G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995

HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner, vs.HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The determination of whether  the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, 1 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of   1989,   has   been   divested   of   his   authority   to   conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, 2 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition.

The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14. 3

Parenthetically,   Deputy   Ombudsman   for   the   Visayas   Arturo Mojica  assumed   the office of   Juan  Hagad,  now resigned, 4 who took   the   initiative   in   instituting   this   special   civil   action for certiorari and prohibition.

The   controversy   stemmed   from   the   filing   of   criminal   and administrative   complaints,   on   22   July   1992,   against   herein respondents Mayor  Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and   Sangguniang  Panlungsod  Member  Rafael  Mayol,   all   public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having   violated  R.A.  No.   3019,   as   amended, 5 Articles   170 6 and 171 7 of  the Revised Penal  Code;  and R.A.  No.  6713. 8Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy,   had   caused   the   alteration   and/or   falsification   of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein   from P3,494,364.57  to P7,000,000.00  without  authority from   the   Sangguniang   Panlungsod   of   Mandaue   City.   The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.

A day  after  the  filing  of   the  complaints,  or  on 23  July  1992,  a sworn   statement   was   executed   by   Mandaue   City   Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against   respondent   officials.   The   next   day,   petitioner   ordered 

respondents,   including  Acting Mandaue City  Treasurer   Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive  suspension  of   respondent  officials   in   the   separately docketed administrative case.

Aside   from   opposing   the   motion   for   preventive   suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was   bereft   of   jurisdiction   to   try,   hear   and   decide   the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as   to effect   their  preventive suspension,  had now been vested with the Office of the President.

In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed,   abrogated   or   otherwise   modified   the   pertinent provisions  of   the  Constitution granting  to  the Ombudsman  the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any   case,   the   power   of   the   Ombudsman   to   investigate   local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.

During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties  were  directed  by   the  Deputy  Ombudsman   to  file   their respective memoranda.

In   his   memorandum,   Mayor   Ouano   reiterated   that,   under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective   official   of   a   province,   a   highly   urbanized   city   or   an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the   provision   of   the   Constitution   giving   to   the   Office   of   the Ombudsman superior  powers  than those of  the President over elective officials of local governments.

In an Order, 9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order 11 of 21 September 1992.

On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of 

Mandaue   City.   Acting   favorably   on   the   pleas   of   petitioning officials,   respondent   Judge   issued,  on  even  date,   a   restraining order directed at petitioner,  enjoining him ".  .   .   from enforcing and/or   implementing   the   questioned   order   of   preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied the motion to dismiss and   issued  an  Order   for   the   issuance  of   a  writ   of   preliminary injunction, holding thusly: 

So   by   following   and   applying   the   well-established rules  of  statutory  construction that   endeavor   should   be   made   to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that each shall be effective, it is the finding   of   this   Court   that   since   the investigatory  power  of  the Ombudsman is so   general,   broad   and   vague   and   gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose   administrative   sanctions   against   a responsible   public   official   or   employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government  Code  provides   for  more  well defined and specific grounds upon which a local   elective   official   can   be   subjected   to administrative   disciplinary   action,   that   it Could   be   considered   that   the   latter   law could be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct   an   investigation   against   local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against   local   elective   officials   is   already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE,   foregoing   premises considered, Order is hereby issued:

1)   Expanding   the   restraining   order   dated September   25,   1992   issued   by   the   Court into an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary  injunction upon the posting of the petitioners of the bond in the amount of   Fifty   thousand   pesos   (P50,000.00) conditioned that the  latter will  pay all  the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court will 

finally adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto, and

2)   Denying   the   respondent's   Motion   to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 12

A   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   was   issued   on   21   October 1992. 13 A  motion   for   reconsideration  made   by   petitioner  was denied by the trial court.

The  instant   recourse   seeks   the  nullification  of   the  order  of  15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 both  issued by the  trial  court  and prays   that   respondent judge be directed to desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.

There is merit in the petition.

The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution, 14 thus:

Sec.   13.   The  Office   of   the  Ombudsman   shall have   the   following   powers,   functions,   and duties:

(1)  Investigate on its own, or on complaint  by any person,  any act or omission of  any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act   or   omission   appears   to  be   illegal,   unjust, improper, or inefficient;

while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:

Sec.   19.   Administrative   complaints.   —   The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2.   Are   unreasonable,   unfair,   oppressive   or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's   functions,   though   in   accordance  with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could  be  subject   to   the  disciplinary  authority  of   the Ombudsman, viz.:

Sec.   21.   Officials   Subject   to   Disciplinary Authority;  Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman   shall   have   disciplinary authority   over   all   elective   and   appointive officials   of   the   Government   and   its subdivisions,   instrumentalities   and agencies,   including   Members   of   the Cabinet, local government,   government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries  except  over officials  who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members   of   Congress,   and   the   Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner   thus   contends   that   the   Office   of   the Ombudsman   correspondingly   has   the   authority   to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:

Sec.   24.   Preventive   Suspension.   —   The Ombudsman   or   his   Deputy   may preventively   suspend   any   officer   or employee   under  his   authority  pending   an investigation,   if   in   his   judgment,   the evidence   of   guilt   is   strong,   and   (a)   the charge   against   such   officer   or   employee involves   dishonesty,   oppression   or   grave misconduct  or neglect   in  the performance of   duty;   (b)   the   charges   would   warrant removal   from   the   service;   or   (c)   the respondent's   continued  stay   in  office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The   preventive   suspension   shall   continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the   Ombudsman   but   not   more   than   six months,   without   pay,   except   when   the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office   of   the   Ombudsman   is   due   to   the fault,   negligence   or   petition   of   the respondent,   in  which   case   the   period   of such   delay   shall   not   be   counted   in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondent   officials,   upon   the   other   hand,   argue   that   the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to   investigate   administrative   charges,   listed   under   Section 60 15 thereof,   on   various   offices.   In   the   case   specifically   of complaints   against   elective   officials   of   provinces   and   highly urbanized cities, the Code states:

Sec.  61.  Form and Filing of  Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any   erring   local   elective   officials   shall   be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of  a  province,  a  highly  urbanized  city,   an independent component city or component city shall  be filed before the Office of  the President.

Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can   only   be   imposed  by:   ".   .   .   the  President   if   the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an  independent component city;   .   .   .   " under sub-paragraph (b) thereof:

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at   any   time   after   the   issues   are   joined, when  the  evidence  of  guilt   is   strong,   and given   the   gravity   of   the  offense,   there   is great   probability   that   the   continuance   in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity   of   the   records   and   other evidence; Provided,   That,   any   single preventive   suspension   of   local   elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further,   That   in   the   event that   several   administrative   cases  are  filed against   an   elective   official,   he   cannot   be 

preventively   suspended   for   more   than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same   ground   or   grounds   existing   and known at the time of the first suspension.

In his comment,  which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local  Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested   under   R.A.   6770   conformably   with   a   constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate   remedy   that   should   have   been   pursued   by respondent  officials   is  a  petition  for certiorari before   this   Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions   of   the   Ombudsman   Act.   The   two   statutes   on   the specific  matter   in   question   are   not   so   inconsistent,   let   alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the   other   .  Well   settled   is   the   rule   that   repeals   of   laws   by implication   are   not   favored, 16 and   that   courts   must   generally assume   their   congruent   application. 17 The   two   laws   must   be absolutely   incompatible, 18 and   a   clear   finding   thereof   must surface,   before   the   inference   of   implied   repeal   may   be drawn. 19 The   rule   is   expressed   in   the   maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,   every   statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of  jurisprudence. 20 The fundament  is that   the   legislature   should   be   presumed   to   have   known   the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. 21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,22 and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23

Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." 24

Quite   interestingly,   Sections   61   and   63   of   the   present   Local Government  Code run almost  parallel  with  the provisions  then existing  under   the  old  code.  Section 61  and  Section 63  of   the precursor local Government Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:

Sec.   61.   Form   and   Filing   of   Complaints.   — Verified complaints against local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:

(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local Government.

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be  imposed by the  Minister  of Local   Government   if   the   respondent   is   a provincial   or   city   official,   by   the   provincial governor   if   the   respondent   is   an   elective municipal   official,   or   by   the   city   or  municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after   the  issues  are  joined,  when  there   is reasonable   ground   to   believe   that   the respondent   has   committed   the   act   or   acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is   strong,  when   the   gravity   of   the   offense   so warrants,  or  when the continuance  in  office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records   and   other   evidence.   In   all   cases, preventive  suspension  shall  not  extend  beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official   shall   be   deemed   reinstated   in   office without   prejudice   to   the   continuation   of   the proceedings   against   him   until   its   termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case  is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time   of   the   delay   shall   not   be   counted   in computing the time of suspension.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and   to   impose   preventive   suspension   over   elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the   Minister   of   Local   Government   until   it   became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification   being   only   in   the   substitution   of   the Secretary  (the  Minister)  of  Local  Government by the Office of the President.

Respondent  local  officials contend that  the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is   much   too   repugnant   to   the   60-day   preventive   suspension provided by Section 63 of  the Local  Government Code to even now   maintain   its   application.   The   two   provisions   govern differently.   In   order   to   justify   the   preventive   suspension   of   a 

public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee   should   involve   dishonesty,   oppression   or   grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued  stay   in  office  would  prejudice   the  case  filed  against him.   The   Ombudsman   can   impose   the   6-month   preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under  investigation. Upon the other hand,  in  imposing the   shorter  period  of   sixty   (60)  days  of  preventive  suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that  (a)  there  is  reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence   the   witnesses   or   pose   a   threat   to   the   safety   and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Respondent   officials,   nevertheless,   claim   that   petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.

The   contention   is   without   merit.   The   records   reveal   that petitioner   issued   the  order  of   preventive   suspension  after   the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for   preventive   suspension   and   (b)   by   Mayor   Ouano   of   his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as  it may, we have heretofore held that, not being  in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official  under   investigation  after  charges  are  brought  and even before   the   charges   are   heard.   Naturally,   such a preventivesuspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence.   In   the   early   case   of Nera vs. Garcia, 26 reiterated   in subsequent cases, 27 we have said:

In   connection   with   the   suspension   of petitioner before he could file his answer to the   administrative   complaint,   suffice   it   to say   that   the   suspension   was   not   a punishment   or   penalty   for   the   acts   of dishonesty   and  misconduct   in   office,   but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a   preliminary   step   in   an   administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges   are   established   and   the   person investigated   is   found   guilty   of   acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This  is  the penalty. There  is, therefore, nothing  improper  in suspending an   officer   pending   his   investigation   and before   the  charges  against  him are  heard and be given an opportunity   to  prove his innocence.

Moreover,   respondent   officials  were,   in   point   of   fact,   put   on preventive   suspension   only   after   petitioner   had   found,   in consonance  with   our   ruling   in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 28 that   the evidence of guilt was strong. Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:

After  a  careful  and honest  scrutiny of  the evidence submitted on record, at this stage, it   is   the   holding   of   this   office   that   the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the   instant   case   is   strong.   There   is   no question   that   the   charge   against   the respondents   involves   dishonesty   or   gross misconduct   which   would   warrant   their removal   from the  service  and  there   is  no gainsaying   the   fact   that   the   charge   for falsification of veritable documents like city ordinances   are   very   serious   charges   that affect   the   very   foundations   of   duly established   representative   governments. Finally,   it   is   likewise   the   holding   of   this office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the judicious investigation and resolution of the instant case. 29

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that   respondent   official's   petition   for   prohibition,   being   an application   for   remedy   against   the   findings   of   petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads:

Sec.   14.   Restrictions.   —   No   writ   of injunction shall  be   issued by any court   to delay  an  investigation being conducted by the   Ombudsman   under   this   Act,   unless there   is   a prima facie evidence   that   the subject   matter   of   the   investigation   is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No   court   shall   hear   any   appeal   or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Likewise  noteworthy   is   Section  27  of   the   law which prescribes a direct  recourse to this Court  on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .

In   all   administrative   disciplinary   cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme   Court   by   filing   a   petition for certiorari within   ten   (10)   days   from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45   of   the   Rules   of   Court.   (Emphasis supplied)

All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October  1992   is  ANNULLED and  SET  ASIDE,  and  RTC  Case  No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700Petitioner,- versus - ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. July 23, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case  This is a petition for review[1] of the 8 May 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528 setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the 21 September 2004 Decision[3] of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H. The Antecedent FactsOn   26   August   2003,   the   Ombudsman   in   Visayas   received   a complaint[4] for   abuse   of   authority,   dishonesty,   oppression, misconduct   in   office,   and   neglect   of   duty   against   Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in   Brgy.   Sto.   Rosario,   Binalbagan, Negros   Occidental. On   1   September   2003,   the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint[5] against Rodriguez for abuse of   authority,   dishonesty,   oppression,  misconduct   in  office,   and neglect of duty.

In   its   8   September   2003   notice,[6] the municipal   vice-mayor required  Rodriguez   to   submit  his   answer  within  15  days   from receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed a motion  to dismiss[7] the  case  filed   in   the sangguniang bayan on the ground that  the  allegations  in   the complaint  were  without factual   basis  and  did  not   constitute   any  violation  of   law.   In  a compliance[8] dated   22   October   2003,   Rodriguez   alleged complainants violated the rule against forum shopping.

Meanwhile,   in   its  10 September  2003 order,[9] the Ombudsman required   Rodriguez   to   file   his   answer.   Rodriguez   filed   on   24 October   2003   a   motion   to   dismiss[10] the   case   filed   in   the Ombudsman   on   the   grounds   of litis pendentia and   forum shopping.   He   alleged   that   the sangguniang bayan had   already acquired   jurisdiction   over   his   person   as   early   as   8   September 2003. The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3 October 2003.[11] Since complainants had no counsel, the hearing was reset to   a   later   date.  When   the   case  was   called   again   for   hearing, complainants counsel manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the administrative  complaint  filed  in  the sangguniang bayan. On  29  October   2003,   complainants   filed   a  motion[12] to withdraw   the   complaint   lodged   in   the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping, not on the   ground   complainants   stated.   In   their   opposition,[14]complainants   admitted   they   violated   the   rule   against   forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in the sangguniang bayan without the assistance of counsel. In his 4 November 2003 Resolution,[15] the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.

 In   its   29   January  2004 order,[16] the  Ombudsman  directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion   to   dismiss.[17] In   its   11   March   2004   order,[18] the Ombudsman  stated  that  a  motion  to dismiss  was  a  prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its order for Rodriguez to file his position paper. In   his   position   paper,   Rodriguez   insisted   that   the sangguniang bayan still  continued to exercise  jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received any resolution or   decision   dismissing   the   complaint   filed   in   the sangguniang bayan. In   reply,[19] complainants  maintained  there  was no more complaint pending in thesangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez   averred   that   the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed it. The Ruling of the Ombudsman In   its   21   September   2004   Decision,[21] the   Ombudsman   found Rodriguez   guilty   of   dishonesty   and   oppression.   It   imposed   on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to hold public office, and forfeiture of   civil   service   eligibilities.   Rodriguez   filed   a   motion   for reconsideration.[22] In   its   12   January   2005   Order,[23] the Ombudsman   denied   the   motion   for   reconsideration.   In   its   8 March   2005   Order,[24] the   Ombudsman   directed   the  mayor   of Binalbagan,   Negros   Occidental   to   implement   the   penalty   of dismissal against Rodriguez. Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its 8 May 2006 Decision,[25] the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to   proceed   with   the   hearing   on   the administrative   case.   The   appellate   court   reasoned   that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the person  of  Rodriguez   to   the  exclusion  of   the  Ombudsman.   The Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, to wit: 

Sec.   4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired.   The court  shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent   by   the   service   on   him   of   its order   or   resolution   indicating   its   initial action on the petition or  by his  voluntary submission to such jurisdiction   

The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on Rodriguez a  notice,   requiring the  latter  to file an answer,  on 8 September 2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10 September 2003. Petitioner   Ombudsman   contends   that   upon   the   filing   of   a complaint before a body vested with jurisdiction, that body has taken   cognizance  of   the  complaint.   Petitioner   cites  Blacks   Law Dictionary in defining what to take cognizance means to wit, to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner points out it had taken   cognizance  of   the   complaint   against  Rodriguez  before   a similar complaint was filed in the sangguniang bayan against the same  respondent.  Petitioner  maintains   summons  or  notices do not operate to vest in the disciplining body jurisdiction over the person  of   the   respondent   in  an  administrative  case.  Petitioner concludes that consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the   Ombudsmans   exercise   of   jurisdiction   should   be   to   the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.

Private   respondent   Rolson   Rodriguez   counters   that   when   a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over a complaint and the person of   the respondent,  other  bodies  are  excluded from exercising  jurisdiction over the same complaint.  He cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.   7160,[26] which   provides   that   an   elective   official   may   be removed   from   office   by   order   of   the   proper   court   or   the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Private respondent insists the sangguniang bayan first   acquired   jurisdiction   over   the   complaint   and   his person. He argues jurisdiction over the person of a respondent in an   administrative   complaint   is   acquired   by   the   service   of summons   or   other   compulsory   processes.   Private   respondent stresses  complainants  violated the rule against   forum shopping when they filed identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

The IssuesThe issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman   and   the sangguniang bayanidentical   complaints against   Rodriguez;   and (2)   whether   it   was   the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired jurisdiction.

The Courts RulingThe petition has merit.Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution provides: 

Sec.   13.   The  Ombudsman   shall   have   the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate   on   its   own,   or   on 

complaint  by any  person,  any act  or omission   of   any   public   official, employee,   office,   or   agency,   when 

such   act   or   omission   appears   to   be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Section  15  of  Republic  Act  No.   6770,   otherwise   known as   the Ombudsman Act of 1989, states: 

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. The Ombudsman   shall   have   the   following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own 

or  on  complaint  by  any  person,  any act or omission of any public officer or employee,   office   or   agency,   when such   act   or   omission   appears   to   be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It  has primary  jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in   the   exercise   of   this   primary jurisdiction,   it  may take  over,  at  any stage,   from any  investigatory  agency of  Government,   the  investigations of such cases.

The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.   In cases cognizable by regular courts,   the  Ombudsman  has  concurrent   jurisdiction  with  other investigative agencies  of  government.[27] Republic  Act  No.  8249, otherwise known as  An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,   limits   the   cases   that   are   cognizable   by the Sandiganbayan to   public   officials   occupying   positions corresponding   to   salary   grade   27   and higher. The Sandiganbayanhas   no   jurisdiction   over   private respondent   who,   as punong barangay,   is   occupying   a   position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic  Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.[28]

Under   Republic   Act   No.   7160,   otherwise   known   as   the   Local Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has   disciplinary   authority   over   any elective barangay official, to wit: 

SEC.  61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.   A   verified   complaint   against any erring elective official shall be prepared as follows: x x x x (c)   A   complaint   against   any elective barangay official   shall   be   filed before   the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang

bayan concerned  whose   decision   shall   be final and executory. 

Clearly,   the   Ombudsman   has   concurrent   jurisdiction   with the sangguniang bayan over   administrative   cases   against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.  The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which likewise involved identical administrative complaints filed  in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30] Thus,   even   if   complainants   filed   in   the   Ombudsman   and the sangguniang bayan identical   complaints   against   private respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their  complaint was  in  the nature of an administrative case. In   administrative   cases   involving   the   concurrent   jurisdiction  of two   or   more   disciplining   authorities,   the   body   in   which   the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,   acquires   jurisdiction   to   the   exclusion   of   other   tribunals exercising   concurrent   jurisdiction.[31] In   this   case,   since   the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted   to   assume   jurisdiction   over   the   complaint,   the Ombudsmans   exercise   of   jurisdiction   is   to   the   exclusion   of the sangguniang bayanexercising concurrent jurisdiction. It   is   a   hornbook   rule   that   jurisdiction   is   a   matter   of   law. Jurisdiction, once acquired,  is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[32] When herein complainants   first   filed   the   complaint   in   the   Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer  be   transferred   to   the sangguniang bayan by   virtue  of  a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has   no   power   to   remove   an elective barangay official.   Apart   from   the   Ombudsman,   only   a proper   court   may   do   so.[33] Unlike   the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman   is   clothed  with   authority   to  directly   remove[34] an erring  public  official  other   than  members  of  Congress  and   the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.[35]

 WHEREFORE,  we GRANT the  petition.  We SET ASIDE the  8  May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.

 No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 1999]CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and

REYNALDO G. MEJICA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),

OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, respectively,   of San   Nicolas,   Pangasinan,   while   petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo  is   the  former Municipal  Treasurer  of   the same municipality.

On   15   June   1992,   the   Municipality   of   San   Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood   Construction,   represented   by   Larry   Lu,   for   the electrification  of  Barangay  Caboloan,   San  Nicolas,   for   the   sum of P486,386.18, requiring:

1. Installation  of   the   two  (2)  units  diesel  power  generator   (20) KVA, 220 W, Battery start and other accessories);

2. Installation of 24 rolls feeder lines with nos. 6, 8 and ten wires;

3. Installation of 40 units 4 x 4 wooden post with accessories; and

4. Construction of powerhouse with concrete foundation double throw safety switches (double pole, 250 amperes capacity of 220 V with fuse).[1]

On   2   September   1992,   Mejica,   the   Planning   and Development   Coordinator   of   San   Nicolas,   prepared   an Accomplishment   Report   stating   that   the   Caboloan   Power Generation   project   was   97.5%   accomplished. Said   report   was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On   the   basis   of   said   report,   payment   of P452,825.53   was effected   by   the   Municipal   Treasurer,   petitioner   Facundo,   to Philwood Construction.

On   14   August   1993,   petitioners   received   a   Notice   of Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr.,  who found that as per COA (Commission on Audit)  evaluation of   the  electrification project, only   60.0171%   of   the   project   (equivalent   to P291,915.07)  was actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased,  only one second-hand unit  was delivered. The same generator   broke   down   after   only   two   nights   of   operation. In addition, instead of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635% completed.The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.

The graph below serves to illustrate the conflicts between Mejicas report and the COAs:

Percentage

AccomplishedAmount paid

By Municipality

P452,825.5393.0090% (accdg.   to Mejicas report)

Cost of Actual

Accomplishment

P  291,915.07   60.0171% (accdg.   to   COA report)

Amount

Disallowed

P  160,910.46   33.08% (difference)

In   September  1993,   petitioners   requested   the  Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance[2] and to re-inspect the project.[3] Petitioners   reiterated   their   plea   in   a   letter   to   the Provincial Auditor dated 3 November 1993,[4] attaching therewith a Certificate of Acceptance and Completion[5] signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, and Eusebio Doton, President   of   the   Cabaloan   Electric   Cooperative. The   Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on petitioners requests.

On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint   for   estafa   before   the   Ombudsman   against petitioners. Likewise   impleaded  were   Larry   Lu   and   Ramil   Ang, President   and   General   Manager,   and   Project   Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.

On   10   June   1995,   Acting   Ombudsman   Francisco   Villa approved   the   filing   of   an   information   against   petitioners   for violation   of   Section   3   (e)   of   Republic   Act   No.   3019[6] before the Sandiganbayan.

On   28   July   1995,   petitioners   filed   a   motion   for reinvestigation   before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22 April 1996.

On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that  the  charges  against petitioners   be   maintained. The   Ombudsman   approved   said memorandum.

Petitioners   thereafter   filed   before   the Sandiganbayan a motion   to  quash   the   information  alleging,  as  grounds   therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense,  and (2)   the  same  information charged more  than one offense. Petitioners,   however,   did   not   elaborate   on   these grounds. They instead faulted the Provincial Auditor for instituting the   complaint   against   them   notwithstanding   the   pendency   of their opposition to the notice of disallowance. They also argued that the evidence against them did not establish the element of damage nor the presence of any conspiracy between them.

The Sandiganbayan denied said motion in an Order dated 18 March 1996.

On   18  March   1996,   the   prosecution  moved   to   suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. In a Resolution dated 2 July 1996, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction   over   petitioners   and   ordered   the   suspension   of petitioners pendente lite.

Petitioners thus filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the Court annul: (a) the order of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash, and (b) the resolution of the same court upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners. Petitioners likewise prayed that this Court issue a temporary   restraining   order   to   enjoin   the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case.

On   28   August   1998,   the   court   resolved   to   issue   the temporary restraining order prayed for.

Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of their petition:

I

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED   IN   ALLOWING   THE LITIGATION  OF THE   CRIMINAL   INFORMATION   FOR CONSPIRACY   IN   VIOLATING SECTION  3(E)  OF  THE  ANTI-  GRAFT  ACT   (R.A.3019) WHEN  THE NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE STILL PENDS WITH THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR   UNDER   PETITIONER   PROTEST   SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATE   OF   COMPLETION   AND   ACCEPTANCE   OF   THE REQUIRED ELEMENT OF 'CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

II

THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS   NO   JURISDICTION   TO   PROCEED AGAINST   ALL   THE   PETITIONERS   AND   ALL   THE   PROCEEDINGS THEREIN,   PARTICULARLY   THE   ORDER   OF   SUSPENSION   FROM OFFICE PENDENTE LITE, ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

III

THE ONGOING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS A CLEAR   VIOLATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTIONAL   RIGHTS   OF   THE PETITIONERS   UNDER   THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSEAS   IT   WAS PRECEDED   BY   HASTY,   MALICIOUS,   SHAM   AND   HASTY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INEVITABLY EXPOSING THEM TO A PROLONGED   ANXIETY,   AGGRAVATION,   EXPENSES,   AND HUMILIATION OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.

IV

THE PRECIPITATE SANDIGANBAYAN ORDER OF SUSPENSION IS A LEGAL   ERROR   AS   THE   SAME   EVIDENTLY   THE   LACK   OF   THE REQUIRED COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATING   PETITIONERS   CONSTITUTIONAL   RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND BILL OF RIGHTS.[7]

The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether petitioners right to due process was violated by the filing of the complaint against   them   by   the   Provincial   Auditor,   and   (2)  whether   the Ombudsman  committed  grave  abuse  of  discretion   in  filing   the information   against   petitioners. The   second   questions   the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioners. The third and fourth   grounds   are   related   to   the   first   and   are   subsumed thereunder.

After  a  meticulous  scrutiny of  petitioners  arguments,  we find the petition devoid of merit.

I

Petitioners   contend that   the  institution by  the  Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their opposition to   the   notice   of   disallowance   violates   their   right   to   due process. They submit that the issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or  adjudicate  and decide on the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance.[8]

The   italicized   portion   above   is   an   excerpt   from   Section 44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which states in full:

Sec. 44.6.4. Auditors Responsibility re Evaluation of Disallowance. It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise professional judgment   in   evaluating,   on   the   basis   of   the   facts   and circumstances of each case as well as the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, rules and regulations, the grounds for a charge or suspension/disallowance of an account or transaction.

It   shall   be   the   responsibility   of   the   auditor   to   exercise   sound judgment   in   evaluating the   written   explanation   of   the accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the   ninety   (90)   day   period   prior   to   its   conversion   into   a disallowance.      (Underscoring supplied.)

The aforequoted provision should be read in conjunction with Section 82 of the State Audit Code,[9] which states that:

(a) charge   of   suspension   which   is   not   satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable   officer   concerned   shall   become   a disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor concerned 

shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days.

At   this  point,   it  may  be useful   to  distinguish  between a disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is the disapproval of   a   credit   or   credits   to   an   account/accountable   officers accountability   due   to  non-compliance  with   law  or   regulations.[10] Thus,   the   auditor   may   disallow   an   expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper.[11]

A suspension,   on   the   other   hand,   is   the   deferment   of action   to   debit/credit   the   account/accountable   officers accountability pending compliance with certain requirements.[12] A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.[13]

As   stated   in   Section  82, supra,   however,   the   suspension shall  become a disallowance if   the charge of  suspension is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by   the   accountable   officer   concerned."   The   ninety-day   period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for good cause shown.

Clearly,   petitioners   misinterpreted   Section   44.6.4. First, petitioners   were   not   charged with suspension but disallowance. Second,   the   written explanation referred to in said section is for the purpose of lifting the   suspension   or   extending   the   time   to   answer   beyond   the ninety   (90)   day   period   prior   to   its   conversion   into   a disallowance, not for   contesting   a   disallowance,   as   petitioners wrongfully assert. Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.

On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke Sections 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B, which respectively provide:

SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is convinced that the evidence sufficiently discloses the fraud and other unlawful activities and identifies the perpetrators thereof, he shall prepare the sworn statements of the examining witnesses and/or other witnesses and make a report to the Manager/Regional  Director concerned,   attaching   thereto   copies  of   the  pertinent   affidavits and other supporting documents.

SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION

If   criminal   prosecution   is   warranted,   the   Regional Director/Manager   concerned   with   respect   to   National Government   Agencies/government   Owned   or   Controlled Corporations   or   Provincial/City   Auditors   with   respect   to   local government  units   shall   prepare   a   letter-complaint  and  file   the same with   the Tanodbayan or   the   local  deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor within ten (10) days from receipt of the report from the   examining   auditor,   attaching   thereto   copies   of   the   sworn statements   or   affidavits   of   witnesses   and   other   pertinent documents.

Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) when,   from   the   evidence   obtained   during   the   audit,   he   is convinced that criminal prosecution is warranted. The Provincial Auditor   need   not   resolve   the   opposition   to   the   notice   of disallowance   and   the  motion   for   re-inspection   pending   in   his office before he  institutes such complaint  so  long as  there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of   the   respondents   to   the   complaint,   insofar   as   the   criminal aspect   of   the   case   is   concerned,   is   not   impaired   by   such institution. The   respondents   will   still   have   the   opportunity   to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses,   in   the preliminary   investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondents motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such   decision. The   prosecuting   officer   may   then   accord   such decision its proper weight.

It  bears  stressing that  the exoneration of  respondents  in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint  against   them. The preliminary  investigation,  after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their   purposes   distinct   from  each   other. The   first   involves   the determination   of   the   fact   of   the   commission   of   a   crime;   the second relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds.[14]

Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners,  nor   the Sandiganbayan in  allowing   trial   to  proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners motions before the auditor.

II

Petitioners argue that their opposition to the disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of acceptance and completion, would betray the absence of the elements of evident bad faith or negligence,  and damage. They  likewise  claim that   the  evidence does not establish conspiracy among them.

The  presence  or  absence  of   the  elements  of   the  crime, however, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the  merits.[15] The   same  applies   to   the   alleged   absence  of   any conspiracy between the accused.

This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference   in   the   determination   of   the   Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave   abuse   in   the   exercise   of   such   discretion.[16] In   a   recent decision,[17] this   Court,   quoting Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[18] stated the rationale for this rule:

... The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions   of   the   court   will   be   grievously   hampered   by innumerable   petitions   assailing   the   dismissal   of   investigatory proceedings   conducted  by   the  Office  of   the  Ombudsman  with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the   courts   would   be   extremely   swamped   if   they   could   be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information   in   court   or   dismiss   a   complaint   by   a   private complainant.

Petitioners have failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.

III

Petitioners   next   question   the   jurisdiction   of the Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original  and exclusive jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.

Before   the   passage   of   Republic   Act   No.   7975[19] on   30 March 1995,  the pertinent portions of section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[20] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[21] read as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic  Act  No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other  offenses  or   felonies  committed by public  officers  and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or 

complexed with other crimes,  where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or   felonies   mentioned   in   this   paragraph   where   the   penalty prescribed   by   law   does   not   exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by   the   proper   Regional   Trial   Court,  Metropolitan   Trial   Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx.

Section   2   of   R.A.   No.   7975   subsequently   redefined   the jurisdiction   of   the   Anti-Graft   Court   such   that   the   pertinent portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:

Sec.   4. Jurisdiction.   --   the Sandiganbayan shall   exercise   original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations  of  Republic  Act  No.  3019,  as  amended,  otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of  the principal  accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,   acting   or   interim   capacity,   at   the   time   of   the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials  of   the  executive  branch occupying   the positions  of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher,   of   the  Compensation  and  Position  Classification  Act  of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial   governors,   vice-governors,   members   of the sangguniang panlalawigan and   provincial   treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City   mayors,   vice-mayors,   members   of   the sangguniang panlungsod,  city treasurers,  assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials   of   the  diplomatic  service  occupying   the  position  of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City   and   provincial   prosecutors   and   their   assistants,   and officials  and  prosecutors   in   the  Office  of   the  Ombudsman  and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned   or   controlled   corporations,   state   universities   or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen   and   members   of   Constitutional   Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In   cases   where   none   of   the   principal   accused   are   occupying positions   corresponding   to   salary   grade   27   or   higher,   as prescribed   in   the   said   Republic  Act  No.   6758,   or   PNP   officers occupying   the   rank   of   superintendent   or   higher,   or   their equivalent,  exclusive   jurisdiction   thereof   shall  be  vested  in   the proper Regional Trial  Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant   to   their   respective   jurisdictions   as   provided   in   Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

x x x

Then Associate, now Chief Justice, Hilario Davide explained the effects of these amendments in People vs. Magallanes:[22]

As   a   consequence   of   these   amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly   lost   its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases   involving   violations   of   R.A.   No.   3019,   as   amended,[23] as amended; R.A. No. 1379,[24]and Chapter II,  Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,[25] it retains only cases where the accused are   those   enumerated   in   subsection a,   Section   4   above   and, generally,  national and local  officials  classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989   (R.A.   No.   6758). Moreover,   its   jurisdiction   over   other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in   relation   to   their   office   is   no   longer   determined   by   the prescribed   penalty, viz.,   that   which   is   higher   than prision

correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees   enumerated   in   subsection a, Section   4 above. However,  it  retains  its exclusive original   jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,[26] 2,[27] 14,[28] and 14-A.[29]

The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the   dockets   of   the Sandiganbayan and   to   allow   the  Anti-Graft Court to focus  its efforts on the trial  of those occupying higher positions   in   government,   the   proverbial   big   fish. Section   4,   as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan from the task of trying cases involving lower-ranking government officials, imposing such duty upon   the   regular   courts   instead. The   present   structure   is   also intended to benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those residing  outside  Metro  Manila,   charged  with  crimes   related   to their  office,  who can  ill-afford the expenses of a  trial   in Metro Manila. As the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9825[30] states:

One is given the impression that only lowly government workers or the so-called small fry are expediently tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The   reason   for   this   is   that   at   present, the Sandiganbayanhas the exclusive and original jurisdiction over graft   cases   committed   by   all   officials   and   employees   of   the government, irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-paid   janitor   to   the   highly-placed   government   official. This jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only those occupying high positions in the government and the   military   (the   big   fishes)   may   fall   under   its   exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this was, the Sandiganbayan can devote its time   to   big   time   cases   involving   the   big   fishes   in   the government. The   regular   courts   will   be   vested   with   the jurisdiction   of   cases   involving   less-ranking   officials   (those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twenty-seven (27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to people in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila to file their complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be.

To   distinguish   the   big  fish   from   the   small   fry,   Congress deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those who should   come  under   the   jurisdiction  of   the   Sandiganbayan   and those within  the regular   courts. (While H.B.  No.  9825 originally intended   only   officials   of   Grade   28   and   above   as   within   the exclusive   and   original   jurisdiction   of   the   Sandiganbayan,   the resulting   law   included   officials   of   Grade   27.) Thus,   officials occupying positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes referred   to   in  Section  4  a.   and  b.,   are  within   the  original  and exclusive   jurisdiction  of   the  Sandiganbayan;   those  below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor is not among   them. Nevertheless,   Congress   provided   a   catchall   in Section 4 a. (5), thus:

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Such  a  catchall is  necessary,   for   it  would be  impractical,   if  not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above.

At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational  Services,  Position  Titles  and  Salary  Grades,  which was  prepared  by   the  Department  of  Budget  and  Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758,[31] otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of Municipal Mayor I:

Assistant Commissioner of Internal RevenueAssistant Regional Cabinet SecretaryAssistant Regional Executive SecretaryBoard Member IChairman, Police Regional Appellate BoardChief of Mission, Class IICity Government Department Head IIICity Trial Court JudgeClerk of the CommissionCommission Member ICourt Attorney VICourt of Appeals Reporter IIDeputy Administrator IDeputy Commissioner IDeputy Executive Director IIIDeputy Insurance CommissionerDirector IIIExecutive Clerk of Court IIExecutive Director IIGovernment Corporate Attorney IIIGraft Investigation Officer IIMunicipal Mayor IProfessor IVProject Manager IIIProsecutor IIProvincial Agrarian Reform AdjudicatorPublic Attorney IVRegional TreasurerRegister of Deeds IVSangguniang Panlalawigan MemberSangguniang Panlungsod Member IIScientist IISolicitor IISpecial Prosecution Officer II

State Counsel IVSUC President ISUC Vice-President III

Earlier,   in   the  1989   version  of   the   same   Index,   the  Municipal Mayor   was   also   assigned   a   Salary   Grade   of   27. It   appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners,   however,   claim   that   at   the   time   of   the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992, Mayor   Rodrigo,   the   highest   public   ranking   public   official impleaded   in   this   case,   was   receiving   a   monthly   salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent  to a fourth   step   increment   in  Grade  24  under   the   Salary   Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758: *

SEC.   7. Salary Schedule. The   Department   of   Budget   and Management is hereby directed to implement the Salary Schedule prescribed below:

Salary ScheduleGrade 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th

Xxx

24 10,13510,23610,33910,44210,64610,65210,76810,866Xxx

 

Petitioners   conclude   that  Mayor   Rodrigo,   at   the   time   of   the commission   of   the   alleged   crime,  was   occupying   a   Grade   24 position and,   thus,  not within  the  Sandiganbayans original  and exclusive jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.

This is a simplistic, and altogether incorrect, interpretation of the law.

Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:

The   Congress   shall   provide   for   the   standardization   of compensation of government officials and employees,   including those   in   government-owned   or   controlled   corporation   with original   charters,   taking   into   account   the   nature   of   the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.

This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII thereof, contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then President Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985.[32]

However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially   equal  work   and to   base   differences   in   pay   upon substantive   differences   in   duties   and   responsibilities,   and qualification requirements of the positions."

To   give   life   to   this   policy,   as  well   as   the   constitutional prescription   to   (take)   into   account   the   nature   of   the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the  positions  of  government  officials  and  employees,  Congress adopted   the   scheme   employed   in  P.D.  No.   985   for   classifying positions with comparable responsibilities  and qualifications for the   purpose   of   according   such   positions   similar   salaries. This scheme is known as the Grade, defined in P.D. No. 985 as:

Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect   to   kind   or   subject   matter   of   work,   are   sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[33]

The   Grade   is   therefore   a  means   of   grouping   positions sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work so that they may be lumped together in one range of basic compensation.

Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary   Grades[34] of   officials   holding   constitutional   positions,   as follows:

SEC.   8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent. Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the salary of  the following officials shall  be  in accordance with the Salary Grades indicated hereunder:

SalaryGrade

President   of   the Philippines

33

Vice-President   of the Philippines

32

President   of   the Senate

32

Speaker   of   the House   of Representatives

32

Chief   Justice   of the   Supreme Court

32

Senator 31Member   of   the 31

House   of RepresentativesAssociate   Justices of   the   Supreme Court

31

Chairman   of   a Constitutional Commissionunder Article   IX,   1987 Constitution

31

Member   of   a Constitutional Commission under   Article   IX, 1987 Constitution

30

 

The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to   determine   the   officials  who   are   of   equivalent   rank   to   the foregoing  Officials,  where  applicable,  and  may be assigned  the same Salary Grades based on the following guidelines:

x x x

As   indicated   in   the   aforequoted   section,   Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades) to the DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing   the   DBM   to   determine   the   officials   who   are   of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable, and to assign them the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.[35]

For   positions   below   those  mentioned   under   Section   8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the Index of Occupational Services   guided   by   (a)   the   Benchmark   Position   prescribed   in Section 9,[36] and (b) the following factors:

(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position;

(2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;

(3) the kind of supervision received;

(4) mental   and/or   physical   strain   required   in   the completion of the work;

(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;

(6) kind of supervision exercised;

(7) decision-making responsibility;

(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;

(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and

(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

Pursuant   to   such   authority,   the   DBM  drafted   the   1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary Grade 27.

That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758, which respectively provide:

SEC.   10. Local Government Units (LGUs).   -- The   rates   of   pay   in LGUs shall be determined on the basis of the class and financial capability of each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not exceed   the   following   percentages   of   the   rates   in   the   salary schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:

 ForProvinces/Cities

ForMunicipalities

Special Cities

100%

1stClass 100% 90%2ndClass 95% 85%3rdClass 90% 80%4thClass 85% 75%5thClass 80% 70%6thClass 75% 65% 

SEC.   19. Funding Source. The   funding   sources   for   the   amounts necessary to implement this Act shall be as follows:

(a) x x x

(b)      For   local   government   units,   the   amount   shall   be   charged    against their respective funds. Local government units which do not   have   adequate   or   sufficient   funds   shall   only   partially implement the established rates as may be approved by the Joint Commission   under   Section   8   of   Presidential   Decree   No. 1188: Provided, That any partial implementation shall be uniform and   proportionate   for   all   positions   in   each   local   government unit: Provided further, That   savings   from National  Assistance   to Local  Government  Units   (NALGU)   funds  may   be   used   for   this purpose.

x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, a local government officials actual salary may be less than   what   the   Salary   Schedule   under   Section   7   prescribes, depending   on   the   class   and   financial   capability   of   his   or   her respective local government unit. This circumstance, however, has 

no bearing  on  such officials  Grade. As   the   foregoing  discussion shows, on officials salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, andultimately by the nature of his position the level of   difficulty   and   responsibilities   and   level   of   qualification requirements   of   the   work. To   give   credence   to   petitioners argument that Mayor Rodrigos salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.

Petitioner mayors position having been classified as Grade 27  in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with   violation  of   Section  3   (e)   of   R.A.  No.   3019,   petitioner   is subject   to   the  jurisdiction of   the  Sandiganbayan,  as  defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By   virtue  of   the   same  Section  4   a.,   as   amended, his   co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Courts jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   hereby DISMISSED and   the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 28 August 1996 LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 122297-98. January 19, 2000]

CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J.:

The   case   before   the   Court   is   a   special   civil   action for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over 

the   criminal   cases   against   then  municipal  mayor   Crescente   Y. Llorente, Jr. for violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

Petitioner Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. was elected municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga in 1988 and 1992. On May 8, 1995, he was a candidate for congressman, second district of Zamboanga del Norte, and was duly elected.

On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor[2] filed with the Sandiganbayan an information[3] against Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr.,  municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, P/Sgt. Juanito   Caboverde   and   Jose  Dy   for   violation   of   Section   3   (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

"That on or about June 12, 1989, in the Municipality of Sindangan,   Zamboanga   del   Norte,   and   within   the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Crescente Y.   Llorente,   Jr.,   Municipal   Mayor   of   Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and P/Sgt. Juanito Cadoverde of the   defunct   Integrated  National   Police   and   as   such public officers and the other accused Jose Dy, a private individual, conspiring with each other and acting with evident   bad   faith,   did   then   and   there,   willfully, unlawfully   and   criminally   seized   (sic)   930   sawn knockdown wooden  boxes  owned   by  Godofredo  M. Diamante without any search and seizure warrant and without issuing any receipt of seizure thereby causing undue   damage   and   injury   to   said   Godofredo   M. Diamante and this offense was committed in relation to the office of the said public officers.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Manila, August 6, 1993.

s/t) GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANASpecial Prosecution Officer III

On February 2, 1994, the three accused were arraigned before the Sandiganbayan and pleaded not guilty. Nex old

On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman[5] filed with the Sandiganbayan   another   information[6] against   petitioner   for violation of  Section 3   (f),  Republic  Act  No.  3019,  as   amended, committed as follows:

"That on or about July 5, 1993, and for sometime subsequent   thereto,   in   Sindangan,   Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above-named accused,   a   public   officer,   being   then   the 

Municipal  Mayor  of  Sindangan,  Zamboanga  del Norte,  with  grave  abuse  of  authority,  did   then and   there   wilfully,   unlawfully   and   criminally refuse  to   issue  Mayors  permit   to   the   ice  plant and resawmill/box factory of R. F. Diamante and family,  without sufficient  justification, after  due demand and payment of license fees were made, said   refusal   to   grant  Mayors   permit   being   not only personal but for the purpose of giving undue advantage to similar businesses in town and as an act  of discriminating against  the  interest  of the complainant to the latters damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Manila, Philippines, March 31, 1995

"(s/t) DANIEL B. JOVACON, JR.Special Prosecution Officer I

The trial of both criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun.

On  May   16,   1995,   Congress   enacted   Republic   Act   No.   7975,[8] amending   Section   4   of   Presidential   Decree   No.   1606,[9] providing: Mani kx

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise   known   as   the   Anti-Graft   and   Corrupt Practices   Act,   Republic   Act   1379,   and   Chapter   II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one   or  more   of   the   principal   accused   are   officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials  of the executive branch occupying the positions   of   regional   director   or   higher,   otherwise classified   as   Grade   "27"   and   higher,   of   the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,   and   provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b)   City   mayors,   vice   mayors,   members   of the sangguniang panglungsod,   city   treasurers, assessors,   engineers,   and   other   city   department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; Maniks

"(d)   Philippine   army   and   air   force   colonels,   naval captains, and all other officials of higher rank;

"(e)   PNP   chief   superintendent   and  PNP   officers  of higher rank;

"(f)   City   and   provincial   prosecutors   and   their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities   or   educational   institutions   of foundations.

"(2)   Members   of   Congress   and   officials   thereof classified   as   Grade   "27"   and   up   under   the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3)  Members  of   the   judiciary  without  prejudice  to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4)   Chairmen   and   members   of   Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b.   Other   offenses   or   felonies   committed   by   the public   officials   and   employees   mentioned   in subsection   (a)   of   this   section   in   relation   to   their office.

"c.  Civil  and criminal  cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"In  cases  where  none  of   the  principal  accused  are occupying   positions   corresponding   to   salary   grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 

No.   6758,   or   PNP   officers   occupying   the   rank   of superintendent   or   higher,   or   their   equivalent, exclusive   jurisdiction thereof  shall  be  vested  in   the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal   Trial   Court,   and   Municipal   Circuit   Trial Court,   as   the   case   may   be,   pursuant   to   their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129."[10] Manikan

On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a motion to dismiss or transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.

On the same date, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, First Division,   a   motion   to   refer   Criminal   Case   No.   22655   to   the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.

Petitioner averred that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over criminal cases against municipal mayors for violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, who receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade   27,   pursuant   to   the   Index   of   Occupational   Services prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

On September 7, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Division[11] denied the motion to refer Criminal Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court.   On   October   10,   1995,   the   Sandiganbayan   denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[12]

On   September   14,   1995,   Sandiganbayan,   Third   Division[13] also denied the motion  to  transfer  Criminal  Case  No.  19763  to the Regional Trial Court.

Hence, petitioner filed these petitions for certiorari.[14]

On December 27, 1995, the Court consolidated the two cases.[15]

On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[16]

On  September   1,   1999,  we   gave  due   course   to   the   petitions.[17] Ncm

The issue raised in these two cases is whether or not Republic Act No.   7975   divested   the   Sandiganbayan   of   its   jurisdiction   over violations   of   Republic   Act   No.   3019,   as   amended,   against municipal mayors.

We   have   resolved   this   issue   in   recent   cases   ruling   that   the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors.[18]

There is no merit to petitioners averment that the salary received by a public official dictates his salary grade. "On the contrary, it is the officials grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around."[19] "To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should   be  made   to   Republic   Act   No.   6758   and   the   Index   of Occupational   Services,   Position   Titles   and   Salary   Grades.   An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law which the court must take judicial notice."[20]

Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that "the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding  to Salary  Grade twenty-seven (27)  as  prescribed under  Republic  Act  No.   6758  and   the   implementing  guidelines issued pursuant thereto." Additionally,  both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary  Grades   list   the  municipal  mayor  under  Salary  Grade 27.[21] Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, we  hereby  DISMISS   the   consolidated  petitions   at bar, for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.R E S O L U T I O N 

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed   by   the   registered   voters   of   the   barangay.   Acting   on   the petition   for   recall,   public   respondent  Commission   on   Elections 

(COMELEC)   resolved   to   approve   the   petition,   scheduled   the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on   November   13,1995. 1 At   least   29.30%   of   the   registered   voters   signed   the petition, well  above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC,   however,   deferred   the   recall   election   in   view   of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the   recall  election,   this  time on  December  16,  1995.  To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Cabanatuan   City   a   petition   for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court   issuing a  temporary  restraining order.  After  conducting a summary   hearing,   the   trial   court   lifted   the   restraining   order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain   why   they   should   not   be   cited   for   contempt   for misrepresenting   that   the  barangay   recall   election  was  without COMELEC approval. 2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January  12,  1996,   the Court   issued a  temporary  restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public   respondent,  to comment on the petition.  In view of  the Office   of   the   Solicitor   General's   manifestation  maintaining   an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department   filed   the   required   comment.   Petitioner   thereafter filed a reply. 3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b)   of   Republic   Act   No.   7160,   otherwise   known   as   the   Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall  election is  now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local  election.  Petitioner  maintains   that as   the  SK  election  is  a regular   local  election,  hence  no   recall  election  can  be  had   for barely   four  months   separate   the   SK   election   from   the   recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec.  74.  Limitations on Recall.  —  (a)  Any  elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only   once   during   his   term   of   office   for   loss   of confidence.

(b)  No   recall   shall   take  place  within  one   (1)  year from the date of the official's assumption to office or   one   (1)   year   immediately   preceding   a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts,  and kept subservient   to   the general   intent of   the whole enactment. 4 The   evident   intent   of   Section   74   is   to   subject   an elective   local  official   to  recall  election  once  during  his   term of office.   Paragraph   (b)   construed   together   with   paragraph   (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall  election can be conducted rendering  inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,   or   as   otherwise   expressed,   nullified,   destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

It   is   likewise   a   basic   precept   in   statutory   construction   that   a statute   should   be   interpreted   in   harmony   with   the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be   in   conflict  with   the  Constitutional  mandate  of  Section  3  of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government   structure   instituted   through   a   system   of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal  reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill   its purpose and defeat the  intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally,   recall   election   is   potentially   disruptive   of   the   normal working   of   the   local   government   unit   necessitating   additional expenses,   hence   the   prohibition   against   the   conduct   of   recall election   one   year   immediately   preceding   the regular local election.   The   proscription   is   due   to   the  proximity  of   the   next regular   election   for   the   office   of   the   local   elective   official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in  the said election who certainly has a  longer tenure  in office than   a   successor   elected   through   a   recall   election.   It   would, therefore,   be   more   in   keeping   with   the   intent   of   the   recall provision  of   the  Code   to  construe regular local election as  one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that   the   next   regular   election   involving   the   barangay   office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY,   the   petition   is   hereby   dismissed   for   having become  moot   and   academic.   The   temporary   restraining  order issued   by   the  Court  on   January  12,   1996,   enjoining   the   recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126576 March 5, 1997

MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, and ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN, respondents.

 HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 1 dated October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   which   (1) approved   the  Petition   for  Recall   filed   and   signed   by  only  one registered voter — herein private respondent Ma. Aurora Siccuan de   Alban,   against   petitioner   —   incumbent   Mayor   Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.

On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 2 enjoining public respondent COMELEC from implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.

The facts of this case are not disputed.

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of   all   the   votes   cast.   Private   respondent  de  Alban  was   also   a candidate in said elections.

Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local  Election Registrar  of  Tumauini,   Isabela,  a  Petition for Recall 3 against   petitioner.   On   September   12,   1996,   petitioner received a copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was forwarded   to   the   Regional  Office   in   Tuguegarao,   Cagayan   and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.

Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio   Jose   Joson   submitted   to   the   COMELEC En Banc,   a Memorandum 4 dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the petition for recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the COMELEC en bancissued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

Petitioner  now attacks   the  aforementioned   resolution  as  being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall   election   within   one   (1)   year   from   the   May   12,   1997 Barangay Elections.

In   at   least   three   (3)   urgent  motions,   private   respondent   has sought the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that the issue of the one-year  bar  on recall  elections has been resolved  in   the  case of Paras v. COMELEC 5, promulgated on November 4, 1996; and (2) that   the   procedure   prescribed   by   Resolution   No.   96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation of even just one person, is no different from that provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272   which   was   upheld   as   constitutional   in   the   1991   cases of Sanchez, et al.v. COMELEC 6 and Evardone v. COMELEC 7.

Private  respondent   is   correct   in   saying  that   in   the   light  of  our pronouncement   in Paras v. COMELEC 8,   the   recall   election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to   be   barred   by   the   May   12,   1997   Barangay   Elections.   In construing the  meaning of   the  term,  "regular   local  election"  in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year . . . immediately preceding a regular local election," we ruled that for the time bar to   apply,   the   approaching   regular   local   election  must   be   one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no application of the one year bar,  hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.

We,  however,  find petitioner's  second ground to be  impressed with merit.

Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall   of   public   officials   voted   for   in   popular   elections,   was governed   by   Sections   54   to   59   of   Batas   Pambansa   Blg.   337, otherwise   known   as   the   Local   Government   Code   of   1983. Pursuant   to   Section   59   thereof,   which   states   that   "the Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of   and   election   on   recall   .   .   .   and,   in   pursuance   thereof, promulgate the necessary rules  and regulations,"  the COMELEC promulgated   Resolution   No.   2272   Sections   4   and   5   of   which provide as follows:

Sec. 4. How instituted. — The recall of an elective provincial,   city   or   municipal   official   shall   be commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall  containing the address and precinct number of the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official sought to be recalled, his position, and the ground(s)   for  the recall.  Each notice shall  refer   to only one official.

The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election   Registrar   if   the   recall   involves   a   city   or municipal   official,   or  with   the   Provincial   Election 

Supervisor   if   it   involves   a   provincial   official,   one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.

If   the   recall   involves   a   provincial   official,   two additional   copies   of   the   notice   shall   also   be furnished   by   the   voter   filing   the   notice   to   the Election Registrar  of  each city  and municipality   in the   province,   one   copy  of  which   shall   be  posted upon  receipt   thereof  on the bulletin board  in   the city/municipal hall.

In  every  case,   the  voter  filing  the  notice of   recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the official sought to be recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election Records and Statistics Department of the Commission.

Sec. 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. —   The   Election   Registrar   shall   submit   to   the Commission on Elections,  not   later   than   ten days from filing of the notice of recall,  the schedule of the signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding . . . 9

In   the   case   of Sanchez v. COMELEC 10,   petitioners   therein contended   that   the   aforegoing   "Resolution   No.   2272   is unconstitutional there being no legislative enactment yet on [the] mechanism  of   recall   as  mandated  under   Sec.   3,  Art.   X  of   the Constitution". 11 It is true, as private respondent asseverates, that we upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, but not because   we   found   nothing   constitutionally   infirm   about   the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall petition to be filed by only  one  person.  The  issue  in Sanchez was  not   this  questioned procedure but the legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the alleged absence of a grant of such power by an enabling statute on recall. Thus we ruled:

While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a local government code   providing   among   others   for   an   effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said provision could be   inferred   the   repeal   of   BP   337,   the   local government code existing prior to the adoption of the   1987   Constitution.   Sec.   3,   Art.   X   of   the Constitution   merely   provides   that   the   local government code to be enacted by Congress shall be   "more   responsive"   than   the   one   existing   at present. Until such time that a more responsive and effective   local   government   code   is   enacted,   the present code shall  remain  in full   force and effect. Thus,   under   Sec.   3,   Art.   XVIII,   (a)ll   existing   laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of 

instructions   and   other   executive   issuances   not inconsistent   with   this   Constitution   shall   remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Considering that the present local government code (BP   337)   is   still   in   effect,   respondent   COMELEC's promulgation  of  Resolution  No.   2272   is   therefore valid   and   constitutional,   the   same   having   been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:

Sec.   59.   Supervision   by   the   Commission   on Elections.   —   The   Commission   on   Elections   shall conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall . . . and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. 12

We  reiterated   the   foregoing   ruling   in   the   case   of Evardone v.COMELEC 13 in this wise:

Article   XVIII,   Section   3   of   the   1987 Constitution   expressly   provides   that   all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution   shall   remain   operative,   until amended,   repealed   or   revoked.   Republic Act   No.   7160   providing   for   the   Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President  on 10 October  1991,  specifically repeals   B.P.   Blg.   337   as   provided   in   Sec. 534,   Title   Four  of   said  Act.   But   the   Local Government Code of 1991 will  take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case.

xxx xxx xxx

Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides   for   the  mechanism   for   recall   of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes   the   respondent   COMELEC   to conduct and supervise the process  of  and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers,   promulgate   the   necessary   rules and regulations. . .  . Thus, pursuant to the rule-making   power   vested   in   respondent COMELEC,   it   promulgated   Resolution   No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.

We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated   by   respondent   COMELEC   is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to 

approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. 14

In Sanchez and Evardone,   the COMELEC-prescribed procedure  of (1) allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least one person or by  less  than 25% of  the total  number  of   registered  voters  and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux of the present constitutional challenge, the proper time has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling on the matter.

Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a mode of removing a public officer by direct   action   of   the   people,   essayed   in   the   case   of Garcia v. COMELEC 15:

Recall   is   a  mode   of   removal   of   a   public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove   a   public   officer   is   an   incident   of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional   restraint,   the   power   is implied   in   all   governmental   operations. Such   power   has   been   held   to   be indispensable for the proper administration of   public   affairs.   Not   undeservedly,   it   is frequently described as a fundamental right of   the   people   in   a   representative democracy.

Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials   made   its   maiden   appearance   in section   2   of   Article   XI   entitled   Local Government, viz.:

Sec.  2.  The  Batasang Pambansa shall enact a   local   government code  which  may   not thereafter   be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members,   defining   a more   responsive   and accountable   local government structure with   an   effective system of recall . . .

The  Batasang  Pambansa   then  enacted  BP 337 entitled, "The Local Government Code of   1983.   Section   54   of   its   Chapter   3 

provided   only   one  mode   of   initiating   the recall elections of local election officials, i.e., by petition of at   least  twenty-five percent (25%)   of   the   total   number   of   registered voters   in   the   local   government   unit concerned . . . .

Our   legal   history   does   not   reveal   any instance   when   this   power   of   recall   as provided by  BP 337 was exercised  by our people.

In   February,   1986,   however,   our   people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of the   land.   The   successful   use   of   people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate  led to its   firm   institutionalization   of   the   1987 Constitution.   Its   Article   XIII   expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations . . . .

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate   for   Congress   to   enact   a   local government code which "shall provide for a more   responsive   and   accountable   local government structure  instituted through a system   of   decentralization   with   effective mechanisms   of   recall,   initiative   and referendum   .   .   .   .   In   response   to   this constitutional   call,   Congress   enacted   R.A. 7160,   otherwise   known   as   the   Local Government   Code   of   1991,   which   took effect on January 1, 1992." 16

Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective . . . municipal . . . official may also   be   validly   initiated   upon   petition   of   at   least   twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected". The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of  at   least  25% of   the  total  number  of   registered  voters,  may validly   initiate   recall  proceedings.  We   take  careful  note  of   the phrase, "petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%)" and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be   "of"   or   by,   at   least   25%   of   the   registered   voters, i.e.,   the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. This is understandable, since   the   signing   of   the   petition   is   statutorily   required   to   be 

undertaken "before  the election registrar  or his   representative, and in the presence of a representative of the official sought to be recalled,  and in a public  place  in the .   .   .  municipality  .   .   .  " 17. Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures   of   at   least   25%   of   the   total   number   of   registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

We   cannot   sanction   the   procedure   of   the   filing   of   the   recall petition   by   a   number   of   people   less   than   the   foregoing   25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitutions and recall statutes in various American states to the same extent that they were aware of the rationale therefor.  While recall was  intended to be an effective and   speedy   remedy   to   remove   an   official   who   is   not   giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging   his   full   duty   to   the   best   of   his   ability   and   as   his conscience dictates 18 it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small   percentage   of   disenchanted   electors.   Otherwise,   its purposes as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would   destabilize   the   community   and   seriously   disrupt   the running of government.

A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum voter requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of In Re Bower 19 that:

[t]he   only   logical   reason   which   we   can ascribe   for   requiring   the   electors   to  wait one   year   before   petitioning   for   a   recall election is to prevent premature action on their   part   in   voting   to   remove   a   newly elected official before having had sufficient time   to   evaluate   the   soundness   of   his political policies and decisions. We view the statutory provision requiring the number of petition signers to equal at least 45% of the total votes case in the last general election for  mayor   as   a   further   attempt   to   insure that an official will not have to defend his policies   against   frivolous   attacks   launched 

by   a   small   percentage   of   disenchanted electors. 20

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen, v. City of Boulder 21 that:

[t]he   framers,   by   requiring   that   a   recall petition contain   the  signatures  of  at   least 25% of all votes cast in the last election for all   candidates   for   the   position  which   the person   sought   to   be   recalled   occupies, assured   that   a   recall   election  will   not   be held  in response to the wishes of  a  small and   unrepresentative   minority.   However, once  at   least  25% of   the  electorate  have expressed   their   dissatisfaction,   the constitution   reserves   the   recall   power   to the will of the electorate. 22

And   in   the   case   of Wallace v. Tripp 23,   the   Supreme   Court   of Michigan echoed the foregoing posturings in this wise:

Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated by the Constitution   has   revealed   fears   about   an irresponsible   electorate   .   .   .   .   A   much   cited Nebraska   case   pertaining   to   a   Nebraska   recall statute provides some answers which are equally applicable to the Michigan constitutional right of recall:

.   .   .   Doubtless   the   provision requiring   30   per   cent   of   the electors to sign the petition before the   council   [is]   compelled   to   act was   designed   to   avoid   such   a contingency.   The   Legislature apparently   assumed   that   nearly one-third   of   the  electorate  would not  entail  upon the  taxpayers   the cost   of   an   election   unless   the charges made approved themselves to   their   understanding   and   they were seriously dissatisfied with the services   of   the   incumbent   of   the office. 24

In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to   the   spirit   underlying   that   law.  Private   respondent  who  is   a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% 

of the total  number of registered voters.  Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition  that   she  has,   together  with  many  others   in  Tumauini, Isabela,   lost  confidence in the  leadership of petitioner.  But  the petition does not bear  the names of all   these other citizens of Tumauini   who   have   reportedly   also   become   anxious   to   oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed   her   name   in   the   petition   shows   that   she   claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner's continuance in  office.  But   the  same cannot  be said  of  all   the  other  people whom private  respondent claims  to  have sentiments  similar   to hers. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected   officials,   the   same   power   is   accompanied   by   the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the   exercise  of   such  power,   including   rising   above  anonymity, confronting   the   official   sought   to   be   recalled,   his   family,   his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall  election to  its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which  may   have  not,   in   the  first   place,   even  entertained   any displeasure   in   the   performance   of   the   official   sought   to   be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all  circumstances,  countenance a circumvention of  the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is   hereby  GRANTED.   COMELEC  Resolution  No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.

The   RESTRAINING   ORDER   heretofore   issued   is   hereby   made permanent.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000]

JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000]

PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.: Calrky

These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory   Recall   Assembly   of   Pasay   City   (PRA)   in   the Commission   on   Elections   in   E.M.   No.   99-005   entitled   IN   THE MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY.  G.R.  No. 140560  is  a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the resolution,[1] dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall  of petitioner  Jovito O. Claudio   as  mayor   of   Pasay   City.  On   the  other   hand,  G.R.  No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its Chair, Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Jovito  O.  Claudio,  petitioner   in  G.R.  No.  140560,  was   the  duly elected mayor of  Pasay City  in the May 11,  1998 elections.  He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

Sometime during  the  second week of  May  1999,   the  chairs  of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of  filing  a  petition   for   recall   against  Mayor  Claudio   for   loss  of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin   Lim,   Jr.   in   Barangay   11,   Zone   4,   Pasay   City,   several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner  in  G.R.  No.  140714,  was designated chair.

On  May   29,   1999,   1,073   members   of   the   PRA   composed   of barangay chairs,  kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay   City,   adopted   Resolution   No.   01,   S-1999,   entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR  OF  PASAY  CITY  FOR  LOSS  OF  CONFIDENCE.   In  a   letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor,   Vice-Mayor,   Station   Commander,   and   thirteen   (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall. Mesm

As scheduled,   the  petition  for   recall  was  filed on July  2,  1999, accompanied   by   an   affidavit   of   service   of   the  petition   on   the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards of the local COMELEC office,  the City Hall,  the Police Department,  the public market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of   the   Sta.   Clara   Church   on   P.   Burgos   St.,   all   in   Pasay   City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC.

Oppositions   to   the   petition  were   filed   by   petitioner   Jovito  O. Claudio,  Rev.  Ronald   Langub,   and  Roberto   L.   Angeles,   alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only   representatives   of   the   parties   concerned  who  were   sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA  took  place  within   the  one-year  prohibited  period;   (4)   the election case,[2] filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City,  should first be decided before recall  proceedings against   petitioner   could   be   filed;   and   (5)   the   recall   resolution failed   to  obtain   the  majority   of   all   the  members   of   the  PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials   had  withdrawn   their   support,   and   60   barangay   chairs executed affidavits of retraction. Slx

In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of  whether   the  PRA was constituted by  a  majority  of   its members,   the   COMELEC   held   that   the   1,073   members   who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership  of   the  PRA  was  1,790,  while   the   statistics  of   the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only   a   majority   is   required   to   constitute   the   PRA,   clearly,   a majority  had been obtained  in support  of  the recall   resolution. Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first   be  decided   before   any   recall   election   could   be   held,   the COMELEC ruled that  it  was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally,  on  whether   the  petition   for   recall   violated   the  bar  on recall  within one year from the elective official's  assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.

Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members,[3] resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave   abuse   of   discretion.   On   the   other   hand,   the   Court unanimously  dismissed  the petition  in  G.R.  No.  140714  on  the ground   that   the   issue   raised   therein   had   become  moot   and academic.

We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.

In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall  elections  in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City  is  no  longer tenable.  We are thus  left with only petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.

The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG)[4] which provides: Scslx

Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall  take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or  one  (1)  year   immediately  preceding  a   regular local election.

As defined at   the hearing of   these  cases  on April  4,  2000,   the issues are:

WHETHER,   under   Section   74   of   the   Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) ...

A.   The   word   "recall"   in   paragraph   (b)   covers   a process   which   includes   the   convening   of   the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of   paragraph   (b)   includes   the   election   period   for that   regular   election   or   simply   the   date   of   such election.

(1)

On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the

Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution

Petitioner   contends   that   the   term  "recall"   in  74(b)   refers   to   a process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in 74(a), which   obviously   refers   to   an   election.   He   claims   that   "when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to  initiate the recall,  followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a  resolution  to  initiate  the   recall  of   Jovito  Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed   office,   the   PRA   was   illegally   convened   and   all proceedings   held   thereafter,   including   the   filing   of   the   recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void. Slxsc

The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

Both  petitioner  Claudio  and   the COMELEC  thus  agree   that   the term "recall" as used in 74 refers to a process. They disagree only as   to   when   the   process   starts   for   purposes   of   the   one-year limitation in paragraph (b) of 74.

We   can   agree   that   recall   is   a   process  which   begins  with   the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the   signatures  at   least  25% of   the   registered  voters  of  a   local government   unit,   and   then   proceeds   to   the   filing   of   a   recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.[5] However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion.

First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, 69 provides that "the power of  recall   ...shall  be exercised by the registered voters   of   a   local   government   unit   to  which   the   local   elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings[6] but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall"   in   paragraph   (b)   refers   only   to   the   recall   election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be   resorted   to.   These   are   merely   preliminary   steps   for   the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the   exercise   of   the   power   of   recall   which   is   vested   in   the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

Indeed,   this   is   the   thrust   of   the   ruling   in Garcia v. COMELEC[7] where two objections were raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of   incumbent   elective   local   officials.   Both   objections   were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power   to   recall   and   not   the   power   to   initiate   recall   that   the Constitution   gave   to   the   people.  With   respect   to   the   second objection,   it  was  held  that  a   recall   resolution "merely  sets   the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office . . . ." Sdaadsc

If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether  the  local  official  concerned continues to enjoy   the   confidence   of   the   people,   then,   the   prohibition   in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the   official's   assumption   of   office,   cannot   apply   to   such proceedings.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for   judging   the   performance   of   an   elective   local   official.   In the Bower case[8] cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC,[9] it was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring   the  electors   to  wait  one year  before petitioning      for  a recall   election   is   to  prevent  premature  action  on   their   part   in voting   to   remove   a   newly   elected   official   before   having   had sufficient   time   to   evaluate   the   soundness   of   his   policies   and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of 

a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall  be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve   months."   But   however   the   period   of   prohibition   is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation   is   to   provide   a   reasonable   basis   for   evaluating   the performance of an elective local official.  Hence,  in this case,  as long   as   the   election   is   held   outside   the   one-year   period,   the preliminary   proceedings   to   initiate   a   recall   can   be   held   even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before   the   official   concerned   has   been   in   office   for   one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it  is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official  concerned;  it  is  the vote of the electorate  in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held   before   the   official   concerned   has   completed  one   year   in office,   he   will   not   be   judged   on   his   performance prematurely.Rtcspped

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the   convening   of   the   PRA   for   the   purpose   of   discussing   the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members.  The people  cannot   just  be  asked  on  the  day of   the election   to   decide   on   the   performance   of   their   officials.   The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions   among   citizens   is   to   unduly   curtail   one   of   the  most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it  is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law   cannot   really   provide   for   a   period   of   honeymoon   or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically  motivated   and   when   it   is   not.   The   only   safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self  restraint of the people and its  leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan   politics   may,   have   the   incidental   effect   of   providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended 

to   provide   a   sufficient   basis   for   evaluating   and   judging   the performance of an elected local official.

In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's]  Preparatory Recall  Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.

Two points may be made against this argument.

One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election   the   local   official   whose   recall   is   sought   is   actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for   the   holding   of   plebiscites   during   which   the   question   of cityhood  is  submitted to the  people   for   their  approval  are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.

Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a   local  government  unit   cannot  be more   representative  of   the sentiments  of   the  people   than   those   initiated  by  PRAs  whose members represent the entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs. Korte

The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question here   is  not  whether   recalls   initiated by  25% of   the  voters  are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph   (b)   includes   the   convening   of   the   PRA.   Given   that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to be?

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall -

1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a  local  government unit.  Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide   voters   a   sufficient   basis   for   judging   an   elective   local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

(2)

On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election

Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election"  which,   for  the year 2001  is  May 14,  but  the election period  as  well,  which   is   normally   at   least   forty   five   (45)  days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that   beginning   March   30,   2000,   no   recall   election   may   be held. Sclaw

This contention is untenable.

The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place  within  .   .   .  one  (1) year   immediately  preceding a  regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the   campaign  period,  which  period   is   defined   in   the  Omnibus Election Code,[10] it could have expressly said so.

Moreover,   petitioner's   interpretation  would   severely   limit   the period   during   which   a   recall   election  may   be   held.   Actually, because no recall  election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local  official,  presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable." Sclex

Indeed,   there   is   a   distinction   between   election   period   and campaign   period.   Under   the   Omnibus   Election   Code,[11] unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30)  days   thereafter.  Thus,   to   follow petitioner's   interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

To   recapitulate   the   discussion   in   parts   1   and   2,   74   imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the   holding   of   a   recall   election  within   one   year   immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC,[12] "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

(3)

On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified

Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution   of   the   COMELEC   ordering   the   holding   of   a   recall election.  He contends   that  a  majority  of   the   signatures  of   the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that  this  is  shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand   at   the   top   of   the   page   on  which   the   signatures   of   the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for   the   first   time   in   this   case.   It   was   not   raised   before   the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of   the   names   in   the   petition  were   double   entries,   that   some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a prejudicial question  which  must   first   be   resolved   before   the   petition   for recall   could   be   given   due   course.   The   order   of   the  COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not  include the  issue now being raised by petitioner. Xlaw

Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out   by   two   parallel   lines   drawn   across   it.   Apparently,   it   was 

mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the   recall   resolution   signified   their   attendance  at   the  meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part.

The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

WHEREFORE,  G.R.  No.  140560   is  DISMISSED   for   lack  of  merit, while   the  petition   in  G.R.  No.  140714  is  DISMISSED for  having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738Complainant, Vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,Respondent

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:  Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu  is  a  co-owner  of a   lot[1] and the building   erected   thereon   located   at   959   San   Andres   Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,   contested   the  possession   of   Elizabeth   C.   Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio  Pastor[3] of  one of   the  units   in   the  building.  The  latter ignored   demands   for   them   to   vacate   the   premises.   Thus,   a 

complaint   was   initiated   against   them   in   the Lupong Tagapamayapa of  Barangay  723,   Zone  79   of   the  5th District   of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

 Respondent,   as punong barangay of   Barangay   723, 

summoned   the   parties   to   conciliation   meetings.[5] When   the parties   failed   to   arrive   at   an   amicable   settlement,   respondent issued a certification for   the  filing of   the  appropriate  action  in court. Thereafter,  Regina and Antonio filed a complaint  for ejectment against  Elizabeth and Pastor   in   the Metropolitan  Trial  Court  of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the  instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed  an  act  of   impropriety   as   a   lawyer   and  as   a  public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In   his   defense,   respondent   claimed   that   one   of   his   duties as punong barangay was   to   hear   complaints   referred   to   the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa.   As   such,   he   heard   the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however,  were   not   able   to   amicably   settle   their   dispute   and Regina  and Antonio  filed  the ejectment  case.   It  was   then  that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He   handled   her   case   for   free   because   she   was   financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her. The   complaint   was   referred   to   the   Integrated   Bar   of   the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar   Discipline   (CBD)   required   the   parties   to   submit   their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties,   the   IBP-CBD   found   sufficient   ground   to   discipline respondent.[7]

 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, 

as punong barangay,   he   presided   over   the   conciliation proceedings   and   heard   the   complaint   of   Regina   and   Antonio against   Elizabeth   and   Pastor.   Subsequently,   however,   he represented   Elizabeth   and   Pastor   in   the   ejectment   case   filed against  them by Regina and Antonio.   In the course thereof,  he prepared   and   signed   pleadings   including   the   answer   with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By   so   doing,   respondent   violated   Rule   6.03   of   the   Code   of Professional Responsibility:

 Rule   6.03   A   lawyer   shall   not, 

after   leaving   government   service,   accept engagement or employment in connection 

with   any  matter   in  which  he   intervened while in said service. Furthermore,   as   an   elective   official,   respondent 

contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

 SEC.   7. Prohibited Acts and

Transactions.   In   addition   to   acts   and omissions   of   public   officials   and employees   now   prescribed   in   the Constitution   and   existing   laws,   the following   shall   constitute  prohibited  acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.   Public   officials and   employees   during   their   incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,   provided   that   such practice will not conflict or tend to   conflict   with   their   official functions;   xxx   (emphasis supplied)

 According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this 

prohibition   constituted   a   breach   of   Canon   1   of   the   Code   of Professional Responsibility:

 CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)For these  infractions,  the IBP-CBD recommended the 

respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act  will   be   dealt  with  more   severely.[9] This  was   adopted   and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

 We   modify   the   foregoing   findings   regarding   the 

transgression of respondent as well  as the recommendation on the imposable penalty. RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.   In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we   ruled   that   Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from   accepting engagement  or   employment   in   connection  with   any  matter   in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

 Respondent   was   an   incumbent punong barangay at 

the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SEC 90 OF RA7160 , NOT SEC 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713 GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or  law,  provided that such practice will  not conflict  or   tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC.   90. Practice of Profession. (a)   All   governors,   city   and   municipal mayors   are   prohibited   from   practicing their   profession   or   engaging   in   any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members   may practice   their   professions, engage   in   any   occupation,   or teach  in  schools  except  during session   hours: Provided, That sanggunian members  who are  members   of   the   Bar   shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before   any   court   in   any   civil case   wherein   a   local government  unit  or any office, agency,   or   instrumentality   of the government  is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer   or   employee   of   the national or local government is accused   of   an   offense committed   in   relation   to   his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their   appearance   in 

administrative   proceedings involving the  local  government unit  of  which he  is  an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel   of   the   Government except   when the sanggunian member concerned   is   defending   the interest of the Government.(c)   Doctors   of   medicine   may practice   their   profession   even during   official   hours   of   work only   on   occasions   of emergency: Provided,   That   the officials   concerned   do   not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

 This is a special provision that applies specifically to the 

practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713,   the   general   law   on   engaging   in   the   private   practice   of profession   by   public   officials   and   employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

 Under   RA   7160,   elective   local   officials   of   provinces, 

cities,   municipalities   and   barangays   are   the   following:   the governor,   the   vice   governor   and  members   of   thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces;  the city mayor,  the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities;  the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for   municipalities   and   the punong barangay,   the  members   of   the sangguniang barangay and   the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

 Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors 

and   municipal   mayors   are   prohibited   from   practicing   their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is  because they are required to render  full  time service.  They should therefore devote all  their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

 On   the   other   hand,   members   of   the sangguniang

panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors   and   municipal   mayors, members   of   the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice 

their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

 While,   as   already   discussed,   certain   local   elective 

officials  (like governors,  mayors,  provincial  board members  and councilors)   are   expressly   subjected   to   a   total   or   partial proscription   to   practice   their   profession   or   engage   in   any occupation,   no   such   interdiction   is   made   on   the punong barangay and   the   members   of   the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since   they   are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed   to  practice   their   profession. And   this   stands   to   reason because   they   are   not   mandated   to   serve   full   time.   In   fact, the sangguniang barangay is   supposed  to  hold   regular   sessions only twice a month.[16]

 Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not 

forbidden   to  practice  his  profession.  However,  he   should  have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

 A LAWYER IN THE GOVT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT  A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage   in   the   private   practice   of   law   only   with   the   written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: 

Sec.   12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private   business,   vocation, or profession or   be   connected   with   any commercial,   credit,   agricultural,   or industrial   undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,   That   this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those   officers   and   employees   whose duties   and   responsibilities   require   that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,  That if  an employee is granted permission to engage in   outside   activities,   time   so   devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the   agency   to   the   end   that   it   will   not impair   in   any  way   the   efficiency   of   the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of   investments,   made   by   an   officer   or employee,  which  do   not   involve   real   or 

apparent   conflict   between   his   private interests and public duties, or in any way influence   him   in   the   discharge   of   his duties,  and he shall  not  take part   in  the management of the enterprise or become an   officer   of   the   board   of   directors. (emphasis supplied)

 As punong barangay,   respondent   should   have 

therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of   Interior   and   Local   Government   before   he   entered   his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

 The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the  law and promote respect for  it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written   permission,   respondent   not   only   engaged   in   the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which   is   a   breach   of   Rule   1.01   of   the   Code   of   Professional Responsibility:

Rule   1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

  For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting   ethical   standards   of   the   legal   profession,   respondent failed   to   comply   with   Canon   7   of   the   Code   of   Professional Responsibility: 

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT   THE   ACTIVITIES   OF   THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. 

In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

 Public  confidence  in   the  law and  in   lawyers  may be 

eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport  himself  in a manner that promotes public confidence in the  integrity of the legal profession.[19]

 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended 

from   his   office   as   an   attorney   for   violation   of   the   lawyers 

oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE,   respondent   Atty.   Vicente   G.   Rellosa   is   hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a   lawyer   and   Canons   1   and   7   and   Rule   1.01   of   the   Code   of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for   a   period   of   six  months   effective   from   his receipt   of   this   resolution.   He   is   sternly WARNED that   any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. Let  a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant   and   entered   into   the   records   of   respondent   Atty. Vicente  G.  Rellosa. The  Office  of   the  Court  Administrator   shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

 SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner questions and seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 27504 dated March 31, 1992, dismissing the petition for having been filed by a private counsel, as well as its succeeding resolution dated June 9, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1

The   records   show   that  on  March  17,   1989,   the  Regional   Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of plaintiff, now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against defendant, now herein private respondent Philippine   Petroleum   Corporation   (PPC,   for   short),   ordering therein   defendant   to   pay   said   plaintiff   (1)   the   amount   of P5,301,385.00   representing   the   tax   on   business   due   from   the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983, inclusive, plus such amount of tax as may accrue until final determination of the case; (2) storage permit fee in the amount of P3,321,730.00 due from   the   defendant   under   Section   10,   paragraph   Z(13) (b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance for the period from 1975 to 1986,   inclusive,  plus   the amount  of  said   fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; (3) mayor's permit fee due from the defendant under Section 10, paragraph (P) (2) of said municipal tax ordinance from 1975 to 1984, inclusive, in the amount of P12,120.00, plus such amount of the same fee as may accrue until final determination of the case; (4) sanitary inspection fee in the amount of P1,010.00 for the period from 1975 to 1984, plus   the   amount   of   this   fee   that   may   accrue   until   final determination of the case; and (5) the costs of suit. 2

On   June   3,   1991,   in   G.R.   No.   90776   this   Court   affirmed   the aforesaid   judgment,  with   the  modification   that   business   taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC because the same have prescribed, and that storage fees are not also to be paid by PPC since the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by the municipality and, therefore, cannot be the bases of a charge for service   by   the  municipality. 3 This   judgment   became   final   and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution.

On October 14,  1991,  in connection with the execution of  said judgment,   Atty.   Felix   E.  Mendiola   filed   a  motion   in   behalf   of plaintiff  municipality  with   the  Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch  78, Morong,  Rizal* for   the  examination  of  defendant   corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose  of   computing   the   tax  on  business   imposed  under   the Local  Tax  Code,  as  amended.  On October  21,  1991,  defendant corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00   as   full   satisfaction   of   the   above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim  documents   executed   by   said  mayor.   Accordingly,   on October   31,   1991   the   court   below   issued   an   order   denying plaintiff municipality's  motion for examination and execution of 

judgment   on   the   ground   that   the   judgment   in   question   had already been satisfied. 4

Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order of October 31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff   municipality   amounted   to   P24,176,599.00,   while   the amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor could not waive   the   balance  which   represents   the   taxes   due   under   the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law firm   of   Atty.   Mendiola   had   registered   two   liens   for   alleged consultancy  services  of  25% and attorneys'   fees  of  25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million. On January 28,1992, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 5

On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality, filed a petition forcertiorari with us, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition   and   was   docketed   therein   as   CA-G.R.   SP   No. 27504. 6 On   March   2,   1992,   respondent   PPC   filed   a   motion questioning   Atty.  Mendiola's   authority   to   represent   petitioner municipality. 7 Consequently, on March 31, 1992 respondent Court of   Appeals   dismissed   the   petition   for   having   been   filed   by   a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla   through   the   proper   provincial   or   municipal   legal officer. 8 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of June 9, 1992. 9

Petitioner is once again before us with the following assignment of errors:

1. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to consider   private   respondent's   new   issue raised   for   the   first   time  on   appeal,   as   it could  no  longer  be  considered on appeal, because it was never been (sic) raised in the court below.

2. It is an error for the Court of Appeals in dismissing   (sic)   the   instant   petition   with alternative remedy of filing similar petition as   it   is   a   departure   from   established jurisprudence.

3. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the filing of the instant petition by the private counsel is in violation of law and jurisprudence. 10

We find the present petition devoid of merit.

The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality   of   Pililla.   The   matter   of   representation   of   a municipality   by   a   private   attorney   has   been   settled   in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 and reiterated  in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 12 where  we   ruled   that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section   1683.  Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation.   —   The   provincial   fiscal   shall represent the province and any municipality or  municipal  district   thereof   in   any  court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in   question   is   a   party   adverse   to   the provincial   government   or   to   some   other municipality   or   municipal   district   in   the same   province.  When   the   interests   of   a provincial  government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve   any   municipality   or   other   political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. 13

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, 14 only the provincial fiscal and   the   municipal   attorney   can   represent   a   province   or municipality   in   their   lawsuits.   The provision   is  mandatory.   The municipality's  authority  to employ a private  lawyer  is  expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. 15

For   the   aforementioned   exception   to   apply,   the   fact   that   the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must   appear   on record. 16 In  the  instant case,   there   is  nothing  in  the  records  to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the  Municipality  of   Pililla   on  appeal,   hence  the  appearance  of herein private counsel is without authority of law.

The   submission  of  Atty.  Mendiola   that   the  exception   is   broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses 

to  handle  the  case  cannot  be  sustained.  The fiscal's   refusal   to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office.  Instead of engaging the services of  a special attorney,  the municipal  council  should request  the Secretary of Justice   to   appoint   an   acting   provincial   fiscal   in   place   of   the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.17

It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel, Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality  itself  in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality. 18

The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality  is  untenable.  The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore   cited, 19 the   issue   of   lack   of   authority   of   private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case   had   become   final   and   executory   and/or   had   been   duly executed.

Furthermore,   even   assuming   that   the   representation   of   the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is  deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter,   through the municipal  mayor  and without  said  counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two   pleadings entitled and constitutive of  a  "Satisfaction of   Judgment"  and a "Release and Quitclaim". 20

A   client,   by   appearing  personally   and  presenting  a  motion   by himself,   is   considered   to   have   impliedly   dismissed   his   lawyer. Herein   counsel   cannot   pretend   to   be   authorized   to   continue representing   the   municipality   since   the   latter   is   entitled   to dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law and under Section 26,  Rule 138 of the Rules of  Court,  a  client  may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings, and   there   is   nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. 21

The   client   has   also   an  undoubted   right   to   compromise   a   suit without the intervention of his lawyer. 22 Even the lawyers' right to 

fees   from   their   clients   may   not   be   invoked   by   the   lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned can  enforce   their   rights   in   the  proper   court   in   an   appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may  not  be  used   to  prevent   the   approval   of   the   compromise agreement. 23

The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition, considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative, is not only   conjectural   but   without   factual   basis.   Contrary   to   his pretensions,   there   is   presently   a   manifestation   and   motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for   the  withdrawal   of   the   "Satisfaction   of   Judgment"   and   the "Release and Quitclaim"24 previously filed  in the case therein as earlier mentioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the   judgment   of   respondent   Court   of   Appeals   is   hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 99425. March 3, 1997]ANTONIO C. RAMOS, ROSALINDA M. PEREZ, NORMA C. CASTILLO and BALIUAG MARKET VENDORS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 19, and MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Who has the legal authority to represent a municipality in lawsuits?   If   an   unauthorized   lawyer   represents   a  municipality, what   is   the   effect   of   his   participation   in   the   proceedings? Parenthetically, does a motion to withdraw the appearance of the unauthorized counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court regarding notice and hearing of motions?

These  questions are  answered  by  this  Court   in   resolving this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision[1] of   public   respondent[2] in   CA-G.R.   SP   No.   23594 promulgated on March 15, 1991, which denied due course to and dismissed the petition therein. Also assailed is the Resolution[3] of public respondent promulgated on May 9, 1991, which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Facts

The facts as found by public respondent are undisputed, to wit:[4]

"On April 18, 1990, petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez,   Norma   C.   Castillo,   and   the   Baliuag   Market   Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo docketed as   Civil   Case   No.   264-M-9   for   the   Declaration   of   Nullity   of Municipal  Ordinances  No.  91   (1976)  and No.  7   (1990)  and  the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.

On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for   the   issuance  of  preliminary   injunction,   the  Provincial   Fiscal appeared   as   counsel   for   respondent   Municipality   of   Baliuag, which  opposed   the petition.  Whereupon,  a  writ  of  preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990.

Meanwhile,   on   May   3,   1990,   the   Provincial   Fiscal   and   the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality.

At   the   pre-trial   conference   scheduled   on  May   28,   1990,   Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990,   respectively,  Atty.   Romanillos   filed   a  motion   to   dissolve injunction   and   a  motion   to   admit   an   Amended   Answer   with motion to dismiss.

On   June   18,   1990,   Provincial   Attorney   Oliviano   D.   Regalado appeared   as   collaborating   counsel   of   Atty.   Romanillos.   The Provincial   Fiscal   did   not   appear.   It   was   Atty.   Romanillos  who submitted the Reply  to- petitioners'  Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve  injunction.  It  was also Atty.  Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence on July 17, 1990 for respondent municipality.

During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of (sic) the respondent   municipality,   which   opposition   was   reiterated   on August 15, 1990, and was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the   proceedings   participated   in   and   undertaken   by   Atty. Romanillos.

Meanwhile,   Atty.   Romanillos   and   Atty.   Regalado   filed   a   joint motion dated August 22, 1990 stating, among others, that Atty. Romanillos   was   withdrawing   as   counsel   for   respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for  respondent  municipality,   is  adopting the entire  proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.

On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order now being   assailed   which,   as   already   stated,   denied   petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality   and   to   declare   null   and   void   the   proceedings participated   in   by   Atty.   Romanillos;   and   on   the   other   hand, granted  Atty.   Regalado's  motion   'to   formally   adopt   the   entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence'. In support of his foregoing action, respondent Judge reasoned:

'Petitioners' motion for the disqualification of Atty. Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is deemed moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of said municipality pursuant to a joint motion dated August 22, 1990, although he shall remain as   counsel   on   record  of  private   respondent  Kristi  Corporation. Atty. Oliviano Regalado under the same joint motion moved for the   adoption   of   the   entire   proceedings   conducted   by collaborating counsel, Atty. Romanillos.

It is noted that Atty. Romanillos initially entered his appearance as collaborating   counsel   of   the   Provincial   Prosecutor   and   the Provincial Attorney when he filed a motion to dissolve injunction under  motion  dated  May  30,  1990  and  since   then  despite  his active participation in the proceedings, the opposing counsel has never  questioned his  appearance  until  after  he made a  formal offer   of   evidence   for   the   respondents.   The   acquiescence   of petitioners,'  counsel  of   (sic)  his  appearance  is   tantamount to  a waiver and petitioners are, therefore, estopped to question the same. In all the pleadings made by Atty. Romanillos, it was clearly indicated that he was appearing as the collaborating counsel of the   Provincial   Attorney.   Besides,   petitioners'   counsel   failed   to submit their comment and/or objection to the said joint motion of respondents'   counsel   as   directed   by   the   Court   within   the reglementary   period.  By   virtue  of   these   circumstances,   all   the proceedings attended to and participated in by said collaborating counsel   is   a fait accompli and   the   Court   finds   no   cogent justification to nullify the same.'

Petitioners'  motion   for   reconsideration  of   the   foregoing  Order was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated October 19, 1990,   the second Order  now being assailed.  Respondent  Judge reiterated   the   observations   which   he   made   in   the   Order   of September 19, 1990 that Atty. Romanillos, while actively handling the said case was merely appearing as the collaborating counsel of both the Provincial Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan; that Atty. Romanillos' appearance was 'never impugned by   petitioners'   and   was   only   questioned   after   his   (Atty. Romanillos')   submission   of   the   formal   offer   of   evidence   for respondent;  and  that   therefore,  said  court  proceedings   'is   (sic) a fait accompli'.   Respondent   Judge   went   on   to   say   that   the declaration of nullity of said proceedings and the re-taking of the same evidence by the same parties is (sic) apparently an exercise in futility'. He added that in the absence of untimely objection by petitioners  to Atty. Romanillos'  appearance as the collaborating counsel, petitioners are guilty of laches for having slept on (sic) their   rights   and   are   estopped   as   their   acquiescence  may   be considered   as  waiver  of   such   right.   Furthermore,   according   to respondent   Judge,   assuming   that   the   proceedings   had   been 'tainted with frailness to render the same legally objectionable', the same has been 'legally remedied' by its formal adoption upon motion of the Provincial Accorney (sic), Atty. Regalado, who is not disqualified to appear as counsel for the municipality of Baliuag, for the reason that by virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 5185 (The Decentralization   Act   of   1967),   the   authority   to   act   as   legal officer/adviser for (sic) civil cases of the province of Bulacan, of which  the municipality  of  Baliuag   is  a  political   subdivision,  has been   transferred   from   the   Provincial   Fiscal   (now   Provincial Prosecutor) of Bulacan to the Provincial Attorney thereof."

As   earlier   stated,   the   Court   of   Appeals   dismissed   the petition and denied the motion for  reconsideration.  Hence this recourse.

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum are:[5]

"1)   Under   present   laws   and   jurisprudence,   can   a municipality be represented in a suit against it by a private counsel?

2) If not, what is the status of the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel;

3) Can the provincial attorney of a province act as counsel of a municipality in a suit;

4) Can the provincial attorney adopt with legal effect the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counselof (sic) a municipality;

5) May  a  court   act  on   an   alleged  motion  which  violates Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."

Petitioners   contend   that   the   assailed   Decision   which affirmed the Orders of the trial court is void for being violative of the following laws:[6]

"VI-1 The   respondent  court  violated   Section  1683 of   the Revised   Administrative   Code;   Section   3, paragraph 3  (a) of Republic Act  No. 2264, otherwise   known   as   the   Local   Autonomy Act;   and   Section   35;   Book   IV,   Title   III, Chapter   12,   Administrative   Code   of   1987 (Executive   Order   No.   292)   when   it authorized Atty.  Oliviano D.  Regalado,   the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan, to appear as counsel   for   respondent   Municipality   of Baliuag.

VI-2 The   respondent   court   violated   Section   1683   of   the Revised   Administrative   Code;   Section   3, paragraph 3  (a) of Republic Act  No. 2264, otherwise   known   as   the   Local   Autonomy Act;  Section 35,  Book  IV,  Title   III,  Chapter 12,   Executive   Order   No.   292,   otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; and   Article   1352   of   the   New   Civil   Code, when  it  denied the petitioners'  motion to declare   the   proceedings   undertaken   or participated   in   by   said   Atty.   Roberto   B. Romanillos,   as   private   counsel   of respondent Municipality, null and void.

VI-3 The respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and   in   grave   abuse  of   discretion  when   it acted and granted the respondent's  JOINT MOTION dated August 22, 1990 (Annex 'H') which, as a rule, is a mere worthless piece of paper which the respondent judge/court has  no  authority   to  act  upon,   considering that said motion was filed in court in patent violation of or without complying with the mandatory   requirements   provided   for   by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court."

Public respondent did not give due course to the petition "because it does not prima facie show justifiable grounds for the issuance of certiorari."[7] Public respondent adds that:[8]

"Considering the foregoing jurisprudence, the logical conclusion is that the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan has now the authority to represent the municipality of Baliuag in its law suits.

It   follows   that   respondent   Judge  was   correct   in   ruling   in   the assailed Order of October 19, 1990 that even assuming, arguendo, that   the   proceedings   by   the   court   a quo which   had   been participated in by Atty. Romanillos are legally objectionable, this was   legally   remedied by  the   formal  adoption by the  provincial Attorney, Atty. Regalado, of the said proceedings, considering that the provincial attorney is not disqualified from representing the municipality of Baliuag in civil cases.

In the second place, the record discloses that Atty. Romanillos had appeared  as   counsel   for   respondent  municipality  of  Baliuag   in collaboration  with   the  Provincial   Prosecutor   and   the Provincial Attorney,   as   shown  in   the  motion  to  dissolve   injunction  dated May 28,  1990 which Atty.  Romanillos  had filed  for   respondent municipality.   Accordingly   and   pursuant   to   the   aforecited provisions   of   law,   it   cannot   correctly   be   said   that   respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed Atty.  Romanillos   to   act   as  private   counsel  and  Atty.  Regalado, Provincial   Attorney   of   Bulacan,   to   appear   as   counsel   for respondent  Municipality  of  Baliuag.  Perforce,   it   also cannot  be correctly   said   that   respondent   Judge   violated   the   aforecited provisions when he denied petitioners' motion to declare null and void the proceedings undertaken by and participated in by Atty. Romanillos as private counsel of the municipality of Baliuag.

At any rate, even granting, only for the sake of argument,   that   Atty.   Romanillos'   appearance   as counsel   for   the   municipality   could   not   be   legally authorized under the aforesaid provisions of law, the fact   that   Atty.   Regalado   as   Provincial   Attorney   of Baliuag   had   formally   adopted   the   proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos as counsel for the municipality of Baliuag had served, as already stated, to cure such a defect.

Thirdly, We are likewise unable to see grave abuse of discretion in respondent Judge's actuation in granting the   joint   motion   filed   by   Atty.   Romanillos   and   Atty. Regalado   for   the  withdrawal   of   the   former   as   private counsel of respondent municipality, and the adoption by the latter of the proceedings participated in/undertaken by   the   former,   including   the   formal   offer   of   evidence submitted by the former."

Public   respondent   likewise   found   that   the   "joint  motion does not partake of  the nature of  an adversarial  motion which would have rendered non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court  fatal  to the motion."[9] It   is  to be emphasized that petitioners "sought the disqualification of Atty. 

Romanillos   x   x   x   (Thus,)  what   petitioners   had   sought   to   (be) achieve(d) in their said motion was in fact what Atty. Romanillos had sought x x x in the joint motion dated August 22, 1990."[10]

Respondent  municipality   submits   that   Section   19   of   RA 5185:

"is not meant to prohibit or prevent the Provincial Attorney to act as legal adviser and legal officer for municipalities and municipal districts because such interpretations would be to say the least, absurb   (sic).   In   this   jurisdiction,   a   province   is   composed   of municipalities   and  municipal   districts,   and   therefore   they   are deemed included in the provisions of Section 19 of Republic Act 5185. It is also impractical and contrary to the spirit of the law to limit   the   sphere  of  authority  of   the  Provincial  Attorney   to   the province only."[11]

The different allegations boil down to three main issues: (1) Who is authorized to represent a municipality in a civil suit against it?   (2)  What   is   the   effect  on   the  proceedings  when  a  private counsel   represents   a   municipality?   Elsewise   stated,   may   the proceedings  be validated by a  provincial  attorney's adoption of the   actions  made  by  a  private  counsel?   (3)  Does   a  motion  of withdrawal  of   such  unauthorized  appearance,  and  adoption of proceedings participated in by such counsel have to comply with Sections 4 and 5[12] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court?

The Court's Ruling

We   affirm   the   Decision   and   Resolution   of   public respondent.

First Issue: Who Is Authorized to Represent a Municipality in Its Lawsuits?

In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals,[13] this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it, thus:[14]

"x x x The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has  been settled  in  Ramos vs. Court  of  Appeals, et al.,[15] and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[16] where   we   ruled   that   private   attorneys   cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

'Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic) original jurisdiction is vested 

in   the   Supreme   Court   or   in   cases   where   the  municipality   or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.'[17]

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law,[18] only the provincial fiscal and   the   municipal   attorney   can   represent   a   province   or municipality   in   their   lawsuits.   The provision   is  mandatory.   The municipality's  authority  to employ a private  lawyer  is  expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.[19]

For   the   aforementioned   exception   to   apply,   the   fact   that   the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record.[20] In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as   counsel   for   the  Municipality  of   Pililla   on   appeal,  hence   the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law."

The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for   the   civil   cases   of   a   province   and   corollarily,   of   the municipalities   thereof,   were   subsequently   transferred   to   the provincial attorney.[21]

The   foregoing  provisions  of   law and   jurisprudence  show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in  its lawsuits.  Only  in exceptional   instances   may   a   private   attorney   be   hired   by   a municipality   to   represent   it   in   lawsuits.   These   exceptions   are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,[22] to wit:[23]

"Indeed, it  appears  that the  law allows a private counsel  to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party   in  a  case  involving the provincial  government or  another municipality  or   city  within   the  province.   This   provision  has   its apparent origin in the ruling inDe Guia v. The Auditor General (44 SCRA   169,   March   29,   1979)   where   the   Court   held   that   the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited  only   to   situations  where   the  provincial  fiscal  would  be disqualified to serve and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative   Code   as   legal   basis,   the   Court   therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez [107   Phil.   932   (1960)]   which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction   of   case   involving   the  municipality   is   vested   in   the 

Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.

Thereafter, in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728, October 30,   1981),   the   Court   ruled   that   a   municipality   may   not   be represented   by   a   private   law   firm  which   had   volunteered   its services gratis,   in collaboration with the municipal  attorney and the fiscal, as such representation was violative of Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the law   appears   to   have   been   dictated   by   the   fact   that   'the municipality  should  not  be  burdened with  expenses of  hiring a private lawyer' and that the interests of the municipality would be best  protected  if   a  government   lawyer  handles   its   litigations."' (Underscoring supplied.)

None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It may   be   said   that   Atty.   Romanillos   appeared   for   respondent municipality   inasmuch   as   he   was   already   counsel   of   Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this same case. The order of the trial court dated September 19, 1990, stated   that   Atty.   Romanillos   "entered   his   appearance   as collaborating   counsel   of   the   provincial   prosecutor   and   the provincial  attorney."[24] This collaboration  is contrary  to  law and hence should not have been recognized as  legal.   It  has already been ruled in this wise:

"The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy  in Civil  Case No. 5095-M. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff."[25]

As   already   stated,   private   lawyers   may   not   represent municipalities   on   their   own.  Neither  may   they   do   so   even   in collaboration   with   authorized   government   lawyers.   This   is anchored on the principle   that only accountable  public  officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers.

Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality  of   the  appearance  of  Atty.  Romanillos,  notwithstanding that   they questioned  the  witnesses  of   respondent  municipality during   the   hearing   of   its   motion   to   dissolve   the   preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals[26] held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. This Court stated that:[27]

"The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his 

lack   of   authority   to   represent   the   municipality   is untenable.  The   legality  of  his   representation  can  be questioned   at   any   stage  of   the   proceedings.   In   the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised   for   the   first  time   in   the   proceedings   for   the collection of  attorney's   fees   for  services  rendered  in the particular case, after the decision in that case had become   final   and   executory   and/or   had   been   duly executed."

Elementary   fairness  dictates   that parties unaware  of   the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality. The rule on appearances of a lawyer is that

"(u)ntil the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under  authority  of   the   litigant  whom he purports   to represent. (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear for   and   represent   petitioner   in   litigation,   not   having   been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for   his   client.   (Republic v. Philippine   Resources   Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960)"[28]

Second Issue: Effect on Proceedings by Adoption of Unauthorized Representation

Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate such proceedings? We agree   with   public   respondent   that   such   adoption   produces validity.   Public   respondent   stated   the   reasons [29] to  which  we agree:

"Moreover,   it   does   not   appear   that   the adoption   of   proceedings   participated   in   or undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel   for   the   respondent  municipality  of  Baliuag such as   the proceedings  on the motion to dissolve the  injunction,  wherein  petitioners  had even cross-examined   the   witnesses   presented   by   Atty. Romanillos  in support of said motion and had even started   to   present   their  witnesses   to   sustain   their objection to the motion would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners'   interest. As We see it, to declare the said proceedings null and void notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty. Regalado  as  Provincial  Attorney  of  Bulacan  who   is authorized to  represent   respondent  municipality  of Baliuag in court and to require trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hear the same witnesses and to admit   the   same evidence adduced by the   same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice."

This   Court   believes   that   conferring   legitimacy   to   the appearance   of   Atty.   Romanillos   would   not   cause   substantial prejudice on petitioners.  Requiring new trial  on the mere  legal technicality that the municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice. After all,   this   Court   does   not   see   any   injustice   committed   against petitioners by the adoption of the work of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served by requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal representative of the town.

In   sum,   although   a  municipality  may  not  hire   a   private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed  in  good faith  by  such private  lawyer,  which work is  beneficial to it  (1) provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse  party  and (2)  provided  further   that  no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the   private   lawyer.   Unless   so   expressly   adopted,   the   private lawyer's work cannot bind the municipality.

Third Issue: "Joint Motion" Need Not Comply with Rule 15

We also agree with the justification of public respondent that a  motion to withdraw the appearance  of an unauthorized lawyer   is  a  non-adversarial  motion   that  need not   comply  with Section   4   of   Rule   15   as   to   notice   to   the   adverse   party.   The disqualification   of   Atty.   Romanillos  was  what   petitioners  were really praying for when they questioned his authority to appear for   the  municipality.   The  disqualification  was   granted,   thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. Such being the case, no "notice directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof"[30] need be given petitioners, the questioned   motion   not   being   contentious.   Besides,   what petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized counsel,  Atty. Regalado.  The action of   the   trial   court  allowing   the  motion of respondent municipality effectively granted petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos. In People vs. Leviste,[31] we ruled that:

"While   it   is   true   that  any  motion   that  does  not comply  with  the requirements  of  Rule  15 should  not be accepted for filing and,  if  filed,   is  not entitled to  judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will  result  in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.  Litigations should,  as much as possible,   be   decided   on   the   merits   and   not   on technicalities.   As   this   Court   held   in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals,   an   order   of   the   court   granting   the  motion   to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of   service   thereof,   is   merely   an   irregularity   in   the proceedings   x   x   x   (which)   cannot   deprive   a   competent court of jurisdiction over the Case."'(Citations omitted).

It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools  designed to  facilitate the attainment of  justice,  such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises   considered,   the   Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The   1987   Constitution   is   borne   of   the   conviction   that   people power can be trusted to check excesses of government. One of the  means   by   which   people   power   can   be   exercised   is   thru initiatives where local ordinances and resolutions can be enacted 

or repealed.  An effort  to  trivialize the effectiveness  of  people's initiatives ought to be rejected.

In   its   Pambayang   Kapasyahan   Blg.   10,   Serye   1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone   in   accord   with   Republic   ActNo. 7227.

On   May   24,   1993,   petitioners   filed   a   petition 2 with   the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:

I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para   sa   pag-anib   ng   Morong   sa   SSEZ   na   walang kondisyon.

II.   Palitan   ito   ng   isang   Pambayang   Kapasiyahan   na aanib   lamang   ang  Morong   sa   SSEZ   kung   ang   mga sumusunod   na   kondisyones   ay   ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan:

(A).   Ibalik   sa   Bataan   ang   "Virgin   Forests"  — isang   bundok   na   hindi   nagagalw   at   punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman.

(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K).   Isama   ang   mga   lupain   ng   Bataan   na nakapaloob   sa   SBMA   sa   pagkukuenta   ng salaping   ipinagkakaloob   ng   pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.

(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.

(E).   Ibase   sa   laki   ng   kanya-kanyang   lupa   ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G).   Ibase   rin  ang  alokasyon ng  pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H).   Pabayaang   bukas   ang  pinto   ng   SBMA na nasa  Morong  ng  24  na  oras  at  bukod  dito   sa 

magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong   at   Hermosa   upang   magkaroon   ng pagkakataong  umunlad   rin   ang  mga  nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.

(I).  Tapusin  ang  pagkokonkreto ng  mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani   at   Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan   para   sa   kabutihan   ng  mga   taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.

(J).  Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong,  Hermosa at Bataan.

The  municipality   of  Morong   did   not   take   any   action   on   the petition within   thirty   (30)  days  after   its  submission.  Petitioners then   resorted   to   their   power   of   initiative   under   the   Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number   of   signatures 4 to   cause   the   repeal   of   said   resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon,  Vice  Mayor  and  Presiding  Officer  of   the  Sangguniang Bayan  ng  Morong,  wrote   a   letter  dated   June  11,   1993   to   the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition   for   a   local   initiative   and/or   referendum   because   the exercise  will   just  promote  divisiveness,   counter  productive and futility." 5 We quote the letter,viz:

The   Executive   DirectorC   O   M   E   L   E   CIntramuros, Metro Manila

S i r:

In   view   of   the   petition   filed   by   a   group   of proponents   headed  by  Gov.   Enrique  T.  Garcia, relative to the conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum   for   the   annulment   of   Pambayang Kapasyahan   Blg.   10,   Serye   1993,   may   we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto   considering   the   issues   raised   by   the proponents   were   favorably   acted   upon   and endorsed   to   Congress   and   other   government agencies by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.

For   your   information   and   guidance,   we   are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the petitioners   with   the   corresponding   actions undertaken   by   the   Sangguniang   Bayan   of Morong, to wit:

ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS

I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.

II.  Palitan  ito ng  isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung:

a)   Ibabalik  sa  Morong ang pag-aaring   Grande   Island, kabundukan   at   Naval Reservation;

b)   Ibase   sa   aring   Lupa   ng   LGU ang   kikitain   at   mapapasok   na manggagawa nila sa SSEZ;

c)   Isama   ang   nasabing   lupa   sa pagkukuwenta   ng   "IRA"   ng Morong,   Hermosa   at Dinalupihan;

d)   Makapagtatag   ng   sariling "economic   zones"   ang  Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;

e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong   patungong   SSEZ   at magbukas ng dalawang (2) pinto pa;

(f)   Konkretohin   ang   daang Morong   papunta   sa   Orani   at Dinalupihan;

g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar.

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG

1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as  the  Bases  Conversion Development  Act of 1992, all actions of LGU's correlating on the   above   issues   are   merely recommendatory   in   nature   when   such provisions  were   already   embodied   in   the statute.

2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan   of   Morong   passed   and   approved 

Pambayang   Kapasyahan   Blg.   18,   Serye 1993,   requesting   Congress   of   the Philippines  to amend certain provisions  of R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg. 12, Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same   issues   raised   by   the   petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).

3.   Item d)   is  already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying letter from BCDA Vice-Chairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated June 3, 1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA.

4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note   over   the   letter   request   of  Morong, Bataan  Mayor   Bienvenido   L.   Vicedo,   the Sangguniang   Bayan   and   Congressman Payumo,   when   the   Resolution   of Concurrence   to   SBMA was   submitted   last April   6,   1993,   order   the   priority implementation of completion of  Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road)  Project,   including the   Morong-Poblacion-Mabayo   Road   to DPWH.   (Attached   and   marked   as   Annex "C").

Based   on   the   foregoing   facts,   the Sangguniang   Bayan   of   Morong   had accommodated   the   clamor   of   the petitioners   in   accordance  with   its   limited powers   over   the   issues.   However,   the Sangguniang   Bayan   of   Morong   cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of   R.A.   7227   that   will   perhaps   drag   for several  months or years,   thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan.

Henceforth,   we   respectfully   reiterate   our request   to   deny   the   petition   for   a   local initiative   and/or   referendum   because   the exercise   will   just   promote   divisiveness, counter productive and futility.

Thank you and more power.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)   EDILBERTO   M.   DE   LEONMun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer

In  its session of  July 6,  1993,  the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground   that   its   subject   is   "merely   a   resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." 6 On July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N.  Casiano,   to  hold   action   on   the   authentication  of signatures being gathered by petitioners. 7

These  COMELEC   resolutions   are   sought   to  be   set  aside   in   the petition at bench. The petition makes the following submissions:

5.   This   is   a   petition for certiorari and mandamus.

5.01  For certiorari,   conformably   to   Sec.   7, Art.   IX   of   the   Constitution,   to   set   aside Comelec Resolution Nos.  93-1676 and 93-1623   (Annexes   "E"   and   "H")   insofar   as   it disallowed the initiation of a local initiative to   annul   PAMBAYANG  KAPASYAHAN  BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and authentication  of   the   required  number  of signatures in support thereof.

5.01.1   As   an administrative agency,   respondent Comelec   is  bound   to observe   due   process in   the  conduct  of   its proceedings.   Here, the   subject resolutions,   Annexes "E"   and   "H",   were issued ex parte and without   affording petitioners   and   the other   proponents   of the   initiative   the opportunity   to   be heard  thereon.  More importantly,   these resolutions   and/or directives were issued with   grave   abuse   of discretion.   A 

Sangguniang   Bayan resolution   being   an act   of   the aforementioned   local legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject   of   initiative. (Sec.   32,   Art.   VI, Constitution)

5.02   For mandamus,   pursuant   to   Sec.   3, Rule  65,  Rules  of  Court,   to   command   the respondent Comelec to schedule forthwith the   continuation   of   the   signing   of   the petition, and should the required number of signatures be obtained,  set  a date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof.

5.02.1   Respondent   Comelec's   authority   in the   matter   of   local   initiative   is   merely ministerial. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering   of   signatures   in   support   of   the petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of signatures are obtained.

If   the   required   number   of signatures   is   obtained,   the Comelec   shall   then   set a date for the initiative during which   the   proposition   shall be   submitted   to   the registered voters in the local government  unit   concerned for   their   approval within sixty (60) days from the date of   certification   by   the Comelec,   as provided   in subsection   (g)   hereof,   in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities,   and   thirty (30)   days   in   case of barangays.   The   initiative shall   then   be   held   on   the date   set,   after   which the results   thereof   shall   be certified  and  proclaimed  by the   Comelec.   (Sec.   22, par. (h) R.A. 7160. 

Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the Local 

Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject   of   a   local   initiative.   The   same   stance   is assumed   by   the   respondent   Sangguniang   Bayan   of Morong. 8

We grant the petition.

The   case   at  bench   is   of   transcendental   significance  because   it involves an issue of first impression — delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of   legislative  power,  original  and  derivative.  Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative   power   is   that   which   has   been   delegated   by   the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people." 9

Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary   laws.   Section   1,   Article   VI   of   the   1935   Constitution delegated   legislative   power   to   Congress,   thus   "the   legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist  of  a  Senate and a House of  Representatives."  Similarly, section   1,   Article   VIII   of   the   1973   Constitution,   as   amended, provided that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa." 10

Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact   laws   for   their   benefit.   So   total  was   their   trust   that   the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The omission was to prove unfortunate. In the 70's and   until   the   EDSA   revolution,   the   legislature   failed   the expectations   of   the   people   especially   when   former   President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which could have bridled the nation's downslide from democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day.

In   February   1986,   the   people   took   a   direct   hand   in   the determination   of   their   destiny.   They   toppled   down   the government  of   former  President Marcos  in  a  historic  bloodless revolution. The Constitution was rewritten to embody the lessons of   their   sad   experience.   One   of   the   lessons   is   the   folly   of completely   surrendering   the   power   to   make   laws   to   the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American Constitution." 11

For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law. To be sure, it was a late awakening.   As   early   as   1898,   the   state   of   South   Dakota   has 

adopted initiative and referendum in its constitution 12 and many states have followed suit. 13 In any event, the framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate   weapon   of   the   people   to   negate   government malfeasance   and   misfeasance   and   they   put   in   place   an overarching   system.   Thus,   thru   an   initiative,   the   people  were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at   least  twelve per centum of the total  number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at   least   three per centum of   the   registered   voters   therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide:

Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in   the   Congress   of   the   Philippines  which shall   consist   of   a   Senate   and  a  House  of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 32.   The   Congress   shall,   as   early   as possible,  provide  for a system of  initiative and   referendum,   and   the   exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose   and   enact   laws   or   approve   or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by   the   Congress   or   local   legislative   body after the registration of a petition therefor signed   by   at   least   ten per centum of   the total number of registered voters, of which every   legislative   district   must   be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereto.

The  COMELEC  was   also  empowered   to  enforce   and administer   all   laws   and   regulations   relative   to   the conduct of an initiative and referendum. 14 Worthwhile noting   is   the   scope   of   coverage   of   an   initiative   or referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra — any act or law passed   by Congress or local legislative body.

In   due   time,   Congress   respondent   to   the   mandate   of   the Constitution.   It   enacted   laws   to   put   into   operation   the constitutionalized   concept   of   initiative   and   referendum.   On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act   Providing   for   a   System   of   Initiative   and   Referendum   and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American 

laws, 15 R.A.   No.   6735,   among   others,   spelled   out   the requirements 16 for   the  exercise  of   the   power  of   initiative  and referendum,   the   conduct   of   national   initiative   and referendum; 17 procedure of local initiative and referendum; 18 and their limitations. 19 Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and referendum.

In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the   case   at   bench   is  whether  Pambayang  Kapasyahan  Blg.  10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper   subject  of   an   initiative.  Respondents   take   the  negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local  Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

We reject respondents'  narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The   Constitution   clearly   includes   not   only   ordinances   but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as   early   as   possible,   provide   for   a   system   of   initiative   and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can   directly  propose   and  enact   laws  or   approve   or   reject any act or   law   or   part   thereof   passed   by   the   Congress,   or   local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act  as "an expression of  will  or  purpose  .   .   .   it  may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and   determinations   .   .   .   ."   It   is   basic   that   a   law   should   be construed   in   harmony   with   and   not   in   violation   of   the constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if  there  is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative,   if   the   words   or   provisions   are   obscure,   or   if   the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation  will   be   adopted   which  will   avoid   the   effect   of unconstitutionality,   even   though   it  may   be   necessary,   for   this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used." 22

The constitutional  command to  include acts (i.e.,  resolutions) as appropriate subjects of  initiative was  implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for   a   System   of   Initiative   and   Referendum   and   Appropriating 

Funds   Therefor."   Thus,   its   section   3(a)   expressly   includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean;

(a)   "Initiative"   is   the power   of   the   people   to   propose amendments   to   the   Constitution   or   to propose and enact   legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There   are   three   (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1.   Initiative   on   the Constitution   which   refers   to   a   petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.

a.2.   Initiative   on statutes   which   refers   to   a   petition proposing   to   enact   a   national   legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation   which   refers   to   a   petition proposing   to   enact   a   regional,   provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours)

Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative   Bodies  —   Any   proposition   on   ordinance orresolution approved through the system of initiative and   referendum   as   herein   provided   shall   not   be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom . . .  ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re  Rules   and  Regulations  Governing   the  Conduct  of Initiative   on   the   Constitution,   and   Initiative   and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative — The power of initiative may be exercised to   amend   the   Constitution,   or   to   enact   a   national legislation,   a   regional,   provincial,   city,   municipal   or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."

There   can   hardly   be   any   doubt   that   when   Congress   enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper subjects of   local   initiatives.  The  debates  confirm  this   intent.  We  quote 

some   of   the   interpellations   when   the   Conference   Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of Representatives, viz:

THE  SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE.  The  Gentleman   from Camarines Sur is recognized.

MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and   the   consolidated   House   Bill   No.   21505  which refers   to   the   system providing   for   the   initiative ad referendum,   fundamentally,   Mr.   Speaker,   we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both   versions   are   totally   intact   in   the   bill.   The Senators   ironically   provided   for   local   initiative  and referendum   and   the   House   of   Representatives correctly  provided for   initiative and  referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.

I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?

MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?

MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.

THE   SPEAKER   PRO   TEMPORE.   The   Gentleman  will please proceed.

MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference   in   the   two   bills  was   that   in   the   Senate version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.

MR.   ROCO.   In   fact,   the   Senate   version   provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version,  we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.

MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.?

MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR.   ALBANO.   So   that   we   will   now   have a complete initiative   and   referendum   both   in   the constitutional amendment and national legislation.

MR. ROCO. That is correct.

MR.   ALBANO.   And   provincial   as   well   as municipal resolutions?

MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance  with   the   provision   of   the   Constitution whereby   it   mandates   this   Congress   to   enact   the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be done every five years.  Is  it  five years in the provision of the Constitution?

MR.   ROCO.   That   is   correct,   Mr.   Speaker.   For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years. 23

Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely  defines the  concept of   local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local   government  unit  may  directly   propose,   enact,   or   amend any ordinance.   It  does  not,  however,  deal  with   the  subjects  or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:

Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The  power  of   local   initiative   shall   not  be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.

xxx xxx xxx

This provision clearly does not limit the application of local   initiatives to  ordinances,  but  to  all  "subjects  or matters   which   are   within   the   legal   powers   of   the Sanggunians   to   enact,"  which   undoubtedly   includes 

resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125   of   the   same  Code  which   provides:   "Limitations upon   Sanggunians.   —   Any proposition or   ordinance approved   through   the   system   of   initiative   and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified   or   amended  by   the   sanggunian   concerned within  six   (6) months from the date of  the approval thereof   .   .   .   ."   Certainly,   the   inclusion   of   the wordproposition is   inconsistent   with   respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives.   The   principal   author   of   the   Local Government  Code  of  1991,   former  Senator  Aquilino Pimentel,   espouses   the   same   view.   In   his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz: 24

4. Subject Matter Of  Initiative. All  sorts of measures   may   be   the   subject   of   direct initiative for as long as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California,   for   example,   direct   initiatives were  proposed   to   enact   a   fishing   control bill,   to   regulate   the   practice   of chiropractors, to levy a special tax to secure a   new   library,   to   grant   a   franchise   to   a railroad   company,   and   to   prevent discrimination   in   the   sale   of   housing   and similar bills.

Direct   initiative   on   the   local   lever   may, therefore,   cover   all   kinds   of   measures provided that these are within the power of the  local  Sanggunians  to enact,   subject  of course to the other requisites enumerated in the Section.

5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the  measure,   the   section   speaks   only   of "ordinance," although the measure may be contained in a resolution.  If the registered voters   can   propose   ordinances,   why   are they   not   allowed   to   propose   resolutions too?  Moreover,   the  wording   of   Sec.   125, below,   which   deals   not   only   with ordinances   but   with   "any   proposition" implies   the   inclusion   of   resolutions.   The discussion hereunder will also show support for   the   conclusion   that   resolutions   may indeed be the subject of local initiative.

We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies   in  the well  known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance   —   i.e.,   that   a   resolution   is   used   whenever   the 

legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct   and   control   matters   applying   to   persons   or   things   in general. 25 Thus,   resolutions   are   not   normally   subject   to referendum  for   it  may  destroy   the  efficiency  necessary   to   the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. 26

In   the  case  at  bench,  however,   it   can  not  be  argued   that   the subject  matter of  the resolution of  the municipality  of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent   rule   of   conduct   or   government.   The   inclusion   of Morong   as   part   of   the   Subic   Special   Economic   Zone   has   far reaching   implications   in   the   governance   of   its   people.   This   is apparent from a reading of section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 entitled   "An   Act   Accelerating   the   Conversion   of   Military Reservations   Into   Other   Productive   Uses,   Creating   the   Bases Conversion   and   Development   Authority   For   This   Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit:

Sec.   12.   Subic Special Economic Zone.  — Subject to the concurrence by resolution of thesangguniang panlungsod of   the  City  of Olongapo   and   the sangguniang bayan of the   Municipalities   of   Subic,   Morong   and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of  Subic,  Province  of   Zambales,   the   lands occupied by   the  Subic  Naval  Base  and   its contiguous   extensions   as   embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases  Agreement  between  the Philippines and   the   United   States   of   America   as amended,   and   within   the   territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and   Hermosa,   Province   of   Bataan, hereinafter   referred   to   a   as   the   Subic Special   Economic   Zone  whose  metes   and bounds   shall   be   delineated   in   a proclamation to be issued by the President of   the  Philippines.  Within   thirty   (30)  days after   the   approval   of   this  Act,   each   local government unit shall submit its resolution of   concurrence   to   join   the   Subic   Special Economic   Zone   to   the   Office   of   the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines   shall   issue   a   proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.

The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and   the   pertinent   provisions   of   the   Local Government   Code,   the   Subic   Special Economic  Zone   shall  be  developed   into   a self-sustaining,   industrial,   commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment   opportunities   in   and   around the   zone   and   to   attract   and   promote productive foreign investments;

(b)  The Subic  Special  Economic  Zone shall be   operated   and  managed   as   a   separate customs   territory   ensuring   free   flow   or movement of goods and capital within, into a   exported   out   of   the   Subic   Special Economic   Zone,   as   well   as   provide incentives   such   as   tax   and   duty-free importations   of   raw  material,   capital   and equipment.   However,   exportations   or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic  Special  Economic  Zone to the  other parts   of   the   Philippine   territory   shall   be subject to customs duties and taxes under the   Customs   and   Tariff   Code   and   other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:

(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations   to   the   contrary notwithstanding,   no   taxes,   local   and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special   Economic   Zone.   In   lieu   of   paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the of the gross income   earned   by   all   businesses   and enterprises   within   the   Subic   Special Economic   Zone   shall   be   remitted   to   the National   Government   one   percent   (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In   addition,   there   is   hereby  established  a development  fund of  one percent   (1%) of the gross  income earned by all businesses and   enterprises   within   the   Subic   Special Economic   Zone   to   be   utilized   for   the development  of  municipalities  outside  the City  of  Olongapo   and   the  Municipality   of Subic,  and other  municipalities  contiguous to the base areas.

In   case   of   conflict   between   national   and local   laws  with   respect   to   tax   exemption privileges   in   the   Subic   Special   Economic 

Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d)   No   exchange   control   policy   shall   be applied   and   free   markets   for   foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be   allowed   and  maintained   in   the   Subic Special Economic Zone;

(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board,   shall   supervise   and   regulate   the operations   of   banks   and   other   financial institutions   within   the   Subic   Special Economic Zone;

(f)  Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;

(g)   Any   investor  within   the   Subic   Special Economic   Zone   whose   continuing investment   shall   not   be   less   than   Two hundred fifty  thousand dollars   ($250,000), his/her   spouse   and   dependent   children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted  permanent   resident   status  within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from   the   Subic   Special   Economic   Zone without  any  need of   special  authorization from   the   Bureau   of   Immigration   and Deportation.   The   Subic   Bay  Metropolitan Authority referred to  in Section 13 of  this Act may also issue working visas renewable every   two   (2)   years   to   foreign  executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills   which   no   Filipino   within   the   Subic Special   Economic   Zone   possesses,   as certified  by  the  Department  of   Labor  and Employment.  The names of aliens granted permanent   residence   status   and   working visas   by   the   Subic   Bay   Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and  Deportation  within  thirty (30) days after issuance thereof.

(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall 

provide   and   establish   its   own   internal security and fire fighting forces; and

(i)   Except   as   herein   provided,   the   local government   units   comprising   the   Subic Special   Economic   Zone   shall   retain   their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be   governed   by   their   respective   charters and   the   municipalities   shall   operate   and function   in   accordance  with   Republic   Act No.   7160,   otherwise   known   as   the   Local Government Code of 1991.

In   relation   thereto,   section   14   of   the   same   law provides:

Sec.   14.  Relationship  with   the  Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units. —

(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations   to   the   contrary notwithstanding,   the  Subic  Authority   shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over the Subic Special  Economic  Zone  in   conformity  with the   oversight   function   of   the   Conversion Authority.

(b)   In   case  of   conflict   between   the   Subic Authority   and   the   local   government  units concerned  on  matters   affecting   the   Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and   security,   the   decision   of   the   Subic Authority shall prevail.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the   social,   political,   and   economic   existence   of   the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material   that   the   decision   of   the   municipality   of Morong   for   the   inclusion   came   in   the   form   of   a resolution for  what  matters   is   its enduring  effect  on the welfare of the people of Morong.

Finally,   it   cannot   be   gained   that   petitioners  were   denied   due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice  Mayor  Edilberto  M.  de Leon to  the  respondent  COMELEC praying   for   denial   of   their   petition   for   a   local   initiative   on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any 

fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the mushrooming abuses in government.

IN   VIEW  WHEREOF,   the   petition   is   GRANTED   and   COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July  6,  1993 and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.