Digester:Ernesto C. Herrera III CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V. DIR. OF LANDS Date of Case: October 17, 1910 DOCTRINE: For the purpose of the establishment of new pueblos in this Archipelago, at the beginning of its occupation by the Spaniards, an endeavor was always made to find, in favorable places, a nucleus of inhabitants and, later, near the pueblos already established, barrios, which ordinarily served as a basis for the formation of other new pueblos that became a populated as the centers on which they were dependent. The Laws of the Indies was followed in the establishment and laying out of new towns. Petitioner: Municipality of Catbalogan represented by its President Respondent: Director of Lands represented by the Attorney-General FACTS:1.The Municipal President of Catbalogan wanted to register a parcel of land where its courthouse was located.2.On June 19, 1908, He filed an application with the Court of Land Registration in which he asked for registration in conformity with the Land Registration Act.3.The Director of Lands through the Attorney-General opposed the application and claimed that the property belonged to the United States and was under the control of the Government of the Philippine Islands. 4.The Court of Land Registration ordered that the land in question be awarded and registered in the name of the municipality of Catbalogan. Issue(s) Municipality of Catbalogan Director of Lands Supreme Court 1.WON the lot belongs to the municipality of Catbalogan 1.thatthesaidlandwasacquiredby possession and material occupation for a large number of years and is at present occupied by theapplicantasamunicipalcorporationduly organized (acquisitive prescription). 2.Thelandindisputeisabuildinglotof whichthepuebloofCatbaloganhadabsolute need at the beginning of its organization for the erection thereon of its court-house. 1.Thelotindisputeis astatelandunder thecontrolofthe Insular Government. 2. The land in dispute is common. 1. Since Spanish occupation, the policy of the state has been to form new pueblos and seek out the nucleus of inhabitants. The Laws of the Indies was followed in lay-outing new towns. 2.Whileviceroyshadthepowertodesignate commonlands,theycouldnotassignthelocationof courthouses and churches because only the Provincial government could do so. 3.CatbaloganwastheprovincialseatofSamar andassuchhaddesignatedthelandwhereits courthouse would be erected hence, the land in dispute hasbeenconsideredasbienpropiopatrimonial property of the municipality. 4.Catbaloganhasbeeninpossessionandhasbeen exercising ownership of the land for 40 to 45 years. The presumption therefore is that it is the owner of the land. Dispositive Portion:Judgment of the Court of Land Registration is Affirmed declaring that the municipality of Catbalogan is the owner of the land occupied by its court-houseandthatitisentitledtohavethesaidpropertyregisteredinitsnameintheCourtofLandRegistration. Digester:Ansis V. PornillosCASE TITLE: MONDANO vs. SILVOSA Date of Case: May 30, 1955 DOCTRINE: In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a crime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. Petitioner: Jose Mondano Mayor of Mainit, Surigao Respondent: Fernando Silvosa, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the Provincial Board, FACTS:Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for (1) rape committed on his daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with his daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Issue 1 Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Gov. Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Governor has no power to suspend a mayor since it presupposes that the governor has control over a mayor. Supreme Court: NO. Governor only has supervision over city/municipal officers and has no control over them RATIO: In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities. Dispositive Portion: The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs. Digester:Renz Ruiz CASE TITLE: Ganzon v. CA1

Date of Case: August 5, 1991 DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution has not repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. Supervision" and "Removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. Petitioner: RODOLFO T. GANZON, Mayor of Iloilo City Respondent: LUIS SANTOS, Secretary of the Department of Local Government FACTS:This petition originated from 10 administrative complaints filed against Mayor Ganzon by various city officials in 1988, on various charges of abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Among others, Mayor Ganzon is claimed to have: 1)Removed a clerk assigned to the City Health from her position for allegedly supporting the rival candidate during the elections 2)Padlocking the office of an Assistant Health Officer and withholding her salary without explanation or justification 3)Padlocking the office of a Councilor without notice and harassing the latter with armed men when the latter held office in the town plaza Finding probable grounds, the respondent issued a preventive suspension2 order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. Later, another 60-day preventive suspension arising from the arbitrary detention case was issued. Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the respondent issued a 3rd 60-day preventive suspension against Mayor Ganzon and designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor. The cases filed in the CA were consolidated by the SC. ISSUESPETITIONERS CONTENTIONRESPONDENTS CONTENTION Supreme Court WON the 1987 Constitution, inAccording to petitioner, the Constitution isNo discussionNO, the Constitution does not divest President of the 1 Since my topic is under B. Brief History... of the Syllabus, let me quote here the relevant provision in the 1987 & 1935 Constitution (These were also quoted in the case): Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions (1987 Consitution) Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (1935 Constitution) 2 ...in meting out the suspensions, the Secretary acted in consonance with the provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. power to discipline local officials. Notwithstanding the omission, the charter did not divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission merely underscores local governments' autonomy from congress. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government. Also, in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. However, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". Hence, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. WON third suspension validNoneNoneVALID, but succeeding suspensions precluded. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. The sole objective of a suspension is "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. Imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to make his suspension permanent. We are therefore allowing Mayor Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension...We are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. Dispositive Portion:WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. Digester: M. Espinal Vilas v. City of Manila April 3, 1911 DOCTRINE: A change in sovereignty does not operate to destroy the municipal laws of the affected territory and they continue in force until altered or repealed by the new government or sovereign. Petitioner: Verisimo Vasquez Vilas, Esperanza Otero Trigas, Ricardo Aguado (whose cases were all elevated to the US Supreme Court upon consolidation) Respondent: City of Manila FACTS: The petitioners were creditors of the City of Manila when it was still under Spanish sovereignty.They are now trying to collect on their claims from the city which has since been reincorporated (in 1901), following the cession of the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of Paris. [During this era, decisions by the Philippine Supreme Court were reviewable by the US Supreme Court if the dispute involved a United States Treaty.] Issue:What was the legal consequence of the cession upon the property rights and civil obligations of the city incurred before the cession? Petitioners Contention: That the obligations of the former municipal corporation passed on to the city as now incorporated Respondents Contention: That the liability of the city was effectively extinguished by the change of sovereignty.Such stance is anchored on the analogous relationship between principal and agent, whereby the agency is destroyed upon the death of the principal.The supposed death/annihilation of the municipal entity was deemed so complete that, in one of the opinions in the court a quo, it was even held that since the United States had already paid the consideration for the cession, the new municipal entity created thus became free of any obligation to the creditors of the former entity and the suggestion was that the petitioners claim may be pursued more properly against the Spanish Crown which has received payment from the United States. SC: The respondents contention fails to convince.Their argument loses sight of the dual nature of municipal corporations, which is both governmental and proprietary.In the latter character, the corporation is deemed a corporate legal individual existing for private purposes. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession.True, there arises a total abrogation of the political relations with the former sovereign, but that body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. The Charter of the City itself provides that the new entity shall possess all the rights of property enjoyed by the City of Manila as organized under Spanish sovereignty and adds that all ordinances/orders in force and not inconsistent thereto were to be preserved until modified or repealed.There is not the slightest suggestion that the new corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old and no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of the old municipality is intended to permit an escape from the obligations of the old. The US Supreme Court, in Shapleigh v. San Angelo, has earlier held: An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is treated as the successor of the old one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities. Dispositive: Cases reversed and remanded. (Special mention was made of the Aguado case. Aguado became a creditor by virtue of a contract for the supply of coal intended for the citys waterworks.A special fund known as the Carriedo fund had been put up for the purpose of establishing the waterworks project and for which the city had been the trustee. The case states that no evidence was established whether the credit for the supply of coal had been given to the Carriedo fund or to the general credit of the city.Nevertheless, the debt having been incurred by the city, it also must be regarded as a city liability.) Digester: Jel GallegoLIDASAN v. COMELEC October 25, 1967; G.R. No. L-28089 DOCTRINE: Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality: population, territory, and income. Petitioner: Bara Lidasan resident & taxpayer from Parang Cotabato, a qualified voter for 1967 electionsRespondent: Commission on Elections- description FACTS:1.18 June 1966: Republic Act 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" was enacted into law. 2.It was later found that barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. 3.15Aug1967:COMELECadoptedaresolutionwhichresolvedthatthese12barrios,situatedin2municipalitiesintheprovinceofCotabato,willbe transferred to the province of Lanao Del Sur to form part of the new municipality of Dianaton.4.Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to the COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation. 5.20Sept1967:COMELEC,byresolution,stoodbyitsowninterpretationanddeclaredthatthestatute"shouldbeimplementedunlessdeclared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." 6.Hence, this original action for certiorari and prohibition by Lidasan, praying that RA 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that COMELECs resolutions be nullified. ISSUEPETITIONERRESPONDENTSUPREME COURT WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional YES RA 4790 is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but includes barrios located in Cotabato. It is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title. NO YES Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Compliance of the latter is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. Change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; technical accuracy is not essential; the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. Title projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. It is misleading and deceptive for legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." did not reflect this fact. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur (with the nullification of the portion which took away the 12 barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato) YESRule is that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld NO, RA 4790 is indivisible & null and void in its totality. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income.It is clear from the explanatory note3 of the House Bill 1247, creating the town of Dianaton that these factors were considered and they were considering the original 21 barrios which comprise the new municipality and not simply the 9 remaining barrios. WON petitioner has legal standing to bring this suit Petitioner is not a real party in interest. He has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of RA 4790. YES, Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. Since constitutional direction, the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress. Dispositive Portion: We vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes. FERNANDO, J., dissenting: Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. Fact that barrios found in 2 other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. What Consti precludes is the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that. The Consti provision must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in Courts as opposed to the strict and technical interpretation given the Court herein. For instance, in Radiowealth v. Agregado, he noted that certain provisions of the Admin Code were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law. In re Guaria: "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law 3 The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy. Digester:Roddel Paraos CASE TITLE: Republic v City of Davao Date of Case: September 12, 2002 DOCTRINE: Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual functionsgovernmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and advancement of public good/welfare asaffectingthepublicgenerally.Here,theLGUactsasanagencyofthenationalgovernment.Proprietaryfunctionsarethosethatseektoobtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent of the community in administration of local affairs. Civil Code of the Philippines, Book 1, Chapter 3, Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:(1)The State and its political subdivisions; x x x Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by DENR Sec Heherson Alvarez et al. Respondent: City of Davao, represented by Mayor Benjamin De Guzman FACTS:Petition for review on certiorari assailing RTC Davaos decision which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favour of respondent City of Davao, against petitioner Republic. The court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favour of respondent. RespondentfiledanapplicationforCertofNon-Coverage(CNC)foritsproposedproject,DavaocityArticaSportsDome,withtheEnvironmentalManagement Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached were the following:a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the projectis not located inanenvironmentally criticalarea (ECA). TheEMB denied the application after finding thatthe proposed project was within an environmentally critical area, and pursuant to sec 2, PD 1586, in relation to Sec 4 of PD 1151, the City of Davao must undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before it can proceed with the project. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus, and alleged that the project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area, hence out of scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was DENRs ministerial duty to issue a CNC upon submission of the required documents. The RTC said that there is nothing in PD 1586 in relation to PD 1151 and LOI 1179 that requires LGUs to comply with the EIS. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national govt, including GOCCs, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process. Since the LGU is not an agency or instrumentality of the national govt, it is deemed excludedexpresio unius est exclusion alterius. TheRTCalsoagreedwithrespondentthatthesitefortheArticaSportsDomewasnotwithinanenvironmentallycriticalarea.Neitherwastheprojectan environmentally critical one. Hence, it was mandatory for DENR to approve respondents application for CNC. Supervening event: change of administration, respondent agreed with petitioner that it needs to secure an ECC, rendering the petition moot and academic, but the SC still addressed the issue in the case. WON LGUs are part of the EIS system N/AN/AYes, LGUs are part of the EIS system. Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual functionsgovernmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and advancement of public good/welfare as affecting the public generally. Here, the LGU acts as an agency of the national government. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent of the community in administration of local affairs. Sec 16 of the LGC shows the duty of the LGU to promote the peoples right to a balance ecology. Hence, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from coverage of PD 1586. An LGU has the duty to ensure quality of the environment, which is the objective of PD 1586. The law must be interpreted in its entirety, and the RTC failed to take into account other parts of PD 15864. Sec 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. A person is either natural or juridical. The State and its political subdivisions (LGUs) are juridical persons, hence not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586. Sec 1 of the same law shows that it intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection (sustainable development), and that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all sectors of the community are involved. LGUs as part of the machinery of the govt cannot be deemed outside the scope of EIS system. WON the project involved is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical areaYes it is within an environmentally critical area No it is not within an environmentally critical area, nor is it an environmentally critical project The arguments above presuppose that the project is environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. But respondent City of Davao has sufficiently shown that the said project is not. 4 WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the eigencies of socio!economic underta"ings can be reconciled with the re#uirements of environmental #uality$ %Section &% Policy. 't is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio!economic growth and environmental protection%

Section 4% ( Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. )he *resident of the *hilippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the +ational Environmental *rotection ,ouncil, by proclamation declare certain pro-ects, underta"ings or areas in the country as environmentally critical% +o person, partnership or corporation shall underta"e or operate any such declared environmentally critical pro-ect or area without first securing an Environmental ,ompliance ,ertificate issued by the *resident or his duly authorized representative% .or the proper management of said critical pro-ect or area, the *resident may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities% RTC found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area, nor is it an environmentally critical project after considering the evidence5. The SC said that none of the exceptional circumstances when the court may disregard findings of the RTC is present. Under Art II, sec 1 of the IRR of PD 1586, the declaration of certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586. Pursuant to this, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued proclaiming certain areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System. The SC said that the Artica Sports Dome does not come close to any of the projects or areas enumerated in such Proclamation. Neither is it analogous to any of them. The project then is not environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Hence, DENR has no choice but to issue a CNC, a ministerial duty which can be compelled via mandamus. Dispositive Portion: Petition DENIED. RTC decision granting the writ of mandamus and directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED. No separate opinions. /Evidence submitted by the respondent0 &% ,ertification from the ,ity *lanning and 1evelopment 2ffice that the pro-ect is not located in an environmentally critical area$3% ,ertification from the ,ommunity Environment and +atural Resources 2ffice 4,E+R2!West5 that the pro-ect area is within the &6!789 slope, is outside the scope of the +'*AS 4R%A% :/6;5, and not within a declared watershed area$ and7% ,ertification from *H'indanao .ault$ and is outside the re#uired minimum buffer zone of five 4/5 meters from a fault zone% Digester:JFD MADARANG PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. COMMISSIONERS, COA et al 28 September 2010 : J. CARPIO DOCTRINE: An LGU is under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution. Under said general supervision, the Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. He does not have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Petitioner: Negros Occidental is represented by Gov. Isidro ZaycoRespondent: Commission on Audit officers and employees: Commissioners, Director, Cluster IV-Visayas, Regional Cluster Diirectors, Provincial Auditor FACTS:In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A allocating P4M of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. Philcam Care won the bidding for the insurance coverage. Then-Gov. Coscolluela and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. The total premium amount was paid on 25 January 1996. In 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as provided under AO 103, and for violating RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law. In a Memorandum, then Pres. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of P100K.Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued Notice of Disallowance. Upon appeal, the COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor's disallowance. IssuePETITIONERS CONTENTIONRESPONDENTS CONTENTIONSupreme Court WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees Payment of the insurance premium for the health benefits of its officers and employees was not unlawful and improper since it was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance. Such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle of local fiscal autonomy.Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 (SSL) and their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and applicable auditing rules and regulations enforced by the COA. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution. The Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but he cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules.Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need the approval of the President to be valid. LGUs are only agents of the national government and local autonomy simply means decentralization. An LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base. Grant of additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits, must have prior Presidential approval to conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government workers. AO 103, which required prior approval from the President before granting additional benefits to government personnel, only applies to government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards under the Executive branch, as stated in its Sec. 2. LGUs are not included. This is consistent with Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE (the) Decision(s) of the Commission on Audit. Digester:Romero CASE TITLE: Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. Date of Case: March 16, 2011 DOCTRINE: It cannot be said that the power to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and municipal legislative bodies under LGC Sec. 20. Said section only articulates a power of local legislatures, which previously had only been implied or inferred. Petitioner: Department of Agrarian Reform Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. on behalf of alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of subject property; intervened only in the proceedings in the CA. Respondent: E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc (EMRAS) owner of disputed properties FACTS:1965:EMRAS bought 372 hectares of unirrigated land in Dasmarinas, Cavite to develop it into a residential subdivision. 1972: EMRAS applied for authority to convert and develop 372 hectare property into a residential subdivision. 1972: Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A approving EMRAS application. 1988: RA 6657 (CARP Law) took effect. Note: To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to date of effectivity. [Sec 3(c) of CARP Law] 1990: DAR Secretary sent out notices of acquisition covering 303 hectares of EMRAS property for acquisition under CARP Law. EMRAS filed petition to nullify notices of acquisition with DARAB. DARAB: Notices of acquisition null and void.EMRAS property is exempt from CARP because subject lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before 1988, therefore no longer convered by CARP. DAR SECRETARY:Affirmed notices of acquisition. OFFICE OF tHE PRESIDENT:EMRAS property remained agricultural. Subject of CARP acquisition. CA:In favor of EMRAS. Subject property already converted as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to effectivity of CARP Law. Notices of acquisition declared void. Issue 1 Whether the subject property could be placed PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Municipal Ordinance 29-A did not reclassify subject property from agri to non-agri.The power to reclassify lands is an inherent power of the Legislature under the Public Land Act, which, absent a specific delegation, could not RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Cites jurisprudence (Ortigas & Co v Feati Bank) wherein SC rued that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations under Sec. 3 Supreme Court No, subject property could not be placed under the CARP. Zoning classification is an exercise by the local govt under the CARP. be exercised by an LGU. The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 (in effect when Municipality of Dasmarinas approved Ordinance 29-A) merely delegated to cities and municipalities zoning authority. It was only Sec. 20 of LGC of 1991 that extended to cities and municipalities limited authority to reclassify lands. of the Local Autonomy Act. The Municipality could validly zone and reclassify the subject property in the exercise of its police power in order to safeguard health, safety, peace, good order, and general welfare of the people in the locality.EMRAS mentioned that residential subdivisions and industrial estatesthe surround the area of their property. of police power, not the power of eminent domain.A Zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logincally arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agri uses, embodied in the land use plan. The land use plan is enacted through a zoning ordinance. Thus, zoning ordinances take precedence over reclassification. When city or municipal boards and councils approved ordinance delineating an area as residential pursuant to power under the Local Autonomy Act, they were at the same time reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agri use. Hence, ensuring compliance and implementation of their zoning ordinance. Therefore, the approval by municipal concils of an application for subdivision through an ordinance should already be understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land, covered by said application, from agri to non-agri. Liberal application of zoning powerof city and municipal councils, as to include the power to accordingly reclassify lands within their zones, is in accord with legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy Act to increase the autonomy of local governments. It cannot be said that the power to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and municipal legislative bodies under LGC Sec. 20. Said section only articulates a power of local legislatures, which previously had only been implied. Dispositive Portion: Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. and the Department of Agrarian ReformareDENIED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED. Digester:Stan GeronimoCASE TITLE: CSC vs. Yu Date of Case: 2012 DOCTRINE: devolution Petitioner: (name and short description) Respondent: (name and short description) FACTS: Castillo occupied the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) in the DOH regional office in Zamboanga. Yu occupied PHO I position in the same office. LGC 1991 came into effect. DOH regional offices were devolved to the LGUs (specifically, Basilan). Devolution carried with it the TRANSFER of the plantilla items PHO II and PHO I to the devolved units. Devolution obliges the Governor to re-appoint the incumbents of the plantilla items that were devolved from DOH to Basilan. Governor did not re-appoint Castillo, despite the automatic transfer rule during devolution. As a consequence of non-reappointment, Castillo remained working at DOH. Governor later on appointed Yu to occupy the devolved PHO II position in the Basilan hospital, the one previously occupied by Castillo. A law was passed re-nationalizing the hospitals in Basilan. The PHO II position occupied by Yu was transferred back to DOH. The PHO II position was also converted to Chief of Hospital II position. The DOH Secretary did not re-appoint Yu to the Chief of Hospital II position. The DOH Secretary compelled Yu to continue occupying the PHO II position. The DOH Secretary appointed another person to occupy the Chief of Hospital II position. Yu questioned her non-reappointment, saying that she has a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position. CSC said that she has no vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position. CSC's theory: the PHO II position was NEVER devolved to the Basilan hospital. CSC's theory: that because Castillo remained in the DOH during the devolution, PHO II position was retained in DOH. CSC's theory: when Yu was appointed to a PHO II position in Basilan hospital, it was a different position. CSC's theory: the Chief of Hospital II position which was a conversion from the PHO II position in the DOH was the plantilla item of Castillo. Castillo had already retired by the time of the re-nationalization. WON the PHO II position occupied by Yu was a devolved position. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The PHO II position was never devolved to LGU Basilan. The PHO II position remained with the DOH, along with Dr. Castillo. The PHO II position that Dr. Yu occupied in the LGU of Basilan was a newly created position. Hence, Dr. Yu has no vested right in the re-classified PHO II position in the DOH, which was converted to a RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The PHO II position was devolved to LGU Basilan. Said position became VACANT when Dr. Castillo was not re-appointed by the Governor. When Dr. Yu occupied the PHO II position, she acquired vested right in the re-classified PHO II position, as Chief of Hospital II. DOH Secretarys appointment to the Chief of Hospital II Supreme Court (see below) Chief of Hospital II position.

position is invalid. SUPREME COURT What is the policy of LGC on devolution/decentralization? Provide a responsive and accountable LOCGOV structure through system of decentralization. NG agencies, including DOH, are mandated to devolve LGUs: provision of basic services & facilities What is devolution? the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. What is the manner of devolution prescribed by the LGC? (Sec. 17) transfer of records, equipment, and other assets to LGUs transfer of personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities NG personnel to be absorbed by LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they were assigned Collatilla: That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure How does EO No. 503 ensure the implementation of devolution? 1. Mandatory absorption of NGA personnel by LGU 2. LGUs shall create equivalent positions of affected personnel, except when not administratively viable 3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned. 4. NG personnel not absorbed are retained by NGA, subject to civil service law 5. Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer What is the mandatory duty of the Governor in the devolution? Mandatory to absorb the PHO II position Mandatory to reappointment Castillo, the incumbent to the PHO II position What is the only instance when LGU may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel? When absorption is not administratively viable, such as when it will result to duplication of functions. In such a case, the NGA personnel will be retained by the NGA. What is the evidence showing that PHO II position was devolved to the LGU? Certification by Governor: said position was included in 1992 OSCAS received from DBM with budget appropriation Declaration by Governor during formal turn over program: the item position of PHO II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of Basilan What is the argument of CSC in support of Governor? Only 53 plantilla positions, not 54, were devolved. PHO II position was devolved. Why was Governor's refusal to reappoint Dr. Castillo whimsical? No showing that absorption was not administratively viable. What was the effect of Governor's refusal to reappoint? did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which, together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. How was the dilemma resolved? Governor requested that Dr. Castillo be DETAILED to DOH Detail was confirmed by Sec. of Health Juan Flavier through Department Order Dr. Castillo drew salary from the devolved position What is the rule on compensation of DETAILED officers/employees? Officials and employees on detail with other offices shall be paid their salaries, emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits and other personal services costs from the appropriations of their parent agencies and in no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the agencies where they are assigned or detailed, except when authorized by law. What is a detail? Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6): (6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. What was Dr. Castillo's recourse if she felt aggrieved by the detail? Right to appeal to CSC Why did Dr. Castillo not appeal? We could only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her detail until her retirement in 1996 considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to pursue the matter Neither did Dr. Castillo find need to raise a howl when, at the behest of Governor Salapuddin who was determined to replace her, DOH officials categorized her as a devolution non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not because of an actual non-viability When did Dr. Castillo cease to be a detailed employee? in 1994, when Governor Salapuddin formally manifested his intention to stop the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU in anticipation of his appointment of Dr. Yu to the PHO II position, Dr. Castillo ceased to be a detailed employee at the DOH Regional Office but was re-absorbed by the DOH as a devolution non-viable employee What is the consequence of re-absorption? consequently, paid salaries and benefits from the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund that had been set aside under the Office of the Secretary of Health precisely for such employees. Was the PHO II position devolved? While Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH, the PHO II position was devolved to the LGU. Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II. Edward Dayog PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE July 19, 2000 The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. Petitioner: 1. Aquilino Pimentel; 2. Roberto Pagdanganan, Intervenor (provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines, and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) Respondent: 1. Alexander Aguirre, Executive Secretary; 2. Emilia Boncodin, Secretary of Budget and Management FACTS: -12/27/1997: The President of the Philippines, in light of the impending economic crisis (Asian Financial Crisis of 1997), issued Admin Order 372, sections 1 and 4 of which provide: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas: 1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following: a. Operationalization of new agencies; b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions; c. Filling of positions; and d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source. 2. Suspension of the following activities: a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out; b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles; c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants; d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet; e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants; f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events; g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person concerned; h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis; i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities. 3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs 4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities 5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems 6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves SECTION4.PendingtheassessmentandevaluationbytheDevelopmentBudgetCoordinatingCommitteeoftheemergingfiscalsituation,theamount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. - This petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was brought to annul Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4. Issue 1: W/N Sec. 1, AO 372 is a valid exercise of the President's power of general supervision over LGUs. Petitioner's Contention: No. 1. The President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of generalsupervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. 2. The government failed to satisfy the requisites before it can intervene in LGU fiscal matters as provided for in LGC 284. Respondent's Contention: Yes. AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25%. Supreme Court: Yes. Sec. 1, AO 372 is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.Issue 2: W/N Sec. 4, AO 372 is a valid exercise of the President's power of general supervision over LGUs. Petitioner's Contention: No. The directive to withhold 10% of the LGUs' IRA is in contravention of Sec. 286 of the Local Government Code and of Sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. Respondent's Contention: Yes. The withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." Supreme Court: No. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. LGC 286 specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." OBITER (But important to the topic) 1. Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. 2. Mondano v. Silvosa: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 3.Taule v. Santos: He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," 4. Limbona v. Mangelin: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. 5. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government. 6. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government. 7. LGC 284 provides for requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. DISPOSITIVE: Petition partially granted. J. Kapunan's Dissent: 1. Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality, especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. 2. As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local government units and ensures that laws are faithfully executed. The goal of local economy is not to "end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units," but to make local governments "more responsive and accountable" to "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his power of general supervision, but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates. 3. The phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be determined, and the money for their payment collected. (J. Kapunan refers to LGC 284 which empowers the President to adjust IRAs, subject to several requisites.) Majority's Refutation 1. RE Prematurity: This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. 2. RE President's power as CFO: Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis. 3. RE Release and adjustment of IRA: It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments. Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. Digester:Krissy Flores CASE TITLE: TAN v. PERENADate of Case: Feb. 18, 2005 DOCTRINE: Sec. 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Sec. 16 of the LGC. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the welfare of their constituents. However, the national government undoubtedly has the ability to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdiction. A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. Petitioners:1.Leonardo Tan defendant; applied on Nov. 8, 1995 with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan 2.Robert Uy an agent of Tan 3.Lamberto Te Mayor of Daanbantayan Respondent: 1.Socorro Y. Perena plaintiff; a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan since the 1970s and whose franchise was valid until 2002 FACTS:1974 Presidential Decree 449 (PD 449) or the Cockfighting Law of 1974 was enacted. Sec. 5(b) thereof limits the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities: Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over 100,000, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated. 1991 The LGC was enacted, where the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, any law to the contrary not withstanding, to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breding of gamecocks. 1993 The Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (MO6), which served as the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. Sec. 5: There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided, however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants. Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (MO7), which amended Sec. 5 (above): There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan not more than three cockpits. Nov. 8, 1995 Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission (MGC) for the issuance of a permit/license to establish a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan. The MGC favorably reccomended to Mayor Te that a permit be issued to Tan. Jan. 20, 1996 Mayor Te issued a Mayors Permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit in Combado for the period of Jan. 20, 1996 to Dec. 31, 1996. Perena, a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan since the 1970s, filed a Complaint for Damages with a Prayer for Injunction against petitioners: 1.There was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit; 2.Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado but in Malingin, less than 5km away form her own cockpit. 3.The unlawful operation of Tans cockpit caused injury to her own legitimate business 4.Demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages 5.Prayed that the Mayors Permit be declared null and void 6.Prayed that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against petitioners, preventing Tan from conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to pursue such activity. RTC: initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners: Under the LGC, the sangguniang bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of cockpits. Respondent: The amendment in MO7 violated Sec. 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974. RTC: Dismissed the complaint. MO6, prior to its amendment was, by specific provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. Yet, questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under MO7, since under MO6, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could be had only if the municipal population so warrants. Since the case was only for damages, the RTC cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. There was no evidence to show that respondent had actually suffered damages and no bad faith in the issuance of the permit to Tan as it was pursuant to MOs that nonetheless remained in force. In denying Respondents MR, the RTC stated that MOs 6 and 7 were valid and legal for all intents and purposes. Also valid is the Sangguniang Bayans Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for 10 years. While the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the LGU, following the principles of devolution under the LGC. CA: Sec. 447(a)(3)(V) of the LGC vesting unto the Sangguniang Bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily inconcistent with each other. The LGC merely transferred to the Sangguniang Bayan powers that were previously conferred on the MGC. MO7 should be held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the operation of not more than three cockpits in the municipality, clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449 (but this issue is mooted by the expiration and non-renewal of the Mayors Permit). Respondent is not entitled to damages. Tan enjoined form operating a cockpit and conducitng any cockfights within the municipality. Issue 1:Whether the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not even contain a prayer to declare the ordinance valid. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The CA, in invalidating MO7, embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of a muncipal ordinance. Perenas complaint did not pray for the nullity of MO7. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT: The CA did not expressly nullify MO7. However, it enjoined Tan from operating a cockpit and conducting cockfights in the municipality. Absent the invalidity of MO7, there would be no basis for this injunction. So it seems that the CA did deem MO7a nullity. The Complaint is not only an action for damages but also one for injunction, which requires a judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is to be protected and if there is an act consituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. Also, to warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom (damnum et injuria). Petitioners averment in its Answer that MO7 is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, hence, it became a justiciable matter for the RTC. Issue 2:Whether the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the LGC (Whether a second cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan). PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Yes, repealed. MO7 is valid. The Cockfighting Law was repealed by the LGC (citing Sec. 5(b) of LGC). Said provision vests on LGUs the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respecitve municipalities, any law to the contrary withstanding. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: No, based on Sec. 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law.SUPREME COURT: No. While the LGC expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Sec. 534(f) of the LGC is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify/designate the acts that are intended to be repealed. Implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest or unless the repugnancy between the two laws is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing. The clear import of Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establshment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the contrary. History of laws: The power (generally unqualified by restrictions) of the municipal council to authorize/license cockpits was repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of the Republic in 1946. However, in the 1970s, there was a desire for stricter licensing requirements of cockpits, hence the enactment of the Cockfighting Law in 1974. In said law, it wa the city or municipal mayor who was authorized to issue licenses for the opeartion and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative. Thus, the sole discretion to authorize the operation of cockpits was removed from the LGUs. PD 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and provided that city and municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod/bayanwere given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting under the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor. The latter was subsequently amended, transferring the supervision from the mayor or governor to the PGC. Issue 3:Meaning of the qualifier any PETITIONERS CONTENTION: RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT: PGC v. IAC (construing Sec. 4 of PD 1802): The law to the contrary notwithstanding provided in Sec. 447(a)(3)(v). conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. The PGC did not possess the power to issue cockpit licenses; it only had review and supervision powers, as distinguished from control. The regulation of cockpits was vested in the municipal authorities, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the PGC. The qualifier serves notice that it is the sangguniang bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commmercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. Issue 4:Does the qualifier in the LGC similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize more cockpits than allowed under the Cockfighting Law? SUPREME COURT: No. While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of more than 100,000, in which case two cockpits may be established. Considering that Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restricitons on how such power may be exercised. There is no dichotomy between affirming the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time. Sec. 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Sec. 16 of the LGC. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devloution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the welfare of their constituents. However, the national government undoubtedly has the ability to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdiction (ex. Cockfighting is a traditionally regulated activity due to the attendant gambling involved, which is essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance). Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) cannot be construed as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction because then, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal the Sec. 447(a)(3)(v). A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. MO7 contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing 3 cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by petitioners arising from the ordinance. Dispositive Portion: Petition denied. Injunction proper. BATANGAS CATV, INC., vs. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD& BATANGAS CITY MAYOR September 29, 2004 | Sandoval Gutierrez, J Digest by: Monica G. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid Why? Magtajas v. Pryce: Municipal government are only agents of the national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal. Petitioner: Batangas CATV, Inc.-cable service provider in BatangasRespondent: Batangas Sangguniang Panlungsod & Batangas City Mayor original respondents, CA since CA decision subj to R45. FACTS:On July 28, 1986, the Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod(Panlungsod) enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV permit to construct, install and operate a CATV in Batangas City. Sec. 8 of the said resolution authorizes petitioner to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein. However, any increase of rates would be subject to the approval of the Panlungsod. In 1993 petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month without approval of the Panlungsod. The Batangas City mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit if it doesnt secure the approval of the Panlungsod for the rate increase. Petitioner filed for injunction assailing the Panlungsods authority to regulate rates charged by CATV operators because under EO 205, it was the National Telecommunications Commission which had the sole authority to regulate CATV operation in the Philippines. The trial court GRANTED the petition holding that the sole agency which can regulate CATV operations was the NTC and that LGUs cannot exercise regulatory powers over it without appropriate legislation. The CA REVERSED: The Certificate of Authority to operate a CATV system is granted by the NTC, but this does not preclude the Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it by the LGC of 1983. Sec. 177 (now 457 in RA 7160) provides:Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper topromote the prosperity and general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of property therein; d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the cityUnder cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari. Issue 1 W/N a LGU can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV (cable tv) operators within its territorial jurisdiction PETITIONERS CONTENTION: NO While the LGC of 1991 extends to LGUs to perform any act that will benefit their constituents, it does not authorize them to regulate CATV operations since pursuant to EO 205, only NTC has that authority. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: YES > Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177(c)&(d) of the LGC of 1983 which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses, including the CATV industry. SUPREME COURT NO 1. For more than two decades the NTC has assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Presidential issuances have reinforced the NTCs powers: > Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512 which granted Sining Makulay the exclusive franchise to operate CATV system in any place within the Philippines. It terminated all franchises, permits, or certificated for CATV systems previously granted by local governments and national government instrumentalities. Pres. Marcos subsequently issued letter of instruction 894 vesting upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over Sining Makulay. Thereafter he issued EO 546 integrating the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the NTC. >Sining Makulays franchise was cut short by the People Power Revolution. Pres. Aquino issued EO 205 opening the CATV industry to all. It mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary IRRs. >Pres. Ramos issued EO 436 restating NTCs regulatory powers over the CATV operations:Sec. 2 The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the Philippines shall remain vested solely with the NTC. 2. Note, however, that this does not mean LGUs are stripped of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the LGC. >When EO 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as, the determination of rates, issuance of certificates of authority, etc. >There is no dispute that the Panlungsod has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of the LGC of 1983. It continues to posses such power is clear under Sec. 16 & 458 ofRA 7160 (LGC of 1991). >The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause, primarily because the CATV system uses public properties. The physical realities of constructing CATV system allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. Sub-issue 1 W/N Resolution 210 was a valid enactment PETITIONERS CONTENTION:PETITIONERS CONTENTION: YES > On the premise that RA 7160 repealed EO 205 (regulatory power of NTC) SUPREME COURT NO In enacting Resolution No. 210, the respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power because:1. It violates the mandate of existing laws. Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting as an agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. De la Cruz v. Paraz: Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. Resolution No. 210 contravenes EO 205 and EO 436 insofar as it permits respondent Pa