[brief template] - edenprairiedebate.files.wordpress.com file · web view1ac. plan: the united...

Eden Prairie 2009-10File TitleYour Name

1AC

PLAN The United States federal government should end its ballistic missile defense presence in Japan

ADVANTAGE ONE IS MIRVS

MOST RECENT REPORTS SHOW CHINA IS DEVELOPING MIRVS ndash BUT NO DEPLOYMENT YET

Hoar 9-28(William China Embraces US Debt and Technology The New American httpwwwthenewamericancomindexphpreviews903-correction-please4704-china-embraces-us-debt-and-technology)

The Pentagon report also notes that Beijing has been modernizing its nuclear forces by adding systems that make them more survivable For example says the report the road-mobile solid-propellant ldquoDF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBM) have entered service The DF-31A with a range in excess of 11200 km can reach most locations within the continental United States (CONUS) China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV)rdquo What the Department of Defense report most emphatically does not say is where that DF-31 technology came from although it is hardly a secret the US of A Even the warheads now on Chinese nuclear weapons are believed to be derived from espionage directed at this country and our systems Author Bill Gertz pointed out in The China Threat a full decade ago how Lockheed scientists had earlier traveled to China to help out the communists with problems they were having with rocket motor failures As Gertz wrote Solid rocket technology mdash like other technical assistance Lockheed supplied the Chinese mdash is critical in helping the Chinese develop multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles or MIRVs The rockets can be adapted to guide clusters of nuclear warheads launched on a single missile As the Cox Committee stated China has threatened to ldquoMIRVrdquo its warheads in response to US national missile defenses So far China has not deployed MIRVs on its current nuclear arsenal but has shown the capability of adding up to three warheads on its new DF-31 truck mobile intercontinental ballistic missile The DF-31 was flight tested for the first time in 1999 with ldquopenetration aidsrdquo mdash dummy warheads designed to fool missile defenses These used ldquokick motorsrdquo another technology on which Lockheed provided assistance

ONGOING US BMD DEVELOPMENT IS THE UNIQUE CAUSE

LaBauve 09 (ldquoChina and Japanrsquos Strategic Nuclear Relationshiprdquo Jeffrey Lt US Navy BA Tulane Masterrsquos Thesis Naval Postgraduate School httpedocsnpsedunpspubsscholarlytheses2009Sep09Sep_LaBauvepdf)

These recent changes to Chinarsquos nuclear forces have resulted in some internal Chinese discussion about the future of their nuclear strategy Medieros offers a few possibilities for changes in future Chinese nuclear strategy from offering conditions to the ldquono first userdquo pledge to development of MIRV warheads or explicit adoption of launch doctrines such as ldquolaunch on warningrdquo or ldquolaunch under attackrdquo However these improvements seem to be in response to the development of BMD and not a response to the US Strategic Commandrsquos implementation of Global Strike or other US nuclear improvements The Chinese are determined to maintain an underlying policy of minimum deterrence Many Chinese analysts note that it is counterproductive to counter BMDs with a large force buildup and that believe China should focus on increasing the survivability of the Chinese ICBM force and augmenting those ICBMs with penetration aids The Chinese ultimately desire to maintain a doctrinal status quo by slowly increasing its nuclear capability and the survivability of its current nuclear forces

1


MIRVS CAUSE SINO-CHINA WAR ndash ENABLES FIRST STRIKE UNDERMINES STRATEGIC STABILITY

Fravel and Medeiros 10 (Taylor Professor of Political Science Senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation until August 2009 and is currently the director for China Taiwan and Mongolian Affairs at the National Security Council Chinarsquos Search for Assured Retaliation The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure Fall International Security Muse)

Looking forward this situation suggests that two aspects of modernization should be monitored as they might signal a change in Chinarsquos nuclear posture First in response to missile defense programs in the United States and other countries the Second Artillery is researching and developing a variety of technologies to defeat such systems including maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) decoys chaff jamming thermal shielding and ASAT weapons131 If deployed MaRV and MIRV warheads could affect Chinarsquos strategic relationships with other nuclear powers by increasing the options available to China for using its nuclear weapons including providing it with additional options against smaller nuclear powers such as India This shift could undermine strategic stability in Chinarsquos relationships with India and Russia because MIRVrsquod missiles in particular have a first-strike potential Arming the silo-based missiles such as the DF-5 with MIRVrsquod warheads might also further undermine crisis stability by presenting a potentially vulnerable target for an opponentrsquos first strike against China132

CHINA AND INDIA ARE ON THE BRINK ndash TIBET CHINA SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN CANCELING OF DEFENSE TALKS PROVE

The Economist 12-16 (ldquopushing backrdquo httpwwweconomistcomnode17732947)

Ms Rao was responding to the ambassadorrsquos dark warning that criticism of China during a rare visit by Wen Jiabao the prime minister to India between December 15th and 17th could threaten ldquofragilerdquo bilateral ties He added that these would be ldquodifficult to repairrdquo if broken Indiarsquos leaders are not in a mood to listen In Delhi a few hundred Tibetans were left to demonstrate against Mr Wen as he arrived More striking the Dalai Lama their spiritual leader embarked at the same time on an eight-day trip to Sikkim a north-eastern state on the border with Chinese-run Tibet That excursion like one last year to Arunachal PradeshmdashIndian territory claimed by China as ldquosouth Tibetrdquomdashseemed designed to arouse Chinese ire China has certainly been doing its bit to provoke the ire of the Indians It reportedly sent several thousand soldiers to parts of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir this year to build roads for its ldquoall-weatherrdquo ally It has denied visas (other than ones stapled to passports) to Indian Kashmiris and to a general responsible for Kashmir a hint that it might not respect Indian control of the territory India has responded by suspending regular bilateral defence meetings But Omar Abdullah the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir suggests going further ldquoWhy should India have a one-China policy when China doesnrsquot have a one-India policyrdquo he asks ldquoWhat if we started stapling passports from Tibetrdquo Though this is never likely to be adopted as policy by the government in Delhi the very suggestion would make China furious The Indiansrsquo increasingly strong ties with America are bolstering their confidence in dealing with China President Barack Obama visited Delhi a month ago and earned much goodwill by offering hearty support for Indiarsquos bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council (China is distinctly lukewarm) This cosying up between India and America makes China all the more prickly

2


EXTINCTION

Sethi 09 (Manpreet Sethi December 2009 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SECOND TIER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES A CASE STUDY OF INDIA Dr Manpreet Sethi is Fellow International Relations at the Centre de Sciences Humaines New Delhi She is also Senior Fellow Centre for Air Power Studies where she heads the Nuclear Security project She completed her Ph D from School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi in 1997 and was on the research faculty of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi from 1997-2001httpwwwcsh-delhicompublicationsdownloadsopsOP25pdf)

The first factor that is deemed to heighten nuclear dangers in the case of the two dyads under study is geographical proximity and a history of conflict Located next to one another and sharing disputed boundaries it is feared that any major breakout of conventional hostilities between India-Pakistan or India-China could increase the pressures for a pre-emptive strike or a nuclear attack being launched without proper confirmation Moreover since the missile flight times would only be between 8-13 minutes for missile ranges of 600-2000 kms it would not allow either side to even use the hotline (assuming these were functional) to confirm the veracity (deliberate or accidental) or nature (conventional or nuclear) of launch Haunted by the thought that the country that waited to use its nuclear assets might end up losing them to a disarming first strike would cause near immediate nuclear retaliation engulfing the nations in a mindless nuclear exchange

3


ADVANTAGE TWO IS CHINESE SOCIETY

THIS YEAR IS KEY FOR CHINESE LEADERSHIP ndash DIVIDE BETWEEN PLA HARDLINERS AND PRO-AMERICAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Raman 10-15 B Additional Secretary (retd) Cabinet Secretariat Govt of India New Delhi and presently Director Institute For Topical Studieshttpwwwsrilankaguardianorg201010chinese-attitude-to-us-trust-distrusthtml

One has been seeing a trust-distrust syndrome in Sino-US relations since the beginning of this year The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) particularly the new generation of younger officers who are rising to positions of senior leadership in the military hierarchy continues to show signs of distrust of the US This is particularly so in the Navy In other segments of the Chinese strategic community such as the Foreign Office the various economic ministries and scientific establishments the distrust of the US is not that pronounced In fact these non-military elements in the strategic community seem to be keen to keep the present level of co-operation with the US and even increase it

PLAN RESTRAINS THE PLA HAWKS ndash TRANSFORMS RELATIONSHIP INTO COOPERATION

Cronin et al 99 Patrick Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London The US-Japan alliance past present and future Google Book

The most vociferous opposition to TMD cooperation with Japan comes from those concerned about its impact on Sino-US relations Some China experts and arms control advocates argue that a US-Japan decision to develop TMD would cause the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) to incorporate into its long-range multiple-independently-targeted-vehicle (MIRV) warheads capability and submunitions into short- and medium-range ballistic missiles thereby escalating vertically from a strategy of minimum deterrence to a more threatening one of limited deterrence Moreover they point out that TMD would set both Japan and the United States on a collision course with Beijing that would undermine their broader strategic objectives for integrating China into the regional and global community of nations Beijing has reinforced these concerns with its active and vocal opposition to TMD Some opponents of TMD advocate an approach to Beijing that would instead be based on arms control and confidence-building measures because this would strengthen Chinarsquos burgeoning arms control community and constrain hawks in the PLA Ultimately there is a fundamental difference between a China that aspires to work within the boundaries of the international community and a pariah regime operating outside such constraints As China builds a role in the maintenance of global arms control regimes the United States and Japan will have a stronger basis for confidence-building with Beijing related to TMD

4


HARDLINERS DERAIL HUrsquoS ECONOMIC AGENDA ndash US BMD EMPOWERS CONSERVATIVES

Stratfor 05Stratfor Strategic Forecasting November 8th ldquoChinarsquos Obsession with the Zoellick Speechrdquo Subscription

As Chinarsquos leadership prepares to implement a new five-year plan calling for the harmonization of society mdash the equalization of economic benefits and prosperity derived from nationwide growth mdash it is hoping for a stable international environment that would allow Beijing more securely to focus its attentions inward The United States will play a role critical to the provision of this stability and Beijingrsquos top minds are pondering what they believe represents a key insight into US strategic thinking vis-a-vis China the text of a Sept 21 speech by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick Analysis Chinarsquos National Peoplersquos Congress (NPC) will meet in March 2006 when among other things it will probably approve Chinarsquos 11th five-year plan for economic growth The plan the first overseen by President Hu Jintao enshrines Hursquos so-called ldquoharmonious societyrdquo as a key goal In essence it promotes a massive redistribution of wealth in China in order to narrow the gaps between rich and poor urban and rural and between various regions of China Such a plan is ambitious to say the least and fraught with difficulties Nevertheless in order to address the growing problems caused by widening wealth gaps population migration and rising unemployment Beijing feels it imperative to take extreme measures to avoid social meltdown This ldquoRobin Hoodrdquo economic plan however will take money resources and opportunities from the more well-off segments of society and transfer them to those heretofore left behind As an Oct 27 commentary in the official Peoplersquos Daily bluntly stated ldquoNew reforms will affect the vested interests of certain social strata and certain regions which means the redistribution of social wealth Some prices must be paid for lasting peace and stability and for real harmony of societyrdquo Given the likelihood that those ldquovested interestsrdquo are unlikely to sacrifice their privileges quietly Beijing faces a showdown with local and regional governments Communist Party officials businessmen and even the emergent Chinese middle class Thus as China prepares for changes that could spark massive internal upheaval it is seeking a peaceful international environment mdash one allowing it effectively to focus its attention inward without too much risk of exploitation or external pressure With this in mind Beijing is looking first toward the United States Relations between China and the United States shifted quickly after the Sept 11 attacks mdash from a diplomatic and military showdown as a US reconnaissance plane sat on a runway on Chinarsquos island of Hainan to the relative benign neglect of Chinese issues by Washington This peaceful pause allowed Chinarsquos leaders to carry out a transition of leadership from Jiang Zemin and the so-called third-generation leaders to Hu Jintao and the fourth-generation leaders This marked more than a simple generational shift however it also marked the evolution of Chinese economic security and international policies On the economic front Jiang and many of his comrades supported the continuation of the ldquogrowth for the sake of growthrdquo policies of the past characterized by the acceptance that economic growth was not equal and the belief that high levels of growth were necessary to keep China from slipping into social chaos This view held that anything shy of around 85 percent to 95 percent growth would not even maintain Chinarsquos employment levels and that any real shift in Chinese economic policies would undermine the statersquos advance The newly evolved policies mdash as embodied in the draft five-year plan mdash espouse sustainable economic growth rather than unrestricted growth This shift in priorities derives from the current leadershiprsquos subscription by and large to the theory that the social repercussions of Chinarsquos uneven economic growth are now becoming a threat equal to or greater than the threat posed by a decline of the economic growth rate And it is the study of the failures of other Asian economic systems mdash from the Japanese to the Southeast Asian economic crisis mdash that prompted this redefinition of the best path for China On the security front the Jiang-era leadership viewed it as Chinarsquos right to be a big power to exert its influence and to counter the US encirclement of China in the post-Cold War period Chinarsquos economic growth was expected to translate into increased political and military leverage and confronting the ldquounipolarityrdquo of the United States in the international system constituted a necessity In this world view issues like Taiwan for example were best dealt with by a clear show of force and repeated threats The Hu-era leadership has taken a more subtle approach it views a more cooperative approach as the surest path to greater Chinese influence This ldquoPeaceful Riserdquo concept which burst on the scene in 2003 after a series of very public debates promoted the concept of a cooperative China one that would inevitably play a larger regional and global role and that would do so with as little overt threat as possible In other wordsChinarsquos ldquoriserdquo would occur more smoothly if its neighbors were not calling on foreign powers for defense assistance against this rising China Peaceful Rise offered a way for China to try to demonstrate the economic and security benefits of cooperation mdash as opposed to the frictions resulting from confrontation that would leave neighboring states behind the curve and under the influence of foreign powers (ie the United States) Chinarsquos new ldquopineapple diplomacyrdquo with Taiwan has been a case in point as have Beijingrsquos emerging energy ties with the Philippines and Vietnam While the generational debate continues over the concepts of economic policy and Chinarsquos global role during the most intense period of discussion China was largely unmolested by a United States preoccupied with its wars in Afghanistan Iraq and against militant Islam in general This reduction of foreign pressure contributed to the victory of the fourth-generation leadersrsquo overall vision of Chinarsquos path over that of their third-generation counterparts (While this debate was not entirely conducted along generational lines the generational shift has seen the more refined and subtle views of economic and

strategic policies become pre-eminent) As Beijing now prepares to tackle the very real problem of internal inequity it again seeks a respite from US pressure Chinarsquos leadership has suggested it can only proceed with economic social and even political reforms if the United States keeps pressure on China to a minimum The idea is that ldquoconservativerdquo or ldquohard-linerdquo forces are waiting in the wings seeking an opportunity to undermine Beijingrsquos new ldquoprogressiverdquo policies Thus if US threats and pressures mdash be they economic political or military in nature mdash give these reactionary forces the opportunity these forces will curtail the new economic and strategic policies of Chinarsquos current leadership and perhaps even restore a policy of confrontation instead of cooperation

5


EXPERTS CONCLUDE 2011rsquoS FIVE YEAR PLAN IS KEY TO CHINA INEQUALITY

Gold 10Howard China needs to step it up httpwwwmarketwatchcomstoryas-china-grows-massive-hurdles-loom-2010-07-24reflink=MW_news_stmp

Every pundit and China hand says it The next decade will be a critical one for China After an unprecedented three decades of 10 annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in which hundreds of millions of its people were lifted out of poverty as the country became the workshop of the world China faces a more difficult second act Its government must spread the wealth beyond the great coastal cities of Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou and Shenzhen to deep in the interior It must find work for its young people while providing for a growing number of retirees It must encourage people to spend more and save less to rebalance the economy away from exporting and towards domestic consumption How the Communist Party-run government handles this transition will determine whether it will retain the support of the Chinese people despite its inherently undemocratic nature and avoid the social upheavals that are the bane of all authoritarian states It will also decide how great a power China will become I pondered these questions during and after a recent family trip to China I have been a China skeptic for some time In October 2007 I warned about a bubble in Chinese stocks when the Shanghai Composite index topped 6000 Its trading just above 2500 now But our trip did give me a new appreciation of how much China has achieved Its hard not to be impressed by the glittering new buildings smooth roads and gleaming subways And the optimism of the people is a refreshing antidote to the gloom and doom you hear all the time in America these days Of course theyre moving up in the world and were the established superpower so theres only one way to go right Also all our mistakes are cycled endlessly through cable news channels and the Internet but in China the government keeps a tight lid on news Nonetheless the government-run English-language China Daily displays surprising candor about certain issues such as corruption the direction of the economy and increasing concerns about the gap between the rich and poor in China Those are the big issues the Chinese government faces and the crunch time is now as party members and intellectuals debate the big issues that will be addressed in the next five-year plan (oh yes they still have those) Typically those debates continue until the Party Congress adopts the plan then everyone gets in line The sense of urgency is compounded by the fact that the party leaders will be anointing a successor to President Hu Jintao over the next few years Stephen Roach chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia who will be teaching at Yale University in the fall told the South China Morning Post that the upcoming 12th five-year plan for 2011-2016 will be a watershed for China and the rest of the China-centric region He told Bloomberg that GDP growth will remain strong this year but China must up the ante to boost domestic consumption which now stands at a lightweight 36 of GDP a bit more than half the percentage in the US How He says China needs to develop a stronger social safety net raise incomes in the rural areas and boost employment in the service sector We certainly saw evidence of the latter on our trip A growing army of hotel and restaurant workers serve tens of millions of visitors from inside China and abroad The safety net is key Right now many Chinese retire early -- often with government pensions But by 2015 there will be some 200 million Chinese aged 60 and over and a shrinking population to support them thanks to the one-child policy instituted in 1978 With the Communist-era benefits dismantled Chinese feel they must save more to take care of living and medical expenses in their old age Thats where the rebalancing comes in Its going to be difficult [but] they have the wherewithal to do that says Christopher McNally fellow of the East-West Center and an expert on China

6


CHINA INEQUALITY CAUSES SINO-RUSSIAN WAR - EXTINCTION

Sharavin 01 (Alexander Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis ldquoWhat the Papers Sayrdquo 103)

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China It should not be forgotten however that some 250 to 300 million people live there ie at most a quarter of Chinas population A billion Chinese people are still living in misery For them even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high They have absolutely nothing to lose There is every prerequisite for the final throw to the north The strength of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s However through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage Thanks to our zeal from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems Chinas air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II The shock air force of our eastern brethren will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces Russia may face the wonderful prospect of combating the Chinese army which if full mobilization is called is comparable in size with Russias entire population which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China) Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II It would require from our state maximal tension universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware up to the last tank or a plane in a single direction (we would have to forget such trifles like Talebs and Basaev but this does not guarantee success either) Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out what would exhaust Russias armament completely We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats In the long run even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed our country would be absolutely unprotected against the Chechen and the Balkan variants both and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter

7


ADVANTAGE THREE IS CRUISE MISSILES

AMERICAN ADVERSARIES FOCUSING ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT NOW

Gormley 08 ndash Dennis M Gormley senior fellow in the Washington office of the Monterey Institute of International Studiesrsquo James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies faculty member at the University of Pittsburghrsquos Graduate School of Public and International Affairs September 2008 ldquoThe Risks and Challenges of a Cruise Missile Tipping Pointrdquo online httpwwwntiorge_researche3_missile_tipping_pointhtml

Ballistic missiles have dominated the missile proliferation scene thus far They emblematized ultimate military power during the Cold War Iraqs use of modified Scud ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War mesmerized the public with lasting images of duels between Iraqi ballistic Scuds and US Patriot missile defenses Ballistic missiles based on Scud technology have spread widely to potential American adversaries and as a potential means of WMD delivery they represent significant impediments to US force projection and a potent means of future coercive diplomacy An epidemic of cruise missile proliferation would aggravate matters gravely If the use of large numbers of LACMs becomes a major feature of military operations in the next decade a combination of cruise and ballistic missile attacks even with conventional payloads could make early entry into regional bases of operation increasingly problematic Nuclear and possibly biological payloads would produce catastrophic consequences

CONTINUED JAPAN BMD DEVELOPMENT LEADS TO NORTH KOREAN SHIFT FROM BALLISTIC TO CRUISE MISSILES

Dutra 04 ndash Michael Dutra Associate White amp Case LLP 2004 ldquoStrategic Myopia The United States Cruise Missiles and the Missile Technology Control Regimerdquo Journal of Transnational Law amp Policy Vol 14 No 1

Cruise missiles represent a way for Third World states to offset the technological superiority of the United States and exploit the weaknesses of extant US systems The US focus on building theater anti-ballistic missile systems such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program will only push nations such as North Korea and Iran which have long sought to acquire long-range means to threaten US interests to look for an alternative to ballistic missiles As the effectiveness of US antiballistic missile defenses increases potential foes are likely to turn to LACMs as an alternative In the 2003 war in Iraq the effectiveness of US Patriot SAMs at shooting down approximately fifty percent of Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles launched at US forces should be contrasted with the failure of US missile defenses to intercept any of the antiquated Iraqi Seersucker cruise missiles fired at US forces David Tanks an analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis notes that ldquo[i]f we start fielding ballistic missile defense other countries will start developing more cruise missiles It is cheap and relatively easyrdquo The logical choice for such nations is to start a cruise missile program which is increasingly technologically feasible or to try to obtain LACMs from another source As cruise missiles are more accurate than first generation ballistic missiles like the Scud less technologically complex and less expensive to develop they are the most attractive choice for a state seeking long-range strike capability as the technology required for indigenous LACM development becomes easier to obtain

8


CRUISE MISSILES BOOST BIOWEAPONS DELIVERY


Modern low-flying LACMs offer more attractive offensive options Compared with ballistic missiles LACMs are expected to be much more accurate (by a factor of at least ten) less costly (by at least half) and because of their aerodynamic stability and larger footprint substantially more effective in delivering chemical and biological agents (conservatively enlarging the lethal area for biological attacks by at least ten times)[17] They provide more flexible and survivable launch options from air land and sea platforms than larger ballistic missiles while offering easier maintenance in harsher environments And surely the success of American Tomahawk cruise missiles in both the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq burnished their appeal Nevertheless until recently the symbolic and psychological power of ballistic missiles trumped LACMs superior efficiency and effectiveness As long as ballistic missiles were not seriously threatened by effective missile defenses they maintained this apparent advantage over cruise missiles no matter how problematic their true military utility proved to be

WE CONTROL UNIQUENESS ndash BALLISTIC MISSILES FAIL AT BIOWEAPON DELIVERY

Dickey 2000 (ldquoBiocruise A Contemporary Threatrdquo Michael E Lt Col USAF Air War College httpwwwauafmilauawcawcgatecpc-pubsdickeyhtm)

Dispersal of biological weapons via aerosolization of the agent using spray devices is the delivery method of choice While the agent could also be sprayed from a motor vehicle or boat such sprayers may not achieve the optimal downwind results or cover as wide an area On the other hand a crop duster type dispenser on an RPV or cruise missileUAV carrying BW munitions gravity bombs or spray attachments might be other methods of dispersal Delivery using explosives is probably the least efficient of all options since heat and blast effects may inactivate the biological agent Also delivery via ballistic missile may be ineffective since the speed and heat generated by the reentry vehicle or warhead could render biological weapons harmless Effective use of ballistic missiles with BW warheads is a technical challenge difficult to engineer Interestingly Iraq reportedly experimented in December 1990 and January 1991 on an unmanned aircraft which could deliver biological agent via spray nozzles and with a biological weapons spray tank developed from an aircraft drop tank Iraqi officials claimed to United Nations inspectors that the experiment did not work however UN inspectors found evidence the Iraqis had subsequently modified and stored three additional drop tanks Under favorable weather conditions with a properly sized aerosol dispersal system an aircraft cruise missile or UAV could deliver BW weapons and cause mass casualties in densely populated areas For example it has been calculated that 100kg of anthrax sprayed over a 300 square kilometer area theoretically could cause up to 3 million deaths if the targeted population density is 3000 to 10000 per square kilometer The effects of each biological agent will be different however depending upon its resiliency to the environment An additional consideration in the type of agent employed is persistency While most biological agents are sensitive to heat oxidation and desiccation once stabilized through the freeze-drying process for effective weaponization their persistency is increased dramatically Notably live anthrax can be persistent on the ground for up to 40 years Obviously weaponization is entirely feasible

9


SUCCESSFUL NORTH KOREA BIOWEAPONS ATTACK GOES GLOBAL IN SIX WEEKS ndash WORSE THAN NUCLEAR WAR

Levy 07 (6-8-07 Janet Ellen The American Thinking ldquoThe Threat of Bioweaponsrdquo httpwwwamericanthinkercom200706the_threat_of_bioweaponshtml)

Immediately following 9-11 an anthrax attack originating from letters containing anthrax spores infected 22 people killing five After almost six years the case has not been solved Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed anthrax plague and botulism toxin and conducted extensive research on smallpox typhoid and cholera A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox a very closely related virus The researcher further reports that Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and possibly in the Sudan Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively rogue nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox anthrax plague botulinum tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers With the exception of smallpox which is exclusively a human host disease all of the other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic or can be transmitted to humans by other species Biological weapons are among the most dangerous in the world today and can be engineered and disseminated to achieve a more deadly result than a nuclear attack Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific location a biological attack with smallpox could infect multitudes of people across the globe With incubation periods of up to 17 days human disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure before diagnosable symptoms indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place Unlike any other type of weapon bioweapons such as smallpox can replicate and infect a chain of people over an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of release According to science writer and author of The Hot Zone Richard Preston If you took a gram of smallpox which is highly contagious and lethal and for which theres no vaccine available globally now and released it in the air and created about a hundred cases the chances are excellent that the virus would go global in six weeks as people moved from city to citythe death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millionsin scale thats like a nuclear war[1] More so than chemical and nuclear research bioweapons development programs lend themselves to stealth development They are difficult to detect can be conducted alongside legimate research on countermeasures sheltered in animal research facilities within sophisticated pharmaceutical corporations disguised as part of routine medical university studies or be a component of dual use technology development Detection is primarily through available intelligence information and location-specific biosensors that test for the presence of pathogens Biological weapons have many appealing qualities for warfare and their effects can be engineered and customized from a boutique of possibilities Offensive pathogens are inexpensive compared to conventional weapons and small quantities can produce disproportionate damage They have unlimited lethal potential as carriers and can continue to infect more people over time Bioweapons are easy to dispense through a variety of delivery systems from a missile an aerosol or a food product They can be placed into a state of dormancy to be activated at a later stage allowing for ease of storage Pathogens are not immediately detectable or identifiable due to varying incubation periods and can be rapidly deployed activated and impossible to trace The technology to develop biological agents is widely available for legitimate purposes and large quantities can be developed within days

10


ADVANTAGE FOUR IS THE UPPER TIER

JAPAN ALREADY HAS LOWER TIER MISSILE DEFENSE ndash KILLS YOUR DISAD UNIQUENESS ndash BUT US IS IN PROCESS OF DEPLOYING SM-3 BLOCK 2A UPPER TIER MISSILES BY 2014

Toki 09 (Masako project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies where she studies Japans nonproliferation and disarmament policy June 4 ldquoJapans Evolving Security Policies Along Came North Koreas Threatsrdquohttpwwwntiorge_researche3_japan_north_korea_threatshtml)

Japan has deployed a multi-layered missile defense system consisting of sea-based mid-course missile defense (the Aegis BMD system) and ground-based terminal phase systems (PAC-3) With the accelerated process PAC-3 installment in the Tokyo Metropolitan area was completed in March 2008 By March 2011 PAC-3 missiles will be deployed with 16 fire units around Japans major cities So far PAC-3 systems have been deployed in 7 sites [4] Moreover Japan conducted its first test-firing of the PAC-3 interceptor at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico on 17 September 2008 At the test Japans Air Self-Defense Force successfully shot down a mock ballistic missile[5] Aegis BMD features the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) a three-stage missile with a range of 1000 km that is said to be capable of intercepting missiles up to an altitude of 200 km or higher The SM-3 block I-A missile is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in outer space during mid-course flight and with Aegis BMD it can intercept a short to intermediate range ballistic missile A milestone in US-Japan missile defense cooperation occurred when Japan became the first country other than the United States to succeed in intercepting a mock missile with the Aegis system On 18 December 2007 a Japanese Aegis guided missile destroyer Kongo intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile target in space for the first time The flight test was conducted in cooperation with the United States Missile Defense agency[6] After the series of successful tests the failure of the second Aegis missile defense test off Kauai Hawaii in November 2008 however disappointed both US and Japanese missile defense proponents[7] Despite the mixed results Japans Ministry of Defense plans to deploy four Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with SM-3s by March 2011 The current Japanese missile defense system is designed to shoot down medium range missiles such as the Nodong within the range of 1000 km with the SM-3 Japan does not yet have the capability to intercept a Taepodong type missile of which the range is more than 6000 km However currently the Japanese and US governments are jointly developing an advanced version of the SM-3 Block II-A missile to improve its defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles such as the Taepodong The new SM-3 is scheduled to be available by 2014[8] Japan and the United States have been also discussing deployment of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) since 2005 Deployment of this system however is unlikely to happen before 2011-2012 due to financial constraints

11


CHINA IS OK WITH JAPANrsquoS LOWER TIER SYSTEMS ndash IT FEARS THE NEW US UPPER TIER SYSTEM ndash COULD DEFEND TAIWAN

NTI 07 [James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies ldquoChinas Opposition to US Missile Defense Programsrdquo Last Copyrighted 2007httpwwwntiorgdbchinamdposhtmChina27s20Opposition20to20TMD20in20Japan]

Chinas position on TMD is largely influenced by its profound mistrust of Japan which dates back to the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and atrocities committed during World War II Ambassador Sha has stated We are still suffering from our nightmare with Japan since the war These are a people who even deny the fact that there was something called the Nanking Massacre some of them feel it didnt happen at all So how can we have any confidence in a country like that21 Despite Chinas strong opposition to TMD cooperation with Japan PRC officials have indicated a willingness to accept deployment of lower-tier TMD in Japan China considers lower-tier theater missile defenses to be legitimate missile defenses since these systems have a limited footprint that can only protect small areas such as military bases and troop deployments from missile attacks22 Chinas concerns about Japans development of an upper-tier TMD system especially a sea-based one are based on the fear that such a system would also be capable of defending Taiwan in the event of a missile attack from the mainland The US Navys Theater Wide (NTW) system could be based in Japan but still be easily deployed near Taiwan According to a 1999 Pentagon report one Aegis cruiser equipped with the NTW system could defend all of Taiwan

12


SCENARIO ONE IS CHINA FIRST STRIKE

UPPER TIER DEFENSE THREATENS LOSS OF CHINESE ICBM DETERRENT ndash LEADERS FEAR US FIRST STRIKE

Zhang 05 (Hui Research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Universityrsquos John F Kennedy School of Government December ldquoActionReaction US Space Weaponization and Chinardquo httpwwwarmscontrolorgprint1943)

A Loss of Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Capability Many Chinese officials assume that China is the real target for US missile defense and space planning From Beijingrsquos perspective it is inconceivable that Washington would expend such massive resources on a system that would be purely defensive and aimed only at ldquoroguerdquo states As seen by Chinese leaders Chinarsquos own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a much more plausible target for US missile defenses[11] Chinese experts are concerned that even a limited missile defense system could neutralize Chinarsquos fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States ldquoIt is evident that the US [national missile defense] will seriously undermine the effectiveness of Chinarsquos limited nuclear capability from the first day of its deploymentrdquo said Ambassador Sha Zukang the former director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ldquoThis cannot but cause grave concerns to Chinardquo he said[12] Some Chinese fear that whether or not the US missile defenses are as effective as planned US decision-makers could act rashly and risk a disarming first strike once the system is operational Beijing is particularly concerned about the refusal of the United States unlike China to declare a no-first-use nuclear policy The Bush administrationrsquos 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) feeds these anxieties The NPR specifically mentions the possibility of using nuclear weapons during a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons The Pentagonrsquos draft Doctrine on Joint Nuclear Operations would maintain an aggressive nuclear posture including the possible use of nuclear weapons to pre-empt an adversaryrsquos attack with weapons of mass destruction and increasing the role of such weapons in regional (theater) nuclear operations[13] Thus some experts fret that the US policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons in combination with its missiles defenses and a lowered nuclear threshold could encourage Washington to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against China over Taiwan US plans for global force projection would pose another threat to China Some proposed space weapons such as common aero vehicles would be used to target hard and deeply buried as well as mobile targets Such weapons would pose a major threat to the nuclear arsenal of mobile ICBMs that China is in the process of developing Consequently China worries that the combination of future US space weapons and its missile defense system could subject China to political or strategic blackmail Such systems would give the United States much more freedom to intervene in Chinarsquos affairs including undermining Chinarsquos efforts at reunification with Taiwan This concern is enhanced by US moves in recent years to boost cooperation in research and development of advanced theater missile defense with Japan and potentially with Taiwan

13


CAUSES CHINA FIRST STRIKE ndash DOCTRINE ANALYSIS PROVES

Winn 08 (Jan 27th 2008 Patrick Winn Staff Writer httpwwwairforcetimescomnews20rategy_080121)

No principle is as routinely and uniformly emphasized in Chinese writings on the demands of high-technology local war as the need for the PLA to seize the initiative from the outset of a conflict Although official Chinese doctrine holds that at the strategic level China will never initiate a conflict Chinese military observers view seizing the initiative at the operational level to be an imperative if they hope to have any chance of success particularly against an adversary as potent as the United States As one Liberation Army Daily article argues ldquoin a high-tech local war a belligerent which adopts a passive defensive strategy and launches no offensive against the enemy is bound to fold its hands and await

destructionrdquo (Huang 1999 p 6) The risks of passively waiting for the enemy to complete deployment and buildup of forces are potentially devastating Once the US marshals its forces the PLA would find itself in an untenable position In the words of one Chinese analyst (Lu 1996) if [the PLA] just sits there and waits for the enemy to complete assembling its full array of troops Chinarsquos fighting potential will certainly be more severely jeopardized because the enemy will then be in a position to put its overall combat superiority to good use making it more difficult for China to win the war Moreover ldquofor the weaker party waiting for the enemy to deliver the first blow will have disastrous consequences and may even put it in a passive situation from which it will never be able to get outrdquo (Lu 1996) Chinese strategists recognize that attaining some degree of surprise may be necessary to effectively seize the initiative in a conflict with an adversary as powerful as the United States Indeed numerous Chinese strategists emphasize 1050574105057410505741050574 [achieving victory through surprise]

by striking at an unexpected time and in an unanticipated place12 In one recent internal volume (Wang and Zhang 2000 pp 108ndash110) Chinese military writers highlight the importance of surprise defining it and describing its potential results as follows Taking the enemy by surprise would catch it unprepared and cause confusion within and huge psychological pressure on the enemy and would help one win relatively large victories at relatively small costs [authorsrsquo translation] Wang and Zhang (2000 pp 108ndash110) further states that once surprise is achieved the PLA must exploit it decisively as quickly as possible Under modern conditions it is difficult to sustain surprise which can only exist at the beginning Therefore once surprise is achieved one must move quickly to exploit and expand the initial battle success so as not to let the enemy regain its footing from the confusion [authorsrsquo translation] How China will be able to conduct such operations in the face of the clear superiority the US military holds over Chinese forces remains a problem Chinese analysts express their concerns that surprise is becoming more difficult to achieve although they assess that it is still possible According to Wang and Zhang (2000 pp 108ndash110) disguising onersquos own intent well is an important element of taking the enemy by surprise The objective of disguising onersquos intent can be achieved through camouflage deception feint and under bad weather Although it has become more difficult to disguise onersquos intent under modern conditions modern campaign practice has proved that it is still possible to take the enemy by surprise through excellent stratagem smart camouflage deception feint and under bad weather conditions With developments in disguising technology and equipment it is particularly important to deceive and mislead the enemy by high-technology means so as to truly hide onersquos intent and achieve victory by taking the enemy by surprise [authorsrsquo translation] In terms of timing it is critical to strike before the superior adversary has a chance to initiate its own attack or when it is still deploying its forces and building up its strength According to one Chinese writer ldquothe enemy is most vulnerable during the early phase of the war when it is still

deploying troops and making operational preparationsrdquo (Lu 1996) Similarly the authors of a Chinese book on US military strategy (Pan and Sun 1994 p 238) view the deployment phase as a critical period of weakness for the United States In the opening stage it is impossible to rapidly transfer enormous forces to the battlefield Thus [the United States] is unable to establish superiority of forces and firepower and it is easy for the US military to be forced into a passive position from the start this could very possibly have an impact on the process and outcome of the conflict [authorsrsquo translation] To this end one possibility mentioned in an internal volume is using a military exercise as 10505741050574 [cover] for the

preparations that would precede an attack (Wang and Zhang 2000 p 330) This is the point at which the logic of preemptive attack begins to assert itself in Chinese writings A number of Chinese authors describe preemptive attack as a necessary and logical strategy for a less-advanced country to utilize against a more-powerful adversary If future wars will be decided largely by the outcome of the initial engagement or campaign attempting to take the initiative after hostilities have commenced seems a risky strategy particularly for the weaker side A quick strike prior to or quickly following the formal declaration of hostilities will disrupt US deployment of forces to

the region place the United States in a passive position and deliver a psychological shock to the United States and its allies As Lu (1996) argues this makes it imperative that China launch a preemptive strike by taking advantage of the window of opportunity present before the enemy acquires a high-tech edge or develops a full-fledged combat capability in the war zone Through a preemptive strike China can put good timing and geographical location and the support of the people to good use by making a series of offensive moves to destroy the enemyrsquos ability to deploy high-tech weapons and troops and limit its ability to acquire a high-tech edge in the war zone thus weakening its capacity to mount a powerful

offensive This is the only way to steer the course of the war in a direction favorable to China Iraqrsquos fate in the first Gulf War provided ample evidence to Chinese strategists of the perils of not seizing the initiative from the beginning of the conflict Many Chinese assessments of the first Gulf War argue that Iraq would have had a better chance of defeating the United States if it had launched a preemptive attack instead of waiting for the United States to deliver the first blow Chinese analysts assess that Iraq missed the opportunity to attack US and coalition forces while they were deploying to the region (Jiang 1997 pp 151ndash152) According to Lu (1996) in the Gulf War Iraq suffered from passive strategic guidance and overlooked the importance of seizing the initiative and launching a preemptive attack In doing so it missed a good opportunity to turn the war around and change its outcome For the PLA the US deployment phase represents a window of opportunity that can be exploited through preemptive attack Accordingly one Chinese analyst wrote the following (Lu 1996) an effective strategy by which the weaker party can overcome its more-powerful enemy is to take advantage of serious gaps in the deployment of forces by the enemy with a high-tech edge by launching a preemptive strike during the early phase of the war or in the preparations leading to the offensive In the words of another Chinese analyst (Li 1995 p 190) this lengthy period of war preparations undoubtedly provides an adversary with quite a few opportunities that it can exploit by launching a surprise attack or cutting off supply lines for instance causing the enemy to collapse without a battle because it is unable to receive supplies in a timely fashion [authorsrsquo translation]

14


SCENARIO TWO IS SPACE MILITARIZATION

JAPAN BMD MILITARIZES SPACES

Mitchell 01 [Gordon R Member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group on Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region Winter ldquoJapan-US Missile Defense Collaboration Rhetorically Delicious Deceptively Dangerousrdquohttpwwwpittedu~gordonmJPubsJapanTMDpdf]

Any clear-cut distinction between offensive and defense in the TMD context is hopelessly muddied when one realizes that plans for the NTW system include a substantial space component An elaborate network of space satellites (as well as spaceborne forces to protect them) would be essential features of any robust NTW system providing early warning data of enemy missile launches as well as tracking information designed to guide SM-3 interceptors to their targets in mid-flight It is instructive to note that politically powerful missile defense proponents such as US Senator Bob ldquoSpacemanrdquo Smith (R-NH) envision NTW integrated into an overall space force that would pursue both defensive and offensive military missions49 We need to incorporate forward-deployed capabilities like the Navy Theater Wide program and the Air Force Airborne Laser as space-based missile defense programs to ensure [that] we can stop missiles in their boost phase dropping the debris fallout over our adversaryrsquos homes not ourshellip[S]pace offers ushellipthe prospect of inflicting violencemdashall with great precision and nearly instantaneously and often more cheaply With credible offensive and defensive space control we will deter our adversaries reassure our allies and guard our nationrsquos growing reliance on global commerce50 This full-throated call for a robust blend of offensive and defensive space weaponry reflects a strategic principle elucidated by Frank Barnaby when it comes to arming the heavens ldquoanti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-handrdquo51 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent ldquodual capabilityrdquo of spaceborne weapon components To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight such interceptors can also be used as orbiting ldquodeath starsrdquo capable of sending munitions hurtling through the earthrsquos atmosphere at dizzying velocities52 As Marc Vidricaire a member of the Canadian Delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament explains ldquoIf you want to intercept something in space you could use the same capability to target something on landrdquo53 Furthermore spaceborne BMD components can be used for offensive attacks in outer space itself where orbiting space assets belonging to adversaries could be targeted for destruction According to defense analyst James E Oberg ldquohellipthe benign defensive nature of a ballistic missile killer is not the only facet of such a systemmdashit also has inherent offensive capability against satellitesrdquo54

15


US WEAPONIZATION GUTS HEGEMONY AND RISKS NUCLEAR WAR ndash FIVE REASONS

1 SYMETRIC AND ASSYMETRIC BALANCING

2 CRIPPLES ALLIANCES

3 SPARKS COUNTERCOALITIONS

4 FOSTERS ARMS RACES AND INSTABILITY

5 ERODES TERRESTRIAL AND SPACE MILITARY ADVANTAGES

Deblois 03 (Bruce M Deblois Council on Foreign Relations ldquoThe Advent of Space Weaponsrdquo ASTROPOLITICS v 1 n 1 Spring 2003 p 43-45 pp 29-53)

The migration of weapons to space is likely to create more military problems for the host country than it will solve From a military perspective the price of localized and global instability coupled with incentives for pre-emption and escalation may well be a weakened military posture Global instability is the core issue in an

international context One countryrsquos pursuit and deployment of space weapons is destabilizing from the perspective of both foe and friend Weaponization could prompt adversaries to develop ASAT or space -based weapons In the extreme case a peer competitor might engage in an escalatory arms race Probably a greater threat however is dispersed low-level proliferation A number of countries are capable of building limited ASAT or

rudimentary space weapons and might choose to do so The wide proliferation of micro-satellites or other ASAT weapons would threaten all space assets due to the varying (and perhaps unpredictable) motivations of countries that could obtain them Those countries capable of posturing space weapons are generally those that have the most assets to lose in a space war The acquisition of such weapons might well present an irresistible first- strike opportunity for a country unlikely to win in a conventional conflict Other adversarial states especially those incapable of building space weapons or achieving parity in conventional forces might increase their efforts to acquire nuclear biological or chemical weapons or pursue other asymmetric activities (eg terrorism) Beyond adversarial responses allies and partners abroad might also react unfavorably Any unilateral decision to weaponize space might have negative consequences for diplomatic relationships worldwide The European Union has been a consistent and vocal critic and as validated by multiple resolutions in the UN regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) reflects the opinions of the larger international community In response to proposed US tests of its mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) an official from the European Space Agency commented lsquoThe world space community is confused as to the need for the US to develop space weaponry now and is dismayed that the US is planning to test a high-powered laser against a satellite targetrsquo Although it is unlikely that weapons in

space would threaten or sever strong existing diplomatic ties simple unpopularity might prompt a shift in the international center of gravity Countries opposing or alienated by one statesrsquo space policy might gravitate to other alignments possibly creating an international coalition to oppose the space-weaponizing country on these and other issues within international organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO) A decision to posture weapons in space might also diminish the ability of the space-weaponizing country to assemble international coalitions In the case of the United

States such international political clout has been crucially important to the military political judicial and economic conduct of the war on terrorism These forms of diplomatic influence might be more important than hard power in the maintenance of global stability in the twenty-first century 32 The simple unilateral posturing of space weapons creates global instability in the form of encouraging adversaries to respond symmetrically or asymmetrically heightening tensions while at the same time crippling alliances In this less stable global environment there is also the prospect of space weapons causing less stable regional environments Integrating space weapons into military operations could have unexpected consequences for the progression of conflict

situations prompting significant regional instability In most war games that include space assets commanders discover that preemptively destroying or denying

an opponentrsquos space-based assets with space weapons is appealing yet often leads to rapid escalation into full-scale war even triggering nuclear weapons use One commander commented lsquo[If] I donrsquot know whatrsquos going on I have no choice but to hit everything using everything I haversquo 33 That this conclusion surprised strategists suggests that the full implications of space weapons have not yet been fully explored What is common

knowledge derived from years of experience in futuristic war games is that permanently based space weapons invite pre- emption and escalation Local to a specific situation of heightened tensions the existence of space weapons on one side the other or both could be the determining catalyst for escalatory war In this view a space-weaponizing country creates both the powder keg of global instability (where it has weakened its own international posture) as well as the spark of regional instability (where it has made itself a target of pre- emption and escalation) Coupled with this very unstable environment it can

16


also be argued that the same country that weaponizes space may actually damage its own military power Much of the impetus behind space weaponization stems from perceived military utility to include national missile defense applications for boost-phase intercept time-critical targeting and defense mechanisms for critical space systems Ironically the posturing of more military assets in space could actually weaken the military posture of those that seek further military advantage in that domain Space assets are already a center of gravity (CoG) or at least a critical concentration of military force enhancement assets To deploy more systems in space in an attempt to protect this CoG only complicates the problem In spite of the added defenses the preponderance of threats will remain denial and deception electronic warfare (eg uplink and downlink jamming) ground facilities disruption micro-satellites (eg space mines) direct ascent interceptors or even a nuclear detonation in space 34 In addition to limited utility to defeat these threats the new space-based weapon systems would also be vulnerable to those same threats There are more logical alternatives many of which de-emphasize reliance on centralized space assets (eg alternatives offering redundancy in space or with terrestrial systems) In a briefing to the George Washington Universityrsquos Space Policy Institute Workshop Dr Karl Mueller of RAND summarized a comprehensive set of responses to foreign space threats that do not require space-based weapons (igure 4) In short for the countries that could weaponize space doing so would only amplify an extant and vulnerable CoG and they would do so in the midst of many better and less costly alternatives Perhaps more significant than extending the space CoG (ie making it more vulnerable) is exposing it (ie revealing it) A move toward space weapons is likely to prompt competitors to build ASAT systems systems that will also threaten robust communications intelligence gathering systems that to date have been protected by an open-skies environment Additionally it could be strongly argued that the countries currently able to posture space weapons are those that currently hold military advantages

in many other realms and this begs the question why would powers that currently hold military advantage in the air land and sea realms open a new realm in space that could conceivably level the playing field for others The posturing of weapons in space by a country capable of doing so will extend and expose a military CoG space-based military force enhancement 36 As a result the militarily weakened and more vulnerable space-weaponizing state would simultaneously posture space forces that invite pre-emption and escalation in a globally unstable environment it created From the military effectiveness perspective alone lsquonon-sensersquo may be too weak a term more to the point for a state to posture weapons in space is lsquocounter-sensersquo

17


MIRVS CAUSE SINO-CHINA WAR ndash ENABLES FIRST STRIKE UNDERMINES STRATEGIC STABILITY

Fravel and Medeiros 10 (Taylor Professor of Political Science Senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation until August 2009 and is currently the director for China Taiwan and Mongolian Affairs at the National Security Council Chinarsquos Search for Assured Retaliation The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure Fall International Security Muse)

Looking forward this situation suggests that two aspects of modernization should be monitored as they might signal a change in Chinarsquos nuclear posture First in response to missile defense programs in the United States and other countries the Second Artillery is researching and developing a variety of technologies to defeat such systems including maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) decoys chaff jamming thermal shielding and ASAT weapons131 If deployed MaRV and MIRV warheads could affect Chinarsquos strategic relationships with other nuclear powers by increasing the options available to China for using its nuclear weapons including providing it with additional options against smaller nuclear powers such as India This shift could undermine strategic stability in Chinarsquos relationships with India and Russia because MIRVrsquod missiles in particular have a first-strike potential Arming the silo-based missiles such as the DF-5 with MIRVrsquod warheads might also further undermine crisis stability by presenting a potentially vulnerable target for an opponentrsquos first strike against China132

CHINA AND INDIA ARE ON THE BRINK ndash TIBET CHINA SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN CANCELING OF DEFENSE TALKS PROVE

The Economist 12-16 (ldquopushing backrdquo httpwwweconomistcomnode17732947)

Ms Rao was responding to the ambassadorrsquos dark warning that criticism of China during a rare visit by Wen Jiabao the prime minister to India between December 15th and 17th could threaten ldquofragilerdquo bilateral ties He added that these would be ldquodifficult to repairrdquo if broken Indiarsquos leaders are not in a mood to listen In Delhi a few hundred Tibetans were left to demonstrate against Mr Wen as he arrived More striking the Dalai Lama their spiritual leader embarked at the same time on an eight-day trip to Sikkim a north-eastern state on the border with Chinese-run Tibet That excursion like one last year to Arunachal PradeshmdashIndian territory claimed by China as ldquosouth Tibetrdquomdashseemed designed to arouse Chinese ire China has certainly been doing its bit to provoke the ire of the Indians It reportedly sent several thousand soldiers to parts of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir this year to build roads for its ldquoall-weatherrdquo ally It has denied visas (other than ones stapled to passports) to Indian Kashmiris and to a general responsible for Kashmir a hint that it might not respect Indian control of the territory India has responded by suspending regular bilateral defence meetings But Omar Abdullah the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir suggests going further ldquoWhy should India have a one-China policy when China doesnrsquot have a one-India policyrdquo he asks ldquoWhat if we started stapling passports from Tibetrdquo Though this is never likely to be adopted as policy by the government in Delhi the very suggestion would make China furious The Indiansrsquo increasingly strong ties with America are bolstering their confidence in dealing with China President Barack Obama visited Delhi a month ago and earned much goodwill by offering hearty support for Indiarsquos bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council (China is distinctly lukewarm) This cosying up between India and America makes China all the more prickly

2


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