals every year (van Schaik et ah,2001), we stress that there is little room for anyweakness in the political will to implement theserecommendations.

We start with those changes at the political level thatare well beyond the reach of any individual pro-gramme, but that would greatly facilitate orang-utanconservation by reducing corruption, improving trans-parency and accountability of all decisions involvingland use, and generate broad political support forconservation. These recommendations are limited tothose with the most immediate positive impact onorang-utan conservation:1. lobby the international community to make disburse-

ment of international development loans or grants toIndonesia (i.e. excluding humanitation aid) condition-al on preventing degradation of protected areas, asmonitored by local- and national-level NGOs;

2. lobby the Indonesian government for complete trans-parency of Forestry's regulations and decisions ('SK')by ensuring an on-line register is kept that can beconsulted by the public, in particular for applicationsconcerning proposed changes in land-use status;

3. lobby the international NGOs to support the capabil-ity of local NGOs to challenge in court, illegalactivities and proposals by local governments torelease protected areas for other forms of land use.Assuming that these political problems are resolved

and illegal threats to the Leuser Ecosystem are reduced,technical challenges remain to be met. The major

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priorities are (i) redesigning the national park toenhance its ability to protect the full biodiversity ofthe Leuser Ecosystem, including the orang-utans and(ii) restoration of habitat corridors to connect majorforest tracts important for orang-utans (see Robertson &van Schaik, in press). These activities are alreadyplanned by LDP, and deserve continued support ofthe Indonesian government, but the following actionsthat would strengthen conservation inside the LeuserEcosystem are also recommended to the government:

1. ensure sufficient funds are provided to prosecuteviolators of protected areas and thus establish clearlegal precedents;

2. ensure sufficient funds are provided for enforcementoperations, and in particular, overcome budget short-falls by authorizing roll-over extensions;

3. ensure that LMU/LIF must be consulted before anychanges to land-use status inside the Leuser Ecosys-tem are made, or logging concessions are renewed ortheir annual work plans are approved.In addition to these recommendations to allow the

LDP to operate effectively, we should also ensure thatthe long-term conservation of the region is supportedafter the end of the scheduled EC contribution to theprogramme in March 2003. This requires the followingmeasures:1. lobby the European Union to extend the LDP by a

substantial period to give more time for the pro-gramme to overcome the setbacks incurred duringthe period of political instability and thus reach itsobjectives;

2. lobby international donors to create a substantial trustfund for the LIF to support future managementactivities after the end of the EC's contribution tothe programme.

Acknowledgements

C.v.S. thanks the Wildlife Conservation Society forsustained funding of orang-utan work. We sincerelythank all staff of the LMU and colleagues who made realsacrifices to help conserve the Leuser Ecosystem and itsspectacular biodiversity. We are grateful to ElizabethPurastiti of the LMU for preparing the maps. The LMUis the implementing body of the Leuser DevelopmentProgramme, and is jointly funded by the EuropeanUnion and the Government of Indonesia. We believethat, without this programme, the processes leading tothe elimination of all viable populations of the Sumatranorang-utan would already be set in motion. The viewsexpressed in this article are those of the authors alone,and do not necessarily represent the views of anyinstitutions we are associated with. We dedicate thispaper to the memories of Sayed Mudahar, whose vision

was instrumental in establishing the programme, andIdrusman, naturalist, conservationist and close friend,killed in action.

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Biographical sketches

Dr Yarrow Robertson is co-ordinator of the ConservationManagement Division of the Leuser DevelopmentProgramme, Medan, Indonesia. He studied the Socioecologyof pigtalled macaques in Leuser for his PhD, and has beenco-ordinating conservation activities of the Leuser Manage-ment Unit with local communities and enforcementagenices for the past 4 years. He is a member of the IUCNSSC Asian Rhino Specialist Group, and affiliated with theWildlife Research Group, Department of Anatomy,Cambridge University, UK.

Dr Carel van Schaik is Professor of Biological, Anthropologyand Anatomy, and co-director of the Center for TropicalConservation, Duke University (Durham, NC, USA). Aresearch associate of the Wildlife Conservation Society inNew York, he has studied primate behavioural ecology, rainforest ecology and conservation policy, focussing on Leuser,for the past 23 years. He is a member of the IUCN PrimateSpecialist Group.

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