DUE PROCESS CLAUSEVillegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978] En Banc, Fernandez (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.

Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)J. Fernando

FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.

There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of OMKA

That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the OMKA of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside

POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great public needs.There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.

LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919] En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code

Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and thatconfinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Deloso vs Sandiganbayan

FACTSThis petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.

Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter, thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.

Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

ISSUEWhether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.

HELDIt would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term. The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension limited to only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales.