1

Briefing to Portfolio Committee on PoliceBriefing to Portfolio Committee on PoliceSAPS Restructuring/ReorganisationSAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation

1 June 20101 June 2010Johan Burger & Bilkis OmarJohan Burger & Bilkis Omar

Crime and Justice ProgrammeCrime and Justice ProgrammeINSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIESINSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Briefing to Portfolio Committee on PoliceBriefing to Portfolio Committee on PoliceSAPS Restructuring/ReorganisationSAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation

1 June 20101 June 2010Johan Burger & Bilkis OmarJohan Burger & Bilkis Omar

Crime and Justice ProgrammeCrime and Justice ProgrammeINSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIESINSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

2

Presentation OutlinePresentation Outline

www.issafrica.org

• Reasons for and concerns with restructuring & redeployment• Comparing the trends (police expansion & crime)• Research focus & methodology• Key findings

- SANAB (anti-drug unit)- ACU (anti-corruption unit)- SVC units (serious & violent crimes)- FCS units (family and child abuse)- CCU’s (public order policing)

• Concluding remarks & recommendations

3

SAPS reasons for re-structuring and redeployment

www.issafrica.org

SAPS reasons:• Area level not in line with section 205 (1) of the Constitution (3 tiers of Govt)

• Area level created a duplication of functions & acted as a post office• Senior and experienced members were concentrated at Provincial & Area levels• Need to strengthen police stations

SAPS reasons:• Area level not in line with section 205 (1) of the Constitution (3 tiers of Govt)

• Area level created a duplication of functions & acted as a post office• Senior and experienced members were concentrated at Provincial & Area levels• Need to strengthen police stations

4

Concerns with restructuring

www.issafrica.org

Specialised units were disbanded and their members were ‘migrated’ to the various Accounting and Priority Stations

• Specialisation would be weakened as members would be overwhelmed by other investigation demands• Organisational expertise would be reduced due to the loss of dedicated specialist personnel • It would reduce the organisation’s ability to produce replacements• Loss of esprit de corps & negative impact on morale

1

Comparing the trends

www.issafrica.org

Police expansion 2004 - 2012

Police budget 2003/04 - 2010/11

Murder 1994 - 2009

Trio crimes

Att Murder

6

Research QuestionsResearch Questions

www.issafrica.org

The research was guided by two primary questions:

1. What was the impact of the restructuring

initiative on the service delivery of the SAPS?

2. What are the lessons to be learned from the

SAPS’ approach to restructuring/reorganisation?

7

Research focusResearch focus

www.issafrica.org

Specialised Units:

Serious & Violent Crimes Unit (SVC); Family Violence, Child Protection & Sexual Offences Unit (FCS); Crime Combating Units Add SANAB, Anti-Corruption Unit, Murder & Robbery Unit

Area Commissioner’s offices Accounting stations Cluster Commanders

8

Research methodologyResearch methodology

www.issafrica.org

• Initial request to conduct research denied by SAPS (July 2008). Reason given - not enough time to determine success & research methodology not clear

• Alternative methodology therefore adopted – i.e. interviews with former members of these units & other senior members

• Assess other research reports and available official documents

• Initial request to conduct research denied by SAPS (July 2008). Reason given - not enough time to determine success & research methodology not clear

• Alternative methodology therefore adopted – i.e. interviews with former members of these units & other senior members

• Assess other research reports and available official documents

9

Research methodologyResearch methodology (contd)

www.issafrica.org

• Four provinces visited: Northern Cape; Western Cape; Gauteng; & KwaZulu-Natal

• Interviews conducted with former members of Anti-Corruption Unit; SVC Unit; SANAB; and various other senior officers (incl PC’s; Prov Heads of Detectives; etc)

• Refer to FCS Report by RAPCAN, 2009

• Refer to Monograph on Crime Combating Units (Omar, 2007) & updated information

• Four provinces visited: Northern Cape; Western Cape; Gauteng; & KwaZulu-Natal

• Interviews conducted with former members of Anti-Corruption Unit; SVC Unit; SANAB; and various other senior officers (incl PC’s; Prov Heads of Detectives; etc)

• Refer to FCS Report by RAPCAN, 2009

• Refer to Monograph on Crime Combating Units (Omar, 2007) & updated information

10

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB)

• Phased out between 2000 – 2004 and functions taken over by Organised Crime Unit & (until 2006) Station Task Teams

• Official reasons: To enhance detective capability to fight organised crime more effectively & to improve service delivery at station level

• Reasons according to members: Perceptions of corruption within SANAB & lack of transformation

South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB)

• Phased out between 2000 – 2004 and functions taken over by Organised Crime Unit & (until 2006) Station Task Teams

• Official reasons: To enhance detective capability to fight organised crime more effectively & to improve service delivery at station level

• Reasons according to members: Perceptions of corruption within SANAB & lack of transformation

11

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Impact of restructuring – SANAB

• Increase in drug related crime arrests (49 839 in 2000 to 117 172 in 2009) more as a result of increase in drug trade than restructuring (UN Report on Drugs and Crime states SA is by far the largest market for illicit drugs in Southern Africa)

• Ex-SANAB members argue that street level drug trade became neglected and there is a noticeable increase in drugs such as cocaine and ecstasy

12

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)

• Established 1996 - closed down 2003. Functions taken over by the Org Crime Unit and stations

• Official reasons: Corruption is an organised crime function and police corruption was decreasing• Reasons according to members: ‘Investigations had identified suspects linked to senior national police officials’

Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)

• Established 1996 - closed down 2003. Functions taken over by the Org Crime Unit and stations

• Official reasons: Corruption is an organised crime function and police corruption was decreasing• Reasons according to members: ‘Investigations had identified suspects linked to senior national police officials’

13

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Impact of restructuring on the ACU• Corruption related to organised crime investigated by OCU – all other corruption investigated at station level – intelligence gathering placed with Crime Intelligence – ‘the function ceased’!

• Corruption within SAPS investigated in a haphazard manner by various agencies

• Dedicated police anti-corruption capability was lost & no single source of information to assess the scale of the problem

14

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

• ‘Restructuring led to loss of expertise in a unique and complicated area of investigation’

• Public Service Commission Report (PSC) on corruption (2000) found that ‘uncertainty around restructuring is impacting on the morale and effectiveness of the Unit’ [ACU] & dedicated staff were declining while number of corruption cases were increasing• Corruption remains a substantial problem plaguing the SAPS

15

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC)

• Unit established in 2002 by integrating various smaller units such Murder & Robbery

• In 2006 restructuring led to decentralisation of SVC to 169 Priority Stations – approximately two members per station

• Official reasons: Decentralising expertise to station level will improve service delivery

16

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Impact of restructuring on SVCs• Police members perceived ongoing restructuring as demonstrating uncertainty by police manage- ment and impacted negatively on morale

• SVC detectives at some stations became over- burdened with general investigations and the specialised detective function became diluted

• Loss of expertise and a weakened ability to produce new specialists/experts

17

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Family Violence, Child Protection & Sexual Offences Unit (FCS)

• Established in 1996 (gradual incorp. of some Child Protection Units depending on resources, etc)• By 2006 - 49 FCS units and 17 CPU’s• Initially FCS attached to Org Crime Unit, in 2004 moved to General Investigations and in 2006 decentralised to Accounting Stations (approx 6 p/s)• Reasons and impact largely similar to those for SVC units

18

Key findingsKey findings

(From a RAPCAN Report, 2009, Raising the Bar: A Review of the SAPS Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units)

www.issafrica.org

The restructuring had a profound impact on both victims and personnel responsible for these services. No longer a national pattern that demonstrates dedicated officers, dedicated resources, and specialised management for cases within the FCS mandate (page v)

The restructuring had a profound impact on both victims and personnel responsible for these services. No longer a national pattern that demonstrates dedicated officers, dedicated resources, and specialised management for cases within the FCS mandate (page v)

19

Some key conclusionsSome key conclusions (RAPCAN report)

www.issafrica.org

Current system for delivery of FCS services a reversal of historical developments aimed at offering a skilled & specialised service to complainants in FCS-related cases

Policy objective to prioritise crimes against women and children cannot be realised under the new structure

Services devolved to local level without articulated national strategy, specialised management and oversight, and dedicated budgets and resources

Current system for delivery of FCS services a reversal of historical developments aimed at offering a skilled & specialised service to complainants in FCS-related cases

Policy objective to prioritise crimes against women and children cannot be realised under the new structure

Services devolved to local level without articulated national strategy, specialised management and oversight, and dedicated budgets and resources

20

Some key conclusionsSome key conclusions(RAPCAN report)

www.issafrica.org

Restructuring resulted in confusion and uncertainty (internally and externally) Result was the placement of staff that:

(1) were not suitably trained (2) were not suitably experienced (3) did not undergo special screening or selection (4) did not elect to work on FCS cases (5) did not have some of the basic requirements to do the job, e.g. drivers licences

Resulted also in demoralisation and demoti- vation of FCS members

21

Some key conclusionsSome key conclusions (RAPCAN report)

www.issafrica.org

SA is out of step with comparable countries in shifting away from specialised services

Inter-sectoral collaboration with stakeholders required to deliver essential services has suffered

Victims have been impacted on negatively and currently exposed to services of questionable quality in many areas

22

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Crime Combating Units (CCU’s) Or Public Order Police Units (POP’s)

• POP’s established during mid-90’s for crowd management and underwent restructuring in 2001 and 2006• In 2000/01 POP mandate was adapted to crime combating (with crowd control as a secondary function) • Official reason was that crime was increasing & public protests were decreasing – also that this was part of a plan to strengthen fight against crime and improve service delivery at local level

23

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

• POP units were renamed Area Crime Com- bating Units (ACCU’s) & in 2006 CCU’s

• Between 2001 – 2005 violent crowd manage- ment incidents increased from 632 to 932 & peaceful incidents from 7 281 to 9 230

• With restructuring in 2006, 50% of personnel were redeployed to stations and other units & 20 of the 43 units were closed down

24

Key findingsKey findings

www.issafrica.org

Impact of restructuring - CCUs• In 2008 during xenophobic violence CCU’s were not able to manage the situation alone and the military had to be asked to assist• Result was that former members of CCU’s had to be recalled and SAPS were forced into a process of rebuilding these units• Restructuring resulted in work overload, longer travel distances, low morale and poor team spirit• Many of the good and experienced members of these units have since resigned because of frustration with ongoing restructuring

1

Comparing the trends

www.issafrica.org

Police expansion 2001 - 2012

Police budget 2003/04 - 2010/11

Murder 1994 - 2009

Trio crimes

Att Murder

26

Concluding remarksConcluding remarks

www.issafrica.org

• This study revealed that although intentions may be good, restructuring is undertaken without adequate research (i.e. pilot or impact studies), a clear strategy and meaningful external and internal consultation

• When problems occur within a unit, it should be addressed without necessarily having to close down the unit

• Uncertainty resulting from ongoing and staff experiences of random change leads to despondency, dissatisfaction, low morale and loss of efficiency and effectiveness

• This study revealed that although intentions may be good, restructuring is undertaken without adequate research (i.e. pilot or impact studies), a clear strategy and meaningful external and internal consultation

• When problems occur within a unit, it should be addressed without necessarily having to close down the unit

• Uncertainty resulting from ongoing and staff experiences of random change leads to despondency, dissatisfaction, low morale and loss of efficiency and effectiveness

27

RecommendationsRecommendations

www.issafrica.org

• A clear strategy for police reform over 3 to 5 years should be developed as part of a White Paper policy process

• The strategy should be developed by teams of highly experienced police officials and civilians with proven experience in effective change management

• It should be informed by best policing practices both locally and internationally

• Clear & detailed links should be made between the strategy and expected results and not simply assumed

• A clear strategy for police reform over 3 to 5 years should be developed as part of a White Paper policy process

• The strategy should be developed by teams of highly experienced police officials and civilians with proven experience in effective change management

• It should be informed by best policing practices both locally and internationally

• Clear & detailed links should be made between the strategy and expected results and not simply assumed

28

RecommendationsRecommendations (Contd)

www.issafrica.org

• The strategy should be broadly consulted on both within and outside of the police (SAPS members, Unions, civil society, other government departments)

• All concerns should be considered and meaningfully addressed

• Where restructuring is broadly agreed as being required it should be piloted and tested before being rolled out

• Implementation should be independently assessed and reported on to the Minister and parliament

• The strategy should be broadly consulted on both within and outside of the police (SAPS members, Unions, civil society, other government departments)

• All concerns should be considered and meaningfully addressed

• Where restructuring is broadly agreed as being required it should be piloted and tested before being rolled out

• Implementation should be independently assessed and reported on to the Minister and parliament

29

: www.issafrica.org: www.issafrica.org: jburger@issafrica.org: jburger@issafrica.org

: +27 12 346 9500: +27 12 346 9500 : +27 12 346 4569: +27 12 346 4569

Thank you/Baie dankie