british views in turkish national movement 1919-22

8/9/2019 British Views in Turkish National Movement 1919-22

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British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22Author(s): A. L. MacFie

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 27-46Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284241Accessed: 16-03-2015 16:36 UTC

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2/21

British Views of the Turkish

National

Movement

in

Anatolia,

1919-22

A.L. MACFIE

British views of the

Turkish national

movement in Anatolia

differed

according

to the

point

of view

adopted.

Whereas British officials

on

the

spot, in Constantinople(Istanbul, occupied by the EntentePowers, Britain,

France

and

Italy,

following

the defeat

of the

Ottoman

Empire

in the First

WorldWar)and

Anatolia tended to view the movement as the

product

of a

conspiracy, organized by elements

within the

Ottoman

government,

in

particular

the

Ministry

of

War,

the

intelligence services, particularly

hose

operating

in

Europe,

Central Asia and the Middle

East,

tended to view

it

as

pa

t

of

an

international

conspiracy, organized by

outside forces

(CUP

in

exile,

German

right wing,

Bolshevik),

centred in Berlin

and

Moscow. This

discrepancywas never fully resolved, but as events developed in Anatolia,

in the period of Turkishnational

struggle,

the

view put

forward

by

the men

on the

spot gained

increasing acceptance.

The view expressed

by

most of

the British officials serving

in

Constantinople

and Anatolia

(General Milne,

Commander

of the

Army

of

the Black Sea, Admiral

Calthorpe,

British

High Commissioner

in

Constantinople,

Admiral de

Robeck,

also a British

High Commissioner,

Commander

Heathcote-Smith, RNVR, Captain Hurst,

an officer

in

the

LevantConsular Service, Captain Perring, a relief officer, and many others)

found its

clearest expression

in

a

History

of the

National Movement, printed

by

the

War Office in

the

autumn of

1919. Until the end of May, the History

of the National

Movement

noted,

all the Turkish

corps commanders

continued

to

dispatch

armaments to

Constantinople,

as

they

were

required

to do

by

the Armistice of Mudros

(30

October

1918).

But the

occupation

of

south-western Anatolia

by

the

Italians,

in

March

1919,

and the

occupation

of

Smyrna (Izmir) by

the Greeks

in

May entirely changed

the

situation. By

the end of May the countrywas flooded with accounts of what had occurred.

These accounts, which

'naturally'were exaggerated, came as a great shock

to the

Turks,

and

had a

unifying

effect on the various

factions into which the

country

at that time was

divided.

Middle

Eastern

Studies, Vol.38,

No.3, July 2002, pp.27-46

PUBLISHED

BY

FRANK

CASS, LONDON


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3/21

28

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

About that

time

-

so the

History

continues

-

the surrender

of

armaments

from

central and eastern Anatolia ceased.

During

June

the

creation of two

different

organizations

was

reported:

a) The first was an unofficial

organization,kept

very secret,

and headed

by

Raouf Bey, a

sailor,

lately

Minister of Marine. This

organization

was

engaged

in

sending

men and

money

into the area near

Smyrna.

b)

The second

organization

was

the creation of General Shevket

Turgut

Pasha,Ministerof War, n

consultation

with

the Minister of the Interior.

He

mapped

out Asia

Minor into

Northern and

Southern

Inspectorates,

and

allotted to

each

a

distinguished

General Staff. The first two

appointmentswere General MustafaKemal to the NorthernInspectorate

and General 'Kutchuk'

Djemal

to the Southern

Inspectorate.

So far as

one can ascertainthis official

organization

at its

inception

seems to have

been

intended

to

ensure

the

peace

of TurkishAnatolia

during

a

period

of

intense strain.

Unfortunately

the method

adopted by Mustafa Kemal had the

opposite

effect. He

and

his

officers did

everything

in their

power

to stir

up

the

people,

by condemning the action of the Allies with regardto the events occurring

in

the

Smyrna

district. This

agitation

became

so serious that it

was

necessary

to

order the return of Mustafa

Kemal to

Constantinople,but he

refused

to

obey. Instead,

early

in

July

he

went to

Erzerum,

and about

the

same

time was

joined

there

by

Raouf

Bey

from

Aydin.

The first

step taken

was

the

summoning

of the

Congress of

Erzerum,with

delegates

from

what

were known

as the six

eastern provinces. This

was the

first important

meeting

at

which

the

nationalist programme

was

discussed. There

appeared

to

have been a

good deal of

disagreement at the

congress, but in

the end

a

declarationwas agreedon. The underlying principle of the declarationwas

the 'defence of

national

rights'.

As

a

result

of

the

defeat of the Ottoman

army

by

the

British

forces the

leaders

of

the

movement were

preparedto

accept

the

loss of

Mesopotamia, Arabia,Palestine and

Syria,

but they were

determined

to

defend,

if

need be

by force,

the

remainderof

Turkey, which

'representedthe home of the

race'. On

no account

would they accept

the

division

of

parts

of

Anatolia

between the

Greeks and

Armenians.Nor would

they accept

the

granting

of

any

form of

mandate,which would

'result in

the

Ottoman Empire losing its independence to the Powers'. The 'real'

programme

of

the

nationalists

was,

therefore, the report

concluded:

a)

To

organize

the

villages

as

best

they could

without taking

men from

their

homes;

b)

To

maintain

complete order in

Anatolia, and to

refrain from

any

aggression across the

pre-war

frontier;




4/21

BRITISH

VIEWS

OF

TURKISH

NATIONAL

MOVEMENT

29

c)

To

get

rid of the

government

of

Ferid

Pasha,

and

to

substitute

a

government which

would

furnish

a

delegation

to the Peace

Conference

capable

of

making

a

dignified

protest upon

the basis of

President

Woodrow Wilson's 14

Points;

d)

To avoid

any

immediate clash with the

Allies,

and

reserve

to their

party

such powers of

compromise,

as

would put them

in

a

position

of

being

at

once the saviour of

their

country,

and able to come

to

a

settlement with

the Entente.

Following this

programme,Mustafa Kemal and

his

associates

continued

to

organize

the

country.

As a

preliminarystep

to

the overthrow

of

Damad

Ferid

Pasha, they summoned a congress at Sivas. The Sivas Congress differed

from the Erzerum

Congress

in

that its

delegates

came from

the whole of

Turkey. It was at the

Sivas

Congress

that the

delegates decided on the

seizure

of

the

telegraph offices in

Anatolia,

therebysecuringthe isolation of

the

government

in

Constantinople.

A

second

account, dispatched on 30

June 1919, from

General Milne,

Commanderof the

Army

of

the Black

Sea,

to

Admiral

Calthorpe,

he British

High

Commissioner, may also

be taken

as representative of

the views

frequently expressed at the time by the men on the spot. In his account,

Milne

informed

Calthorpethathe hadjust

received a series of

reportsfrom

the

interior

suggesting that a 'serious

movement' was

developing

in the

districts of Sivas

and

Konia,

and that armed bands

were

being

assembled

there. This

movement,

which

had,

it was

reported,

been set

up by Mustafa

Kemal

Pasha at

Sivas, and

Djemal Pasha at

Konia, aimed at

'action

independent

of the Ottoman

Government'.

A

third

account, entitled

History of

the Movement,

composed by

CommanderHeathcote-Smith, and dispatched to London on or about 24

July

1919, may

also be

taken as

typical.

In

his

reportHeathcote-Smith races

the

events

leading

up

to

the

declarations, ssued on 8

July

1919

by

Mustafa

Kemal

(on

the occasion of

his resignationfrom

the

army), and on 9 July by

Raouf

Bey, ex-Minister

of

Marine. In

recent months,

Heathcote-Smith

reports, members

of the CUP,

left at liberty in

Anatolia, had

made much

propaganda, promoting

the

idea that

President

Wilson's

14

Points

guaranteed

the

territorial

integrity

of

Turkey.

But

hampered

by their

'inveterateinstinct for intrigue' they had made little headway. Then came

the Greek

occupation

of

Smyrna

(15 May

1919)

and

the 'Greek

bungling'

that

accompanied

it. From

that

date

the

resistance movement

began

to

thrive,

and

the national

defence

organization,

set

up by

Mustafa Kemal

and

his

colleagues, became

'practically Turkey'. The

organization,

Heathcote-

Smith

was

informed,

was backed

by

the

Ottoman

government,

or at

least

elements within

it.

Members of a

congress, shortly to be

assembled

in




5/21

30 MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

Erzerum,

would act as

political

advisors to the movement. Methods to

be

employed

would include the threat of

massacre.'

The view frequently expressed

by

the

various

intelligence agencies,

on

the

other

hand,

found its clearest

expression

in three

reports

on the Causes

of Unrest

in

Mesopotamia,

drawn

up by

the India Office and the War

Office

in

the

autumn

of

1920.2

According

to

Major

N.N.E.

Bray,

a

special

intelligence officer,

attached to the Political

Department,

India

Office,

and

author of two of the

reports,

the Turkish national

movement,

like

other

national movements

active

in

the area

(Arab, Syrian, Mesopotamian)

was

merely a 'compliment

of a far

wider

conspiracy', organized

in Berlin

and

Moscow.

The aims of that

conspiracy

were:

a) By every possible

means to discredit the

Entente;

b)

To

organize

national forces

in Anatolia and

Thrace,

if

possible

with the

assistance of men and

money

from the Bolsheviks

and

Berlin;

c)

To

prepare

rebellion on a

large

scale in

Syria

and

Mesopotamia;

d)

To

organize

all

the

parties

concerned so as to

produce

a simultaneous

action.

These plans could not be carried out until arrangementshad been made for

the

organization

of the national

elements

in

Turkey,Syria and

Mesopotamia,

the alliance of the

pan-Arab movement with the Turkish

national

movement,

the

co-operation of the tribes and the unification of the

whole on

a

pan-Islamist

basis.

When unification was

completed and all the plans were

ready,

a

signal would be given and a simultaneous action

undertaken.This

action

would,

it was

hoped,

be of so widespread a nature as to force the

withdrawalof the Entente

Powers from the Middle East, and possibly

even

from Asia.

Much

evidence was adduced by the British intelligence

services in

support

of

the contention

that the Turkishnational movement was

part of a

wide-ranging conspiracy,aimed at the expulsion of the British and

French

from

the Middle

East.

In

November 1919,

so

it was reported, a

'very

important' meeting was held at Montreux, presided over by Talaat

Pasha,

the

Committee of

Union and

Progress (CUP) leader and former

Ottoman

Grand Vizier.

At this

meeting, which was also attended by Amir Shakib

Arslan, a 'delegate of the Damascus extremists' and representative of

Feisal,

the

leader of the

Arab national forces in Syria, proposals were

discussed for the

formation of

a defensive alliance between the

Syrian

nationalists, the Turkish

nationalists and the Arab sheikhs of

Arabia. The

Arab

sheikhs,

in

particular,might be united under the leadership of

Emir

Husein, Feisal's father, the

so-called 'King of the Hedjaz'. In

December, at

a

similar

meeting,

held

at St Moritz, again attendedby Amir Shakib

Arslan




6/21

BRITISH

VIEWS OF

TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 31

(who had

it seems in

the meantimebeen instructed

by

Feisal

to agree to the

proposals

put forward by Talaat

at

Montreux),

a

proposal

-

so

it was

reported

-

was

discussed

for the

formation

of an

alliance between Enver

Pasha, the exiled CUP

leader

and

Ottoman Minister of War

in

the First

World

War, Mustafa Kemal,

the Arab

sheikhs and the Bolsheviks. At the

meeting,

Amir

Shakib Arslan was instructed to

go

to

Moscow,

to make

contact

with the

Soviet

government;

but

in the

event

it

seems

he

did not do

so.

Rather he sent a letter to

Litvinoff,

the

Soviet

representative

in

Copenhagen, asking

him to inform

Moscow

of

the conference

proposal.

In

the

meantime

letters

and

telegrams,dispatched

by

the

Ottoman Minister of

War and

other officials

in

Constantinople,

to Ottoman

army

commanders n

Anatolia, intercepted by British intelligence or otherwise obtained,

indicated that the Turkish nationalist

army

commanders

concerned,

in

particular he commander of the XIII

Army

Corps,

stationed at

Diarbekir,

were

being

instructed to make

contact with

leading

sheikhs

in

Syria

and

Mesopotamia,

and

where

possible promote

resistance to the

forces of the

Entente Powers

stationed there. Thus on 8 December

1919 it was

reported

that

the

Under-Secretary

of

War,

Constantinople,

had instructed the GOC

XIII

Army Corps, Diarbekir,

to

maintain contact with

the Arab sheikhs

in

Mesopotamia; and on 29 December that he had instructed the GOC XV

Army

Corps to instruct one

Ajaimi,

the

'Chief Sheikh of

Iraq', to keep

in

touch and

patiently await events. On 31

December

it

was

reported

that

Djevad,

Chief

of

the Ottoman General

Staff,

and

Djemal,

Minister of

War,

had

orderedthat contact be

maintainedwith Ibn

Saud,

the ruler of

Nejd,

and

Sheikh

Rashid, the ruler of

Ha'il;

and

on 21

February

1920 that various

Arab tribes had made it clear

that

they

were

ready

to take

action as soon as

they

received orders.

Otherreportsreceived about this time appeared o confirmthe existence

of

a

wide-ranging conspiracy. In

November

1919

MI

ic

reported that

the

Turkish

nationalists

intended to

convene a

pan-Islamicconference at

Sivas,

and

that

delegations were

expected

to

attend from

Azerbaijan,

Kurdistan,

Arabia, Persia and

Afghanistan. Efforts

were

also being made to

make

contact

with

pan-Islamic

elements

in

the

neighbourhood

of

Kashgar.3

n

December the

Director of

Military

Intelligence,

Constantinople,dispatched

a

copy

of a

report,

drawn

up by

Major Hay,

on

Possible Relations between

the Nationalist Leaders in Anatolia and Agents of the Soviet Government,

based

in

the Ottoman

capital.

Soviet

agents based

in

the

Ottoman

capital

had,

it was

believed, made

contact with

the Turkish

nationalists in

September;

and in

October

they

had

dispatched an

emissary (actually

a

British

agent),

supposedly

a

member of the 'Council of the

Representatives

of

the Russian

Socialist

Federative

Soviet Republic in

Constantinople', to

the

interior.4

n

January

1920

it

was

reported

hat a

pan-Islamic organization




7/21

32

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

in Constantinople had received

funds from

Germany

and

Switzerland; and

that

the Ottoman

Minister

of

War was

engaged

in

the

direction

of

pan-

Islamic intrigue

in

India,

Afghanistan,

Azerbaijan

and Arabia.'

In

July

1920

it was reported that Bolshevik influence was

becoming

increasingly

apparent

in

nationalist

circles;6

and in

August

that

Mustafa Kemal

had

arrived

at

an understanding

with Feisal.7

Particularattention was

paid

by

the British

intelligence

services to

the

activities of

secret societies

operating

in

the

Near

and Middle

East,

in

particular

al-Nadi-al-Arabi,

an

extreme

pan-Islamic

society

set

up

in

Damascus,

al-Ahd,

a secret

society,

set

up by

ex-Ottoman

Army

Arab

officers and

others,

in

Mesopotamia,

and

Mouvahiddin,

a

pan-Islamic

society, set up in Sivas in November 1919.8 These secret societies, British

intelligence

concluded, were directly linked with

Constantinople

and

Switzerland,

and

from

there

with

the

German

Foreign

Office

in

Berlin.

They

were, it was

believed, generally formed for some

specific

political purpose,

to tap

a

'new source of

activity' (Islam)

in

the

struggle

with

the

Western

imperialpowers.9

Mouvahiddin,

in

particular,

had been

set

up

by

the CUP

and Turkish

nationalists, with

the

object

of

'enlisting

the

support

and

co-

ordinating

the efforts of all

anti-foreign

and disaffected

elements

in

Islamic

countries'.'?Acting in conjunctionwith the Bolsheviks, they were capable

of

causing

much

trouble,

more

particularly f,

as

appeared

ikely, they

were

'able

to

dispose

of

the

large

funds

in

the

possession

of

the CUP'.

In the

second

of the three reports on

the

Causes

of

Unrest in

Mesopotamia, Bray

described

in

some detail

the

part played

in

the anti-

imperialist movement

by

Moscow and Berlin. Soviet

efforts to

create world

unrest,

Bray

declared,

were 'ceaseless and

effective'

l

Opportunism as

regards means was

absolute,

and it

did not

exclude an 'alliance

with

opposites'.'3Lenin andhis Commissariatof Military Affairs were aiming to

'bring

the whole

world

under

the

communist

system',

and

secure the

downfall of the

British

Empire

in

Asia.'4

Their main

centre

of

endeavour

was the

Middle East where

they

were

busy

undermining

stable

government,

organizing secret societies

and

spreading

revolutionary

propaganda. In

Anatolia,

in

particular, hey

were

hoping

to

have

Mustafa

Kemal replaced

by

Enver,

and

a

Soviet

regime established.

German

reactionaries were

similarly seeking

to

create

unrest and

revolution in the Middle East. To this end they were 'undoubtedly'

providing Enver,

and

possibly

also

Mustafa Kemal,

with capable German

officers. In

December 1919

Enver, it

was

reported, had been in Berlin,

working

hard to establish

an

alliance

between

the Germans and the

Bolsheviks,

and

unify

the

Arab, TurkishandEgyptian

national

movements.

About the

same time a

number of

CUP,

nationalistand

pan-Arab leaders

(Talaat,

Shakib

Arslan,

Fuad

Selim, Nedjmeddin

Molla) had

come together




8/21

BRITISH VIEWS

OF TURKISH

NATIONAL MOVEMENT 33

to

discuss the possibility; and

shortly

thereafter

Enver,

with German

and

Bolshevik support,

had formed an Asiatic Islamic

Federation hroughwhose

medium all the various movements and

societies would

be

co-ordinated.

Enver and Talaatwould provide substantial unds, fromCUP accounts held

in Berlin.

Large scale

operations,

from

Mesopotamia

to

India, might

be

expected

to

begin

in the autumnof

1920.'5

Not that the Turkish nationalists

in

Anatolia

were

necessarily

entirely

committed to

the Bolshevik

cause.

Opinion

in

Anatolia, according

to

various accounts,

was divided on the

issue.

A

numberof armycommanders

were sceptical. But

Bolshevik propaganda

was

rampant,

and

several

towns

had

highly

organized revolutionary organizations.

In

the Grand

National

Assembly 105 members were committed to the Bolshevik programmeand

direct

contact

had been made

with

the Bolsheviks

by way

of

Nakhichevan.'6

Further

supportfor the

view

that the Turkishnational

movement should

be

seen as part of

a

world-wide

conspiracy,

aimed at the

destruction of the

British

Empire

in

Asia,

was

provided

by

Commander

Luke,

a

political

officer,

attachedto the Commander-in-Chiefof the British

fleet,

stationed

n

Constantinople, and Andrew

Ryan,

a member of the

British

High

Commission staff.

In

a

report

on the Effects of Bolshevism

on the British

Empire, composed in December 1919, Commander Luke argued that in

order to inflict

injury

on the British

Empire,

the Bolsheviks were

prepared

to

disavow their own

principles

and seek

allies in

their

struggle

in all

parts

of the Muslim

world, including

Turkey,Transcaucasia,Persia,

Afghanistan,

India,

Arabia and

Egypt. Skilfully making

use of

every

circumstance

lending

itself

to

misinterpretation

or

distortion, they

had

succeeded in

making large numbers

of

Muslims

throughout the Near and Middle East

honestly

believe

that Great Britain was the

enemy

of

Islam. The dispatchof

a Greek Army of Occupation to the Muslim province of Aydin, with its

'deplorable' results,

had been a

useful and

much

used

argument.

The

delay

in

concluding

peace, resulting

in

the

rise

of

the nationalmovement and

the

resurrection

of

the

CUP,

had provided

'valuable

allies',

or more

correctly

'tools'. Another successful

argument

used had been the

'injudicious'

policy

of Britain's

ally,

Denikin,

towards

Muslim

Daghistan

and

Azerbaijan.'7

Very skilfully,

Luke

continued,

the Bolsheviks were

contriving

to turn

the

'somewhat

vague and unframed'

aims

of

the

pan-Islamic

movement,

such as it was, into anti-British channels; while Mustafa Kemal was

reported

to be

summoning

a

pan-Islamic conference

in

Sivas, attended

by

delegations

from

Persia,

India and

Afghanistan.'

Andrew

Ryan,

in

a memorandum

attached

to

the above

report,expressed

more

or

less

complete agreement with

Luke.

The

principal object of the

Bolsheviks,

he

wrote,

was to

wield

all

Muslims into

one

whole,

to be used

as an

instrument

against

the

West,

especially

the British.

Constantinople




9/21

34

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

was the natural

pivot

of this movement

on the

Muslim side.

How

far all

the

converging activities

had

a common

instigation

in

Germany

remained

in

doubt; but therewas

no doubt that Constantinople

andTurkey

were now

the

'creatures'

and

'instruments' of the CUP

and the nationalists. While some

of the forces

in

play,

such

as

Bolshevism,

an

essentially

anarchical

movement,

might

exhaust

themselves

or be

crushed, others,

such as

Islam,

especially dangerous

for the

British, might

continue

to

grow.'9

The view

put forward by

the

British

intelligence

services,

that the

Turkish national movement

was part of an

international conspiracy,

organized

in Berlin and

Moscow,

found

support

n

the

assumption,

held

by

virtually all of the British officials

involved,

at least

in

the early stages,

that

the national movement was organized by the CUP, in particularthe CUP

leaders

in

exile.

In

a note

on Local

Opposition

to Mustafa Kemal Pasha,

written

in

October 1919,

a British naval intelligence

officer remarkedthat

the national movement

was

merely

a 'recrudescence of the Committee

of

Union

and

Progress', presented

under a

'new,

high sounding

name'.

In

a

report presented

to de Robeck

in

the same

month, Captain

Perring,

the

British

representative

in

Samsun,

remarked

that in his view the

whole

national movement originated

with

Enver,

whose

presence

in the Caucasus

was not to be doubted.2' In a petition presented to the British High

Commissioner

by

the notables of

27

villages

in the

Bozgir region,

it was

asserted

that the national

forces

in

the area had been set

up by

the

Union and

Progress

Committee.22

n November Captain Hadkinson,

who had just

completed

a two-month tour of

the

province

of Bursa, reported hat

n

recent

weeks

the

western national

movement, which originated with

the Greek

occupation

of

Smyrna,

had now amalgamated

with Mustafa Kemal's eastern

movement

and Ali Fuad's central movement. The movement was spreading

all over

the

country, though

not

as fast as the ringleadershad expected.

Having

had

the

opportunity

of

watching

the

proceedings

of the

late

congress,

held at

Balikessir,

he, Hadkinson,was more than ever

convinced

that the CUP

was

'at

the

bottom of all

this national

movement', whatever

may be said to the contrary.23

s de Robeck remarked,

n a telegramto Lord

Curzon,

the

British

Foreign

Secretary,dispatchedin October:

Whether the

organizers

of the national movement can properly

be

called Committeemenor not is a question of labels. They may differ

from the Committee

to some extent in personality.

Indeed, they are

just

now at

pains

to

advertise

their

past differences with, and

present

horror

of, people

like

Enver and Talaat.They may differ

in minor

points

of

sentiment. They may differ even more in method.

Their

fundamental character

s, however,

the same. They want

Turkey for

the

Turks.

They

want

no

foreign

interference or

foreign protection.




10/21

BRITISH

VIEWS OF TURKISH


Ottoman

Christiansare their cattle and

they

want to do with

their own

what they will.

They

want to

fight Europe,

and above

all, England,

with the weapons

of

pan-Islamism

and

pan-Turanianism.They aspire

to sign,

not the

death

warrant

of

the

Empire,

but a lease of new

life.24

Recognition of

the

importantpartplayed by

the CUP

in the

organization

of the

national movement

did not lead British officials to

ignore

the

part

played by

the

military,generally

seen

as decisive.

As

Calthorpe

remarked n

a letter

to Curzon

in

August 1919,

the

Congress

of Erzerum

appeared

o

be

dominated

by dashing

young soldiers,

who are

willing

'to stake

everything

on a

gambler's throw'.25

And as

Captain Perring

remarked n a note on

the

Nationalist Movement in the Samsun Area, where the CentralGovernment

pinned

its

hopes

on the

goodwill

of

the Allies and the influence

of

the

'mass

of the

Muslin

world',

the

Military Party (most

of whom were

in

any

case

CUP) hoped

to

save

Turkey by

its

own activities:

'The Turks

were

excited.

They

had

been caught

napping

at

Smyrna.

There was

good

reason

for

believing

that an Armenian state was

to be

formed,

and

many

talked

of a

Greek

Pontus

state.

The

military

were

prepared

o

prevent

another

coup.'26

In

other words, as de Robeck remarked

n

a telegramto Curzondispatched

in December, the movement was not so much a 'national' as a 'military

political' organization.27

To

the British officials

on

the spot, Mustafa Kemal,

the

leader of the

Turkish national movement, remained for some time an enigma. He was

known

as

a leading member

of

the CUP (ordershad been issued

in

February

1919

for his

dismissal)

and

a

hero

of the

Gallipoli campaign, but otherwise

little was known

about

him.

According to GHQ Constantinople, which in

January

1921

compiled

a

character sketch of

Mustafa Kemal, based on

informationprovided by his former commanding officer, school and college

companions,

the nationalist

agent

in

Constantinopleand others, he had been

born in

humble circumstances

in Salonika, and educated at the military

college, Salonika, the

cadet school, Monastir, and the War College,

Constantinople.

At an

early age,

it

was said, he had become a passionate

nationalist.

After graduating from the General Staff College, as a Staff

Captain,

he

had been

posted

in

1905 to Syria, and in 1907 to the General

Staff,

Salonika. In

1913 he had

been appointed TurkishMilitary

Attache

at

Sofia, where he is said to have indulged in 'dissipation' and contracted

'venereal'. This had

imbued him with a 'contempt and disgust for life',

prohibited marriage and driven him to 'homosexual vice'. Careless of his

life

in

action, he had

deliberately disobeyed Liman von Sanders at Gallipoli,

and

quarrelled

with Enver.

In

the fighting he had 'lost an

eye'.28

Mustafa

Kemal's

quarrels with Enver

and the German commander had

induced the present Sultan

(then Prince Vahideddin)on the occasion of the




11/21

36

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

coronation

of Karl

of

Austria-Hungary

to invite Mustafa

Kemal

to

accompany

him to

Vienna,

with the

intentionof

using

him as

a

counterpoise

to

Enver and

the CUP.

It was

the

present

Sultan,

Vahideddin,

who had

sent

Mustafa

Kemal

to

Anatolia

in

May 1919,

with instructions

to thwart

Greek

aspirations

to a Pontus

republic.

In

spite

of the fact that Mustafa

Kemal

was

probably

a comparatively

wealthy

man there was no reason

to

suppose

that

he had

resorted

to dishonest

methods.

On the

contrary,

almost alone among

unionist

leaders,

he

had

never been accused

of

peculation.

Finally,

he

was

known as

a fluent speaker,

but he

was

probably

too

egotistical

to envisage

wider issues

and ultimate consequences.29

The discrepancy

between

the

two

explanations

offered

by

British

officials on the spot and the intelligence services was never fully resolved.

But as British Foreign

Office and

other comments

on

a secret

intelligence

report,

received

in

August 1920,

from a

'well educated

and

intelligent

Turkish

gentleman',

recently

returned

from

Ankara, show,

they eventually

concluded

that there

must

in fact be two

parties

atwork in

Anatolia,

one

that

of

Mustafa Kemal

and the nationalists

and the other

that of

Enver,

Talaat

and the CUP.3

As D.G.

Osborne,

a

Foreign

Office

official,

remarked:

This shows that there are two parties

in Anatolia and

not only one.

The

weaker

is that of

Mustafa Kemal

and the Nationalists,

who,

induced

by

patriotic and

religious

motives, have

been,

and are,

endeavouring

to resist the Peace

terms and

the resultant

dismemberment

of

Turkey

and the

reduction

of the prestige

of the

Ottoman Khalifate.

They

have failed:their adherents

are going over to

the

other and far more

dangerousparty,

that

of Enver and Talaat

and

the

CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik

combination.

The latter

are not

concerned with the defence

of Turkey but

with

the Pan-Islamic

offensive

of Bolshevism throughout the

East, primarily

directed

against

Great Britain. The plans

for

this

offensive have

recently

been

discussed

at Baku. Enver andhis associates

have

sacrificedTurkey

to

the Bolshevik conception

of

Pan-Islam,have

accepted

the principles

of

Lenin

and are disseminating

them

by

means of the

Green

propagandist

Army.

Mustafa Kemal

on the

other hand has

rejected

Lenin's principlesand

is consequently

about to

be discarded

n favour

of Enver

and

Talaat.3

In his

report the

'well

educated and

intelligent

Turkish gentlemen',

recently

returnedfrom Ankara,

pointed

out

that opinion in

the nationalist

camp regarding

relations

with the Bolsheviks was

divided.

Where the

'Unionist'

wing,

led

by Eyub

Sabri,argued

that

in order to secure

effective

Bolshevik supportit was

necessary

to adopt the Bolshevik

system

with all

its

consequences,

the 'genuine'

nationalists

who were devoted

to

Mustafa




12/21

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL

MOVEMENT

37

Kemal argued that,

whilst Bolshevik

support might be accepted,

their

system

should not be introduced.

In

the national

assembly,

about 100

deputies

had been won over to the Bolshevik

cause,

and their

party,

which

was

in

a constant touch

with

Talaat

Pasha,

the

'principal

protagonist

of

Islamic Bolshevism

in

Europe',

was

steadily gaining strength. Recently

they

had

formed the Green

Army

organization,

'a vehicle for the

fulfilment

of

the

Soviet Government's

campaign

to arouse the

whole

Islamic

world

againstEurope

in

general and

Great

Britain

in

particular'.Supporters

of the

Green

Army argued

that

the principal

tenets of Islam

could

easily

be

reconciled with Bolshevik

doctrine.Differences between the Unionists

and

the

'genuine'

nationalists were

exacerbated

by

the

personal

rivalry

that

existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.32

In

an introductionto the above

report,

the

British

intelligence

service

in

Constantinople

concluded that the

development

of

Bolshevism

in

Anatolia

should

be

seen as

a

product,

not of

nationalist,

but of

Unionist

co-operation:

It is scarcely

open to doubt that the introduction of

Bolshevism into

Turkey, as the foremost of the

Eastern Muslim

countries, was

in

accordance with

the

plan

of

campaign formulated

by

the

Unionist

leaders, when the defeat of Germany ruined their former schemes.

The rise of the

Nationalist

movement in Turkey merely provided a

practical vehicle for the progress

of this later

Unionist programme,

which included the spread of

Bolshevism. The

Soviet Government

had directedits

attentionto the

possibilities of Islam as early as 1917.

But, in spite of

constant efforts, no

progress has been made, in Turkey

at

least. After the Armistice we

saw from

reports from Geneva, Rome

and

London,

the

development of Unionist

activities working

in

Germany, Switzerland, Italy and

Russia.

These

same Germans and

Turks who

had

been working togetherduring the

war again came to

notice

in

association, and as early

as February 1919 it became evident

that the Unionist

chiefs were

actively preparing a

Pan-Islamic

movement

in

connection with Bolshevism and with

the assistance of

the

very

efficient,

but

so far

unsuccessful, Germanorganizationwhich

had been

co-operating for five years against British

prestige in the

East. After the

Armistice, too, the

purely

Russian efforts of the

Bolsheviks

to

develop

Bolshevism as

an Eastern world movement

were assisted

by many Indians and other

Pan-Islamists, who had

gravitated to

Berlin

and Moscow on

the final

defeat

of

Turkey. As

soon as

the

Nationalist

movement underMustafa

Kemalshowed signs

of

reaching

serious

proportions, the

Unionist made an

immediate

attempt

to

gain control

of so

potentially powerful an

instrument.

In

spite, however,

of the

expenditure

of a

certain

amount

of

money,

the




13/21

38

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

attempt

then

failed, partly owing

to

personal jealousies, as for

example

that between

Mustapha

Kemal and

Enver,

and

partly owing

to

the

Nationalist

dislike

of

the Jewish Free-Masonic

elements

dominating the Unionists. More oblique methods were then adopted

and advantagewas taken of the circumstance that

Mustapha Kemal,

having realised

the

impracticability

of

rousing

the Muslim

world

by

such

poor

instrumentsas the Mouvahiddin

Society

and

ordinary

Pan-

Islamic propaganda,

was

turning

n

despair

to the

Soviet Government.

The

reluctance to accept Bolshevism

in

principle may

be seen

from

the

little we know of the earlier

stages

of

Mustapha

Kemal's

dealings

with the Soviet

Government.

In

the

first

proposals

for an

agreement

t

was stipulated that the Nationalists should place no obstacle in the

way of Bolshevik propaganda

n

Anatolia,

but

only

in so far as

it was

not

in

conflict with

the tenets of Islam.

This

agreement

was

reported

to

have been concluded

in

the autumn of

1919 and it was

shortly

afterwardsthat

the

activities of Bolshevik

propagandists

n

Anatolia

were

first

reported.

It has

since become

evident that an

energetic

campaign

has been

in

progress

in Anatolia

assisted

in

some cases,

as

at Eski

Shehir, by

the

Nationalist authorities

but we cannot

be

sure,

and it still seems unlikely that Mustapha Kemal had any cordial

sympathy

with that

campaign.

It is to be observed that the National

Assembly has

never

officially declared

its

adherence to Bolshevism

and it has

never been

very

clear

by

what means or under what

auspices

the movement was

gaining ground.33

Thereafter

he

assumption

that

two

parties

existed in

Turkey,

a

Unionist

party

headed

by

Enver

and

Talaat,

and a

nationalist party,

headed

by

Mustafa

Kemal,

became a

regular

component

of British

reportson the issue.

In

a set

of

notes on Relations

between the Bolsheviks and

the Turkish

Nationalists,

drawn

up by

D.G.

Osborne, a Foreign Office official, in

November

1920, for instance, a clear

distinction was drawnbetween the two

parties. 4

And in

a War

Office

Report

on the Situation in

Mesopotamia,

drawn

up

about

the same

time,

it

was

pointed

out that

two militant parties

existed

in

Anatolia,

the

CUP led

by

Enver and

Talaat, which had decided to

throw

in its

lot with the

Bolsheviks,

and

the

nationalistparty, ed by Mustafa

Kemal, which,

while

anxious to secure Russian arms

and ammunition and

the recovery of the western provinces, had decided to oppose a Bolshevik

penetration

of

Anatolia.

In

dealing

with

the

Turks

it would be well to

remember that Mustafa Kemal and

Enver were rivals. Enver's influence

was

greatest

with

the Russians,

but

in

the West he was discredited. Any

arrangement made with

the

Turks

would have to be made with a

'representativegovernment', and

this would of necessity have to include




14/21

BRITISH

VIEWS

OF

TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

39

both 'Old

Turks' and 'Young Turks'.

Any such 'representativegovernment'

would

require a leader and

it

seemed probable

that Mustafa Kemal would

emerge as the most suitable condidate.

His

recognition

should have the

effect of driving Enver and Djemal into obscurity.35

British

intelligence

in this

period

appeared

well

informed

about the

nature

of

the struggle taking place

between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.

According

to

a note

on

the

Soviet

Government's

Intrigues

with

Mustafa

Kemal and Enver

Pasha, composed

in

June

1922,

Enver

had

initially

been

prepared o co-operate with Mustafa Kemal. But Mustafa

Kemal,

driven

by

'indescribablemegalomania and

lust for

power',

had brusquelyrejected the

offer. As a result

Enver,

with Soviet

backing

-

the Soviets feared that

MustafaKemal would open the way to capitalistand imperialistintriguein

the area

-

had

attempted

to build

up

his

position

in

Anatolia, preparatory

o

a take-over

of

power.

To

this end he

had

attempted

to

win

over the Defence

of

Rights

associations

in

the

eastern

provinces,

the

labour

guilds (artisans,

porters,

lightermen)

and the

officer

corps

of a number of

regiments,

stationed

in

the area.

Mustafa Kemal had

then

taken

fright

and reached a

secret

agreement

with the

Bolsheviks, promising

them

support,

with the

result that the

Soviets had

taken

steps

to undermine Enver's

position,

leaving him thoroughly puzzled and unable to cope. Meanwhile Mustafa

Kemal

had taken steps to secure

his

hold on the Defence of

Rights

associations;

and he had had

Yahya Kahya,

the Unionist

strong

man in

Trabzon,

arrested,

and

untrustworthy

officers

posted

or

otherwise dealt

with.

It

was at this

point

that

Enver, discovering

the true nature and

extent

of Soviet

duplicity,

had decided to withdraw to

Turkestan and

join

the

Basmachi

insurgents.36

The

different

appreciations

of the

natureand

significance

of the

national

movement in Anatolia, offered by British officials and the intelligence

services were

not

merely

of academic

interest,

for

it

can be

argued

that

they

implied

different

policy responses.

Policy responses

to

an

essentially locally

based national

movement, seeking

to achieve limited

aims and

objectives,

might

include Allied

support

for the sultan's

government

in

Constantinople

(the

policy adopted by

the Entente Powers

in

November 1918), the use of

the

Greek forces

in

western

Anatolia

to

bolster the

Allied position on the

Straits,

support

for

the sultan's efforts to

suppress

the national

movement

by

force (attempted in 1920), and when these efforts failed, as they did,

attempts

at conciliation and

the conclusion of a

negotiated

settlement,

satisfying

some

but

by

no means all of

the aims

of

the

national

movement,

as set out in

the National Pact of

January

1920

(the

policy

later

pursued).

Policy

responses

to

an

internationallyorganizednational

movement, aimed

at the

destruction

of

the British

Empire

in

Asia, might include the dispatch

of British forces to secure the defeat of the

movement

(neverattempted),

he




15/21

40

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

exploitation

of

the full potential

of the Greek expeditionary force,

stationed

in western

Anatolia (never

fully attempted),

he

expulsion

of the Turks

from

their capital

city (considered

by

the

Allies

in

December

1919

and

January

1920 but never

implemented),

vigorous support

for the minorities,

a

determination o

secure the

neutralisation

and demilitarisationof the

Straits

(secured

in

the

treaty

of Lausanne of 24 July 1923) and vigorous steps

to

secure the defeat

of the

forces

of

revolution

in other

parts

of the world,

in

particular

Russia and

Germany.

One of

the

strongest

cases

put

forward n favour of a policy

based on

the

assumption

that

the national

movement

was

essentially

a

locally

based

movement with

limited aims

and

objectives,

was

surprisingly

that

put

forward by CommanderLuke, in a note on the FuturePeace with Turkey,

composed

in March 1920.37

n his

paper

CommanderLuke

suggested that,

as the

policy

of suppression

so

far

pursued by

the Entente Powers

appeared

likely to

fail, they might now

consider

a

substantial

modification of the

proposed

peace treaty,

involving

the

possible

return

of

Izmir,

western

Thrace

and the so-called

Armenianprovinces

to

Turkish

rule. The

Entente

Powers

might then seek to rallier

the Turksby giving them

a

peace,

which,

while

conforming

to the principle

of

self-determination

and sufficiently

severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive:

The Turk, and

indeed, the

Muslim in general,

is

by

instinct opposed

to

the theory

of Bolshevism,

which is

wholly

incompatible

with

the

principles

of

Islam. Only necessity, as

he understands

it, will drive

him to this unnaturalalliance.

Cannot

the necessity be avoided?

I

submit

that it

is

worth avoiding, even

if

the avoiding

involves the non-

acquisition by Greece of

Smyrna

and Thrace and the reduction

of the

area to be ceded

by Turkey

to Armenia.

A

stolid conservative

people

such

as the Turks should

prove

a

valuable

buffer against the ferment

of Bolshevism

in

the

Middle

East.38

One

of the

strongest

cases

put

forward

n

favour

of

a

policy

based on the

assumption

that the national movement

was

essentially

part of

an

international

conspiracy,organized

in Berlin

and Moscow, and aimed

at the

destruction

of

the

British

Empire

in Asia, was that put forward

by the author

of

the War

Office

memorandum

on the Cause

of Unrest

in Mesopotamia,

composed, in October 1920.39At an importantmeeting of representativesof

the Third International

held at

the Foreign Office in Moscow,

the author

declared, Lenin,

the

Bolshevik

leader, had personallyexpounded

his design

for

attacking

British

imperialism

n the East, strikinghardest

at India,

where

the national movement was to be encouraged

and assisted.

A secret treaty

had then been signed between

Soviet Russia

and the Islamic

countries,

including the government

of Mustafa

Kemal;and the Bolshevik

advance

on




16/21

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH


Enzeli (on the

Caspian Sea),

the Arab outbreak

n

Mesopotamia,

the Turkish

advance on the Armenian

provinces,

and

the

Arab

uprising

in

Syria

had

followed. These

developments

indicated the

inception

of a

'generalstrategic

plan', directedostensibly from Moscow, againstFrance and England,more

particularly the latter. The Moscow Direction had

a

gap

in their

line

of

attack

against the British

Empire,

which

they

were

prepared

to fill with

a

combined movement of

Turks,Arabs,

and Kurds.

Enver,

it

may

be

assumed,

controlled the

'connecting

lever'.

This

he would

pull

as soon

as,

but

not

before,

British

policy

towards

Turkey

was

definitely

determined.

The sinister influence of

Moscow,

in other

words,

could be discovered

behind

every

form of

political

unrest

in

the Middle East. There could be

no

doubt what the British response should be:

As long as the

Moscow Direction survives to absorb into

its

organization,

thrive on and

exploit

agencies

of

local

discontent,

Nationalism will be the

instrumentof

Internationalism,and until the

International

Monster has been

starved,

or severed at the

neck,

its

various heads will

have to be dealt with

in

detail

when and where

they

arise.4

Paradoxically the War Office, which in the above memorandum at least

appeared

to

advocate a

vigorous

response

to the

problem

of

international

conspiracy, opposed

the

expulsion

of the

Sultan

from

Constantinople.

In

a

report

on the

StrategicPosition

on

the

Straits, composed

in

December

1919,

they

argued that,

if

the

sultan were

removed from his

capital the whole

military position

in

the area would be

altered to

Britain'sdisadvantage. In

peacetime she

would lose both

knowledge

of the

Sultan's plans and power

to

check his

preparations.The

powerful deterrentof

having the

sultan and

the whole of his government under her guns would have disappeared.If the

sultan

were

removed a

much

larger garrison

would

be required,

and

a

more

elaborate

system

of

defence, especially

on the

Asia Minor

side, where a

'veritable frontier'

with 'all

its disadvantages and

bickerings

and constant

aggravations',

would

have

to

be set

up.41

The

case for the

expulsion

of

the sultan

from

Constantinople was put

forward

most

effectively by Curzon.

In a

memorandum on

the Future of

Constantinople, presented

in

January 1920,

he

argued

that,

if

they had to

face, as he thoughtthey probablywould, a new formof Turkishnationalism,

founded on

either

religion

or

race,

and

exploiting

pan-Islamism or pan-

Turanism,would

it not be a

moreformidablefactor if

its 'rallying

point' and

'inspiration'

were

the

sultan at

Constantinoplerather han a

sultan at Bursa?

Would not the

retention of

the old

capital

give a prestige and an

impetus to

the

movement,

which

would add

immensely to its

potentiality

for harm. A

nationalist

party

in

Anatolia

under

Mustafa Kemal

may be a 'hard nut to




17/21

42

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

crack'. But a nationalist

party

with its

sovereign

in

Constantinople

would

be

a 'muchmore anxious

problem'.

Were the

sultan

to remain

in his

capital,

the

Turk

would be ideally placed to

'set the Powers

by

the

ears,

to

embroil

Governments and

nations,

and to inoculate the West with the worst vices

of

Eastern

intrigue'.42

Ryan

and Forbes Adam,

a

member

of the Eastern

Department

at

the

Foreign

Office, supported Curzon, emphasising

the

dangers

to

Britain

inherent in the

forces

of

pan-Islamism

and

pan-Turanism, orces, according

to Forbes

Adam, dependent

on the maintenance

of

the

prestige

of

Turkey,

a

thing

itself dependent

on the retention

of the

Sultan-Caliph

at

Constantinople.43

The problems caused to British policy makersby what they perceived,

rightly or

wrongly,

to be the existence of a divided

leadership

in

Anatolia

were for the most part resolved

in

the autumn of 1921

when, following

the

battle of Sakarya(August-September

1921),

Mustafa Kemal

emerged

as the

supreme leader of the

Turkish

people.

As

a

British

General

Staff

memorandum

on the Position in

Anatolia, composed

following

the

victory

put it:

There

is no doubt that the

prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has

been

greatly

enhanced as a result of these

operations.

Formerly

in the

position

of a Prime Minister

answerable

to a

Government,

he now

appears to be almost

in

the

position of a Dictator. We

may, therefore,

assume that the

Moderate

Party

in

the

Angora Government s, for the

time

being, firmly

in

power,

and this

assumption,

if

correct,

would

seem

to

remove

any

immediate

danger

of

the return of

Enver

Pasha,

or of

a

military

alliance between the

nationalists and

Bolshevik

Russia, especially as the Nationalists

will

shortly

be no

longer wholly

dependent upon Russia for the supply of war material. At the same

time, Mustapha Kemal

is in

such

a strong military

position, that there

appears

to be no reason why he should

moderate his political

demands,

in

the

event

of

peace

negotiations being

re-opened.4

But

in

the

period following the battle of Sakarya

British concern

regarding

the

true nature of the Turkishnational

movement remained. As

Sir Horace

Rumbold,

who

replaced

de Robeck

as

British High

Commissioner in

Constantinople

in

November 1920, remarked, in a

telegram to Curzon, dispatched following the expulsion of the Greek

expeditionary

force from

Anatolia,

in

October 1922, it was

possible that for

the

Kemalists

the

realisation

of

the National

Pact, now

virtually assured,

was

merely

an

'immediate

objective', a 'first step':

It is

a

step at which they will

pause, and there will

not be the same

union

afterwards

regarding

a

completely revolutionary

policy at home




18/21

BRITISH VIEWS OF

TURKISH

NATIONAL MOVEMENT

43

and a

policy

of

expansion abroad.

Many

of the

leaders and

the

majority

of

ordinary

Turks

will wish them to

preserve

traditional

institutions and 'cultivate their

garden'

in

peaceful

conditions. It

would, however, be

folly

to

forget

that others

among

the leaders

cherish

the

dream

of

reconstructing

the Turkish

Empire,

if

only

on

a

federal basis and

establishing Turkey

in

a

position

of

hegemony

in

a

grand Islamic combine. For

these Great Britain not

only

is but also

will

remain

the

enemy.

They

desire

nothing

less than the

collapse

of

our

position,

first

in

Mesopotamia,

then

in

the

East

generally.

The

real

vital

issue at the

Peace Conference

will

not be

any

of the

questions

enumerated

above, important

as

they

are

[Smyrna,

the

Straits,

Thrace,

the Caucasus,the capitulations],but whetherTurkeyis to be placed in

such a

position

as to enable these men to

dominate her

internally

and

so

carry

forward their

plan.45

Thus to the

end

of

the period of Turkish

national

struggle

the British

remaineduncertain how far the Turkish

nationalists

intended

to 'cultivate

their garden' in

Anatolia,

and how far

they intended to become

embroiled

in some

kind of great

pan-Islamist

conspiracy,

aimed at the destruction

of

the British

Empire

in

Asia.

Just

how far

the different views of the

Turkish national

movement, put

forward

by

British

officials, the

'men on

the

spot',

and the various

intelligence services,

actually

affected the

formulation of

British policy in

the

period

of Turkish

national

struggle

must remain

a subject for future

investigation.

It has

been the intention

of this

article merely to draw

attention

to

what may be considered

real or

apparentdifferences in

British

views of

the Turkish

national movement in

Anatolia, and to point to

some

of the

possible

consequences.

Incidentally,

in the

process,

much evidence

has been adduced, which would seem to supportthe view, put forwardby

E.J.

Zurcher and

others,

that the

national

movement,

in

its

early stages at

least, was

organized by elements within

the Ottoman

government,

in

particular

the

Ministry of

War; that CUP

leaders

in

exile, acting

in

conjunction

with German

right

wing

elements in

Berlin and

the Bolshevik

leadership

in

Moscow,

struggled

to gain,

or keep, control of

the

movement;

and that

Mustafa

Kemal

Pasha,

the

'man-on-the-spot'

in

Anatolia,

eventually

succeeded

in

undermining their

influence and

taking over

the

leadership of the movement. This he succeeded in doing because the

national

movement, as it

emerged,

particularly

following the

Allied

occupation

of

Constantinople

in

March

1920, was

despite all its

numerous

international

connections,

essentially a

'locally based'

movement,

seeking

for the

most

part

to

achieve

merely local

aims and

objectives.




19/21

44

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

NOTES

1. British

Public Record Office, WO

32/5733

History

of the National Movement in Turkey,

Nov. 1919. See

also

FO 371/4158/105780

Milne to

Calthorpe,

Constantinople,

0 June

1919;

FO

406/41

No.126

de Robeck

to

Curzon,

10 Oct.

1919;

FO 371/4158/118411 Calthorpe o

Curzon,

30

July 1919,

enclosure;

FO 371/4158/96979

Calthorpe

o

Curzon,

21 June

1919,

enclosure; K. Bourne,

D.

Cameron

Watt

(eds.),

British Documents

on

Foreign

Affairs

(BDFA) (University

Publications of America), PartII, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.68,

enclosure.

The histories

and accounts

drawn

up by Milne, Calthorpe,

Heathcote-Smith

and

their

colleagues,

the

'men on the

spot', appear

n

retrospect

remarkably

ccurate.That is

because

they

were, for the most part,

based

on information

provided

by

British control

officers,

posted

to

strategic points

in Anatolia

(until

their arrest

or

expulsion

in

the

spring

of

1920),

membersof the Levant Consular

Service,

membersof the Ottoman

government,

oyal

to the

Sultan,

members

of the Greek Orthodox

church,

resident

in

Anatolia,

and

even members

of

the Turkishnationalmovement itself. Surprisingly he Historyof the National Movement

in

Turkey

makes no mention of

the

declaration,

ssued

by

the leadersof the

nationalmovement

at

Amasya

in

June

1919,

seen

by

some

as the

founding

document

of

the national

movement.

The

Congress

of Erzerumwas

organized,

not

by

Mustafa Kemal

Pasha,

but

by

the

Society

for

the Defence

of

the National

Rights

of the EasternProvinces.

2. FO

371/5230/E

12339 Mesopotamia,

PreliminaryReport

on Causes

of

Unrest, by Major

N.N.E. Bray,

14

Sept. 1920;

FO

371/5231/7765

Mesopotamia,

Causes

of Unrest

-

Report

No.2, by Major

N.N.E. Bray, Oct. 1920;

WO33/969 Causeof

the

Outbreak

n

Mesopotamia,

General

Staff,

War

Office,

Oct. 1920.

The materialused

by

the Political

Department,

ndia

Office,

and

the War

Office,

in

the above

reports,

was assembled from information

ent in

by

the various British

intelligence

services

in

Europe,

the

GOC, Army

of the Black

Sea,

Constantinople, British Military Intelligence, Cairo, the Arab Bureau, the GOC,

Mesopotamia,Embassy

and legation

staff throughoutEuropeand Asia,

Russian and other

government

publications

andbroadcasts,

and

German,French,

Italian,

Russian and Turkish

telegraph

and wireless

intercepts.

Turkish

elegraph

and

wireless

signals

were

interceptedby

Cable

and

Wireless,

from 1919.

They

were

decrypted,

where

necessary, by

the

Admiralty

(Room 40 OB)

and

by MI.

For an account of this work, see

Robin Denniston, Churchill

Secret

War

(Stroud: Sutton,

1997).

Evidence available elsewhere would suggest

that the information provided in the

above

reportswas,

with one or two

exceptions,

not referred o

in

this article,factually

correct.

But it

can be argued

that the interpretationplaced on the evidence

was to some

extent

misconceived.

For

an analysis

of this

aspect

of

the question,

see A.L. Macfie, 'British

Intelligence and the Causesof Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21', Middle EasternStudies,

Vol.35,

No.

1

(1999).

In their various

reports

the British recognizedthat Emir Feisal, though

apparently

duplicitous,

may have

been forcedby the extremists o 'acquiesce

in action distasteful

o him

personally'.

In

the

first

of

his

reports

on the

Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia,

Bray noted

that the Mouvahiddin

Society,

which had

representatives in Moscow, had

definitely

proclaimed

itself

pro-Bolshevik,

and that it had converted 105 members of the

Grand

National

Assembly

in Ankara

o

Bolshevik

principles.

Enver,

Talaatand Djemal Pashas,

who

fled

the Ottoman

Empire

in

the last days

of the First WorldWar, all remained

politically

active for some

years,

Enver

mainly

in Russia and Central Asia, Talaat in Germany

and

Djemal

in

Afghanistan.

3. B.N. $imrnired.), British Documents on Atatuirk BDA) (Ankara:Turk TarihKurumu,

1973-84),

Vol.

1, No.96,

enclosure.

4.

Ibid.,

No.101,

enclosures.

5.

Ibid.,No.112,

enclosure.

6.

Ibid.,Vol.2, No.73,

enclosure.

7.

Ibid.,No.96,

enclosure.

8.

Mesopotamia,

PreliminaryReport

on

Causes

of Unrest, pp.6-7.

9.

Ibid., p.6.

10. Ibid.




20/21

BRITISH VIEWS OF

TURKISH NATIONAL

MOVEMENT

45

11.

E.L.

Woodward

and R. Butler

(eds.),

Documentson British

Foreign

Policy

(London:HMSO)

First Series, Vol.4, No.660.

12. Mesopotamia,

Causes of Unrest

-

Report No.2, p.3.

The War Office

report

concluded

that

the Soviet connection

with the

Arab

situation was

by way

of

the

channel

'Arslan-Talaat-Enver'.

13. Ibid.

14.

Ibid.,

p.4.

15. Ibid.,p.6. According

to

Mesopotamia,

Causes

of Unrest -

Report

No.2,

TalaatPasha

would

be

charged

with the direction

of the

revolutionary

movement in

Syria, Egypt

and

Arabia;

Djavid with the direction

in

Greece, Italy

and

France;

Enver

with the direction in

the

Caucasus, Djemal

with

the

direction

in

Afghanistan,

and Khalil

[sic]

with the direction

in

Persia.

16. Ibid.,

p.14.

In

August 1920

British

intelligence acquired

a

copy

of a

proclamation,

supposedly

issued

by

Mustafa

Kemal,

as 'President

of the Turkish

Republic'.

In

Bray's view

this

designation signified

a Turkish national

acceptance

of

Bolshevik

policy

and an

abandonmentof the Sultan as Caliph. It signified in other words the detachmentof the

national

movement from the body of Islam.

17. BDA,

Vol.l, No.109,

enclosure 1.

18. Ibid.

19.

Ibid., enclosure 2.

20.

BDFA,

Part

II,

Series

B,

Vol.

1,

Doc.96.

21. Ibid., Doc.69.

22. FO 406/41

No.186, 1,

de Robeck to

Curzon,

2

Dec.

1919.

23.

BDA,

Vol.1,No.86,

enclosure.

24.

FO 406/41

No.126,

de Robeck to

Curzon,

10 Oct. 1919.

25. BDFA, Part