Certificate...

I, Ms/Mr Ketan Nagpal ,Roll no. 15424401709 certify that the Minor Project

Report(213)entitled “ Bullet for a bullet is it the right policy ”is completely by me by

collecting the material from the referenced sources . The matter embodied in this has not

been submitted earlier for the award of any degree or diploma to the best of my knowledge

and belief .

+

Signature of the guide

Name of the student:Ketan Nagpal

Date:22nd September10

Certified that the Minor Project Report(213)entitled “Bullet for the bullet is it the right policy

” done by Mr./Ms Ketan Nagpal Roll No.15424401709 ,is completely under my guidance .

Signature of the guide:

Name of the guide:MS SARMISHTA

Designation:IITM

Date:22nd Sep10

1

Countersigned

Director /Project Coordinator

Acknowledgement

My gratitude is due to my revered teacher, MS.SAMRISTHA (Marketing faculty), INSTITUTE OF

INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY NEWDELHI .her valuable suggestions and deep

involvement in the project motivated me to complete the study with great zeal. I am also

thankful to the institute for providing us with a resourceful library through which I could

create a better understanding of the subject and conduct an in depth study of the topic “The

Study Of Determinant Factors Affecting Sales Of Newspaper”

KETAN NAGPAL

2

CONTENT

3

S.no Topic Page no

1 Certificate. 1

2 Acknowledgement. 2

3 Content. 3

4 What is the conflict? 4

5 Rise of regional power. 6

6 War between Israel& Iran. 10

7 Agreeing & Disagreeing in for peace. 16

8 Conflict resolution by war. 19

9 Unprecented attacks against community organizations & trade unions

23

10 Examples of conflict resolution by negotition 28

11 Sequncing staegies in social conflicts 33

12 Reunification of east germany &west germany 39

WHAT IS THE CONFLICT?

INTRODUCTION…

The thunderous events set in motion by Israel's storming of the Mavi Marmara, the

lead ship in the peace flotilla challenging the blockade of Gaza, have thrown

important light on the overall situation in the Middle East. Turkey has emerged as

the major protagonist among the forces that support the Palestinian cause. This is

extremely ironic given that the country has been a loyal member of NATO for six

decades and “Israel's most important friend in the Muslim world” (New York

Times, May 31, 2010) for as long as one can remember, markedly so in the post-

Cold War period and even under the present government. The Turkish national

flag competed all over the world for the pride of place with the Palestinian flag in

demonstrations protesting the barbaric murder by Israeli commandos of at least

nine volunteers on board the Marmara, all of them Turkish citizens. From Istanbul

to Toronto, Islamic motifs also dominated most such protests.

4

What is behind this rise of a new Turkish-Muslim protagonist in the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict and what does this imply for the system of imperialist

domination in the Middle East in the foreseeable future?

To provide an answer to this question, we need to bring into the discussion

another unusual set of events: the imbroglio between the U.S., on the one

hand, and the co-operation between Turkey and Brazil, on the other, over

the question of sanctions against Iran. Barely a week after the Israeli assault

on the humanitarian flotilla, on June 8, 2010, a vote was taken at the United

Nations Security Council on a fourth round of (reinforced) sanctions on Iran

and, lo and behold, Turkey and Brazil, rotating members of the Security

Council and two docile allies of the U.S., voted against (and the only Arab

country on the Council, Lebanon, abstained).

Only three weeks before that, the same two countries, after tough

negotiations in Tehran, had signed an agreement with Iran for a swap of

Iran's low-enriched uranium in exchange for enriched uranium to be used

for medical purposes, something the Western countries had not been able to

5

convince Iran into last fall. This was seen, as it certainly should, as a

manoeuvre by the two countries to prevent the tabling of a motion on a new

round of sanctions at the Security Council by the United States. So once

again we end up with a similar question: Why this active diplomacy on the

part of Turkey (and Brazil) that seems to swim against the current of the

U.S. effort to isolate Iran?

Rise of a Regional Power or Islamic

Fundamentalism?

There are at least three sets of contradictions to be taken into consideration

when looking into the forces behind this new situation. The first of these

involves the dynamics of Turkey's economic and political rise as a regional

power that is in search of a new kind of position within the imperialist

constellation of forces. The second set of contradictions derives from the

triangular contest between the three actual or potential nuclear powers of

the Middle East (Israel, Iran and Turkey) and the U.S. stance on this

question. The third aspect derives from the explosive contradictions of

Turkey's domestic politics. Let us take up these three factors one by one.

Turkey is the foremost ally, with the obvious exception of Israel, of U.S.

imperialism in the Middle East. It is also a candidate for accession to the

European Union engaged in negotiations for the last five years, although

relations have recently soured between the two sides due to the explicit

reluctance of the Sarkozy and Merkel governments to carry the accession

6

process to completion. The country is ruled by the most sophisticated and

well-organized capitalist class in the Muslim Middle East. It wields the most

advanced industrial production capacity among these countries and has

increased its exports from around $30-billion (U.S.) at the beginning of this

decade to more than $130-billion (U.S.) in 2008, before the onset of the world

economic crisis. Moreover, 90 per cent of its exports are industrial goods,

increasingly focused on such sectors as the automotive industry. It has very

recently become a major recipient of foreign direct investment: many

multinationals, from Microsoft to Coca Cola, have made Istanbul their

headquarters for Eastern Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and North

Africa.

Turkey is now seeking to become a financial hub and a business arbitration

centre for the entire Arab world, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the

Balkans. Add to this the fact that it has the second largest army in NATO

after the U.S., which puts it among the three major military powers of

Eurasia, along with Russia and Israel.

It is on the basis of this increasing economic and military clout that Turkish

governments have, for some time now, been seeking to become a regional

power. It was under Turgut Ozal, a staunch ally of the West and in

particular the U.S. (and founder of the Motherland Party – Anavatan

Partisi), that Turkey first started to venture into a pan-Turkic and neo-

7

Ottomanist foreign policy, drawing the conclusion that the collapse of the

Soviet Union meant a whole new era of opportunities for Turkey.

A singular product of this new orientation within the ranks of the Turkish

bourgeoisie has been the mushrooming network of schools all around the

world established by an immensely powerful religious congregation led by a

charismatic Imam, Fethullah Gulen, not only in predominantly Muslim

countries, but also in such improbable corners of the world as Latin America

and the Far East. Fethullah Gulen is not committed to any single political

party, but has lately supported the AKP (Justice and Development Party

– Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) government and has disciples within the army

of AKP MPs and even within the council of ministers. He himself resides in

the United States for fear of persecution by the Turkish secular

establishment.

The AKP government has inherited Ozal's orientation and reinforced it

through an immensely active foreign policy that at times veers in directions

that are substantially independent of, and runs counter to, U.S. foreign

policy. The fact that the government party comes from an Islamist

background has raised a controversy within the country's ruling circles and

the U.S. and EU establishments as to whether this new foreign policy implies

an ‘axis shift,’ i.e. whether the government is moving away from the firmly

entrenched pro-Western foreign policy of the traditional wing of the Turkish

bourgeoisie in the direction of closer links with the Islamic world. The

8

answer to this question is of considerable importance, since the government

formed in the late 1990s by the more fundamentalist predecessor of this

mildly Islamic party, the Welfare Party – Refah Partisi (RP) – of Prime

Minister Necmetten Erbakan, was toppled by an alliance of the Turkish

military, the Westernist wing of the bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism

through brazen military intervention.

Our characterisation of the situation is that the AKP government is

simultaneously attempting to cater to the new expansionist needs of the

Turkish bourgeoisie and to become a regional power so as to better negotiate

with the U.S. and, in particular, the EU. In other words, the simplistic

explanation conjured by the Islamophobics of both the West and of Turkey

itself – the idea that the AKP is finally revealing its Islamic fundamentalist

nature – is false. The alliance with Brazil is not limited to the question of

Iran, but extends across a spectrum of areas both economic and political. It

seems that these two midsize rising powers are trying to achieve a level of

influence comparable to those of Russia and India, if not China, on the basis

of a closer alliance.

However, certain objective factors complicate the situation. For one thing, if

Turkey wishes to become a regional power, that necessarily implies reaching

out first and foremost to Islamic countries, of which there is no dearth in

Turkey's vicinity, not only in the Middle East and North Africa, but also in

the Balkans, the Caucusus and Central Asia.

9

In setting up relations with predominantly Muslim countries, the AKP has a

natural advantage over its more secular rivals in Turkish domestic politics,

which of course raises certain paranoid reactions from Islamophobics of all

stripes. Even more important than this is the fact that Turkey's rise in the

Middle East has coincided with two other developments of substantial

import: the conflict over Iranian nuclear efforts and the rise of Hamas as a

highly contentious factor in the Israeli/Palestinian drama. These bring us to

the second set of contradictions mentioned above.

WAR: Between Israel and Iran

It should not be necessary to delve at length into the series of contradictions

between Israel and Iran that make the hostility between these two countries

the most burning question of the Middle East at present. Turkey's special

position vis-à-vis this standoff is what complicates the nature of the new

Turkish foreign policy. Turkey is, or at least used to be, the most reliable ally

of Israel as well as of the U.S. in the Muslim world. One would expect

Turkey to go along with U.S. policy toward Iran, albeit with the

circumspection to be naturally expected from a country neighbouring the

powerful country that Iran is.

However, the U.S.-Israeli pressure on Iran for its supposed efforts at going

nuclear has very paradoxically backfired on Israel by projecting, at least

from the Turkish standpoint, the question of the (unacknowleged) nuclear

10

weapons of Israel under the limelight. The Turkish government now insists

on a nuclear-free Middle East; and since, whatever its real intentions, Iran,

as opposed to Israel, does not yet wield nuclear weapons, this policy implies

turning the attention of the region and the world on Israel's nuclear

capability rather than the putative nuclear arming of Iran.

Not without further irony, Turkey is the only other country in the Middle

East, apart from Israel, that maintains (so far unacknowledged in this case

as well) nuclear weapons on its territory, although these tactical warheads

belong to the U.S. and were placed in Turkey during the Cold War as a

deterrent to the Soviet Union. All in all, what we are witnessing in the

triangular relationship between Turkey, Iran and Israel is the effort of each

of these countries to have the upper hand regarding nuclear clout in the

Middle East.

It is on the question of Palestine, and in particular the plight of Gaza, that

the semi-Islamic nature of the AKP comes into the equation. Since Hamas

11

was elected in a landslide in January 2006 to rule the Palestinian Legislative

Council (eventually becoming isolated in Gaza), the AKP has followed a

policy that widely diverges from both that of the U.S. and the EU (and of the

so-called Quartet that also includes Russia and the UN). This policy also

diverges from that which would have been followed by the rabidly pro-

Western and Islamophobic secular parties of Turkey. The Western alliance

classifies Hamas as a terrorist organization and rejects engagement with it so

long as it refuses (a) to renounce violence against Israel, (b) to recognise the

right of Zionist Israel to exist and (c) to abide by the Oslo accords.

The AKP, in contrast, invited Hamas officials to Ankara for talks in 2006 in

the wake of the elections, an initiative severly rebuked by Israel and the

United States. When Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008, the Turkish

government unambigously came up against the war drive. During a panel

discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in the

aftermath of this war in late January 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Racep

Tayyip Erdogan ferociously attacked the Israeli President Shimon Peres in

an incident that captivated Arab audiences and made him a hero in the eyes

of Arab masses. Joint military exercises that had been held for many years

were later cancelled by Turkey. The Mavi Marmara incident is thus only the

latest drama to be played out in the long agony of Turkish-Israeli friendship.

This clearly raises the question of whether, from the point of view of

American interests, the AKP is fit to rule a country with which the U.S. has,

12

in the words of Obama, a ‘model alliance.’ It is, of course, no secret that the

AKP still bears some of the marks of its Islamic origins. The first serious test

of the party's usefulness for the U.S. was tested in March 2003, when scores

of AKP MPs blocked a government motion that stipulated the use of Turkish

territory by the U.S. in its attack on Iraq. This soured relations between the

two allies for years on end. Having already refused complicity in the U.S.

war against the secular regime of Saddam, the more Islamist elements of the

AKP may certainly resist, in the case of Iran, the waging of war on a country

that calls itself an ‘Islamic Republic.’

Conflict resolution skills are desperately needed in many workplaces today.  The world

around us is filled with hostility at times, while some of our government leaders seem intent

on creating war.  

We Have Choices 

We do have choices in how we handle our own affairs.  We can choose a more peaceful

existence.  

This month's article provides tips for handling conflict in peaceful ways.  It also offers tips

for taking responsibility for our own individual part in creating, sustaining or resolving

conflict.  

If we can understand what parts of ourselves may contribute to creating or sustaining

conflict, we can begin to understand what parts of ourselves can also be useful in resolving

conflict.

13

If you can begin to see that your own attitudes, beliefs, prejudices, values, personality and

habits may be partly responsible for conflict, you can then begin to adjust what you do,

how you do it and who you do it with.  That tiny shift (the beginning), will have ripple

effects and start to transform your relationships.

This is not easy work, make no mistake about it.  This work of looking at your own role in

conflict requires maturity, patience and diligence to be successful.  It will not happen

overnight or all at once.  This is a growth and development process.

Finding the Peaceful Way

If we are willing to understand the other person's point of view, we can find a more

peaceful resolution to disagreements.  And, we can gain a broader perspective that helps us

avoid conflict in the future.  

For example, when you have a disagreement with someone at work, it helps to put yourself

in their place.  

1. Try to see their job as they see it.  

2. Try to understand why they might choose to do what they do.  

3. Try to understand the pressures they face. 

4. Try to understand how their life experience leads them to their current place.

5. Try to understand their personality and how that affects their views.

6. Try to understand their values and beliefs and how they affect their views.

7. Try to understand why they might believe their viewpoint is right.  

14

If you do all that, you may find that your disagreement is not so large after all.  

Seek to Understand

If you can talk to the other person, ask them to try "trading places" with you in the same

way.  By getting to know each other better, you can build on what you share and can agree

on, instead of focusing on your disagreements.  You can come to appreciate how they see

the world and they can come to appreciate how you see it.  Together, you can work to solve

the real problems not waste your time and energy on your differences. 

When a conflict arises, consider talking to yourself as the other person by trying to

understand their perspective.  Make a list of at least a dozen reasons why they might have

that viewpoint before confronting them.  When you do talk to them, seek to understand

rather than defend your position, prove yourself right or prove them wrong.  Truly listen

to why they believe the way they do.  You may learn something very important about them,

about yourself and about the situation.  From there, you can both work toward a mutually

beneficial resolution. 

One of the reasons that corporate conflicts become more inflamed is the prevalent use of e-

mail.  Since it is a very "flat" communication method and prone to misunderstandings,

feelings can be hurt, other people can be quickly drawn into the conflict and the

misunderstanding can get out of hand very quickly.  

If you feel yourself wanting to "fire back" to a message, try talking to someone who is not

involved for a clearer view of what might be happening.  Trust me, I know that's much

easier to say than to do.   Still, if you are willing to back away from responding out of

15

anger, frustration, impatience or superficial hurt, your professionalism will improve and

your career chances will also improve.  Nobody likes someone who is constantly on the

defensive or can be counted on to send messages to a wide distribution list.  

Improving your tolerance, understanding and compassion will improve your health by

eliminating those toxic acids that fire up in your stomach every time you get angry or those

squeezes around your heart every time you feel attacked.  

If possible, wait 24 hours before responding to a message that you think is somehow

attacking you.  Better yet, don't respond at all — hit the Delete key and forget they ever

wrote it.  Reaffirm that you have mutually important partnership goals and conduct

yourself as if you are still working well together — you may be amazed at the way you

perceive the situation.  You may be amazed at how well the other person views you as well. 

Remind yourself constantly  — no one and nothing is against you.

Following are some guidelines for working through disagreements in organizations. 

Agreeing and Disagreeing for Peace…

A method for resolving conflict in organizations through positive means.

IN THOUGHT

Accept conflict  1.  Acknowledge that differences of opinion are a normal part of life.

Affirm the truth 2.  Affirm that we can work through our differences to growth.  See

conflict as a symptom of what is missing in our understanding of

16

others.

Commit to a process  3.  Examine where we are coming from and release our need to be

right.  Acknowledge all parties have needs and commit to a process to

achieve a mutually satisfactory solution.

IN ACTION

Go to the other . . . 4.  Go directly to those with whom we disagree.  Avoid "behind the

back" criticism.  Refrain from gossip and "parking lot"

conversations.  

. . . in the spirit of humility 5.  Go in gentleness, patience and humility.  Own up to our own part in

the conflict instead of blaming others and acting as if others are

responsible for how we are.

Be quick to listen 6.  Listen carefully, summarize and check out what is heard before

responding.  Seek as much to understand as to be understood.

Be slow to judge 7.  Suspend judgment about who is "right" and who is "wrong." 

Avoid name-calling and threats.  Act in a non-defensive, non-reactive

way.

Be willing to negotiate 8.  Work through the disagreement constructively:

  Identify issues, interests and needs of both — rather than take

positions.

Generate a variety of options for meeting both parties’ needs —

rather than defending one’s own way.

Evaluate options by how they meet the needs and satisfy the

interests of all sides — not just one side’s values.

17

Collaborate in working out a joint solution — so both sides

gain, both grow, both learn from the experience and both win.

Cooperate with the emerging agreement — accept what is

possible, not demand your ideal.

Reward each other for each step forward toward agreement —

celebrate mutuality.

IN BELIEF

Be steadfast in respect for

people

9.  Be firm in commitment to seek a mutual solution.  Be hard on

issues, soft on people.

Be open to peace-making 10.  Be open to accepting skilled help.  If we cannot reach agreement

among ourselves, we will use those with gifts and training in mediation.

Trust the community 11.  Trust the wisdom of the community (*).  If we cannot reach

agreement or experience reconciliation, we will seek assistance from

others.

  In one-to-one or small group disputes, this may mean allowing

others to arbitrate.

This may mean allowing others to help negotiate, arbitrate or

implement democratic decision-making processes, insuring that

they are done in the spirit of these guidelines, and abiding by

whatever decision is made.

Be committed to

partnership 

12.  Believe in and rely on the wholeness of the community.  Strive

toward peace, productivity, partnership and teamwork.

18

Conflict resolution by war…

This is the fifth consecutive year of Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW).

Launched in Toronto, this week-long initiative hosts a string of lectures, film

screenings, panels, demonstrations, cultural performances and other events

across campuses and community centers around the world to inform the

public about the continuing violations of one of the longest and devastating

occupations in modern history.

IAW seeks to raise awareness about Israel's apartheid policies towards

Palestinians and to mobilize support for the growing international boycott,

divestment and sanctions campaign initiated in July 2005 in a statement by

over 170 Palestinian civil society organizations.

But if you didn't support IAW in the past, now is the time to start.

19

McCarthyism on Canadian

Campuses

In February 2008, the McMaster Student Union (MSU) and McMaster's

Human Rights and Equity Services (HRES) officebanned the IAW

poster due to allegations that it was "inflammatory." That decision was

made in the shadow of attempts by the McMaster administration, to

unequivocally ban the mere usage of the phrase "Israeli Apartheid" by

student groups on campus. What was then an explicit and unprecedented

attack on the right to academic freedom, the right to organize and freedom

of speech has become the norm for Canadian universities during this year's

IAW – all of which was successfully documented by organizers.

Both Carleton and Ottawa University banned the IAW poster featuring

Carlos Latuff's cartoon of an Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) helicopter

firing a rocket at a Palestinian child in Gaza holding a teddy bear. IOF

killings of unarmed civilians, including over 400 children, in the Gaza Strip

during the latest onslaught is a well documented part of the IOF's policy of

collective punishment of the 1.5 million civilian population of the Gaza Strip.

In a blatant violation of free expression for students drawing attention to

Israel's indiscriminate military offensive, these administrations issued

communiqué's making contrived claims of the poster as offending the

"Ontario Human Rights code" and so-called "civil discourse in a free and

20

democratic society." As neither university administration responded to

student calls for a statement condemning Israel's indiscriminate civilian

killings and the bombing of the Islamic University in Gaza, it is evident that

they are simply unwilling to engage in the same human rights and

democratic discourse they spuriously allege the IAW poster is violating.

Another well documented elaborate campaign against IAW played out at the

University of Toronto, where the administration along with the collaboration

and direct involvement of pro-Israeli organizations and other Ontario

university administrations attempted to prevent student access to campus

space. Pointing to email correspondence gathered through the Ontario

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act between University

President David Naylor, Assistant Provost, Interim Vice-President Provost

and Hillel of Greater Toronto, among others, IAW organizers exposed a

coordinated attempt to cancel the event prior to their issue of a request for

campus space. Attempts by the University of Toronto administration to deny

anti-apartheid organizers access to campus space reveals the extensive

influence of lobby groups on the decision and policy-making of officials in

office. Further, this points to disturbingly coordinated cross-university

initiatives to prevent students from voicing their opposition Israeli violations

of international law and their academic, political and corporate ties to

Canadian institutions.

21

At York University, Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA York)

recently "received notice of a 30-day suspension, a $1000 fine and an

individual fine of $250 for the student signatory for the group" for "actively

participating" in a rally on February 12 ,using "various sound amplification

devices and other noise making instruments” that disrupted classes. SAIA

York notes that despite redirecting the rally from Vari Hall to deliver a

letter to the administration, York University imposed the "maximum

monetary penalty" and violated its own procedures by not following the

"verification process outlined in the university's Student Code of Conduct."

This decision follows York's precedent of censoring political speech in an

arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

In addition to bureaucratic harassment, regular statements by University

President Mamdouh Shoukri "calling for peace" on York campuses, and

motions for the re-evaluation of campus spaces such as Vari Hall for protest

activity signal a growing nervousness among Canadian university

administrations from increased student organizing around issues of social

justice.

Indeed, for the most part, pro-Israeli groups on the above campuses argue

that Israeli Apartheid Week creates "fear on campus" making it more

difficult to "speak out in defence of Israel." What is missed here is that

however outrageous and infringing on basic freedoms of thought, speech,

opinion and expression: banning a poster, censoring a phrase, and denying

22

campus space will not stifle discussion or debate. Nor will it quell the

responsibility and drive of students and community members to condemn

Israeli war crimes. Rather, confidence in terms like "tolerance...civil

discourse...free and democratic society" is the real casualty of the latest wave

of campus repression.

Unprecedented Attacks Against

Community Organizations, Trade

Unions

In conjunction with attempts to stifle organizing on campuses, local

community organizations and trade unions supporting Palestine solidarity

groups are experiencing extreme financial blackmail and bureaucratic

harassment. In a speech at theInaugural Conference on Combating Anti-

Semitism held in London, Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration,

and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney declared that the Canadian Arab

Federation (CAF) and Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) should not expect

to receive government funding because of what he called "their hateful

sentiments toward Israel and Jews." The conference was largely organized

by the Canadian Former Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, a staunch pro-

Israel advocate who gathered similar-minded pro-Israeli parliamentarians

and advocates including: Co-chairperson of Liberal Parliamentarians for

23

Israel, MP Anita Neville, former chair of the Canada-Israel Friendship

Group, MP Carolyn Bennett, Canadian Jewish Congress CEO Bernie

Farber, CEO of the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy

(CIJA), Hershell Ezrin, and MP Bob Rae, member of the Tribute Committee

of the Jewish National Fund.

Pointing to their criticisms of Israeli war crimes during the second Lebanon

war in 2006 and during the recent military attacks in Gaza, and their

condemnation of increasing institutional collaborations between Canada and

Israel particularly in regards to issues of national security and public safety,

Kenney depicts CAF and CIC as undeserving of "official respect from the

government or the organs of [the] state." In a recent interview with

the Canadian Jewish News, Kenney even voiced a vicious personal attack on

CAF President Khaled Mouammar, as representing a “kind of shrill,

cartoonish voice of extremism." While the vilification of respected

community leaders and organizations is troubling, perhaps what is more

chilling is the explicit use of government and taxpayer money to financially

blackmail recognized groups who disagree with the political direction of

appointed members of parliament.

Similar bureaucratic harassment is directed at the Canadian Union of Public

Employees Ontario (CUPE Ontario), whose delegates voted in favour of a

resolution to boycott Israeli universities as a form of protest against Israel's

recent offensive in Gaza. Joining an international chorus of voices calling for

24

political, academic and economic pressure on Israeli institutions for its war

crimes, CUPE Ontario President Sid Ryan argues that the resolution targets

"academic institutions and the institutional connections that exist between

universities here and those in Israel," with a focus on those "doing research

that benefits that nation's military."

The call for boycott aimed at challenging deep rooted alliances between

Canadian and pro-Israeli institutions on university campuses – the types of

alliances allowing for the aforementioned instances of repression faced by

IAW organizers – was met with intense political and financial pressure from

all sides. Reiterating his previous statement when the resolution was first

proposed, CUPE National President Paul Moist swiftly announced his

disagreement with its passing and highlighted the autonomous character of

the provincial branches of the union. The resolution was even condemned by

the Liberal Party of Canada, whose speaker Justice Critic Dominic LeBlanc

pointed to "widespread academic collaboration between Canadian and

Israeli scholars" and deemed the CUPE resolution "foolish" and "reckless."

These statements are made in the shadow of a wave of scathing press

releases, memos, letters and email campaigns initiated by the Canada Israel

Committee, Canadian Jewish Congress, Jewish Defence League, and B'nai

Brith Canada which flood people's inboxes with outrageous accusations of

"anti-Semitism" directed at community representatives such as Ryan and

Mouammar.

25

Baseless accusations of anti-Semitism

One of the most troubling trends in Canadian public discourse around Israel

is the explicit equation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism. At the London

Conference, Kenney contrasts "old-school anti-Semitism" with what he calls

"new anti-Semitism." This new anti-Semitism is the "anti-Zionist version of

anti-Semitism," argued Kenney, one "predicated on the notion that the Jews

alone have no right to a homeland." In other words, the anti-Semitism of the

right is replaced with the anti-Zionism of the left.

At the very least, such a warped argument should make students of this

conflict very nervous. Criticism of Israel has long been equated as an

expression of hate against the Jewish people by Israeli lobbyists, who inflate

the definition of "anti-Semitism" to capture any and all criticisms of Israel.

Indeed, this all-encompassing umbrella would capture even Jewish and

Israeli political opponents and critics of Israel. There is no question that

organizers of IAW and community representatives such as Sid Ryan and

Khaled Mouammar are openly critical of Israel and, like countless

international and Israeli human rights organizations, demand that Israel be

held accountable for its continued war crimes. However, to apply anti-

Semitism to their anti-Zionist policies and criticisms is to dilute the intense

moral condemnation that should accompany accusations of anti-Semitism.

26

Granted, anti-Jewish racism exists. But when it comes to the question of

political criticisms of Israel's constitutionally entrenched ethnic exclusivity

and continued policies of Zionist land appropriation at the demise of the

indigenous Palestinian population, such accusations are unfounded.

Zionism is not just racism. It is deeply rooted in racist, militarist, nationalist,

and colonial thought. Kenney's argument that Zionism is simply a belief that

Jewish people are a nation and thus entitled to self-determination like other

nations is a grotesque oversimplification. From the onset, political Zionism

was a controversial movement even among Jews, and Israeli historians and

academics have since provided a range of arguments, and uncovered

evidence that Zionism is both historically and thematically rooted in racist,

nationalist and colonial thought. Baruch Kimmerling argued Zionism is a

“mixture of territorial nationalism with colonialism”; Gershon Shafir called

it a “clear variant of colonialism”; and Ilan Pappe deems Zionism as an

“unconventional colonialism... [whose] thought and praxis were motivated

by a national impulse but acted as pure colonialism” (Atlantic Quarterly,

Fall 2008).

It is well documented by both Israeli and non-Israeli historians that early

Zionist leaders spoke openly about ethnically cleansing the indigenous

Palestinian population. In fact, Israeli politicians continue to do so today, as

with recent statements made by the so-called centrist Kadima party

leader Tzipi Livni who, prior to winning the largest number of Knesset seats

27

in the February 10th elections, said: “Once a Palestinian state is established,

I can come to the Palestinian citizens, whom we call Israeli Arabs, and say to

them 'you are citizens with equal rights, but the national solution for you is

elsewhere.” Indeed, IAW lectures, panels and workshops also illuminate the

effects of Zionist policies on the Arab community inside Israel, the remnants

of the ethnically cleansed Palestinian community in 1948, pointing to its legal

forms of ethnic discrimination designed to maintain the exclusive "Jewish

character" of the State.

‘

Examples of conflict resolution by peaceful

negotiation.

Parties in conflict, as well as conflict scholars, often perceive a dilemma about when to

negotiate and when to confront their opponent in an adversarial or even coercive

way.Moderates often advocate a "soft path" of conciliation and negotiation,

while hardlinersadvocate using force, either nonviolent or violent, to try to prevail. These

approaches are often seen as completely incompatible; they are not perceived as linked or

sequential, but as either/or choices.

Negotiation and Direct Action Together

Despite this image, negotiation and coercive action can actually be paired together very

successfully. Both Gandhi[1] and Martin Luther King, Jr.[2] specify the use of negotiation

28

in their steps for addressing injustice. In fact, both advocate attempting to resolve issues

through direct talks with the adversary prior to planning a nonviolent action. Since their

philosophies do not treat their adversaries as enemies, there is no intention to harm the

adversary. Rather, if the adversary is given an opportunity to respond to the grievance,

there may be no need to mount a nonviolent action.

Nonviolent action is undertaken only if the negotiation is unsuccessful at bringing a

solution that is acceptable to the aggrieved party. Gandhi and King do not even advocate

extensive preparation for the action prior to the negotiation stage. Some nonviolent

activists might be concerned that this approach gives the adversary an unfair preparatory

advantage. Gandhi and King's focus on converting the adversary takes precedence over

this strategic concern in most of their writings. They prefer a process that leaves open the

possibility of the adversary's change of heart to one which presumes the worst.

Negotiation, a standard conflict-resolution process, was therefore an integral part of the

nonviolent-action campaigns that have set the standard in the development of nonviolent

action. Nonetheless, there is little discussion of negotiation skills or practice in the

nonviolence literature.

Nonviolent action is given even less attention in the literature on conflict resolution.

Conflict-resolution practitioners are often uncomfortable with the confrontational nature

of some nonviolent action. Beyond this, conflict-resolution professionals are concerned with

getting the parties to the table, and tend to be less concerned with what happens before the

negotiation or mediation than what can be done once the discussions begin.

29

Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that study of how the two processes interact is

scant. Few have looked into how nonviolent action and conflict resolution might work best

as part of the same effort to address injustice or power inequity. When addressing

intractable conflict and persistent injustice, this oversight is unfortunate. Combining the

particular strengths of these two approaches can likely further enhance possibilities for

peace. Adam Curle outlines such a combined approach.

Curle's Model

Adam Curle is an English Quaker and peacemaker. He has worked around the world,

helping people find just and peaceful resolutions to a broad array of conflicts, from familial

to international. Reflecting on his wealth of experience, he developed a model for proper

sequencing of conflict-resolution and nonviolent-action processes.

Curle considers two variables: awareness and balance. Awareness refers to the degree to

which relevant actors are aware of the conflict, its sources, and viable solutions. Relevant

parties include the membership of the aggrieved group, the adversary, and possible allies.

It may seem obvious that the aggrieved group has a high level of conflict awareness, but

this may not be the case. Certainly, the aggrieved group members live with the negative

consequences of the grievance and are intimately aware of them. That does not, however,

mean that members are cognizant of the sources of the conflict, or that they know what can

be done to address the problem. In an extreme case, they may consider their lot part of the

natural order of things and/or presume there is nothing that can be done (or, at least,

nothing that they can do) to improve the situation. Further, they may fear the possible

30

consequences of challenging the status quo. In the extreme case, they may be barely

subsisting, and fear that any challenge they make will be greeted with violence. In such

situations, while it may be true that "when you got nothing, you got nothing to lose," the

little that one has may be too precious to put at risk.

Curle avoids the word "power" and names his other key variable "balance." This

distinction has the advantage of avoiding the many conscious and subconscious

connotations of the word power. It also helps us to focus more fully on the relationship

between the parties and on the resources they bring to bear on the particular issue(s) in

contention. In a balanced relationship, neither party is able to impose its will on the other.

This does not mean that they are identical in their sources of power. The resources which

each bring to the relationship may be different. Parties may vary substantially in levels of

control over any given commodity (e.g., wealth, arms, popular support). In relation to the

issues in contention, however, the sums of their individual assets are relatively equal when

weighed against each other. Neither side is likely to be successful in acting on the issue

without the support or at least acquiescence of the other.

Four processes are integral to Curle's model: education, confrontation, bargaining, and

conciliation.

Education: Education involves efforts to increase the awareness of parties relevant to the

conflict. Education is likely to take different forms, depending on the nature of the party.

In the case of members of the aggrieved group, people may need further information on the

sources of the conflict as well as training in the discipline of nonviolence. Potential allies

need to be clear about both the strength of the aggrieved's case and ways in which they can

31

support it. Adversaries may need to understand the ways in which their own actions create

or exacerbate the injustice and the possible impact on themselves, should people organize

to redress it.

Confrontation: While education is geared to all groups with any stake or interest in a

conflict, confrontation is directed only at the adversary. Confrontation tactics are designed

to make it uncomfortable, if not impossible, for the adversary to proceed with business as

usual. They highlight and help build the strength of the aggrieved group, so that any power

imbalance begins to be equalized. Since the strength of the aggrieved group is more likely

to have its base in numbers than in wealth or control of resources, that strength may only

become apparent to the adversary group in the confrontation stage.

Bargaining: Bargaining refers to efforts between parties to work out a resolution to the

conflict which both find acceptable. In some cases, the parties may be able to fashion an

agreement with no external assistance through negotiation. More likely, they may need

a third party to help them reach a mediated resolution. In either case, it is important that

parties do more than simply reach an agreement.

[Re]conciliation: During the course of the conflict, parties tend to develop negative,

mistrustful feelings toward one other. This is particularly likely if the conflict has lasted for

a long time and if people have died or been irreparably injured as a result of it. Curle

underscores the importance of conciliation, which is a technique through which parties

overcome feelings of antipathy, hatred, distrust, and resentment. Without overcoming these

feelings and building a new base for a relationship, the agreement may not be durable or

dependable. It is important that the parties work together to re-knit their frayed

32

relationship. It is conciliation that sets the stage for moving toward what Curle calls

development, "the restructuring of unpeaceful relations to create a situation, a society, or a

community in which individuals are enabled to develop and use to the full their capacities

for creativity, service, and enjoyment."

Sequencing Strategies in Social

Conflict

The sequencing of the peaceful change strategies is depicted in Figure 1. When both

balance and awareness are low, the appropriate focus for the aggrieved group is education.

33

However, if increased awareness does not prompt the adversary to make changes, the

aggrieved group needs to adopt more confrontational tactics. This does not necessarily

mean that educational efforts should be stopped. Previously unreached parties may be

potential allies. Also, members of the adversarial party may not have complete

information, and outreach is needed to contact additional aggrieved group members who

have yet to become involved. Additionally, newly uncovered information should be shared.

As confrontation tactics address the imbalance between the parties, negotiations and

mediations may begin. Once again, this does not mean that the nonviolent actions are

entirely called off. The protest group may decide to wait until an agreement is reached

before calling off the action.

In other words, while the arrows indicate the general path of the different strategies, this

does not mean that the stages cannot overlap. More than one class of action may be taking

place at the same time. The important thing is to avoid moving into a given stage before

necessary preparatory work has been done.

When to Start Negotiating

You may have noticed a disparity between Gandhi and King's steps and Curle's model. As

indicated above and in the section on nonviolent action, both leaders advocated negotiating

before mounting nonviolent action campaigns. In Curle's model, all forms of nonviolent

action precede negotiation and mediation.

This discrepancy is less significant than it may seem. Gandhi and King were leaders of

broad social movements. When Gandhi went to speak to a British governor, or King to a

34

Southern mayor, their reputations preceded them. The officials knew of their capacity to

draw large numbers of apparently unorganized people together and engage them in

activities that challenged the power of the establishment. They also knew of the leaders'

commitment to their cause and their capacity to generate similar levels of commitment on

the part of their followers.

We can look at Curle's model as starting at the very beginning of an attempt to address a

disagreement. In this case, it may still be desirable to contact the adversary and attempt to

discuss the matter. But this is unlikely to result in productive negotiations. Without the

nonviolent action campaign, or at least the education component thereof, the more

powerful adversary is very unlikely to agree to a negotiation or to bargain seriously. This

does not mean that the protest group should refuse to come to the table, only that it must

be wary not to agree to an unacceptable solution simply because the other party has more

power. It is better to go back to constituents and begin nonviolent actions, culminating in

an effort to equalize the power imbalance. Then negotiations can begin anew.

What About Legislative and Judicial Remedies?

Curle's model considers only nonviolent action and conflict-resolution strategies. There is

in fact, another category of peaceable means of approaching conflict. Sharp calls this

category "traditional institutional mechanisms" which includes enacting legislation and

filing court cases.

To see where these mechanisms might best fit in the model, it might be helpful to use a

familiar case: the Montgomery bus boycott.

35

In Jim Crow -- racially segregated -- Alabama and elsewhere in the American South,

African-Americans were not provided the same facilities as their European-American

neighbors. Sometimes this segregation took the form of totally separate facilities, as was

typically the case with public waiting rooms, bathrooms, schools, and water fountains. In

the case of public transportation, separate trains and buses were not provided, but space

on them was segregated by race. On the city buses of Montgomery, as elsewhere in the

South, blacks were required to sit in the back of the bus. If whites filled the seats at the

front of the bus, black passengers were expected to give up their seats to furnish more

seating for white riders. To make matters worse, if one white was in need of a seat, all black

passengers in the row had to get up and make way.

Rosa Parks, secretary of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement

of Colored People (NAACP), was returning from work on the evening of December 1,

1955 . She was sitting in a row at the front of the section reserved for blacks. When

additional white riders boarded the bus, she and the three other black passengers in her

row were asked to get up and move to the rear. The others did as requested. Rosa Parks

refused.

Mrs. Parks was arrested. She was quickly bailed out, but the NAACP and local ministers

decided to call for a one-day boycott of the bus on the day of her trial. The initial boycott

was successful, and group leaders chose to continue the boycott.

Meanwhile, Rosa Parks' case went through the courts, ending up with a Supreme Court

decision handed down on Nov. 13, 1956, that ruled intrastate bus segregation

unconstitutional. When the decision became operative on Dec. 21, Martin Luther King Jr.

36

boarded a bus with a white colleague, and blacks began using the buses again, now on a

desegregated basis.

Traditional institutional mechanisms, challenging an unfair practice in the courts, were the

way through which bus segregation became illegal. This would have been an important

victory in itself. But the impact was much larger than the legal case could have achieved. In

the course of the boycott, a movement was born. Civil-rights leaders gained experience and

credibility. Masses of people discovered that they had the power to undermine centuries of

oppression.

Throughout the civil-rights movement, all categories of peaceful-change processes were

used. Sometimes, as with school desegregation, the struggle was fought largely in the

courts. More often, the changes were the direct result of massive acts of nonviolence, up to

and including civil disobedience. Enactment of new legislation, particularly the Civil Rights

Acts of 1964 and 1965 and the Voting Rights Act were also important, but it is unlikely that

they could have been achieved without the awakening of the American conscience

accomplished by the prolonged nonviolent-action struggle.

The case would suggest that traditional mechanisms can also be incorporated into Curle's

model. Challenging unjust laws can begin when balance and awareness are both low.

Campaigns to enact new legislation that addresses existing injustices are unlikely to be

successful until awareness, at least, has been heightened. This would suggest a slight Before

closing the discussion of how different sets of strategies can be appropriately sequenced, I

need to mention one caveat regarding my inclusion of legislative and judicial mechanisms.

The case I used occurred in a democracy. While it is certainly true that U.S. law has failed

37

people of color in various ways from the writing of the U.S. Constitution with its 3/5

Compromise onward, U.S institutions nonetheless seek to provide "government of the

people, by the people, and for the people," to use Abraham Lincoln's phrase.

If the site of the conflict to be addressed is a more authoritarian form of government, a

dictatorship.

Conclusion

Combining classes of strategies in the service of bringing intractable conflicts to just and

constructive conclusions is a challenge. Those who have expertise in conflict resolution are

not likely to have expertise in nonviolent action or legislative and judicial processes. People

who have devoted their whole lives to one set of mechanisms may have difficulty seeing its

limits. Some may be reluctant to combine methods.

Nonetheless, each method of peaceful change has its strengths and its limits. A movement to

resolve intractable conflict will be empowered by bringing different types of actors into the

planning and strategy sessions and by casting the widest net possible for participation. In

all probability, conflict-resolution processes will also be helpful in the planning processes

rather than simply with opponents.

Paul Wehr, Conflict Regulation, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

"Six Steps for Nonviolent Social Change" (Atlanta: The King Center, 2002, accessed 1

July 2003)

38

Gene Sharp, the leading scholar of nonviolent direct action lists many "persuasion"

techniques, which are likely to bring about education in his treatise The Methods of

Nonviolent Action (Part II of The Politics of Nonviolent Action), (Boston, MA: Porter

Sargent Publishers, 1973).

The confrontation stage draws primarily on techniques classified by Sharp as non-

cooperation or nonviolent intervention. Others call this reconciliation. The term

"conciliation" usually specifies informal mediation.

Adam Curle and Ma'ire A. Dugan."Peacemaking: Stages and Sequence," Peace and

Changes.

39

Reunification of east germany & west

germany

40

German reunification (German: Deutsche Wiedervereinigung) was the process in which

the German Democratic Republic (GDR/East Germany) and Berlin, reunited into a single

41

city, joined the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG/West Germany), as provided by its

then Grundgesetzconstitution Article 23. The start of this process is commonly referred by

Germans as die Wende(The Turning Point.). The end of the unification process is officially

referred to as the German unity (German: Deutsche Einheit), celebrated on 3 October

(German Unity Day).

The East German regime started to falter in May 1989, when removal of Hungary's border

fenceopened a hole in the Iron Curtain. It caused an exodus of thousands of East

Germans fleeing to West Germany and Austria via Hungary. The Peaceful Revolution, a

series of protests by East Germans, led to the GDR's first free elections on 18 March 1990,

and to the negotiations between the GDR and FRG that culminated in a Unification Treaty,

[1] whilst negotiations between the GDR and FRG and the four occupying powers produced

the so-called "Two Plus Four Treaty" (Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to

Germany) granting full sovereignty to a unified German state, whose two halves had

previously still been bound by a number of limitations stemming from their post-WWII

status as occupied regions. The united Germany remained a member of the European

Community (later the European Union) and of NATO.

There is debate as to whether the events of 1990 should be properly referred to as a

"reunification" or a "unification". Proponents of the former use the term in contrast with

the initial unification of Germany in 1871. Also when the Saarland joined the West

German Federal Republic of Germany on 1 January 1957, this was termed the Small

Reunification. Popular parlance, which uses "reunification", is deeply affected by the 1989

opening of the Berlin Wall (and the rest of the inner German border) and the physical

reunification of the city of Berlin (itself divided only since 1945). Others, however, argue

42

that 1990 represented a "unification" of two German states into a larger entity which, in its

resulting form, had never before existed (see History of Germany).

For political and diplomatic reasons, West German politicians carefully avoided the term

"reunification" during the run-up to what Germans frequently refer to as die Wende. The

official and most common term in German is "Deutsche Einheit" (in English "German

unity"). German unity is the term that Hans-Dietrich Genscher used in front of

international journalists to correct them when they asked him about "reunification" in

1990.

After 1990, the term "die Wende" became more common. The term generally refers to the

events (mostly in Eastern Europe) that led up to the actual reunification; in its usual

context, this term loosely translates to "the turning point", without any further meaning.

When referring to the events surrounding unification, however, it carries the cultural

connotation of the time and the events in the GDR that brought about this "turnaround" in

German history. However, civil rights activists from Eastern Germany rejected the

term Wende as it was introduced by SED's Secretary General Egon Krenz.[2]

[edit]Process of reunification

43

Police officers of the East GermanVolkspolizei wait for the official opening of

the Brandenburg Gate on 22 December 1989.

On 18 May 1990, the two German states signed a treaty agreeing on monetary, economic

and social union. This came into force on 1 July 1990, with the Deutsche Mark replacing

the East German mark as the official currency of East Germany. The Deutsche Mark had a

very high reputation among the East Germans and was considered stable. While the GDR

transferred its financial policy sovereignty to West Germany, the West started granting

subsidies for the GDR budget and social security system. At the same time many West

German laws came into force in the GDR. This created a suitable framework for a political

union by diminishing the huge gap between the two existing political, social and economic

systems.

A reunification treaty between West Germany and the GDR was negotiated in mid-1990,

signed on 31 August of that year and finally approved by large majorities in the legislative

chambers of both countries on 20 September 1990. After that last step Germany was

officially united at 00:00 CETon 3 October 1990. The five re-established federal states

(Bundesländer) of East Germany –Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-

Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia – formally joined theFederal Republic of

Germany, along with the city-state Berlin which formally came into being at the same time,

created out of the still formally occupied West Berlin and East Berlin, and admitted to the

federation. In practice however, West Berlin had already acted as an 11th state for most

purposes, so Berlin is generally not included in the list of "New Länder".

The process chosen was one of two options implemented in the West German

constitution (Grundgesetz; literally: Basic Law) of 1949. The constitution allowed - with

44

(the then-existing) Article 23 - all Länder (German federative states), to give in their

adhesion to the new Federal Republic. Thus the states' parliaments would vote in for their

adhesion. The initial eleven joining states of 1949 comprised the Trizone andWest Berlin.

However the latter was legally inhibited by Allied objection due to the status of the city as a

quadripartite allied occupation area. In 1957 the Saar Protectorate joined West Germany

under Article 23 procedure.

As the five newly-founded eastern German states formally joined the Federal Republic

using the Article 23 procedure, the area in which the Basic Law was in force simply

extended to include them. The alternative would have been for East Germany to join as a

whole along the lines of a formal union between two German states that then would have

had to, amongst other things, create a new constitution for the newly established country.

Under the model that was chosen, however, the territory of the former German Democratic

Republic was simply incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, and accordingly

the Federal Republic of Germany, now enlarged to include the Eastern States, continued

legally to exist under the same legal personality that was founded in May 1949.

Thus, the reunification was not a merger that created a third state out of the two, but an

incorporation, by which West Germany absorbed East Germany. Thus, on Unification

Day, October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist, giving way to five

new Federal States, and East and West Berlin were also unified as a single city-state,

forming a sixth new Federal State. The new Federal States immediately became parts of

the Federal Republic of Germany, so that it was enlarged to include the whole territory of

the former East Germany and Berlin.

45

The practical result of that model is that the now expanded Federal Republic of Germany

continued to be a party to all the treaties it had signed prior to the moment of reunification,

and thus continued the same membership of the U.N., NATO, the European Communities,

etc; also, the same Basic Law and the same laws that were in force in the Federal Republic

continued automatically in force, but now applied to the expanded territory.

Inner reunification.

Re-enacting famous Alfred Eisenstaedtphoto at 12:01 A.M. on

Reunification night inCologne, Germany.

46

Berlin Wall at the Brandenburg Gate, 9 November 1989

Politicians and scholars have frequently called for a process of "inner reunification" of the

two countries and asked whether there is "inner unification or continued

separation". "The process of German unity has not ended yet", proclaimed

Chancellor Angela Merkel, who grew up in East Germany, in 2009. Nevertheless, the

question of this "inner reunification" has been widely discussed in the German public,

politically, economically, culturally, and also constitutionally since 1989.

Politically, since the fall of the Wall, the successor party of the former East German

socialist state partyhas become a major force in German politics. It was renamed PDS, and,

later, merged with the Western leftist party WASG to form the party Die Linke (The Left).

Constitutionally, the Grundgesetz, the West German constitution, provided two pathways

for a unification, the first including an implementation of the constitution in the East, the

second the implementation of a new all-German constitution, safeguarded by a popular

referendum. While the former option was chosen as the most feasible one, the latter option

was partly regarded as a means to foster the "inner reunification".

A public manifestation of Vergangenheitsbewältigung is the existence of the so-

called Birthler-Behörde, the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives, which collects

and maintains the files of the East German security apparatus.

The economic reconstruction of former Eastern Germany following the reunification

required large amounts of public funding which turned some areas into boom regions,

although overall unemployment remains higher than in the former West.

47

In terms of media usage and reception, the country remains largely divided. Mentality

gaps between East and West persist, but so does sympathy. Additionally, the daily-life

exchange of Easterners and Westerners is not so large as expected. Especially young

people's knowledge of former East Germany is very low. Some people in former Eastern

Germany engage in Ostalgia, which is a certain nostalgia for the time before the wall came

down.

Today, there are several prominent East Germans shaping the image of Germany at home

and abroad, including Kurt Masur, Michael Ballack, Katharina Witt, and Angela Merkel.

War in Afghanistan (2001–present)

The War in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001,[29] as the US military'sOperation

Enduring Freedom (OEF) that was launched, along with the British military, in response to

the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. The UK has, since 2002, led its own military

operation, Operation Herrick, as part of the same war in Afghanistan. The character of the

war evolved from a violent struggle againstAl-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a

complex counterinsurgency effort.

The first phase of the war was the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the

United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, to remove the safe haven to Al-

Qaeda and its use of the Afghan territory as a base of operations forterrorist activities. In

48

that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with the Afghan opposition forces of

the Northern Alliance, quickly ousted the Talibanregime. During the following Karzai

administration, the character of the war shifted to an effort aimed at smothering an

insurgency hostile to the US-backed Karzai government, in which the insurgents preferred

not to directly confront theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, but

blended into the local population and mainly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

and suicide bombings.

The stated aim of the invasion was to find Osama bin Laden and other high-rankingAl-

Qaeda members to be put on trial, to destroy the organization of Al-Qaeda, and to remove

the Taliban regime which supported and gave safe harbor to it. The Bush

administration stated that, as policy, it would not distinguish

between terroristorganizations and nations or governments that harbored them.

The United Nationsdid not authorize the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.

Another ongoing operation is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which

was established by the UN Security Council at the end of December 2001 to

secure Kabul and the surrounding areas. NATO assumed control of ISAF in 2003. By July

23, 2009, ISAF had around 64,500 troops from 42 countries, with NATO members

providing the core of the force. The NATO commitment is particularly important to the

United States because it gives international legitimacy to the war. The United States has

approximately 29,950 troops in ISAF.

The US and UK led the aerial bombing, in support of ground forces supplied primarily by

the Afghan Northern Alliance. In 2002, American, British and Canadianinfantry were

49

committed, along with special forces from several allied nations, including Australia. Later,

NATO troops were added.

The initial attack removed the Taliban from power, but Taliban forces have since regained

strength. Since 2006, Afghanistan has seen threats to its stability from increased Taliban-

led insurgent activity, record-high levels of illegal drug production, and a fragile

government with limited control outside of Kabul. The Taliban can sustain itself

indefinitely, according to a December 2009 briefing by the top U.S. intelligence officer in

Afghanistan.

On December 1, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that he would escalate

U.S. military involvement by deploying an additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six

months. He also proposed to begin troop withdrawals 18 months from that date. The

following day, the American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal,

cautioned that the timeline was flexible and “is not an absolute”[41] and Defense

Secretary Robert Gates, when asked by a member of theSenate Armed Services

Committee if it is possible that no soldiers would be withdrawn in July 2011, responded,

"The president, as commander in chief, always has the option to adjust his decisions." 

On January 26, 2010, at the International Conference on Afghanistan in London, which

brought together some 70 countries and organizations, Afghan PresidentHamid

Karzai told world leaders that he intended to reach out to the top echelons of the Taliban

within a few weeks with a peace initiative.[44] Karzai set the framework for dialogue with

Taliban leaders when he called on the group's leadership to take part in a "loya jirga"—or

large assembly of elders—to initiate peace talks.

50

Main articles: Civil war in Afghanistan (1992–

1996) and Civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001)

After Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the Kabul government fell to the mujahideen in

1992. In the years that followed, various factions of the mujahideen fought each other for

control. In 1996 the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist movement formed in 1994,

captured the capital Kabuland subsequently overran approximately 90% of the country,

leaving only a small corner in the northeast under control of the Northern Alliance.

Although members of the international community, including the United States, initially

viewed the Taliban as a potential source of stability for the war-ravaged country,[46] their

tolerance for hosting Islamic extremists combined with their reluctance to negotiate with

their enemies soon soured this. In 1996, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization

began using Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a base of operations. Under the Taliban, Al-

Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a place to train and indoctrinate fighters, import

weapons, coordinate with other jihadists, and plot terrorist actions.[47] While Al-Qaeda

maintained its own establishments in Afghanistan, it also supported training camps

belonging to other organisations. 10,000 to 20,000 people passed through these facilities

before 9/11, most of whom were sent to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance

but a smaller number were inducted into al-Qaeda.

After the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were linked to bin Laden, President Bill

Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant training camps in Afghanistan. U.S. officials

pressed the Taliban to surrender bin Laden, and the international community imposed

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sanctions of the Taliban in 1999 calling for bin Laden to be surrendered to U.S. custody.

The Taliban repeatedly rebuffed the demands, however.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special Activities Division paramilitary teams were

active in Afghanistan in the 1990s in clandestine operations to locate and kill or

capture Osama Bin Laden. These teams planned several operations, but did not receive the

order to execute from President Bill Clinton. These efforts did however build many of the

relationships that would prove essential in the 2001 U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan.

US attack against al Qaeda and the Taliban planned before

September 11

Richard A. Clarke, chair of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group under the Clinton

administration, and later an official in the Bush administration, allegedly presented a plan

to incoming Bush administration official Condoleezza Rice in January 2001 that involved

covert action in Afghanistan to deny al Qaeda a safe haven there. The plan allegedly

involved covert support for the Northern Alliance, air strikes, and the introduction of U.S.

special operations forces into Afghanistan.

One day before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration agreed on a plan

to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by force if it refused to hand over Osama bin

Laden. The plan involved using escalating methods of applying pressure over a three year

period. At that September 10 meeting of the Bush administration's top national security

officials, it was agreed that the Taliban would be presented with a final ultimatum to hand

over Osama bin Laden. If the Taliban refused, covert military aid would be channeled by

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the U.S. to anti-Taliban groups. If both those options failed, "the deputies agreed that the

United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action."

Naiz Naik, former Foreign Secretary of the government of Pakistan, alleged that at a

meeting in Berlin in mid-July 2001 senior U.S. officials warned him that unless bin Laden

was handed over quickly, the U.S. would take military action to kill or capture bin Laden

and Taliban leader Mullah Omar sometime in the middle of October 2001. The wider

objective of the planned operation, according to Naik, was to topple the Taliban regime

and to install a more moderate government. Naik also claimed he was told that the

operation would be launched fromTajikistan and Uzbekistan, and that U.S. military

advisors were already in place.

Legal basis for war

The United Nations Charter, which has been ratified by the United States and to which

other members of the invasion coalition are signatories, provides that all UN member states

must settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and no member nation can use

military force except in self-defense. The United States Constitution states that

international treaties, such as the United Nations Charter, that are ratified by the U.S. are

part of the supreme law of the land in the U.S.[65] The United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) did not authorize the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan

(Operation Enduring Freedom).

Defenders of the legitimacy of the US-led invasion argue that UN Security Council

authorization was not required since the invasion was an act of collective self-defense

provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and therefore was not a war of

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aggression.[65][66] Critics maintain that the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan were not

legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter because the 9/11 attacks were

not “armed attacks” by another state but rather were perpetrated by groups of individuals

or non-state actors. Further, even if a state had perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, no imminent

threat of an armed attack on the U.S. existed after September 11, and the U.S. would not

have waited three weeks before commencing the bombing campaign against Afghanistan if

there had been such a threat: the necessity for self-defense must be “instant, overwhelming,

leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”.

The Bush administration for its part did not seek a declaration of war by the US Senate,

and labeled Taliban troops as supporters of terrorists rather than soldiers, denying them

the protections of the Geneva Convention and due process of law. This position has been

successfully challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court and questioned even by military lawyers

responsible for prosecuting affected prisoners. On December 20, 2001, the UNSC did

authorize the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with authority

to take all measures necessary to fulfill its mandate of assisting the Afghan Interim

Authority in maintaining security. Command of the ISAF passed to NATO on August 11,

2003.

2001: Initial attack

Further information: 2001 in Afghanistan

After the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harbouring al Qaeda, on October 7, 2001

the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan. Teams from the

CIA's Special Activities Division (SAD) were the first U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan and

54

begin combat operations. They were soon joined by U.S. Army Special Forces from the 5th

Special Forces Group and other units fromUSSOCOM. These forces worked with Afghan

opposition groups on the ground, in particular the Northern Alliance. The United Kingdom

and Australia also deployed forces and several other countries provided basing, access and

overflight permission.

On October 7, 2001, airstrikes were reported in the capital, Kabul (where electricity

supplies were severed), at the airport, at Kandahar (home of the Taliban's Supreme

Leader Mullah Omar), and in the city of Jalalabad. CNN released exclusive footage of

Kabul being bombed to all the American broadcasters at approximately 5:08 p.m. October

7, 2001.

At 17:00 UTC, President Bush confirmed the strikes on national television and Prime

Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair also addressed the UK. Bush stated that

Taliban military sites and terrorist training grounds would be targeted. In addition, food,

medicine, and supplies would be dropped to "the starving and suffering men, women and

children of Afghanistan".

A pre-recorded videotape of Osama bin Laden had been released before the attacks in

which he condemned any attacks against Afghanistan.Al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite news

channel, reported that these tapes were received shortly before the attack.

The fall of Kabul

On the night of November 12, Taliban forces fled from the city of Kabul, leaving under

cover of darkness. By the time Northern Alliance forces arrived in the afternoon of

November 13, only bomb craters, burned foliage, and the burnt-out shells of Taliban gun

55

emplacements and positions were there to greet them. A group of about twenty

hardline Arab fighters hiding in the city's park were the only remaining defenders. This

Taliban group was killed in a 15-minute gun battle, being heavily outnumbered and having

had little more than a telescope to shield them. After these forces were neutralized Kabul

was in the hands of the U.S./NATO forces and the Northern Alliance.

The fall of Kabul marked the beginning of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map.

Within 24 hours, all the Afghan provinces along theIranian border, including the key city

of Herat, had fallen. Local Pashtun commanders and warlords had taken over throughout

northeastern Afghanistan, including the key city of Jalalabad. Taliban holdouts in the

north, mainly Pakistani volunteers, fell back to the northern city of Kunduz to make a

stand. By November 16, the Taliban's last stronghold in northern Afghanistan was

besieged by the Northern Alliance. Nearly 10,000 Taliban fighters, led by foreign fighters,

refused to surrender and continued to put up resistance. By then, the Taliban had been

forced back to their heartland in southeastern Afghanistan around Kandahar.

By November 13, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, with the possible inclusion of Osama bin

Laden, had regrouped and were concentrating their forces in the Tora Bora cave complex,

on the Pakistan border 50 kilometers (30 mi) southwest of Jalalabad, to prepare for a stand

against the Northern Alliance and U.S./NATO forces. Nearly 2,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban

fighters fortified themselves in positions within bunkers and caves, and by November 16,

U.S. bombers began bombing the mountain fortress. Around the same time, CIA and

Special Forces operatives were already at work in the area, enlisting and paying local

warlords to join the fight and planning an attack on the Tora Bora complex.

The battle of Qala-i-Jangi

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On November 25, the day that Taliban fighters holding out in Kunduz surrendered and

were being herded into the Qala-I-Janghi fortress near Mazar-I-Sharif, a few Taliban

attacked some Northern Alliance guards, taking their weapons and opening fire. This

incident soon triggered a widespread revolt by 300 prisoners, who soon seized the southern

half of the complex, once a medieval fortress, including an armory stocked with small arms

and crew-served weapons. One American CIA paramilitary operative who had been

interrogating prisoners, Johnny Micheal Spann, was killed, marking the first American

combat death in the war.

The revolt was finally put down after seven days of heavy fighting between an SBS unit

along with some US Army Special Forces and Northern Alliance, AC-130 gunships and

other aircraft took part providing strafing fire on several occasions, as well as a bombing

airstrikes.[104] A total of 86 of the Taliban prisoners survived, and around 50 Northern

Alliance soldiers were killed. The quashing of the revolt marked the end of the combat in

northern Afghanistan, where local Northern Alliance warlords were now firmly in control.

Consolidation: the taking of Kandahar

American Special Forces withHamid Karzai in Kandahar province

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By the end of November, Kandahar, the Taliban's birthplace, was its last remaining

stronghold, and was coming under increasing pressure. Nearly 3,000 tribal fighters, led

by Hamid Karzai, a loyalist of the former Afghan king, and Gul Agha Sherzai, the

governor of Kandahar before the Taliban seized power, pressured Taliban forces from the

east and cut off the northern Taliban supply lines to Kandahar. The threat of the Northern

Alliance loomed in the north and northeast.

Meanwhile, the first significant numbers of U.S. combat troops had arrived. Nearly

1,000 Marines, ferried in by CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and C-130s, set up

a Forward Operating Base known as Camp Rhinoin the desert south of Kandahar on

November 25. This was the coalition's first strategic foothold in Afghanistan, and was the

stepping stone to establishing other operating bases. The first significant combat involving

U.S. ground forces occurred a day after Rhino was captured when 15 armored vehicles

approached the base and were attacked by helicopter gunships, destroying many of them.

Meanwhile, the airstrikes continued to pound Taliban positions inside the city, where

Mullah Omar was holed up. Omar, the Taliban leader, remained defiant although his

movement only controlled 4 out of the 30 Afghan provinces by the end of November and

called on his forces to fight to the death.

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