cases registration of votesrs

7/22/2019 Cases Registration of Votesrs

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for cancellation of COCs, on the ground of false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC,the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve theholding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.[29] The determination, therefore, madeby the COMELEC that Maruhoms Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration is void, isonly in accord with its explicit jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers. Furthermore, as aptlypointed out by Abinal and COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General ,[30]the 8 May 2007Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 21 August 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC enbancmerely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of herright to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao i s void, her registration in Marawi still

subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exerciseher right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.

Maruhom does not deny at all that she registered twice. However, Maruhom calls ourattention to the fact that on 30 December 2003, she made a written request to the election officer ofMarawi to cancel her registration therein as a voter. On 20 March 2007, she reiterated her request tothe same election officer. On 23 March 2007, she also informed the COMELEC Law Department of herrequest for cancellation of her registration in Marawi. Thus, the failure of the election officer of Marawi tocancel Maruhoms voter registration in said municipality, despite repeated requests, should not be takenagainst the latter.[31]

It is true that Maruhom did make several requests for the cancellation of her Marawiregistration, but without official action by the COMELEC thereon, they remain mere requests. Theycannot simply be deemed granted. We take note that Maruhoms first request for cancellation of her

Marawi registration was submitted on 30 December 2003, and her next request was made only on 20March 2007. Maruhom subsequently filed her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao on 28 March2007. Far from convincing us that she had exercised due diligence in having her Marawi registrationcancelled, we are more persuaded that Maruhom had not been assiduous in ensuring that her requestfor cancellation be acted upon by COMELEC. Maruhoms reiteration of her request for cancellation ofher Marawi registration on 20 March 2007, three years and three months since her first request, and justa week prior to the filing of her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao, reveals a harried attempt tocomply with the eligibility requirements for her candidacy than a sincere desire to right a wrong.COMELEC, thus, had more than enough basis to support its conclusion of Maruhom being a doubleregistrant whose subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void, rendering her unfit to run asmunicipal mayor therein.

Therefore, Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared therein

that she was a registered voter of Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the saidmunicipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her eligibility in her COC, especially sobecause the COC is filled up under oath.[32]An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires forelective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself.[33]

The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision/resolutionunless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion. Correctly understood,grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lackof jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion orpersonal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of apositive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all incontemplation of law.[34] Given our foregoing discussion, we find no capricious and whimsical exerciseof judgment on the part of the COMELEC in rendering the assailed Resolutions in SPA No. 07-093.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the instant Petition for Certiorariishereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and the

Resolution dated 21 August 2007 of the COMELEC En Bancin SPA No. 07-093, arehereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom.

SO ORDERED.
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Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personalfiling of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office ofthe Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, beconducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before aregular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELECbe accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.

The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among otherthings, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rulesand regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of Republic Act No.6646 (RA 6646)[4]and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA 8436)[5]authorize it to fix other dates forpre-election acts which include voter registration; and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows thatthe October 31, 2009 deadline of voter registration was impelled by operational and pragmaticconsiderations, citingAkbayan-Youth v. COMELEC[6]wherein the Court denied a similar prayer for anextension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of everyFilipino to choose the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent possible, inevery national and local election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law that i t devoted an entirearticle solely therefor:

ARTICLE V

SUFFRAGE

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens ofthe Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen yearsof age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and inthe place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediatelypreceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive requirementshall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing thesecrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by

qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and theilliterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall beallowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission onElections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power fromthe consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the Statepolicy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in thepeople and all government authority emanates from them,[7]bolstered by the recognition of the vital roleof the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public andcivic affairs.[8]

It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter registration

in Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personalfiling of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in theoffice of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) daysbefore a regular election and ninety (90) days before a specialelection. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices

hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a specialelection.

By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before aregular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL thenecessary preparations with respect to the coming elections including: (1) completion of projectprecincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and otherelection forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including thedetermination of the precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized VotersList; (4) supervision of the campaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution ofVoters Information Sheet. Such determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative

power, which this Court is bound to respect. And the COMELECs rule-making power should beexercised in accordance with the prevailing law .[9]
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Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates forpre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration under RA8189. This Courts primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed by theother. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against impliedrepeal. For Congress is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to enact inconsistentor conflicting statutes.[10]

Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC thepower to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the samecannot be reasonablyheld within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enablingthe people to exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 andRA 8436.

In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voterregistration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily duringoffice hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regularelections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or

deadlines therefor.

The present case differs significantly fromAkbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.[11]In said case, theCourt held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the thereinpetitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14,2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitiveperiod for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.

The Court in fact suggested inAkbayan-Youththat the therein petitioners could have, but had not,

registered during the period between the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC and beforethe start of the 120-day prohibitive period prior to the election date or January 13, 2001, thus:

[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and therecords are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed anapplication to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC norfiled a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or sheproceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the periodstarting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she wasdisallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application forregistration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the

registration deadline onDecember 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm viewthat petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the

continuing registration under R.A. 8189.[12] (emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

The clear import of the Courts pronouncement in Akbayan-Youth is that had the thereinpetitioners filed their petition and sought an extension date that was before the 120-day prohibitiveperiod, their prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case,as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension sought(until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legalimpediment to the extension prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared nulland void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010elections on October 31,2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters andholding the same until January 9, 2010. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
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Hence, this recourse.

On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Regional TrialCourt Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist from enforcing questioned decision.13

The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the Solicitor General into

(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S. 1992 andCase No. 92-03-42, the petition having been filed by one who did not allege to be himself a registeredvoter of the municipality concerned; and

(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the countryand abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the respondent Court andthe MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of any allegation in thepetition filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a registered voter in Precinct No. 9 of BarangayMalbog, Tolosa, Leyte conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code. 14

When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein petitionerRomualdez, the latter countered by filing his answer 15and praying for the denial of the petition, withoutraising the issue of jurisdiction. But what can be telling is that when the MTC decision, denying thepetition for disqualification, went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum,explicitlyprayed that the MTC decision be affirmed. This unassailable incident leads us to reiterate that"while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedingsbefore a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of

jurisdiction." 16Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of therespondent not only by his active participation in the proceedings thereat but, more importantly, in havingsought an affirmative relief himself when the appeal was made to the latter court whose jurisdiction he, ineffect, invoked. Furthermore, the question is not really as much the jurisdiction of the courts below asmerely the locus standiof the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that, at this stage, should be

considered foreclosed.

In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left thecountry and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for thepetitioner.

The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at thisstance given by the Solicitor General, respondent Advincula posits non sequiturargument 17in hiscomment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all, indisabusing the minds of those concerned, it may well be to recall what this Court said in Rubiovs.Sto.Tomas: 18

It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the Courtthe position that will legally uphold the best interest of the government, although itmay run counter to a client's position.

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only anintention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conductindicative of such intention." 19"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent forbusiness or pleasure, or for li ke reasons, one intends to return. 20That residence, in the case of the

petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residencethus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquirea new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) anintention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 21In other words, there mustbasically be animus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at thedomicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 22

The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused greatapprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of themembers of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would havesomehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot bedescribed as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are

used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."

We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the petitioner had,in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden dutyof every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensurethat the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed. 23We,therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort even all the way up to thisCourt, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it butonly on behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the

Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby REINSTATEDand the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly madePERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of privaterespondents ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[14]

The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. Theexercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described asintended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Earlier,this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete.Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunaland it remained as full, cl ear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral

Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the1987 Constitution.

Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition fordisqualification, and move for the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamationof private respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion was deniedbefore the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorariin this Court with a prayer for arestraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or (2) to file a petition for quowarrantoin the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamationof private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.[15]Obviously, neither of these remediescan be availed of now.

In any event, even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve the instant petitionfor certiorari, we find no merit in petitioners allegation that private respondent is ineligible for the office ofRepresentative of the Third District of Cagayan.

Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution states:

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippinesand, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-listrepresentatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of notless than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decisioninAquino v. COMELEC,[16]as follows:

. . . [T]he place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may

be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitutionrefers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from theusual conceptions of residency in law as explai ned in Gallego vs. Verais to exclude strangers or newcomersunfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existingin that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in agiven area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is toplace through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if acandidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviouslybest met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have beendomiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence fromGattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1) theaffidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St.,

Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease betweenprivate respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias

St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriagecertificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificateof live birth of private respondents second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to privaterespondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao,Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been aresident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit ofthis factual finding.

Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least untilJune 22, 1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his certificatesof candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voters registrationrecords, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that private respondent voted inGattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.

The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is notproof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino,[17]this Court held that theregistration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to haveabandoned or lost his residence.

Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in theelections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran. Underthe law,[18]what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any district or

municipality, one year before the election.

Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:[19]

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive indetermining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualificationrequirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberateattempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually aresident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for morethan seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July

1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would beconvenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province ofCagayan.

As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera,[20]in which thisCourt held: [W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusiveand it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted byupholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. In this case, consideringthe purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with theneeds and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified,having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election asRepresentative of that provinces Third District.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
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LUIS A. ASISTIO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, PresidingJudge, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 129;HON. ARTHUR O. MALABAGUIO, Presiding Judge,Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52;ENRICO R. ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of

Precinct 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City; and the CITYELECTION OFFICER, Caloocan City,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 191124

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 27, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION: NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1]for certiorari,with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order, under Rule65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Order[2]dated February 15, 2010 issued, allegedly with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, by public respondent Judge ThelmaCanlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre (Judge Aguirre) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, CaloocanCity in SCA No. 997.The petition likewise ascribes error in, and seeks to nullify, the decision datedFebruary 5, 2010, promulgated by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City inSCA No. 10-582.

The Antecedents

On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitionerLuis A. Asistio (Asistio) a Petition[3]for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of CaloocanCity (Petition for Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City. Public respondent Judge Arthur

O. Malabaguio (Judge Malabaguio) presides over MeTC Branch 52. The petition was docketed as SCA

No. 10-582, entitled Atty. Enrico R. Echiverri v. Luis Aquino Asistio, the Board of Election Inspectors ofPrecinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City and the City Election Officer of Caloocan.

In his petition, Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically notof 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate ofCandidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also acandidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/orCancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was aboutto furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a Certification[4]dated December 29, 2009issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangayof Barangay15Central, Zone 2, District II of CaloocanCity. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) forBarangay15,

Asistios name appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 LibisGochuico, Barangay15, Caloocan City.[5]

Echiverri also claimed that Asistio was no longer residing in this address, since whatappeared in the latters COC for Mayor[6]in the 2007 elections was No. 110 Unit 1, P. ZamoraSt., Barangay 15, Caloocan City,[7]but that the address used in Asistios current COC is situatedin Barangay17. He said that, per his verification, the voters[8]duly registered in the 2009 CVL using theaddress No. 123 P. Zamora St., Barangay17, Caloocan City did not include Asistio.[9]

On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing[10]notifying Asistio, through Atty.Carlos M. Caliwara, his counsel of record in SPA No. 09-151 (DC), entitled Asistio v. Echiverri, before

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), of the scheduled hearings of the case on February 1, 2 and3, 2010.

On February 2, 2010, Asistio filed his Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelamwith AffirmativeDefenses.[11]Asistio alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., CaloocanCity, and aregistered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in thecontract of lease with Angelina dela Torre Tengco (Tengco), which was 123 Interior P. ZamoraSt., Barangay 15, Caloocan City.[12]

Trial on the merits ensued, after which Judge Malabaguio directed the parties to file theirrespective position papers on or before February 4, 2010.

Echiverri filed his Memorandum[13]on February 4, 2010. Asistio, on the other hand, failed to file hismemorandum since the complete transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) were not yet available.[14]

On February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision,[15]disposing, as follows

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Election RegistrationBoard, Caloocan City is hereby directed to remove the name of LUIS AQUINO

ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Meanwhile, on January 26, 2010, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition forDisqualification,[17]which was docketed as SPA No. 10-013 (DC). The Petition was anchored on thegrounds that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and that he had been previously convicted of acrime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com

Memorandum),[18]

raised the same arguments with respect to his residency and also argued that thePresident of the Philippines granted him an absolute pardon.
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On February 10, 2010, Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal[19]and his Appeal (from the Decisiondated February 5, 2010)[20]and paid the required appeal fees through postal money orders.[21]

On February 11, 2010, Echiverri filed a Motion[22]to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did notacquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees.

On the scheduled hearing of February 15, 2010, Asistio opposed the Motion and manifested hisintention to file a written comment or opposition thereto. Judge Aguirre directed Echiverris counsel to filethe appropriate responsive pleading to Asistios appeal in her Order[23]of same date given in open court.

Judge Aguirre, however, cancelled her February 15, 2010 Order, and issued an AmendedOrder[24]on that date holding in abeyance the filing of the responsive pleading of Echiverris counsel andsubmitting the Motion for resolution.

In another Order also dated February 15, 2010, Judge Aguirre granted the Motion on the groundof non-payment of docket fees essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. It stated that

Asistio paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 per the Official Receipt of the MeTC, Office of theClerk of Court.

Hence, this petition.

Per Resolution[25]dated February 23, 2010, this Court required the respondents to commenton the petition, and issued the Status Quo AnteOrder prayed for.

On March, 8, 2010, Echiverri filed his Comment to the Petition (with Motion to Quash StatusQuo Ante Order). Departing from Echiverris position against the Petition, the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG), on March 30, 2010, filed its Comment via registered mail. The OSG points out that

Asistios family is known to be one of the prominent political families inCaloocanCity, and that there isno indication whatsoever that [Asistio] has ever intended to abandon his domicile, Caloocan City.Further, the OSG proposes that the issue at hand is better resolved by the people of Caloocan City. Inall, the OSG propounds that technicalities and procedural niceties should bow to the sovereign will of thepeople of Caloocan City.

Our Ruling

In her assailed Order, Judge Aguirre found

The payment of docket fees is an essential requirement for theperfection of an appeal.

The record shows that Respondent-Appellant paid his docket fee onlyon February 11, 2010, evidenced by O.R. No. 05247240 for Php1,510.00 at theMetropolitan Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, yet the Notice of Appeal wasfiled on February 10, 2010, at 5:30 p.m., which is way beyond the official officehours, and a copy thereof was filed at the Office of the Clerk of Court, MetropolitanTrial Court at 5:00 p.m. of February 10, 2010. Thus, it is clear that the docket feewas not paid simultaneously with the fil ing of the Notice of Appeal.

It taxes the credulity of the Court why the Notice of Appeal was filedbeyond the regular office hours, and why did respondent-appellant had to resort to

paying the docket fee at the Mall of Asia when he can conveniently pay it at theOffice of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court along with the filing of the

Notice of Appeal on February 10, 2010 at 5:30 p.m. at the Metropolitan Trial Court,which is passed [sic] the regular office hours.

The conclusion is then inescapable that for failure to pay the appellatedocket fee, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.[26]

This Court observes, that while Judge Aguirre declares in her Order that the appellate docket feeswere paid on February 11, 2010, she conveniently omits to mention that the postal money ordersobtained by Asistio for the purpose were purchased on February 10, 2010.[27]It is noteworthy that, asearly as February 4, 2010, Asistio already manifested that he could not properly file his memorandumwith the MeTC due to the non-availability of the TSNs. Obviously, these TSNs were needed in order toprepare an intelligent appeal from the questioned February 5, 2010 MeTC Order. Asistio was able to getcopies of the TSNs only on February 10, 2010, the last day to file his appeal, and, naturally, it would takesome time for him to review and incorporate them in his arguments on appeal. Understandably, Asistiofiled his notice of appeal and appeal, and purchased the postal money orders in payment of the appealfees on the same day. To our mind, Asistio, by purchasing the postal money orders for the purpose ofpaying the appellate docket fees on February 10, 2010, although they were tendered to the MeTC onlyon February 11, 2010, had already substantially complied with the procedural requirements in filing hisappeal.

This appeal to the RTC assails the February 5, 2010 MeTC Order directing Asistios name to beremoved from the permanent list of voters [in Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City. The Order, ifimplemented, would deprive Asistio of his right to vote.

The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen,enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government to ensure that it can truly be saidto derive its power solely from the consent of its constituents .[28]Time and again, it has been said thatevery Filipinos right to vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect.[29]A citizen cannot bedisenfranchised for the flimsiest of reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear andconvincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom.

In this case, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that the appellate docket fees werenot filed on time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution of theinstant case on substantial grounds. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result offrustrating and nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.[30]

On more than one occasion, this Court has recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal

construction of procedural rules to serve substantial justice. Courts have the prerogative to relax rules ofeven the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily endlitigation and the parties right to due process.

It is true that, faced with an appeal, the court has the discretion whether to dismiss it or not.However, this discretion must be sound; it is to be exercised pursuant to the tenets of justice, fair playand equity, in consideration of the ci rcumstances obtaining in each case. Thus, dismissal of appeals onpurely technical grounds is frowned upon as the policy of the Court is to encourage resolution of caseson their merits over the very rigid and technical application of rules of procedure used only to helpsecure, not override, substantial justice. Verily, it is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse atechnical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of it on atechnicality that would cause grave injustice to the parties.[31]

The primordial issue in this case is whether Asistio should be excluded from the permanentlist of voters of [Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law.
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Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang881) states:

SECTION 117. Qualifications of a voter.Every citizen of thePhilippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, whoshall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipalitywherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding theelection, may be registered as a voter.

Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality orcountry solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private orpublic service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; servicein the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; orconfinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shallbe deemed not to have lost his original residence.

This provision is echoed in Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189), towit:

SEC. 9.Who May Register.All citizens of the Philippines nototherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age and whoshall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the placewherein they propose to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding theelection, may register as a voter.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality orcountry solely by reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private orpublic service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservationswithin the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the NationalPolice Force, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordancewith law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

Any person who, on the day of registration may not have reached therequired age or period of residence but who, on the day of election shall possesssuch qualifications, may register as a voter.

From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residencein the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.

Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, isdoctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but alsopersonal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention[32]inferable from apersons acts, activities, and utterances.[33]Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, whenabsent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.[34]In the consideration ofcircumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that aperson must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new oneis acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.[35]

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate:(1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fideintention of abandoning the former place of

residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose .[36]

There mustbe animus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of

choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and theresidence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.[37]

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years.His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio servedin public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, havingbeen elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election asCity Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstancesinto consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistiohas qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he hasestablished domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residencein Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No.1811A, Barangay15, Caloocan City.

That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in theaddress he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter ofCaloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for anelection offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) ,[38]or an action to deny due course to the

COC.[39]

But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicilein Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City.

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated February 15, 2010 of theRegional Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City in SCA No. 997 and the decision dated February 5,2010 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan City in SCA No. 10-582are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.Petitioner Luis A. Asistio remains a registered voter of Precinct No.1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on February 23,

2010 is MADE PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 188671 February 24, 2010

MOZART P. PANLAQUI,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NARDO M. VELASCO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition is one for certiorari.

Petitioner Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui) assails the Commission on Elections (Comelec) EnBancResolution of June 17, 2009 denying his motion for proclamation, which he filed after t his Courtaffirmed in G.R. No. 1800511the nullification of the proclamation of private respondent Nardo Velasco(Velasco) as mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga.

Velasco was born in Sasmuan on June 22, 1952 to Filipino parents. He married Evelyn Castillo on June29, 1975. In 1983, he moved to the United States where he subsequently became a citizen.

Upon Velascos application for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 92252was approved on July 31,2006, he took on even date his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and returned to thePhilippines on September 14, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, which application wasdenied by the Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition for the inclusion of his name inthe list of voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan which, by Decision of February 9,2007, reversed the ERBs decision andordered his inclusion in the list of voters of Sasmuan.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by Decision of March 1, 2007,reversed3the MTC Decision, drawing Velasco to elevate the matter via Rule 42 to the Court of Appealswhich, by Amended Decision4of August 19, 2008, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In the meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor ofSasmuan, therein claiming his status as a registered voter. Panlaqui, who vied for the same position,thereupon filed before the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velascos COCbased on gross material misrepresentation as to his residency and, consequently, his qualification tovote.

In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of Sasmuan. As the Comelecfailed to resolve Panlaquis petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumedthe duties of the office.

Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec cancelled his COC and nullifiedhis proclamation, by Resolutions of July 6, 2007 and October 15, 2007, which this Court affirmed in G.R.No. 180051.

Panlaqui thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec denied by the assailedResolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does not operate in favor of Panlaqui as the secondplacer because Velasco was not disqualified by final judgment before election day.

Hence, the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec for notregarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final judgment of disqualification against Velasco priorto the elections, so as to fall within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on Elections5on the exception tothe doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.

Velasco filed his Comment of September 18, 2009 with motion to consolidate the present case with G.R.No. 189336, his petition challenging the Comelecs September 8, 2009 Order which directed him tovacate his mayoralty post for the incumbent vice-mayor to assume office as mayor. A perusal of therecords of the petition shows, however, that it had already been dismissed by the Court by Resolution ofOctober 6, 2009.6

In his present petition, Panlaqui implores this Court to apply in his favor the case of Cayat where theCourt affirmed, inter alia, the Comelec Order directing the proclamation of the second placer as Mayor ofBuguias, Benguet in this wise:

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palilengs proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayats certificate ofcandidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004when Cayat failed topay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palil eng was the onlycandidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the10 May 2004 elections. Twentythree days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final

judgmentto run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not asecond placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine onthe rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the presentcase because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palilengs proclamationas Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the secondplacer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case,if two conditionsconcur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualificationremained pending on election day,

10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in theelections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only aftertheelections.7(emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Repackaging the present petition in Cayats fashion, Panlaqui asserts that the RTC March 1, 2007Decision in the voters i nclusion proceedings must be considered as the final judgment of disqualificationagainst Velasco, which decision was issued more than two months prior to the elections. Panlaqui positsthat when Velascos petition for inclusion was denied, he was also declared as disqualified to run forpublic office.

Unwrapping the present petition, the Court finds that the true color of the issue of distinction between apetition for inclusion of voters in the list and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate ofcandidacy has already been defined in Velasco v. Commission on Elections8where the Court held that

the two proceedings may ultimately have common factual bases but they are poles apart in terms of theissues, reliefs and remedies involved, thus:
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[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1301. July 30, 2002]

CIRILO I. MERCADO, ARSENIO L. CARPIO, PEDRO V. SORIANO and FLORDELIZA C.ALEJO, complainants, vs.JUDGE HECTOR F. DYSANGCO, IN HIS CAPACITY ASACTING JUDGE OF 2nd MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, GEN. NATIVIDAD -LLANERA AND TERESITA S. ESTEBAN, CLERK OF COURT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In an election, one vote can spell the difference between victory and defeat. Trial judges are,therefore, advised to exercise caution in granting petitions for inclusion of voters. Fealty to theprocedures outlined in the Omnibus Election Code is imperative, lest not only the integrity of the judiciarybut also that of the election process would be undermined.

In a sworn complaint[1]dated May 29, 1997, complainants Flordeliza C. Alejo, Arsenio L. Carpio,Cirilo I. Mercado, and Pedro V. Soriano charged Judge Hector F. Dysangco, Acting Presiding Judge ofthe 2ndMunicipal Circuit Trial Court of Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, and Teresita S. Esteban, Clerk ofCourt of the same court, with grave misconduct.

The complainants alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, forty-eight (48)persons filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list.Of these forty-eight(48) petitioners, nine (9) were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while thirty-nine (39) weresupporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales. Mercado and Gonzales were candidates for theposition of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija. Consequently, Mercado andthe other complainants filed an opposition to the petition of the thirty-nine (39) supporters of Gonzales.

The hearings of the petitions were set on April 17, April 28, May 6, May 8, and May 9, 1997. Thefirst three scheduled hearings were cancelled due to the absence of either respondent judge orpetitioners counsel. The May 8 hearing proceeded but only the nine (9) petitioners supportingcomplainant Mercado presented their evidence. The thirty-nine (39) petitioners supporting Gonzalesrequested the postponement of the hearing to May 9. However, on that day, those petitioners and theircounsel failed to appear in court. Thus, respondent judge dismissed their petitions in open court.

On May 10 (Saturday), respondent judge, when approached by herein complainants, assuredthem that he did not issue any order for the inclusion of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners in the voters list ofBarangay Kabulihan.

However, on the day of the election, complainants were surprised to find thirty-four (34) of thethirty-nine (39) petitioners with an Order signed by respondent judge and attested by respondent clerk ofcourt,[2]directing their inclusion in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan.

Complainants averred that the issuance of the Order by respondent judge was highly anomalous,illegal, and patently of dubious origin because not one of the thirty -nine (39) petitioners presentedevidence or appeared in the scheduled hearings. Respondents, therefore, aided and abetted thirty -four(34) flying voters in violating the Election Laws and in influencing the result of the Barangay Elections inKabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija.

Respondents filed separate comments on the complaint.

Respondent judge denied committing any anomaly in ordering the inclusion of the thirtyfour (34)petitioners in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. He explained that his Order was based on hisinterviews with those petitioners,[3]who registered as voters in the said barangay during the registrationon June 14-15 and 21-22, 1997, per Certification issued by the Office of the Election Officer.[4]

In her comment, respondent clerk of court denied any hand in the issuance of the questionedOrder, asserting that it was respondent judges official and personal act. She claimed that, as a mereclerk of court, she could not coerce respondent judge into issuing the Order. Moreover, she did not haveany personal reason or motive in aiding the thirty-four (34) petitioners. Lastly, she invoked thepresumption of regularity in the performance of her duties as clerk of court and prayed for the dismissal

of the complaint against her.[5]

In a Memorandum[6]dated March 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator foundrespondents comments unsatisfactory. Thus, on April 21, 1999, this Court resolved to refer the case tothe Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, for investigation, report andrecommendation .[7]

On January 3, 2000, Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay submitted the following findings andrecommendation:

in the memorandum of respondent Judge Hector F. Dysangco, he admitted that he conducted merelypersonal interviews, he did not categorically state as to whether during his interviews, the counsel for thepetitioners as well as the counsel for the oppositors were present. Likewise, the respondent TeresitaEsteban admitted that the thirty-four (34) petitioners for inclusion were included and all owed to vote

merely on the strength of interview conducted by Judge Hector F. Dysangco and that there was nohearing conducted. Considering, however, that Atty. Ambrosio Matias, Jr. appeared for the thirty-nine(39) petitioners for inclusion and Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba appeared for the oppositors, fair play requires thatduring the interview of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners at least this (sic) two (2) counsel must have beenpresent which, however, as admitted by the Clerk of Court, Teresita S. Esteban, they were not present.Such failure to wait for Attys. Ambrosio Matias, Jr. and Ellis F. Jacoba, as in fact, they were both absentwhen the interviews were conducted by the Municipal Judge, is a conduct which should have beenavoided if a fair hearing should have been afforded the two (2) lawyers. Such act of the respondentJudge is not only reprehensible, but also denial of due process.

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , recommendation is hereby made that for the said act of respondentJudge Hector F. Dysangco, he should be meted a fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS withwarning that a repetition of the same wil l be dealt with more severely. On the part of respondent TeresitaS. Esteban, she must be reprimanded and warned that she should be more careful in her actuation andshe should act strictly in accordance with her duties as stated in her job description.[8]

In his Memorandum dated October 12, 2000, the Court Administrator found that respondentjudge, in issuing the questioned Order, committed a lapse and recommended that he be fined in theamount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offensewill be dealt with more severely. The Court Administrator further recommended that the complaintagainst respondent clerk of court be dismissed for lack of merit. Thus:

In order that a j udge may be held liable for serious misconduct, there must be reliable evidence showing

that the judicial acts complained for were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were inpersistent disregard of well-known legal rules (Ang Kek Chen vs. Judge Amalia Andrade, A.M. No. RTJ-
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99-1504, November 16, 1999). The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error ofjudgment. In the instant case, complainants failed to present evidence to show that respondents actedwith corrupt and malicious intent to violate the law so as to warrant the imposition of penalty of dismissalfor grave misconduct.

However, we concur with the observations of Executive Judge Ballutay that there appears to be alapse in according herein complainant her right to due process when respondent judgeinterviewed the thirty-four (34) petitioners in the absence of counsels of both parties, sans aformal hearing. As to the liability of respondent Clerk of Court, this was not sufficiently established

either in the complaint or the report of the investigating judge.[9]

(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, on February 11, 2002, this Court dismissed the complaint against respondent Clerkof Court Teresita S. Esteban.[10]

We find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct constitutingviolation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, asamended.[11]

Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,explicitly lays down the procedure governing petitions for inclusion, exclusion, and correction of namesof voters, thus:

SEC. 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and

correction of names of voters. --

(a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of votersshall be received.

(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state theplace, day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending acopy thereof by registered mail or by personal delivery or by leaving it in the possession of a person ofsufficient discretion in the residence of the said person or, in the event that the foregoing procedure isnot practicable, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in twoother conspicuous places within the city or municipality, at least ten days prior to the day set for thehearing.

In the interest of justice and to afford the challenged voter every opportunity to contest the petition forexclusion, the court concerned may, when the challenged voter fails to appear in the first day set for thehearing, order that notice be effected in such manner and within such period of time as it may decide,which time shall in no case be more than ten days from the day the respondent is first found in default.

(c) Each petition shall refer to only one precinct.

(d) No costs shall be assessed in these proceedings. However, if the court should be satisfied that theapplication has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the adverse party and causing him to incurexpenses, it may condemn the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.

(e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and present hisevidence.

(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the question is whether or not thevoter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidencethat the registered voter is fictitious. In no case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation of facts.

(g)These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The decision shall be renderedwithin six hours after the hearing and within ten days from the date of its filing in court.Casesappealed to the regional trial court shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal in theoffice of the clerk of court. In any case, the court shall decide these petitions not later than the daybefore the election and the decision rendered thereon shall be immediately final and executory,

notwithstanding the provision of Section 138 on the finality of decisions. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis of theevidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to render a decision within 10 days from thefiling of the petition. Respondent judge, unfortunately, does not know the above legal provisions.

He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He could not have doneso. Extant in the record is the fact that the thirty-nine (39) petitioners failed to attend any of thescheduled hearings. How then could they present evidence?

Respondent judge claimed that he personally interviewed the thirty-four (34) petitioners on April25, 1997 and that this was the basis of his Order. We are hard put to treat such personal interview ascorresponding to the hearing required by law.A hearing means that a party is given the chance toadduce evidence to support his side of the case.[12]The minutes of the interview merely show that it is a

superficial and mechanical inquiry on each petitioners age, citizenship, residence and years ofresidence in Barangay Kabulihan. The petitioners were not required to swear under oath or topresent proof of their residence.[13]Their lawyers were not even notified.These incidents renderthe bare assertions of the thirty-four ( 34) petitioners doubtful and unreliable.

Significantly, despite respondent judges allegation that the petition for inclusion was set forhearing on April 25, no notice of hearing was sent to the parties and their counsel. This was affirmed byBonifacia C. Barcancel, the court stenographer, during the investigation conducted by Executive JudgeBallutay, thus:

Court:

x x x x x x

Q So, actually here as per record of the case there was no notice to their lawyer, there was

no notice to the counsels, to the oppositors as well as counsel for the oppositors?

A Yes, Your Honor, no notice.

Q So, what happened was just a moro-moro?

x x x x x x

Q It was just like this. It was

cases registration of votesrs

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