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C H A P T E R II
SINGAPORE 1 S FOREIGN POLICY
THE DETERMINANTS
74
CHAPTER II
SINGAPORE'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE DETERMINAlifTS
The foreign policy of a country is goverhed by certain
o~ective conditions such as its historical experiences,
socio-political setting, economic conditions, geopolitical
situation, and strategic location. Singapore is no exception.
Its historical legacy, the impact of British colonialism,
consequences of joining and later seperation ::Erorn Malaysian
Federation in 1965, experience during Indonesian Confronta-
tion (1963-66), its demography, geopolitical situation, and
$trategic location, it:s economic and strategic vulnerability
to the regional as well as world powers, and finally, decision
of withdrawal by the British, the major anchor power which had
guaranteed not only the security of the Republic but contributE f..-
a great deal to its economy, all in a combined fa~ion shaped
its foreign policy attitudes. Certain tendencies which had
grown out of historical experiences - as, for example, anti
colonial~( anti-imperialism, anti-communism had been re
inforced by its geopolitical and strategic location.
Singapore, with a population of 2.6 million and an
area of 620.5 square kilometres, was one of the smallest
countries in Asia. It consisted of the island of Singapore
and some 57 isle~s within its territorial waters, was sltuated
between latitudes 1 degree, 9 minutes Horth and 1 degree 29
minutes .. Horth, and lonqi tudes 103 degree 38 minutes !!last and
75
104 degree 6 minutes East,and lay about 137 kilometres north
of the 1 equator.
Despite its size, its economic growth after its
independence and the large measure of political stability
it had achieved,impressed the world. Its successes were
quoted as ideal not only for the Third World but also for the
advanced countries. Its gross national product had risen
steadilyo Its average annual.growth of Real Gross Domestic
Product per capita had also been impressive, averaging 12.7
percent and 10.7 percent between 1965 and 1973, 8.7 percent
and 5.8 percent between 1973 and 1979 and 8.6 percent and 7.3
percent between 1979-80 respectively. 2 Official foreign
reserves had shown a spectacular increase tog$ 12.6 billion
3 in 1979. These were rather impressive figures especially in
view of the fact that there were many who, after Singapore's
separation from Malaysia in August 1965, had opined that the
new Republic would crumble economically without the Malaysian
hinterland. Its singularly autonomous separate political
identity,. economic development and the large degree of
political stability acl:ieved over the years had been a source
of great satisfaction for its leaders, especially for its
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who had been guide as well as
1 1cited in Singapore, Facts and Pictures 1986(Singapore, Ministry of Comnication and Information, 1986), p.l.
2see Lawrence B Krause, Koh A; Tee and Lee (Tsao)Yuan, The Sin a re Econom Reconsidered(Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987 , p.6.
3 See Singapore Facts and Figures, (Singapore, 1968),p.70.
76
Chief articulator of Singapore's foreign policy since 1959.
It would be interesting to note that as early as March 1957,
he had observed during a legislative assembly debate that the
idea of an independent Singapore was 11 a political, economic,
and geographical absurdity 11•
4
The impressive economic growth and political stability
had taken place against the backdrop of considerable political
infighting and economic uncertainty. The 1950s had been
trying years for the island-colony. The struggle of the
Communist United Front for political supremacy coincided with
heightened nationalist fervour. It was against this background
that the People's Action Party (PAP) was born and ultimately
triumphed in the 1959 elections designed to mak~ Singapore
a self-governing colony. However, Lee Kuan Yew's victory
proved pyrrhic. This was mainly because the communists and
the non-commhnists, more precisely the left and moderates,
were united in a marriage of convenience to oust the British
colonialists and their local supporters. Following the
electoral victory where the PAP had won 37 out of 51 seatsJ,·the
internal struggle for control of Singapore began. In retros-
pect, Lee Kuan Yew came to deseribe the political setting as
ppe in whicha
4singapore, Legislative Assembly Debates, vol.2, 5 March 1957, col.1471.
77
We tacitly understood that communists ru1d their fellow travellers would be admitted into the ranks of the party in a united front for the struggle ~6r independence against the British •••• We were riding a tiger and we knew it. No non-communist faction in any united front of the communists had ever emerged in one piece, let alone retain its grip over the United Front organization. Hence many political correspondents believed we were more knaves than fools• (5)
The years between 1959 and 1963 proved to be politically
chaotic years for Singapore. In 1963, it joined Malaysia
and by doing so, the moderates in the PAP, under the steward-
ship of Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee and S.
Rajaratnam succeeded with the help from government in Kuala
Lumpur to undedcut by various means the influence and image
of the Left. For instance, on 2 February 1963 'Operation
Cold Store' was carried out on orders of the Internal Security
Council, where more than a hundred pro-communist political,
trade unions and student leaders were arrested, including half
of the members of the Barisan Sosialis' Central Executive
Committee.
On the basis of massive electoral victory in the
Referendum for merger in 1962, Singapore had joined the new
Federation of Malaysia. This membership, however proved to be
a mistake for the long term political health of both Singapore
and Malaya. The difficulties lay in thB fact that both could
5Lee Kue.n Yew, "What of the Past is Relevant to the Future"?, Peo le's Action Part 1954-1979 Petir 25th Anniversary Issue Singapore~ Central Executive Committee, PAP, .. _...,,.... \
78
not agree on the basis of their mutual relationship. Of greater
danger was the fact that during the tenure of its membership in
new Federation, Singapore had been gripped by communally
oriented politics that culminated in the racial riots of 1961.
In the light of this experience, on 9 August 1965 Singapore was
separated from Malaysia and an independent Singapore became a
painful reality for the PAP. It was in these difficult circum-
stances, especially its unexpectedly sudden birth as an indepen-
dent state that the PAP leadership had to steer the Republic on
a course of political, economic and military survival.
Survival, according to the Singapore leaders, meant the
task of inculcating new values in a hetrogenious population,
which was often loyal to their countries of origin and which had
little sense of common national identity. Accordingly, after
1965, the PAP Government felt that it was important for the
Singaporeans to acquire non-ideological pragmatic values related
6 to the concepts of multiracialism and multilingualism. By
multiracialism, the Singapore leaders meant the practice of
mutual cultural tolerance towards one another and acceptance
of differences in religions practices. As regards multi-
lingualism, the Singapore leaders always advocated it as they
considered it unwise within the Southeast Asian context to
accord the Chinese language a predominant status in the Multi-
6 Lee Boon-Hock, "Singapore, Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement concept", Southeast Asian Studies, 1978, p.229.
79
lingual Singaporean society. The political strategy under
lining these two concepts was determined by the realization
that for a predominantly Chinese island state to survive in
Southeast Asia, it was essential not to be labelled as third
China. 7
In terms of economic policy, the idea of survival was
linked to the concept of the "global city" first proposed by
• 'It'"\ lq 72...;. the Singapore foreign Minister s. RaJaratnamA ·~his concept
suggested that if Singapore had to survive, it must establish a
relationship of interdependence in the rapidly expanding global
8 economic system. This implied an economic policy which empha-
sised a world market for Singapore's products rather than the
one oriented towards the regional trade. However, after the fal
of Indochina to the communists, this "global city" concept had
been modified to allow for greater economic, and political co-
operation with the member countries of the Association of South
east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless in 1965 survival meant
that the economy would have to shift from one which relied on
shipping, insurance, an entrepot trade and the British military
bases, to one which stressed industrialization, banking, finance
and the tourist trade. 0..
This meant~shift in the economic policy
from one of import substitution to that of outward-looking
export-oriented policy of industrialization.
80
The political strategy of survival had taken many forms
on the domestic level. 13asically, the PAP government had
attempted to mould the nature and style of politics, economic
growth and social life into certain desired end-results. An
important objective had been the achievement of political
stab~ility in the island state which would remove much of the
uncertainty and turmoil in Singapore politics in the postwar
period. Political stability would, also, give foreign investors
considerable confidence that their investments would not be
adversely affected because of some unpredictable political event.
Chan Heng Chee, a well-known political scientis~ suggestec
three important elements in the survival ideology. The first
was the PAP's firm belief that Singapore's survival depended
on the "willingness and ability to adopt a new set of attitudes,
a new set of values, a new set of perspectivet in short, on the
creation of a new man". A second aspect of the ideology of
survival was the PAP Government's insistence on producing a
tightly organized society. In other words, the government
believed that the best chances for Singapore's survival lay in
its ability to mobilize to the maximum what it was capable ofe
The third theme of the survival ideology stressed the nation
building task which was an important objective in the early
pays of the young Republic. The political theme of survival
had been, therefore, developed and utilized by the Singapore
Government to legitimise and justify their domestic policies
81
and its stance towards the outside world. 9
Keeping in view the immensity of problems of survival,
the early years of the independent Republic were made still
more trying because of the far from placid international
environment. The Americans, with some half a million soldiers,
were committed to fighting a war in Indochian. China was in
the throes of a cultural revolution. Sukarno's Indonesia was
committed to a policy of Konfrontasi' with Malaysia and
Singapore. The British had given early indication of a possib~e
withdrawal from 'East of Suez'. In due course it culminated in
the withdrawal of the British military presence from Singapore
a presence that had hitherto been crucial to the external
defense of the Republic. How did a small state, almost defense-
less and surrounded by large antagonistic neighbours survive?
It was in these circumstances that the PAP leadership had to lay
out its foreign policy goals and precepts. In this connection,
it would be necessary first to study the basic determinants
which shaped the countr~,-' s foreign policy.
Key Factors
Strategic Location
Being one of the two smallest states in Southeast Asia
(the other being Brunei), geography dominated the outlook of
Singapore's leaders. Located at the 9outhern end of the Straits
of Malacca, it is a focal point and hub of east-west, north-south
82
trade and air-sea communications. It is a gateway to both the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Because of its location it acquired
the focal position as the crossroads between two oceans and two
continents and naturally became the meeting point of local and
international shipping routes. 1-\tsto'cically, it inherited its
position as a trading and business centre of Southeast Asia
possessing the deepest harbour and dock facilities within a
thousand-mile radius. Not surprisingly, it became the linchpin
of Southeast Asia. The location and modern infrastructure made
the Republic the second busiest port in the world after Rotterdam
Until the British implemented their ,,,i thdrawal from "East of Suez
the Republic had been the nexus of an important military base
which was pivotal to the whole system of Western defence in the
region. Because of its strategic location guarding one end of
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Republic's significanc0-
as a strategic asset did not recede following the British
Government's decision to close down its Singapore base in 1971.
Indeed Singapore had oecome one place in Southeast Asia where O.'W'\tl
the strategic interests of all the external powers met,~even
merged. This had further invited external attention to the
Republic. Added to its small size and strategic location,
the foreign policy perceptions of the leaders of the ·Republic
had been conditioned by its location between two large Malay
neighbours: Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south.
The proximity to these two states with divergent ethnic-
religious-political orientations and which had not always been
friendly had created complex security problems for the Republi.
At the same time, geography had also allowed the Republic
to play a predominant role in regional and global affairs
out of proportion to its size as it gave it a freedom of
83
0 action and choice in p~itical, social and economic matters.
In Lee Kuan Yew's words: "we are not landlocked. We are a
centre of great communications. The crossroads between the
northern and southern hemispheres between the East and West ••• I '
all centres of great learning and civilization. And it is
this factor which we must exploit". 10
Thus the sensitivity to regional and global develop-
ments had been an important aspect of Singapore's foreign
policy and this was something which had been regularly stressed
by the leadership since 1965.
Demography
According to the latest available data Singapore had a
population of 2.6 million in mid-1986, with the Chinese nwnbering
1.97 million (76.6 percent), Malays 387,400 (14.7 percent),
Indians 166,800 (6.4 percent) and others 60,000 (2.3 pereent). 11
Singapore became the only state in Southeast Asia to have
political power vested in the hands of the local Chinese after
independence. Inspi te of the racial heterogeneity, the pre
dominantly Chinese population placed Singapore apart from its
Malay neighbours. In Singapore, not only were the Chinese in
10 Cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew(Singapore, 1~68), p.641.
11 Monthl~ Digest of Statistics(Singapore, Department
of Statistics,ingapore), January 1987, pp.3-4.
84
a numerical majority, they were also dominant politically and
economically. In short, in Singapore the Chinese hegemony
prevailed. In addition to creating problems of nation building
and national identity, the Chinese majarity position in Singapore
created a natural racial barrier in the region. The Chinese in
Southeast Asia had been the object of envy, even persecution
and were perceived as a potential fifth column and a vanguard o~
expansionism by the Peoples• Republic of China. In view of
this racial perception, the prepondenence of Chinese demogra
phic strength had created security problems and the Republic had
been charged with being a 'Third China'. Viewed largely as a
'Chinese state' in a 'H~tlay world •, the Republic faced acute
political, economic, and military problems vis-a-vis its larger
and often difficult and sensitive Malay neighbours and this
had played a crucial role in shaping the security perceptions
and foreign policy of Singapore. In short, the demographic
make up of Singapore placed constraints on the Singapore
leadership and had invoked the need to be cautious in order to
reduce concern in Malaysia and Indonesia that the city-state
might become a satel~te of the PRC or even give hope to the
Chinese minorities in the two states. It was to reduce the
"Chineseness" of Singapore that since independence the
Republics• leaders had been stressing on a multi-racial,
multi-cultural and multi-religious Singapore. More importantly,
the Prime Minister had warned the Chinese majority in Singapore:
"If you want a Chinese chauvinist society, failure is assured.
85
Singapore will surely be isolated. But even if you are
not isolated and you extend your chauvinistic influence to
our neighbour (Malaysia), they will if they find no way out,
join up with another big neighbour (Indonesia) to deal with
you."12
Thus the racial tolerance in domestic politics had been
emphasised as this had been seen to have widespread foreign
policy implications, especially vis-a-v!s the two Malay
neighbours.
Bconomy
Since Stamford Raffles founded Singapore in 1819,
entrepot trade had been mainly responsible for the island's
economic growth. Lacking in almost all natural resources,
the Republic thrived economically by using the region as its
hinterland. Besides its excellent geographical position, its
other major asset economically had been its hardworking, highly
skilled population. Historically, its population had inherited
an immigrant zeal which bestowed the people with qualities of
hardwork and togetherness in extrer~ly difficult and ever
changing circumstances. Singapore's role as an entrepot centre
c~e under threat as its neighbours began to market their produc
directly and thus reduced the need for a middleman. This
reality was recognized by the PAP from the very start. The
12 The Straits Times, 6 March 1966.
86
Republic was forced to diversify its economy. The successful
diversification was well reflected in the net foreign exchange
earnings in 1979. Out of a total income ofS$ 19.5 in 1979,
manufacturing accounted for 31 percent, transport and commu
nications 25 percent, finance, business and other services 1.2
percent, and trade 13 percent. 13 This was a far cry from the
pre-1965 era where trade was the principal foreign exchange
earner. Economic nationalism of the neighbouring states and
later the British military withdrawal were mainly responsible
for forced transformation of the Republic's orientation from
being a 1 regional' to a 1 global city'. On 6 February 1972,
foreign minister s. Rajaratnam explained Singapore's 'global
city• role in the following terms: "It is my contention that
Singapore is becoming a component of that system (global citles)
not a major component but a growingly im0ortant one. It is in
this sense that I have chosen to describe Singapore as a global
city. This is why all the gloomy predictions about the future
of an independent Singapore have been proved wrong. The
pessimistic scenario was written on the assumption that an
independent Singapore would be a self-contained city state~
that it would, at the most, be a regional city and therefore
its fate and fortunes would depend wholly on the economic climate
0£ the region. The economic climate would have consequences
for us economically, politically and militarily.
13 Singapore, Facts and Pictures, Singapore, 1980, pp.58-9.
87
But we are more than a regional city. We draw sustenance
not only from the region but also from the intern.3tional economic
system to which as a global city we belong and which will be
the final arbiter of whether we prosper or decline.
If we view Singapore's future not as a regional city
but as a global city then the smallness of Singapore, the
absence of a hinterland, or raw materials and a large domestic
market are not fatal or ittsurmountable handicaps. It would
explain why, since independence, we have been successful eco-
nomically and, consequently, have ensured political and social
stabili ty 11•
14
As a result Singac)ore became a major financial and
banking centre and depended on world trade for its economic
viability and buoyancy. The total lack of natural resources
and its near total dependence on world trade had rendered the
Republic's economy vulnerable to the vagaries of world trade
cycles. This in turn affected the country's political health
and generated serious implications for security. It was in
this regard that foreign policy had come to be viewed as an
important tooi for the advancement of the country's economic
growth. As a result of the successful economic strategy,
Singapore had attained a standard of living which was second
only to Japan in Asia. From this success came peace and
14cited in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid Ul Haq, (eds.), The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches & Writings of s. Rajaratnam(Singapore, 1987), pp.226-7.
88
stability. Nevertheless, despite the economic !)regress, the
lack of raw materials and resources, the limited size of the
domestic economy and the dependence on foreign trade and
investments had made Singapore exceptionally vulnerable to
external pressures, which in turn placed constraints on the
country's foreign policy and hence forced it to be excessively
concious of international developments.
Political Experience
Over and above geography, demography and economy, the
Singapore leadership's foreign policy perception had been influ
enced to a considerable degree by its political experiences.
Before Singapore became an independent and sovereign state, the
PAP leaders believed that an independent Singapore was a
political joke. 15 This belief was largely shaped by the cons-
traints imposed by geography, lack of natural resources and
demography which would have made Singapore unviable as an
independent state. Equally significant was the turbulent period
through which the PAP initially guided the country, especially
with reference to the violent labour strikes, racial riots and
communist and non-communist struggle for power.
The PAP was the sole political party to have held power
ever since Singapore had become a self-governing state in 1959.
Since October 1966, when all the Barisan Sosialis MPs had
resigned and vowed to take their fight to the streets, the PAP
15see Bilveer Singh, of a Small State(Occasional
l
89
had emerged and remained without an opposition in the Parlia
ment. Although the PAP's rule in Singapore had since then be
come the most prominent feature in the polity, Opposition
parties were allowed to function and they did, in fact, contest
16 the general elections.
Nevertheless the opposition parties in Singapore had
been clearly in disarray. This was despite the fact that in
the 1972 elections seven opposition candidates (five belonging
to the opposition parties and two independent candidates) had
managed to win thirty percent of the votes. The leading opposition
party, the Barisan Sosialis (which, according to the PAP govern
ment had been a pro-communist party) had been weakened. This
had resulted from detention of their leaders, their conversion
during the period of imprisonment, or expulsion from the country.
In addition they were at a disadvantage because of the intra
party personality conflicts and ideological disputes.17
16 It should be noted, however, that none of the opposition parties candidates was returned in any of these elections. Useful news paper accounts and party statements in the three elections held in 1968, 1970 and 1972 could be found in the works compiled by Alex Josey: The Crucial Years Ahead: Republic of Singapore General Elections 1968(Singapore, 1968)1 Democracy in Singapore: The 1970 By-Election§(Singapore, 1970)7 The Singapore General Elections 1972(Singapore 1972). Pang Cheng Lian in her study of the PAP suggested that it was very m1.1.Ch similar to the party of Revolutionary Institutions of Me~ico which was "a dominant non-dictatorial party''~-~- Chan Heng Chee asserted that Singapore was a de-facto one~s~ate. See Pang Chen Lian Sin a re•s Peo les' Action Part - Its Histor , Organization and Leadership Singapore, 1970 , p.77, and Chan Heng Chee, Singayore: The Politics of survival, 1965-1967 (Singapore, 1971 , p.51.
17 See Thomas J. Bellows, "The Singapore Party System",
Journal of Southeast Asian HistoSY, vol.8, No.1 March 1967, pp.122-381 Thomas J. Bellows, The Peoples Action Partn of Singapore : Emerg~nce of a Dominant Party System(Newaven:
90
As regards other opposition parties, one observer described
them as being "implausible and faction ridden groups of mal
contents with no political base. Most are led by western.h:ed
liberals who meet with little sup:)':)rt in the population at
large for their complaints about infringements of civil
18 liberties".
The PAP government had aisplayed a rather ambivalent
19 attitude towards the role and desirability of an opposition •
. . . . . . . Yale University Southeast Asian studies, Monograph series No.14, 1970); and P. Naidu, "Why the Barisan Socialis Failed in its constitutional struggle for power", Journal of the Political Science Society, No.1, November 1971, pp.19-22.
18see Dick Wilson, The Future Role of SingaporeJLondon, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 197~), p.19.
19The two statements made by s. Rajaratnam, the foreign minister and director of the PAP's political bureau, were indicative of the PAP's outlook. "In a living democracy theJre must be a government and there must be an opposition. And the OPPPsition must learn to play its role. To do this, two things are necessary. There is the image that an opposition party should project to the people. First, that it is capable of effective and intelligent criticism, can make articulate the dissatisfac·tions, the aspirations of the people ••• Second, it mast present itself as a practical alternative to the ruling party •.. #It must put forward ideas, suggestions, within the framework of a parliamentary system ••• We hope there will be an effective opposition which will give us a run for our money. We are not going to create an opposition. Nothing could be more insulting to the country and voters ••• That means we will fight every election, and concede victory only to an opposition which has the mettle, the guts, the intelligence, to outwit us". Opposition for the sake of opposition is meaningless. It has nothing to do with promoting or strengthening democracy ••• only an opposition which can come out with better solutions to problems offered by the ruling party can become a genuine and meangiriiEul opposition •••• I don't believe that a one-party Parliament can endanger democracy or neglect the interests of the people, any more than a multiparty Parliament can safeguard de~ocracy and promote the welfare of the people". From his speeches in 1966 and 1971, quoted in Alex Josey, ~cracy in Singapore:The 1970 By-Elections(Singapore 1970), pp.1-2.
91
on the one hand, it had recognised that "in a living democracy •••
there mas:t be an opposition", and had deplored the lack of one.
On the other it stated that more important "than parliamentary
democracy on western lines, was good government by good men,
and that outside of the PAP there was no other group of "able,
honest, and dedicated men" capable of ".Safeguarding the conti
nued stability and progress" of Singapore. 20
Various measures taken by the PAP government seemed to
indicate its desire to perpetuate its own rule and to work
against any opposition candidate aspiring for the office.
These measures included:(a) deliberately causing internal di
ssention and disruption by infiltrating opposition parties1 21
(b) unfavourable campaign tactics such as allowing only the
legally minimum number of days (nine working days) for campaign
ing, and choosing a date of election most suitable for the PAP; 22
(c) limiting air time on television and radio to recognised
political parties fielding ten or more candidates, and strictly
controlling party rallies, and the number, size and location of
banners, and posters each candidate could display1 23 (d)
controversial electoral laws such as those requiring the taking
down of voters' numbers on the counterfoil of serially numbered
2°From statements of the Lee Kuan Yew and s. Rajaratnam in Alex Josey, The Singaoore's General Elections, 1972, pp.57-9.
21Alex Josey, Singapore General Elections 1972, pp.83-4. Wilard A Hanna,"How to win a clea~ sweep in Free elections", AUFS Reports:Southeast Asia Series, vol.20, No.ll(November 1972)
22 See Alex Josey, ~, pp.l-2.
23~, p.109o
!12
ballots (and thereby making it possible to trace how a par·ti
cular voter voted and requiring political parties to submit
24 their accounts for periodic inspection1 and (e) inhibiting
the opposition's campaign by closely mmnitoring all statements
and swiftly issuing summons when speeches crossed the limits of
25 tolerance.
The attitude of the PAP governmentcould be ascribed,
at least partly, to the fact that it viewed members of the
underground Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to be its real
opponents. Although the MCP had only a limited influence in
Singapore, the PAP had always been reminding the public
24 The former law was still a matter of some controversy
even among high officials and PAP supporters. See for example the exchange of letters between the Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Singapore and others in the Straits Times, 14 January 1974, 15 January 1974, 17 January 1974 and 21 January 1974.
25 After the 1972 elections the Secretary General of the Peoples Front Party was imprisoned for six months for writing about the President of Singapore as "Slavish" and "a puppet". A Barisan Sosialis candidate was also imprisoned for six months for "criminally defaming", the Prime Minister by calling h:lm "one of the biggest scoundrels in the world, not only in Singapore", the Barisan Sosialis to pay exemplary damages of $ 50,000 to Lee Kuan Yew for other "scurrilous, vicious and unfounded attacks". Alex Josey, n.16, pp.17, 62, 87 and "Singapore Survey", Financial Times, 1 October 1975, p.17.
93
that "they should not ~orget that it is the primary objective
of the Malayan Comnunist Party to bring about economic decline
through civil disturbances 11•
26
In addition, the PAP government had later on identified
the "New L .. eft" as its another rei'!l opponent. According to
Finance Minister Goh K~ng Swee and Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam
these 11 non-co;Tu!w.nist subversives included: .ti) "crack pot
academics", ( ii) "groups and people in search of a movement •••
who bear some resemblance to the hotch potch of contending
radical movements that swept through western Europe and the
Americans in the sixties and early seventies and which have
now degenerated into openly criminal and terrorist insurrect
ionist groups", (iii) "foreign intellectuals and journalists
who are unhappy to witness successful Asian experiments in self-
government", and ( i v) 11 a clandes·tine organization ••• operating
in Singapore to generate and sustain rumours 11•
27
The concept of democracy for the Lee Kuan Yew meant
11 the principle that the people should at periodic elections
elect their representatives who had then the mandate to govern
for a fixed number of years in accordance with their programne
policy". 28 Besides this fundamental right of the people to choose
26 Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.85, No.26, 1 July 1974, p.lS.
27 See FEER, vol.85, No.36, 13 September 1974, pp.18-25~ 26, vol.85, No.33;-Allgust 23, 1974, p.32. See also S Rajaratnam, 11 The New Left", The Mirror, vol.lO, No.49, 9 December 1974, pp.1-6.
28 Statement by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Legislative Assembly Debates, vol.18(June 12- July 6, 1962), vol.684.
94
their own leadership and government, the various aspects of
the democratic system inherited from the British had to be
"adopted, adjusted, and amended", to meet local conditions
29 and changing circumstances. In 1967, Lee Kuan Yew had
publicly stated: "He have departed in quite a number of
material aspects, from the 0rinciples of justice, and the
liberty of the individual .. .620 criminal detainees on whom the
due processes of law were unable to place even an iota of
evidence. To let them out would be to run the very grave
risk of undermining the whole social fabric ••• we have had to
adjust, to temporarily aeviate from ideas and norms. This is
a heavy price. We have over a hundred political detainees, men
against whom we are unable to~ove anything in a court q~ law.~~·
However, certain additional measures taken by the PAP
government since 1965 made some observers more concerned with
0 what they called "a g~wing trend of authoritarianism and
31 regimentation" in Singapore. There were Singaporeans who
dubbed the PAP rule as "fascist" or "police state". They
mentioned among other things, the ab~tion of trial by Jury,
the suppression of two newspapers (in 1971), the pressure for
family planning, the requirement of a "suitability certificate"
29 Alex Josey, n.16, p.18.
30 Quoted in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew(Singapore, 1968), First edn., pp.42-3.
31For two highly critical studies of such developments in
Singapore, see Iain Buchanan, Sin aoore in Southeast Asiaz An Economic and Political A raisal London, 1972 , and T.J.S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore London, 1973).
95
(security clearance) for university entrance, the loss of
autonomy of Singapore's two universities, and the detention
without trial of 50 to 100 political prisoners. A vehement
cri 1;icism of the PAP rule was reflected in the following state
ment made by lain Buchanans "Today the tiny Republic is perhaps
as regimented a society as that of either North or South Korea ••••
The extent and nature of this regimentation is ••• tangibly expre
ssed in the nation's everyday life--in education, in industrial
relations, in public housing , in the Press, in the operation
of an extensive governmental cadre-system and the well
developed secret police network ••• legislation has strongly
emphasized social and political discipline, the introduction of
compulsory expression of loyalty to the state and the expansion
of martial organization in schools, the introduction of campul-
sory national service, rigid limitation of employee's bargaining
power, and the abolition of trial by Jury were among measures
1132 taken in the later half of 1960s.
Though the Singapore government had not been very tolerant
of any kind of oppesition, the Republic was still a relatively
open society and not a "police state". Even though, in their
quest for security, stability and economic progress, the PAP
leaders had passed laws and resorted to action which appeared
harsh and undemocratic, it would be necessary to look at these
measures :1ot as operating in a western socio-cultural milieu but
32Ibid, pp.274-81o
96
in a society which did not have a long history or tradition of
politics, and whch was composed of various races, cultures, and
subcultures with different perceptions of the political process.
Certain scholars came out with justifications as to why p/(.p
government became quite undemocratic in its practice, while
maintaining the facade of democracy. They observed that& ~~
11 democratic regimentation" should be seen in t.he wider con·text
of the external and internal political, economic and communal
pressures within which Singapore was placed. In addition to
the problems of a young plural society with language and cultural
differentiation and loyalty, creating diverse focus of identity,
Singapore with its predominantly Chinese population had been often
regarded with suspicion and referred to as a "Third China" in
the region. This may be because of the poor image of itself as
Singapore had prlbjected in the past that of a "middle man"
living off the resources of its neighbours. It had been a fact
that Singapore had no natural resources apart from its harbours,
its gee-strategic position at the major international cross-
roads, and the intelligence, skill and determination of its people.
The PAP government's tbugh attitude toward persons
suspected of procommunist activities was consistent with its
political ideology of survival. Such an attitude was also
consistent with the notion of a £ightly organized society where
certain limits of freedom of speech, political action are pre
defined by the government. Individuals whose actions might de
stabilise the political system, particularly if the actions were
communist-inspired or racialistic in intent, were not tolerated
by the PAP government.
97
The PAP's approach to the problems of the polity caused
concern in the neighbouring countries and added ':o ~~he initial
problems between an independent Singapore and j_ts immediate
neighbours. It also created a sense of political fear which
dominated the Singapore leaders' thinking. As a result, a
strong belief got embedded in the leadership's world view that
the country could not afford to make mistakes or falter in any-
way and if it did, it would not be able to recover. This 'do
or die' attitude was vividly expressed by the Prime Minister
when he warned: "This time we are playing for keeps and if we
make a mistake there is no safety n~t underneath. You will
fall and the chances are you will never get up again". 33
This fear of failure had its impact on the country's foreign
policy and largely explained the cautious stance in its external
relations.
Factors Relating to Security
Singapore had always run the risk of political and
military conflict and had been vulnerable to the pressures of
exogenous powers. That sense of vulnerability could be ascribed
to many factors: location in a politically turbulent region,
limited territory, no physical ~esources, and only a pool of
human resources. Historically, this vulnerability had been
proved many times. After Singapore was founded in 1819 there
33 The Mirror, vo1.2. No.29, 18 July 1966.f.l.
98
was constant fear that the colony would be overrun by the
Dutch, then based in Batavia (present day Jakarta). There
was a three-and-a-half years of control by the Japanese during
World War II, and from 1948 until 1960, Singapore, together
with the Malay peninsula, was subjected to insurgency directed
by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). From 1954 to 1963, a
period that overlapped with the insurgency, Singapore endured
the violent activities of the Conununist United Front Organiza-
tion. More .acently, there was the 'confrontation' with Indo
nesia during 1963-65 when Singapore was a part of Malaysia. 34
Since the end of World War II, the island had experienced a
series of ethnic or quasi-ethnic disturbances, at times fanned
by ideological considerations to such an extent that they became
a taboo subject not to be discussed in public. There could be
no public discussion on subjects such as commun~~m and
communism. The fear about security heightened when Singapore
was separated from Malaysia in 1965 and British government o} S.v.e -z...
1
took decision in 1968 to wi':hdraw its forces 'East!.. by 1971.
It was these experiences that made Singapore leaders highly
conscious of the possibilities and potentialities of insurgency
and regional conflict.
34 Between September 1963 and May 1965, a total of 37 bomb explosions in Singapore, and on at ~ast five occasions bombs were rendered harmless by the authorities. The worst incident occurred on 10 March 1965 when a bomb was exploded in a bank ~illing three persons and wounding thirtyfive. The threat of communist infilteration and subversion was demonstrated again by several less publicised events in the second part of 1977. The first was the arrest and conviction, ln September 1977, of a twenty-three, year old woman employee, Teo Geok Tin, at Chartered Industries Singapore Private Limited (The Singapore arms factory), for stealing explosive substances
•••
99
contrary to foreign policy or internal security problems,
defense was a completely nPw area of responsibility that
Singapore government had to handle after Singapore's indepen
dence in 1965 in general and from 1968 in particular. From
the time of its founding in 1819 till 1963 Singapore defense
had been the responsibility of the British government and of
the Malaysian government from 1963 to 1965. In 1967, however,
Singapore with only two infantry Battalions (of 1,600 men) and
without a navy or airforce found itself in a really precarious
position as regards external defence and security.
In order to meet the challenges in this field, Singapore
government designed and executed a "Security Policy". While
describing the essence of it, the then foreign minister s.
Rajaratnam observed that it was "a judicious mixture of well-
trained and well-equl:pped defence force, friendly alliances,n-
and giving as many countries as possible a tangible stake in the
security, prosperity and integrity of Singapore". 35
• • • • • •
and mortar components for the use of the Communist Party of Malaya (MCP}. In October 1977, a statement by the Home Affairs Ministry revealed a new series of a•~sts by the Internal Security Department (ISD) since July 1977. By the end of confrontation, a total of 48 Indonesian infiltrators and saboteurs had been captured. See People's Action Party: The Record of Treason, Betratal of the People, and Criminal Acts of the Barisan Socialis Singapore: PAP, 1965), p.4; "Intensification of Intrusions into Singapore and Malayaa Official Report, 1964", in Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in Internation=Jl Diplomacy, pp.83-84; Lau Teik Soon, ·Malays!.§.:: Singapore Foreign Policies in Southeast Asia, 1965-70, pp. 167-711 and Lee Boon Hiok, Singapore: Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement Concept", South East Asian Studies, no.?, 1978, pp.233-34.
35 . The Straits Times, 16 December 1970.
100
As could be seen from this statement, there were three
basic elements of this policy. The first element of Singapore's
security policy ,.,as to develop and maintain a "credible 11 (though
limited) self-defence capability. According to Singaporf:~·~
strategic thinking, it could not, given the limitations of its
size, and resources, prevent being overrun by a larger and
determined aggressor; but what it could do to deter any such
attempt by making it sure that it could jnflict intolerable
lGvel of darlage on the aggressor. It was also felt that the
city-state could not take advantage of the competing interests
in the event of military threat. It must be able to resist
any such action to bring about an effective response from the
great powers.
In order to implement this aspect of its security stra-
tegy, Singapore had since 1967 been spending upto 11 percent of
36 its national budget on building up its armed forces. After
separation in 1965, it was assumed by Singapore leaders that
the newly inde~)endent Republic would have at least a decade of
British military support in the form of the British army, naval
and air bases which had been L~built in the postwar period. 37
In July 1967, however, the British Labour Government announced
that its ~orces in Malaysia and Singapore would be reduced by
one half over a period of four years and would be withdrawn
altogether by the mid-1970s six months later, in January 1968,
36 Derek McDougall, "The Wilson Government and the British
Defense Commitment in Malaysia and Singapore", Journal t>f Southeast Asian Studies, vol.4, No.2, September 1973, pp.229-40.
37 Straits Times(Singapore), n.d. 1967, p.13.
101
the British government decided to accelerate the withdrawal of
its forces which was rescheduled to be completed in 1971.38
Faced with this impending British Military withdrawal,
the Singapore Government assigned priority to create by 1972,
an elite national defense force which would corrm1and the respect
of its neighbours. It also initiated compulsory National
Service Scheme in 1967 and introduced new tax measures. Such
as ceiling on spending on social services, health and education
39 to increase revenue for defense expenditure.
The Singapore military structure was, in fact, an
adaptation of the Israeli model with an emphasis on quality
to compensate for numbers, quality of men, mobility, moral,
training, and equipment. Indeed, between 1965 and 1974, Israel
became instrumental in the bui ldi.ng u~) of the Singapore Ar·med
torces. 40 Israeli assistance included sending technical
missions and providing some 45 resident military advisors who
helped se1c up the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute
(SAFTI) and lent their expertise on such matters as logistics,
training schools, maintenance bases, manpower, general staff,
and the Armed Forces Technical Institute.
38 David Hawkins, The Defense of Malaysia and Singahbre:
From AMDA to k~ZUK(London, 1972), pp.28-32.
39Ministerial broadcast by the Minister of Defense, Lim
Kim San, and the Minister of Finance, Goh Keng Swee, in March 1968, reprinted in Alex Josey, The Crucial Years Ahead: ~public of Singapore General Elections 1968(Singapore, 1968), pp.44-53.
40see 11 Last Three Israeli Advisors Leaving in May"(an article in Straits Times), 14 April 1974, pp.1~81 Goh Keng SWee, "National Service and Defense Policy 11
, in Towards Tomorrow, n.d. pp. 56-611 and Willard A Hanna, "'!'he New Singapore Armed Forces" AUFSa Southeast Asia Series, vol.21, No.1, January 1973, p.73.
102
The Israeli assistence, however, drew some criticism
from Singapore's two immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indo-
nesia. Newspaper from Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta considered the
choice of Israeli advisors "tactless" "Singapore knew that two
of its neighbours-Malaysia and Indonesia-were the enemies of Is-
rael, because Israel had violated the rights of the Palestinian
people and desecreted the Holy Islamic centres in Jerusalem".
Questions were also raised as to "why Singapore's military
advisors were being imported from Israel whose defense strategy
is offensive, to attack first before being hit? Why did Singa-
pore's instructors not come from Britain? Would Singapore in
"41 the future adopt an offensive defense strategy like Israel?
It was, however, economic considerations which made
Singapore take the decision to seek Israeli assistance in the
defense field. Another reason was that Israel was the only
country willing to provide the assistance when Singapore required
it. The Singapore leaders chose the Israeli model of defence
also because they saw Israeli problems similar to their own and
were impressed by the Israeli concepts of "ruggedness and self-
reliance", and their "determination to survive and prosper in
an unfriendly world on the basis of superiority and desctpline
of mind and muscle". 42
41cited in Dick Wilson, The Future role of Singapore (London, 1972), p.65.
p.l.
42willard A. Hanna, "The New Singapore Armed Forces~' n. ~~ ·;
103
The decision to create an 11 elite" and 11 credible"
defense force was carried 0ut with full determination.
By mid-1971, the active armed forces (15,000 men) were fully
operational and the reserved units (9,000 men) were building
up fast. 43 By 1973, the Singapore Armed Forces (an integrated
force without a seperate army, navy, or air force) had a total
44 of 18,000 on active duty. The army had 16,000 men organized
into 3 battalions and a brigade of armour. The Singapore Air
Defence Command had 15,000 men, 2 squadrons Hanker fighter-
bombers (which were to be ,gradually replaced by refurbished
skyhawks bought from the United States), and a blood hound
surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadron (with a total of 60
missiles). Singapore's maritime command had 500 men and a
total of 8 seaward defense crafts and 6 fast 100-foot long
patrol boats. In addition to the regular armed forces and the
reserves there were also three other para-military or auxiliary
organizations-the vigilante corps (Home Guard) with 25,000 men,
the Special Constabulary (Police Auxiliary) with 10,000 men,
and the Peo Jles' Defence Force(another larger Home guard consis-
ting of both men and women, youth and adults, and volunteers and
43 \'b,,\.P.2.
44By 1973 the total annual intake into the national service was on the order of 11,000- the top 50 percent in academic and physical qualifications of t.he 22, 000 young men who reached the age of 18. Of these 11,000, about half were actually called up for full-time service in the Singapore Armed Force(SAF). The rest were assigned to part-time training and duty in the various para-military and auxiliary services-the special constabulary, the vigilants corps and the Peoples' Defense Force. Of the half of the 22,000 eligibles not called up, exemption was given for hardship cases (i.e., sole supporters of families) and for those who were the "inadequate education, physique or ....
45 conscripts).
104
Singapore's defence preparedness in 1980 was like this:
The army consisted of 9 full-time infantry battalion and
1 commando battalion organised in 3 brigades. These were
complemented by artillery, engim~ers, signals, armour and ser-
vice units. The operational elements of the Republics' air
force comprised 2 squadrons of hunters, 2 squadrons of skyhawks,
1 squadron of F-5E's, a transport squadron of skyrans and C 1
30s and a helicopter squadron of illi-1 Hs and Bell 212s, supported
by a radar unit and a squadron of bloodhound surface-to-~tr
missiles. The Navy had 6 patrol craft, 6 sophisticated missiles
gunboats and 2 squadrons of 12 coastal patrol craft. These were
used for coastal patrols, air/sea rescue operations and fisheries
protection. A squadron of 4 landing ship tanks and a squadron
of 2 mine-sweepers and 3 miscellaneous craft were used for the
46 support role.
. . . . . . character". After full-time national service of 2 years for non-officers and two-and-a-half years for officers conscripts were required to remain in the r.eserve for ten years. Parttime national servicemen underwent one year basic training (part-time evening training) and served for eleven years on a part-time basis.
45 The above information on the Singapore Armed Forces
(the number of men, and equipment etc.), has been obtained from Robert c. Sellers (ed.), Armed Forces of the World: A Reference Hand Book(Third ed, New York, 1971)1 The Military Balance 1971-72, ~London) 1 and the two articles by Kevin Rafferty, "Dependence on U.s. Might", and "Nervously Awaiting the British Defence Review" "Singapore Survey", Financial Times, 1 October 1973 and 30 Sept. 197 4 ¥'U pH·\-'," L\j•
46All these figures of defence capability of the Republic
during 1980 has been taken from Singapore, Facts and Pictures, Singapore, 1980, pp.166-67;
105
Thus, the whole military set-up was rather large and
powerful for a small state like Singapore. The second element
of Singapore's security strategy- 11 friendly alliances"~ was
based on the fact that, regafdless of the expansion of its
armed forces, Singapore would never be in a position to be
engaged in a long-term conflict with its much bigger neighbours.
The most Singapore could do militarily, was to threaten a 11 Short
but sharp retaliation" and to put up a resistance that would
hopefully be costly to the aggressor. Therefore, it was impor-
tant for Singapore to be able to draw upon the strength of its
powerful allles in the event of any conflict with its neighbours.
Singapore's security and defense were covered by the 1967
Anglo-Malayan (later Malaysian) Defence Agreement, when it was
part of Malaysia. After the seperation in August 1965, these
defense arrangements with Britain continued pending a new
agreement in which not only Singapore, Malaysia, and Britain,
but also New Zealand and Australia were to be participants.
It was also writeen in the declaration of Seperation between
Singapore and Malaysia that a mutual defense agreement would be
negotiated. 47 This never materialized and it was in fact, six
years before the five-power defpnse arrangement was eventually
concluded in April 1971. The 1971 arrangement 9opularly known
as the Five-Power Defense Agreement, was a more flexible, and
47 For text of Article v of the Separation Agreement of 7 August 1965, see Singapore, Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol.2, No.66, 9 August 1965,
106
in a sense, weaker and more vague agreement than the previous
48 Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement. It was not a formal pact
put- rather an evolving (and hence frequently misunderstood)
understanding that the parties involved will coordinate their
individual defense measures and thereby compensate for the c
British military withdrawal which was initially (in 1967) intend
to be total but since 1970 provided for a continuing "limited
presence". The key clause in the agreement was the declara-
tion by the five governments that in relation to the external
defense of Malaysia and Singapore ••• in the event of any form of
armed attack externally organized or supported or the threat of
such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their governments
would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding
what measures would be taken jointly or seperately in relation
to such attack or threat. 49
It was clear from the communique outlining the agreement
that none of the parties was committed to come to the aid of
Singapore. The only commitment was to consult, with no guaran-
tee that subsequent action would be taken. The agreement, how-
ever, did provide a "consultative framework" as a basis for the
continuing "limited pros•!nce" of ANZUK l:orces in Singa.rorc and
48 Chin Kin Wah pointed out that the more accurate term was the "Five Power Defense Arrangements" since two different sets of agreements were involved, one between the ANZUK powers and Singapore, and the other between the ANZUK powers & Malaysia. See Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and AMD~, (Singapore, 1974), pp.1-3.
49 Section v of the "Communique issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Mi!l.tste
1fial Meet:Lng on the External Defense of
Malaysia and Singapore, r,ondon, April 15-16, 1971.
107
and Malaysia, and this restructured ANZUK military presence
(replacing the ANZUK presence under the old Anglo-Malaysian
Defence Agreement) was worked out via two sets of "exchanges
of notes 11 between Singapore and ANZUK, and Malaysia and
ANZUK.SO
The continued ANZUK 11 limi ted military presence 11 was
indeed li!ni ted a:nd was recognized as being primarily of psy-
chological value rather than of military significance. The
Singapore Defense Minister openly stated: "They represent no
more than a token acknowledgement of these three governments
that they have an interest in peace and stability in the region.
They prefer not to close one important option by pulling back
all their troops". 51
Prior to the Australian Labour Governments decision to
withdraw its ground forces (whi retaining its air and naval
contributions) from the ANZUK presence, the combined ANZUK
forces (mostly based in Singapore except for the air force
component stationed at the Butterworth Base in Malaysia)
totalled 7,000 men (3,300 Australians, 2,550 British, and 1,150
New Zealanders). Besides the infantry component, the ANZUK
forces included 8 warships and 1 submarine and two (Australian)
52 air force squadrons.
50 For the set involving Singapore see, Singapore, Exchanqe of Notes and Annexes Between the Government of Singapore and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the Uniteq Kingdom on 1 December 1971 in Relation to the Five Power Defense Arrangements.
51 Goh Keng Swee, Straits Times, 31 December 1970. 52see T.B. Miller, "The Five-Power Defense Arrangement
and Southeast Asian Security 11, Pacific Community, vol.3, No.2
•••
108
The immediate value of the Five Power Defense
Agreement and the presence of ANZUK forces to both Singapore
and Malaysia was that it provided "a breathing space", for
them to build up their defence capabilities·. Furthermore,
it provided a necessary counterweight to Indonesia as demons-
trated by the crucial role played the ANZUK forces in with-
standing president Sukarno's policy of confrontation. For
Singapore, in addition, the arrangement provided a counter-
weight in its relations with Malaysia. According to one
observer: "One of Singapores neightmare is a possible, tacit
or open alliance between Malaysia and Indonesia to take advan-
tage of a "neutralized" Southeast Asia no longer patrolled
by British or American ••• warships and aeroplanes, in order
to put the "squeeze" on the heart of the hated overseas
Chinese commercial power in the region". It is hoped by some
circles in Singapore that, "If these were serious internal
violent clashe~ there or in Malaysia, the presence of •••
ANZUK troops would •••• force public opinion in Britain,
Australia and New Zealand to come to their rescue". 53
Singapore had no other military agreement or internal
defence a.rrangements besides this fi.ve power defence arranqe-
ment nor it had ever joined SEATO.
The third element was concerned with pursuing a multiple
involvement in, or a "multilateral supp·1rt for, Singapore's
security. It was essentially a balance-of-power strategy . . . . January, 1972,p.344: and Chin Kin Wah, n.45, pp.3-4.
53Dick Wilson, The Future Role of Singapore, p.71.
109
involving a constant effor~ by Singapore's leaders to convince
great and medium powers both eastern and western that they
had a stake-strategic and economic-in the existence of a viable
and independent Singapore. According to one analyst: "One of
the basic tenets of Singapore's policy for survival in a harsh
international environment is to develop a balance-of-power
structure favourable to its survival .. o.In Singapore's case this
depends on the big powers being convinced1 (i) that Singapore
is of considerable strategic and/or economic value to each of
them1 (2) that the direct interests of each big power can be
adequately served without bringing Singapore under its sole
domination to the exclusion of other big powerst and (3) that
the interest of each can be served only by preventing the sole
domination of Singapore by others". 54
TJJ~ m~ )Singapore pursuing a policy designed to make itself
into a neutral regional oenter (of trade, shippng, i.nvestment,
manufacturing, and distribution) useful to all powers and cap-
able of absorbing their presence and influence, and to encourage
these competing foreign interests to prevent any one of them
from achieving a predominating role. A clear statement of this
aspect of Singapore's security policy and its underlying assumptic
was made by an Assistant Secretary of the Singapore Foreign
Ministry and is worth quoting:
54Yuan-L~u, Strategic Significance of Singapore: A Study a,n Balance of Power(Wash:i.ngton, D.C. :American Enterprise I'1stitutE for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study, 1972), pp.3-1.
110
Since time immemorial, external forces have exerted themselves on the lands and people in the area; it would be idle to wish for a cessation of outside involvement in the region, in one guise or another •••• As of now these seems little prospect of a complete withdrawal of the major powers from Southeast Asia strategically economically or diplomatically. The most one could postulate is that ideological considerations have apparently been subsumed by more hard-heated calculations of selfinterest ••• The immediate reality is that of external involvement and the iml)Otencc oE the c-egion ·to stop larger and more powerful states ••• in pursuit of their policies •••• Rather than trying to keep out all outsiders, therefore, it would be better for as many interested powers as possible to come in and develop a stake in the region, thereby ensuring that no single great power gets into a dominant position •••• In our actions, we are not only friendly to the Big Powers, but we also facilitate their presence in the region. American and Russian ships come into our waters openly for servicing; the Chinese have money-making emporia in various parts of the Republic in addition to a bank; British, West European and Japanese groups participated in our industrial, commercial and financial development~(5:
External Environment
In addition to the geography, demography, economy,
security, and political experiences in the past, the external
environment had also been a key factor in shaping Singapore's
foreign policy and its security concerns. Moreover, besides
an open market economy, Singapore leaders desired for political
~tability in the Southeast Asian region. In the face of the
intended British military withdrawal from Singapore, American
decision to disengage from Indo-China and the probable threat
of communist spread over into the southeast Asia, the Republic
55Goh Kiah Chee, "Regional Perspectives for Singapore", in Towards Tomorrow: Essa s on Develo ment and Social Transformation in Singapore National Trade Union Congress Singapore, 1 Q7~)
lll
joined ASEAN in 1967 which provided a useful platform to
project its views and interests. From the time of British
colonial rule to independence and even after, through its
membership of Five Power!! Defense Arrangements, Hepublic had
maintained a special relationship with Malaysia. Close
political, economic, and cultural, ties had ensured that the
Republic must always take particular notice of Malaysia in its
foreign policy.
The Republic's location at the centre of strategic sea
communications made the Republic a useful window of Southeast
Asia. The strategic im:1ortance of the resource-rich region had
invited the attention of all the major powers. While ,.,elcoming
them to further their int.erests, the Singarore leaders had at
the same time considered it necessary to keep a comfortable
distance from unwelcome influences where necessary. Being small
and vulnerable, the Republic's leaders realized that it could
not wish among the great powers, since they had vital interests
in the region. In a speech at the Asian Business Brieftng
Seminar in Bangkok on 28 June 1976, Foreign Minister s.
Rajaratnam declared: "we in Singapore accept the fact of great
powers and the fact of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia.
We might wish things were otherwise but we console ourselves
with the thought that if the~e were no great power rivalry
in the region, then, if pre-European history in the area is
any guide, we might be confronted with less manageable small
112
u56 power rivalries. Again, in a major speech on 12 June 1976
s. Raj aratnam reiterated: "we accept the existence of great
powers and their rivalri.es as an immutable fact of inter-
national life. We do not subscribe to the prevailing belief
that great powers are necessarily wicked, dangerous and ~e.Y(.
immoral. They are no moreA.than are small nations. Since we
cannot wish away greater power rivalries in the region then in
Singapore's view, the next best thing for small nations is the
presence of all great powers ••• when there is a multiplicity
of suns the gravitational pulls of each is not only weakened
but also, by a judicious use of the pulls and counter pulls
of gravitational forces, the minor planets have greater freedo~
/J57 0f navigation.
56The Mirror, vol.12~ No.28, 12 July 1976, p.l.
57 Straits Times, 13 June 1976, p.4.
1 1 ! 1 1