brahma sutra notes by sadananda

Message 5875 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Aug 14, 2000 9:47amSubject: Notes on Brahmasuutra I -

NOTES ON BRAHMASUTRA-1

shR^iti smR^iti puraaNaanaam aalayam karuNaalayam.h | namaami bhagavat paada.n sha~Nkara.n lokasha~Nkaram.h ||

My humble prostrations to Shri Shankara Bhagavatpaada who is the veryabode (for the study) of the Vedas, the Bhagavad Gita and Puranas andwho is the very source of compassion and auspiciousness for the world.

Preface

The purpose of these notes is primarily for my own learning. If it helpsothers in the process, it is due to His blessings. Any discussions,comments and criticisms on the topics are most welcome, since it helps thestated objective. I intend to present first my understanding ofBrahmasutras based on Shankara Bhashya. These notes closely follow theteachings of the sutras by H.H. Swami Paramarthananda of Madras. Myhumble prostrations at his holy feet. Shri Swamiji was a graduate ofSandeepany Sadhanalaya of Chinmaya Mission, and studied under SwamiChinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. He has been teaching for many years invarious parts of Madras City. I had the privilege of attending hislectures when I was in Madras on my sabbatical. After discussing the firstfour sutras based on Advaitic interpretation, it is my intention toexamine the other interpretations, particularly from Vishisht-advaita andDvaita points of view. Emphasis will be specifically on their primaryobjections to Advaita doctrine and on the examination of the validity oftheir objections. In this connection, I had the benefit of helping ShriGururaj, who was well known in Madhva community as former Pejavar Juniormathadhipati, Shri Vishwavijaya Tirtha, in translating the condensedversion of Nyaya Sudha of Shri Jayatirtha of Madhva Tradition.

I am a student of Science and Vedanta, and therefore I do not claim myselfto be an expert in Brahmasutra or Advaita Vedanta. If the learned membersfind errors in the contents or in the logic, I will be grateful if theseare brought to my notice. If alternate interpretations are possible, thoseare also welcome. Editorial corrections in terms of English and in typingare also appreciated. As Shri Gummuluru Murthy pointed recently that itis difficult to translate some of the technical Sanskrit words intoEnglish; the meaning will not be exact. Hence initially both Sanskrit andEnglish words are used with the hope that readers will get familiar withthe Sanskrit words. Later mostly Sanskrit words will be used. This is notto discourage those who are not familiar but to encourage them to becomefamiliar with the words since in the final analysis one gains betterunderstanding of the subject. This being a serious subject one cannot justread and expect to understand. It has to be studied. Because ofunfamiliarity of the words it may not be clear in the first reading, butthe second and third readings should help. As the time permits, I intendto post one lecture a week, giving enough time for discussions andassimilation. As we proceed, many of the doubts get cleared slowly. Acommitment or 'shraddhaa' is always essential to gain any knowledge and moreso for Brahmavidya.

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I. Introduction

I.1. Prasthana-trayam

Brahmasutra forms one of the three basic texts of Hinduism or morecorrectly to be called 'Sanatana Dharma'. The three basic texts arecalled 'prasthaana-trayam'- the three pillars of Vedanta. They are shRîtiprasthaanam, smRîti prasthaanam, and nyaaya prasthaanam. The Upanishads oruttaramiima.nsaa forms the shRîti prasthaanam, Bhagavad Geeta is the smRîtiprasthaanam, and Brahmasutra is the nyaaya prasthaanam. Brahmasutradiscusses the essence of Upanishads or Vedanta in a concise form. Itestablishes the coherency or consistency in the Upanishads and shows thatthe central theme of the Upanishads is related to the nature of Brahman.Hence the sutras are called Brahmasutras. It is also called Nyayaprasthanam since it uses nyaaya or logic to establish the superiority ofVedanta over other philosophies. It is not necessary to study Brahmasutrato understand Vedanta. For most of the seekers, the study of basicUpanishads and Bhagavad Gita is sufficient. Only if one wants tounderstand the intricate logic involved and wants to appreciate the logicalsoundness of Vedanta over other systems of philosophy, one needs to studyBrahmasutra. The sutras being in a concise form, they need to bestudied through bhaashhya-s. There are many bhaashhya-s by manyaachaarya-s each reinforcing their philosophy using Brahmasutras. Thereare commentaries on the Bhashyas and commentaries on these commentaries.Thus it is a very vast mushrooming literature, and it is very easy to getlost in these studies. Hence it is advisable to study sutras under ateacher.

1.2 DarshhaNa-s

Human beings are different from animals in the sense that they are endowedwith intellect, what is commonly called as 'conceptual thought'. There isa famous shloka that says:

aahaara nidraa bhaya maithuna.n cha saamaanyam etat pashubhiH naraaNaam.h | buddhirhi teshhaam adhiko visheshhaH buddhyaa vihiinaaH pashhubhiH samaanaaH ||

Hunger for food, sleep, fear for security, and desire for progeny arecommon for both animals and human beings. Only one thing that is specialfor human is the intellect. If intellect is not there (or if it is notused properly), then man is not different from animals.

Because the human being is endowed with such an intellect (buddhi), birthas a human being is glorified in our scriptures. Because of the intellect,the man is given a choice to accentuate his evolution to a state ofGod-hood. To accomplish that Vedanta insists that contemplation isessential for evolution and contemplation involves application of theintellect.

Because of the gift of this rational intellect, man cannot but inquire intothe cause for an observed phenomenon. For example he begins to question:who is he? Wherefrom he came and what is the cause for his birth? What isdeath and what happens after one dies? What is this Universe? Wherefrom itcame or what is its cause? What is life and what is its purpose? Why thereis so much suffering in life? How to get over this suffering? These aresome of the questions that an intellect cannot but ask at one time or another. In fact one can formulate six topics of inquiry that a seriousstudent of life can pursue. In Vedantic terminology these are related to:



1. Who is Jiva -or who is or what is an individual?2. What is this Jagat, world?3. Who is Ishwara or what is the cause of these two - the source for jivaand the world?4. What is bandhana or bondage, which is the cause for human suffering, orsa.nsaara?5. What is the nature of Moksha or Mukti or Freedom from this bondage orLiberation from the human suffering?6. What is the means or Sadhana for liberation, or means for a person to gofrom bondage to liberation or what is the link between the bandha andmoksha?

The six topics are related to jiiva, jagat, iishvara, bandha, moksha,saadhanaani (individual, the world, creator, bondage, liberation and meansfor liberation, respectively). A serious thinker of life cannot but thinkdeeply and come to a consistent or self-consistent explanation for these.A consistent and logical view or a teaching arrived at by a serious thinkerregarding these six topics is called 'darshanam' or a Philosophy, and onewho founds such a philosophy is called 'daarshhanika'. Because of theconsistent and philosophical approach to life, there are always others whowant to follow these daarshanika-s. Thus a daarshanika becomes apreceptor and propagator of his philosophy, darshanam. In India there aretwelve such well known 'darshana -s', of which six are called 'naastikadarshana -s' and the other six are 'aastika darshana -s' The former arethose systems which do not accept Veda as pramaaNa, or means of knowledge.Hence they rely mostly on 'pratyaksham' or direct perception and'anumaana' or inference or reasoning as the means of knowledge. Incontrast 'aastika darshana -s' are those that accept Veda as the valid orreliable source of knowledge.

The six naastika darshana -s are as follows: The first one is called'chaarvaaka darshanam' or materialism. The source of this philosophy issaid to be bRîhaspati, who is the deva guru. The original purpose of thisphilosophy was to mislead the demons so that they can be destroyed. Thefirst disciple of bRîhaspati is said to be chaarvaaka (meaning the one whospeaks very sweetly), and because of that he could popularize thismaterialistic philosophy. This philosophy does not accept - Veda-s, soulor aatmaa, re-birth, heaven, hell, dharma or adharma- but it emphasizes thesense pleasures as the ultimate goal or the very purpose of life. Themodern science and technology may come close to this philosophy, since theexistence of a soul is not conceived, and consciousness is assumed to be atemporary product of matter. 'yaavat jiivet sukham jiivet |' 'R iNamkRîtvaa ghRîtam pibet.h |' Enjoy the life as long as you live - if you don'thave it, then borrow and enjoy - the American way. How about paying itback?- That is not important since it is the lenders problem and not ours.- How about heaven or hell? It says: 'bhasmii bhuutasya dehasya,punaraagamanam kutaH | Once the body is burned into ashes, where is thequestion of returning back and who has seen life after death? No one hasever come back and no one has seen any one coming back. Hence death is theend of life. They believe only 'kevala pratyaksha pramaaNa' -that is thedirect perception as the only means of knowledge. chaarvaaka darshanam isnot discussed in Brahmasutra, since it was not considered as worthdiscussing. But it is recognized that materialism was not new and wasprevalent in those days along with theistic philosophies.

The second is Jaina darshanam. It is given by 24 aachaaryaa-s calledTiirthaa~Nkaara-s, beginning from Rîshhabha deva ending with vardhamaanamahaaviira. Vardhamana Mahavira is also called Jina -meaning one who



has conquered himself. He is responsible for the wide popularity of thisdarshanam and hence is called Jaina matam or Jainism. Jainism has twobranches; shwetaambara and digambara. There is no differences in theirphilosophies but only differences in their practices. Philosophicalaspects of Jainism are discussed and refuted in Brahmasutra.

The third is Bouddha darshanam or Buddhism, founder being Buddha who wasSiddhartha before he became Buddha. Buddha did not teach systematicallyany system of philosophy. He only had various dialogues with hisdisciples. Hence initially Buddhism was not well developed. But later,the teachings of Buddha were collected into three books called tripiTakam(three baskets), during the specially called assemblies of Buddhists called'Sangha-s'. The three are: suutra (sutta) piTakam , abhidharma (abhidamma)piTakam and vinaya piTakam. suutra piTakam deals with the statements ofBuddha in a simple form. abhidamma piTakam deals with philosophy, which isbased on the statements of Buddha and third one deals with the Code ofConduct or aachaara. Later on, Buddhism gave birth to four branches: 1.soutraantika, which is based on sutta piTakam. 2. vaibhaashhika, based onthe commentary of abhidamma piTakam known as vibhaashha. 3. yogaachaara -got its name due to its emphasis on the practice of Yoga and aachaara. 4.maadhyamika, since they claim to follow the true teachings of Buddha whichis called 'golden middle path' which is moderation or avoidance ofextremes. All of these philosophies are analyzed and criticized inBrahmasutra. Thus there are four from Buddhism, one Jainism and onechaarvaaka - total six 'naastika darshanam-s'.

There are six 'aastika darshanam-s': 1. Saa~Nkhya of Kapila muni 2. Yoga ofPatanjali 3. Nyaya of Gautama 4. Vaisheshika of Kanada 5.puurvamiimaa.nsaa of Jaimini and 6. uttaramiimaa.nsaa of Vyasa. All of themaccept Veda pramaaNam. Even though all of them accept Veda as pramaaNa(valid means of knowledge), three of them, Sankhya, Vaiseshika and Purvamimamsa do not accept Brahman. Of these six, the first four give moreimportance to tarka or reasoning. That is tarka is primary or pradhaanafor them while Veda is secondary or apradhaanam. In that sense, they aresimilar to naastika darshanam-s, which also give emphasis on tarka orreasoning. Shankara calls all of them, that give primary importance totarka over Veda, as taarkika-s. The last two darshanams give moreimportance to Veda and only secondary importance to tarka. Of this thepuurva miimaa.nsaa darshhaNam, as the name implies is based on puurva bhaagaor the first part of the Veda-s or on Karma Kanda of the Veda-s. For themthe Upanishad portion or the uttara bhaaga is of less importance orunimportant compared to karmakaanDa. In contrast in uttaramiimaa.nsaa, theimportance is to the last portion of Veda or Veda anta bhaaga - or vedauttara bhaaga. In this philosophy, veda puurva bhaaga or karma kaanDa isconsidered as supportive or only of secondary importance. One commonfeature of all these six darshanams is that all of them have beenpresented in the suutra form by their founders. uttaramiimaa.nsaa suutra-sare called Brahmasutras since they deal with Brahman. They are alsocalled as vedanta suutraas, shaariiraka suutraas (shaariiraka means aatmaa),vyaasa or baadaraayaNa suutraas.

About the author of Brahmasutra: The author is Badarayana. The authorsof bhaashhya-s identified him as none other than Vyasacharya, who is theeditor of Veda-s and the author of puraaNa-s including Mahabharata, whereBhagavad Gita is a part. There are some questions identifyingBadarayana with Veda Vyasa since Mahabharata is considered asprehistoric while Brahmasutra-s must have been composed after Buddhismbecame prevalent. But from the point of our discussion the true identityof the author is immaterial, and we accept bhaashhyakaara's identification of



the author with Veda Vaasa.

What is a suutra? Sutra is a very brief statement packed with an idea. Itis the most concise statement possible to express a given idea, like amathematical equation. It will not be a complete sentence. Hence a simpletranslation of the suutra will not make any sense to the novice. Thereforemany commentaries exist explaining the suutra-s and they are calledbhaashhyam-s. Since the statements are brief, there is always a possibilityfor some ambiguity or doubt regarding the intention of the original author.Hence different bhaashhya-s have come for different types of teachings,each claiming that their bhaashhyam represents the intended meaning of theauthor of the suutra-s or suutrakaara. Thus Brahmasutra-s themselves gavebirth to more than ten types of philosophies. Of these three are verypopular. One is the nirvisheshha advaitam that is Brahman withoutattributes, by Shankara, popularly known as shaariiraka miimaa.nsaabhaashhyam, next is vishishhTaadvaitam by Ramanuja and his commentary iscalled shriibhaashhyam, and the third one is dwaitam based on commentarydue to Madhvacharya called anuvyaakhyaana. We will consider here onlyShankara bhaashhyam.

I.3. A Brief out line of Brahmasutras

Brahmasutras consists of four adhyaaya-s or chapters. Each adhyaaya issubdivided into four sections, called paada-s. Each paada or section isdivided into topics known as adhikaraNam. There are in total 191 or 192adhikaraNam-s depending on how suutra-s are divided. The number ofadhikaraNam-s or topics in each section varies and is not constant. Mostof the adhikaraNam-s are related to the analysis of the statements in theUpanishads, especially the ten important or dasha upanishad-s. EachadhikaraNam contain sutra-s, number of sutra-s varying from one to many.Thus we have in Brahmasutra, adhyaaya (chapter), paada (section),adhikaraNa (topic) and suutra. There are 555 sutras in total.

Broadly there are four adhyaayas or chapters each with a major theme fordiscussion. The first chapter is called samanvaya adhyaaya. Approximatelyit means 'consistency'. Thus in the first chapter, Vyasacharya isestablishing consistency or samanvaya as the proof or hetu indicating thatthe central theme of the Upanishads is Brahman. Vyasacharya has toprove this, since some of the other darshana-s (especially saa~Nkhya andpuurvamiima.nsaa) do not accept Brahman as the central theme of Vedanta. Thesecond adhyaaya deals with avirodha, noncontradiction. That is, it showsthat Brahmavidya is free from all contradictions, since any contradictionis recognized as a defect in teaching. Hence in this chapter Vyasa pointsout that Brahmavidya is free from defects. He shows that all the threetypes of contradictions are not there. First is the internalcontradiction, 'paraspara virodhaH', is not there within the Upanishads.That is the Vedic statements do not contradict one another. The secondcontradiction is with smR^iti. And he shows there is no contradictory withstatements from smR^iti. And the third one is no contradiction with logic.That is it is not illogical. Hence the second chapter is heavily logicallybased. The third chapter is based on saadhanaa and is calledsaadhanaadhyaaya, discussion of the means for attaining Brahman. Thesesaadhana-s include both that are directly related and those that areindirectly related, such as rituals, upaasanaa-s, values etc., which are notthe direct means but means for the purification of the mind. The fourthchapter is phala adhyaayaH, discussion of the benefits of Brahmavidya andthat is mukti or moksha. The types of mukti are also discussed thatinvolve immediate liberation and delayed liberation, krama mukti.



1.4 Some Definitions:

The definition of three important words, suutram, bhaashhyam and adhikaraNamare given below:

suutram or aphorism is generally defined as:

alpa aksharam asandigdham saaravat vishhvatomukham.h | astobham anavadhya.n cha suutram suutravido viduH ||

The statement is believed to be from padmapuraaNam.The definition says sutra has to be -Alpa aksharam - very concise - very briefasandigdham - clear without being vague or unambiguous (at least after thecommentary)saaravat - should be pregnant with the meaning - with essentialsvishvatomukham - having many meanings or many facets if possible.astobham - Since it is logical science it should be free fromglorification or praise since praise does not involve any logic andsometime no limit alsoanavadhyam - faultless or defectless - that is free from two defects - 1.shabda doshha and 2. arthadoshha, that is free from grammatical mistakesand logical mistakes.

Sutra literally means a 'thread'. For Brahmasutra, each suutra- servesas a thread, threading upanishhadic statements which form beads constitutingdifferent topics, adhikaraNas, presenting a coherent darshanam orphilosophy. Shankara says in his introduction - vedaanta vaakya kusumagrathana arthatvaat suutraaNaam - Vedantic statements are like flowers - butthe flowers are not arranged but randomly spread - but Vyasacharya hascollected, rearranged and tied them beautifully through suutra-s to presentas a beautiful garland and that is the garland of Vedanta Shastra.

The definition for bhaashhyam:

suutra artho varNyate yatra vaakyaiH suutra anusaaribhiH | swapadaani cha varNyante bhaashhyam bhaashhya vido viduH ||

The commentary should explain every word in the suutra and in the orderthat is occurring in the sutra itself. One cannot rearrange the words.The commentator may introduce extra technical words, then he has to explainwhy those words and meaning of those words- swapadaani cha - suchcommentary is called bhaashhyam.

Definition for adhikaraNam:

vishhayaH sa.nshayaH cha eva puurva-pakshastatottaram.h | sa~NgatiH cha iti pa~nchaa~Nga.n shaastra adhikaraNam smR^itam.h ||

A topic should consists of five aspects:1. vishhayaH - subject matter - Generally about the idea taken from thestatements from dasha upanishad-s - is it Brahman or jiiva etc.2. sa.nshayaH - What is the doubt in that statement or if there are severaloptions available what is the most relevant among these - (if there is nodoubt, there is no need for further discussion - whatever is self evidentneed not be inquired into).3. puurva-pakshaH - the views of non-vedantins or other daarshanika-s withtheir reasoning.4. siddhaantaH - the Vedantic conclusion which need to be established by



refuting logically all other views and also showing that vedanticconclusion is free from logical defects - hence Brahmasutra is callednyaaya-suutra since every statement should be supported by logic.5. sa~NgatiH - the connection between the two consecutive topics.Every topic should consist of all these five topics. Shankara brings outthese five aspects with every sutra.

With this background we discuss next Shankaracharya's introduction toBrahmasutra. This is called 'adhyaasa bhaashhyam' which Shankaraintroduces as the basis for his philosophy of nirvisheshha advaita before hebegins his suutra-bhaashhya. But before we discuss the adhyaasa, we willfirst discuss the nature of 'anumaana' or logical inference, since this isextensively used in all bhaashhyam-s and in scientific investigations aswell.

End of Introduction

Message 5952 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Aug 21, 2000 9:56amSubject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA - II

Notes on Brahmasutra-II

2. anumaana prakaraNam

Brahmasutra being nyaaya prasthaanam uses nyaaya or logic to establish theteachings of the upanishads. The word nyaaya sometimes is translated asyukti, tarka or logic, and is technically called anumaana or inference.Since anumaana will be used extensively in the analysis of Brahmasutra,one should have a clear idea of what anumaanam is or inference means orwhat it involves.

2.1 pramaaNa - Means of knowledge

pramaa means valid knowledge and pramaaNa means valid means of knowledge.In contrast to this, there is bhramaa, meaning illusory knowledge.Understanding of the nature of pramaaNa becomes important in Vedanta. Thescience of knowledge and means of knowledge and the errors in knowledge,etc., constitute the Science of epistemology. The knowledge ofepistemology helps to understand the ontological aspects, that is thereality of the objects. Our philosophers have done extensive analysis ofpramaa and bhramaa. Its importance can be recognized in Vedanta, since itaddresses what is real and what is unreal. For example, if I want to knowthe Brahman, I need a proper means to know Him, as He is not directlyvisible or whatever is that is directly visible cannot be Him. It becomesimportant then to know whether the knowledge that I have gained is pramaa,valid, or bhramaa, invalid, or the means for gaining that knowledge,pramaaNa, is appropriate for the task or not. This requires an analysis orunderstanding of the source and types of errors that can occur in theknowledge to make sure the means of knowledge to know Brahman iserror-free. A student of science, for example, learns first about the'parallax error' before he starts correctly measuring the dimensions of anobject. Without that understanding and without applying that understandingin his measurements, his length measurements could be erroneous. Hence theneed to study the right means of knowledge, more so for Brahmavidya, whichis beyond the human comprehension. In the final analysis a validknowledge, pramaa, is the one that can not negated by subsequent



investigations.

There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramaaNa - They arepratyaksha, anumaana, arthaapatti, upamaana, anupalabdhi and shabda. Somephilosophers reduce these to three, pratyaksha, anumaana and shabda. Theother three are considered as parts of anumaana itself. pratyaksha is thedirect perception, particularly through sense organs, the five senses andsometime mind is included as the sixth, since mind can imagine things fromthe past or project things into future which are not directly perceivablein the present place or time. Each sense organ is very specific - eyes aremeans only to see form and color of an object but not to hear sounds fromthe object. Likewise each of the indriya-s function within their field ofoperation. Thus we make a general rule that each pramaaNa is very specificto its field of operation. That which cannot be directly perceived bypratyaksha can be inferred. Hence anumaana becomes an important source ofknowledge for objects that cannot be directly perceived. That which isbeyond sense input and that which cannot be logically inferred, can only belearned through shabda pramaaNa. An example is the knowledge of heaven or

hell. shabda includes shaastra, science or scriptures and sometimes aaptavaakya, statements of the trustworthy. For sanaatana dharma, shruti, whichare Veda-s, form the main or ultimate source of shabda pramaaNa. It isbelieved that Veda-s being apaurushheya (not authored by humans), they arefree from the defects associated with human authorship. In a generalsense, one can say that they are revelations to the sages who are incontemplation who assimilated them and passed them on to their disciples byword of mouth. Thus they are handed down through generations 'intact'and they are called shruti since they are learned by hearing to theteacher, who heard from his teacher, thus a guru-paramparaa. Brahmasutrarelies heavily on anumaana, inference and shabda pramaaNa. We will discusshere a few aspects of anumaana. We may note here that Brahmasutra is notapaurushheya, that is, it is authored by human, that is sage Badarayana topresent the coherent theme contained in the shruti. It is still an opinionof an author who is well versed in the scriptures and hence cannot be asvalid pramaaNa as the shruti on which it is based. Even when Krishnateaches Bhagavad Gita, He refers to the fact that the teaching is not newbut is what the sages have declared in the shrutis - 'R^ishhibhiH bahudhaagiitam ..'. pramaaNa therefore is a valid means of knowledge and forbrahmavidyaa, shaastras or shabda pramaaNa becomes an ultimate means ofknowledge.

2.2 anumaana pramaaNa:

If one has to infer something, he should have some basis for inference orshould have some valid data to make some conclusions. The data is gathereddirectly or indirectly using pratyaksham or direct perception. One cannever make of an inference without collecting or relying on perceptualdata. (One can use inductive reasoning but for that reasoning to be valid,it requires subsequent confirmation by perceptual data). If inference ismade without collecting or without having supportive data, the inferencecan only be a speculation or imagination. Such a speculative inferencecannot be valid. For example if one wants to infer the age of a moon, hecannot look at the moon and estimate the age of the moon. He can trulyestimate the age only by anumaana or inference. For that he needs tocollect the requisite data - such as rocks from the moon and study usingcarbon dating etc. Using such a valid data one can infer the age of themoon. However, without any data and by looking at the moon if oneestimates the age of the moon, then it will only be called a speculationand not inference. Therefore for any anumaana or inference to be valid,



perceptual data is essential.

2.3 Factors involved in anumaana

In tarka shaastra, the anumaana has been extensively studied. Based onthis we conclude that at least four essential factors are involved in anyanumaana. They are as follows: 1. paksha, 2. saadhya, 3. hetu, and 4.dRîshhTaanta. Taking a famous example of the inference of a fire on themountain by seeing the smoke on the mountain, one can express this inanumaana vaakyam or an inferential statement as

"parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase" 'Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky, just as in the kitchen'

In this parvataH or mountain is said to be paksha. The saadhyam isagnimaan - that is the mountain is fiery. The hetu is that it is smokyor dhuumavatvaat. Finally dRîshhTanta is mahaanase, just as in thekitchen. Thus the total statement is 'mountain is fiery, because it issmoky, just as in the case of kitchen'.

Mountain is said to be paksha, because it is the locus of the discussion.Mountain is the topic of the discussion and not the fire per se. Why thediscussion about the mountain? - because there is a dispute whether themountain is fiery or not. The locus of dispute is therefore not thefieriness but the mountain, and the topic of discussion is whether thelocus of discussion, the mountain, is fiery or not. Therefore paksha isalways the locus of discussion or debate. From this debate, someconclusion has to be arrived at. The paksha has to be visible or known,otherwise it cannot be a matter of dispute - hence mountain has to beperceptible or known. The dispute is not about whether the mountain existsor not, but whether the existing or perceptible mountain is fiery or not.The fieriness of the mountain (the mountain having fire) is not perceptibleand hence the dispute. If the fieriness of the mountain is perceptible thenthere is no dispute at all, and anumaana does not enter into picture.Hence mountain is perceptible but its fieriness is non-perceptible. Sinceperceptual method is of no use to establish that the mountain is fiery, weneed an inferential method. Since mountain is visible but not itsfieriness, paksha is always partially visible. We are not proving thevisible part but proving only the invisible part, that is the fieriness ofthe mountain, which is invisible. Using a technical language, the dharmii(mountain) is visible but its dharma (fieriness) is not visible.

saadhyam is that the mountain is fiery or it has fire. This conclusion isnot perceptually available or directly provable. Hence saadhyam is always'apratyaksham', while paksha is always partially pratyaksham. hetu isdhuumavatvaat - the mountain is smoky. To be more precise, one cannot justsay 'smoke' is the reason or hetu, because if the smoke is somewhere else,one cannot infer that the mountain has fire. One cannot infer thatmountain is fiery because there is smoke in the kitchen. Then it is thekitchen that is fiery and not the mountain. Hence one cannot say merelysmoke is the hetu. The correct statement is smoke in the mountain is thehetu or smokiness of the mountain is the hetu just as the fieriness of themountain is the saadhyam. The hetu, the smokiness of the mountain, ispratyaksham or perceptible. Thus of the three, paksha and hetu arepratyaksha and saadhyam is apratyaksha, invisible.

Next is the example or dRîshhTaanta, just as in this case of the kitchen,



where the smoke and the fire are together. Therefore dRîshhTaanta must besuch that one has the experience of both smoke and fire together - to beprecise, they should have invariable concomitance with each other. ThusdRîshhTaanta provides an example, which both speaker and the listener arefamiliar, to show that the fire invariably exists with the smoke. It isnot the other way around that smoke invariably exists with the fire. Weshould have at least one example to show the invariable concomitance of firewith the smoke. The current example shows whenever there is smoke in thekitchen there is fire and that is the dRîshhTaanta.

Thus to make inference, one requires a basic knowledge of the concomitantrelationship between hetu and saaddhya which is gathered throughperception. Here the basis of the knowledge that one should have, is theinvariable coexistence of smoke along with fire. That is, wherever thereis smoke there is fire. This relationship becomes fundamental for theinference. Thus 'yatra yatra dhuumaH, tatra tatra agniH' that is 'whereverthere is smoke there is fire' - this knowledge is called vyaapti j~naanam.This invariable coexistence of fire and smoke is called vyaapti. Itconsists of two factors vyaapyam and vyaapakam - 'yatra yatra dhuumaH' iscalled vyaapyam and 'tatra tatra agniH' is called vyaapakam. Hence yatrayatra vyaapyam tatra tatra vyaapakam. The coexistence of vyaapyam withvyaapakam is called vyaapti and that knowledge is vyaapti j~naanam.

Thus in the operation of inference there are two statements - anumaanavaakyam and vyaapti vaakyam. These are, 'parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaatyathaa mahanase' and 'yatra yatra dhumaH tatra tatra agniH', respectively.The vyaapyam, dhuumaH, in the vyaapti vaakyam becomes hetu in the anumaanavaakyam and vyaapakam in the vyaapti vaakyam becomes saadhyam in theanumaana vaakyam. Hence vyaapti vaakyam can be rephrased as 'yatra yatrahetuH tatra tatra saadhyam'. Only when this statement or vyaapti vaakyam isproved, then only the anumaana vaakyam is valid. vyaapti vaakyam, forexample 'where there is smoke there is fire, can be validated only byperception. Once the vyaapti vaakyam is validated, that can be used tovalidate the anumaana vaakyam. This is the basis used even in scientificinvestigations. hetu, the observed data such as the study of the rocks ofthe moon, helps a scientist to arrive at the saadhya, the age of the moon.Hence anumaana or inference is always based on valid or perceptual data.

2.4 Limitation of Scientific Logic

Another important aspect, which is always taken for granted in scientificinvestigations, is the conclusion or inference can only be made about aspecific object if the hetu or the perceptible data is gathered from thatobject or entity. For example, one cannot make conclusion about Mars ifthe collected data is from the moon. One can speculate about Mars, butinference is valid only for the moon since data is from the moon. Itappears to be a common sense statement, but is a fundamental requirementfor a valid anumaana, and many a time people argue without realizing thatthey are violating this simple common sense. Thus loci of the data andinference should pertain to the same object or paksha. If they aredifferent then that anumaana is illogical or unscientific or speculative atbest. Thus hetu and saadhyam must belong to the same paksha. We can statethis niyama or rule as 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam'.

From this we reach an important conclusion. Scientist collects data fromthe observed universe. Thus all the data that is collected, or can becollected, are from 'anaatma' or perceptible universe. The data can rangefrom as small as sub-atomic particles to as huge as the clusters ofgalaxies, but all belong to 'anaatma'. Hence paksha for all scientific



investigations is 'anaatma' or perceptible universe. One cannot collectdata from aatma - since we know from scriptures that aatma is 'ashabdamasparsham aruupam avyayam tathaa rasam nityam agandham ..' - aatma isessentially unobservable. Hence all the observed data deal with'anaatmaa'. Hence if scientific reasoning is used, all the scientificconclusions can only be about 'anaatma' and not about 'aatma'. Thus wereach an important conclusion that using scientific observations one cannot arrive at any conclusions about 'aatma' because of the followingniyama or rule that 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam'. Hence theentire scientific reasoning is called 'laukika anumaanam', dealing with'anaatma j~naanam' or 'aparaa vidyaa' alone. Thus 'laukika anumaana has noaccess to 'aatma-vidyaa'. The Upanishads declare, 'naishhaa tarkeNamatiraapaneya' - don't hope to arrive at aatma j~naanam through thescientific process of reasoning or anumaanam or logic because it has noaccess. It is similar to trying to 'hear' through the 'eyes'. It amountsto abuse or misuse of the pramaaNam. In Brahmasutra itself there issuutra to establish this - 'tarkasya apratishhThaanaat' that is tarka orlogic can never finally prove anything with regard to aatmaa.

2.3. shaastriiya anumana

Then question is how or where anumaana or logic is used by shaastram - whatis the shaastriiya anumaanam which is used in Brahmasutra that isdifferent from laukika anumaanam or scientific reasoning? laukikaanumaanam is based on the perceptual based data. For any anumaana 'validdata' is important and based on which inference can be made. Thereforeshaastriiya anumaanam also involves data collection. The differencebetween laukika and shaastriiya or alaukika is only with reference to thesource of the data. Scientific observations or laukika data are importantfor laukika anumaanam. For shaastriiya anumaana, since we are dealing withaatmaa, we cannot collect data from anaatmaa, that is, through observationsor by perception. The data can only be collected from shaastram itself.Therefore it is shaastra based data collection. Hence all shaastriiyaanumaanam-s used in Brahmasutra are based on the data collected fromshaastram only.

Implication of this is that we must first accept that shaastram is themeans for collecting the data required for shaastriiya anumaanam, just as ascientist accepts the observations as a means for collecting data forlaukika anumaanam. Once a scientist accepts the observations are correct,he does not question anymore the validity of the data, he only questionsthe conclusions that can be arrived at using the data. Sometimes differenttheories are put forth to explain the same data. The theories can beincorrect but not the observations. This statement becomes little bitshaky as we go into quantum mechanics. Even the scientists are beginningto question now the validity of the perceptual data to gain the knowledgeof the universe - 'do I see because there is a thing or is there a thingbecause I see' - akin to the questions raised in Advaita concerning thecreation in terms of sRîshhTi-dRîshhTi or dRîshhTi-sRîshTi.

When it comes to shaastra anumaana, all the aastika darshana-s haveaccepted that shaastra is a valid source for collecting data, which cannotbe disputed. Just as in scientific inference, what one can dispute is theconclusion arrived at from the data but not about the data itself.Advaita, Vishishtadvaita and Dvaita are conclusions arrived at based onthe shaastric statements - one can question these conclusions but not theshaastric statements since they are accepted as valid data, thereforecannot be questioned. Without valid data no anumaana can have a basis.One can have speculations or beliefs without data, but for anumaanam valid



data are essential. Since for shaastriiya anumaanam the hetu is based onshaastram, that requires a basic assumption that one must be 'aastika',that is accept shaastra as valid means of knowledge. For a 'naastika'person, that is those who do not accept that shaastra is a valid means ofknowledge or pramaaNa, Brahmasutra which is based on shaastriiya anumaanais of no use.

2.4 Where laukika anumaana is used on shaastra-s?

This does not mean laukika anumaana or perception based reasoning is notthere in Brahmasutra. The application of it is different. laukikaanumaana or scientific reasoning is used not to establish Vedanta becauseof the above stated objections. laukika anumaanam can not prove Vedanticteaching since laukika anumaana deals with data from anaatma and Vedanticteaching is related to aatma. It is equally important to recognize thatlaukika anumaana cannot disprove Vedantic teaching either since it is notaccessible to laukika anumaanam. But some philosophers, particularlynaastika daarshanika-s used laukika anumaanam to disprove Vedanta. It isimmediately clear from the above understanding that they have used laukikaanumaana wrongly in trying to disprove Vedanta. That implies that there issome fallacy in their inference when they use laukika anumaana which isbased on anaatma to disprove alaukika vishhayam or entity. In saadhanapa~nchakam Shankara says:

vaakyaarthashca vichaaryataam shrutishiraH pakshaH samaashriiyataam.h | dustarkaat suviramyataam shrutimataH tarko.anusandhiiyataam.h | |

Use of laukika anumaanam in Vedantic field, Shankara calls it as dus tarkaHor shushhka tarkaH. The proper tarka or reasonings should be scripturaldata based.

Therefore a Vedantin uses lukika anumaana only to show the fallacy of thelaukika anumaana used by other philosophers. Thus Brahmasutra useslaukika anumaanam not to prove Vedanta but to disprove other philosophiesthat use laukika anumaana in their arguments against Vedanta. Thus laukikaanumaana is used in Brahmasutra not to prove Vedanta is logical but toprove Vedanta is not illogical. The truth is Vedanta is neither logicalnor illogical, it is beyond the realm of logic.

There is a second use for laukika anumaanam. The philosophers of thenaastika darshanams, since they do not believe in the shaastra, use thelaukika anumaana to arrive at the truth of the aatmaa or the truth of theworld. A Vedantin wants to establish that the truth can never be arrivedat using laukika anumaana. To accomplish that he uses similar laukikaanumaana to disprove or dismiss all the conclusions of the naastikadaarshanika-s. This is because shaastriiya anumaana cannot be used fornaastika-s as they do not accept shaastra as the pramaaNa. Hence Vedantinuses laukika anumaana to disprove all the naastika philosophies. Thuslimitations of laukika anumaana or scientific reasoning should beunderstood when applied to Vedantic knowledge. It is said that

achintyaaH khalu ye bhaavaaH na taa.nstarkena yojayet.h | apratishhThita tarkeNa kastiirNassa.nshayaambudhim ||

In the creation there are many things which are beyond logic and science.To expect everything to fall within the scientific logic is to showshortsightedness. Every scientist must be humble enough to understand thatthere are things which are beyond the scope of science. Hence one should



not apply the scientific logic to those that are beyond logic. There canbe always a person who has superior intellect and who can provide a logicsuperior to a previous one. Hence by using the logic improperly(apratishhTita tarkeNa) no one has solved or gone beyond the ocean ofdoubts. That is, the problem can never be resolved beyond any doubt.

Hence limitation of scientific logic or laukika anumaanam in Brahmavidyashould be understood. It is used in Brahmasutra only to establish thatVedanta is not illogical and to disprove all the naastika systems ofphilosophies such as Jainism, Buddhism etc., which do not accept thevalidity of Veda as pramaaNa, but never to establish the validity ofVedanta philosophy, per sec. Vedantic conclusions are arrived at usingonly shaastriiya anumana or alaukika anumaana.

End of anumaana prakriyaa.

From the next topic on we will dive into Shankara Bhaasya starting withadhyaasa bhaashhya which forms an introduction to his bhaashhya.

Questions on Notes II:

These questions are for those who are studying the Brahmasutra along withme on the internet.

Try to answer the following questions without seeing the notes to checkyour understanding. After answering go back and study the notes to crosscheck your answers.

1. What are pramaa, bhramaa, and pramaaNa? What are the six pramaaNas?

2. What are the four factors needed in any anumaana pramaaNa?

3. Among the four factors what comes under pratyaksha and what underapratyaksha? Where does paksha belong?

4. What is a vyaapti vaakyam and what is its role in anumaana?

5. What does the statement 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam' means?How does that establish that scientific logic has no access to Brahmavidya?

6. Where exactly then laukika anumaana used in Brahmasutra?

This ends the anumaana prakaraNam.Message 6073 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Tue Aug 29, 2000 2:26pmSubject: Notes on Brahmasutra - IIIa

Notes on Brahmasutra -IIIa

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h | asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is ever



auspicious and with Bhagavan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to my own teacher.

vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/- maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h | shrii chinmaayaananda guro praNiitaM sadaa bhaje.aham tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection, who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity, who is the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayananda, to his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.----------------- adhyaasa bhaashhyam.h .

(The topic is presented in three parts - because it is quite long and also it helps to assimilate the subject providing enough time for discussions. I know some people are preserving in a file to study later. But I can guarantee that if you do not have the commitment to study now the probability that you will study later is almost zero. One needs to study couple of times before the concepts and the definitions become clear. The first three notes are very important since subsequent topics will relay heavily on the definitions and concepts discussed in these.)

Shri Shankara bhaashhyam popularly known as shaariirika miimaa.nsaa bhaashhyam starts with Shankara's introduction called adhyaasa bhaashhyam. Bhagavan Shankara gives a great importance to adhyaasa since that is the basis of the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta and his interpretation of Brahmasutra. As with all bhaashhyam-s, every bhaashhyakaara or author of bhaashhyam claims that his interpretation is close to the meaning of what was intended by Shri Baadarayana. We should recognize at the outset that the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta does not depend on the validation of its concepts by Brahmasutra-s. It rests squarely on the mahaavaakya-s, the four aphoristic statements, one in each of the four Veda-s; praGYaanambrahma (consciousness is Brahman), tat tvam asi (that thou art), aham brahmaasmi ( I am Brahman) and ayam aatmaa brahma (this self is Brahman). What Shankara shows is that Brahmasutra is compatible with the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta. With the advent of science in the twentieth century and with the development of relativistic and quantum mechanics, scientists vision of the Universe is coming more close to the precepts of Advaita Vedanta.

For a saadhak or seeker, it is important to have a very clear understanding of the nature of the problem so that one can seek the solution that is appropriate to solve the problem. Hence mind should be doubt-free, in terms of the goal and the path. For this one needs to reflect deeply (mananam) to insure that there are no traces of doubts about the goal and the means. Constant study of scriptures and contemplation on their meaning and applications of that to one's own situation are all the steps recommended to have a clear vision. In that sense Shankara Bhashya helps to provide a necessary means to launch oneself into the contemplation of the reality. While the study of Brahmasutra is helpful but it is not necessary, since as mentioned before Adviata Vedanta does not rely on the sutra-s for its validation. With this understanding we now enter into adhyaasa bhaashhyam.

3.1 What is adhyaasa and what is its importance?

Before entering into the discussion of Brahmasutra, Shankara provides an introduction, describing the adhyaasa aspect of Advaita Vedanta. adhyaasa



means an error or a mistake. In this bhaashhyam Shankaracharya establishes the central cause for sa.nsaara or human suffering, and it is due to adhyaasa or a mistake or an error. Once Shankara proves that sa.nsaara is due to an error or adhyaasa, then removal of sa.nsaara should be related to the removal of the error or adhyaasa nivR^itti. When the error is gone, then the error-caused problems also disappear. If it is proved that sa.nsaara is due to an error, naturally the question arises why there is an error or how did the error arise? Errors can arise because of different reasons. For example, when I do not know and I still act, I commit a mistake or an error. Even if I do not know that I do not know, I still commit a mistake. For example, lack of knowledge of the required language skills can be the cause of some of the errors in these notes. Here the lack of knowledge or ignorance is the cause. Sometimes even if I know, I still can make mistakes as in the typographical errors in these notes. Here too, if one analyzes carefully, the error is due to non-awareness or ignorance as the basic problem, since I am not conscious of what I am typing in relation to what I want to type. Errors can also arise if the instruments of knowledge are defective, like if I am, say, color blind or if there is insufficient illumination. In all these cases I am still ignorant of the truth and more importantly I take the false as real. Sometimes there is a double jeopardy since I not only take false as real but also real as false. In all these commissions, there is always a price I have to pay for committing an error. Thus there is always some suffering associated with it. If the error is not there, the associated suffering will also be not there. Thus fundamentally the root cause for all errors is lack of appropriate knowledge. Hence any error arises because of ignorance or aGYaanam. Therefore aGYaanam causes adhyaasa, error, and adhyaasa causes sa.nsaara, suffering. For sa.nsaara to go, adhyaasa should go, for adhyaasa to go aGYaanam should go, and for aGYaanam to go knowledge should come. Hence Shankara says in Vivekachudamani,

na yogena na saa~Nkhyena karmaNaa no na vidyayaa |bramhaatmaaikatva bodhena mokshasiddhyati naanyathaa ||

One can do anything or follow anything - yoga, sankhya, karma, bhakti, direct path, straight path, curvilinear path etc. Through these process one cannot gain Moksha. They may be useful in gaining the saadhanaa chatushhTayam, the four-fold qualifications, which help to gain the requisite knowledge. But to gain Moksha, the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and aatmaaa alone is required. Otherwise even if all others are present, there is no liberation. Because the bondage is an error-based or due to adhyaasa, and adhyaasa can only be removed when ignorance goes, and ignorance goes only when the knowledge comes. In support of this we have declarations: 'na anyaaH panthaaH ayanaaya vidyate', 'gataasuuna gataasuu.nscha na anushochanti paNDitaaH' - those who have gained the knowledge do not grieve for those who have gone and for those in the process of going'. And therefore 'athaato brahma jiGYyaasaa' - to gain that knowledge only, this inquiry into the nature of Brahman. This is the essence of the adhyaasa bhaashhyam. Now the details follow.

3.2 Example of adhyaasa:

For conveying this concept of adhyaasa in Vedanta a well known example is taken as illustrated by Shri Goudapada in his Mandukya karika:

anishchitaa yathaa rajjuH andhakaare vikalpitaa | sarpadhaaraadibhiH bhaavaiH tadvadaatmaaa vikalpitaH ||

meaning, when there is a rope in front of us which is not clearly visible



then there is a mistake of a snake or a stream of water. Similarly aatmaaa is mistaken for something other than aatmaaa. Hence a snake perception on a rope is an error or adhyaasa. rajju sarpa buddhiH - on the rope the notion of a snake.

When does the error takes place? If the rope is completely not seen when it is pitch dark, then no error takes place, and there is no fear of a snake. Hence it is said that 'ignorance is a bliss', as in deep sleep. In total ignorance, there is no error. Similarly in total knowledge also there is no error, since one can see clearly the rope. There is no fear of snake and hence knowledge is also bliss, as with a wise man. Only when there is a partial light or when the eyes are partially defective, the error can occur. When there is a partial light, then we know there is something in front of us. Thus we have some partial knowledge. But what is that something we don't know. That there is something is called 'saamaanya GYaanam' or partial knowledge. That part of the rope (that is the 'thingness' that exists) is called 'saamaanya a.nsha' (general existent part). The saamaanya a.nsha is not covered by darkness since we know that something exists there. Hence it is also called 'anaavRîta a.nsha' (uncovered part). Since the existence of something is real, it is also called 'satya a.nsha' or real part.

Since light is dull, that the existent thing is 'a rope' - that aspect is covered, which is the particular feature of the existent object. The 'ropeness' of the object is covered, which is the specific feature of that object. This specific feature of the object, that is the 'ropeness', is called 'visheshha a.nsha' also 'aavRita a.nsha' or covered part. 'There is a rope' is a fact or real. Of this total fact, one part is covered and another part is not covered. Of the total statement, 'there is a rope', 'there is' -, that part (saamaanya a.nsha) of the knowledge is not covered and ' a rope' - that part (visheshha a.nsha) is covered. When the visheshha a.nsha is covered, the mind projects with another visheshha a.nsha - which is 'a snake'. Hence 'snakeness' is the replaced visheshha a.nsha in the place of 'ropeness'. We are not replacing saamaanya a.nsha or satya a.nsha or real part but we are replacing only the visheshha a.nsha, a particular part, with a snake which is mithyaa or anRîtam or not real.

Thus when we say 'there is a snake' it consists of two parts - saamaanya a.nsha, which is real and visheshha a.nsha which is unreal or anRîtam. Therefore in every error there is satya saamaanya a.nsha and mithyaa visheshha a.nsha. The unreal particular feature is there only because the real particular feature (visheshha a.nsha - the ropeness) is covered. When the light is shown, the true knowledge of the object takes place and we say now 'there is a rope'. The previous saamaanya a.nsha, 'there is' or the real part still remains. Only the previous visheshha a.nsha, the snakeness, which is not real is replaced by the other visheshha a.nsha (ropeness), which happens to be also real. When we say it is replaced, it is not that the snake is now replaced by the rope. Where did the snake go? - the snake was never there to go anywhere. But in the mind of the perceiver who says 'there is a snake', the snake was very much alive and it was a very frightening experience for him. The frightening experience that includes rapid heart beating, blood pressure rising and sweating are all as much real as the snake, for the one who sees the snake. He runs away to avoid the snakebite and that running away is real too. Can the false snake cause so much of havoc? False snake cannot cause any problem if one knows that it is false. Since it is a real snake in the mind of the perceiver, the perceived suffering is equally real in his mind. Thus relative to his state of mind, the snake is real. Only from the point of wise man, snake is mithyaa (for the time being we translate it is unreal) while rope is real.



The snake appears to be real from the point of the perceiver, and is unreal from the point of the wise man. Thus off-hand there appear to be two realities, one from the point of the perceiver who sees the thing as a snake and the other from the point of the wise man who sees the thing as a rope. One is relatively real (vyaavahaarika satya) and the other is absolutely real (paaramaarthika satya). Thus relative realities depend on from whose reference we are discussing the issue. Most of the confusion in discussions arises when we inadvertently switch the reference states without realizing it. The discussion of real and unreal so far is from the point of a perceiver. But from the point of the object, it was rope all the time. It was just an innocent rope lying in semi dark alley, without realizing that it is the subject of so much discussion from Goudapada on! It was rope before any one saw, it is a rope when people are mistaking it as a snake and it will remain as rope even when a torch light was shown on it. Rope never became a snake causing problems for the people. But people saw it as a snake and got frightened. Who created a snake out of a rope? Can we say ignorance created a snake out of the rope? Both questions will sound as ridiculous since there was never a snake where the rope is, for it to be called a created entity. But yet for the person who is perceiving a snake, there is indeed a snake where the rope is. But when we ask him later why he saw the snake there when it is a rope, his only answer is - I didn't know it was a rope. From his point, ignorance of the rope is the cause for the snake creation in his mind. These concepts need to be clearly understood when we apply it to reality of the world, concept of creation and what is the adhishhThaanam or substratum for the creation or the world etc.

Now when the light is shown, the reality of the object gets revealed by itself, since it is real, and the unreality disappears by itself since it is unreal. The correction is not in the saamaanya a.nsha but only in the visheshha a.nsha. When this correction takes place in the visheshha a.nsha, the fear caused by that unreal snake is also gone. The fears and tribulations are all related to the visheshha a.nsha, which is unreal and not to the saamaanya a.nsha, which is real. Thus when the inquiry is done about the nature of the visheshha a.nsha using a valid means of inquiry, in this case, say a torch light, then the reality of the object in total is known. The method of inquiry should be appropriate since the error is due to ignorance of the visheshha a.nsha, the rope, because of the dim light. Hence the means should be such as to eliminate the ignorance by throwing light on the object. No amount of prayers, actions such as jumping up and down, or japa or meditation on the rope ' idam rajjuH, idam rajjuH', 'this is a rope, this is a rope' etc., will help reveal the rope in the place of a snake. Hence Shankara say in Vivekachudamani:

vadantu shaastraaNi yajantu devaan.h kurvantu karmaaNi bhajantu devataaH | aatmaaikya bodhena vinaa vimuktiH na sidhyati brahma shataantare.api ||

Let erudite scholars quote all the scriptures, let gods be invoked through endless sacrifices, let elaborate rituals be performed, let personal gods be propitiated. Yet, without the experience of one's identity with the self or self-knowledge, there shall be no liberation for the individual, even in the lifetime of a hundred Brahma-s put together.

The problem is centered on ignorance and the solution has to be an appropriate knowledge that removes that ignorance. If I don't know Chemistry no amount of the study of Psychology will help remove my ignorance of Chemistry. Knowledge of Chemistry alone removes the ignorance of Chemistry. Similarly the knowledge of oneself removes the ignorance



centered on the self. Hence discussion of any other paths is meaningless from the point of the stated problem - hence the shruti's declaration - na anyaH panthaa vidyate ayanaaya - no other path other than knowledge removes the sa.nsaara. Hence Shankara insistence on the understanding of the nature of the problem, i.e. adhyaasa.

Thus the problem itself will define the solution to that problem.

3.4. Role of adhyaasa in Vedanta:

Similar to the case of rope-snake case, when a person says 'aham sa.nsaarii' - 'I am a sa.nsaarii', Shankaracharya says here too there is a 'saamaanya a.nsha' and 'visheshha a.nsha'. "I am' in the above statement is the saamaanya a.nsha, which refers to 'a conscious being' - conscious corresponding to 'chit' and 'being' corresponding to 'sat'. It is anaavR^ita a.nsha or uncovered part and is also 'satya a.nsha', part that is real. In fact this part is never covered or eternally true and is self evident or ever evident or 'pratibodha viditam' or GYaanaswaruupam, of the nature of the knowledge. That is, I am not only conscious but also I am 'self-conscious' - and therefore require no means of knowledge, pramaaNa, to know that I exist. I know that I am there even when it is pitch dark outside. Hence this particular saamaanya a.nsha is never covered - in fact nothing can cover it!

In the above statement there is also a visheshha a.nsha, a particular part - 'asamsaarii', which is unreal like our snake. The unreal 'visheshha a.nsha' has come into existence only because of the covering of real visheshha a.nsha. Therefore covering as well as uncovering belongs only to 'visheshha a.nsha' and not to saamaanya a.nsha. What is that real visheshha a.nsha that is covered - Sat and Chit are evident in the saamaanya a.nsha. Then what is covered is aananda (bliss) a.nsha, or anantatva (unlimited) a.nsha, or puurNatva (complete) a.nsha or Brahmatva (infiniteness) a.nsha or in effect 'asamsaaritva a.nsha'. That is the visheshha a.nsha that is covered. In that place we have unreal visheshha a.nsha ' duHkhii, (miserable) or asampuurNaH (incomplete) or parichchhinnaH(limited) or sa.nsaarii'. Hence ' aham sa.nsaaari or jiivaH' is an error and is the cause for all the human suffering. Therefore to solve the problem of human suffering there is no need to change the real part (in fact one cannot change it) that is the saamaanya a.nsha, which is 'I am', but only remove the visheshha a.nsha called 'sa.nsaarii'. This has to be done by putting a 'torch light' to reveal the real visheshha a.nsha that 'aham asamsaarii' or 'aham Brahma asmi'. The torchlight is 'the Vedanta Knowledge' that is required to reveal the true visheshha a.nsha. 'aham asmi' is common both in the samsaarii state and in the realized state. In the sa.nsaarii state, I have knowledge only as ' aham sa.nsaarii asmi' , which is replaced by real knowledge, that 'aham Brahma asmi'. The change is taking place only in the visheshha a.nsha, anR^ita a.nsha or mithyaa a.nsha, the unreal part -just as the change is taking place from mithyaa 'snake' to real 'rope'. Hence 'I am the sa.nsaarii' notion goes away and is replaced by 'I am asa.nsaarii or puurNaH' knowledge comes and that is the aim of all the prasthaanatraya, Upanishads, Gita and Brahmasutra.

3.5 Examination of adhyaasa:

This adhyaasa or error can be defined differently by looking at it from different angles - As mentioned before the study of knowledge and error comes under the science of epistemology. There are differences of opinions about error (some may be erroneous too!) and these are called 'khyaati vaada' or analysis of errors. From the standpoint of rope, one can call it



as 'misapprehension' of rope - mistaking (missing the rope and taking the snake!) the rope is an error. In Sanskrit it is called 'anyathaa grahaNam or anyathaa khyaati'. The same error can be defined from the standpoint of snake also. From the point of snake error is 'superimposition of a snake', that is a non-existent snake is superimposed on the existing object. This is called 'adhyaaropa' or 'adhyaasa'. A third definition is both from the point of rope and snake. From this point an error is a combination or mixing of some parts of real rope and some parts of unreal snake. When we say 'there is a snake', in that 'there is'- belongs to rope, which is saamaanya a.nsha, which is real. Hence the statement ''there is a snake' involves a real saamaanya a.nsha and unreal visheshha a.nsha. Hence error involves mixing up of satyam, real, and asatyam or unreal or anRîtam. Hence error is defined as 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam' - mixing up of real and unreal. By the mixing up of the two entities, real and unreal, a third singular entity is created that involves parts of the real and part of the unreal. A fellow while seeing a rope says 'there is a snake'. While saying, he does not know that there are two entities, real and unreal, which he is mixing. The problem is, in principle, is inconsequential, but for the fact that he is having a real suffering as a consequence of the mistaken identity or the presence of unreal snake. From our point who knew the whole truth, he is mixing up of the two entities. From the mistaker point, he is not aware of the two things. In his cognition, there is only one entity but only on analysis we find that in his unitary perception there is a satya a.nsha and anRîta a.nsha. When he says 'the snake is frightening' - frightening part belongs to anRîta a.nsha, the snake, whereas the 'is' part belongs to the satya a.nsha, the rope. 'It is a long snake' - the length belongs to the rope and it is therefore satya a.nsha. "It is a poisonous snake' - the poisonous part belongs to snake which is anRîta a.nsha. ' It is a curved snake' - the curved part belongs to rope, hence satya a.nsha. Hence a peculiar mixture of some aspects which are satyam and some aspects which are anRîtam. He mixes them both to arrive at one unitary entity.

Similarly when a person says 'I am so and so' - he takes himself as one unitary entity but Shankara says there are two aspects mixed in that statement - a satya a.nsha and anRîta a.nsha, creating a jiiva who is miserable. When he says 'I am existent conscious being' - existent and conscious are from satya a.nsha. When he says 'I am a fat person' - fat person is anRîta a.nsha. Hence jiiva is neither pure aatmaaa nor pure anaatmaaaaa, it is a mixture of aatmaaa and anaatmaaaaa, satya and anRîta a.nsha. It is this mixed unitary entity, jiiva, is striving for liberation. This missing up is called 'error' called 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam.The purpose of Brahmasutra is to inquire into the nature of jiiva to discard the unreal part and to get established in the real part. In this process, the sa.nsaara which is associated with the unreal part gets dissolved and that is Moksha or liberation. This is the general background on adhyaasa.

3.6 Shankara's discussion of adhyaasa:

The discussion of Shankaracharya on adhyaasa bhaashhyam can be broadly classified into six subtopics: 1. adhyaasa sha~Nkaa (objections to the theory of error) 2. adhyaasa sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam (answering to the objections) 3. adhyaasa lakshaNam (the definition of error) 4. adhyaasa sambhaavanaa (showing the possibility of error) 5. adhyaasa pramaaNa (proof for adhyaasa) 6. adhyaasa upasa.nhaaraH (conclusion of the adhyaasa topic). For convenience, we take the third topic first, adhyaasa lakshaNam, the rest of the topics will be discussed in the order.

3.7 Definition or lakshaNa for adhyaasa:



Shankara gives two definitions for adhyaasa. An additional third definition is indirectly available and is often quoted. The first definition is:

'smRîti ruupaH, paratra puurva dRîshhTaavabhaasaH adhyaasaH' |

meaning 'the perception of a previously experienced object on a wrong locus' - In the rope-snake example, one is perceiving a snake - a snake which is already experienced before. A person who has never seen a snake will not mistake a rope for a snake. I am superimposing an experienced snake upon a wrong locus, which is a rope. This is called an error.

Second definition which is more popular and simpler and that is:'atasmin tat buddhiH' meaning 'perception of an object on a wrong locus' - The snake is seen on a wrong locus that is the rope. Or perception of silver on a shell.

The third indirect definition is what was discussed before 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam' - mixing up of real and unreal.

When I say 'I am the body' - the error is seeing the body on a wrong locus 'aatmaaa' which is not the body. I, the immortal, is seen as the mortal - I, the all pervading, is seen as the limited - This is the error.

This is the adhyaasa lakshaNam.

3.8 Objections to adhyaasa -adhyaasa sha~Nkaa:

The objections are raised by all other systems of philosophies, sankhya, yoga, vaiseshika etc., who claim that adhyaasa introduction is an improper introduction because aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa is impossible. Rope-snake adhyaasa is possible which can be accepted but not aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa. To establish that the puurvapakshii (the objector) gives the following reasons. Any superimposition like rope-snake superimposition requires four conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. Only if all the four conditions are fulfilled then this satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam can occur otherwise it is not possible. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa not a single one of the four conditions is satisfied. Hence the idea of adhyaasa is itself an adhyaasa or a mistake.

Let us illustrate the four conditions using the rope-snake example. First, the rope is a 'pratyaksha vishhaya', a directly perceivable object in front. Hence the first condition is 'pratyaksha vishhayatvam', an object which is directly perceivable in front. That is 'there is a rope in front', for anyone to mistake it as a snake. The second condition is that the rope should not be completely known. One should be ignorant of the fact that it is a rope. Hence the second condition is called 'aGYaatatvam', absence of the complete knowledge of the rope. The third condition is saadRîshyam - there should be a similarity between what I superimpose and what is there in front. I mistake the rope only as a snake but not as an elephant or monkey, because there is no saadRîshyam between rope and the elephant or monkey. The fourth condition is 'sa.nskaaram'. That is a false snake is superimposed because I had an experience of a real snake before which left the impression or vaasanaa in my mind. Because of that snake vaasanaa or 'sa.nskaara' alone I commit the mistake that the rope as a snake. If I have not experienced a real snake before then there is no question of mistaking the rope as a snake. Therefore the fourth condition is 'puurva anubhava janya sa.nskaaraH', a vaasanaa which is born out of the experience of a real snake before. Hence only when the four conditions, pratyaksha vishhayatvam,



aGYaatatvam, saadRîshyam and puurva sa.nskaara, are there, then one can have an error due to the superimposition or adhyaasa. If one applies this to aatmaa-anaatmaaaa case, none of the four conditions is fulfilled. Hence aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa is impossible.

Let us examine this in detail. The first condition is pratyaksha vishhayatvam - rope is clearly perceived as an object for the mistake to take place. In the case of aatmaaa, is it an object to be perceived in front to commit a mistake? aatmaaa is apratyakshaH, avishhayaH -it is imperceptible and also not an object - Thus it is not an object in front for any one to commit a mistake. Hence the first condition is not fulfilled. aatmaanaH apratyakshatvaat, a claim made by advaitin himself that aatmaa cannot be directly perceived, and that violates the first condition.

The second condition is aGYaatatvam, ignorance with regard to rope in the rope-snake example. But in the case of aatmaaa advaitin accepts that aatmaaa is svayaM prakaashaH(self evident or self-effulgent), nitya chaitanya swaruupaH (always conscious). Hence how can there be ignorance with regard to self-evident aatmaaa? nityopalabdha swaruupaH - swaya.n jyotiH -It is self-luminous or shines by itself - these are advaitin's own statements regarding aatmaaa. If that is the case, how can there be ignorance in that chaitanya swaruupa swam prakaashha aatmaaa, self-conscious, self-shining aatmaaa? Hence the second condition of aGYaatatvam is not fulfilled and hence no adhyaasa is possible.

The third condition is saadRîshyam, similarity. Between aatmaaa and anaatmaaaaa what similarity is there? They are diagonally opposite to one another in all features. aatmaaa is the subject and anaatmaaaaa is the object. aatmaaa is chetanam (conscious entity) and anaatmaaaaa is jaDam( inert), aatmaa is sarva gatam (all pervading) anaatmaaaaa is alpa gatam (limited in time and space), aatmaaa is nirguNam (attributeless) where as anaatmaaaaa is saguNam(with attributes) - In every aspect they are opposite. Shankara says in his bhaashhyam 'tamaH prakaashavat viruddha swabhaavayoH, vishhaya vishhayinoH, yushhmadashhmat pratyaya gocharayoH' - they are diagonally opposite to each other like light and darkness, one is object and the other is subject etc. Hence saadRîshyam or similarity is not at all there. Hence the third condition is not fulfilled.

The fourth condition is sa.nskaaraH - Advaitin claims anaatmaaaaa is unreal and aatmaaa is real - since it involves satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam - satya aatmaa and anRîta anaatmaaa are mixed up. In the case of snake the unreal snake is possible because we have experienced a real snake before. The sa.nskaara of real snake is there in the mind. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaaa superimposition, for the unreal anaatmaa to be superimposed on real aatmaa, we should have prior sa.nskaara or experience of real anaatmaa, that is, we should have experienced before a real anaatmaa. But advaitin himself claims that there is no real anaatmaa at all because aatmaa alone is real, which is one without a second. Therefore the sa.nskaara, the fourth condition is also not fulfilled. Since all the four conditions are not fulfilled the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is impossible. Hence the very foundation of Advaita Vedanta is on shaky grounds.

Thus according to puurvapakshii for adhyaasa to operate all the four conditions need to be satisfied - they are 1. pratyaksha vishhayatvam, 2. aGYaatatvam, 3. saadRîshyam, and 4. sa.nskaaraH. puurvapakshii, the objector shows while all the things are applicable to snake-rope case but none for aatmaa-anaatmaa case. Therefore aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is impossible and hence the whole theory of based on adhyaasa is wrong.

This ends the arguments of the puurvapakshii or an objector.



(A Note: We pause here for few days for us to think deeply - Is puurvapakshii or objector right in his arguments? If we are convinced of Advaita can we contour his arguments to show that adhyaasa is possible in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case? - what do you think? How do you address these objections? Can one argue that all the four requirements are met in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case as in the case of rope-snake example and therefore adhyaasa is applicable? Or is it the time now to switch our party and move to a different list? The ball is now in your court.)

Message 6139 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Sep 4, 2000 9:35pmSubject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUTRA-3B

Notes on Brahmasuutra-IIIB

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h | asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is ever auspicious and with Bhagavan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to my own teacher.

vaastalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/- maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h | shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiita.n sadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayananda, to his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.-------------------------------------------------------------------

dhyaasa bhaashhyam (continued)

(Note: Due to feed back I received so far, I am cutting down the length of the postings. Hence the adhyaasa part will be discussed in more than three parts. This may give more time for readers to think and discuss. If you have not voiced your opinion so far it is time to do that).

In the last notes we stopped with puurvapakshii's claims that aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is not possible even though rope-shake adhyaasa is possible. For adhyaasa involving 'satyaanR^ita mithuniikaraNam', mixing up of real and unreal entities, four conditions need to be satisfied, simultaneously. All the four conditions are satisfied for the rope-snake case but none are fulfilled for the aatmaa-anaatmaa case. They are pratyaksha vishhayatvam, aGYaatatvam, saadR^ishyam and sa.nskaaram. (The reader is referred back to Notes IIIa for details). Since none of the four conditions are satisfied, aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is not possible, and the concept of adhyaasa is wrong. Since adhyaasa is the foundation for Advaita Vedanta, the whole philosophy is on shaky grounds. This is the objector's contention.

3.9 adhyaasa sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam and sambhaavanaa (Response to the objections and showing the possibility for adhyaasa)



Of the six topics of adhyaasa stated above (see section 3-6), we have covered two topics, adhyaasa lakshaNa and adhyaasa sha~Nkaa. The next two topics of adhyaasa; sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam and adhyaasa sambhaavanaa are very similar. Hence they will be discussed together in the following.

Shankaracharya has to address the objections with regard to each of the four conditions stated by puurvapakshii or the objector.

The first condition is that the thing that is mistaken should be 'pratyaksha vishhaya' - should be an object perceived in front. For that Shankara's answer is that the condition to be fulfilled is not exactly the same as stated by the puurvapakshii, or the objector. The first condition needs to be modified slightly since it was presented incorrectly by puurvapakshii. For a mistake to take place an object must be evident, or it should be a known object since an unknown object cannot be mistaken. I cannot make a mistake about 'gaagaabuubuu', since I do not know what that 'gaagaabuubuu' is. Hence it should be a known object or an evident object, but need not be an object in front, as puurvapakshii claims. There is no need for an object to be in front for it to be mistaken. It is sufficient if it is a known object. From the point of aatmaa, it is not an object in front, but still as the subject aatmaa is evident enough for one to commit the mistake. Hence the first condition should be restated as that it should be evident and not pratyaksha vishhaya, as the puurvapakshii claims. It should be an evident 'vishhaya' and need not be 'pratyaksha vishhaya' and aatmaa fulfils the modified requirement. Therefore the first condition should be restated as 'prakaashhamaanatvam', or a known existent entity and not 'pratyaksha vishhayatvam'. Then the modified first condition is fulfilled both in the case of rope-snake and in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa. Hence adhyaasa is possible.

The second condition is aGYaatatvam - that is it should be not known - that rope is not known - Rope is partially known as an object present but it is not fully known as a rope. Existence of a rope as an object is known, but the 'ropeness' of the existing object is unknown. Partial ignorance is the second requirement - it is 'aa.nshika aGYaatatvam' that is partial ignorance and not 'puurNa aGYaatatvam', complete ignorance. We claim in the case of aatmaa also it is partially known and partially unknown, and therefore the second condition is completely fulfilled. The aatmaa is partially known as 'aham asmi', that is 'I exist'. Whenever a person says 'I am' - the sat (am) and chit (I) of aatmaa is evident but not fully known as 'aham brahma asmi' or 'aham aanandaH asmi', I am the totality or I am bliss. Thus sat and chit are known but anantatvam, my infinite nature is not known; 'aham aanandaH', I am bliss, is not known. What is the proof for this? - Everybody's bio-data speaks for itself in proof of this. Everyone introduces himself as ' I am this or that' etc., where 'I am', the subject corresponding to sat and chit, and 'this and that' being an object with a limited qualification - apuurNatva - proving that one is ignorant of oneself. Because of the existence of this self-ignorance only Upanishads are coming to our rescue to teach us our true nature. In Chandogya Upanishad there is a statement, 'aatmavit shokam tarati' - 'the knower of the self crosses the sorrow' - From these it is very clear that a sa.nsaarii, who is always engulfed in sorrow, does not have self-knowledge. Hence self-ignorance is there. This is everybody's personal experience. Hence the second condition that there should be partial knowledge and partial aGYaatatvam is fulfilled. That is the requirement of aa.nshhika aGYaatatvam, partial ignorance is fulfilled.

Third condition is 'saadR^ishyam', similarity, should be there between the



'adhishhThaanam' that is the rope and the superimposed snake. For this objection, the advaitin's answer is that the similarity is a general condition, which always need not be fulfilled for adhyaasa to occur. There are exceptions to this condition. For example, the general rule is the creator, intelligent cause (nimitta kaaraNa) is different from the material for creation (upaadaana kaaraNa). That is the pot maker (nimitta kaaraNa) is different from the clay (upaadaana kaaraNa). But there are exceptions to this general rule - for example a dreamer creating his dream world, a spider creating its web, ultimately the Ishwara creating this world. Similarly 'saadRîshyam' or similarity is a general condition but it is not an invariable necessity or compulsory condition. And adhyaasa is possible without having 'saadRîshyam' or similarity. aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa comes under this category of exceptions. Hence the third rule is not applicable here.

Why saadRîshyam is not a compulsory requirement? Because we do have cases where error or adhyaasa takes place without any similarity or saadRîshyam. Shankaracharya gives an example - 'apratyakshetiH aakaashe baalaaH talamalinataadi adhyasyanti' - To illustrate this take the example of the blue sky or blue space - the blue sky, is it an error or knowledge? We know that the sky is niruupam or without any color or form. When we say it is a blue sky, we are superimposing blueness upon the colorless sky. Not only the blueness but the sky seems to look like a vessel turned upside down (due to horizons) - the concavity of the space (talatvam) and its niilatvam (blueness) and also malinatvam (space pollution) are all falsely superimposed on space. When such an error or adhyaasa takes place what kind of saadRîshyam or similarity one can attribute between aakaasha or space and the superimposed blueness or pollution or concavity? In fact aakaasha is never similar to anything else - there is beautiful statement to this effect in Ramayana.

Gagana.n gaganaakaara.n saagaram saagaropamam.h | raama raavaNayor yuddha.n raama raavaNayoriva ||

There are no other similar things to compare, for space other than with the space, ocean other than with the ocean and similarly the Rama-Ravaa war other than with Rama-Raavaa war.

Therefore aakaasha is not similar to anything and therefore no saadRîshyam' is possible. However aakaasha adhyaasa is every body's experience. Thus adhyaasa seems to take place even with out having a similar object and therefore the third condition saadRîshyam is not compulsory. In the rope-snake case, it is applicable but in the case of blue sky or aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa it is not applicable. Hence the third condition for aatmaa-anaatmaa case is invalid.

The forth condition of the puurvapakshii is related to the mixing up of satya and asatya or anRîta vishhaya. Such a mixing up is possible as in the case of rope-snake case if one has prior experience of real snake before. That is prior sa.nskaara of the real snake exists in the mind for one to project it on the rope in front. Thus a false snake is possible due to experience of a real snake before. Such sa.nskaara is not possible for aatmaa-anaatmaa case since there is no real anaatmaa for one to have that experience or sa.nskaara. This is the objection of the puurvapakshii. This objection is answered by advaitin as follows. sa.nskaara is required and it comes from previous experience and up to this part, it is acceptable. But we differ from objector's statement that the previous experience of a real snake is required for adhyaasa to take place. Previous experience of a snake is required all right, but it need not have to be a real snake. One can have a



previous experience of a false snake and that experience of false snake or sa.nskaara can create an impression, which can produce another false snake. For example if I have never seen a real snake but experienced a false snake in a movie (if it is real snake, no body will remain in the theater) which created sa.nskaara for me to project a snake on the rope, and I experience the fears associated with seeing a snake. People project ghost on a post without having seen a real ghost in their life. Concept of a ghost in book is sufficient to create a sa.nskaara for adhyaasa to take place.

Similarly the adhyaasa in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa is possible by the previous sa.nskaara of unreal anaatmaa. How did this previous experience or sa.nskaara of unreal anaatmaa occur? That again is due to adhyaasa involving previous to previous unreal anaatmaa. And for the previous to previous adhyaasa there is previous to previous to previous unreal anaatmaa. This can go on. Then how did the very first unreal anaatmaa experience occur? Shankaracharya says - 'naisargitoyam lokaH vyavahaaraH' - it is anaadi adhyaasa. We never talk about the beginning of adhyaasa. It is naisargitaH (uncreated or beginning-less or anaadi) - puurva puurva adhyaasaH, uttara uttara adhyaasasya kaaraNam (previous previous adhyaasa is responsible for the following and the following adhyaasa). anaadi avidyaa vaasanayaa - the beginning-less ignorance based sa.nskaara. Therefore real anaatmaa is not there and is not required for adhyaasa to take palace. Previous experience of unreal anaatmaa is there which is the cause for adhyaasa.

Hence all the four conditions are effectively fulfilled. The first condition is fulfilled in a modified form - prakaashamaanatvam instead pratyaksha vishhayatvam that is it should be evident rather than directly perceivable in front. The second condition aGYaatatvam is fulfilled since aatmaa is indeed partially known and partially unknown. The third condition is not compulsory and the fourth condition is also fulfilled since sa.nskaara is there not of real anaatmaa but of unreal anaatmaa, which is sufficient to produce adhyaasa. Therefore aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is possible.

This forms the first answer to puurvapakshii. This answer is only a provisional or temporary answer. This is a defensive argument. This above answer is applicable to both objectors that belong to aastika and naastika camps. The answer is given using the same laukika anumaana that puurvapakshii used in his objections. Thus Shankara first shows using the same language of the objector that it is not adhyaasa that is wrong but his objections against adhyaasa are based on wrong postulates. In the process he provides the correct postulates too and shows that adhyaasa is possible.

Since the objectors are mostly aastika-s a more complete answer is provided in the next post.

Message 6202 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Sep 11, 2000 3:30pmSubject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA IIIC

Notes on Brahmasutra IIIC

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h | asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||




vaastalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/- maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h | shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiita.n sadaa bhaje.aham tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------- adhyaasa bhaashhyam (continued)

In the last notes we began the discussion of Shankara's sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam or response to the objections of the puurvapakshiii that aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is not possible since the four conditions required for the adhyaasa are not met in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case. In response to the objections, Shankara shows that the first condition is incorrectly stated by the puurvapakshii and it should be prakaashhamaanatvam instead of pratyaksha vishhayatvam. The second condition should be aa.nshika aGYaatatvam instead of puurNa aGYaatatvam and this is fulfilled even the aatmaa-anaatmaa case. The third condition is not universal and there are exceptions and aatmaa-anaatmaa case falls in the category of the exceptions. For the fourth condition involving 'sa.nskaara' Shankara shows that it need not have to be real snake to have previous sa.nskaara, and even the sa.nskaara of a false snake can do the job. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case also it is the previous experience of false anaatmaa that leaves a sa.nskaara, which helps to project false anaatmaa on the aatmaa. The previous sa.nskaara of false anaatmaa occurs because of previous to previous sa.nskaara of involving false anaatmaa. The chain can go on. For the question of how did the very first experience of false anaatmaa occurred. Shankara raises the issue that one cannot ask about the beginning for the avidya. It is anaadi or beginningless and it is similar to inquiring which is the first, chicken or egg. It is anirvachaniiyam - naisargitoyam - it is inexplicable or beginningless.

This above forms the first answer to puurvapakshii. This answer is applicable to objectors that belong to both aastika and naastika camps. The answer is given using the same laukika anumaana that puurvapakshii used in his objections.

There is a second answer which is a more important answer, which is an offensive argument. This part is mainly for the aastika puurvapakshii-s who also believe in the validity of Veda-s as pramaaNa.

Shankara claims that adhyaasa that is talked about is Veda pramaaNa. The rope-snake example is given not for proving adhyaasa. adhyaasa is not derived from the rope-snake example. This example is given only as an illustration of the nature of adhyaasa. Hence one should not try to extract more than what is intended for, from the rope-snake example. It is not meant for proving aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. The proof for that comes from Vedas, directly. Not realizing that many puurvapakshii-s and objectors focused their attention on the rope-snake example and extracted rules to apply for aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Even if one can disprove rope-snake adhyaasa, that does not affect our arguments about aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa,



since it is scriptural based not on laukika anumaana, such as on rope-snake case. Arguments based on laukika anumaana are not applicable to adhyaasa aatmaa since it is scriptural based anumaana. (The reader is referred back to Ch.II to see the limitations of laukika or worldly example for application to inference about aatmaa). For this adhyaasa, shruti is pramaaNa. This is the first aspect to be noted.

The second aspect is this adhyaasa involving aatmaa-anaatmaa should not be questioned by puurvapakshii-s coming from aastika group, because the puurvapakshii-s themselves have accepted, in one form or the other, adhyaasa in their own systems of philosophies, which they themselves are not aware of. Here we are referring to puurvapakshii-s of aastika darshaNa-s that is saa~Nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa. In all their systems aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is already there, whether they recognize it or not. For example these systems also talk about aatmaa and they all accept based on veda pramaaNa that aatmaa is nityaH or eternal. They accept Veda pramaaNa, karmakaanDa, puNyam and paapam (merits and demerits), aatmaa surviving the death, and reincarnation into next birth - all implying the continuity of aatmaa. They are all aware that aatmaa refers to 'aham' or 'I' the self. Hence all of them say that "I" the self is immortal or nityaH, based on veda pramaaNa. In spite of this fact about aatmaa, which they all agree, they are conscious also of the fact that our experience is 'I am a human being' " I am a male', I am a female', I am a husband', I am a wife', I am a father' etc. Since aatmaa is neither human being, nor male, female, wife, husband, or father, the above statements, 'I am male' refers to anaatmaa only. Hence even according to their systems, I am a human being or I am a mortal when such statements are made, are they error or knowledge? They have to accept, and they do accept, that they are erroneous statements, since they believe based on veda pramaaNa that the self that I am is eternal and not mortal. The error is 'deha aatma buddhi' or manushhyatva buddhi or mR^ityatva buddhi - I am the body, I am a man, I am mortal - these errors It is an error accepted by all aastika systems. It is called 'sthuula shariira adhyaasaH', superposition of aatmaa on the gross body. They have to agree for this sthuulashariira adhyaasa. In case if they do not accept it as an error, then their philosophies will reduce to that of Charvaka system of philosophy, which does not believe in the existence of aatmaa, leave alone its eternity. This is because 'dehaatma buddhi' will become a fact, if it is not an error. To be classified under Charvaka will not be acceptable to any aastika philosophers, and therefore they have to accept that dehaatma buddhi (dehe aatmaa buddhi) is an error or adhyaasa and not a fact. Hence the second point is adhyaasa - stuulashariira adhyaasa, is already accepted by puurvapakshii-s even though they are not conscious of it when they raise this objection.

Since stuulashariira adhyaasa, superimposition of aatmaa on gross body, is inherently accepted by the puurvapakshii-s, they have to accept the extension of this error as aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Therefore puurvapakshii has no basis to raise the issue of fulfillment of the four conditions for adhyaasa, since they have accepted the stuulashariira adhyaasa without applying their four conditions. Let us take, for example the first condition, the 'pratyakshatvam' requirement for adhyaasa. It is not applicable, since in stuulashariira adhyaasa that puurvapakshii has already accepted as an error, even though the superimposed aatmaa is apratyaksham. Similarly the same applies with respect to all other conditions that the puurvapakshii has raised. What saad^Rishyam or similarity is there between aatmaa and stuulashariiram, gross body? Yet it is accepted due to shruti pramaaNa that says aatmaa is different from the inert gross body.

Hence puurvapakshii has no basis to raise the issue against aatmaa-anaatmaa



adhyaasa. Another problem with puurvapakshii's argument is he is bringing conditions pertaining to laukika anumaana which are not necessarily valid for aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa, which is based on shruti that is accepted by both advaitin as well as puurvapakshii as valid pramaaNa.

While aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is based on shruti, one can not question even the rope-snake adhyaasa also with the four conditions, since that adhyaasa or error is experienced by us. Hence puurvapakshii can explain, but not question the anubhava based rajju-sarpa adhyaasa. Different philosophers have different explanations for the rajuu-surpa or rope-snake adhyaasa, and these are called khyaati vaada-s.

aatmaakhyaatirasakhyaatiH akhyaati khyaatiranyathaa | tathaa nirvachanakhyaatiH ityetat khyaati pa~nchakam.h ||

The yogachaara Budhhists say it is aatmaakhyaati, which is one type of explanation. Madhyamika Budhhists say it is asakhyaati. Nyayavaiseshika-s say it is anyathaa khyaati, miima.nsaka-s say it is akhyaati, advaitins say it is anirvachaniiya khyaati; thus explanation vary for the snake-rope adhyaasa. Shankara says whatever be the explanation, one cannot question the snake-rope adhyaasa since it is based on anubhava or experience or pratyaksha pramaaNa. Similarly the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa also cannot be questioned since it is based shruti pramaaNa. Everyone's explanation for it may differ but adhyaasa cannot be denied.

3-10. Degrees of adhyaasa in aastika darshaNam-s

Now, the difference between the puurvapakshii and advaitin is concerning to what extent this adhyaasa has taken place. It is not the existence of adhyaasa but to the degree this adhyaasa occurs. Here the different philosophers disagree. Let us take for example the adhyaasa related to 'I am a mortal'( anityatvam), 'I am a doer' (kartRîtvam), and 'I am an enjoyer'(bhoktRîtvam). A nyaayavaisheshhika says that mortality is not a fact but is due to a superimposition or adhyaasa and the truth is 'I am immortal', whereas I am a doer, kartaa and I am enjoyer or bhoktaa are not errors but facts only. Thus according to these philosophers, the first one only is adhyaasa and the other two are facts. Sankhya and yoga philosophers, on the other hand, says 'aham anityaH' and 'aham kartaa' both are adhyaasa but 'aatmaa is a bhoktaa' is a fact and there is no adhyaasa in that. An advaitin says all the three are adhyaasa.

naadatte kasyachitpaapam na chaiva sukRîtam vibhuH | aGYaanenaavRîtam GYaanam tena muhyanti jantavaH ||

hantaa chenmanyate hantum hatashchenmanyate hatam | ubhau tou na vijaaniitaH naaya.n hanti na hanyate ||

The first sloka is from Geeta (V-15) and the second one is from KaThopanishad[I:ii:19]. Because one is not a doer he neither acquires merits or demerits. Only because of ignorance-born delusion one thinks that one is a doer and enjoyer. One thinks one is a killer and the other one is killed, neither one knows the fact, there is neither a killer (kartRîtvam) nor the one who undergoes killing (bhoktRîtvam). Hence in addition to anityatvam the kartRîtvam and bhoktRîtvam are also due to adhyaasa.

Hence there is no disagreement in agreeing that there is aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Only in the extent of the adhyaasa there is a disagreement between different schools of philosophy. Hence aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is possible and is there.



With this, the third and fourth of the six topics that is adhyaasa sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam and adhyaasa sambhaavanaa are completed.

Next we will discuss adhyaasa pramaaNam.--------------------------------------------------------

For those who are studying with me, here are the questions in Chapter III up to this point. Try to answer and cross check the answers with the notes.

Questions on IIIA&B

1. What are the four mahaavaakyaas that provide shruti pramaaNa for advaita?

2. What is adhyaasa? what is the source for any error? What is the fundamental error? What is its importance?

3. Why Shankara says there is no path other than knowledge? How does the knowledge solve the problem? What role the other paths play?

4. In the rope/snake adhyaasa - why it is called satya anR^ita mithuniikaraNam? What does that mean? And how is this definition applicable to rope-snake adhyaasa?

5. How the above definition satya anR^ita mithuniikaraNam applies to aatmaa -anaatmaa case? How is that relevant to you and to everyone else?

6. What are the three definitions of adhyaasa?

7. List the four conditions for adhyaasa that the puurvapakshii presents to dismiss the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. How they are applicable to the rope-snake case but not to the aatmaa-anaatmaa case.

8. How does Shankara address each of the four requirements for adhyaasa that the puurvapakshii presents?

9. Why Shankara brings anaadi and anirvachaniiyam to account for how the very first experience of anaatmaa occurs?

10. Now a bonus question! anaadi or beginningless and anirvachaniiyam, the inexplicable nature -are they valid answers to the problem or are they just a clever way of escaping to answer the question? How do the other aachaaryaas get out of the problem of answering the question of 'How did we all got into this problem of bondage in the first place?' - Or to rephrase it, how did this cycle of janma to karma to janma start in the first place? Which explanation you think is more logical and why?

Message 6336 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Sep 25, 2000 3:57pmSubject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA-IIID

Notes on Brahmasutra - IIID

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |



asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||


vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/- maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h | shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitam.h sadaa bhaje.aham tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayananda, to his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.-----------------------------------------------------------------------3-10 adhyaasa pramaaNa - proofs for adhyaasa:

Now we take up the fifth topic - adhyaasa pramaaNa. What is the proof for adhyaasa? It has already been stated that aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is based on shruti pramaaNa. puurvapakshii has no basis to question since he has already accepted in his system of philosophy, the sthuulashariira adhyaasa, error associated with the identification of aatmaa with the gross body, on the basis of shruti only. There are two shruti based pramaaNa for adhyaasa; one is called arthaapatti (postulate) pramaaNa and the other is called shaastriiya anumaana (inference from shruti statements) pramaaNa.

arthaapatti, as discussed in Ch.II, is one of the six pramaaNa-s or means of knowledge. It is a means of knowledge based on an idea, which is postulated to explain an observed fact. For example, let us say, after I get up from sleep, I see lot of water flooding all over the streets. Based on this observed data, I postulate that last night, it must have rained heavily. Since I had a sound sleep last night, I did not have any direct knowledge of the rain. However I had to postulate that it rained last night to explain the heavily flooded streets, particularly in Madras, where the drainage system is very bad. Without postulating the last night rain, I cannot explain the observed fact, the flooded roads. One can, of course, make a different postulate, like for example, a 'miracle' must have occurred last night. However, such a postulate is not agreeable to a rational intellect, unless one first proves that the more probable cause, like rain, did not happen. Since the observed fact can only be explained by postulating an idea, that idea becomes a valid knowledge. Even though it is a postulated idea, it is considered as valid knowledge or pramaaNa. Postulation is to explain, as in the case of the rain, a pratyaksha anubhava, a directly perceivable experience or a fact. Hence we can call this as pratyaksha based, or direct observation based arthaapatti pramaaNa. But when we postulate something to explain the shaastra or scriptures, then it is scripture based arthaapatti pramaaNa. Shankaracharya points out that adhyaasa or error is an idea postulated to explain the shruti statements. adhyaasa is not directly mentioned in shruti. This does not imply that it should be considered as Shankaracharya's imagination, just as the postulation of last night rain to explain the flooded streets is not a segment of my imagination. Hence adhyaasa should be considered as valid knowledge, since it is postulated based on shruti pramaaNa. Some philosophers, for example, Shri Madhvacharya, consider that arthaapatti is only an extension of anumaana pramaaNa (see Ch. II), and not different from it. That is not completely incorrect, since one can possibly come up with a concomitant relationship or vyaapti vaakyam, such as in the case of flooded streets that 'wherever there are flooded streets there must be



heavy rains'. But here the concomitant relation between the rains and the flooded streets does not necessarily apply at the same time and place, making it as a poor example of anumaana. One can have rains upstate somewhere at a slightly different times resulting in flooded streets down stream later. The fact remains, however, that a postulation in arthaapatti can be a means of valid knowledge or pramaaNa.

Just as in the case of postulation of rains to explain the flooded streets, arthaapatti can be used to show that 'kartRîtvam', doer-ship, bhoktRîtvam, enjoyer-ship, and 'anityatvam', mortality, are all due to error. In reality, I am neither a kartaa, a doer, a bhoktaa, an enjoyer and 'anityaa' a mortal. For this we need to go to shruti pramaaNa, which tells me of a particular fact -For example the above quoted shloka (Ref. IIIC)- 'hantaa chenmanyate hantum .... ' is from shruti, kaThopanishad. In support of this a very similar shloka also exists in Gita [II:19], where only the first line is slightly different but with the same meaning.

ya enam vetti hantaaram yashchainaM manyate hatam.h | ubhau tau na vijaaniito naaya.n hanti na hanyate ||

In this shloka it is very clearly implied that aatmaa is 'akartaa' and 'abhoktaa', neither a doer, nor an enjoyer. It says aatmaa is not a killer, killing representing all the actions, and aatmaa does not get killed, thus representing that it is not a bhoktaa or an enjoyer. Krishna also says: 'naiva ki~nchit karomiiti yukto manyeta tatvavit.h' (Ch.V:8), one who knows the truth knows that one does not do any action. He knows that he is 'akartaa', non-doer. Also He says ' ....... naiva kurvan na kaarayan.h' (Ch. V:13) - aatmaa does not do any thing nor instigate anyone to do. ' I am never a doer', therefore, the statement that 'I am a doer' is an error. Thus there is a veda pramaaNa as well as smRîti pramaaNa. A shloka from Geeta (V:15) as provided before which shows that aatmaa does not take either merits or demerits of anyone. There is also another statement in shruti that say 'aatmaa' is 'nirvikaaraH' - it is changeless. If aatmaa is kartaa, doer or bhoktaa, enjoyer, it will have to undergo a change, since action/experience requires a change. Hence aatmaa can be neither a kartaa or a bhoktaa. From this we postulate that 'I am a kartaa or doer' or 'I am an enjoyer or bhoktaa' is an error. Thus by arthaapatti pramaaNa based on shruti as well as smRîti we postulate that 'aham kartaa', 'I am doer' 'aham bhoktaa', 'I am an enjoyer' are due to error or adhyaasa.

One may note that shruti based arthaapatti pramaaNa is used not only by Shankara but also by other aastika daarshanika-s, such as saa~Nkhya-s, nayyaayika-s, etc., when they agree that 'I am mortal' is an adhyaasa or an error. Thus 'aatmaa anityatva adhyaasa', the error that self is mortal, is based on 'aatmaa nityatva', the aatmaa is immortal, shruti statement and hence it is shruti based arthaapatti pramaaNa. In contrast to other darshanams, advaita postulates, based on shruti statements, that aatmaa anityaH, aatmaa is mortal, is an error, kartRîtvam or doer-ship is an error and bhoktRîtvam, enjoyer-ship is an error.

Similarly, the next superimposition is 'I am a knower' 'pramaatutvam' is also error or adhyaasa. 'I am the consciousness' is not a superimposition but 'I am a knower' is. It is again postulated based on shruti statement, which clearly says that aatmaa is not a knower. aatmaa is GYaanam, knowledge, but not a GYaataa or pramaataa, a knower. In Mandukya Upanishad it says 'naantaH praGYam, na bahishhpraGYam, na ubhayatah praGYam, na praGYaanaghanam, na praGYam, naapraGYam' meaning that aatmaa is not waking knower (knower in the waking state, vishva GYaata), aatmaa is not a dream-knower (taijasa GYaataa), aatmaa is not a sleep-knower (praaGYa GYaata). aatmaa is pure consciousness. Hence Shankara says that 'I am a knower' is



also an adhyaasa or an error based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa.

All these adhyaasa-s, I am a doer, enjoyer, mortal, knower, etc., can also be derived using another shruti statement. 'aatmaa nirvikaaraH', aatmaa is changeless from the statement 'achchhedyoyam adaahyoyam avikaaryoyam uchyate' -this is indestructible, incombustible, and changeless. If aatmaa is kartaa, bhoktaa or pramaata, it becomes subject to change. To be a kartaa is to undergo a modification. It is anubhava or an experience. Similarly to be bhoktaa or pramaataa - these all involve anubhava or experience of doing, enjoying, knowing etc. since they are all 'process' involving modification of one's state from say aGYaata to GYaataa - state of being ignorant to state of being knowledgeable, etc. In fact, in Sanskrit - any suffix 'taa' as in bhoktaa, kartaa, GYaataa, etc. indicates a modification just as in English the suffix 'er' after a verb - doer, enjoyer, knower, etc. involves a modification. The suffix 'taa' or 'er' indicates an action, action indicates a process and process indicates a modification or vikaara. But shruti says 'aatmaa is nirvikaaraH' meaning aatmaa is not a kartaa, bhoktaa, pramaata because 'nirvikaaratvaat', it is changeless. Thus from 'nirvikaara' shruti statement we can postulate that aatmaa is neither doer, enjoyer, knower, etc. Since they do not belong to me, the self, then kartRîtvam, doer-ship etc., are adhyaasa.

There is also a third method to show that these are adhyaasa based on shruti. This is also indicated by Shankara in his adhyaasa bhaashhyam. Any kartaa or doer has to be associated by a karaNam or an instrument. He cannot be a doer otherwise. For example, 'mind' is antaH karaNam, inner instrument. Similarly sense organs are baahya karaNam, external instruments. Instruments like spectacles or pen, etc., are called upakaraNam. Thus doer will be associated with a karaNam or instrument of doing, similarly a bhoktaa, enjoyer will also be associated with a bhojana karaNam, instruments of enjoyment. kartaa, bhoktaa, pramaataa - all have association or 'sa~Nga' with instruments of action. Thus if I am a kartaa, bhoktaa or pramaataa, 'I am sa+sa~NgaH' - one who has associated with an instrument. However scripture says - 'asa~Ngo hi ayam purushaH' - that is aatmaaa is not associated with anything. Hence aatmaa cannot be a kartaa, bhoktaa or pramaata since to be a kartaa, etc., aatmaa has to get associated with something other than aatmaa. Thus the shruti's statement that aatmaa is detached or asa~NgaH, it is non-doer, non-enjoyer, non-knower, etc. Hence kartRîtvam, bhoktRîtvam or pramaatRîtvam, doer-ship, enjoyer-ship, knower-ship, etc., must be due to error or adhyaasa.

Next we consider another adhyaasa - parichchhinnatvam -"I am limited' - I am here, and not elsewhere - that the notion of space-wise limitation is also an adhyaasa. How is this postulated? This is because shruti clearly says, aatmaa is anantam - limitless. If limitlessness is the nature of aatmaa, then limitation is an error.In kaThopanishad (I-3-15) it says:

ashabdam asparsham aruupam avyayam tathaa arasam nityam agandhavach cha yat.h | anaady anantam mahataH para.n dhruvam.h nichaayya taM mRîtyumukhaat pramuchyate ||

aatmaa is beyond the five sense perceptions namely shabda, sparsha, ruupa, rasa, gandha (sound, touch, form, taste, smell). It is eternal and unlimited. Thus it is anaadi and anantam - beginningless and limitless. One who knows that is beyond the sense of limitations and is eternal. Since limitlessness is a fact, limitation must be an error - by shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa. The limitlessness alone is called 'brahmatvam', infiniteness, and



limitation is 'jiivatvam', individuality. Brahmatvam is a fact and hence jiivatvam is an error. Thus aham brahmaasmi is a fact and aham jiivo.asmi is an a error or adhyaasa. Thus parichchhinnatvam or jiivatvam, limitation or jiiva-hood is an error or adhyaasa based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa.

Last example, which is also important is 'anekatvam' or 'bahutvam' or multiplicity of aatmaa, is also an error or adhyaasa. That is, that 'there are not one aatmaa but many aatmaa-s, is also an error or adhyaasa. That there are many aatmaa-s is accepted by many philosophers - saa~Nkhya, yoga, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa, and even those that give importance to Vedanta such as vishishhTaadvaita and dvaita. They all say that there are many aatmaa-s. Shankara says 'anekatvam', multiplicity, is also an error or adhyaasa based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa. There are shruti statements that says aatmaa is ekaH - single. Shvetashvatara Upanishad says: eko devaH sarva-bhuuteshhu guuDhaH sarvavyaapii sarva-bhuuta-antaraatmaa | karmaadhyakshaH sarva-bhuutaadi-vaasaH saakshii chetaa kevalo nirguNash cha ||(this is very important mantra that Shankara quotes very often) 'eko devaH' and 'saakshii chetaa kevalaH' in the above sloka imply that aatmaa is one only.There is one indweller who is enlivening all beings hidden from all perceptions, while being all-pervading as the inner self in all. He presides over all actions and all beings reside in Him. He is the witness and is pure consciousness free from all qualities or attributes.

yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaivaabhuud vijaanataH | tatra ko mohaH kaH shokaH ekatvam anupashyataH || [Isha Upan. 7]

when the wise man sees everything is nothing but aatmaa alone as ekaH, then where is the delusion or sorrow, when one does not see anything other than oneself - emphasizing singularity in statement 'aatmaa ekah eva abhuut.h'. Since aatmaa ekatvam or is single, is a fact then aatmaa anekatvam, that there are many aatmaa-s, must be an error or adhyaasa.

Thus shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa, Shankara shows that 'anityatvam (mortality), kartRîtvam (doer-ship), bhoktRîtvam (enjoyer-ship), pramaatRîtvam (knower-ship), parichchhinnatvam (limitedness), and anekatvam (multipleness) - are all due to adhyaasa.

So far we have discussed one pramaaNa - that is shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa for adhyaasa. Now we will discuss the anumaana pramaaNa for adhyaasa.

In Ch. II we have discussed in detail the technical aspects involving what is anumaana pramaaNa, the four factors that are involved, and its relation to vyaapti vaakyam or statement of concomitant or coexistent relation between hetu and saadhya. The famous example is 'yatra yatra dhuumaH, tatra tatra agniH', wherever there is a smoke there is a fire'. This relation is required to establish the inferential statement, anumaana vaakyam - 'parvatah agnimaan dhumavatvaaat yathaa mahaanase', the mountain is fiery, because it is smoky, just as in the kitchen.

Hence to prove adhyaasa using anumaana, we need vyapti vaakyam or statement of concomitant relation. We can express Shankara's analysis for adhyaasa in vyapti vaakyam form as 'yatra yatra vyavahaaravatvam tatra tatra adhyaasavatvam' 'wherever there is transaction there is adhyaasa. Any transaction proves adhyaasa or error. Why? Shankara says 'aatmaa cannot do any transaction' because aatmaa is different from the body, which is accepted by all the 'aastika darshanam-s'. An example, Shankara gives for this



anumaana is 'pashu aadi vyavahaaravat' -just the transactions of a cow and other animals. 'pashvaadibhischa avisheshhaat' is the statement in the bhaashhya. When we are chasing a cow or showing fresh green grass to a cow, the cow comes towards the grass - why does it come towards the grass? Because the cow has the notion that 'I am the body, I am hungry and the grass is tasty treat for me'. Only cow comes towards the grass because it has the notion or error that 'I am this body'. In motivating the action, the cow may think, "I am hungry and grass will remove the hunger, and the fellow seems to be a nice guy offering me tasty grass". Because of deha adhyaasa only (error or notion that I am the body), the cow comes towards the grass. This is called pravRîtti vyavahaara or going after for some thing conducive to one's happiness. This cannot happen without the deha adhyaasa. Shankara gives another example - if the same person drops the grass and takes a stick, a cow realizes that this person is worse than any brute that I know off, not dependable. It is true, beasts are more trustworthy and predictable than humans, and there is a danger involved in staying here - making such an inference the cow goes away from him - this is called 'nivRîtti vyavahaara', going away form things that cause unhappiness. This is again due to 'deha adhyaasa', because of the notion that I am the body. The person is going to beat with the stick only the sthuula shariiram, gross physical body and not the suukshma shariiram, subtle body. - thus there is a sthuula shariira adhyaasa error that I am this gross body. Hence both pravRîtti and nivRîtti vyavahaara takes place only because of adhyaasa or error. Hence the study of the behavior of the cow, provides an example or dRîshhTaanta for vyaapti GYaanam. 'pashu aadi vyavahaaravat' - just as the transactions of the cow and other animals, particularly since the behavior of humans is not different from animals. He goes after something he likes, pravRîtti vyavahaara and he goes away from things he dislikes, nivRîtti vyavahaara. Hence we can express the statement of anumaana in our standard format - manushhyaH adhyaasavaan vyavahaaravatvaat, yathaa pashuvat - similar to our familiar statement - parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase. manushhyaH is paksha, adhyaasavaan is the saadhyam, hetu is vyavahaaravatvaat and pashuvat is the dRîshhTanta.

Hence Shankara says all human activities are based on adhyaasa or error since all activities can be considered as either pravRîtti going after or nivRîtti or going away. Hence all human beings have got this adhyaasa. This is the second pramaaNa for adhyaasa. Thus Shankara provides two types of pramaaNa for adhyaasa.

With this adhyaasa pramaaNa section is also completed.

Next we will take up the concluding section of adhyaasa in terms of its implication in human life. That constitutes the last section on adhyaasa.

Questions on Section IIID.

1. What are the two types of proofs Shankara provides for the adhyaasa? How do the arthaapatti and anumaana serve as pramaaNa or means of knowledge?

2. How does Shankara prove each one of the following is an adhyaasa or an error: 1.'I am a doer', 2. 'I am an enjoyer', 3. ' I am knower' 4. 'I am limited', 5.'I am one of many aatmaa-s' etc.

3. How does Shankara prove that any vyavahaara or transaction involves an error or adhyaasa.

End of Section IIID.



Message 6388 of 7993 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg # From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Fri Sep 29, 2000 2:37pmSubject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA IIIE



vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/- maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h | shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitam.h sadaa bhaje.aham tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayananda, to his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.----------------------------------------------------------------- Notes on Brahmasutra IIIE

It should be understood from the analysis presented so far that in all our transactions, we all have this problem of adhyaasa or error involving aatmaa-anaatmaa mithuniikaraNam - satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam - mixing up of real and unreal or aatmaa and anaatmaa. In should be recognized that we have one unitary experience, but unaware that in that unitary experience, we are mixing two things in all our transactions. This is exactly like the fellow, who mistakes that there is a snake, is not aware of the fact that he is mixing two things; a real rope as an existent entity and an unreal snake. In his vision there is one single entity or unitary experience that it is a snake. So when I say 'aham jaanaami', 'I know' it looks like there is one single entity, knower. But upon analysis there is mixing up of 'chetana aatmaa' conscious self and 'achetana vRîtti', inert thoughts are involved.

Hence Shankara says in Atmabodha:

aatmanaH sachchida.nshashcha buddher vRîttiriti dvayam.h | sa.nyojya cha avivekena jaanaami iti pravartate ||

Thus in 'aham jaanaami' - I know - there is 'aatmaanaH sat and chit a.nshaH', that is 'I am existent and conscious entity' is involved. At the same time 'vRitti', a thought process, in the intellect is involved. The changeless chit and sat belong to aatmaa and changing vRîtti belongs to anaatmaa- these two get mixed together, forming into one entity leaving me with the notion that 'I am the knower'.

Thus we transact all the time, due to the notions about ourselves, based on adhyaasa. In the same text, Shankara says:

aatmano vikRîyaa naasti buddherbodho na jaatviti | jiivaH sarvamalam Gyaatvaa GYaataa drashhTeti muhyati ||

aatmaa cannot be a knower since it cannot go through the knowing process



(since it is 'avikaaraH', changeless), anaatmaa cannot be a knower because it is jaDam or inert. Then we create a new entity by combining aatmaa and anaatmaa, and thus, a 'knower' is born. Thus, there is a mix-up of aatmaa and anaatmaa - satya asatya mithuniikaraNam, real and unreal parts into one single unitary experience.

Thus adhyaasa pramaaNa proves that there is satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam resulting in adhyaasa.

3-11 adhyaasa upasa.nhaaraH - Conclusion of adhyaasa bhaashhyam:

In this last topic, Shankara says we are interested in this adhyaasa, not for an academic interest, but for our own evolution, because adhyaasa is harmful to the entire humanity, since adhyaasa alone brings in the notion that I am 'anityaH' or mortal. Therefore, because of this adhyaasa, there is a constant fear of death, and this fear in turn results into constant insecurity. Hence wealth becomes very important in life, since we have a strong notion that wealth brings some security - food on a plate to eat, a shelter above my head etc., through the wealth. But the fact of the matter is wealth only provides comforts and one can be comfortably insecure, since the basic insecurity does not go away even if one has any amount of money. The famous example is the terminal life of multi billionaire -Howard Hughes of the fifties. Thus because of adhyaasa only there is sa.nsaara. Since adhyaasa leads to pravRîtti and nivRîtti vyavahaara, we go after things or try to get rid of things. Because of the adhyaasa 'that I am limited', I go after for all those things that I like, to remove my limitations. Hence all types of actions, vyavahaara, are due to adhyaasa alone. These actions produce merits and demerits or puNya and paapa phalam. These, in turn, result in re-birth, thus cycle of birth and death. Thus adhyaasa propels one to action, karma, and karma leads to janma, birth. All karma-s are based on this error. This includes both laukika karma or worldly actions and vaidika karma or alaukika karma, or scriptural sanctioned actions, since both involve the notion of kartRîtva bhaava or the notion of doer-ship. To put it another way around, because of this adhyaasa alone, all the karma-s originate. Because of laukika and vaidika karma-s, worldly and ritualistic actions, one reaps different results. The laukika karma-s, the worldly actions, produce dRîshhTa phalam or tangible results and vaidika karma-s produce adRîshhTa phalam or intangible results. Because of this the cycle of birth and death, there is the associated suffering involving janma, jaraa, vyaadhi, duHkha, birth, old-age, disease and suffering, etc.

If we want to get rid of sa.nsaara, we need to get over the adhyaasa or committing the error. Only remedy to sa.nsaara is adhyaasa nivRîtti. How does adhyaasa go away? - Only by eliminating the cause of adhyaasa. Cause for adhyaasa is aGYaanam or ignorance. Ignorance will go away only with knowledge - hence athaato brahma jiGYaasaa - inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

This adhyaasa occurs at various levels. The first adhyaasa is that 'ahaMpramaataa' or I am a knower' caused by the mixing up of aatmaa and the antaH karaNam, mind and intellect. Through the mind, the error, as if, flows down to sense organ level. At that level, there is further mixing up I and the sense organs resulting in the second level of adhyaasa. For example, if I say 'I am blind' - the problem of the sense organ is super imposed on aatmaa. Through the sense organs the error further flows down to the level of the body - ahaM purushhaH, aham strii, aham sthuulaH, aham vRîddhaH, I am a man, woman, fat, old, etc. The properties of the upaadhii-s, equipments, are taken as my property by the superimposition on aatmaa. aatmaa in principle is



naiva strii na pumaan eshha na chaivaayam napu.nsakaH | yadyat shariiram aadatte tena tena sa rakshyate ||

as stated in shvetaashvatara upanishhad V-10. He is neither female, nor male, nor neuter. Whatever body he assumes he becomes identified with that. This is further echoed as:

na asat na sat na sat asat na mahat na jaanuu | na strii pumaan naja napu.nsakam eka-biijam.h ||

I am neither non-existent ( from aatmaa a.nsha) nor existent (from anaatmaa a.nsha), neither existent and non-existent (mixture of both aatmaa and anaatmaa), neither female nor male nor neuter - I am none of these - those properties of the body are superimposed on the self and properties of the self are superimposed on the non-self - all due to adhyaasa. Just like the long, curved, poisonous, fearful snake, where there is only a rope.

Through the physical body, the adhyaasa goes to surrounding environment. Through the body I get relationships with all types of people - father, mother, brother, uncle, grand father etc.,. etc. In this process, one develops aha~Nkaara adhyaasa and mamaakaara adhyaasa, I-ness and my-ness in the upaadhiis or equipments and the surroundings. Really speaking aatmaa being asa~NgaH with no associations, it is relation-less. But because of this adhyaasa, the roots of sa.nsaara spread all over - Krishna comparing the sa.nsaara as an ashvattha or peepal tree says (15-2):

adhashchordhvaM prasR^itaastasya shaakhaaH guNapravR^iddhaa vishhayapravaalaaH | adhashcha muulaani anusantataani karmaanubandhiini manushhyaloke ||

Its branches extend both above and below, nourished by guNa-s they indulge in sense objects. Their secondary roots extend downwards resulting in actions that bind the human beings. The root of sa.nsaara spreads all over the world - some even to America - families spreading from east coast to west coast.

One has to work for the removal of adhyaasa. How does adhyaasa start? adhyaasa is born of ignorance - since the error is centered on the self 'I', and therefore the self-error is born out of self-ignorance. It is not ignorance of any thing or any subject - That is why any amount of removal of other ignorance such as the ignorance of chemistry, physics, etc. will not remove the self ignorance. In spite of all the degrees that can be attached to the name, he will be only an educated sa.nsaari or an erudite sa.nsaari since he has gained an anaatmaa GYaanam which cannot remove sa.nsaara. Instead of being an unintelligent fool, I will be an intelligent fool. sa.nsaara can only be removed by aatmaa GYaanam, since we have an error with regard to aatmaa. That is the reason in Ch. U. in the seventh chapter known as bhuumaa vidya, we find Naarada approaching Shri Sanatkumara to learn Brahma vidya. Narada gives a long list of degrees he has so far received. He has a Ph.D. in every subject possible in this world. But then he says in the end: so.aham bhagavan shochaami- 'I am still suffering'. Sanatkumara says 'tarati shokam aatmavit' grief can go away only by self-knowledge. Hence Shankara says 'aatmaa ekatva vidyaa pratipattaye sarve vedaantaaH Aarabhyante | asyaaH anartha hetoH prahaanaaya |' all the Upanishads begin with an intention of giving only, the knowledge of aatmaa or knowledge of oneself alone removes the suffering resulting from adhyaasa. In Mundaka Upanishad - the student approaches the teacher, realizing that no amount of objective knowledge is making him wiser, asks the teacher - 'kasminnu bhagavo



viGYaate sarvam idam viGYaatam bhavati' - 'Oh bhagavan, please teach me that knowledge, knowing which everything of 'this' is known. The teacher teaches him self-knowledge which makes him realize that he is the very essence of all knowledge. He is the very GYaanam in all GYeyam.

When we say aatma GYaanam, self knowledge, has to be gained to remove aatmaa aGYaanam, self ignorance, one point has to be noted. We already have partial knowledge or partial ignorance of the adhishThaanam, the substratum. It is not total ignorance. Remember, if the rope is totally not seen there will not be an error. There is a partial knowledge that 'there is' - some object is there, the satya a.nsha or real part. Only the ignorance is about the visheshha a.nsha or 'rope-ness' of the object. Similarly the self-error is because of partial ignorance. I know 'aham asmi' - the sat part is known and the chit part is known. What is not known is "aham brahma asmi' or brahmatva a.nsha is not known. The Brahman feature or Brahmanhood or Brahman status of mine is not known. Thus whenever we say Brahma GYaanam it is not that we are going to know a new thing called 'Brahman', it is knowing the Brahman status of mine. We are only knowing the full real status of 'I'. Hence 'Brahma GYaanam means 'aatmanaH brahmatva GYaana' the knowledge of my real status as Brahman. When the real status is not known, a false status is taken up as real that is my jiivatva status. Hence what is required is a self-correction involving knowing my Brahman status and in the process displacing my jiivatva status. Hence 'athaato brahma jiGYaasaa' therefore inquiry into the nature of myself as Brahman - athaataH aatmanaH brahmatva jiGYaasaa - I should learn my own superior status as Brahman. For this purpose alone all the Upanishads begin teaching. This is the difference between vedaanta shaastra and all other shaastra or sciences. All other shaastra-s take our inferior status as a fact. Then they prescribe the methods of improving the status. Some religions follow the same methodology. They start with the statement that we are sinners. Only a sage of the Upanishad screams at the top of his voice - 'shruNvantu vishve amR^itasya putraaH' addressing all of us as 'Listen you all, Oh! Sons of Immortality!' implying that immortality is our birth right! He even dares to address the Gods in the Heavens - 'ayo dhaamaani divyaani santi - you too the indwellers of the heavens!' That is the goal of Vedanta - to make us inherit our own true divine nature. We waste our whole life in working to improve our status symbol. Even the karmakaanDa is promoting this status enhancement assuming an inferior status of us as a fact. All sciences take the view that our inferior status as a fact. Only Vedanta raises the very fundamental question- whether this, my present inferior status, is a fact or a presumption on my part. Upanishads instigate us to inquire saying that you do not have to work for improving your status. You as you are 'a nitya shuddha budhha mukta swabhaavaH' -you are eternal, pure, free from any limitations- there is no competitor for you since you are ekaH, one without a second. It is not an image building but for removal of superimposed low image. This is done by instigating us to inquire into the nature of Brahman - which is the nature of our own self - athaato brahma jiGYaasaa - to remove the superimposed error or misunderstanding on our part by correct understanding of our own nature. Hence the inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

This ends the essence of adhyaasa bhaasya.

3.12 Further questions on adhyaasa:

Here we will briefly mention couple of important objections raised by the post-Shankara philosophers, that are relevant to adhyaasa. These include from vishishhTaadvaita school, Shri Ramanuja and Shri Vedanta Deshika; and from Dvaita school Shri Madhvacharya, Shri Jayatirtha and Shri



Vyasatirtha. There were also several advaitin masters who addressed these issues. These include Shri Harsha, Shri Vidyaranya, Shri Citsukha, and Shri Madhusudana Saraswati. These are only few names but in reality there were many more involving arguments and counter arguments. These in fact helped in crystallizing the concepts for each school of philosophy. We will mention couple of objections that were raised and we will address them once we complete the Shankara Bhashya.

1. Who or what is the locus of avidya?

According to Shankara, adhyaasa or error is due to ignorance and error involves mixing up of satya a.nsha as in 'I am' and asatya a.nsha as in 'a sa.nsaari'. This is the jiiva who consists of a mixture of real part of the statement ' I am' or aham which implies that I am sat and chit, and unreal part 'a parichchhinnaH' a limited entity, or jiiva asmi. My true nature is aham brahma asmi. This error occurred because I am ignorant of my true nature that is aham brahma asmi. Now Ramanuja asks - there has to be a locus for avidya and what or who is that locus? That is who has this avidya or ignorance - jiiva or Brahman? Brahman cannot be the locus because (1) that will make Brahman ignorant, in which case He cannot be Brahman any more, (2) If ignorance rests with Brahman then ignorance is as real as Brahman and now we have two real entities, Brahman and ignorance and that violates the advaita principles of non-dual nature of Brahman as well as his nirguNatvam, since He has ignorance. Lastly 3) Brahman is of the nature of light and ignorance of the nature of darkness and are diagonally opposite to each other, and therefore cannot exist together. Thus Brahman is the locus of ignorance is unacceptable. On the other hand jiiva cannot be the locus of avidya since jiiva is the product of avidya. That is, the status of jiiva or jiivatvam arose because of the presence of avidya. That implies jiiva status comes after avidyaa. That is avidyaa existed even before jiiva-hood arose. Hence jiiva cannot be the locus of avidyaa. Ignorance is not an independent entity to exist without any locus. Therefore we conclude that Advaitic concept of avidya is wrong. Hence there is a fundamental problem in the doctrine of Advaita based on adhyaasa as the cause for jiiva.

2. Ontological status of pramaaNa:

The next important issue is related to Veda-s as pramaaNa. Shankara says ignorance can only go with the knowledge of Brahman and the source of the knowledge for Brahman is Veda-s which are apaurushheya. Hence the inquiry into the nature of Brahman as stated in Brahmasutra. But in the discussion of adhyaasa, the satya a.nsha is only 'aham' or 'I am' and any other is only a superimposition of unreal on the real. This include all idam vastu-s or all that can be identified as idam or 'this' - These are not real and are superimposition on Brahman. Then the question is, are Veda-s real or unreal?. If Veda-s are real like Brahman then we have duality, Brahman and Veda-s and that violates the Advaita doctrine which states that Brahman is one without a second. If Veda-s are unreal then how can the unreal pramaaNa provide a knowledge of the reality? False books cannot teach us about real science! If Veda-s are unreal and such unreal texts are pramaaNa, the knowledge that they provide will also be apramaa or bhrama. Hence there is no use of inquiry of Brahman using invalid tools. In addition as per Advaitin, if Veda-s are considered as unreal, similar to the world which is considered as unreal, then Advaita cannot claim as aastika system of philosophy. It should be considered as naastika system similar to Budhhism. In fact they are more parallel to Buddhism, with nirguNa Brahman, which cannot described by any means, since all descriptions presuppose guNa-s. Brahman is as good as 'shuunyam', which cannot be described since there is nothing to describe it.



Thus there are many questions raised against Advaita doctrine and Shri Vedanta Deshika has written a book with the title a 'shataduushaNii', hundred objections to advaita. We will address some of these later but it is suffice at this stage to know that philosophical discussions were kept alive. These discussions and counter discussion are back bone of our culture, and inquiry into the nature of reality is there at the time of Veda Vyasa, at the time of Shankara and even now with advancement of science and technology, as in the advaitin list serve! These discussions are not necessarily for convincing somebody else, but at least for convincing the discussor himself. Otherwise there will be 'vyabhicaara doshha' - a vagrant mind uncertain about what the goal is.

Now, those who want to venture into the discussion of the above issues may do so. But for the time being we will formally end here the adhyaasa bhaashhyam and we will next take up Shankara's Brahmasutra Bhashya. When and if the time permits we will come back later to address the above issues.

This completes the Notes on adhyaasa bhaashhyam. With this introduction, Shankara takes up the suutra bhaashhyam. adhyaasa bhaashhyam forms the back bone for the entire analysis of the suutras and hence its importance need not be emphasized. This section should be thoroughly studied not only from the point of its contents but also from the point of its implications in terms of our day to day life.----------------------------------------------------------------------------We will start the notes with discussion of Sutra 1, after three weeks. This will give some time to contemplate on the contents discussed so far.

Message 6566 From: Kuntimaddi Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Mon Oct 23, 2000 12:58pmSubject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1

Notes on Brahmasutra IV (Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1A)


I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to my own teacher.

vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiitaMaananda saandram amalairnidhaanam.h .|shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitaMsadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1 suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa



( A note for the readers: The discussion is done very elaborately and some parts are somewhat technical and some are rather general. One could have condensed the notes avoiding subtle technical points, and emphasize only its essential aspects. In that process we could miss a lot. Even if one finds some redundancy, I feel it is important to go through the arguments and counter arguments to be familiar with the logic and the depth to which the analysis was done by Shankara Bhagavat paada before one studies criticisms of Shankara Bhaashhyam by other bhaashhyakaara-s. References to shruti's statements and some sloka-s are incomplete and any help in completing the references are most welcome. As stated in the beginning, the notes follow closely the lectures of H.H. Swami Paramaarthaanandaji of Chennai. I am deeply indebted to him.

Notes Designation: While the Bhaashhyam is discussed under chapter IV - to follow which suutra we are discussing, from now on, we will use the following designation - For example for sutra 1 we use the designation as I-i-1-1. The first Roman number designates that it is first of the four adhyaaya-s, the second lower case Roman number designates that it is first paada of the adhyaaya, the third number designates that it is the first adhikaraNa and last number designates the suutra in that adhikaraNa. Since the suutra will be discussed in more than one post, we will use the letter designations A ,B, C, etc., to the suutra number for easy identification during discussions. Following this notation this post is designated as Notes BSB-I-i-1-1A)

This is the first adhyaaya called samanvaya meaning consistency. The significance of samanvaya will be discussed later. The first paada in this adhyaaya has a big name and is called 'spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada'. The significance of this title will also be discussed later. Each adhikaraNam or topic is also given a name. The name of the topic will be based on the first suutra in that adhikaraNa. The first adhikaraNa is called jij~naasaa adhikaraNam, based on the first suutra - athaato brahma jij~naasaa. The number of suutra-s in a topic can vary from one to many, and in this very first adhikaraNa, there is only one suutra.

From now on in the study of each suutra, we will strictly follow a three-step procedure: First, a general analysis of the suutra will be provided. Second, the word analysis of the suutra is donetaking each word in the order it is given in the suutra. And finally, a conclusion of the suutra is provided bringing out any special aspects involved.

1. General Analysis of the first suutra:

This suutra happens to be an introduction to vedaanta shaastram, or Brahmavidya. This is like upodghaata or anubandha or preface to the text, which is required for every shaastram. This suutra cannot be considered as out side the text nor inside the text - it isthe connecting link to the outside and the inside like a door of a house. Hence it is called anubandhaH, a pre-appendix, attached to the shaastra as an integral part but not part of the shaastra, similar to the first chapter of Geeta. The shaastra begins from the secondsuutra only just as Geeta starts with the second chapter.

2 The content of the suutra:

According to our tradition for any shaastra, the introductory shloka should discuss four-fold factors called anubandha chatushhTayam. (These four



factors, anubandha chatushhTayam, should not be confused with the four-fold qualifications, saadhana chatushhTayam, required for a seeker. These two chatushhTayam-s will be discussed with reference to this suutra, and the reader should be aware of the difference between the two). This anubandha chatushhTayam is stated simply in a sloka form as:

adhikaariishcha vishhayaH sambandhashcha prayojanam.h |shaastraarambha phalaM proktam anubandha chatushhTayam.h ||

The shloka just provides the list of the four factors that constitute the anubandha chatushhTayam. The first suutra or shloka in a text should present these four factors. The four factors are: 1. adhikaarii - or qualified student - who is qualified to study the text,here the Brahmasuutra-s? 2. The second factor is vishhayah - the subject matter. 3 The third one is 'prayojanam'- what is the benefit of studying the suutra-s? and 4 the fourth is the sambandhaH, the relationship. This is similar to preface in a textbook, where theauthor discusses to whom the text is written, the contents and the benefit.

For the study of Brahmasuutra, who is the adhikaari or qualified student? Shankara says the one who has saadhana chatushhTayam or the one who has the four-fold qualifications is the adhikaari or the qualified student. Nowhere in the ten upanishhads one can finddirectly mentioning of saadhana chatushhTayam as qualifications. How did Sankara come up with these four-fold qualifications? - It is based on Brahmasuutra only. On that basis he wrote Tattvabodha which defines these four-fold qualifications. All other prakarana grantha-s contain an elaborate discussion of these. The four-fold qualifications are 1. viveka, discrimination to remove the superimposed error or adhyaasa, 2. vairaagyam or dispassion - considering all other pursuits to be subservient to this main pursuit, which is the removal of adhyaasa, 3. shaTka sampattiH - the six-fold inner discipline: (a) shama, mind control, (b) dama, sense control, (c) uparama, reduction of extrovertedness (withdrawal), (d) titikshaa, forbearance (capacity to ignore discomforts in life), (e) shraddhaa, faith in guru, scriptures and God and (f) samaadhaanam (concentration) or commitment to the goal. and 4. mumukshutvam or desire for moksha. The benefit of having these four-fold qualification is to be qualified to the study of Brahmasuutra - He is the adhikaarii or a qualified student.

The second factor that should be provided in the introduction - it is vishhayaH, the subject matter. For Brahmasuutra as the name shows Brahman is the subject matter of the suutra-s. It has to be understood from advaitin's point that when we use Brahman, we are not using Brahman as a new substance, which is revealed by Vedanta. Brahman is the new status of the student or the listener or the aatma. It is not a new thing but my own higher status, paraa prakR^iti. Thus whenever we talk about Brahman it should be understood as aatmanaH brahmatvam, the brahman status of my own self is the subject matter.

The third factor is prayojanam - What benefit do I get for studying Vedanata shaastra through Brahmasuutra? When I know the Brahman status of mine, the benefit is that I will negate the abrahman or non-Brahman status of mine, which is due to error. For example, when I come to know that 'this is a rope', what benefit I have of knowing the 'ropeness'? In the process of knowing that 'this is a rope', the prior misconception that 'this is a snake' goes away or displaced by the knowledge of the truth of the object. Thus 'ropeness' knowledge displaces the prior 'snakeness' misconception. It is replaced only because it is a misconception and not real knowledge. If



it is real, it will not be replaced. Similarly 'Brahmatvam' knowledge (the knowledge of Brahmatvam status of mine) displaces the 'jiivatvam' (the knowledge of jiivatvam status of mine) misconception. This is stated simply as "brahmatva j~naanena jiivatva nivR^ittiH prayojanam |" Jiivatva is the same as samsaara. samsaara nivR^itti is otherwise called moksha or liberation. Moksha is the freedom from the sense of limitation, sense of smallness or sense of inadequacy.

The fourth factor is sambandha or relationship. The immediate question that arises is relation between what and what? In this context, the relationship is between the textbook and the subject matter. We call the relationship as 'pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandhaH' (a poor translation of this is object-subject relationship) - Brahman and Brahmasuutra have got the pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandha - It is a technical factor and can be understood as follows. There is a rule that a topic can be considered as a subject matter of a book only if the topic is discussed as the central theme of the book. If the topic is discussed casually as a side-subject, it cannot be taken as the central theme of the book. For example in the Bhagavad Geeta there is a discussion on one's diet. From that we cannot say 'diet' is the subject mater of the Geeta. Since diet is not the central theme, Geeta and the diet do not have pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandha. Then what is the central theme of Geeta? One can say aatma vidyaa or Brahmavidya is the central theme. This is explicitly stated at the end of each chapter; brahmavidyaayaa.n yogashaastre shrii krishhNaarujana sa.nvaade..., etc. With Geeta, Brahmavidya has pratipaadya-pratipaadaka sambandha. This may be translated into English as revealer-revealed relationship. This aspect becomes more clear when one discusses the various arguments in terms of what is the central theme of Brahmasuutra.

As mentioned above the anubandha chatushhTayam, the four fold-factors, are required for any text as the contents of its introductory sloka. But this anubandha chatushhTayam is not directly revealed by the first suutra. In the first suutra that says - 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa', there is no direct mention of adhikaarii etc., in the suutra. Hence the anubandha chatushhTayam is not the direct meaning of the suutra but it is only an implied meaning of the suutra. This is called in Sanskrit 'aarthika arthaH' or indirect or implied meaning. If so, then what is the direct meaning of the suutra?

The direct meaning of the suutra, 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa', is 'thereafter, therefore, Brahman inquiry (should be done)'. Incidentally we should be aware that Shree Vyaasaachaarya is not discussing a new philosophy, unlike saankhya, nyaaya, vaisheshhika etc., wherein the authors are propounding a new system of philosophy. Vyaasa's aim is to extract the philosophy, which is contained in the Upanishads. Hence whenVyaasaachaarya writes a suutra, he has got some Upanishhad mantra-s or sloka-s in his mind. To understand the right meaning of the suutra, we should know what is the upanishhadic mantra-s he had in his mind. Then only we will know what is the import of the suutra. This is very much required here since suutra happens to be a very cryptic statement. So when we study a suutra, we should be aware of what upanishhadic statement Vyaasaachaarya had in his mind in formulating the suutra. That relevant upanishhadic statement pertaining to a given suutra is called 'vishhaya vaakyam'. Hence every suutra must have a vishhaya vaakyam. Unfortunately Vyaasaachaarya does not say what is the vishhaya vaakyam of a given suutra. It becomes important, therefore to take the help of commentators. Without bhaashhyam one cannot know the vishhaya vaakyam-s of many suutra-s. Fortunately Bhagavaan Shankara has laid a royal path for us to follow suutra-s closely in conjunction with the advaitic interpretation. How did Shankara knew the vishhaya vaakyam or relevant upanishhadic statements? He claims that he



learned from his teacher, and who in turn learned from his teacher, etc., - thus a guruparampara traced all the way to Vyaasaachaarya. Hence the invocation of the lineage of teachers at the very beginning of each notes. A teacher of sampradaaya is emphasized in Vedanta.

On that basis, what is the vishhaya vaakya for suutra one? There are three Upanishhadic sentences on which this suutra is based: 1. First and the foremost one is from taittiriiya upanishad 3-1. 'tad vijij~naasaasva' based on which Brahmasuutra says 'athaa to brahma jij~naasaa'. In that Upanishad, the student 'bhR^igu' is being told by his teacher, VaruNa, that he should know or conduct Brahman inquiry, if he wants peace, or fulfillment and security, which are the basic needs of anyone's life. If the problems in life are to be eliminated or samsaara to be removed, the teacher says, know Brahman or inquire into the nature of Brahman. In the Upanishhad, the statement is in imperative mood - vijij~naasasva - 'you should know' - indicating that there is no other alternative to solve the problem at hand than knowledge of Brahman. People say in Kaliyuga it is very difficult to follow any yoga, and it is enough to chant the name of the Lord - naama sa.nkiirthanam and that will take one beyond the ocean of samsaara. Here VaruNa in the Upanishad and Vyaasa in Brahmasuutra are very specific. One should know Brahman or one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. Hence 'chanting of the name of the Lord' may be helpful to quiten the mind so that Brahman inquiry can be done - It is the preparatory to the knowledge and hence for Moksha, but it is not the primary means or sufficient means to gain the knowledge required for Moksha. Upanishhad makes it very clear that if one wants Moksha - tad vijij~naasasva, 'you should know Brahman'. Nowhere in the Upanishad it says that this is only relevant in kR^ita or tretaa or dvaapara yuga-s but in a kaliyuga, knowledge is not required and chanting is enough or one can get liberated with some kunDalini raising, etc. Upanishhad does not specify any specific yuga or time or place. From this it is very clear that irrespective of what yuga it is - for liberation j~naanam is the only means since problem is centered on adhyaasa or error which is based on ignorance. From this it is clear the Brahmasuutras and the Vedanta teaching that it points out are eternally true since they talk about eternal knowledge and not temporal or relative knowledge.

The second vishhaya vaakyam is from Chandogya Upanishad 8-7-1. '...saH vijij~naasitavyaH ...' Here also .'..tavyaH' is an imperative statement implying that 'you have to know' - no short cuts. It is similar to that of taittiriiya statement. Only difference is in T.U. the word 'tat' is in neuter gender and in Ch. U. it is 'saH' in masculine gender - tat refers to Brahman and saH refers to paramaatma, both are one and the same, from the point of the seeker - sat chit aananda swaruupam.

The third vishhaya vaakyam is from Brihadaaranyaka Upanishhad 2-4-5. This occurs in the famous Maitreyii Braahmanam where sage-husband YaJNavalkya while teaching his wife Maitreyi provides a long discourse with the central theme that 'aatmanastu kamaaya sarvam priyam bhavati', giving a big list saying that nobody loves anybody. Everybody loves oneself alone. Hence 'self' alone is the object of love and since everybody loves only that which is the source of maximum happiness, 'self' alone is the ananda swaruupaH - happiness or bliss itself. Whatever is the object of love is of the nature of ananda or happiness. Upanishhad says 'aatma alone is loved by everyone'. How do we know that? When crucial things come we are ready to drop one by one for the sake of oneself. A person disowns his own children, the moment the child disobeys him. Husband disowns wife, wife disowns husband. Both owning and disowning are only for one's happiness. What one is longing for is one's happiness and Upanishhad says that happiness is one's own self. Hence discovering eternal happiness requires self-discovery. Having



presented this elaborately YaaJNavalkya tells his wife Maitreyi 'aatmaa vaa are drashhTavyaH, shrotavyaH, manthavyaH, nidhidhyaasavyaH' - aatma alone has to be seen, heard, thought about, and contemplated upon - therefore aatman inquiry should be done.

Thus in all three Upanishhads - taittiriiya, chhaandogya and bR^ihadaaraNyaka - Brahman inquiry is emphasized. In keeping with those Upanishhadic portions Vyaasaachaarya condenses all of them and says - athaato brahma jij~naasaa.

The suutra is grammatically incomplete and to emphasize the inquiry should be done and to complete it grammatically we add at the end of the suutra a word - karthavyaa. Hence the full suutra should read as: 'athaato brahma jij~naasaaa kartavyaa', thereafter, therefore, Brahman inquiry should be done

This is the direct meaning of the suutra. This direct meaning we revise a little bit. If one has to do Brahman inquiry, it cannot be done independently since Brahman is not available as an object in front of us for one to study - like the study of microbiology or chemistry etc. Hence independent inquiry of Brahman cannot be done. We need to use the 'Upanishhad microscope'. In one of the mantras it is said 'sarvaM brahmopanishhadam' - Brahman is given the title as aupanishhadam to indicate that Brahman can be inquired using Vedanta. Hence we can replace the Brahman inquiry with the word 'vedantic inquiry' - Hence Brahma jij~naasaa is equal to 'vedaanta shaastra vichaaraH' - Hence the suutra will mean as 'athaato vedanta vichaara kartavyaH' - for what purpose? - for Brahma j~naanam - for the knowledge of Brahman. Hence the revised meaning of the suutra is 'thereafter, therefore, vedantic inquiry should be done for Brahma j~naanam'. This is the revised direct meaning of the first suutra.

Some technical considerations: Now we will make some more revisions. We should remember that Brahmasuutra is nyaayaprasthaanam - it is meant for analyzing everything logically. Hence every suutra should present a logical statement - a nyaaya vaakyam. Hence the suutra must be presented technically as nyaaya vaakyam or anumaana vaakyam . (please refer to Ch. 2 for the analysis of anumaana that involve the four factors - paksha, saadhya, hetu and dR^ishhTanta –ex. parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat yathaa mahaanase). Hence the question is what is then the anumaana vaakyam that corresponds to the first suutra. We can express that in the standard format similar to: parvataHagnimaan, dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase | vedaanta shaastram aarambhaniiyam, anubandha chatushhTayavatvaat, yathaa dharmashaastravat |vedaanta shaastram is the paksha, aarambhaniiyam, should be inquired into is the saadhyam and hetu is anubandha chatushhTayavatvaat, because it has got the four-fold factor (mostly here the emphasis on prayojanam or benefit being the Moksha). The example is dharmashaastravat, just as the dharmashhastra. For this anumaana vaakyam there should be a vyaapti vaakyam (similar to yatra yatra dhuumaH tatra tatra agniH- a statement of coexistence). For the above anumaana vaakyam we can express the vyaapti vaakyam as - yatra yatra anubandha chatushhTayavatvam tatra tatra aarambhaniiyatvam - all those shaastraa-s are worth studying since we get prayojanam or benefit. For Brahmasuutra the benefit is the moksha itself. This is the revised meaning for the firstsuutra.

With this the general analysis containing both the direct meaning and the implied meaning of the first suutra is completed.



Next we will take up the word by word meaning and their analysis.

End of BSB I-i-1-1A.Message 6619

From: Kuntimaddi Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Wed Nov 1, 2000 7:55amSubject: Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1B

Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1B



vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiitaM aananda saandram amalairnidhaanam.h .| shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitaM sadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.---------------------------------------------------------------------------

samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1 suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

P.S. Since for some reason single or double quotation marks are not coming properly through e-mail, I am using hyphen to separate the Sanskrit words from the text.

Now the word analysis of the sutra 1:

There are three words - atha ataH brahmajij~naasaa . The last word is the compound word consisting of brahman and jij~naasaa. sha~Nkaraachaarya analyzes each word in the order that it occurs. This is one of the requirement for a bhaashhya as defined in the Ch. 1.

atha shabda vichaaraH: analysis of the first word, atha:

sha~Nkaraachaarya points out the expression -atha- has two fold function; one is -atha- as a sound (shabda ruupena) and second is -atha- as the word (pada ruupena). In the form of a sound, it denotes or produces auspiciousness. That is, -atha-, shabda ruupena mangala janakam. The very sound of the word -atha- as mere vibration (shabda ruupena) produces auspiciousness(mangala janakam). When the word -atha- functions as a -padam-, then it is -artha bodhakam- that it provides a particular meaning.



To be technical, Shankara says: prameya ruupena mangala janakam, pramaaNa ruupena arthabodhdakam.

Why does Vyaasaachaarya uses this word -atha- in this two-fold function? Because, this is the first suutra of the text and should therefore begin with mangalam or auspicious sound. In our tradition, any text that begins without the mangalam is considered as amangalam text or inauspicious text, and we are not supposed read that. Hence every text starts with some prayer sloka. This is benediction for removing any obstacles (vighna nivaaraNaartham) and receiving the blessings of the Lord for the successful fulfillment of the work. In addition, it is the recognition by the author that it is an offering to the Lord and that the Lord is behind the action both as an propellerand a supporter, without whose help the work cannot be undertaken. It is also an invocation by the student of the shaastra to help understand the shaastra in its correct import. Since Vyaasaachaarya is writing the text in suutra form, one cannot have an invocation sloka. He has to reduce the size of the sloka to a word or two since this is a suutra text (alpaaksharam). Vyaasa ingeniously uses just one word to do both functions mentioned above.

How do we know that the sound 'atha' is auspicious? There is a pramaaNa for this:

o~NkaaraH cha atha shabdaH cha dwau etau brahmanaH puraa | kaNTham bhittvaa viniryaatau tena maa~Ngalikau ubhau || - reference?

Before the creation started two sounds, Om! and atha!, issued forth from the throat of the creator, Brahma. Hence these two are considered as auspicious sounds. The two words -Om- and -atha- are ma~Ngala shabda-s. The two words are used in the conclusion of dhyaana slokas as - Om atha | Om atha | Om atha | - In the Geeta, chapters start as -atha prathamo.adhyaayaH- because -atha- sound is considered as auspicious sound.

Now padaartham - word meaning:

The word -atha- has many meanings according to amarakosha: it says mangala, aarambha, adhikaara, prayojana, atha shabdaH | It includes many meanings such as auspiciousness, beginning, qualification, benefit, etc., besides other meanings such as now, then, moreover, rather,certainly, but, else, whatelse, howelse, etc. sha~Nkaraachaarya analyzes various possible meanings and ultimately arrives at one particular meaning with reference to Brahmasuutra. That meaning is -aanantaaryaaH atha shabdaH - the word means -anantaram- or thereafter or immediately after. What does that mean? Shankara says, if we take that meaning, naturally a question will arise in the mind of a listener as to -Whereafter?- Vyaasachaarya by implication can convey the pre-requisites in terms of qualification for the study of the Brahmasuutra - or adhikarii for the study of the suutra - which is one of the four requirements (anubandha chatushhTayam) of any text as outlined in the beginning. Any study should be after - yogyataa siddhi anantaram brahma jij~naasa - after acquiring the necessary qualifications one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. Thus by using the word -atha- Vyaasaachaarya implies the -niyama apekshita yogyataa-, the qualifications which should invariably proceed the study or invariable prerequisites, similar to the requirements for any higher course in any subject in a university. Now what are the invariable prerequisites for the study of Vedanta? Shankara says- saadhana chatushhTayam is the prerequisite. This is not directly mentioned by Vyaasa but it is indirectly



implied by Vyaasa. By using a single short word with two syllables Vyaasa is able to convey in the suutra format the prerequisites needed for the study, the saadhana chatushhTayam. Hence the implied meaning of the word -atha- according to Shankara is -saadhana chatushhTa anantaram- - after acquiring the four-fold qualifications. Of this, -after- is the direct meaning, and the rest is the implied meaning.

The next question is, how does one know that saadhana chatushhTayam or the four-fold qualifications are the prerequisites? The four-fold qualifications are outlined in the beginning of this chapter. There are two pramaaNa-s to show that saadhana chatushhTayam are the prerequisites for Vedantic study. The first is -yukti pramaaNam- or based on logic. The logic is called -anvaya vyatireka nyaaya - or the logic of co-presence and co-absence. This logic can be simply stated as: -yat sattve tat sattvam, yadabhaave tadabhaavaH, tasmaat tat tasya kaaraNam | meaning, when that is present this is present; and when that is absent this is absent and therefore that is a prerequisite for this. This can be simply illustrated by an example. When we add sugar, the milk is sweet and when sugar is absent the milk is not sweet - Hence we can write simply as an exercise as - sugar sattve sweet sattvam, sugar abhaave sweet abhaavaH, tasmaat sugareva sweetasya kaaraNam (this is just to illustrate the point!). Similarly from general observation we come to know that whoever has saadhana chatushhTayam he is able to getthe benefit of the Vedantic study, namely moksha - like Nachiketa in the kaThopanishat, like the student in the Kena, etc. who have the necessary qualifications - the proof is in the end of the teaching they say - dhanyo.aha.n kR^itakR^ityo.aham...- etc. expressing outright joy at the discovery of their freedom from limitations. On the other hand, a student who does not have the saadhana chatushhTayam does not derive the benefit even if he does the shravaNa, manana and nididhyaasanaetc. In kaThopanishat (I-2-24) a similar idea is conveyed when it says:

na avirataH dushcharitaat.h na ashaantaH na asamaahitaH | na ashaanta-maanasaH vaa api praj~naanena enam aapnuyaat.h ||

whoever does not give up the foul actions, and whose mind is always perturbed, who does not have a single pointedness and who does not have a peace of mind, even if he studies Vedanta, he cannot attain the self-realization. Shankara puts this idea nicely in his vivekachuuDaamaNi, v. # 18

saadhanaat yatra chatvaari kathitaani maniishhibhiH | yeshhu satsu eva sat nishhThaa yat abhaave na sidhyati ||

The wise people have spoken of the four qualifications that are required. Only when they are present one can attain brahma nishhThaa or established in Brahman, but when they are absent one cannot attain it. This is the logical establishment for the requirement of saadhanachatushhTayam using the logic of anvaya and vyatireka. If there is any more doubt, we can cross examine our own lives. When these four-fold qualifications are lacking, the study of Vedanta and Brahmasuutra becomes only an academic exercise involving intellectual gymnastics. Study of the suutra becomes more a cause for information rather than transformation of the person. Thus using logic, Shankara shows that saadhana chatushhTayam is required. This is called yukti pramaaNam.

We also have shruti pramaaNam to establish that the four-fold



qualifications are necessary for a vedantic student. They do not directly state them but indirectly imply them. There are many but oneor two will be mentioned for reference here. Mundakopanishhat: I:ii:12

pariikshya lokaan.h karma chitaan.h braahmaNaH nirveda-maayaat na asti akRîtaH kRîtena | tat vij~naartha.n sa gurum eva abhigachchhet.h samit paaNiH shrotriyamM brahma nishhTham.h ||

It is said that a seeker has to examine carefully all his life activities or experiences to learn what is permanent and what is impermanent. From that examination learn that all his experiences andachievements are all impermanent. By implication of this statement, shruti says one should have nitya anitya vastu viveka (discrimination of what is permanent and what is impermanent), which is one of the four qualifications. nirvedamaayaat - he should get disgusted with the anitya vastu or impermanent results and having suffered enough he should know the limitation of the impermanent results and hence turn his attention away from these - That is he should have dispassion or vairaagyam. Tat vij~naartham sa gurumeva abhigachchhet - he should approach a guru seeking the permanent solution for his problem. This indicates the mumukshutvam a desire for the freedom from limitations. Thus the sloka indicates the need for Viveka, vairaagya and mumukshutvam, discrimination, dispassion and the desire for liberation for a student seeking brahmavidya.

The same idea is presented in kaThopanishhat through the story of Nachiketa, who is the glorious example of the person possessing all these four qualification to the degree that the teacher Yama praises him to heavens that he had not seen such a deserving student. When Nachiketa requests for the Vedantic knowledge, Yama tempts him by offering everything including a blank check to shun him away from his desire to know the means for liberation. Nachiketa rejects all the offers without any hesitation and insists that he wants only the brahmavidya and nothing else. The moral of the story is if I want to gain brahmavidya like Nachiketa, I should be after Moksha like him and throw away dharma artha kaama like -kaaka-vishhThaayaam yathaiva- (a statement of Shankara in Aparokshaanubhuuti) meaning -like a droppings of a crow- We just immediately wipe it out and do not claim that getting rid of kaakavishhThaa, crow drops, is a great achievement. Just as a person throws away effortlessly or without thinking twice kaakavishhThaa, one should reject all the pleasures of the fourteen worlds. Nachiketa did not ask for time-out to contemplate whether to take Yama's offer or not. It was an outright rejection without a second thought. Through Nachiketa story, shruti is guiding us to select shreyas over preyas (permanent liberation over temporal pleasures) that is to have appropriate discrimination, viveka, to select shreyas over preyas, and vairaagyam or dispassion towardspreyas, and mumukshutvam - the necessity of all these four-fold qualifications is presented. Yama says to Nachiketa (Katha Up.I-2-2):

shreyaH cha preyaH cha manushhyameta\ stau sampariitya vivinakti dhiiraH | shreyaH hi dhiiraH abhi preyasaH vRîNiite preyaH mandaH yoga-kshemaat vRîNiite ||

Man has always a choice between shreyas (what is good) and preyas (what is pleasurable). Only an intelligent saadhak after contemplating decides to select what is good over what is pleasurable. The dull witted ones are the



ones who select for sense of security and pleasure and go after the sensuous objects. Thus scripture is guiding us to go after disciplined life which helps to acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti.

Hence the necessity of the four-fold qualifications for a student of brahmavidyaa are given in shruti in one form or the other. In these shlokas, we get information about viveka, vairaagya and mumukshutvam. What about the shama aadi shhaTka sampatti? Where is it mentioned inthe shruti? In bR^ihadaaraNyaka Upanishhad IV:iv:23 these are clearly mentioned. There is a sloka that says:

shaantaH daantaH uparataH titikshuH shraddhaa vitto bhuutvaa aatmanyeva aatmaanam pasyet|

In this statement shamaadi shaaTka sampatti is also emphasized. How about that samaadhaana in that group of six which is not mentioned in the above mantra? The BR^ihadaaranyaka has two versions, one belonging to kaanva shaakha and the other belonging to maadhyandina shaakha. In one shaakha shraddha is mentioned and in the other it is said as 'samaahito bhuutva' indicating the need of samaadhaanam as qualification. This is also stated in subaala upanishhat 9:12. Thus all the four-fold qualifications for a student are mentioned in one form or the other in the shruti.

Thus with yukti pramaaNa and with shruti pramaaNa, Shankara proves that -atha- means -saaddhana chatushhTaya anantaram-, that is -after acquiring the four-fold qualifications.

In the next section we take puurvapakshi's or objector's arguments against the above implied meaning for the atha shabdaH. My deep thanks to shree sunder hattangadi for helping me in the transliteration and in getting the correct references for the upanishat mantra-s. Any mistakes are mine.

End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1B ----------------------

6682

From: Kuntimaddi Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Thu Nov 9, 2000 1:37pmSubject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1C

Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1C


I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who isever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all theway up to my own teacher.




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.---------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1 suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

In this section we take a few puurvapaksha-s or objections against the above-implied meaning for atha shabdaH.

Objection:

Some philosophers have ascribed different intended meanings for the word 'atha'. They agree with Shankara that 'atha' means anantaram or thereafter but disagree that thereafter means saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram. The other commentators suggest that 'atha' means 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram', that is, only after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsa or the first portion or karmakaaNDa portion of the Vedas, one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. To put in Shankara's language they say 'karmaavabodha aanantaryam arthaH' - that is after the study of karmakaaNDa portion of the Veda-s. Shankaracharya elaborately refutes this meaning. We will go over this since these ideas are also engraved in some form in the Vishishta-advaita and Dwaita interpretations that give lot of weight to the karmakaaNDa portions.

What is puurvamiimaamsa?

We need to have some understanding of this before we can appreciate Shankara' refutation of their meaning to atha shabda. Purvamimamsa is the analysis of the first portion of the Veda-s. Where as, Brahmasutra-s are uttaramiimaa.nsa containing the analysis of the final portion of the Veda-s. The first portion deals with karma and upaasanaa and the last portion deals with j~naanam aspect. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsa is the analysis of karma and upaasanaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa is the analysis of Brahman or j~naanam. Now puurvapakshi or the objector says that the very word 'puurvamiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come puurva or first and thevery word 'uttaramiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come later or after. Therefore 'atha' should be translated as 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram' that is after the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsa only the inquiry into the nature of the Brahman. Purvapakshi's logic is as follows: puurvamiimaa.nsaa deals with karma and upaasanaa. We all know that karma and upaasanaa are needed to get the qualifications such as chittashuddhi etc. and saadhana chatushhTayam. Therefore one should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa, follow karma yoga and upaasanaa, thereafter acquire saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, and thereafter he should come to the study the uttaramiimaa.nsa and Brahmasutra. Since we know that everybody requires qualifications, and further since qualifications require the puurvamiimaa.nsa, one should give the meaning for the word 'atha' as puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram.

Response:

Shankara refutes puurvapakshi's arguments using both yukti or logic and shruti support.

yukti pramaaNa: Shankara give four reasons to refute the puuvapakshi's



views: The first reason is called 'vyabhichaara doshhaH' - wecan roughly translate as error due to inconsistency. Suppose the word 'atha' is translated as 'after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa' - then we will run into two problems. Suppose a person completes the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Next he will take up the study of uttaramiimaa.nsaa as per the purvapakshi's argument, thinking that he is now qualified to study the uttaramiimaa.nsaa. Shankara says that there is a danger involved. After the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa he may become a scholar of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and does not necessarily have the required saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti for uttaramiimaa.nsaa. The study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa does not necessarily guarantee that one will have acquired viveka, vairaagya, shhatkasampatti and mumukshutvam. Therefore unqualified student thinking that he is qualified will end up studying uttaramiimaa.nsaa. A person may become an expert in karma-s, yoga-s, rituals etc but that does not guarantee that he acquired saadhana chatusshTaya sampatti. On the other hand he may get more interestedin heavenly pleasures etc. MunDaka U. (1-2-10) exemplifies these karmakaanDi-s –

ishhTaapuurtaM manyamaanaa varishhThaM naanyachchhreyo vedayante pramuuDhaaH| naakasya pR^ishhThe te sukR^ite anubhuutvaa imaM lokaM hiinataraM vaa vishanti||

Thinking that these 'ishhTaapuurta karma-s are most supreme and there is nothing more beneficial than these and one goes after heavenly pleasures and thereafter go down the hill into lower worlds. This is what can happen if one hangs on to the karma-s thinking that they are important rather than acquiring the needed saadhana chatushhTayam. There are many expert ritualists and they do not have any interest in Vedanta. On the other hand they want to perform more and more rituals. Hence Shankara says that there is no guarantee that after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa one gets the necessary qualifications for the Vedantic study. He will not gain anything out of it. Thus the first problem that Shankara says is that an unqualified person taking up the study of Vedanta.

There is a second problem also. There can be some rare cases where a person is born with saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti because of puurva janma saadhana. (Shankara's own disciple - Hastamalaka is an example). Hence such students who are already having saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti do not require puurvamiimaa.nsaa since they already have the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. Then why should they waste their time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa? Right from brahmacharya aashrama they are ready for Vedantic study. Therefore if puurvapakshi says that only after puurvamiimaa.nsaa one should study Vedanta, then even an otherwise qualified student will end up wasting his time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Thus the puurvapakshi's ascribed meaning to 'atha' word that it implies 'puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram' or after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa will result in two problems; one an unqualified student entering into the study of Vedanta and the second a qualified student being denied immediate access to the study of Vedanta. On the other hand, as Shankara's ascribed if 'atha' implies 'saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram brahma jij~naasa' that is only after acquiring the four-fold qualifications one should inquire into the nature of Brahman, it automatically eliminates both problems stated above. One can acquire these qualification through puurva janma sa.nskaara (from previous birth) or in this birth through karma and upaasana. What is important is to emphasize the actual qualifications that are required rather than insist on a particular means, which does not necessarily guarantee acquisition of those qualifications. In this interpretation, the four-fold



qualifications become compulsory than the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa for all. Only for the unprepared minds, karma and upaasana can help in acquiring the four-fold qualifications and for them the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsaa will be beneficial. This is the first reason why puurvapakshi is wrong in his interpretation of the meaning to 'atha' shabdam.

Shankara gives three more reasons. To understand these reasons one should understand the background of the Shankaracharya's times when he was responding to these objections. When the puurvapakshi says one should come to Vedanta after studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa, this philosopher has got a particular philosophy in his mind, which was very prevalent during Shankara's time. According to that philosophy, mere knowledge cannot give liberation - 'kevala j~naanena mokshaH na sambhavati'. As an example, the puurvapakshi points out the state of most of the Vedantic students. This example may very well be applicable then as well as now. There are very many great Vedanta experts who can quote from one end to the other, some even in Orange robes. Some can give eloquent lectures and have big ashrams and number of disciples. They have studied Vedanta for many years. But their behavior and their language of communication is worse than the Vedanta illiterates. In the name of tradition, they propagate only fanaticism. Hence the puurvapakshi argues that these have studied Vedanta and still have not gained any benefit from it. Hence it is very clear that 'kevala j~naanena na mokshaH' by the Vedanta knowledge alone one cannot gain moksha. Hence j~naanam must be combined with karma. "j~naana karma samuchchhayena mokshaH' that is only by combining j~naana and karma one can gain moksha and not by j~naana alone. The proof is the direct evidence of the presence of so many Vedanta experts who have not gained what they intend to gain through the knowledge alone. This is the view of one philosopher who is called 'j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi', a proponent of the mixture of j~naana and karma for moksha (Some people now a days give more fancy name called- 'Integral yoga' - involving a samuchchaya of several things!). Hence his contention is that everyone should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa first so that he can know about all rituals or karma-s or upasana-s. Once he learns them, he should practice them or implement them - Yagna-s, various types of puuja-s, japa, vratams, etc. While implementing these, he should study the Vedanta to gain knowledge. Then he can combine both karma and j~naana required for moksha. Hence 'atha' means puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram one should enter into Brahman inquiry and while the inquiry is going on he should perform in parallel the rituals that he learned through the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa. This way he can combine karma with j~naanam - This is the contention of j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi - or a puurvapakshi's argument.

Shankara refutes this j~naana karma samuchchaya philosophy. For this, he gives three reasons. This is the topic Shankara enters into very often since this philosophy was very prevalent in his times. This may be little divergence, but some aspects of this philosophy is also prevalent at least in the practices of vishishhTa-advaita and more so in dwaita where the emphasis on the upaasanaa and puujaa dominates the field. vishishhTa-advaita emphasizes the sharaNaagati aspect with Bhakti involving archanaa, stuti or stotrams and japa as a means while in Dwaita major emphasis is on the puujaa with rigorous aachaara or practices. Puja-s look and sound spectacular with aarati of the deity, Krishna or NaaraayaNa, with one, two, five, ten, twenty-four, forty-eight, etc flames with as many drums and bells as possible making a deafening sound. Vedic upaasanaa and observance of various vrata-s became a norm of the practice than inquiry into the nature of the reality. Hence the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and karma is given importance in daily life.



Shankara provides three reasons to refute the j~naana-karma sumuchchaya philosophy. Three reasons are namely; karma j~naana kaanDayoH (between karma and j~naana) (a) vishhaya bhedaat (themes are different) (b) prayojana bhedaat (utilities are different) and(c) pravR^itti bhedaat (means are different). Because of these three reasons karma, j~naana cannot be combined.

Each one of these will be explained in the next post.

End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1C.

6682

From: Kuntimaddi Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Thu Nov 9, 2000 1:37pmSubject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1C

Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1C





In this section we take a few puurvapaksha-s or objections against the above-implied meaning for atha shabdaH.

Objection:

Some philosophers have ascribed different intended meanings for the word 'atha'. They agree with Shankara that 'atha' means anantaram or thereafter but disagree that thereafter means saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram. The other commentators suggest that 'atha' means 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram', that is, only after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsa or the first portion or



karmakaaNDa portion of the Vedas, one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. To put in Shankara's language they say 'karmaavabodha aanantaryam arthaH' - that is after the study of karmakaaNDa portion of the Veda-s. Shankaracharya elaborately refutes this meaning. We will go over this since these ideas are also engraved in some form in the Vishishta-advaita and Dwaita interpretations that give lot of weight to the karmakaaNDa portions.

What is puurvamiimaamsa?

We need to have some understanding of this before we can appreciate Shankara' refutation of their meaning to atha shabda. Purvamimamsa is the analysis of the first portion of the Veda-s. Where as, Brahmasutra-s are uttaramiimaa.nsa containing the analysis of the final portion of the Veda-s. The first portion deals with karma and upaasanaa and the last portion deals with j~naanam aspect. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsa is the analysis of karma and upaasanaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa is the analysis of Brahman or j~naanam. Now puurvapakshi or the objector says that the very word 'puurvamiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come puurva or first and thevery word 'uttaramiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come later or after. Therefore 'atha' should be translated as 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram' that is after the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsa only the inquiry into the nature of the Brahman. Purvapakshi's logic is as follows: puurvamiimaa.nsaa deals with karma and upaasanaa. We all know that karma and upaasanaa are needed to get the qualifications such as chittashuddhi etc. and saadhana chatushhTayam. Therefore one should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa, follow karma yoga and upaasanaa, thereafter acquire saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, and thereafter he should come to the study the uttaramiimaa.nsa and Brahmasutra. Since we know that everybody requires qualifications, and further since qualifications require the puurvamiimaa.nsa, one should give the meaning for the word 'atha' as puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram.

Response:

Shankara refutes puurvapakshi's arguments using both yukti or logic and shruti support.

yukti pramaaNa: Shankara give four reasons to refute the puuvapakshi's views: The first reason is called 'vyabhichaara doshhaH' - wecan roughly translate as error due to inconsistency. Suppose the word 'atha' is translated as 'after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa' - then we will run into two problems. Suppose a person completes the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Next he will take up the study of uttaramiimaa.nsaa as per the purvapakshi's argument, thinking that he is now qualified to study the uttaramiimaa.nsaa. Shankara says that there is a danger involved. After the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa he may become a scholar of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and does not necessarily have the required saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti for uttaramiimaa.nsaa. The study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa does not necessarily guarantee that one will have acquired viveka, vairaagya, shhatkasampatti and mumukshutvam. Therefore unqualified student thinking that he is qualified will end up studying uttaramiimaa.nsaa. A person may become an expert in karma-s, yoga-s, rituals etc but that does not guarantee that he acquired saadhana chatusshTaya sampatti. On the other hand he may get more interestedin heavenly pleasures etc. MunDaka U. (1-2-10) exemplifies these karmakaanDi-s –

ishhTaapuurtaM manyamaanaa varishhThaM naanyachchhreyo vedayante pramuuDhaaH| naakasya pR^ishhThe te sukR^ite anubhuutvaa



imaM lokaM hiinataraM vaa vishanti||

Thinking that these 'ishhTaapuurta karma-s are most supreme and there is nothing more beneficial than these and one goes after heavenly pleasures and thereafter go down the hill into lower worlds. This is what can happen if one hangs on to the karma-s thinking that they are important rather than acquiring the needed saadhana chatushhTayam. There are many expert ritualists and they do not have any interest in Vedanta. On the other hand they want to perform more and more rituals. Hence Shankara says that there is no guarantee that after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa one gets the necessary qualifications for the Vedantic study. He will not gain anything out of it. Thus the first problem that Shankara says is that an unqualified person taking up the study of Vedanta.

There is a second problem also. There can be some rare cases where a person is born with saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti because of puurva janma saadhana. (Shankara's own disciple - Hastamalaka is an example). Hence such students who are already having saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti do not require puurvamiimaa.nsaa since they already have the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. Then why should they waste their time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa? Right from brahmacharya aashrama they are ready for Vedantic study. Therefore if puurvapakshi says that only after puurvamiimaa.nsaa one should study Vedanta, then even an otherwise qualified student will end up wasting his time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Thus the puurvapakshi's ascribed meaning to 'atha' word that it implies 'puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram' or after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa will result in two problems; one an unqualified student entering into the study of Vedanta and the second a qualified student being denied immediate access to the study of Vedanta. On the other hand, as Shankara's ascribed if 'atha' implies 'saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram brahma jij~naasa' that is only after acquiring the four-fold qualifications one should inquire into the nature of Brahman, it automatically eliminates both problems stated above. One can acquire these qualification through puurva janma sa.nskaara (from previous birth) or in this birth through karma and upaasana. What is important is to emphasize the actual qualifications that are required rather than insist on a particular means, which does not necessarily guarantee acquisition of those qualifications. In this interpretation, the four-fold qualifications become compulsory than the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa for all. Only for the unprepared minds, karma and upaasana can help in acquiring the four-fold qualifications and for them the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsaa will be beneficial. This is the first reason why puurvapakshi is wrong in his interpretation of the meaning to 'atha' shabdam.

Shankara gives three more reasons. To understand these reasons one should understand the background of the Shankaracharya's times when he was responding to these objections. When the puurvapakshi says one should come to Vedanta after studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa, this philosopher has got a particular philosophy in his mind, which was very prevalent during Shankara's time. According to that philosophy, mere knowledge cannot give liberation - 'kevala j~naanena mokshaH na sambhavati'. As an example, the puurvapakshi points out the state of most of the Vedantic students. This example may very well be applicable then as well as now. There are very many great Vedanta experts who can quote from one end to the other, some even in Orange robes. Some can give eloquent lectures and have big ashrams and number of disciples. They have studied Vedanta for many years. But their behavior and their language of communication is worse than the Vedanta illiterates. In the name of tradition, they propagate only fanaticism. Hence the puurvapakshi argues that these have studied Vedanta and still have



not gained any benefit from it. Hence it is very clear that 'kevala j~naanena na mokshaH' by the Vedanta knowledge alone one cannot gain moksha. Hence j~naanam must be combined with karma. "j~naana karma samuchchhayena mokshaH' that is only by combining j~naana and karma one can gain moksha and not by j~naana alone. The proof is the direct evidence of the presence of so many Vedanta experts who have not gained what they intend to gain through the knowledge alone. This is the view of one philosopher who is called 'j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi', a proponent of the mixture of j~naana and karma for moksha (Some people now a days give more fancy name called- 'Integral yoga' - involving a samuchchaya of several things!). Hence his contention is that everyone should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa first so that he can know about all rituals or karma-s or upasana-s. Once he learns them, he should practice them or implement them - Yagna-s, various types of puuja-s, japa, vratams, etc. While implementing these, he should study the Vedanta to gain knowledge. Then he can combine both karma and j~naana required for moksha. Hence 'atha' means puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram one should enter into Brahman inquiry and while the inquiry is going on he should perform in parallel the rituals that he learned through the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa. This way he can combine karma with j~naanam - This is the contention of j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi - or a puurvapakshi's argument.

Shankara refutes this j~naana karma samuchchaya philosophy. For this, he gives three reasons. This is the topic Shankara enters into very often since this philosophy was very prevalent in his times. This may be little divergence, but some aspects of this philosophy is also prevalent at least in the practices of vishishhTa-advaita and more so in dwaita where the emphasis on the upaasanaa and puujaa dominates the field. vishishhTa-advaita emphasizes the sharaNaagati aspect with Bhakti involving archanaa, stuti or stotrams and japa as a means while in Dwaita major emphasis is on the puujaa with rigorous aachaara or practices. Puja-s look and sound spectacular with aarati of the deity, Krishna or NaaraayaNa, with one, two, five, ten, twenty-four, forty-eight, etc flames with as many drums and bells as possible making a deafening sound. Vedic upaasanaa and observance of various vrata-s became a norm of the practice than inquiry into the nature of the reality. Hence the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and karma is given importance in daily life.

Shankara provides three reasons to refute the j~naana-karma sumuchchaya philosophy. Three reasons are namely; karma j~naana kaanDayoH (between karma and j~naana) (a) vishhaya bhedaat (themes are different) (b) prayojana bhedaat (utilities are different) and(c) pravR^itti bhedaat (means are different). Because of these three reasons karma, j~naana cannot be combined.

Each one of these will be explained in the next post.

End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1C.

Message 6812 of 8550 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Sat Nov 25, 2000 10:46amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1E

Notes on BSB-I-I-1-1E







ataH shabda vichaaraH-Discussion of meaning of 'ataH' word :

The literal meaning of the second word 'ataH' is 'therefore'. We know that therefore always indicates a reason. Thus 'ataH' or therefore should be preceded by some reason for Brahman inquiry to be conducted. Vyaasaachaarya does not mention the reason since it is suutram where he has to be brief. Hence we have to supply the reason or reasons and once reason is provided we can say therefore Brahman inquiry should be done. Shankaracharya gives two reasons, one is the negation of alternates and the second is to ascertain the path of inquiry. The first reason is karma cannot give moksha and puurvamiimaa.nsa deals mostly with karma. The second is brahmaj~naanam alone gives moksha. Therefore Brahman inquiry should be done.

Let us take each reason in detail. First, karma cannot give moksha. Why is it so? This aspect has been discussed in the last sections. It is established through shruti, yukti (logic) and anubhava (experience) pramaaNa. The well-known shruti statement is:

na karmaNaa na prajyayaa dhanena tyaagena eke amR^itatvam aanashuH| (kaivalya upanishhat-I-3)

Neither by action, nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation alone the immortality can be obtained. Thus by karma moksha cannot be attained. Shankara gives another shruti's statement taken from Ch. U. (VIII:i:6)"... yatheha karma-jitaH lokaH kshiiyate evam eva amutra puNya-jitaH lokaH kshiiyate |"just as karmaphalam belonging to this world is anityam or impermanent, karma phalam belonging to swargaadi loka-s, heavens etc., are also are impermanent.Hence-iha karma phalam anityam, paraloka karma phalam anityam, sarvam karma phalam anityam - ataH nityamokshaH karmaphalam na bhavati |- The results of actions here in this life are impermanent, the results of actions belonging to next world are impermanent and results of all actions are impermanent, hence moksha which is permanent and eternal cannot be the result of any action, here and hereafter.



Action being finite can only give finite result and series of finite actions can give only a series of finite results and sum of series of finite results can only be finite but not infinite. This statement is mathematically precise. Hence action cannot give eternal infinite result. This is shruti pramaaNa, which is also logical.

Next yukti pramaaNa. Since karma itself anitya or impermanent, the anitya karma can only produce anitya phalam or impermanent result. As the cause so is the effect - karmaNaH anityatvaat karmaphalasyaapi anityatvam-. Why karma anityam? It is -anityam-, impermanent because -kaaraka janyatvaat- - karma is born out of ephemeral ingredients; the perishable man, the perishable priest, the perishable materials, the perishable fire or agni. Hence anitya kaaraka janyatvaat kriyaa api anityaa bhavati|. Since ephemeral impermanent is the cause the result is also ephemeral and impermanent and cannot give permanent eternal liberation.

Next anubahava pramaaNa. Our experience also shows that whatever is produced out of work is also anityam. Civilization arose out of efforts but they all disappeared into oblivion. Kings came, dynasties grew, empires were built but they all got destroyed. None remained eternal. Thus from shruti, yukti and anubhava, one can prove that karma does not give permanent eternal happiness, moksha that one is seeking in all pursuits.

The second reason is brahmaj~naanam alone gives moksha. Again we prove this using shruti pramaaNam, yukti pramaaNam and anubhava pramaaNam.First shruti pramaaNam:Shankara quotes from tittiriiya upanishhat (II-i-1) - brahmavit aapnoti param| - knower of Brahman gains the supreme. From mundaka upanishhat (III-ii-9)- sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati - knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. From purusha suuktam: tamevam vidvaan amR^ita iha bhavati| naanyaH panthaa ayanaaya vidyate| Knowing Him only immortality can be obtained even in this life. There is no other path for liberation. From Kaivalya upanishhat-I:10: sarva bhuutastham aatmaana.n sarva bhuutaani ca aatmani | sampashyan brahma paramam yaati na anyena hetunaa || By knowledge of oneself alone in all beings and all beings in oneself alone, one attains the supreme Brahman, not by any other means. (a somewhat similar statement occurs in Bhagavad-Gita.6-29)

Thus there are several shruti pramaaNa.

Now yukti pramaaNa. Moksha means sa.nsaara nivR^itti - liberation means freedom from sa.nsaara. Freedom from sa.nsaara can only come through knowledge only because sa.nsaara is adhyastam, is due to an error (Please refer to adhyaasa bhaashhya). sa.nsaara will go only by knowledge, because it is adhyaasa or superimposition, like rope-snake case'. How do we destroy the superimposed snake or false snake? We cannot destroy using a stick or GaruDa mantra or Irula tribes men (who catch snakes). It can only be eliminated only by one method that is by j~naana maatrena -by knowledge alone since it is a superimposition or error. Similarly the sa.nsaara, as it is also due an error or adhyaasa. How do we say that sa.nsaara is adhyaasa? Shankarachaarya says you have to go back and study Ch. III again as this was discussed exhaustively there. He says only to explain this word 'ataH' - the whole adhyaasa bhaashhya was written.

Next anubhava [or experience] pramaaNa. Any superimposed problem goes only by knowledge as we see in the case of rope-snake, mirage water. This is our experience - rajju-sarpa janya bhaya kampaadikam rajju j~naanena nashyati |-



A person who was frightened out of rope-snake has got fear, shivering, sweat, thus suffering from sa.nsaara caused by the rope-snake. He gets out of these fears and the associated sa.nsaara once he learns that it is only a rope. Similarly the problems in the dream are superimpositions and we find all the dream sa.nsaara goes once awakened to the knowledge of reality. -yat saakshat kurute prabodha samaye |- Thus by knowledge alone many of the superimposition problems go. After listening to this, one fellow asked - sir, superimposed snake will go by knowledge gained by shedding the light, but if it is a real snake it will not go. Similarly the superimposed sa.nsaara can go by Vedanta knowledge but if there is a real sa.nsaara, it will not go! (This is one of the arguments of the Dwaitins since for them experience is real and sa.nsaara is an intense experience). The answer is in the case of snake there is a possibility of real snake and a false snake but in the case of sa.nsaara there is only a false sa.nsaara and no real sa.nsaara - for this read Shankara's answer for puurvapakshi's arguments in Ch. III. There is no real sa.nsaara at all. The absolute reality is one and that is Brahman - ekam eva advitiiyam, one without second. Hence any second, including sa.nsaara can only be an adhyaasa or error. Hence sa.nsaara cannot be real.

na nirodhaH na cha utpattiH na baddhaH na cha saadhakaH | na mumukshuH na vai muktaH iti eshhaa paramaarthataa || [Mandukya-Karika II:32]In reality there is neither obstruction for liberation, nor birth, nor bondage, nor a seeker of moksha, none liberated - Just the supreme transcendental truth.

Thus by shruti, yukti and anubhava pramaaNa we have established that only by knowledge alone one can gain moksha or freedom from limitations. By the shruti, yukti and anubhava pramaaNa we have also established that karma cannot give moksha - 'ataH', therefore, -brahma jij~naasaa kartavyaa-, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman should be done. Thus, the word -ataH- directly signifies -therefore- implying the reasons for the study of Vedanta and indirectly signifies the -prayojanam- or purpose of the study as required in the anubandha chatushhTayam.

With this the -ataH shabda vichaara- or the inquiry into the meaning of the word -ataH- is completed.

Message 6955 of 8550 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Dec 4, 2000 2:19pmSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F

Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F



vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiitaMaananda saandram amalairnidhaanam.h .|shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitaM



sadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.----------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1 suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

Next word is brahma-jij~naasaa. The word meaning is Brahman inquiry. It should mean 'brahma j~naanaaya vedanta vichaaraH', that is Vedantic inquiry for brahma j~naanam. brahma-jij~naasaa is a compound word with three parts - brahma, jij~naa, saa. The word brahma means brahman which will be defined later as jagat kaaraNam brahma, the cause for the world. Brahman has got different meanings in the shaastra - in Geeta it says - karma brahma udbhavam viddhi brahma-akshara-samudbhavam - there it is translated as the Veda. In taittiriiya Upanishad [I:v:1] it says - 'maha iti tad brahma, sa aatmaa |' - there brahma is translated as OM-kaara. In kaThopanishad [I:ii:25]- yasya brahma cha kshatra.n cha ubhe bavata odanaH| - there the word brahma was translated as braahmaNa. Sometimes brahma is translated as hiranyagarbha also [muNDaka I:1]- sa brahma-vidyaam sarva-vidyaa pratishhThaam - here brahma vidyaa is vidyaa given by hiranyagarbha. When it says [taitt. II:i:1]'brahmavid aapnoti param' - there brahma means 'satyam, j~naanam, anantam brahma' - who is the jagat kaaraNam. Thus according to context the word brahma is translated to mean different meanings. The definition used here for brahma is explained more elaborately in the second suutra by vyaasaachaarya. Based on that suutra we come to conclusion that in brahma-jij~naasaa, brahman stands for jagat kaaraNam brahma, the one who is the cause for the creation of the universe. The second part of the word is jij~naa - Shankara says it means j~naanam - what kind of j~naanam it is? - it is avagati paryantam j~naanam - avagati means dR^iDha aparoksha j~naanam, firm and direct knowledge of the reality.

The last part is 'saa' - it is a suffix - san pratyayaH - it literally means ichchhaa or desire (direct meaning). In Sanskrit when we add the 'san' pratyaya, it conveys the meaning of a desire. Thus jij~naasaa - is desire to know - just as mumukshaa, desire for liberation, pipaThishaa, desire to learn, etc. Hence Shankara says desire is the vaachyaartha of the 'san' pratyaya, here we have to take lakshyaartha or implied meaning. The implied meaning is inquiry or vichaaraH. Thus ichchhaa or desire is the vaachyaartha and vichaaraH or inquiry is lakshyaartha. What is the connection between desire and inquiry? Inquiry is always the result of a desire for knowledge. That is 'ichchha janya vichaara lakshaNa' - that is the inquiry born out of desire to know. The words brahma jij~naasaa means brahma j~naana ichchhaa - which means 'brahma j~naana vichaaraH'. Hence if we can combine all this, we have brahma jij~naasaa meaning 'dR^iDha aparoksha brahma j~naanaaya vedaanta vichaaraH (kartavyaH) - to gain the direct abiding knowledge of brahman, Vedanta vichaara should be done.

The question can be raised as to why one should add Vedanta vichaara - Vyasaachaarya suutra imply just vichaara - he did not specify Vedanta vichaara. Why cannot I make 'self-inquiry' without worrying about Vedanta? - How do you do if asked, they respond that the 'self-inquiry' - it is very simple and is a straight path ' All I have to do is to close my eyes and ask myself- who am I? and thus find out who I am. There are some who claim that



'who am I inquiry?' is different from Vedantic inquiry. And people claim that 'who am I inquiry?' can be done sitting in a corner without having a guru or study of Vedanta - it is a straight path or direct path. All I have to do is dwell deep into my heart and ask the question - who am I, who am I ... etc., and one day I will realize. Since we don't know who we are other than what we know of ourselves as ' I am sa.nsaarii, I am limited, I am duHkhii, I am ignorant, etc. etc. These are the only answers that will come out in the 'who am I inquiry since we do not know any better of who we are. Hence 'self-inquiry' does not mean one self doing the inquiry -it is the inquiry of 'the self' with help of Guru and shaastra or Vedanta. Self inquiry does not mean oneself inquiry or independent inquiry - it is shhashhThii tatpurushha - it is the inquiry of the self with the help of guru and shaashtra. Because Vedanta alone is the pramaaNam for brahman. Hence brahma vichaara or aatma vichaara is through Vedanta vichaara.

Hence the final meaning for 'brahma jij~naasaa' means 'brahma j~naanaaya vedanta vichaaraH' inquiry into Vedanta for gaining brahma j~naanam. Any knowledge can takes place only through the operation of a pramaaNam (means of knowledge), pramaaNa janyaa pramaa. We have already mentioned the six means of knowledge that involves pratyaksha, anumaana, etc. Now vicharaH is not accepted as one of the six pramaaNa-s. Mere inquiry or independent thinking, mere sitting in meditation are not accepted as one of the six pramaaNa-s. If a person goes on inquiring without any of the six means of pramaaNam, it will lead only to a speculative system of philosophy, it can lead to various hypotheses, but can never lead to knowledge. Hence if inquiry should lead to a knowledge, it should involve a pramaaNam, a valid means of knowledge. In the case of brahman, we have got only one relevant and useful pramaaNam, which is shabdta pramaaNam, vedanta shabda pramaaNam. Hence without bringing in the upanishad shabda pramaaNam if inquiry is done it will only lead to speculations only. Therefore brahman inquiry involves a shabda pramaaNam, that is Vedanta or upanishad pramaaNam. Vyaasaachaarya does not use the word 'vedanta vichaaraH', we have to supply the word vedanta vichaara kartavyaH|| In fact, Vyasaaachaarya, himself tells in the third suutra that Vedanta alone is the pramaaNam for brahman and also uses Vedanta for the inquiry of brahman. Hence brahma jij~naasaa means brahma j~naanaaya vedanta vichaaraH. This is the final meaning.

Why are we interested in brahma j~naanam? We are interested in brahma j~naanam since we are interested in moksha or sa.nsaara nivR^ittiH, removal of sa.nsaara. We have analyzed why brahma j~naanam removes sa.nsaara. While inquiring into ataH shabda we have inquired why karma cannot give moksha and why j~naanam alone gives moksha. Since sa.nsaara is adhyastaH or superimposed, it can be removed by j~naanam. Now a question arises. Any superimposition goes by knowledge, like our good old snake. When we say the superimposed snake is removed by knowledge, the question is what knowledge will remove the snake. The snake is not removed by the knowledge of chemistry or knowledge of physics. The snake is removed only by the knowledge of rope which is the adhishhThaanam of the snake. From this we get a rule - adhyaasa is removed only by adhishhThaana j~naanam. Any superimposition is removed by the knowledge of its adhishhTaanam. Applying this logic, we have 'sa.nsaaraH swa adhishhTana j~naana nivartyaH, adhyastatvaat, rujju sarpavat|' sa.nsaara can be removed by the knowledge of its adhishhTaanam, because sa.nsaara is superimposed like our snake. While writing adhyaasa bhaashhyam Shankaraachaarya pointed out that the entire sa.nsaara or jiivatvam is superimposed on the adhishhTaanamm which is aatma. Thus in adhyaasabhaashyam we have learned that the adhishhTaanam of sa.nsaara is aatma. The entire jiivatvam is superimposed upon aatma. If we have to remove sa.nsaara, it is removed by the swa adhishhTana j~naanam. This implies that aatmaj~naanam alone will remove sa.nsaara. Hence for the



removal of sa.nsaara one needs aatma j~naanam and therefore inquiry should be about aatman.

Therefore a puurvapakshi argues that we should be conducting aatmaa vichaaraH where as Vyaasaachaarya writes athaato brahmagij~naasa. It should have been 'athaato aatma jij~naasaa' - aatma vichaaraH karthavyaH. From which we gain aatma j~naanam which removes the samaaraH. It is like inquiry into the shell when we have to remove the snake in the rope-snake adhyaasa. Hence why are you introducing brahman inquiry when we want to inquire into the aatma j~naanam? - asks a puurvapakshi.

One answer is brahman is the same as the aatma. Hence brahman inquiry is aatman inquiry. That is why in taittiriiya Upanishad it says, tat vijij~naasasva in that place brahma vichaara is mentioned. In bRîhadaaraNyaka - aatmaa vaa are shrotavyo, manthavyo, nidhidhyaaitavyaH, there atmaa vichaara is mentioned. Thus Upanishads loosely use the two words indicating that brahman and aatman are one and the same. Hence the first suutra itself indirectly reveals brahma-aatma aikyam. This is the first answer to show that brahma vichaara is the same as the aatma vichaara since brahman and aatma are one and the same. In addition there is a declaration in the Upanishhad as one of the mahavaakya-s. - ayam atmaa brahma - this aatma is brahman. Thus equating the two.

The answer can also be presented in a different way also. When we say brahman inquiry, one should not think that Brahman is a new substance to be revealed by the scriptures. This is the biggest mistake a seeker commits. When the scriptures introduce Brahman, we think Brahman is some new substance to be known. That is why even after studying scriptures for years and years together we look for Brahman in meditation. Some say I have understood Brahman but I have not come across face-to-face with Brahman in Meditation. We should very clearly understand that inquiry of Brahman does not mean inquiry of something other than oneself as a new substance unfamiliar. Brahman is not a new substance. The word Brahman indicates a new status of mine which is already available called 'aham', I am. This can be stated as 'aham, aham, aham iti, siddha ruupasya aatmanaH brahmatvam eva brahma shabdena uchyate|' Hence when we say brahman knowledge, it is the knowledge of brahmatvam status of mine - my paraprakRîti - now I am lost in aparaa prakRîti - It is my own supreme status, currently I am lost in the notion of inferior status due to superimposed limitations that do not belong to me. Therefore 'brahma vichaaraH' should be translated as 'aatmanaH brahmatva vichaaraH'. Brahman inquiry is to be understood as inquiry into the Brahman (limitlessness) status of aatma, one's own self. If Brahman status or brahmatvam is the new status of mine to be discovered, what is the old status of mine? Jiivatvam is my present status. By discovering the brahmatvam status, I discard my jiivatvam status, since that status is not natural to me. This is similar to discarding sarpatvam ( snakeness ) status of the object by learning its the rajjutvam (ropeness) status. Similarly brahman inquiry means inquiry of ones own true nature, aatman inquiry.

Therefore athaataH brahma jij~naasaa is equal to athaataH aatma jij~naasaa or athaataH aatmanaH brahmatva gij~naasa. This is the meaning of the word 'brahma gij~naasa'. Through this word, Vyaasaacharya indirectly reveals the subject matter of Brahmasuutra, a requirement of the anubandha chautashhTayam. Now connecting all these we have the first word atha indirectly revealed 'adhikaari', who is a qualified student, the word 'ataH' indirectly revealed prayojanam, the word brahma gij~naasa' indirectly revealed vishhayaH. Thus three of the four anubandha chatushhTa are pointed out.------------------



End of Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F

Next the conclusion of this adhikaraNa.

Message 7100

From: K. Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Wed Dec 13, 2000 1:27pmSubject: Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1G

Notes on BSB I-I-1-1G




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1 suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

We have completed analysis of all three words of suutra. However, there is a fourth word which we have to supply to complete sentence. The word is kartavyaa. kartavyaa means should be done. That is inquiry should be done for aatmaj~naanam. Since the word is implied,vyaasaachaarya omits the word for brevity. By using this word, it is implied that there is a vidhi or a rule prescribed in the upanishhads - aatmaa vaa are drashhTavyaH shrotavyaH , mantavyaH , nididhyaasitavyaH - where the ending of each involve - tavyaH, indicative of imperative mood meaning 'should be done'. The three are replaced by one word 'kartavyaH'. kartavyaH should therefore be understood as shrotavyaH , mantavyaH and nididhyaasitavyaH. Hence one should do Brahman inquiry means one should do shravaNam , mananam and nididhyaasanam.

Thus the final expanded meaning of the suutra is 'saadhana chatushhTaya sampattyanantaram brahma-j~naanaaya vedaanta shravaNa , manana , nididhyaasanaani kartavyaani - yasmaat brahma-j~naanaat eva mokshaH na tu karmaNaa '. That is 'after acquiring the four-fold qualifications, one should do shravaNa , manana , nididyaasana of Vedanta for the sake of brahma-j~naana because brahma-j~naanam alone gives moksha, not karma'.



Now suppose anyone asks Vyaasaachaarya, 'what should I do?' Then Vyaasaachaarya will ask a counter question - 'Have you already acquired saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti - the four-fold qualifications - in this life or in the past life?' - If you already have like Nachiketa, then you can begin the inquiry into the nature of Brahman using Vedanta as a tool. If not, my advice is to gain the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti by following the karma yoga and/or bhakti yoga. This can be more easily done by following rules laid down in puurvamiimaa.nsa for the karma and upaasanaa. If one has not studied the puurvamiimaa.nsaa , then one can take the help of the priests who have studied puurvamiimaa.nsaa and follow the rituals for karma and upaasanaa. What is required is the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, but how it is acquired is of less significance. Following the strict rules laid down in puurvamiimaa.nsaa which involve do's and don'ts one can gain mental discipline required that involve shama , dama , etc. puurvamiimaa.nsaa helps but does not guarantee that one will acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. Karma yoga and bhakti yoga are the most efficient methods to acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. We hear people complaining that "I have been doing meditation and studying Vedanta for so many years and nothing is happening to me?" - The problem is not with Vedanta but with the lack of appropriate mental framework needed for the inquiry of Brahman. It is like my studying the book on 'Quantum Mechanics' and complain that I have not understood anything from that even though I read it many times. It is not the fault of the book but lack of the prerequisites to study the book. Hence Vyaasaachaarya advises us to go back to our fundamentals and gain the prerequisite qualifications so that when Brahman inquiry is done with that preparatory mind through vedaanta vichaara , one can gain the knowledge of one's own self.

Now the next question is, 'does that mean we should all stop Vedantic study now?' Qualified people are very rare and the majority of us are unqualified and therefore there is no use of continuing the study of the 'Notes on Brahmasutra'. We should stop the notes on Brahmasuutra and what we need now is the "Notes on Jaimini sutra" for our study from the next week on.

The intention is not that. The idea is we should continue our study of Vedanta while we continue to acquire, increase or intensify our saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. As the acquisition of saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti intensifies, the study of Vedanta becomes more and more relevant or significant or meaningful to our own understanding of the nature of ourselves or Brahman. Without that, it will become only an academic study. But even then, let it start as an academic study. However, as I acquire slowly the four-fold qualifications, even the so-called academic study will become very relevant for my life. A causal approach becomes a serious approach as the interest develops. A simple example is like a fellow who is trying to connect an electric bulb to a receptacle. If the wires are already 'live', as soon as the bulb makes a proper contact, it glows instantly and the light emanated from the bulb removes the darkness at the very instant the bulb made the contact. Suppose it is not a live wire, since no electricity is passing through the wires. Connecting the bulb will not make much difference in terms of removing the darkness in the room. However that action is not in vain. One can go back and slowly turn the switch on to pass the electric current through the wires. The switch is like the modern



'dimmer switch'. Nothing will happen even after switch is on. One has to turn slowly to higher power to get the light from the bulb. The previously connected bulb, which was not glowing up to now, will start glowing to its full glory, the moment the wires become fully alive. He does not have to reconnect the bulb again. Vedanta knowledge is like fixing the bulb needed to remove the darkness. If the saadhanaa chatushhTaya sampatti is already there, then Vedanta knowledge will help glow the light of knowledge that removes the darkness of the ignorance. If not, gaining the Vedanta knowledge will not be a waste; it helps slowly as we acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti through karma and bhakti yoga. As our mind becomes purer and purer by karma and bhakti yoga, the light of Vedantic knowledge will intensify to convert j~naanam into vij~naanam , praj~naa into sthirapraj~naa , paroksha j~naanam into aparoksha j~naanam, pratibandhaka j~naanam into apratibandhaka j~naanam. Hence we can continue our Vedantic study and the weekly Notes on Brahmasutra and continue our aashrama dharma also, that is our obligatory duties at various levels including personal, family and society levels. Thus on one side we should refine our qualifications and on the other side shravaNa , manana and nididhyaasana should continue.

With this the word analysis of the first suutra is completed.

Next will be the conclusion of the first suutra with odds and ends!

7177

From: K. Sadananda <[email protected]>Date: Tue Dec 19, 2000 11:06amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1H

Notes on BSB I-I-1-1H




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1



suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

Conclusion:

The final topic of the first suutra is conclusion. In the conclusion, the same concepts are discussed in a technical format in which the Brahmasuutra should be presented.

This may be more of an academic interest, but is worth knowing the format used. Hence no new ideas will be discussed in this section other than following a technical format for the presentation of suutra literature. One can read as review of the topic.

In the introduction we mentioned that topics are discussed under the heading of 'adhikaraNam'. In the first adhikaraNam there is only one suutra and appropriately named as jij~naasaa adhikaraNam based on the first suutra 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa'. Every adhikaraNam has to be presented in a format that includes five factors starting from vishhaya as outlined in the definition sloka given in the Notes I of Brahmasuutra. These are 1. vishhayaH, the subject matter, 2. vishayaH or sa.nshayaH or doubt, 3 puurvapakshaH, the view of an opponent, 4. sidhhantaH, our conclusions and 5. sangatiH, the connection of this topic with the overall. This format is called adhikaraNa nirNayaH and Shankara follows this format with each adhikaraNa.

For the jij~naasaadhikaraNam, the subject matter is Vedanta shaastram. The doubt is 'vichaaraNiiyam vaa or na vichaaraNiiyam vaa' , whether it should be studied or is it worth studying or not worth studying? Should we receive this notes or not, or even if we receive it, 'as some one complained recently that we are dumping on his head', is it worth studying now, delete it or store it in a file to study later as it is not of high priority right now; or complain that we are unnecessarily targeted with something that we are not interested and these is a violation of a law, etc.? These are doubts that need to be resolved. The third factor is the puurvapakshaH - the view of an opponent that should be presented along with his reasoning as anumaanam. For example, we can present a puurvapaksha in anumaana vaakyam as:

'vedaanta shaastram na vichaaraNiiyam, anubandha chatushhTaya abhaavaat, vyatirekeNa dharma shaastravat.h |'

vedaanta shaastram should not be studied, since it does not have anubandha chatushhTayam, unlike dhramashaastra.

Therefore according to a puurvapakshii, there is no anubandha chatushhTayam (the four-fold requirements starting from adhikaarii etc - see the Notes I-I-1-1A). In brief, this puurvapakshi argues first that no adhikaari is ever possible. This is because viveka is impossible, vairaagya no one has it, shama aadi shaTkasampatti nobody seems to have it, including the so-called great sages of the lore who cursed left and right, and nobody seems to have the intense desire for moksha, the mumukshutvam. Hence saadhanachatushhTaya sampatti is asambhavam or impossible. Hence there is no one who is adhikaarii. There is no student who is qualified to study - such students are available only in the books like kaThopanishhad and not in this world and definitely not in this kaliyuga, when dharma is only on one leg. Thus, the first factor in the anubandha chatushhTayam, i.e. a



qualified student, is not there.

We have problem also with the second factor i.e. subject matter - Brahman - we are consistently discussing pages and pages about a hare's horn, which is not there. How can there be a nirguNam vastu at all for one to inquire about. And if we ask the question how to know it, the answer we get is that ' we cannot know it' - and upanishhad in fact declares that 'he who knows it knows not!' It is different from the known and at the same time different from the unknown, one cannot see it, hear it, speak about it or think about it -and at the same time pages and pages are written about that which is unthinkable and unspeakable. From all this, it is very clear that it is just consistent brain washing. There is no such thing as Brahman and it is just mere bhrama of the student and the teacher. The teacher is confused and transmitting that confusion to his student using very high sounding Sanskrit words which are self contradictory with no substance, saying on one side 'He is smaller than the smallest' and with the same breath contradicting that statement by saying that 'He is bigger than the biggest'. And some say He is aatmaa, but no aatmaa has been found anywhere in any body by anybody. You say it is consciousness, there appears to be no independent consciousness. Matter alone seems to be independent and consciousness seems to depend on matter for its existence rather than other way around. If you have any doubts look into discussions on advaitin list serve during the months of August. Consciousness seems to be an illusion happening in matter rather than the other way around. Hence there is no such thing as Brahman or aatman and therefore there is no subject matter to inquire into. Hence adhikaarii naasti, vishhaya naasti - what about prayojanam - when Brahman himself is not there what prayojanam we can talk about. It is like the story in 'Emperor's clothes'!. Hence vedaanta shaastram na vichaaraNiiyam - says the puurvapakshi.

siddhaanta anumaanam says, vedaanta shaastram vichaaraNiiyam, anubandha chatushhTaayavatvaat, dharma shaastravat. anubandha chatushhTaya is there. This means adhikaarii is there, vishhaya, the subject matter is there and prayojanam and sambandha are also there. Just because adhikaari-s are few, one cannot say adhikaari-s are nil. This is true any time including in Krishna's time as declared in Geeta - manushhyaaNaam sahasreshhu kashchit yatati siddhaye | - Of the thousands of people very few are really interested in this Brahma vidya.. Hence adhikaari-s are always few in number but not nil as puurvapakshi claims. Similarly Brahman is there, since it happens to be yourself. How can you negate Brahman? Brahman negation is self-negation. Everyone knows that they are not mere matter - this is my body, my mind and my intellect - the very statements indicate that I am different from this body, this mind and this intellect. I do not know who I am, yet I know I exist and I am conscious. I enliven the body but body does not enliven me. People say when someone dies that 'he is dead and gone', implying that he is something different from the body to go somewhere else after the death. I am not an object for someone to see, hear, feel or touch. I am the very subject because of which the capacity to hear, feel, think, etc. are possible in the enlivened matter. Only objects have attributes or guNa-s, but I am not an object. I am the very subject because of which objects are revealed or illumined by my consciousness. I can not deny myself since I have to be there even to deny myself. I can negate everything but cannot negate myself. Hence I am the one who remains as the very substratum for every



thing. Brahman is not something different from me. Hence he is not an object to have attributes. He is the very subject that I am. Hence Brahman inquiry is the inquiry of the nature of one's own self and thus the vishhaya of the Vedanta suutra-s. Prayojanam is also there since it is moksha. It is freedom that I am inherently longing for in all my pursuits in life. There are always some realized souls existing at a given time even in this kaliyuga. Therefore sambandha also exists. Hence the anubandha chatushhTaya is there, hence Vedanta is vichaaraNiiyam, to be studied. Thus siddhaanta in the adhikaraNa list is given.

The last requirement is sangatiH - the connection with the other topics, particularly with the previous topics. Since this is the first adhikaraNam, there is no connection to previous topic. Since this adhikaraNam consists of the very first suutra, which is anubandha or preface, it emphasizes the central theme of the whole text as the inquiry of the nature of Brahman. By specifying the pre-requisites for a student, it connects all other knowledge required for a student to possess as the pre-requisites. This completes the sangatiH and also the conclusion part of our analysis.

With this the analysis of the first suutra is over.

(A note: For Shankara the most of the puurvapakshi's are non-vedantins, consisting of both aastika group and naastika group. Post Shankara bhaashhyakaara-s, such as Shree Raamaanuja and Shree Madhva have included Advaita philosophy as their puurvapaksha, in fact their main puurvapaksha, since they have to reckon with the most prevailing philosophy of their times, which is advaita, before they establish their siddhaanta. It is fruitful to go into the discussion of their major discussion of advaita and their objections to it. But we will first complete Shankarabhaashhya so that we are better equipped to address the issues that they have raised. )

We will next take the suutra 2 for discussions.

Message 7366 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Wed Jan 3, 2001 1:41pmSubject: Notes BSB I-i-2-1A

Notes on BSB: I-i-2-1A






Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\-----------

samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada I janmaadi adhikaraNam 2 suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |

Introduction:

After the upodghaata or introductory suutra, which indirectly deals with the anubandha chatushhTayam or the four-fold requirements, Vyasacharya begins the shaastram with the second sutra. The second suutra belongs to second adhikaraNam. This adhikaraNam is known as the janmaadi adhikaraNam because the suutra begins with the word janmaadi. This adhikaraNam also has only one suutra. The suutra is 'janmaadyasya yataH'.

We will follow as usual the three-stepped approach; first the general analysis, then specific word by word analysis and then the conclusion.

1. General Analysis:

The topic of discussion in this adhikaraNam is Brahma lakshaNam or the definition of Brahman. Hence the second suutram is also called Brahma lakshaNa suutram. There is a well-known statement in the shaastra which says: 'lakshaNa pramaaNaabhyaam vastu siddhiH', which means that any object is established only through two factors; lakshaNam and pramaaNam. Only after the object is fully established (siddham), there is a possibility for further inquiry into the nature of the object. No inquiry can be done if the existence of the object itself is not established. The inquiry in such a case can only be limited to the extent whether such an object exists or not. Hence vichaara or inquiry of an object presupposes the knowledge of its siddhatvam or existence. Furthermore, even if an object can be defined by its lakshaNam or definition that is not sufficient to establish its siddhatvam or existence. In addition to lakshaNam, we need a valid pramaaNam or valid means for knowing the object. For example, even if someone provides a lakshaNam of a full moon in the sky, that is not sufficient to establish the existence of a moon, if I do not have the eyes to see. Hence we require at least two entities for any inquiry, a lakshaNam and a pramaaNam. If either one is present without the other, it is still useless for me to inquire into that object. Even if I have the eyes to see (pramaaNam), I will not know about the moon, unless I have the definition of the moon that distinguishes it from many luminary objects in the sky. To put in Sanskrit (one can skip these lines if you want, without losing the continuity) lakshaNa satve api, pramaaNam vinaa na vastu siddhiH | pramaaNam satve api, lakshaNam vinaa na vastu siddhiH | yatra lakshaNam cha vartate, pramaaNam cha vartate, tatra eva vastunaH siddhiH |

Once the moon is established through the lakshaNam and pramaaNam one can spend his whole lifetime, if he wants, inquiring into the moon.



Thus vichaara or inquiry presupposes siddhi or existence, and siddhi requires both lakshaNam and pramaaNam.

1.1 lakshaNam and pramaaNam of Brahman:

We are discussing in Brahmasuutra -s about the inquiry into Brahman. Inquiry into Brahman is possible only if there is such a thing called 'Brahman'. To know Brahman's existence therefore we need 'Brahma lakshaNam and Brahma pramaaNam. Hence in the second suutra Vyasacharya gives Brahma lakshaNam and in the third suutra he gives Brahma pramaaNam. Only from the fourth suutra on, we get into Brahma vichaara or inquiry.

In this context it is worth discussing Shankaracharya's comments at the end of the first suutra. There Shankara asks a question - Is Brahman known or unknown before we can talk about the inquiry of Brahman? Purvapakshi comes and says either way the inquiry is not required. If Brahman is unknown, how can one make an inquiry of an object that one does not know. If I ask a student to inquire on 'gaagaabuubuu' and if none of us know what that blessed 'gaagaabuubuu' is or whether such a thing exists or not, then how can one do any inquiry. If Brahman is already known, then one is already a 'brahmaj~naani'. Then any further inquiry into Brahman is also useless. Hence Brahmasutra need not be studied. There is an interesting shloka in Vivekachudamani (shloka 59) to this effect.

avij~naate pare tattve shaastraadhiitistu nishhphalaa | vij~naate api pare tattve shaastraadhiitistu nishhphalaa ||

If one does not know the Brahman, the study of the shaastra -s is futile. Having known the Brahman, the study of the shaastra -s is again futile.

In response to puurvapakshi, Shankara says, Brahman is not unknown. It is known through Veda pramaaNa. Even the word 'Brahman', one is conversant with only because of Veda-s. When a Vedic student studies Veda, he comes to know that there is something called 'Brahman'. Veda teaches him 'brahmavit brahma eva bhavati', 'brahmavidaapnoti param', 'satyam j~naanam anantam brahma'. The very word 'Brahman' indicates that the object in question is infinitely big, since the word is derived from the root 'bRîh' meaning 'bRîhati' or 'bRînhati' - in the meaning of vRîddhi or expansion or bigness. Hence the student comes to know that there is an entity which is very big. Further Shankara says that the very word 'big' is a relative word. The meaning of the word 'big', which is an adjective, itself gets qualified by the noun that it qualifies. There is a big mountain ahead if we say, not only the mountain is qualified by its bigness, but bigness is also qualified by the word mountain in relation to a normal size mountain. In contrast if we say there is a big mosquito in my net, the bigness of the mosquito is qualified by the normal size mosquito which is different from the normal size mountain. The dimensions of the bigness for a mountain are different from those of a mosquito, or an ameba. When upanishhad talks about Brahman it uses the adjective 'big' as the noun itself, as The Big. That is there is no noun to condition the bigness, as the big itself is used as a noun. That is it is unconditionally big, meaning it is infinite. Similarly we use existence not as an adjective but as a noun referring to Brahman. Thus adjectives are used as nouns to indicate that we are not talking about any object that is conditioned



but that which is beyond any conditioning. Hence Shankara says through veda pramaaNa, one comes to know that there is infinitely big entity called Brahman. Since all my experiences are about finite things or entities and that one has never experienced an infinitely big entity, one would doubt the existence of such a thing indicated by Vedas. Hence to remove such a doubt the scripture says that entity is nothing but one's own Self, the aatma. If so, I can never doubt the existence of Brahman, since doubting the existence of Brahman means doubting my own existence. Nobody doubts whether 'I am or not', since the very doubt presupposes my existence. Doubter cannot be doubted, because doubt cannot exist without a doubter. Hence Shankara says 'na kaschit naahamasmiiti pratyeti', no one can question his own existence. Hence there is no doubt regarding aatma astitvam, and thus brahma astitvam, existence of Brahman. And such a 'Brahman', I come to know through veda pramaaNa. Therefore the inquiry is into 'known Brahman' only and not unknown Brahman.

But puurvapakshi still questions, if you have already known Brahman, why do you need to do inquiry? For that Shankara says that from scriptures, I learn that Brahman is aatma. Hence one does not doubt about the existence of oneself, but one still does not have complete knowledge of oneself. One does not know 'who am I?' I do not have clear knowledge of my self due to adhyaasa (See Ch. III). Because of this reason only different philosophers have different notions about I, the self. The chaarvaaka -s say 'I am the body'. The naiyyayika -s say I am not the body, but the soul, which is all pervading. There are many souls or aatma -s ,'aneka vibhu aatmaanaH', each one is all pervading, but locused, one on each body and is kartaa and bhoktaa. The saa.nkhyaa -s say, these all pervading multiple aatma -s are not kartaa -s but only bhoktaa -s. Thus regarding 'who am I' there is so much of confusion, and hence Shankara concludes that inquiry is required. Thus Brahman is neither totally known nor totally unknown, but it is unclearly known. Hence 'aapaata j~naanam' or unclear or vague knowledge or paroksha j~naanam exists. Hence Brahman inquiry is required to convert the unclear knowledge or paroksha j~naanam into aparoksha j~naanam or clear and direct experiential knowledge. Thus Shankara discusses in his introduction to suutra 2, that there are pramaaNam and lakshaNam for Brahman.

1.2 taTastha and swaruupa lakshaNam-s:

The lakshaNam or definition is of two types; swaruupa lakshaNam and taTastha lakshaNam. When an object is defined through its intrinsic feature, that definition is called swaruupa lakshaNam. When an object is defined through an incidental feature or a temporary feature which is not intrinsic feature of the object, it is called taTastha lakshaNam. The word taTastham consists of two words taTa and stha. taTaH means the bank of a river, and sthaH means existing. taTastham means that which remains in the bank of the river, hence is not a part of the river and hence is not an intrinsic feature of the river. An example that is given is 'prakR^ishhTa prakaashhaH chandraH' - moon is brightest luminary in the (night) sky. Brightness of the moon is its intrinsic feature (forgetting the science now) and hence it is swaruupa lakshaNam of moon. Likewise satyam, j~naanam and anantam or aanandam - are swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman since they are the intrinsic feature of Brahman. The definition of swaruupam lakshaNam is 'swaruupam sat vyaavartakam swaruupa lakshaNam' that intrinsic feature of an object which reveals or defines an object. Typical example of taTastha lakshaNam which



can be appreciated easily in America where most of the houses look alike (indistinguishable swaruupa lakshaNam-s) is ' That house on which a crow is sitting right now is John's house' - The sitting of a crow is only an incidental feature of the John's house and not a swaruupa lakshaNa of the house. The definition of taTastha lakshaNam is 'kaadaachitkam sat vyaavartakam, taTastha lakshaNam', temporarily that which pin-points is taTastha lakshaNam.

The taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman is 'jagat kaaraNam Brahma', Brahman is that which is the cause of the universe. To decide if this is taTastha lakshaNam or swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman, one should ask if the world is an intrinsic feature of Brahman or an incidental feature of Brahman. It is an incidental feature since before the creation there is no world and after the desolation there is no world. For videha mukta, the world is permanently not there. Hence world is only an incidental feature of Brahman, thus a taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman. The second suutram is presenting only a taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman and we can say it is 'taTastha lakshaNa suutra of Brahman'.

Next we take the general meaning and then word by word meaning of the suutra.End of Notes on BSB I-2-1AMessage 7445 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Mon Jan 8, 2001 2:05pmSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1B

Notes on BSB: I-i-2-1B




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada I janmaadi adhikaraNam 2 suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |

1.3 General meaning of the suutra:

The suutra grammatically is incomplete and we need to supply two words to complete it. This is called ' adhyaahaaraH ', meaning supplying the words required completing the suutra grammatically. The full suutra is ' janma aadi asya yataH, tat brahma ' - one can



also add ' bhavati ' in the end, which is automatically implied in Sanskrit. Meaning of the suutra is 'Brahman is that from which the origin, etc., of the world takes place' - simply ' sRîshhTi aadi kaaraNam, brahma '. The ' aadi ' or etc., includes ' sthithi ' and ' laya '. Hence the final meaning is ' jagat sRîshhTi, sthiti, laya kaaraNam, brahma ', Brahman is that from which the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the world takes place. (Shankara uses the word bha~Ngam instead of laya since janmaadi is neuter gender and to maintain the same neuter gender or a samaahaara dvandva compound). Vyasacharya uses the pronoun ' asya ' and from the context it refers to ' asya jagataH ', of this world or universe. The word ' yataH ' means yasmaat kaaraNaat - from which cause. tat brahman meaning that is brahman. Hence the final general meaning of the suutra is 'Brahman is that cause, from which the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the universe takes place'.

Being a nyaaya prasthaanam, every suutra must present a ' anumaana vaakyam '. The nyaaya vaakyam that can be derived from this suutra is: ' brahma asti, lakshaNa sattvaat, ghaTavat ' Brahman is existent, because there is lakshaNam for Brahman, just as a pot. the vyaapti vaakyam is, ' yatra yatra lakshaNa sattvam, tatra tatra vastu sidhhiH '. Therefore brahma vichaara can be possible since Brahman exists.

1.4 The vishhaya vaakyam for the suutra:

As discussed before every suutra must have a upanishhad statement or statements that it should have based on which Vyasacharya formulates the suutra. For this suutra the vishhaya vaakyam is from ' bhRîgu valli ' of taittiriiya Upanishhad [III:i:1]. The mantra is :' yato vaa imaani bhuutaani jaayante | yena jaataani jiivanti | yat prayantyabhisa.nvishanti | tad vijij~naasasva | tad brahmeti |' This bhRîgu valli statement is brahma taTastha lakshaNa vaakyam. 'Brahman is the sRîshTi kaaraNam, sthiti kaaraNam and laya kaaraNam'. This is the vishhaya vaakyam of the second suutra. This concludes the general analysis of the suutra.

2. Now word by word analysis of the suutra.

The first word is janmaadi, which is a compound word consisting of janma and aadi. Janma referring to creation and aadi means etc. referring to the sthiti or sustenance and laya or annihilation.

2.1 Objection 1.

A puurvapakshii comes forward and comes with a suggestion for the meaning. Shankara has interpreted the janmaadi as the three-fold aspect, janma, sthiti and layam or janmaadi trayam. Puurvapakshi says that there is another book known as 'niruktam', the science of etymology, authored by 'Yaaska'. In that, Yaaska points out that every object in the creation goes through six-fold phenomenon and not three. He calls them as ' shhaD bhaava vikaaraaH ', six-fold change for objects or padaartham. While enumerating these six, Yaaska starts with 'janma'. He says: 'jaayate, asti, vardhate, vipariNamate, apakshiiyate, vinashyati', birth, existence, growth, modification, decay and death. From that nirukta we came to know that every object in the universe goes through janmaadi shaTkam. Hence the suggestion of the puurvapakshii is that in the suutra, janmaadi means janmaadi shaTkam, the six-fold aspect starting from janma in tune with



Yaaska's nirukta rather than janmaadi trayam, the three-fold aspect, that Shankara proposes.

Shankara gives two answers for this objection.

First Yaska is a human being. Hence 'niruktam' is paurushheyam or authored by a human. Hence the author can only talk about objects within the creation and cannot discuss the creation of the whole universe since the human intellect does not have an access to study the jagat kaaraNam or the cause of the whole universe. For example, Yaska cannot talk about the origin of aakaasha or space. He can speculate about the origin but that is not pramaaNa or valid means of knowledge. Hence his discussion can only be confined to bhautika prapa~ncha or objects within the creation. Hence the six-fold aspect that he discusses concerns only about the objects within the universe. Here in the suutra we are discussing the origin of the whole universe that includes the space and even time. Hence Yaska's statement is irrelevant here.

For this puurvapakshii comes forward with counter statement. Why one should dismiss Yaska text is as not valid pramaaNam? It can be a valid pramaaNam just as smR^iti (like Bhagavad geeta) text since it is based on shruti and is not his intellectual product. Then, even though it is paurusheyam, authored by a human, it gets validity as pramaaNa similar to apaurusheya text. Hence Yaaska's statement about the six-fold aspect can be taken as referencing to the entire cosmos rather than just to objects within the cosmos. Hence Yaska's statement should be relevant here.

For this Shankara says, even if Yaska's statement is taken as pramaaNam, it has only the borrowed validity since it is presumably based on the shruti statement. But the interpretation that is given is based on direct shruti statement, which has intrinsic validity and not the borrowed validity. Shruti talks about janmaadi trayam or the three-fold aspect only and not the six-fold aspect. The taittiriiya upanishhad mantra above very clearly states the three-fold aspect and not the six-fold aspect. This is the first answer to puurvapakshii.

The second answer is simple. Vyasacharya has written the entire Brahmasutra for analyzing the Vedanta statements only and that is the stated purpose of the Brahmasutra. Hence it is also called vedanta suutraani or uttaramiimaa.nsa suutraani. Hence when Vyasa uses the word 'janmaadi', one should give the meaning in tune with Upanishads and not that in tune with Yaska's nirukta text or any other text. Therefore 'janmaadi' in the suutra should refer to the three-fold aspect involving creation, sustenance and annihilation. Then what about the six-fold modifications that Yaska talks about? Since that refers to the objects, which are within the universe, it is part of the three-fold aspect discussed in the Upanishad mantra. Hence it is included and not excluded from the three-fold aspect of the Upanishhad statement. Hence the primary meaning of the 'janmaadi' is the janma , sthiti and layam , and by implication it can include the six-fold aspect discussed by Yaaska.

With this the objections of first puurvapakshii are answered.

2.2 Objection 2.



Now the arguments of a second puurvapakshi are as follows:

According to advaitin, the sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya are cyclic processes and not a linear process. If this is linear, then advaitin will be faced with more severe question, 'When all this began?' Hence advaitin circumvented the problem by arguing that it is cyclic process and therefore the question of beginning does not arise, since every point in a cycle is both beginning as well as the end point. The pramaaNam for that advaitin quotes:

avyaktaadiini bhuutaani vyaktamadhyaani bhaarata |avyakta nidhanaanyeva tatra kaa paridevanaa || B.G.2-28

The beings are unmanifested before creation and unmanifested after annihilation and manifested temporarily in between. Therefore why grieve for such temporal things.

ayaktaad vyaktayaH sarvaaH prabhavanti aharaagame |raatri aagame praliiyante tatraiva avyakta sanj~nake || B.G. 8-18.

All beings and things get manifested from their unmanifested state when the creation starts (when Brahma's day starts) and return to unmanifested form when the creation folds (when Brahma's night starts).

Hence advaitins subscribe that sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya , creation, sustenance and annihilation are cyclic processes. Thus in a cyclic process one can not claim which one of three is the beginning. If so, puurvapakshii questions how did Vyasacharya say - janmaadi asya jagataH, because the word -aadi - in Sanskrit literally means beginning with. The secondary meaning only is etc. Hence the literary meaning of the suutra should be - the three phenomenon of the universe beginning with creation. Because of the cyclic nature, why didn't suutra say, beginning with sthiti or beginning with laya instead of beginning with janma, unless it is a linear process and not a cyclic process?

Shankara gives two answers to this objection.

Even though it is a cyclic process and hence one cannot in principle talk about the beginning in these phenomena, human comprehension generally goes in a particular order. In the events there is no order. But in our - pratipatti - or our understanding there is an order. If I have to talk about the destruction or death of something, it presupposes the existence of that thing. Hence its laya presupposes its sthiti. Likewise, if I have to talk about the existence of something, it presupposes its origin. Hence the understanding of laya presupposes the understanding of sthiti and which in turn presupposes the understanding of shrushhTi. Only after the child is born, we inquire into whether it is surviving or dying. Hence Shankara says understanding requires this logical sequence. Thus what Vyasacharya presents is - pratipatti kramaH - the order in understanding the phenomenon.

The second answer is that Vyasacharya is writing the suutra keeping the shruti vishhaya vaakyam in his mind. Even though there is no order in the sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya , shruti gives a particular order. Hence the choice of the order is dictated by the shruti vaakyam itself. In addition similar order is discussed in several



shruti texts. For example, B.G 11-2 starts - bhava apyayau hi bhuutaanaam , meaning the sRîshhTi and laya of the beings.

With this the analysis of the word janmaadi is completed.

End of Notes on BSB I-I-2-1B.Message 7583 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Wed Jan 17, 2001 6:51amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1C

Notes on BSB I-i-3-1C




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada 1 janmaadi adhikaraNam 2 suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |

Next the Analysis of the word - asya:

The word -asya - is a pronoun meaning, of this'. Vyasacharya does not specify what noun this pronoun stands for. It can be any noun, noun being that which can be conscious or unconscious entity or object. Since Vyasa has not specified any particular noun, we should include all the nouns in the universe as indicated object of the pronoun, asya. That is, the word asya should denote -sarvasya jagataH. Further Vyasacharya used the pronoun -of this - and not -of that or (tasya). According to grammar the pronoun -this- is used for something available or accessible in front. Hence this indicates - pratyaksha gocharasya - or pratyaksha prapanchasya -of the world that is seen in front.

The sixth case or shhashhTi (of this') should be connected with the previous word - janmaadi or sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya. Hence combining with the previous word we get the meaning -pratyaksha prapanchasya sRîshhTi, sthiti, layaH - the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the visible or objectifiable universe.

This completes the meaning of the word -asya.



The next word is -yataH:

Shankara gives the meaning for yataH as yasmaat kaaraNaat, from which cause all these (the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the objectifiable universe) take place. Now the question comes, which kaaraNam the shruti is referring to? We know that cause or kaaraNam is two-fold; nimitta kaaraNam, and upaadaana kaaraNam, the intelligent, and material cause. Since Vyasacharya is talking about sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya kaaraNam, we can say that word kaaraNam should refer to upaadaana kaaraNam or material cause. This can be seen readily as follows:

We find in general nimitta kaaraNa or the intelligent cause is only responsible for the creation of a thing. It is not responsible for the existence and annihilation. For example, if kulaalaH, the potter, is responsible for the existence or for the survival of the pot, then one has to buy potter along with pot. If so every maker of an object then will come with the material object for its existence. Since that is not the case, nimitta kaaraNam is defined as sRîshhTi maatra kaaraNam or cause for the creation only. Whereas the material cause is defined as sRîshhTi, sthiti, laya kaaraNam. It is the material cause that sustains the object and into which the object merges during its destruction. In this particular suutra the word janmaadi refers to sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya and not just to sRîshhTi alone, the kaaraNam or cause should therefore refer to the material cause or upaadaana kaaraNam. The primary meaning of the yataH is upaadana kaaraNam.

Now to give complete meaning of the suutra we can say - yasmaat upaadaana kaaraNaat, pratyaksha prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambhavanti, tat upaadaana kaaraNam brahma. Because of which material cause, the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the objectifiable universe occurs, that material cause is Brahman.

Later upon inquiry, we find that the cause of the universe or jagat kaaraNam is and has to be only one. In the case of worldly objects one can afford to have a separate nimitta kaaraNam and a separate upaadaana kaaraNam. Since we are discussing about the entire universe that includes desha and kaala, time and space, it cannot have two separate causes. (maayaakalpita desha kaala kalanaa vaichitrya chitrii kRîtam ... - Shankara's dakshiNamuurti shloka). That cause which is beyond desha kaala the cause should be - ekam eva advitiiyam - one only without a second. If it has to be one, it itself should serve as upaadaana kaaraNam and nimitta kaaraNam. Hence the second implied meaning for yataH is - nimitta kaaraNam cha - the intelligent cause also. Hence the final meaning of yataH is - abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat - non-differentiable intelligent and material cause - To put in a complete statement (one can skip this if one wants) - yasmaat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat asya pratyaksha prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambavanti, tat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaM brahma. That from which the origin, sustenance, annihilation takes place, that undifferentiable intelligent and material cause is Brahman.

In the upanishhad statement that this suutra refers to varuNa, the teacher, told his student, bhRîgu, that (X) from which this universe originated, that (X) by which this universe is sustained and that (X) into which this universe dissolves is to be known - that is Brahman.



Thus the teacher gave only taTastha lakshaNa and not swaruupa lakshaNa and it is up to bhRîgu as his homework to solve for that X. That is left for the student to inquire and find out what is that X. bhRîgu being an intelligent student (like us!) he goes through the process of inquiry - First he comes up with a solution -annam brahmeti vyajaanaat -annam or food is Brahman since scripture says - annaat purushhaH - since all beings are born out of food, sustained by food and goes back into food. But the teacher sends him back to inquire further. Upon further inquiry he comes up with another answer- praaNo brahmeti vyajaanaat - All these beings are born of life, sustained by life and go back into life. Further inquiry leads to - mano bramheti vyajaanaat - mind is the cause for the creation, sustenance and dissolution since when there is the mind there is the world. - vij~naanam brahmeti vyajaanaat - Intelligence is the root cause for the universe, since without intelligence universe cannot be created - But teacher sends him back to further inquiry. Ultimately this inquiry culminates with the knowledge that (T.U. 3-6)aanando brahmeti vyajaanaat.h | aanandaat hi eva khalu imaani bhuutaani jaayante | aanandena jaataani jiivanti | aanandam prayanti abhisamvishanti iti | saishhaa bhaargavii vaaruNii vidyaa | parame vyoman pratishhTitaa | ya evam veda pratitishhTati | Determined that happiness, fullness or limitlessness, aananda, is Brahman. From the limitlessness these beings are born, these beings are sustained, and into which these beings get dissolved. This is the knowledge belonging to bhRîgu and varuNa. This is established in the supreme space (its very basis). Those who know it, are fully established (in knowledge).

Thus finally bhRîgu discovered that the X-factor, because of which origin, sustenance and dissolution takes place, is of the form aananda swaruupam brahma, is limitlessness or infiniteness or pure bliss. This is the swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman. (Pl. Refer to the discussion before of the difference between swaruupa and taTastha lakshaNa). jagat kaaraNam is the taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman, aanandaH is the swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman. Hence the word yataH in the suutra further means - aananda swaruupaH brahma.

Thus three meanings are provided for the word yataH - first as the upaadaana kaaraNam, material cause then as the nimitta kaaraNam, intelligent cause and now aananda swaruupam cha, limitlessness or bliss state.

Now recapitulating the whole meaning of the suutra - yasmaat prapanchasya abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat aananda swaruuupaat prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambhavanti tat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNam aananda swaruupam brahma bhavati. Thus the word yataH refers to abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNam (non-differentiable material and intelligent cause) which is the taTastha (incidental) lakshaNam and aananda swaruupam which is the swaruupa (intrinsic) lakshaNam of Brahman. Primarily it indicates the taTastha lakshaNam, but indirectly it indicates the swaruupa lakshaNam also. Hence the suutra is called Brahma lakshaNa suutra.

With this we conclude the analysis of the word yataH.

Now two more words are left which are supplied to complete the suutra - tat brahma, that is Brahman. We have already seen three features - upaadaana kaaraNam, nimitta kaaraNam and aananda swaruupam. To this, Shankaracharya adds one more feature of Brahman. Once we know that



there is an intelligent cause, the extent of intelligence involved can be inferred from the nature of the product. The more intricate and sophisticated the product is, the more the intelligence involved in creating that product. For example, seeing the sophisticated computer we can infer the intelligence that was behind the creation of that computer. Shankara says, if one sees the nature of the world, its vastness, its wonders, its vibhuuti, then one can definitely conclude that Brahman or the intelligent cause for this whole creation must be sarvaj~naH, omniscient and sarva shaktimaan, omnipotent. All laws that are discovered and that are yet to be discovered by scientists are within the creation. A scientist does not invent a law, he only discovers the laws that are already there. In an absolute sense, there is nothing really that is man-made, since the possibilities for a man to make already exists within the creation. Incidentally when Brahman is seen as the cause, he gets named as IswaraH. To establish the sarvaj~natvam, sarveshwaratvam (supreme Lordship) and sarvashaktitvam, Shankara beautifully expresses in his bhaashyam about the glory of this universe by giving four adjectives. From the glory of the universe the glory of the creator of such universe can be inferred. Shankara says:

asya jagataH naama-ruupaabhyaam vyaakRîtasya, aneka kartRî bhoktRî samyuktasya, prati niyata desha kaala nimitta kriyaa phala aashrayasya, manaso.api achintya rasanaa ruupasya, janma sthiti bha~Ngam, yasmaat sarvaj~naat sarva shakteH kaaranaat bhavati tat brahmeti vaakya cheshaH |

This will be explained below, step by step. Shankara says, it is a well-designed universe (naama-ruupaabhyaam vyaakRîtasya), which means it cannot be explained that it accidentally formed by some big bang. Hence an intelligent being is required for such an ordered thermodynamically well behaved system with universal laws governing the system. Furthermore this universe consists of- aneka kartRî bhoktRî samyuktasya - countless jiiva-s who are karta-s and bhokta-s. By this Shankara indicates that all the varieties and countless jiiva-s fall within the creation as a product, and hence the creator must be a non-jiiva. Thus jiiva-bhinnatvam (Iswara different from jiiva) is indicated by the statement. He must also be omniscient because - prati niyata desha kaala nimitta kriyaa phala aashrayasya - there are no accidents in the creation. Every event is an incident triggered by specific time, place and reason. Hence it is a cosmos and not chaos, as every event depends on - prati niyata desha kaala nimitta - specific place, time and reason. Thus we call an incident as an accident only when we, with limited intelligence, cannot comprehend the reason. If we take countless number of jiiva-s present, every jiiva is going through a series of experiences with every experience is conditioned by desha, kaala and nimitta. One cannot imagine the amount of intelligence and data base required to run this master show in insuring that every experience of every jiiva is not randomly based but in tune with specific desha, kaala and nimitta. In addition we find that there are certain events which are common to many jiiva-s that Lord has to design the event in such a way that one and the same event should give punya phalam (results of merits) and paapa phalam for another jiiva-s (result of demerits). For example, for some people this posting of these notes is a blessing indeed while some people felt and even complained that it was nuisance thrust on their heads. Thus Bhagavan has to design each event in such a way that He has to gather some to exhaust their



merits and some others to exhaust their demerits by the same event. As the story goes, in the Air India accident that occurred few years ago, many passengers who were originally scheduled to fly in a different flight ended up in that flight since they missed their original flight. At the same time some that were originally scheduled in that flight missed that flight due to delays in their connecting flights. When the flight took off, those who made must have been happy and those who missed the flight must have been cursing their fate. But the fates turned around when accident took place. Bhagavan has to make sure only those that are qualified, enter into that flight. This is just an example. This is true with every experience that involves more than one jiiva. Thus every experience is from one reference a result of punya or merits and some other reference result of paapa or demerits. Thus every event is designed according to karma phala of not just one jiiiva but countless number of jiiva-s. It is not only the human beings but Lord has to take into consideration the merits and demerits of innumerable jiiva-s, including the karma phala of a mosquito which is trying to collect its hard-earned quota of delicious food in a serene spiritual environment when you are trying to meditate on the Lord, in the very early morning.

Rest of the analysis in the next post.------------------End of Notes on BSB I-i-2-1CMessage 7782 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Wed Jan 24, 2001 2:12pmSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1D

Inadvertently an uncorrected version got posted in the morning. Here is the corrected version. (These passive voices are useful, aren't they, to put the blame on non-free will factors!). Please substitute the new version in place of the old. The contents, of course, remain the same, since it is 'vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam' (the transformation is only apparent in the name and form) and we are advaitins!

Notes on BSB I-i-2-1D


I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva whois ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and allthe way up to my own teacher.


Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.---------------------------------------------------------------------------



samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i janmaadi adhikaraNam 2 suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |

We are discussing Shankara's description of the Iswara in terms of sarvaj~natvam.

Shankara in his description uses another adjective- manasaa api achintya rachanaa ruupasya. A scientist can possibly determine how the brain functions, but he cannot recreate such a complex organ. The Lord not only has omniscience - the know-how of how to create but to implement that knowledge or execute that technology. That is, He has enough power and skill to produce such a complex creation. One can see and destroy an ant or bug easily or swallow the whole chicken in few minutes after frying it. But to produce such a complex living entity that can reproduce itself is unimaginable and we can not but admire that great designer and executor. Hence Shankara says He is sarva-j~na and sarva-shaktimaan due to sarva kaaraNatvaat - cause for everything.

This is the final meaning of the suutra 2. To summarize the whole thing - the meaning is yasmaat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat , aananda swaruupaat , sarva-j~naat , sarva shaktaat , pratyaksha prapa~nchasya sR^ishhTi sthiti layaaH sambhavanti , tat brahma. Because of which the non-differentiable intelligent and material cause, which is of the form of pure bliss, omniscient, omnipotent cause for creation, sustenance and dissolution of the visible universe - that is Brahman.

With this Shankara concludes his commentary on the second suutra. After the conclusion he enters into another discussion by introducing a puurvapaksha or objection from nayyayika -s (nyaaya philosophers). Because of its importance we will discuss that aspect here.

The first suutra says that we have to do Brahman inquiry. This can be done only after it is established that there is something called Brahman. To establish Brahman, it was said that - lakshaNa pramaaNaabhyaam vastu siddhiH - we need a lakshaNam or a definition and pramaaNa and means of knowing it. The second suutra provides that lakshaNa for Brahman and the third suutra will provide pramaaNa required. In the third suutra it is said that the pramaaNam for Brahman is shaastram - shaastra yonitvaat . Now nayyaayika comes up with a suggestion. He says why cannot one take the second suutra itself as a pramaaNam for Brahman also. According to him, the second suutra defines Brahman or Iswara as jagat kaaraNam, cause for the world. Since jagat kaaraNam is Brahman, conversely jagat is kaaryam of Brahman. That is if Brahman or Iswara is defined as the cause or kaaraNam, then the world is the effect or kaaryam of Iswara (nayyayika-s use Iswara instead of Brahman). Hence naayayika-s say that the invisible Iswara can be inferred from the visible world just as the invisible fire can be inferred from the visible smoke. Hence nayyayika-s say the pramaaNam for Iswara can be simply anumaanam or inference or logic. This anumaanam is popularly known in tarka shaastra as - kaarya li~Ngaka anumaanam - the inference of invisible kaaraNam or cause from visible kaaryam , or effect. From this nayyayika arrives at a conclusion that shaastra pramaaNam is not required to prove the existence of Iswara. Logic itself can do the



job without the need of shaastra. Generally it is understood that if direct perception, pratyaksha, can establish an object, then we do not need logic. Likewise, if pratyaksha cannot but logic can do the job, then we do not need the next one, shabda pramaaNa to establish the object. Hence nayyaayika -s argue that there is no need for shaastra pramaaNa to establish Iswara.

Advaitin as well as other vedantins would not agree for that. Iswara cannot be established by pure logic without the help of shaastram. There is a radical difference between taarkika and the vedantin. For taarkika the logic is the primary means of knowledge with regard to Iswara and shaastra is only of secondary importance while for Vedantin it is the other way around (see Notes I for reference). We will analyze this in detail since the relative roles of shaastra pramaaNa versus anumaana pramaaNa will be established from the point of two different philosophies, aastika -s vs. naastika -s.

nayyayika-s argue that we do not need shaastra to prove the existence of the Iswara. Just as when we see a person, even though we do not know any thing about his parents, we know that he must have parents. The very presence of an effect presupposes the existence of the cause. Hence if there is a product there must be a producer whose existence I can infer. Since the world or jagat is seen, there must be a creator, Iswara. Thus by inference or anumaana, I can know the existence of Iswara without the need of shaastra -s. Hence for establishing Iswara or Brahman, anumaanam can serve as pramaaNam and shaastram is not required - this is nayyaayika's argument.

Shankara says it is not so. The second suutra does not provide anumaana pramaaNam for brahma siddhi or iishwara sidhhi. Shankara gives a simple reason for this, but the subcommentators provide additional reasons. The argument is as follows. Vyasacharya does not propound a new philosophy by using his reasoning power. This is in contrast to many of darshanams (see Ch.I-for details) where the basis of their new philosophy is the or anumaana pramaaNa. These include saa~Nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, etc. all of which propound new philosophies primarily based on tarka or anumaanam; and Shankara calls all of them together as taarkika -s. They accept the shruti pramaaNam only as subservient to anumaaNa. Uniqueness of Brahmasutra is Vyasacharya does not establish the philosophy through reasoning. He uses reasoning not to propound a new philosophy but only to derive a cogent systematic philosophy of the Vedas. Hence every suutra has got one or many Vedanta vaakyam -s or vishhaya vaakyam -s as its basis. If one claims that the second suutra establishes Iswara by anumaana pramaaNa then the very purpose of Brahasuutra is defeated. Hence Shankara uses a beautiful line which is often quoted and which was provided in Ch. I - vedaanta vaakya kusuma grathanaarthatvaat suutraaNaam - every suutra is providing an anumaaNam or reasoning alright but this reasoning is not an independent anumaanam. It is used only to bring out the Vedantic teaching in cogent form. It is like a thread to create a necklace or garland of the flowers of vedaanta vaakyam -s. Here the garland is the vedaanta darshanam and the flowers are the veda vaakyam -s. The,tarka - thread is only hiding behind the flowers as subservient factor and has no independent utility other than tying the flowers together to form a beautiful garland of cogent vedantic philosophy. Hence the second suutra does not provide an independent anumaana pramaaNa but it is there to analyze the vedaanta vaakyam quoted before: "etova imaani bhuutaani jaayante ...." to provide lakshaNa



suutra but not pramaaNa suutra. - This is the simpler answer Shankara gives. The subcommentators provide further arguments.

It is clear from their puurvapaksha , nayyaayika -s believe that Iswara can be logically established. Vedantins vehemently disagree with nayyayika -s in this aspect. Vedantins strongly believe that Iswara or Brahman is revealed through shaastra alone. For Vedantins, Iswara that is revealed through shaastra can be assimilated through logic. In the discussions that follow we will see that nayaayika -s use anumaana pramaaNam to establish Iswara and Vedantins take the position like that of DMK politicians in Madras to show that their logic is defective.

Now nayyayika -s arguments: They deduce Iswara through three anumaanam -s or logical statements. (See Ch. II for discussion of anumaana pramaaNa.) 1. kshitya~Nkuradhikam (or jagat) sakartRîkam, kaaryatvaat , ghaTavat . - That is, the world must have a creator, because it is an effect or product like a pot. The vyaapti vaakyam for this is - yat yat kaaryam tat tat sakartRîkam , that is, whatever is product, it must have been created (by a creator). From this anumaanam, they deduce first that there is a creator. 2. The second anumaana vaakyam is, jagat kartaa iishvaraH , jiiva bhinnatve sati chetanatvaat , vyatirekeNa kulaalavat. In this anumaanam , nayyayika establishes that the creator must be Iswara alone, because no jiiva can create this world and since the creator has to be an intelligent or conscious being. Since there are only three entities, jiiva , jagat and iishvara , conscious intelligent being other than jiiva is only Iswara, and hence the creator of this world has to be Iswara. This is called paarisheshha nyaaya , the logic by elimination and residue. It is unlike a pot-maker, since like example cannot be given as it is one of a kind. The vyaapti vaakyam is yat jiiva bhinnatve sati chetanam tat iishvaraH - whatever is conscious being other than jiiva that must be IswaraH. 3. The third anumaana vaakyam is - iishvaraH sarva-j~naH sarva-kartRîtvaat vyatirekeNa kulaalavat - that is IswaraH is omniscient since he is a creator of everything unlike alpa-j~na kulaalaH or our good old pot maker who has knowledge of only how to make a pot. The vyaapti vaakyam is yatra sarva kartRîtvam tatra sarva-j~natvam api bhavati. This is called lakshaNa li~Ngaka anumaanam. Thus nayyayika logically establishes sarva-j~na iishvaraH, omniscient Lord. Therefore he argues that existence of Iswara can be established logically and we do not need Vedas to do that. A modern day rational intellect is more happy with a nayyayika than a Vedantin who relies on shaastra which requires a faith.

Vedantin claims all these anumaana vaakyam -s or logical statements are defective. Let us examine the first anumaanam - jagat sakartRîkam, kaaryatvaat, ghaTavat - the world is a creation because it is a product, like a pot. For this nayyayika uses a vyaapti j~naanam - yat yat kaaryam sakartRîkam, wherever there is product there must be a creator - example is like a pot. Every anumaana vaakyam must require a vyaapti and this vyaapti vaakyam (statement expressing concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya - see Ch. II) is derived from pratyaksha pramaaNa only. anumaanam requires vyaapti j~naanam and vyaapti j~naanam is established by pratyaksha pramaaNam alone. If vyaapti j~naanam is established by another anumaanam then that second anumaanam requires another vyaapti and this leads to infinite regress problem. It cannot be by shaastram either, since nayyaayika -s have already rejected shaastra pramaaNam.



Like the example we gave in Ch. II - yatra yatra dhuumaH tatra tatra agniH - this vyaapti j~naanam is arrived only by pratyaksha pramaaNam only - or by direct observation. vyaapti arrived by observation is valid only if it holds good in all the cases. Hence wherever there is a smoke there is a fire is a valid vyaapti but the converse wherever there is fire there is smoke is not a valid vyaapti, since it does not hold good all the time.

Now Vedantin argues - if you say where there is product there is a creator - this is proved by pratyaksha only if the products are man-made. How about natural products - there the creator for these products are not perceptually proved. Therefore the defect in the first anumaana is vyaapti asiddhiH since there is no pratyaksha or direct observation of the creation of the universe by Iswara.

Let us examine the second anumaana - jagat kartaa iishvaraH , jiiva bhinnatve sati chetanatvaat , vyatirekeNa kulaalavat - Iswara is the creator of jagat, since He is a conscious entity different from jiiva . For this vyaapti j~naanam involves establishing that wherever there is a conscious being other than jiiva is involved, it must be Iswara. That means the vyaapti statement involves a presupposition of the existence of Ishwara who is other than jiiva. But vyaapti j~naanam must be gathered by pratyaksha pramaaNam only or by direct perception since nayyayika has already discarded shaashtra pramaaNam . But through perception we cannot talk about a conscious being other than jiiva. Hence the second anumaanam is also defective since vyaapti vaakyam cannot be established by pratyaksha .

Now the third anumaana: iishvaraH sarva-j~naH sarva-kartR^itvaat vyatirekeNa kulaalavat - Iswara is omniscient since He is the creator of everything. Now to negate this anumaana we need to examine some 'axioms' that nayyayika -s have assumed in developing their philosophy. nayyayika-s say that every knowledge is born out of mind. - yat j~naanam tat manojanyam - This axiomatic statement is made since they depend heavily on the perceptions and inferences for their philosophy. There may not be any problem with this statement but in a different place they make another statement which appears to be unrelated to this - iishvaraH asshariiraH - that is Ishwara does not have body- that statement includes sthuula suuksham kaaraNa shariiraaNi - gross, subtle and causal bodies - which obviously includes the mind which is part of subtle body. The reason they took mind away from Iswara is of their presumption that wherever there is mind there is sa.nsaara - since Ishwara cannot have sa.nsaara, He is made devoid of mind. Since according to nayyayikaa 's own statements - that the mind is required for j~naanam and Iswara does not have mind - hence it follows that Iswara being mind-less cannot have any knowledge leave alone the sarva-j~natvam. This defect is called - swaabhyupagama virodhaH - defect involving self-contradiction or contradicting ones own statements. Thus Vedantin proves that nayyayika -s third anumaanam is also defective. (For the record, these arguments are from the commentary called puurNaanandiiyam by Purnananda Saraswati which itself is a commentary on bhaashya ratnaprabhaa by Govindananda Saraswati which is in turn a comentary on Shankara Bhashya).

Hence anumaanam which is based on pratyaksha cannot be a pramaaNa for establishing Ishwara, who is beyond the human perception and hence beyond inference. Iswara established by anumaanam can be negated by



anumaanam. Hence shaastra alone is the valid pramaaNa for that which is beyond the perceptual knowledge. If vedantin uses logic it isblessed by shaastram - shruti sammata tarkeNa iishvara sidhhiH, na tu kevala tarkeNa , or shushhka tarkeNa iishvara sidhhiH. That is logic supported by the shaashtra is only valid for entities that cannot be established by direct perception. The logic supported by direct perceptions are invalid to establish Iswara since He is beyond direct perception.

One more point Shankara makes in his bhaashyam. The discussion does not mean that tarka is totally useless in the inquiry. Shankara emphasizes that tarka is important when properly used with the support of shaastra. - shrotavyaH , mantavyaH , nidhidhyaasitavyaH - the word mantavyaH indicates tarka is imporant for understanding Vedanta. In fact the whole Brahmasutra is called nyaaya prasthaanam - logical analysis of upanishhad -s. Hence the use of tarka as subservient in understanding Vedanta. Shankara gives the reason why tarka is important in Vedanta. He contrasts the karma kaandam and j~nana kaandam - in karma kaanDa tarka has got a limited role. There procedures of rituals is more important - what should be done rather than why should it be done - There the knowledge of a ritual does not produce the results - performance of the ritual does. The benefit is the result of accomplishment of a ritual in time or time-bound. Hence Shankara's language - karma-kaandasya saadhya-vishhayatvaat karma pradhaanam , j~naanam apradhaanam - since it deals with something to be produced in future doing is important and knowing has only an indirect role. Suppose if moksha is something to be produced in future then like karma kaanDa, procedure is important than knowledge - hence people say I have studied Vedanta and now I have to practice or do more practice - some meditation or something else. Shankara says this is the common misconception. Vedanta does not deal with a future event - the result of a process or procedure. We are not learning any procedure, any technique or method of meditation through Vedanta or implement something after Vedantic study. It is dealing with the fact of moksha - which is an accomplished fact! - which one has to understand. The whole Vedantic saadhana is only a process of understanding and there is nothing to implement after understanding. With the understanding the end is accomplished. Whatever the obstruction in understanding need to be eliminated. One of the obstruction is the intellect itself in the form of sa.nshayaH or doubt - Hence tarka or mananam is very important - it is not an independent tarka but to remove the intellectual obstacles created in assimilating the Vedantic teaching. Hence tarka serves in the understanding the Vedantic teaching and in assimilating that teaching as one's own. There is nothing to do after understanding since the very understanding involves - I am akarthaa and abhoktaa. - I have nothing to do as I am ever liberated. - Hence Shankara says shruti is imporant, yukti is important and finally anubhava , which involves assimilating the knowledge as one's own, is important. anubhava is important only because our samsaara is present only in the form of anubhava - I am limited, I am small, the helplessness- the feeling of inadequacy, the misery due to that feeling, the doubt about oneself, the doubt about the teaching of Vedanta, etc. The moksha is freedom from these sensations - the puurNatvam , the samatvam - it is not anubhava or experience in the form of mystic experience that comes and goes, but anubhava in the form of full freedom from all limitations. The understanding is complete when the sa.nsaara bhaavana or vipariita bhaavana goes away- Hence the benefit of this understanding is HERE



and NOW - That I am eternally free and never was bound for any process of un-binding required. Hence inquiry is to be done using shaastra sammata tarka .

With this Shankara's commentary on the second suutra is over. Nextthe conclusion part.

Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed athttp://www.egroups.com/files/advaitin/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.

Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.Message 7900 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Wed Jan 31, 2001 10:10amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1E

Notes on BSB I-i-2-1E




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i janmaadi adhikaraNam 2 suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |

Now the conclusion of the Second suutra.

First the technical presentation of this adhikaraNam :For this adhikaraNa

vishhayaH : The subject matter is brahma lakshaNam , the definition of Brahman.

sa.nshayaH : The doubt - Since we are asked to inquire into Brahman, who is Brahman or what is Brahman in order to begin the inquiry - Is Brahman defined, if so, what is the definition? These are the doubts.

puurvapaksha : - There is no definition for Brahman and hence no inquiry can be done. This is because a definition has to be such that it has to be through a unique feature that identifies that object



from the rest of the objects in the world. Otherwise it cannot be a valid definition. asaadhaaraNa dharmaH lakshaNam - Unique feature of object forms the definition. Since Vedantin says Brahman is featureless, puurvapakshii asks how featureless Brahman can have unique feature to have a definition that distinguishes Him from everything else. Upanishads in fact declare that Brahman is undefinable. yato vaacho nivartante apraapya manasaa saha - na tatra chakshur gachchhati na vaak gachchhati - Since scriptures themselves declare that Brahman cannot be defined, puurvapakshii says brahman lakshaNam naasti - there cannot a definition for Brahman.

siddhaanta: brahma lakshaNam asti - there is a definition for Brahman. Even though Brahman is really featureless, we can define Brahman through superimposed features, adhyasta dharma satvaat , through mithyaa features. It is just like defining our rope as the substratum for our snake, even though the rope is snake-less. Similarly through the superimposed jagat or the world, Brahman can be defined as jagat kaaraNam, even though Brahman is beyond kaaraNa -kaarya sambandha , cause-effect relationship. Hence lakshaNam asti is the siddhaanta.

sa~Ngati : This concerns the connection between this and the previous topic. The previous topic relates to the fact that one should inquire into the Brahman. The connection between this and the previous topic technically is called ' aakshepa sa~NgatiH '. It means the first topic leads to an objection, which is answered in this second topic. Since Brahman inquiry is required and without proving the existence of the Brahman one cannot do such an inquiry and to prove the existence we need - lakshaNa and pramaaNa . Hence to prove the existence of Brahman the second suutra fulfils the lakshaNa requirement.

That ends the technical part of the format.

Some additional important points will be considered now:

1. It was mentioned before that the suutra - janmaad yasya yataH primarily refers to taTastha lakshaNam rather than swaruupa lakshaNam. In the same upanishhad, where the statement - yato vaa imaani bhuutani jaayante .... which forms the vishhaya vaakyam for this suutra, there is also a statement that can provide the swaruupa lakshaNam for Brahman - satyam j~naanam anantam brahman. A question can be raised as to why Vyasacharya choose taTastha lakshaNa for the definition of Brahman in this suutra rather than swaruupa lakshaNam since both are available in the same upanishhad.

The answer lies in the fact that in the case of Brahman, it is easier to understand Brahman initially through the taTastha lakshaNam than swaruupa lakshaNam. The reason is that in the taTastha lakshaNam we are using an external features which are easily available and perceptible and which are known to every one. Thus one transcends from the known to the unknown. When we use swaruupa lakshaNam , satyam j~naanam anantam , the very intrinsic feature of satyam (pure existence) or j~naanam ( nirvisheshha chaitanyam , objectless consciousness) is not easily perceptible or available or known to the inquirer. It will be like defining one unknown thing using another unknown. Hence Vyasacharya chose taTastha lakshaNam for Brahman.

2. The suutra 2 provides the definition of Brahman primarily as the



upaadaana kaaraNam or the material cause of the universe. In upanishhads the Brahman is often said to be the material cause of the universe. But at times we find maayaa or prakRîti was presented as the material cause of the universe. maayaa.n tu prakRîtim viddhi maayinaa.n tu maheswaram - swetasvatara upanishhad - maaya is the prakRîti, which is the material cause. In the Mahanarayana Upanishad there is a famous sloka (12-5) that says:

ajaam ekaa.n lohita shukla-kRîshhNaaM bahvii.n prajaa.n janayantii saruupaam.h |ajo hyeko jushhaamaaNo.anusheto jahaatyenaa.n bhuktabhogaamajo.anyaH ||

This mantra is going to be elaborately analyzed later - for the time being it will suffice to know that it describes maayaa (unborn female) endowed with sattva , rajas and tamo guNa -s as the material cause. It is associated with two types of jiiva -s – one, the unrealized souls who are fascinated by her and are attached to her, and two, the realized souls who, having enjoyed her, reject her by getting detached from her. In Bhaagavat Giita (13-19) says:

prakRîtiM purusham chaiva viddhyanaadii ubhaavapi |vikaaraa.nshcha guNaa.nshchaiva viddhi prakRîtisambhavaan.h ||

prakRîti and purushha are the two beginningless principles and the creation has come out of prakRîti.Thus sometimes the upanishhads say Brahman is the material cause and sometimes the prakRîti as the material cause. Now of the two which is really the material cause. There is a big difference if one says Brahman or purushha is the material cause then the chetana vastu or conscious entity is pointed out as the cause. But if prakRîti is the cause then it is achetana vastu or inert entity is pointed as the cause. Question boils down to ' chetanam kaaraNam vaa achetanam kaaraNam vaa ". Here Vyasacharya has chosen Brahman as the material cause and does not mention about the prakRîti. This choice of Vyasacharya has got lot of significance. Because of this aspect only this suutra has a great significance.

We will present here few arguments why Vyasacharya chose chetana brahman as the material cause for the world.

1. Vyasacharya wants to clearly distinguish Vedantic teaching from Sankhya philosophy. Emphasis of the distinction between the two was felt important for (a) Sankhya was prevalent at that time and (b) many of the words are common between the two philosophies. In Sankhya philosophy they use the word ' purushhaH ' meaning chaitanya aatma or conscious self. In vedanta also the word purushha is used extensively. Gita 13-19 the example above uses the word ' purushha '. In kaThopanishhad also - ' avyaktaat tu paraH purushhaH purushaanna param ki.nchit ' - The word prakR^riti is also used in Sankhya and Vedanta as triguNaatmika achetana vastu , unconscious matter has three guNa -s. More than that the very word Sankhya is used to indicate Vedantic teaching. In Bhagavatam the Sankhya teaching is given by Kapila who is incarnate of the Lord Vishnu to his mother, Devabhuti. Sankhya philosophy is also expounded by Kapila who is different from Bhagavatam Kapila and this Sankhya philosophy is different from Vedanta. To provide distinction between the two, Vyasacharya chose the particular suutra. Sankhya philosophy says achetana prakRîti is the material cause of the universe. Vyasacharya uses this as a key suutra to differentiate Vedanta from Sankhya



philosophy by stating clearly that chetana brahman is the material cause of the universe.

2. In all the systems of philosophy the fundamental question is about the material cause of the universe. From where did the universe come? Even science is trying to address this issue either in terms of the Unified Principle or some Big Bang Theory. Almost all philosophies arrived at achetana tattvam as the basic material cause for the universe. For example, for Sankhya and Yoga philosophies, achetana prakRîti is the basic material cause. Nyaaya and Vaisheshika claim that atoms or paramaaNu as the basic material cause. They are called paramaaNu vaadaH , may be close to modern science. paramaaNu -s join together under appropriate conditions to form grosser and grosser matter leading to the formation of jagat or the universe. paramaaNu -s are also achetanam and hence their theory also falls under achetana kaaraNa vaadaH. Even the naastika systems of philosophies they subscribe to achetana kaaraNa vaada each with different names; pa~ncha skandha -s in Buddhism, astikaaya -s in Jainism etc. Modern science also assumes matter (or energy) alone is fundamental, no life at the time of Big Bang - particles or sub-atomic particles agglomerate to form bigger molecules and life (conscious entity) originated more recently out of matter that too accidentally when the conditions became conducive for it. Thus in most of the philosophies, consciousness is either existing parallel to the matter, or a product of matter. Even the Vedic philosophies such as - vishishhTaadvaita and dwaita subscribe to the theory that achetana and chetana padaartham existing parallel but independent of each other eternally. Interestingly in nyaaya vaisheshhika philosophies even aatmaa is considered as one of the nine types of matter. Consciousness is a property of aatmaa . Hence in principle almost all philosophies are achetana kaaraNa vaadaH , whereas advaita vedaanta stands out as the most unique philosophy which presents chetana kaaraNa vaadaH where the consciousness is the superior to matter as the primary cause or the universe of matter. ( vishishhTadvaita and dvaita vedanta -s differ from advaita in the sense that they subscribe achetana tattva , prakRîti , as the material cause while chetana tattva , iishwara , as the instrumental cause. iishwara being all pervading He pervades the acetana tattva as well as the chetana jiiva -s - jiiva satyam , jagat satyam and paramaatma satyam . The first two are not independent but depend on paramaatmaa who pervades both, yet remaining separate). Uniqueness of the advaita vedaanta is its chetana kaaraNa vaadaH, consciousness is the very essence of the universe. That means it is the very substratum or content of the universe and there is no matter other than chaitanyam . Hence the second suutra presents, Brahman, chetana swaruuupa as the material cause. Through this suutra Vyasacharya distinguishes Vedanta from all other systems of philosophies not only Sankhya but also Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Bouddha, Jaina, Charvaka, etc. as well as modern science etc.

3. No doubt upanishhads point at some places Brahman as the material cause, at other places prakRîti as the material cause. Vyasacharya as the basis for the very first chapter as samanvaya or consistency establishes starting with suutra 2 that upanishhads declare predominantly that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. This in fact may be considered as the essence of the first chapter of the Brahmasutras.

4. The question then arises how can upanishhads teaching contradict



itself by declaring at one side Brahman as the material cause and other places prakRîti is the material cause. Actually there is no contradiction. According to upanishhads, prakRîti does exist independent of purusha (it is a-swatantram or para-tantram and not swa-tantram ). Since maayaa is non-separate from brahman , whatever is attributed to maayaa or prakRîti can be attributed to Brahman also. (As noted before in the context of creation we are using Brahman and Iswara are synonymous). Technically we say in Vedanta, prakRîti is the pariNaamii upadaana kaaraNam but brahman is vivarta upaadaana kaaraNam . The definition of vivarta upaadana kaaraNam is that which lends its existence to the pariNaama kaaraNam , parinaamii upaadaana kaaraNa adhishhTaanam vivarta upaadaanam . Likewise the definition of achetana vastu is anyaadhiina satvam and anyaadhiina prakaashhatvam tat jadam - whose existence and illumination depends on the other (conscious) entity. In contrast, the definition of chetana vastu is swayam prakaashhatvam or swayam chaitanyatvam , self-existent and self-conscious entity. Hence there is no self-contradiction in the upanishhads since prakRîti does not exist separate from purushha. In contrast in Sankhya philosophy prakRîti is independent of purushha. This is the basic difference between the two philosophies. In Vedanta purushha and prakRîti are inseparable like ardhanaariishwara, half shiva and half paarvatii together as one, or like naarayaNa with lakshmii always carrying her on his chest). Since prakRîti is a-swatantram or dependent in Vedanta, hence at places where prakRîti is mentioned as the material cause upanishhads ultimately imply only that Brahman is the material cause. This aspect Vyasacharya emphasizes in this suutra by declaring that Brahman is indeed the material cause.

5. In MunDaka and Chandogya one important topic is discussed and that relates to - eka vij~naanena sarva vij~naanam - by knowing one, one can know everything. This is possible because upaadaana kaaraNa vij~naanena sarva kaarya vij~naanam bhavati - by knowing one material cause all the products are known. This is because the products do not exist separate from its material cause just as bangle cannot exist separate from gold. And in the process, the upanishhads for gaining sarva vij~naanam teach the student the brahma j~naanam or the knowledge of Brahman. In Gita Krishna says:

j~naanam te.aha.n savij~naanam idam vakshyaamyasheshhataH |yaj j~naatvaa neha bhuuyo.anyat j~naatavyam avashishhyate ||

I am going to teach you (Arjuna) brahmaj~naanam completely. Knowing this there will be nothing else left for you to know.

If suppose prakRîti is the material cause then knowing prakRîti, sarva vij~naanam will not come. But if Brahman is the material cause then knowing Brahman, sarvavij~naanam will come. Since the first one does not result in sarva vij~naanam , it follows that Brahman has to be the material cause knowing which everything should be known. (when naarayaNa comes lakshmii also comes with Him, but if one goes after only Lakshmi alone one gets ruined just as it happened to raavaNa ). Hence brahma j~naanena sarva vij~naanaM bhavati is essential truth discussed both in Mundaka and Chandogya. This is possible only if Brahman is the material cause of the universe. This is indirectly implied by Vyasacharya by the emphasis of Brahman as the material cause of the universe in this suutra.

Hence the second suutra is a very significant suutra which presents



the chetana kaaraNa vaadaH , which is the uniqueness of the vedaanta shaastram. It is not there in any of the aastika as well as naastika darshanam -s and is unique to Vedanta, particularly to Advaita Vedanta.

With this discussion of the second suutra is over.

Next we take the third suutra that belongs to third adhikaraNa.Message 7998 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Thu Feb 8, 2001 12:35pmSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A

Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i shaastrayoni adhikaraNam -3 suutra 1: shaastrayonitvaat

The third suutra is shhastrayonitvaat. - This belongs to third adhikaraNam , which again has only one suutra. This suutra will be interpreted in two different ways. It is the glory of a suutra to have the possibility of more than one interpretation (see sutra definition in Ch. 1 that discussed about vishvatomukhatvam , and this suutra is an example for that. We will first study the first interpretation and come back and study the second interpretation. The general analysis, the word by word analysis and the conclusion of the suutra, for each interpretation, follow:

1. General analysis.

The essence of this suutra is that it confirms the omniscience of Brahman which is directly revealed in the second suutra , brahma sarvaj~natvam dR^iDhayati. The second suutra said Brahman is the sarva kaaraNam or jagat kaaraNam. Since sarvasya kartaa sarvaj~naH, it indirectly implied that Brahman is sarvaj~naH or omniscient. This omniscience is derived because of the nimitta kaaraNam or intelligent cause of the jagat (rather than upaadaana kaaraNam - see discussion related to suutra 2.) Vyasacharya confirms the omniscience of



Brahman in the third suutra by pointing out that Brahman is the creator of the Veda-s also. shaastra yoni means Veda kartaa, the creator of Veda-s. kartaa means here the nimitta kaaraNam, the intelligent cause. In the second suutra, Brahman is described as the nimitta kaaraNa of the entire world and in this suutra it points he is the nimitta kaaraNam of all the Veda-s which includes all the knowledge. One can say in the second suutra, nimitta kaaraNam of artha prapa~ncha is pointed out and here the nimitta kaaraNam of shabda prapa~ncha, veda-shabdaanaam api kartaa, is pointed. How does this reveal the omniscience of Brahman? Shankara says Veda contains all knowledge, both paraa and aparaa vidyaa , ephemeral as well as transcendental knowledge. There is no branch of science, which is not discussed in the Veda. Veda-s that are known today considered as insignificant in relation to what was there before. Much was lost. It was said that Sama Veda had 1000 shaakhaa -s or branches of which very few are remaining now. Many branches of Veda are known to be extinct now. Even from Shankara's time to now, in the span of 1300 years many portions are lost, since we cannot find Vedic source of some of the quotes of Shankara. Hence Shankara says vedaH sarvaj~naH. From this Shankara makes a logical statement or vyaapti. That is, the author of a text invariably knows more than the contents of the text. This is because one can never express everything one knows in verbal form in one's authored text. Hence the inference is brahma sarvaj~nam, sarvaj~nkalpa veda kartRîtvaat, vyatirekeNa asmad aadivat ! Brahman is omniscient, since He is the author of the Veda that have all knowledge, unlike all of us! (since there is no like example!)

An incidental point to be made for technical reason. It is accepted by Vedantins that Veda-s are anaadi and apaurushheyam , not created by anyone. If Veda-s are not created by any one intellect then how can one say that Brahman has created these Veda-s. This is not a contradiction since when we say Brahman created Veda-s it does means Brahman has intellectually invented veda-s, like Valmiki writing Ramayana. This knowledge was already there in a potential form. Brahman only brought the teaching to manifestation, like the creation. The world was existing in potential form and creation is only manifestation of that existing in a potential form - avyaakRîta prapa~nchasya vyaakaraNam sRîshhTiH . Similarly the Vedic knowledge, it was anaadi, or beginningless. It was in potential form in Brahman itself. In this aspect, Vedanta differs from nyaaya system of philosophy, which states Bhagavaan created the Veda-s.

vishhaya vaakyam for this suutra: The vishhaya vaakyam is from Brihadaranyaka 2-4-10 in maitreyii braahmaNam . In this particular mantra Brahman is said to be creator of not just the world but Veda-s also: sa yathaa aardra edhaagneH abhyaahitaat pRîthak dhuumaaH vinishcharanti evam vaa are asya mahataH bhuutasya niHshvasitam etat yat RîgvedaH, yajurVedaH, saamavedaH, atharvaa~NgirasaH, itihaasaH ...etc. When a wet fuel is burned the smoke comes out effortlessly and listen Oh! Maitreyii! it is like breathing out - niHshvaasaH that is effortlessly (niHshvasita nyaaya or liila nyaayaH - effortlessly like breathing or play) Breathing occurs naturally even when we are engaged actively in other actions and we not even aware that we are breathing. Hence it is said the creation of all veda-s Rîg, yajur, saama and atharvaNa etc. are done effortlessly by Bhagavan. This is symbolized by Lord Vishnu lying as vaTapatra shaayee - breathing in and breathing out the whole universe - unmanifestation to manifestation. Based on the above mantra Vyasacharya writes -



shaastrayonitvaat.

Next the word analysis:

There is one compound word shaastrayonitvaat - shaastra yoni - shaastra means Veda. The entire Veda is called shaastra. shaasanaat traayate iti shaastram - the teachings and commandments (such as satyam vada, dharmam chara etc - all are in imperative mood). The commands are mostly in the puurva bhaaga in the first portions where do-s and don't-s are discussed. In the end portion of the Veda-s the shaasanam implies the revelations - the statement of facts - the fact is you are Brahman - it is one thing that one does not have to work for - svataH siddham - an accomplished fact. In our whole life we strive for moksha and shaastra comes and tells us that this is one thing you do not have to strive for in life! When shaastra says 'You are Free" - what commandment is there? - it is just a statement of fact. Thus through these two - commandments in the karma kaanDa and revelations of facts in j~naanakaaDa shaastra does is traayate, protects people from sa.nsaara. The second word is yoni - it has several meanings and in this context it means nimitta kaaraNam, author or creator of the Veda-s.

With this the word analysis is also over.

Now conclusion:

In this we discuss the five aspects associated with an adhikaraNam.

1. vishhayaH or subject matter - the subject matter for this adhikaraNam is also Brahman.

2. sa.nshayaH or doubt - the doubt is whether Brahman is the author of Veda-s too or not.

3 puurvapaksha - Brahman is not the author of the Vedas- why? - vedasya anaaditvaat - since veda-s are beginningless. Whatever is created has an end - Veda-s are eternal - vedasya nityatvaat, anaadi nidhanaa vaak - Hence it is not created.

4 siddhaanta - Even though Veda is anaadi or beginningless, we discuss the beginning of Veda as a state of manifestation and unmanifestation exactly like the world. The whole Veda in unmanifested state is considered as just the o~Nkaara. Hence OM is considered as the essence of Veda. yaH chhandasaam RîshhabhaH vishvaruupaH | chhandobhyaH adhyamRîtaat sambabhuuva | saH maa indraH medhayaa spRîNotu | - .. T.U. 1-4By churning the Veda-s Brahmaji took the essence of veda-s and that is the OM -kaaraH. The OM -kaara was there as shabda in the aakaasha or space in the very beginning of the creation. (In the beginning was the word). If OM is the essence of Veda-s, Brahman is the essence of OM - OM iti ekaaksharam brahma. Manifestation from unmanifest is considered as creation and hence there is nothing wrong in saying that Brahman is the creator of the Veda-s since He is the cause for its manifestation.

5. sa~NgatiH - the connection is said to be aakshepa sa~NgatiH, meaning this adhikaraNam answers an objection raised particularly by puurvamiimaa.nsaka based on the previous adhikaraNam. In the previous adhikaraNam Brahman is said to be sarva kaaraNam. The



objection that one can accept Brahman is the kaaraNam for everything except the Veda-s since Veda is anaadi. In this suutra the aakshepa is answered with the emphasis that Brahman is sarva kaaraNam including Veda. Hence that Brahman is sarvaj~nam or omniscient is established through this suutra.

This completes the first interpretation of the suutra.End of Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A

Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed athttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.

Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protectedMessage 8146 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Thu Feb 15, 2001 12:30pmSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-3-1B

Notes on BSB I-i-3-1B




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond thethree guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofpurity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, tohis lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\--------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada - i shaastrayoni adhikaraNam - 3 suutra : shaastrayonitvaat

The second interpretation of the suutra: Let us assume that we are studying the suutra once again as fresh - As before we will follow the general analysis, the word analysis and the conclusion.

General Analysis:

In the second suutra Brahman is defined as jagat kaaraNam , the cause of the universe. We called it as a brahma lakshaNa suutram. We established before that (1) we need a pramaaNam along with lakshaNam to establish Brahman,(2) the second suutra does provide only a lakshaNam and not an anumaana pramaaNa as claimed by nayyayika -s and finally Veda-s alone can provide the shabda pramaaNam to establish Brahman. This idea is conveyed by this suutra. The general meaning



of the suutra - shaastra yonitvaat means shaastra vishhayatvaat -It means the Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta alone as it is beyond the scope of logic. This can be stated as - brahma na anumaana vishhayaH, shaastra vishayatvaat , dharmavat that is Brahman cannot be the subject matter of the logic, it is the subject matter of shaastra alone which is apaurushheyam , like puNyam or merits. In the first interpretation Vyasa states that Brahman sarvaj~nam , shaastra kart^Ritvaat . In the second interpretation Vyasa states that Brahman na anumaana gamyam , shaastra vishayatvaat . yoni means source and in the first interpretation it is the source (author) of Vedas and in the second interpretation it is source for knowledge of Brahman.

vishhaya vaakyam for the suutra :

It is again from bR^ihadaaraNyaka from shaakalya braahmanam (debate between yaaj~nvalkya and shaakalya) and is the basis for this second interpretation- tantu aupanishhadam purusham pR^ichchhaami - Here the word purushha means Brahman - After yaaj~nvalkya successfully answering all the questions of shaakalya, yaaj~nvalkya asks shaakalya a counter question about nirguNa brahman which is only known through neti, neti, not this, not this. In that context the above statement is made where aupanishhadam purushham means upanishhad eka vedyam brahman , that Brahman which can be known only through upanishhads. Also in shaanti paaTha we chant - sarvam brahmopanishhadam - Brahman that includes everything is to be known through upanishads, thus providing additional reference as vishhaya vaakyam. We chant the shaanti paaTha (saama veda eg kena & chhaandogya upan.) as

sarvam brahmaopanishadam maaham brahma niraakuryaam | maa maa brahma niraakarot | aniraakaraNamastu aniraakaraNam me astu | tadaatmani nirate ya upanishatsu dharmaaste mayi santu |

Because Brahman is not available as an object for analysis or can be established by anumaana, let me not reject Brahman. Let me accept the shaastram and through the shaastram let me know Brahman.

Now the word analysis.

shaastra has the same meaning as veda or vedaanta and yoni means source of knowledge or pramaaNam . Grammatical difference is also there between the two meanings. In the first interpretation it is tatpurusha samaasa or compound - shaastrasya yoniH kartaa brahma , Brahman is the author of shaaastra. In the second interpretation it is bahuvriihi samaasa or compound - shaastram yoniH pramaaNam yasya tat , shaastram is the means of knowledge of that which is Brahman.

( A little digression: To see the difference between the tatpurusha and bahuvriihi samaasa - a story is told - an intelligent beggar approached a king and said - aham cha tvam cha raajendra lokanaathau ubhaavapi | bahuuvriihi samaaso.aham shhashhTii tatpurusho bhavaan || Oh! King, myself and your self, both are lokanaatha -s (world-masters) - before the King become furious, the beggar continued, in my case the word lokanaatha should be split into bahuvriihi samaasa and in your case it should be tatpurusha samaasa. In the tatpurusha samaasa lokanaatha means lokasya naathaH - the master of the world. In the case of bahuvriihi samaasa, lokanaatha means lokaH naathaH yasya saH lokanathaH - the one for whom the world



is the master. Similar story is told about rameshwara linga - the linga that Rama worshiped. Rama interprets as tatpurusha that is raamasya iishwaraH, the Lord of Rama; and Shiva interprets as bahuuvriihi samaasa that is raamaH iishwaraH yasya saH, the one for whom Rama is the Lord.)

In bahuvriihi samaasa, shaastra yoni means shaastra pramaaNakam or shaastra vedyam which implies that it is shaastraa vishhayaH , brahman - Brahman is the subject matter of shaastram. Hence it is not available for anumnaana pramaaNam.

Conclusion:

vishhayaH - subject matter is still chetana kaaraNam brahman .

sa.nshayaH - doubt - Is Brahman knowable through anumaaNam or not - anumaana vishhayam vaa , na , - can consciousness be studied objectively by a scientist.

puurvapaksha - brahma anumaana vishhayaH - it is within the scope of objective science - jagat kaaraNatvaat, ghaTa kaaraNabhuuta mR^idvat . The cause for the world just as the clay is the cause of a pot.

siddhanta - brahma na anumaana vishhayaH - Brahman is not subject of anumamaana because it is shaastra vishhayatvaat , because it can be known through shaastra alone. Hence we have a definition for veda (given by Sayanacharya),

pratyaksheNaanu mithyaiva yas tu upaayena budhyate| yenam vindati vedena tasmaat vedasya vedataa ||

Veda means that which gives the knowledge of such a subject matter which is not available for any other means of knowledge such as pratyaksha, anumaana, anupalabdhi, upamaana, arthaapatti.

sa~NgatiH : Connection between this and the previous adhikaraNam. The connection between these two is technically called - eka phala kartavya sa~NgatiH. both adhikaraNam -s have a common goal or benefit - it is brahma siddhiH - Existence of Brahman is to be proved before proper inquiry is done. We have said already that to prove existence of any thing, we need lakshaNam and pramaaNam . The second adhikaraNa gives lakshaNam and this adhikaraNam gives pramaaNam.

In summary connecting all the three adhikaraNam -s we can say that jagat kaaraNam brahma j~naanartham vedaanta pramaaNena vichaaraH kartavyaH | - Brahman, who is the cause for the Message 8254 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Wed Feb 21, 2001 11:44amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1A

Notes on BSB I-i-4-1A

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who



is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to my own teacher.


Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i samanvaya adhikaraNam.h . suutra 1: tat tu samanvayaat.h .

The fourth adhikaraNam also has one suutram. This adhikaraNam is called samanvaya adhikaraNam based on the suutra tat tu samanvayaat.h . First the general analysis, then the word analysis and then the conclusion.

General Analysis - This suutra is the key or important suutra based on which the entire first chapter containing 134 suutra -s is developed. This being the fourth suutra , one can consider the rest of the 130 suutra -s that follow are only an elaboration of this suutra alone. Based on this suutra only, the first chapter is named as samanvaya adhyaayaH . The second suutra - janmaad yasya yataH is the foundation suutra on which the entire Brahmasutra is based. The entire first chapter is based on this fourth suutra. Thus we find among the first four suutra -s two very important suutra -s. Thus according to a tradition if a person cannot study the entire Brahmasutra, at least one should study the first four suutra -s. The first four suutra -s put together is known as chatuH-suutrii . There are many books just dealing with these four suutra -s or chatuH-suutrii alone. In the third suutra Vyasacharya has mentioned - shaastra yonitvaat - and we saw two meanings for this - shaastra kaaraNatvaat and shaastra vishhayatvaat. Of these two, we will be taking now the second meaning for further development. shaastra vishhayatvaat means Brahman is the central theme of Vedanta shaastram .

Now the question is how one can say that Brahman is the central theme of Vedanta shaastram ? When many topics are discussed in a shaastram how can one arrive at the central theme or topic among all the topics that are discussed. Sometimes the central theme is very evident but often it is not. For example, in Bhagavat Gita, various topics, karma yoga, bhakti yoga, j~naana yoga are discussed. Krishna in fact emphasizes while discussing each one as if that particular yoga is the most important among all others. If so, what is the central theme of Bhagavat Gita? Normally a shaastra should have only one central theme and the rest of the topics become subservient to that theme. If there are more than one theme, then it is considered as a defect according to miimaa.nsaka -s, and the defect is called ' vaakya bheda doshhaH '. There is a big controversy regarding Gita as to what is the central theme - karma or bhakti or j~naana. Several scholars consider karma is the central theme while bhakti and j~naanam are subservient (in contrast



to Bhagavatam where bhakti is the central theme). Shree Ramanuja emphasizes Bhakti as the central theme while karma and j~naanam are subservient, and Shree Shankara emphasizes j~naanam while the other two are subservient to j~naanam. If one includes impartially all the yoga-s, then one can say that yoga shaastra or brahmavidyaa is the central theme of the Giita. The question that remains is how does one determine which is the central theme of a given shaastra ? If author is available or has written a commentary on his own work then the question can be easily answered. Veda-s being apaurushheyam the author is not readily available to answer. In all these cases our acharya-s have pointed that there is one method by which a central theme can be arrived at. The central theme is the one that fulfilsone important condition and that is called ' samanvayaH '. It is a technical term, which will be analyzed in detail when we come to the word analysis. SamanvayaH means taatparya vishhayatvam or nearest translation to the word is consistency or a compromised meaning is 'importance'. Next question that arises is how does one know which theme enjoys the importance. The answer is it is that which fulfills six factors of proofs called ' shhaD li~Ngaani '. Vyasa says Brahman is the central theme since it fulfills the six factors of proof. The general meaning of this suutra is Brahman is the central theme of Vedanta shaastram because it enjoys the importance ( samanvaya ).

This idea can be presented as anumaana vaakyam - brahma vedaanta shaastra vishhayaH, samanvayaat , dharmavat . Brahman is the central theme of the upanishads since it enjoys the samanvaya just as dharma in the puurvamiimaa.nsaa.

The vishhaya vaakyam (the upanishhaD vaakya on which this suutra is based on) for this suutra consists of the entire upanishhaD mantra -s since we are talking about importance of the entire vedaanta shaastram. This concludes the general analysis of the suutra.

Now the word analysis.

There are three words - tat tu samanvayaat . We have to supply the fourth word for the completion of the statement and that fourth word is shaaastrayoni . The complete suutra reads tat tu shaastrayoni samanvayaat. The meaning is that the Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta because it has importance. tat means that - a pronoun that stands for a noun. Since no other noun is specified here it refers to whatever noun that was discussed in the three previous suutra -s is the noun that is being referred to here. That noun is Brahman since discussion of the three previous suutra-s are centered on this noun only. In the first suutra Brahman is discussed as an object of inquiry, in the second suutra discussion was centered on Brahma lakshaNam that is jagat kaaraNam , and in the third suutra also we discussed Brahman as shaastra kartaa and hence sarvaj~nam and sarvashakti. The word tat indicates that Brahman. Hence the meaning of tat is vichaaryam, jagat kaaraNam , veda kartRî , sarvaj~nam , sarvashakti brahma shaastra vishhayaH. We have to bring the two words shaastra vishhayaH from the previous suutra - this is called anuvRîtti . A simple example of anuvRîtti is - Rama went to temple; Krishna also. Krishna also gives the complete meaning since we borrow from the previous sentence the words 'went to temple'. In suutra literature this anuvRîtti is used extensively to shorten the words. This completes the meaning of the word ' tat '.



The next word is ' tu ' - which for convenience we will explain this word later, although we are supposed to explain the words in the order present.

The third word is samanvayaat , because Brahman enjoys the importance or consistency. How does one prove Brahman enjoys importance in the shaastra ? It can be proved only if the six factors or shhaD li~Ngaani , are supporting Brahman alone. Hence Vyasacharya has to show now using the six factors that Brahman is the central theme. This method of proving the importance or samanvya by making use of six factors or shhaD li~Ngaani is called miimaa.nsa or analysis. shhaD li~NgaiH taatparya nirNayaH miimaa.nsaa. Vyasacharya is going to do that from the fifth suutra onwards. From suutra 5 up to suutra 134 Vyasacharya will be proving samanvaya . Since at the rate the notes are being posted and studied it will take many months before we complete this section on samanvaya (we started this series six months ago and we are still at suutra 4), Shankara and the subcommentators briefly provide the proof here itself while commenting the suutra 4. Following Shankara bhaashhya , we will also therefore do the brief analysis.

This we will take up from the next post.

********Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed athttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.

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With this third suutra / third adhikaraNam is over.----------------We will take up next the suutra # 4 which happens to be the fourth adhikaraNa also.Message 8361 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Fri Mar 2, 2001 6:25amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1B

Notes on BSB I-i-4-1B




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of



purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i samanvaya adhikaraNam.h . suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .

Discussion of samanvaya aspect:

First question is therefore what are those six factors or shhat li~Ngaani? Lingam means an indicator. li~Ngyate iti li~Ngam . That which indicates is li~Ngam. The shhat li~Ngaani are:

upakrama - upasa.nhaarau abhyaasaH apuurvataa-phalam.h | artha-vaada upapattiH ca li~Ngyam taatparya nirNaye ||

To establish the importance of certain topic six indicators are enumerated. The first one is upakrama upasamhaarau - which means the identity or oneness of the theme at the beginning and in the end. The second one is abhyaasaH or repetition - that which is repeated must be important. Third one is apuurvataa, whatever enjoys newness, that which is not known. The fourth one is phalam - fruitfulness or benefit, something is important only if it is fruitful or useful. The fifth one is arthavaadaH, or stutiH or glorification, whatever that is glorified must be important. Finally upapattiH, reason or logic. Whatever fulfills the logic is of importance and whatever is illogical or irrational or unreasonable cannot be the central theme. These are the six factors. In tradition the commentators take one example for analysis and the standard example is the sixth chapter of Chandogya Upanishad which is called tat tvam asi prakaraNam . It is considered as the model chapter. When we apply the six factors to this chapter, we come out with the conclusion that Brahman is the central theme of the chapter.

The first factor is upakrama upasamhaara li~Ngam, that is, the relation to the topic at the beginning and end of the chapter. The tat tvam asi prakaraNam begins and ends with the discussion of Brahman. - sad eva saumya idam agra aasiit . ekam eva advitiiyam - "Hay good-looking one! Existence alone was there in the beginning and it is one without the second" - thus the beginning of prakaraNa is revealing the nature of Brahman. The chapter ends with the statements - aitad aatmyam idam sarvam | tat satyam | saH aatmaa | tat tvam asi shwetaketo | This entire universe is Brahman. That is the truth. That is aatmaa. Oh! Swetaketu! that thou art. Thus Brahman which is the same as aatman is the theme in the beginning and the end.

The second factor is abhyaasa or repetition. In this chapter of Chandogya the teacher Uddalaka gives several examples to illustrate the point and in the end of each example the same statements - aitad aatmyam idam sarvam | tat satyam | saH aatmaa | tat tvam asi shwetaketo | - are repeated. It is repeated nine times each time taking different examples, to indicate that the statements are not a casual statements but have great significance requiring such extended repetition. Hence the tat tvam asi is considered as the essential teaching as mahaavaakya or aphorism.



The third factor is apuurvataa - new topic. Vedanta shaastram reveals Brahman only, which is new entity since it is not only unknown but also cannot be known by any other means or pramaaNam . What is considered as new? The definition of what constitutes new or apuurvataa is pramaaNaantara avedyam, apuurvatvam. A thing is new if it is not known or cannot be known through all other instruments of knowledge. na tatra chakshuH gachchhati na vaak gachchhati no manaH gachchhati , I cannot know Brahman through the eyes, through the speech nor by process of analysis of thinking. I cannot even know Brahman through karmakaanDa or puurvamiimaa.nsaa also. Brahman is outside the scope of karma - na karmanaa na prajayaa dhanena taygena eke amR^itatva maanasuH - says the shruti. Brahman is revealed only by Vedanta - Hence it is apuurva vishhayaH or new knowledge that is not gained by any other means. Hence apuurvata li~Nga or factor is satisfied. This apuurvata is also indicated in the sixth chapter of Chandogya.

Here the teacher asks the student to bring a lump of salt and dissolve it in a cup of water. Then he asks the student to taste the water at the top, in the middle and from the bottom of the cup. The student after tasting, says the water is saltish everywhere. When the teacher asks the student if he can see the salt in the water, the students says no. He knows that there was the lump of salt in water since he himself added it but he can see where the salt is. Since he could taste salt all-over, the water is pervaded by something other than water, since he is experiencing it yet he cannot see it any where in the water and it is imperceptible to the eyes. Having given this example the teacher says to the student - one knows the body is bundle of matter, just like a statue which is also made up of pa~nchabhuutaa -s. Yet one experiences the body as conscious entity unlike the statue out there, just as the water is saltish. Just as the water is pervaded by something other than water to make it saltish, the body is pervaded by something other than matter to make it conscious. That extra something makes the water saltish, there is extra something that makes the body alive and conscious. Just as one can not see that lump of salt that makes the water saltish, similarly one cannot see that which makes the body alive and conscious. What is that something that makes the matter enliven. The teacher says - sad eva saumya idam agra aasiit , ekam eva advitiiyam - that which exists that which is conscious is there from the beginning before the creation. It is one with out the second. That Brahman you are - tat tvam asi swetaketo. So Brahman pervades the body - atra eva khila sat - na nibhaalayate - My dear boy - there is no need to go in search of Brahman. He is right inside you as the very essence of your life, the essence of your existence and consciousness and is imperceptible to the senses, mind and intellect. You are that. Thus by this example, the teacher proves that Brahman is pratyaksha agocharam or pramaaNaantara agamyam hence apuurvam brahman. Brahman cannot be perceived or thought about. He cannot be known by any other pramaaNa and can be known only through Vedanta pramaaNa. This is the apuurvataa li~Ngam or factor that is established.

Thus Vyasa established that 1. Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta, 2) it is unique subject matter and 3) Brahman is known through Vedanta alone and not by any other pramaaNam. Conversely, looking from Vedanta point, it is the unique pramaaNam for Brahman. The converse is established because other than shabda pramaaNa the other pramaaNa essentially rests on pratyaksha in one way or the



other. Since Brahman cannot be perceived, it can be known only by shabda pramaaNa and Vedanta is the rightful shabda pramaaNa . Thus Vedanta is unique pramaaNam and Brahman is unique prameyam . The first part, Vedanta is unique pramaaNam is established by shaastra yonitvaat and the second part Brahman is the unique prameyam is established by tat tu samanvayaat , since samanvaya requires as a part of the shhad li~Nga, uniqueness aspect. Thus the fourth suutra ' tat tu samanvayaat ' is the converse of the third suutra ' shaastra yonitvaat '. Thus fourth suutra corroborates the third suutra.

The fourth li~Ngam is phalam . It is common understanding that wherever phalam is mentioned that aspect should get primary importance otherwise it is of secondary importance. It is like the bottom line. In the Upanishads we find the statement ' brahmavit aapnoti param ' if one knows Brahman one gets eternal liberation or moksha. Hence the importance is given to brahmaj~naanam . If we examine the sixth chapter of Chandogya, there is a statement 'tasya taavad eva chiram yaavat na vimokshye atha sampatsya iti |' That is brahmaj~naani will get jiivan mukti and at the time of death he will get videha mukti . Thus both jiivan mukti phalam and videha mukti phalam are mentioned from brahmaj~naanam. Hence Brahman is central theme of Vedanta.

The fifth factor is arthavaadaH or glorification. In the Upanishad-s the advaitic understanding is glorified by pointing that ' eka vij~naanena sarva vij~naanam bhavati ', by knowing one, one knows everything. brahma j~naani will become sarva j~naani. The word ' sarvaj~naani ' has to be understood. It does not mean he will start knowing immediately quantum mechanics or C++ language etc. sarvaj~naanam means sarva aatma j~naanam . He gets the knowledge of the essence of everything, which is as good as knowing everything. Thus by glorifying brahmaj~naani as sarvaj~naH , the sixth chapter indirectly glorifies Brahman only. Glorification of brahmaj~naani is the same as the glorification of Brahman since ' brahmavit brahma eva bhavati ' knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. Not only brahma j~nanam is glorified, the knowledge of all others are condemned in the sense that they do not give moksha or freedom from ignorance. In Kathopanishad (2-1-10) it was said " mRîtyoH saH mRîtyum aapnoti yaH iha naanaa eva pashyati ", one who is in duality he will travel from death to death. The one who dies without gaining brahma j~naanam he is considered as unfortunate person, saH kRîpaNaH . Whereas one who dies after brahmaj~naanam he alone is braahmaNaH ( sa eva braahmaNaH - Bri. Upa.), implying that all the aj~naanii -s are called abrahmaNaH. In fact in all other knowledge, the more one knows the more alpa j~naani one becomes. The more and more one specializes in any objective sciences the more and more one recognizes that what he knows is very very small in comparison to what is left to know. He feels more and more ignorant in relation to what he knows. He will never feel that there is nothing more to learn. He will feel more and more inadequate and hence feels more and more humble. On the other hand a brahma j~naani feels he has learned what need to be learned and that there is nothing more to learn. - yat j~naatvaa na param j~neyam'. He has accomplished what need to be accomplished in life, kRîta kRîtyaH. Thus brahmaj~naanam is glorified and in contrast anyaj~naanam is criticized - both come under arthavaadaH , glorification of brahmaj~naanm. It includes brahmaj~naana stuti and anyaj~naana nindaa .



Final factor is upapattiH - the upanishhat wants to show that it is not illogical. It is not dogmatic or irrational or based on blind belief. Brahma satyam and jagat is mithya giving a logical support. The upanishad -s reveal Brahman is kaaraNam and the jagat or the world is kaaryam. It logical shows kaaraNam alone is satyam because it has independent existence. Whereas kaaryam has no independent existence. Hence upanishhat makes an anumaana vaakyam - brahma satyam kaaraNatvaat , jagat mithyaa kaaryatvaat . Upanishad gives an example also for this in the same sixth chapter of Chandogya Up. - vaachaarambhaNam vikaaro naamadheyam mRîttikaa eva satyam , when there is a pot, we know that clay alone is satyam and there is no such substance called pot. Pot is mere name and form ( naama and ruupa ). We need to note mRîttika eva satyam - eva meaning alone - the clay alone is satyam - by using the word eva or alone, the upanishhat indirectly says the pot is mithyaa. If there are two people and if I say pointing to one of them, this one alone is intelligent, it implies that the other one is not intelligent or he is dumb. mRîttika eva satyam means the pot etc mRîtpinda -s are only mRîttikaa vikaaraaH , the products of clay. The products etc. are vaachaarambhanam naamadheyam , they are only name-sake existent. Thus Upanishads logically shows using several examples like this (actually three examples are given) the kaaraNa satyatvam and kaarya mithyaatvam . Through that upanishads reveal the brahma satyatvam and jagat mithyaatvam - and that is upapattiH , the sixth factor which is the logical factor.

Thus by taking the sixth chapter of Chandogya Upanishad as the model, it is clearly established that all the shad li~Ngaani or six factors reveal Brahman alone. Hence brahmaNi samanvyaH |. Hence the conclusion is tat - that Brahman is shaastra prameyam . Brahman is the central subject matter of shaastram - samanvayaat, because of consistency or importance. Conversely the Vedanta is the pramaaNam for Brahman, corroborating the third suutra.

With this we conclude the analysis of the word samanvayaat .

Next we take up the analysis of the word 'tu'.


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Message 8444 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Fri Mar 9, 2001 7:05amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1C

Notes on BSB - I-i-4-1C






Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i samanvaya adhikaraNam.h . suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .

Now The Analysis of the word 'tu':

We will now analyze the word 'tu', which we skipped before for convenience. It is the most important word of this suutra. This simple looking word 'tu' received the most elaborate analysis by Bhagavatpada Shankara.

The word 'tu' is used for emphasis. In English it means only or alone. We have said that Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta shaastram. By adding 'tu' Vyasacharya is emphasizing that Brahman alone is the subject matter of Vedanta shaastra. This is called avadhaaraNam or emphasis. Indirectly Vyasa is implying that nothing else is the subject matter. Hence every emphasis involves indirectly a negation of non-essentials. This exclusion in Sanskrit is called vyaavRîtti - thus every avadhaaraNam implies a vyaavRîtti. tu shabdhaH vyavRîtyarthaH. Hence Shankara says 'tu' involves puurvapaksha vyaavRîtti artham. By using the word 'tu', Vyasa is negating all other interpretations, and all other puurvapakshi-s. Here the puurvapakshi-s include all those who claim that the subject matter of Vedanta shaastram is other than Brahman. Who are those puurvapaksha-s? Obviously it includes only those who analyze the Vedanta shaastram. Hence naastika-s are not of concern here since they do not believe in Veda pramaaNa. Hence the puurvapaksha-s are the aastika-s, that is those who accept Veda pramaaNam. There are six aastika darshhanam - saa.nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, puurva miimaa.nsaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa or vedaanta (see Introductory chapter for details). The first five are the possible puurvapaksha in relation to Vedanta. Of these we reduced them to three since saankhya and yoga are practically the same and they are bunched as one as saa.nkhya-yoga system. Similarly nyaaya and vaisheshhika are almost the same and together are referred to as nyaaya-vaisheshhika system. Hence the three puurvapaksha-s; saa.nkhya-yoga, nyaaya-vaisheshika and puurvamiimaa.nsaa are negated using the word 'tu'. Vyasa has to negate each one. He considers saa.nkhya-yoga as the most powerful puurvapaksha. Hence he spends the rest of the first chapter, from fifth to one-hundred & thirty four, for two tasks; establishing Vedanta that is brahma samanvaya and negating saa.nkhya-yoga puurvapaksha. Hence the rest of the 130 suutra-s in this chapter is a commentary on the word 'tu'. He extends this negation of saa.nkhya-yoga even to the second chapter. The nyaaya-vaisheshhika is not looked upon as that powerful but only a weak puurvapaksha for refutation. In the second chapter nyaaya-vaisheshhika is discussed



very briefly. In one suutra Vyasa says it is not at all relevant.

puurvamiimaa.nsaa is only left out. It is the ritualistic section of the Veda and is analyzed using sutra format by Jaimini maharshi, who was in fact a disciple of Vyasacharya. There is a bhaashhyam also for this suutra by shabara swami - shaabara bhaashhyam. Shankara holds this bhaashhyam with high regard. We normally do not consider the puurvamiimaa.nsaa and shaarbara bhaashhyam as puurvapaksha at all, since the puurva bhaaga of Veda-s are relevant and useful since it is a means for dharma, artha and kaama - dharma artha kaama purushhaartha siddhyarthaM puurvamiimaa.nsaa atyantam upakaarakam. In addition it is useful for chittashuddhi, for purification of the mind. Hence it is called dharma shaastram. It is helpful to obtain the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, discussed with reference to suutra 1. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsaa is not really a puurvapaksha. But we emphasize that puurvamiimaa.nsaa cannot give moksha. According to Vedantins, Jaimini as well as Shabara muni also accept this. However later there were subcommentators who wrote subcommentaries on the shaabara bhaashhyam and presented the puurvamiimaa.nsaa as a means of moksha. Subsequently the subcommentators pushed their arguments further to claim that puurvamiimaa.nsaa alone gives moksha, and uttaramiimaa.nsaa is utterly useless. Therefore the puurvamiimaa.nsaa as presented by these subcommentators forms puurvapaksha. Here puurvapaksha does not include other vedantins such as vishishhTaadvaita and Dvaita but only with non-vedantins. The difference of opinions among the vedantins in the interpretation of Brahmasuutra comes under yaadaviiya kalahaM, internal differences only in interpretations since all vedantins come under one category as uttaramiimaa.nsaka-s. Here all the puurvapakshins are aastika anyottaramiimaa.nsaka-s. Vyasacharya is going to negate elaborately the saa.nkhya-yoga and to some extent the nyaaya-vaisheshhika in the first and second chapters, since those two were considered important at that time. Since Vyasa does not discuss the puurvamiimaa.nsaa to that extent, Shankara uses this opportunity to cover also the puurvamiimaa.nsaa elaborately in his bhaashhyam under the pretext of the word 'tu', Brahman alone or only. This is because of the renewed emphasis on puurvamiimaa.nsaa or karmakaanDa at the time of Shankara, due to the influence of Prabhakara and Kumarila Bhatta, who were the two influential sub-commentators of the shaabara bhaashhyam of the Jaiminisuutra-s. The story of the debate between Shankara and Mandana Misra, the disciple of Kumarila Bhatta is well known. Kumarila Bhatta's subcommentary is in the form of vartikam or verses known as bhaTTa vaartikam-s and the philosophy that was expounded based on the puurvamiimaa.nsaa is called bhaaTTamatam. Similarly Prabhakara's commentary which is in prose form is called bR^ihatii. There he presents another version of puurvamiiimaa.nsaa called praabhaakaramatam. Hence bhaaTTamatam and praabhaakaramatam form the puurvamiimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha-s for our analysis.

First the discussion of puurvapaksha. Under this we will first discuss the common views of both matam-s and later point out where they differ. Later we negate the puurvapaksha using siddhaanta. This is like exercise while learning atomic theories; first we learn about Rutherford model and then later we discard it for the better quantum mechanical model. It provides the glimpse of the logic of the thought that went in the analysis. As noted in the very introduction of the suutra-s, all this analysis and the study of Brahmasutra is not necessary for a saadhak for self-realization, but would help in confirmation of his understanding, particularly when the mind is



still full of doubts about the nature of the reality and means to accomplish the goal.

According to puurvamiima.nsaka-s, the entire Veda or Vedic statements can be broadly classified into two types. 1) siddha bodhaka vaakyaani or statements of facts 2) kaarya bodhaka vaakyaani or statements of commandments persuading one to act, consisting of imperative and potential moods - kuryaat, kartavyaH, na hantavyaH, etc - statements of injunctions. Statements of facts will lead one to only knowledge, where as the statement of commandments or injunctions will lead one to action. They further argue that since the siddhabodhaka vaakyaani or statement of facts give only knowledge, they are not much of benefit to us. This is because mere j~naanam will not help in accomplishing anything. Knowing itself is not an accomplishment or end in itself. Hence j~naanam does not give any purushhaartha, it is utterly useless. For example, if I come to know that there is a heaven; I have only the information about the heaven now. By knowing that there is a heaven what benefit do I get? In fact it can make me more miserable because I have now something to compare with. Hence knowledge does not give any benefit. If you go to a doctor, the doctor diagnoses and says this is the disease you have. Now I have clear knowledge of the my disease. Previously I used call it as stomachache but now I call it with more sophisticated technical name. How does that knowledge relieve my pain? Knowledge does not give either sukha or sukhapraaptiH or get rid of pain or duHkha nivRîttiH. It does not give any purushhaartha - that involves sukha praapti or duHkha nivRîtti or both. Therefore j~naanam does not give any benefit. siddhabodhaka vaakyaani aprayojanaani -For example, aham brahmaasmi - aham brahmaasmi - knowing that how does the problem is solved. Even after knowing aham brahmaasmi, the headache or stomachache that one has still remains. The starving pains due to poverty in the house still remains. One still has to pay for school fees. Did it solve family problems? Did it solve national problems? Did it solve the problems due to hunger and poverty in India? Did it solve the war between India and Pakistan or China? What does one get out of any knowledge particularly the Vedanta j~naanam? On the other hand kaaryabhodhaka vaakyaani make one to do something and by doing alone we get some puurushhaartha in the form of either sukhapraapti or duHkhanivRîtti. Medicine knowledge did not remove the pains only kaaryam involving taking the medicine relieves the pain. Similarly knowledge of heaven does not give any benefit.

swarge loke na bhayam ki.ncha naasti,na tatra tvam na jarayaa bibheti,ubhe tiirtvaa ashanaayaa pipaase,shokaatigo modate swargaloke || (KaTha. U. 1-1-12)

Nachiketa says to Yama, the Lord of Death, there is no fear in the heavens, you (death) are not there to have any effect. No fear of oldage and disease. No pains due to hunger and thirst. Without any sorrows one enjoys the heavenly bliss.

The above statements come under siddhabodhaka vaakyam. It says heaven is so wonderful, etc. By knowing what do I gain. On the other hand by doing a ritual - jyotishhToma yaga- based on the kaarya bodhaa vaakyam one can go to heaven. jyotishhTomena swarga kaamo yajeta - which asks one to do jyotishhToma yaga by which one can attain as purushhaartha the heavens. Hence puurvapakshi-s assert that all the kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s will lead to actions which will lead to



either sukhapraapti or duHkha niV^itti. Hence kaaryabodhaka vaakyams are saprayojanaaNi or useful.

In support of their arguments puurvapakshii-s show that many Vedantic scholars are direct proof for their assertion. They argue that even after any amount of Vedantic teaching, the student still asks in the end, what should I do here after? Why they want to do something? They ask - give me a practical recipe so that I can practice or do. Give me a mantra so that I can do japam. Now that I know I am Brahman, what should I do now? Enough of this intellectual analysis and studies of Brahmasutra-s etc will not help. It is just a waste of time. What we need to do is we need to sit down and meditate or contemplate. Every student asks for doing something since he feels that he has not benefited much out of just the study of Vedanta. This is only because by action only something can be achieved and not just by knowledge. If the students got benefit from knowledge as Vedantins claim then why should they want to do something. Hence we cannot but conclude that siddhabodhaka vaakyaani aprayojanaani, kaaryabodhaa vaakyaanii eva saprayojanaani. Both Praabhakara and Bhatta matams agree with these assertions.

The third point is as follows. These puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s accept with other aastika that Veda-s are pramaaNam. If all the credit of driving Buddhi-ism out of India, it actually belongs to the puurvamiimaa.nsaka. Kumarila Bhatta in fact disguised himself as a student of Buddha to learn their intricate teachings and used that knowledge only to defeat them later on their own grounds. For deceiving his own teacher of Buddhism he later felt guilty and immolated himself for the sin he has committed. Therefore puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s accepts vedapramaaNam. What does it mean when we say Veda is pramaaNam. The popular definition of pramaaNam is:' anaadhigata abaadhita artha bodhakam pramaaNam' - pramaaNam reveals something that which is not revealed by other pramaaNam (anaadhigatam).

If Veda is pramaaNam it should reveal something that is not revealed by pratyaksha or anumaana or logic not even by science. To be a valid pramaaNa Veda has to reveal something, which is even beyond the scope of science (objective). This is what anaadhigatam implies. The second condition abaadhitam that which is not contradicted by other pramaaNam. Veda should not reveal something, which contradicts our pratyaksha pramaaNam. If Veda tells that fire is cold, it is rejected since it is baadhitam, contradicted by pratyaksha. It should not make illogical statements even if it is beyond logic. It should not contradict science either. At the same time it should reveal something that cannot be revealed by other pramaaNa. Hence it should be, unrevealed and uncontradicted by other pramaaNam-s. To this definition the puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s add one more qualification or condition. The altered definition is anaadhigata abhaadita phalavat arthabodhakam pramaaNam. Vedantins are not keen but do not reject the added condition. phalavat means it should be saprayojanam, should be useful. Hence pramaaNam is that which reveals something which is useful and unrevealed and uncontradicted by other pramaaNam-s.

Since puurvapakshi-s argue that siddhabodhaka vaakyaani aprayojanaani, kaaryabodhaka vaakyaani saprayojanaani (statements of facts are useless and statements of commandments are useful), applying the new definition of pramaaNa, they conclude that siddhabodhaka vaakyaani apramaaNaani while kaaryabodhaka vaakyaani



pramaaNaani. That is the former are invalid as pramaaNa since they are useless, while the latter are valid as they are useful. They claim all these ideas have been revealed in one important jaimini suutram which is key suutram. 'aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat aanarthakyam athadarthaanaam' - aamnaayasya means vedasya, kriyaarthatvaata meaning kaarya bodhakatvaat, statements of injections being important (because they are useful), aanarthakyam meaning apramaaNam (invalid referring to all other statements other than kaarya bodhaka vaakyaani), athadarthaanaam meaning sidhhabodhakaanaam, statements of facts. In summary it states that the statements of commandments are valid and statement of facts are invalid as pramaaNam, since the former is useful and the later is useless.

The entire j~naanakaaNDam deals with only siddhavastu - talks about Brahman, talks about sR^ishhTi or creation, talks about aatmaa but it does not talk about any karma to be performed. The very word j~naana indicates that it only gives us knowledge. We already established that kevala j~naanam is aprayojanam or if it cannot be put into action it is useless. Hence the entire j~naanakaaDam is apramaaNam or invalid, siddhabodhaka vaakyatvaat. What benefit do I get by knowing that Brahman is satyam j~naanam and anantam? What benefit do I get that the five elements were created? What benefit do I get knowing that there are pa~ncha kosha-s or pa~ncha praaNa-s in me? By mere knowledge of these, I do not get any benefit, will not put dinner on my table, will not remove the pain in my back or in the neck, or pay the skyrocketing doctor's bill. Hence the entire j~naanakaaNDa is useless. vedosharaaH vedaantaaH - Vedanta is like a desert in an otherwise fertile land. This is the puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s puurvapaksha.

We will continue in the next post.-----------------------------------------------Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed athttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.

Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.Message 8518 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>Date: Fri Mar 16, 2001 11:29amSubject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1D

Notes on BSB I-i-4-1D




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of



purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.--------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4 suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1D

We have been discussing the Shankara's presentation of puurva miimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha under the explanation of the word 'tu'.

puurva miimaa.nasaka-s reject that siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s, statements of facts, which are essentially the whole of j~naakaanDa, as apramaaNaani or invalid, since they are not useful. However, in presenting these, puurva miimaa.nsaka-s themselves encounter a problem in their arguments. The puurva miimaa.nsaka-s accept that the whole Veda as pramaaNam, since it isapaurushheyam, and hence does not have any defects that can arise if it is authored by a human intellect (nirdushhTa pramaaNa- defect-free pramaaNam). puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s do not accept iishwara as the revealer of the Veda-s. For them Veda is ultimate and it is unrevealed even byiishwara since they are eternal and anaadi or beginningless. For puurvamiimaa.nsaka the Veda enjoys the same status as iishwara. But through this aamnaayatvaat suutram he has divided the Veda into two parts - siddhabodhaka vaakyam and kaaryabodhaka vaakyam - of which the farmer is apramaaNam. Hence he made now the part of the Veda as apramaaNam.

The question they had to face is how can one accept on one side the whole Veda as pramaaNam and on the other side reject part of it as apramaaNam. For that they say that siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s are apramaaNam in the direct sense but they are useful indirectly, when they are applied. All the siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s help indirectly the implementation of kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s. For example when Veda-s are glorifying heaven, swarga (see sloka quoted before), naturally we get a desire to go there. Once the desire comes, one looks for the means to go there and Veda-s help him instructing that jyotishhtomena swarga kaamo yajeta - a desiree of swarga should do the ritual jyotishhTa.

Thus student is directed to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam because he learned about swarga. Learning about swarga did not help him directly to go to swarga but indirectly helped him to have a desire and which caused of action that he has to do to go to swarga. Hence all swarga varNana vaakyam (statements describing heaven) should be linked to kaarya bodhaka vaakyam - jyotishhTomena swarga kaamo yajeta. When they are linked like that to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s they become useful hence become pramaaNam. Thus the whole Veda is pramaaNam, part dealing with kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s are directly, while the part dealing with siddhabodhaka vaakyam are only indirectly by linking to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s. This aspect is conveyed by another puurvamiimaa.nsaa suutram - vidhinaathu ekavaakyatvaat stutyarthena vidhinaamsyuH - vidhinaam means kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s, eka vaakyatvaat means sambandhavatvaat, by linking with, stutyarthena vidhiinaa, by assisting kaaryabodhaka vaakyam they become pramaaNam. They use two technical words - siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s are sheshha or dependent and kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s are sheshhi, independent. sheshha-sheshhi



sambandhaH or mukhya-amukhya sambandhaH. Hence they consider that any Vedantic statements (upanishhadic statements) are independently useless. They have to be linked to one or the other kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s for them to be indirectly useful. They are useless unless it is hooked to some kaaryabodhaka statement. That is why some people claim that Vedanta has to be put into practice or to be applied.

What about Brahman revealed in Vedanta - satyam j~naanam anantam brahma. puurvamiimaa.nsaaka-s says - there is no such thing called Brahman at all. It is only a bhrama or illusion. This negation of Brahman is there in both praabhaakara and bhaaTTamatam-s. Veda will not reveal Brahman because Brahman is utterly useless. Upanishads clearly state that Brahman is not attainable or knowable, by statements such as adreshyam, agraahyam, it is imperceptible and it cannot be grasped by the intellect, etc. Brahman is avyayahaaryam, being so it is not available for any transaction. It cannot be a subject, an object, an instrument, a locus etc , it is not a kartaa, karma, kriya, karaNam, sampradaanam, or apaadaanam - Vedantins themselves say that it is kriyaa kaaraka phala vilakshaNam - it is neither an end nor a means to an end. Hence brahman na asti. There is no such thing called Brahman.

What about aatma j~naanam, self-knowledge. That also is not acceptable since self is intimately known to everyone. Why should Veda reveal that which is already siddham or self-evident? Swatasiddhasya aatmanaH vedavedyatvam kathaM bhavati? - pramaaNa should reveal something, which is not known otherwise. Since aatmaa is self-evident, why should Veda waste its breath to reveal something, which is already known. Then what is use of Vedanta? Whenever aatmaa is talked about in Vedanta one should take it as statement glorifying the yajamaana or doer of theritual, so that he will be so happy to perform the ritual. It is like a mother-feeding a child telling the stories of how great the child is so that the child can eat the food. Wherever Brahman is talked about, it should be understood as the glorification of yaaga devata-s, the deities of rituals, so that the yajamaana is encouraged to offer oblations to those devata-s. Thus all the Vedantic statements have to be connected to the kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s, statements of injunctions.

If every Vedantic statement has to be connected to one or the other kaaryabodhaka vaakyam, the question arises which one to be connected to what? Is it optional or is there some rule of connection? With respect to this technical point, the two matam-s, the bhaaTTamatam and praabhaakara matam differ.

According bhaTTamatam, all the j~naanakaanDa vaakyam-s should be connected to karmakaanDa vidhi vaakyam or kriyaa vaakyaani. praabaakara-s disagrees that this connection can be that arbitrary. The karmakaanDa vaakyam-s are far away from the Vedantic vaakyam-s, the arbitraryconnection he calls as prakaraNa bhedaH, totally far apart. According to him the j~naanavaakyam-s should be connected to the closest kaaryavaakyam-s. In the j~naanakaanDa itself there are many upaasana vaakyam-s which are kaaryabodhakam. Hence all the brahmabodhana statements should be connected to upaasana-s prescribed in Vedanta. Because of this the person achieves purushaartha, and that is the final goal of kaaryam, action. There is no direct use of j~naanam, one has to do something, that something can be karma as in



karmakaanDa or upaasanaa as in j~naanakaanDa. Action is the essence of Veda.

So far we have discussed puurvapaksha of puurvamiimaa.nsaa consisting of both praabhaakara and bhaaTTamata-s.

We next take up Shankara's siddhaanta.


***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.***Message 8678 of 9722 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index Msg #

From: Sunder Hattangadi <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 26, 2001 9:56 am Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1E

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes on BSB I-i-4-1E




Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate. --------------------------------------------------- samanvaya adhyaaya - I spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4



suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1E

Notes on BSB I-I-4-1E

Now siddhaanta - Shankara's refutation of the above puurvapaksha. We will go point by point.

1. Taking puurvapakshi's argument that all siddhabodhaka vaakyams lead to knowledge, which is useless, while kaaryabodhaka vaakyams lead to action which, is useful, Shankara says yes you are right. But it is only a general rule, but there are exceptions to the rule. By reading about tennis or swimming, I do not get much benefit. Only by playing or swimming, I get the benefit. Hence the general rule is kevala j~naanam na purushhaartha saadhakam. However, there are several cases where kevala j~naanam or mere knowledge alone without requiring any action gives the benefit. Wherever there is a problem caused by ignorance, then mere knowledge alone can solve the problem. In the case of disease, the problem is not centered on ignorance, but some germs etc and therefore the solution to the problem involves taking an antidote to the germs or antibiotic. But for ignorance caused problems the knowledge alone is the solution. Our famous example is rajjusarpavat, fear arising from the error of superimposed snake. Bhaya kampaadikam sarvam are caused by the snake which appears to be there only because of ignorance of rope, rajju aj~naanam. What homa one needs to perform to get rid of the snake? No karma is required, no upaasanaa is required, what is required is rope-knowledge. rajju j~naanaat rajju aj~naana nivRîttiH , rajju aj~naana nivRîtyaa sarpa adhyaasa nivRîttiH, sarpa adhyaasa nivRîtyaa bhayakampaadi nivRîttiH . By the knowledge of the rope, the knowledge of the existence of serpent is gone, by that the associated fear etc is gone. Therefore in all such cases kevala j~naana maatrena purushaartha siddhiH , only knowledge alone accomplished the result and not the action. Therefore sidhhabodhaka



vaakyaani pramaaNaani, saprayojanatvaat, naayam sarpaH iti vaakyavat. Since they produce results they are useful and hence are pramaaNa vaakyam-s just as in the rope-snake example. Hence whenever the problems are centered on ignorance, then the siddhabodhaka vaakyam are directly useful and hence are pramaaNa-s. If the problems are not centered on ignorance then siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s need to be connected to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam for them to give useful result. Hence one cannot apply a general rule.

Now the question is do the vedaanta vaakyam-s come under this exceptional category giving benefit directly or they must be connected to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s as the puurvapakshii-s claim. A vedaantin claims that all the siddhabodhaka vaakyam come under the exceptional cases giving directly the utility prayojanam-s. For this Vedanta itself is the pramaaNa since it makes it very clear that j~naana maatreNa moksha phalam bhavati. One need not join this knowledge with any kaaryabodhaka vaakyam since knowledge alone can give the moksha which is the purushhaartha. Where it is said? Almost in every upanishad this is mentioned.

1. Ishavasya Upanishad- shloka 7

yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaa eva abhuut vijaanataH | tatra ko mohaH kaH shoka ekatvam anupashyataH ||

When a person clearly knows the aatmaa which is the substratum of everything after that mere knowledge where is the grief and where is the delusion? Hence j~naana maatreNa shoka moha nivîttiH, sa.nsaara nivîttiH, moksha praaptiH | By mere knowledge grief, delusion and sa.nsaara are gone, one gets liberated.

2 Kena Upanishad - shloka 2-4

pratibodha-viditam matam amRîtatvam hi vindate | aatmanaa vindate viiryam vidyayaa vindate amRîtam.h ||

with the emphasis on vidyayaa vindate amRîtam, kevala j~naanamaatreNa (by mere knowledge) a person attains immortality.

3. Katha upanishad shloka 2-2-12



eko vashii sarva-bhuuta-antara-aatmaa ekam biijam bahudhaa yaH karoti | tam aatmastham ye anupashyanti dhiiraaH teshhaa.n sukha.n shaashvatam na itareshhaam.h ||

The one who clearly recognizes (anupasyanti) Brahman as the very aatman, they will have eternal happiness and there is no other way than through this knowledge ( na itareshhaam).

4. Prashna Upanishad:

The upanishad teacher, pippalaada, says in the end: 6-6

...tam vedyaM purushha.n veda yathaa maa vo mRîtyuH parivivyathaaH iti |

After knowing Brahman(purushham) there will not be any suffering due to death etc. One attains immortality.

The students in the end after learning, prostrate to the teacher and prayerfully say: 6-8

.. asmaakam avidyaayaaH paraM paaraM taarayasi iti | namaH parama Rîshhibhyo namaH parama RîshhibhyaH ||

Thus thanking the teacher they indicate that through knowledge they have gained the Supreme.

5. Mundaka uanishad: 3-2-9

sa yo ha vai tat paramaM brahma veda brahma eva bhavati| na asya abrahma-vit kule bhavati | tarati shoka.n | tarati paapmaanam | guhaa-granthibhyo vimuktaH amRîtaH bhavati ||

Knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. In his lineage everyone will have knowledge of Brahman. He is liberated from all the sorrows and all the sins. Free from all ignorance, he attains liberation from death.

6. Mandukya Upanishad: mantra 12

sa.nvishati aatmanaa aatmaanam yaH evam veda |

One, saH, knows the aatmaa (paramaatmaa) by oneself (aatmanaa) yaH evam veda - by knowledge alone.

7. Taittiriya Upanishad - Brahmanandavalli - 1-1



brahmavit aapnoti param.h | tat eshha abhyuktaa | satyam j~naanam anantam brahma | yo veda nihitam guhaayaam parame vyoman saH ashnute sarvaan kaamaan saha|

- thus yaH veda nihitam guhaayaam, the one who knows Brahman as the aatmaa in the heart fulfils all the purushhaartha-s.

8. Aitareya Upanishad: 3-1-3

sarvam tat praj~naa-netram.h | praj~naane pratishhThitam.h | praj~naa-netraH lokaH | praj~naa pratishhThaa | praj~naanaM brahma |

This every thing is nothing but the vision of the consciousness or knowledge. It is established in consciousness. It is the projection of the consciousness. It is nothing but consciousness.

9. Chandogya Upanishad 7:1:3

tarati shokam aatmavit - the knower of aatma crosses over all the sorrows - no need to do any action.

10. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad : janaka-yaaj~navalkya sa.nvaadana- 4-4-12

aatmaanam chet vijaaniiyaat ayam asmi iti puurushhaH | kim ichchhan kasya kaamaaya shariiram anusa.njvaret.h ||

For the one who has known the aatmaa, there-afterwards, what desire he has, what action he has to do, and what suffering he will have to undergo in life? - meaning none. (This mantra has been exhaustively commented on by Shri Vidyaranya in his Panchadasi, 3-298)

11. Kaivalya Upanishad: 10.

sarva-bhuutastham aatmaanam sarva-bhuutaani cha aatmani | sampashyan brahma parama.n yaati na anyena hetunaa ||

By merely knowing Brahman he attains moksha and by no other means (The first line is repeated in Bhagavad Giita 6-31. The second line is different - iikshyate yoga-yukta-aatmaa sarvatra sama darshanaH |)

12. Purusha-suukta: 7.



veda aham etaM purushaM mahaantam | aaditya-varna.n tamasaH tu paare | sarvaani ruupaani vichitya dhiiraH | ..... tam evam vidvaan amRîta iha bhavati | na anyaH panthaaH ayanaaya vidyate |

13. A slightly different version in Shvetashvatara Upanishad 3-8

veda aham etam purushhaM mahaantam aaditya-varNam tamasaH parastaat.h | tam eva viditvaa atimRîtyum eti naanyaH panthaaH vidyate ayanaaya ||

knowing this Brahman alone who is resplendent like the sun and which is beyond darkness of ignorance, one transcends death. There is no other path than knowledge.

These are only examples taken one from each of the main upanishads. There are many in each.

From smRîti pramaaNa- Gita B.G 5-15,16

aj~naanna aavRîtam j~naanam tena muhyanti jantavaH ||

j~naanena tu tat aj~naanam yeshhaam naashitam aatmanaH | teshaam aadityavat j~naanam prakaashayati tat param.h ||

All the problems are caused by ignorance therefore what is required is only j~naanam.

Thus both shruti pramaaNam and smRîti pramaaNam declare that the problem of human suffering is centered on ignorance and for such kind of problems knowledge is the only solution and not action.

Hence Vedanta is siddha bodhaka vaakyam and it produces knowledge and that mere knowledge we get purushaartha. Therefore vedaanta vaakyaani pramaaNa bhuutaani.

This is response to the first point of the puurvapakshii.

******** Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.

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*** n K. Sadanandan Message 8804 of 9723 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] n Messagen Index n n Msg # n

n From: "Dennis Waite" <[email protected]>n Date: Fri Mar 30, 2001 3:45 pmn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1F

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1F

n sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaaryan madhyamam.h |n asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||

n I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is evern auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the way up ton my own teacher.

n vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiitaMn aananda saandram amalairnidhaanam.h .|n shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitaMn sadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||

n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the threen guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who isn the best among then teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) alwaysn prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada - in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .- 4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1F

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1F

n 2. The next point of puurvapakshii '-s argument is that vedaanta j~naanamn being useless as such should be applied towards karma (according to bhaTTan matam) or upaasanaa (according to praabhaakara matam).

n The reason these matam -s insist on this application is because they cannotn totally reject part of the Veda-s as useless and part useful. They aren forced to make thisn connection to make the so-called useless statement useful.

n Shankara says there is nothing more ridiculous than these forcedn connections.n It is impossible to apply or connect siddhabodhaka vedaanta vaakyam -s ton karma or upaasanaa. In the previous siddhaanta it is argued that the Vedantan need not be connected since it give j~naanam which is useful to solve then fundamental human problem whose root cause is ignorance. In this siddhaanta



n it is argued that it cannot be connected with karma or upaasanaa even if onen wants to try to do that. The first reason Shankara says is the vedaantan j~naanam eliminates duality, which is the very basis for karma andn upaasanaa.

n tat kena kaM pashyet (there seer-seen distinctions gone) - na iha naanaan astin ki.nchana (there is no speck of plurality) - yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaanin aatmaa eva abhuut ( where all the beings other than the self non-existent),n etc says Vedanta. upaasanaa also requires upaasya - upaasaka bheda , karman requires kartRî - karaNa aadi bheda and Vedanta knocks off all thesen bheda -s involving subject-object dualities. After a knowledge of Advaitan how can Advaita j~naanam be applied in the field of dvaitam. It isn impossible.

n 2) In addition to being kartaa , the Vedanta knowledge involving Advaitan knocks off the notions of varNaashrama which is one of the criteria forn certain yaaga-s. For example a Brahmin alone is qualified for certainn yaaga-s - brahmaNaH bRîhaspati savena yajeta , - the bRîhaspati savan yaagam can be performed by a Brahmin only.n raajaa raajasuuyane yajeta - Only the king can perform the raajasuuya yaaga.n Not only varNa status, one has to retain aashrama status for performingn yaga.n Without a wife one cannot perform certain yaaga-s that a house-holder has ton do.n What brahmachaari can do, a gRîhastha cannot do. What gRîhastha can do an brahmachaari should not.

n na varNaaH na varNaashrama aachaara dharmaaHn na me dhaaraNaa - dhyaana - yoga - aadayaH api |n anaatma - aashrayaa ahaM - mama - adhyaasa - haanaatn tat ekaH avashishhTaH shivaH kevalaH aham.h || 2 ||

n Shankara - dashashlokii

n Hence Vedanta negates kartRîtvam and varNaashrama status and havingn negated that how can it be combined with karma and upaasanaa which requiren kartRîtvam?

n The third reason: Vedanta positively condemns karma and upaasanaa as bandhan hetu or cause for bondage. In MunDaka Upa. (1-2-7)

n plavaa hi ete adRîDhaa yaj~naruupaan ashhTaadashoktam avaram yeshhu karma |n etat shreyaH ye abhinandanti muuDhaaHn jaraa mRîtyum te punaH eva apiyanti ||

n Those people who hold on to karma hoping that it will take them acrossn the ocean of sa.nsaara , they are all muuDhaaH - most ignorant. They will gon to heaven and come back and again go through the cycle of sa.nsaara. Hencen after the vedaanta j~naanam the person loses the purushhaarthatva buddhi inn karma. Hence how can it be possible to connect vedaanta j~naanam to karma?n Similarly upaasanaa also -n na karmaNaa na prajayaa dhanena tyaagena eken amRîtatvam aanashhuH - [Kaivalya up. 2]

n karma cannot give moksha after saying that how can Veda say that thereforen perform karma?



n vedaanta vij~naana sunischitaarthaaH sa.nnyaasa yogaatn yatayaH shuddhasatvaaH |

n In Gita - sarva dharmaan parityajya maam ekam sharaNamn vraja | - Hence the third reason is that vedaanta j~naanam is contradictoryn to karman therefore it can never combine with karma. Hence Shankara declares inn Atmabodhan -n avirodhitayaa karma , avidyaa na nivartayet.h |n vidyaa avidyaam nihanti eva tejaH timira sa~Nghavat.h ||

n karma is being opposite cannot remove ignorance. Only knowledge can removen ignorance just as the light removes the darkness. Hence one cannot say thatn siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s should be connected to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s.n In the karmakaanDa one may be able to connect to the kaaryabodhakan vaakyam-s. There the knowledge is how and why one should perform then rituals. But the Vedanta is dealing with a different problem and one cannotn force any connection to the siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s of Vedanta to karma orn upaasana.

n The reason four: The fourth objection is related to the puurvamiimaa.nsakan '-sn declaration that Brahman is not at all there. Shankara says it is not true.n To find out what is revealed by shaastra the puurvamiimaa.nsaka -sn themselves have come up with the procedure involving the shhaD - li~Nga orn six factors of determination. Their own criteria of shhaD - li~Nga or sixn factors have been applied to Vedanta and it has been shown that Brahman isn revealed by the shaastram. upakramaadi shhaD - li~NgaiH tat brahman shaastrasya vishhayaHn samanvayaat or nirnayaat |n When it has been clearly shown that Brahman is indeed revealed by Vedantan how can one say that Brahman is non-existent, unless one is a naastika. Inn that case you have ton reject swarga, heaven also, since you cannot establish that by pratyaksha orn anumaana etc and it is revealed only by Veda. Hence brahma asti, vedaantan taatparya vishhayatvaat.

n In addition puurvapakshii says that Brahman is not there, because it isn neither useful as an end or useful as a means, based on Vedantic statementn that it is neither saadhyam (goal) or sadhanam (means) - saadhya saadhanan vilakshaNam brahma. Sir, if Brahman is neither saadhanam or saadhyam and ifn Vedanta says Brahman still exists, it is very clear that Brahman is then saadhaka only i.e the one who is the seeker of saadhyam by saadhanam. If onen still claims that Brahman is non-existent he isn only denying himself or it is a self-denial, and by that very self-denialn one denies that very denial itself, or in other words one is provingn existence of oneself, thus by Vedanta teaching existence of Brahman - ahamn brahma asmi is the essential teaching of Vedanta.n neti neti iti vachanena sarva saadhanan saadhya nishhedhena saadhanan saadhya vyatiriktam siddharuupam saadhakam - tat tvamn asi iti bodhayati |

n The next argument is if aham is the Brahman and aham is ever revealed and In do not need shaastra to reveal the self which is self-evident.n ahamn aham iti baalyaadishhu api sarvaasu avasthaasu jaagratn - swapna - sushhuptishhu



n sarvadaa prasiddhatvaat sarvadaa prathamaanatvaat -n it is self-evident as I am I am from childhood on, in all our experiences inn waking, dream and deep sleep in all states and was the prathama purushha asn the first person singular existent entity. If shaastra is revealing thatn then it is useless as an pramaaNa since aham is self-evident fact.

n For that Shankara answers aham or I am is known as saamaanya ruupeNa and notn as visheshha ruupeNa - as sat and chit but not as aananda - for thatn Shankara says one has to read Ch. III where adhyaasa bhaashyam isn discussed. -

n yadyapi aatma prasiddhaH , parantu adhyasta jiivaatman ruupeNa evan prasiddhaH na tu paramaatma ruupeNa . aha~Nkaaran ruupeNa prasiddhaH na tu saakshin ruupeNa.n tvam pada vaachyaartha ruupeNa prasiddhaH na tun lakshyaartha ruupeNa. -

n Essentially, although self is self-evident, it is recognized only as a jiivan or limited entity not as an all pervading entity, recognized as ego entityn but not as witnessing consciousness, recognized as conscious entities as In and you but not as all pervading consciousness.

n Hence shaastra has to reveal aatmaa as Brahman. Hence Vedanta is required asn pramaaNa. Hence brahma asti and that brahman is aham. This knowledge isn sufficient since it gives me the purushhaartha , the moksha . The knowledgen thatn aham brahma asmi is useful since it negates my jiivatvam or abrahmatvamn status.n This argument is presented in simple Sanskrit as -

n yathaa rajju sarpan j~naanena rajjun adhyasta sarpa bhaavasya nivîttiH bhavati , evamn aatmanaH brahmatvan j~naanena aatmani adhyastasya jiiva bhaavasyan nivRîttiH bhavati | jiivan bhaava nivRîttiH eva moksha ruupa paraman purushaarthaH - kathamn taadRîsha brahmaNaH nishhprayojanatvam swapne apin sha~Nkitum shakyate!

n How can anyone doubt even in a dream that Brahman is useless when brahman j~naanam gives the greatest purushhaartha called moksha itself. That is then ultimate goal of human life itself. Hence brahman asti - aatmaruupeNa asti .n Vedanta isn required to give not saamanya j~naanam but visheshha j~naanam. Shankaran says for details refer to Ch. III- adhyaasa bhaashya.

n One more argument against puurvamiimaa.nsaka. They argue: In Veda-sn karmakaanDa is of primary importance as swataH pramaaNa and Vedanta hasn no independent validity but gets secondary importance as pramaaNa that toon only by hooking itself to karmakaanDa or upaasanaa. Shankara now provides ann offensive argument. Shankara says in fact it is the other way around. Thatn is karmakaanDam is apramaanam, j~naanakaanDam alone is pramaaNam. Ifn karmakaanDa gets validity it is only because of its association withn j~naanakaanDam. How is this proved?



n You have to wait for the next post!n

____________________________________________________________________________n ________________

n ********n Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder andn can be accessed atn http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/n for personal study.

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n From: "Dennis Waite" <[email protected]>n Date: Wed Apr 11, 2001 3:37 pmn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1G




n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the threen guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who isn the best among then teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) alwaysn prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada - in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .- 4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1G

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1Gn If we recall the puurvamiimaamsaka's definition of pramaaNam is - anadhigatan abaadhita saprayojana arthabodhakam pramaaNam - It should reveal something,n which is new, not negated by other pramaaNam-s and useful.n We have proved above that Vedanta is pramaaNa by their own definition sincen it fulfils all the requirements. Now let us examine the karmakaanDa.



n Does it fulfil all the above conditions? It reveals new things like puNyam,n paapam, swarga, etc, merits, demerits, heaven etc. It is also useful - sincen dharma, artha and kaama purushhaartha are fulfilled. Two requirements aren met.n But does it fulfil abaadhita condition that is it should not be negated byn any other pramaaNa. Shankara says it does not fulfil that requirement sincen karmakaanDa is negated by the j~naanakaanDam of the Veda-s. This is becausen karmakaanDa reveals duality, which is the main theme of karmakaanDa.n j~naanakanDam says na iha naanaa asti ki~nchana -n there is no plurality at all. What you call as plurality is nothing butn Brahman

n brahama eva idam amR^itam purastaat brahma pashchaat brahma dakshinataH chan uttareNa, adhaH cha uurdhvam cha prasR^itam brahma eva idam vishvam idamn varishhTham - MunDaka Upa. 2-2-11

n Brahma which is changeless is everywhere - in the front, in the back, in then south, in the north, above, below - all over it is nothing but Brahman.n This entire magnificent universe is nothing but Brahman. What about then duality - Vedanta says - yatra vaa anyadi vasyaat tatra anyaH anyatn pashyet - where there is a seeming duality then alone a person seesn plurality everywhere - yatra sarvam aatmaa eva abhuut tatra kena kamn pashyet - when a person can recognize the aatman where is the question ofn duality? From these two statements it is clear that aj~naana kaale dvaitam,n j~naanakaale advaitam - only when one is ignorant one sees the plurality andn the seeming plurality disappears when one has the knowledge of Brahman.n Whatever one perceives when one is ignorant can be a pramaaNam orn apramaaNam - valid or invalid knowledge. The snake is there at the time ofn ignorance and rope is there after gaining the knowledge - then that is validn knowledge. Hence snake is invalid or mithya. Hence karmakaanDa revealsn invalid duality which is perceived at the time of ignorance. Thereforen karmakaanDa is apramaaNam. Furthermore there is an interesting statement -n anyaH asau anyaH aham iti saH na veda saH devaanam paashuH - the one whon says I am different from others he does not know, he is the most ignorant.n (Devanaam pashuH is a proverb indicating that he is the master inn stupidity.) Thus dvaitam or duality is invalid and karmakaanDa based onn dvaitam is also invalid. If at all it should get validity it has to ben hooked up to j~naanakaanDa. In what way will it be useful to j~naanakaanDa?n Shankara says j~naanakaanDa saadhanatvena karmakaanDasya praamaaNyam. It isn useful as a means to prepare the student to qualify for j~naanakaanDa. Hown will it help as a means to come to j~naanakaanDa? saadhana chatushhTayan sampatti pradhaanena - karmakaanDa is useful by giving four foldn qualifications required to prepare a student for Brahman inquiry - forn details Shankara says refer to the discussion related to the first suutra -n atha ataH brahma jij~naasa. karmakaanDa is not meant for dharma artha kaaman purushaartha, and vedantin does not consider that they are purushhaartha atn all since they are only exalted sa.nsaara. In fact, karmakaanDa andn upaasanaa are all ultimately meant for vairaagya siddhi. dharma, artha,n kaama is only a sugar coating for the medicines to give ultimately then vairaagya required to turn one's attention to secure moksha. It is like an chocolate laxative given to children to cleanse the system. After one getsn deeply entangled in sa.nsaara, a time will come in the evolution of a jiivan when he feels like running away from these attachments - an indication thatn the medicine is working!n Hence it is superficially dharma, artha, kaamaartham but in the finaln analysis it is meant only for acquiring saadhana chatushhTayam eva.n After acquiring the saadhana chatushhTayam the person comes to Vedanta -n athaH (suutra 1) karmakaanDa dwaara vairaagya siddhi anantaram - through then path of karmakanDa after acquiring detachment, inquiry into Brahman.



n Is there a pramaaNam for this? - or is it just sour grapes of an brahmachaarii sanyaasin bhaashhyakaara-s!?n pramaaNam 1: pariikshya lokaan karmachitaan brahmaNo ... Mund. Upa. 1-2-12n (the full mantra is explained with reference to suutra 1), havingn experienced all the benefits of karma and after one examines the bottomn line, one should get vairaagyam or detachment. How come we see lot of peoplen not having that vairaagyam? - Well, all it means is that they will continuen taking the medicine until it works - that is the law of nature. Everyone isn seeking aanandam or happiness and it takes lot more for some to learn thatn seeker and the sought are one and the same and any search is futile.

n pramaaNam 2: tam etam vedaanuvachanena brahmaaNaa vividishhanti yaj~nenan daanena tapasaa anaashhakena (Bri. Up. ref? ). Here yaj~na refers to karma,n daana means charity and tapasaa refers to upaasana. The mantra says then purpose of all these is ultimately for generating interest in Vedantan (vividishaa) - jij~naasa. Interest in Vedanta is directly proportional ton vairaagyam towards sa.nsaara. Gita says - yoginaH karma kurvanti sa~Nga.nn tyaktvaa aatmasiddhaye. Yogis perform action renouncing the fruits ofn actions in order to purify their minds.n Hence karamakaanDa is not useful by itself but only useful for facilitatingn the development of saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti which is the requirementn for Vedanta vichaara. In Gita also this is stated as - sarvam karma akhilamn paartha j~naane parisamaapyate - [IV:33]n Thus Shankara makes it clear that karmakaaNDa is only useful when it getsn related to j~naankaaNDa. puurvapakshi-s got it completely ultasiidan (opposite) in claiming that it is the other way. Hence by their ownn arguments if utility is the criteria, karamakaaNDa is useless directly andn only useful indirectly. Hence it is not a primary pramaaNa but only an secondary one.

n ********n Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed atn http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/n for personal study.

n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected. ***n -- K. Sadanandan Code 6323n Naval Research Laboratoryn Washington D.C. 20375n Voice (202)767-2117n Fax:(202)767-2623

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n From: "Dennis Waite" <[email protected]>n Date: Thu Apr 19, 2001 4:02 pmn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1H






n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the threen guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who isn the best among then teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) alwaysn prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada - in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .- 4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1H

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1Hn We are discussing Shankara's commentary related to the word 'tu'. Withn this the answers to puurvamiimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha-s that include Prabhakaran and Bhatta matams are over.

n Shankara next introduces one more important matam in his commentaryn related to the word 'tu'. Shankara discusses that here since this matamn is very close to puurvamiimaa.nsaka matam. That matam is calledn 'vRîttikaara matam'.

n vRîttiH here means a small commentary like Notes. vyaakhyaanam andn bhaashhyam are also commentaries but they are elaborate. Hencen vRîttikaara means a commentator. So vRîttikaara matam means then philosophy or view of one of the brahmasutra commentators. There weren several bhaashyakaara-s before Shankara. We do not know who thisn commentator was. In English we use the expression 'some Tom, Dick or Harry'n for the unknown person. In Sanskrit (it is not "TomaH, DickkiH or HarryH"!!)n - some times they use devadattaH, yaj~nadattaH or vishhNudattaH for then general name or ditta davittadayaH - dittaH or davittaH etc.

n Shankara discusses two vRîttikaara-s through his commentary - one is calledn j~naanakarma samuchchhya vaadii (who claims that j~naana and karma shouldn be judiciously integrated) - this is heavily discussed in his Gita Bhashya.n (Some aspects of this VRîtti we discussed with reference to suutra 1).n Here Shankara extensively discusses as puuurvapaksha another vRîttikaaran matam and dismisses it establishing his siddhanta. This vRîttikaara mustn have been very popular during Shankara's time to consider his matam asn puurvapaksha. He does not come under puurvamiimaa.nsaa but some of his viewsn are very close to it. Hence Shankara discusses his philosophy along withn the discussion of puurvamiimaa.nsaka matams.

n What is vRîttikaara matam?

n Most importantly he differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s in saying thatn Brahman is existent and is revealed by the upanishhad-s. That is he acceptsn brahman asti and brahmanaH shaastrayonitvam. He also agrees that then upakramaadi shhaD-li~Nga vichaara proves the existence of Brahman as



n revealedn by the upanishhad-s; that is he accepts tat tu samanvayaat. Up to now he isn one with vedantin. But he differs from Vedantin by saying that even thoughn Brahman is existent as revealed by the upanishhad-s, mere Brahma j~naanamn cannot give moksha. Here he goes along with puurvamiimaa.nsaka to say thatn kevala j~naanam cannot give any purushhaartha. He says after gaining brahman j~naanam one has to do brahma upaasanam to gain moksha. Vedanta revealsn Brahman and asks you to do brahma upaasanaa. Through this brahman upaasanaa karma - that is through meditation on brahman - one will getn extraordinaryn puNyam or merit which helps to secure moksha. In support of this hen quotes the same puurvamiimaa.nsaa suutra - aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaatn aanarathakhyam athadarthaanaam. The whole veda asks you to do some thingn or other - mere learning Veda is not enough, one has to apply that knowledgen to something or other. vidhinaa tu ekavaakyarthvaat stutyarthena vidhiinaamn syuH - brahmaj~naanam by itself is of no use therefore it should be put inton upaasana vidhi.

n In support of his statement he gives upanishhat pramaaNam also. In Bri Upa.n there are two statements - aatmaa ityeva upaasiita - it is called vidyaan suutram. In another statement that says aatmaanam eva lokam upaasiita. Inn both cases there is clear expression - upaasiita. From this it is very clearn that brahma upaasanam or paramaatma upaasanam gives puNyam and that in turnn gives moksha. Then what about the Upanishad statements that say throughn j~naanam one can attain moksha - aatmavit shokam tarati brahma vedan brahmaiva bhavati - the knower of aatmaa crosses the ocean of sa.nsaara,n the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman and all those upanishad mantras thatn we have quoted before? For that he says, one should carefully interpretn upanishhadic mantra-s. Everyword indicating j~naanam has got then meaning of upaasanam also.

n For example, in shikshaavalli -

n ya evam etaan mahaasa.nhitaa vyaakhyaataa veda | sandhiiyate prajayaa pashubhiHn brahmavarchasena annaadyena suvargeNa lokena | Taitt. Up. 1-2-6

n The word veda here is interpreted as upaasiita. Thus veda has two meaningsn onen is j~naanam and the other is upaasanam. In bhR^iguvalli also -

n ya evam veda |n kshema iti vaachi |n yogakshema iti praaNaapaanayoH |n karmeti hastayoH | 3-10-2.

n In this context also we take the meaning of veda as upaasanam. Hence brahman veda brahmaiva bhavati - in this statement also brahma j~naanii does notn becomen Brahman, brahma upaaste saH brahma bhavati. One who does upaasanaa onn Brahmann becomes Brahman.

n Similarly the other statements - brahmavit aapnoti paramamn means brahma upaasakaH aapnoti param; aatmavit shokam tarati means aatman upaasakaH shokam tarati. Hence wherever j~naanam word comes one has ton translaten as upaasanam. yastu sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaivaabhuut vijaanataH .... Heren too vijaanataH means the one who does upaasanaa. aatmaanam chet vijaaniiyaat



n ayam asmiiti purushhaH - vijaaniiyaat means upaasiita. In short if we taken all the ten quotations given before wherever the word j~naanam comes it hasn to be translated as upaasanam. Hence upaasanena puNya dwaara mokshamn siddhyati, by upaasana one acquires the merits by which one attainsn moksha. -n says vRîttikaara. According to him, there are exceptions like knowledgen that given results as in the case of rajju j~naane phalam vartate - this is acceptable.n Butn brahmaj~naanam does not come under that exception. Therefore aftern brahmaj~naanam one should do upaasanam.

n In support of his statement he shows that there are many people who aren experts in the upanishads. Look at them - are they muktapurushha-s? Theyn continue to be sa.nsaarii-s even after the thorough study of Vedanta. Hencen vRîttikaara argues shRîta brahmaNaHn api yathaa puurvam sa.nsaaritva darshanaat - Thus there are many peoplen who know Vedanta thoroughly and still are sa.nsaari-s. They are all Vedanticn educated sa.nsaari-s. Therefore it is evident that brahmaj~naanena evan mokshaH na sidhyati - by mere knowledge of Brahman one cannot gain moksha.

n This particular argument should convince anyone to side with then vRîttikaara.n We have seen this as well in the advaitin list serve in terms ofn discussions that cause us to conclude that we have had enough of thisn intellectual analysis, it is of no use- we want to withdraw and spend ourn time in saadhanaa! That isn exactly what the vRîttikaara says - brahma j~naana anantaram upaasanamn kartavyam , after studying Vedanta one has to do upaasana. He gives one moren argument - the upanishad very clearly says aatmaaa vaa are drashhTavyaH,n shrotavyaH, mantavyaH, nididhyaasitavyaH | Atmaa should be clearlyn understoodn through shravanam and mananam. Thus through shravanam and mananam one getsn brahma j~naanam. If j~naanam is enough then shrotavyaH and manthavyaH mustn ben sufficient . But upanishad clearly prescribes after shravanam andn mananam, nididhyaasitavyaH - constant dwelling upon that - it is derivedn fromn the root dhyai - dhyaayati - hence nididhyaasana means repeated dhyaanamn -that is what is called upaasanam. Hence upaasanam kartavyam which is an cleann action, since according to Sanskrit grammar, a suffix tavyaH indicatesn a compulsory action. Hence the word nididhyaasitavyaH indicates a vidhi,n a vidhi indicates a compulsory action. Hence upaasanam action gives then result or prayojanam of moksha and not brahmaj~naanam. Hence the conclusionn ofn vRîttikaara is brahma upaasanena mokshaH, na tu brahma j~naanena. Onlyn action involving brahma upaasanaa will give moksha and not mere knowledge ofn Brahman. This puurvapakshii differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s who do notn accept the existence of even Brahman leave alone Brahma upaasanam.


n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected. ***n -- K. Sadanandan Message 9535 of 9723 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ]



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n From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>n Date: Wed May 23, 2001 9:00 amn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1i

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1i

n sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |n asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||

n I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who n is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all n the way up to my own teacher.


n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the n three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of n purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to n his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1i

n We are currently discussing vRîttikaara matam as a part of n puurvapaksha. This matam differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s in that it n accepts the existence of Brahman. However, it subscribes to the n theory that by just knowing Brahman one cannot gain Brahman. After n brahmaj~naanam one has to do upaasana to gain Brahman. There is some n similarity between this vRîttikaara philosophy and Ramanuja's n vishishhTaadvaita in terms of saadhanaa where emphasis on upaasanaa n in addition to surrender or nyaasa to the Personified God-form is n emphasized as means for moksha. The similarity is only with reference n to the need for upaasanaa for moksha.

n Shankara refutes this puurvapakshii. Shankara approaches this by n defining clearly the nature of moksha from different angles. He shows n that if one accepts the moksha definitions given, then one has to n conclude that such a moksha is never possible through upaasanaa , n whatever be the upaasanaa. Here we are going to heavily criticize n upaasanaa just as Gaudapada does inn Mandukya-karika: III:1

n upaasanaashritaH dharmaH, jaate brahmaNi vartate |n praagutpatteH ajam sarvam, tena asau kRîpaNaH smRîtaH ||

n Goudapada says every upaasaka (one who does upaasanaa) is an



n unfortunate one. When we criticize upaasanaa, it should be understood n in the correct spirit. We are not criticizing upaasanaa totally. We n are criticizing upaasanaa presented as a means of moksha which comes n after brahma j~naanam. But we glorify upaasanaa before brahma n j~naanam as a means of mental purification. This has to be understood n clearly. What is criticized is vRîttikaara's philosophy that states n upaasanaa as a means of moksha after acquiring brahma j~naanam. n According to Shankara, brahma j~naana anantaram kartavyam kimapi na n asti - after acquiring the brahma j~naanam there is no obligation to n do anything. Gita says:

n Na eva tasya kRîtena arthaH na akRîtena iha kaschana |n na cha asya sarva-bhuuteshu kaschit artha-vyapaashrayaH || III:18

n Because for that brahma j~naani there is no gain by performing any n action, there is no loss by not performing any action. Since he does n not depend on anything for his happiness, he has no self-centered n motivation to perform any action amidst all beings.

n karmaNi akarma yaH pashyet akarmaNi cha karma yaH |n saH buddhimaan manushhyeshhu saH yuktaH kRîtsna-karma-kRît.h || IV:18

n One who sees inaction in action, action in inaction, he is the most n knowledgeable and yogi among men and he is fulfilled in terms of all n actions.

n Hence j~naaana anantara upaasanaa we criticize but j~naana puurva n upaasanaa we glorify. Hence Shankara is going to criticize upaasanaa n as presented by the vRîttikaara.

n The definitions of moksha: The first one, which is normally given, is n a-shariirataa hi mokshaH - moksha is freedom from shariira n sambandhaH, freedom from body-relationships.n Naturally the opposite of that is sa.nsaara: sa-shariirataa hi n sa.nsaaraH - shariira sambandha is sa.nsaara. Where does Shankara n find these definitions? - From Chandogya Up. 4-12-1:

n - nahhavai sa shariirasya sataH priyaapriayayoH apahatiH asti |n - ashariiram vaa va santaM na priyaa priye spRîshataH||

n When atmaa is embodied due to the notion of ego it suffers from likes n and dislikes. Along as one is embodied the likes and dislikes do not n leave. When there is no shariira, the likes and dislikes do not n touch that aatma. Hence Shankara says as long as shariira sambandha n is there sukhan and duHkha opposites cannot be avoided and that is sa.nsaara.

n The moksha is - ashariiraM vaa va santaM na priyaapriye spRîshataH | n One for whom there is no shariira sambandha the priya and apriyaa n will not touch. Having given the definition, Shankara says - both n karma and upaasanaa are actions, one is kaayikaM karma, physical n action and the other is maanasaM karma, mental action. Wherever n actions are there, there will be both quantitative and qualitative n gradations, taaratamyam, in those actions. Hence there will be n taaratamya or gradations in the puNya or merits produced also. Hence n the results also will have taaratamya or gradations in the n puNyaphala. The type of bodies that one gets depending on the puNya n phalam. Hence puNyaM can only improve sa-shariiratvam but cannot make n you a-shariiraH that is improvement in the body that one does not go



n beyond the body. One can get human body or even divine body of Indra n or bRîhaspati or prajaapati etc. Any amount of karma and upaasanaa n will keep one only with sa-shariiratvam wherein gradations cannot be n avoided - priya and apriya or likes and dislikes cannot be avoided - n hence sa.nsaara cannot be avoided. Hence Shankara says four things n are interrelated - karma or upaasanaa, puNyam or merits, n sa-shariiratvam or acquiring a body, andn sa.nsaaraH. One will get caught up in this cycle as long as karma or n upaasanaa is there. That is the reason we never accept moksha that n involves going to some loka or field of experience. In other systems n of philosophy the moksha is defined as going to some loka where God n is residing. Advaitan never accepts this as moksha as long as it is a loka and as long as n the jiiva retains their individuality -he will have sa-shariiratvam. n There will then be gradations that will lead to comparisons, some are n more fortunate being close to the Lord compared to the other etc. n (First class versus business class versus economy seats depending on n ones upaasana phala or credit card balance!) Hence Shankara's first n argument is upaasanaa phalam mokshaH na bhavati - Moksha cannot be n the result of a upaasanaa.

n tasmaat upaasana phalam sa-sariiratvam eva bhavati naiva n a-shariiratvam. As a result of upaasanaa one gets only field of n experience with different types of bodies and as long as there is a n body there will be gradations in phalam - as Tai. Upa. says: n II:viii:1 :

n te ye shatam manushhya gandharvaaNaam anandaaH |n sa eko deva gandharvaaNaam aanandaH| ..n te ye shatam deva gandharvaaNaam aanandaaH |n ... sa eka indrasyaanandaH |n te ye shatam indrasyaanandaaH |n sa eko bRîhaspate aanandaH |n te ye shatam bRîhaspateH annandaaH |n sa ekaH prajaapateH aanandaH |

n One is happier than the other. The happiness of Gandharva-s is n hundred times that of human. Deva's happiness is hundred times that n of Gandharva-s. Indra's happiness is hundred times that of deva-s, n and Prajapati's ananda is hundred times that of Indra. Hence as long n as one has body, there are gradations in types of bodies and n gradations in happiness that one gets. Hence moksha is obtained not n by karma not by upaasanaa, but by knowledge alone.

n But one can say all other upaasanaa-s can give better sa-shariiratvam n whereas brahma upaasanaa can be so powerful that it can give moksha n with a-shariiratvam that is without a body. Shankara says no. n A-shariirataa cannot be result of any karma or upaasanaa. This is n because a-shariiratvamn is the very intrinsic nature of aatmaa or the self. Whatever is the n intrinsic nature (swadhrama) of a thing, it should be there always. n That is the definition of intrinsic nature, that is intrinsic swataH n siddham, just as the heat is the intrinsic nature of the fire. n Shankara says a-shariirataa is the very intrinsic nature of every n jiiva, and being nature, it is nitya siddha swaruupam, eternally n accomplished thing. On the other hand, any karma or upaasanaa phalam n is not available now but it will come later after the completion of n that karma or upaasanaa. Hence karma or upaasanaa phalam is not n siddham (already acquired) but saadhyam (yet to be acquired). Hence



n a-shariirataa which is a nitya siddham of jiiva cannot be equated to n saadhyam which is yet to be acquired. Therefore a-shariirataa ruupa n mokshaH, liberation that is free from any body, cannot be the resultn of upaasanaa phalam.

n This raises the question that on what basis one can say that n a-shariirataa is the very nature of aatmaa. The shruti [Katha n I:ii:22] says:

n a-shariiram shariireshhu anavastheshhu avasthitaM mahaantaM vibhuM n aatmaanaM matvaa dhiiro na shocati |

n Thus upanishads clearly state that aatmaa is a-shariiram. In Mundaka n Upa. 2-1-2 says:

n divyo hi amuurtaH purushhaH sa baahyaabhyantaro hi ajaH |n apraaNo hi amanaaH shubhro aksharaat parataH paraH ||

n amuurtaH means sthuula shariira rahitaH (without gross body), apraaNa n amaNaaH means suukshma shariira rahitaH (without subtle body) and n shubhraH means kaaraNa shariira rahitaH (without causal body) - Thus n upanishads says aatmaa is shariira-traya varjitaH, without the threen bodies. In the Mundaka, I:i:6 it says :

n yat tat adreshyam agraahyam agotram avarNam achakshuH-shrotram tat n apaaNi- paadam -

n it cannot be seen, it cannot be grasped, from relations, and color n or caste etc. and no eyes, ears, hands and legs etc.- thus n emphasizing a-shariirataa.

n In Ishaavaasya Upa. mantra 8:

n sa paryagaat shukram akaayam avraNam asnaaviram shuddham apaapaviddham -

n thus says aatmaa is all pervading consciousness and is akaayam - n meaning a-shariiram, without a body. asnaaviram, shuddham apaapa n viddham - means shariira-traya rahitaH aatmaa -free from gross, n subtle and causal bodies. Hence a-shariirataa is not a goal to be n accomplished by karma or upaasanaa but it is a fact to be recognized. n Hence it cannot be upaasanaa phalam. - expressing this in anumaana n vaakyam (Refer to Ch. II of the notes for anumaana) - mokshaH na n upaasanaa saadhyaH, siddhatvaat, chaitanyavat.

n There comes a side objection from a secondary puurvapakshii (a n madhyasthaH) - how can an advaitin define a-shariirataa as moksha - n if he does that then he cannot accept jiivanmukti, that is a n liberation while living in the body, that is he is liberated yet n sa-shariiraH. Hence moksha will be only after death when the body n falls down. Shankara says jiivanmukti is possible. jiivamukta is n a-shariira only. The others around him may think he is sa-shariira. n It is their problem. The upanishad-s reveal a-shariiratvam as our n very nature or swa-swaruupam. Then when am In a-shariira? The upanishad-s point out that I am a-shariiraH all the n time, it is swa-swaruupam, one's very intrinsic nature - nitya n a-shariiraH as stated by the upanishad-s above. Secondly aatmanaH n asa~NgaH - asa~NgaH na hi sajyate - asa~NgaH hi ayam purushhaH (Bri. n Up III:ix:26) - It cannot have any relationship with any object - n like aakaasha - like space. Hence aatma asa~Ngatvaat nityam



n a-shariiraH - It is eternally formless since it is not related to any n thing, like space. shariira sambandha (relationship with body) comes n as a result of karma phalam. Karma-phalam comes only to a kartaa or n doer. aatma being ever a-kartaa - there is no question of karma and n hence karma phala and hence body to experience karma-phalam - hence n aatmaa nitya akartRîtvaat shariira sambandhaH na eva bhavati - n aatmaa being non-doer has no relation to body. Hence aatmanaH n a-shariiratvam nitya siddham.

n If so then how can one say sa-shariiratvam is sa.nsaara - since there n will never be a sa.nsaara since aatmaa is eternally a-shariiraH. For n that Shankara says although aatmaa is nitya a-shariiraH, it can be n mistaken as sa-shariiraH. aatmaa cannot become sa-shariiraH but it is n mistaken asn sa-shariiraH - as Murphy's Law states (Murphy's upanishadic mantra!) n that what can go wrong will go wrong! - Hence sa-shariiratvam is n adhyaasa siddham - hence Shankara says that is the reason why I wrote n first adhyaasa bhaashhyam! If sa-shariiratvam is due to error then n how does one getn a-shariiratvam? If rope is mistaken for a snake then how can one get n the snake converted back to rope? There is no conversion process - it n is only understanding or knowledge that, there was, there is and n there will be rope only all the time and never a snake to start with. n Hence sa-shariiratvam isn adhyaasa or error and it is not by dying one gets a-shariiratvam but n by knowing that aham aatmaa nitya shariiraH sambandha varjitaH asmi - n I was, I am and I will ever be aatmaa without a body or without any n body-relations. I am ever free from shariira sambandha.

n Hence jiivanmukta is a-shariiraH only. So is aj~naani a-shariiraH or n sa-shariiraH? He is also a-shariiraH but he does not know that -He n thinks he is sa-shariiraH and hence he is aj~naani. Shankara quotes n Bri. Up.IV:iv:7 that says:

n tat yathaa ahinirlvayanii valmiike mRîtaa pratyastaa shayiita evam evedamn shariiragm shete | athaayaM ashariiraH amRîtaH praaNaH brahma eva n tejaH eva saH aham.h |

n It gives the example of the snake and its skin. The snake removes its n skin and skin continues to be there close to the snake. But snake has n no attachment to its discarded skin. Hence whatever happens to the n skin the snake is not affected. In the same way the j~naani continues n to be in then body but whatever happens to the body he does not claim that it is n happening to him. It is not that the body becomes free from karma - n it undergoes its own course (praarabdha-karma) but j~naani never n claims those pleasures and pains as his pleasures and pains. He says n aham nitya ashariiraH.

n Giita says: II:56

n duHkheshhu anudvignamanaaH sukheshhu vigata-spRîhaH |n viita-raaga-bhaya-krodhaH sthita-dhiiH muniH uchyate ||

n Hence a-shariiratvam is moksha and moksha is nitya siddha. By j~naana n it is owned-up and it is not a product of upaasanaa.

n That completes the first argument for why moksha cannot be the result n of upaasanaa.



n Shankara provides a few more arguments, which we will discuss in the next post.n -----------------------n End of the post.

n Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed atn http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/n for personal study.

n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.***

n -- n K. Sadanandan From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>n Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 7:05 amn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-4J

n Sorry for the delay in posting this notes - we are streamlining the n editing processes and hopefully these processes become smooth. My n sincere thanks to Geetha who took up the major responsibility in the n editing process, and to Sunder and Dennis as usual for their efforts. n -Any mistakes obviously are mine. Hari Om! Sadanandan --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n -----------------------------

n Notes on BSB I-i-1-4J


n I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who n is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all n the way up to my own teacher.


n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the n three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of n purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to n his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-1n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-4J

n We are discussing Shankara's response to the vR^ittikaara's arguments n that upaasanaa is required after acquiring brahma-j~naanam. In the n last post we have presented the first argument of Shankara and in n this we present the other three arguments. As we noted in the n previous notes, these arguments have relevance also in relation to n vishishhTa-advaita as well as dvaita approaches to moksha.

n 2. For the second argument, Shankara gives a second definition of n moksha from a different angle.



n brahma bhaavaH hi mokshaH | -

n This definition is given since every philosopher agrees that moksha n or liberation is nitya or eternal. From the scriptures, from adviatic n point, we come to know that there is only one nitya vastu that is n Brahman (dwaitins and vishishhTa-advaitins do not accept this, but do n accept that moksha is nitya - - yat gatvaa na nivartante tat dhaama n paramaM mama -) Gita | (15:6)

n Therefore from adviata point moksha and Brahman have to be one and n the same. Hence moksha praaptiH is equal to brahma praaptiH. n Brahmavit brahmaiva bhavati - knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. The n question of 'Can moksha be upaasana phalam?' translates now to ' Can n Brahman be upaasana phalam?'. brahma bhaavaH upaasanena labhyate vaa n na vaa ?-

n Shankara says any karma or upaasanaa can produce only four types of n results or phalam: 1. aaptiH, meaning reaching -Thus by doing an n action we can reach a place. 2. utpattiH, meaning production - Just n as a farmer producing the produce. 3. vikaaraH, meaning modification n or conversion - Converting a bangle into a chain. 4. san.skaaraH, n meaning purification - Purification of water for drinking.

n The question is - 'Can Brahman come under any one of the four types n for it to be a phalam?'. n (a) Reaching Brahman is out of question, brahmanaH sarvagatatvaat n (Brahman is all pervading) - If Brahman is all pervading and moksha n is attaining Brahman - and what should one do for that -some say that n one has to die first (since this body is impure) then, through ' n shuklagati uttaraayaNa maargah' jiiva has to travel and go to some n loka and thereafter merge into that Bhagavan - - which Bhagavan?, the n sarvavyaapakaH bhagavaan, the one who is everywhere! Hence all n pervasiveness of Brahman and travel are contradiction - tasmaat n brahma aapyam na bhavati or therefore Brahman or moksha is not of the n type involving going somewhere or reaching somewhere, vaikunTa or n kailaasa, etc.

n (b) There is no question of utpatti or to be a product of an action n for Brahman because brahmanaH nitya siddhatvaat - ever present. n (people ask; Sir, when can we attain Brahman or make statements we n cannot attain moksha in this life, but may be in the next life - it n is like asking when is the snake going to become a rope? - it is all n the time a rope even when one is thinking it is a snake.) - Hence n 'when?' cannot be the question since Brahman is ever present.

n (c) Can Brahman be the result of a modification or vikaara? Brahman n cannot be an end product of any process because brahmanaH n avikaaryatvaat -Brahman cannot be neither cause for modification or n effect of modification since Brahman is eternal. 'avyaktaH ayam n achintyaH ayam avikaaryaH ayam uchyate - The shruti says that n Brahman is unmanifested, unthinkable, does not undergo any n modification.

n (d) . Brahman cannot be the result of purification process. n Shankara says brahmanaH nityashuddhatvaat, 'apraaNaH hi amanaH n shubhraH' (This mantra was provided before). He is ever pure. Hence n He cannot be the product of purification process. The sa.nskaara or n purification process is subdivided into two types - i) doshha n apanayana-ruupa sa.nskaaraH - refinement by the removal of impurity



n and ii) guNa adhaana-ruupa sa.nskaaraH- addition of various virtues. n In the case of Brahman, doshha apanayana na bhavati - n nitya-shuddhatvaat- since He is eternally pure, there is no question n of purification process. Also guNa adhaanam api na bhavati, n nirguNatvaat , since he is guNaatiitaH. (guNa is a concept of n intellect and he is beyond any guNa-s since he is beyond any n intellectual comprehension). Also being infiniteness, nothing can be n added and nothing can be subtracted. Hence Brahman cannot be n sa.nskaaryaH also. Therefore, Brahman is chaturvidha karma phala n vilakshaNaH - different from all the four types of karma phalam. n Moksha is also different from all the types of karma phalam. Hence n moksha cannot be upaasanaa phalam.

n The next argument is called abhyupedya vaadaH -an assumption - n assuming that puurvapakshi is right and showing that such an n assumption leads to contradiction thereby invalidating the n puurvapaksha. We assume first that the argument of puurvapakshi that n 'moksha is upaasana phalam' is right. Then what will be the nature n of moksha? If it is a result of upaasanam, then it will certainly n have a beginning - since result is accomplished by following a n saadhana and not before. It is not there before and it comes after n the upaasana is completed. It is called praak abhaavaH - not n existent before the upaasana took place. But, whatever has a n beginning will certainly have an end. jaatasya hi dhruvaH mR^ityuH n dhruvam janma mR^itasya cha | (Gita 2-27) - Hence the upaasana n phalaruupa mokshaH will be anitya mokshaH or is impermanent moksha. n Gaudapada says beautifully in his kaarikaa

n anaadeH antavatva.n cha sa.nsaarasya na setsyati |n anantataa cha aadimataH mokshasya na bhavishhyati || 4:30

n Eternity is not possible for moksha which has a beginning if it is n the result of upaasanaa, therefore moksha becomes anitya. n Fortunately all the philosophers have agreed that moksha is eternal. n The very purpose of moksha is to go beyond mortality. In Chandogya n Up., it is said that whatever is acquired here in this loka is n impermanent and whatever is acquired as a result of puNya phala in n the other loka-s is also impermanent -

n tat yathaa iha karma chitaH lokaH kshiiyate, evam eva amutra n puNyachitaH lokaH kshiiyate | -Hence the conclusion is nitya mokshaH n upaasana phalam bhavitum na arhati, upaasana phalasya anityatvaat -

n Eternal moksha cannot be the result of upaasana phalam since upaasana n phalam is impermanent. In fact the very word phalam - Shankara says n -phalgutayaa liiyate iti phalam - that which becomes rotten and gets n destroyed in time is called phalam.

n This completes the second argument.

n 3. For the third argument Shankara says upaasanaa cannot be or is n not the theme of Vedanta. upaasanaa vedaantasya taatparyam bhavitum n na arhati. Why? This is because miimaa.nsaa or samanvaya shows that n the theme of Vedanta is not upaasanaa. This has been proved using n upakramaadi shhaD-li~Ngaani or six-fold factors beginning with n upakramaa. (These six factors were discussed in relation to this n suutra in the earlier posts). By using these six factors it is n established that Vedanta talks about acquiring a moksha which is here n and now. Vedanta does not talk about accomplishing something new in



n future - that is which is not available now and here. In Vedanta the n mahavaakyam in the same 6th chapter of Chandogya. Up., that was n analyzed above, says- tat tvam asi - 'that thou art' - by using asi n the present tense Vedanta clearly shows moksha is in the present. If n it is not here and now, it cannot be anywhere at any time. Either n one is nitya muktaH or nitya baddhaH. That which is not here and now n and comes in future can never be moksha that involves freedom from n all limitations, since it is not eternal and ever existent as it is n not here and now hence that kind of moksha is itself is limited. That n which is limited cannot be a freedom from limitation.

n In addition in BRîhadaaranyaka. Up., there is a discussion of karma n and upaasanaa phalam. putreNa ayam lokaH jayyaH, karmaNaa n pitRîlokaH, vidyayaa deva lokaH (1:5:16). It is said through the n putra, father can gain the birth of human later, through karma one n can gain swarga or heaven and through vidya or upaasanaa one can gain n deva lokaH or brahmalokaH. Having enumerated karma phalam and n upaasanaa phalam, BRîhadaaranyaka. Up., (3:5:1) glorified a n sa.nnyaasii and says -

n putraishhaNaayaaH cha vittaishhaNaayaaH cha lokaishhaNaayaaH chan vyutthaaya atha bhikshaacharya.n charanti | 3:5:1n saH eshha na iti na iti aatmaa agRîhyaH na hi gRîhyate ashiiryaH na n hi shiiryate asa~NgaH na hi sajyate asitaH na vyathate na rishhyati | n 3:9:26

n I do not want putra phalam, I do not want karma phalam, I do not want n even upaasanaa phalam, all I want is moksha - by rejecting, neti neti n - not this - not this - he goes after that which cannot be n objectified, that which is without a body, therefore eternal, that is n free from all attachments, eternally free.

n Thus, shruti says by rejecting all that which can be obtained by n karma and upaasanaa phalam, he goes after moksha. Thus here it n indirectly indicates that moksha will not come under karma or n upaasanaa phalam. Hence how can one bring karma and upaasana in n Vedanta. Hence upaasana is not the taatparyam of Vedanta. In the n previous argument it was established that samanvayaat (in terms of n the six-factors) upaasanaa is not the central theme of the Vedanta. n In this argument it is established that mokshasya upaasanaaphala n vilakshaNatvaat, upaasanaa is not the taatparyam or the central theme n of Vedanta.

n Next Shankara gives a technical reason - The entire Veda is divided n into two portions - karma kaaNDa (upaasana is included) and n j~naanakaaNDa (Vedanta). The first part is analyzed by Jaimini in his n puurva-miimaa.nsaa suutraaNi which begins "atha ataH dharma n jij~naasaa". Vedanta is analyzed by Vyasa in this brahmasuutra which n begins with "atha ataH brahma jij~naasaa". Now Shankara raises a n question - whether all karma and upaasanaa should be analyzed in Veda n puurva or Veda anta? It should be analyzed only in the puurva n kaaNDa. Because karma or upaasanaa produces dharma or puNyam and n hence everything connected with Dharma should be analyzed in the n puurvakaaNDa. If Vedanta deals with moksha and if moksha is upaasanaa n phalam, and if Vedanta also deals with upaasanaa, there is no reason n to separate it from puurvakaanDa and it should be covered under n puurva-miimaa.nsaa under dharma jij~naasaa. Hence Shankara says n Vedanta would not have become a separate part of the Veda. It would n have come under karma kaanDa itself and would have come under



n jaiminii suutra-s. Vyasacharya chose to write a separate suutra for n the Uttara-miimaa.nsaa only because it does not come under karma or n upaasanaa. Only because Vedanta has nothing to do with Dharma n (karma)- It is dealing with aatmaa which is

n anyatra dharmaat, anyatra adharmaat, anyatra asmaat kRîtaa akRîtaat n anyatra bhuutaat cha bhavyaat cha yat tat pashyati tat vida || n (KaTha. Up. 1-2-14)n -It does not deal with dharma or adharma, karma or akarma, and past n and future - that is to be known.

n yadaa pashyaH pashyate rukmavarNamn kartaaram iishaM purushaM brahmayonimn tadaa vidvaan puNyapaape vidhuuyan niranjanaH paramam saamyam upaiti || (MuNDaka. Up. 3-1-3)

n Vedanta deals with vidvaan who renounces both puNyam and paapam - n which are karma upaasanaa phalam. In the Gita Krishna says - sarva n dharmaan parityajya maam ekam sharaNam vraja - Give up all the karma n and upaasana which comes under dharma. (actually no achaarya advises n one to give up karma - what is advised is to give the kartRîtva n bhaava or notion of the doership - His will, will be done). Therefore n moksha is dharma vilakshaNatvaat. Upaasana is not the taatparyam of n Vedanta. That completes the third argument. The first argument was n moksha cannot be upaasanaa phalam. The second argument was if moksha n is upaasanaa phalam it becomes anityam or impermanent. The third n argument was upaasanaa cannot be the central theme of Vedanta.

n This completes the third argument. Now the fourth argument.

n 4. Shankara says, brahma upaasanaa itself is not possible. The n question of brahma as the upaasana phalam will arise until one n settles the issue whether one can even do Brahma upaasanaa at all n before settling the issue of Brahman can be obtained as upaasana n phalam. Upanishad clearly says 'tat twam asi' - you are yourself n Brahman. Which means Brahman is not an object at all for upaasana. It n is the upaasaka swaruupam - the very nature of upaasaka, one who does n upaasana. How can the upaasaka Brahman become upaasya Brahman - n kartRî karma virodhaat ? Subject can never be an object, object can n never be the subject. Therefore nobody can meditate on Brahman. n Therefore Brahman cannot be an object of upaasana - hence the very n basis of the argument of the puurvapakshi has no validity. It is n illogical to talk about Brahma-upaasanaa. The Kena Upanishad clearly n says:

n yat vaachaa nabhyuditam yena vaak abhyudyate |n tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upasate || [1:5]

n The student asked for Brahman and the teacher very clearly says n whatever you do upaasana upon is not Brahman.

n yat manasaa na manute yena aahuH manaH matam.h .|n tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upaasate || [1:6]

n yat chakshushhaa na pashyati yena chakshuu.nshhi pashyati |n tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upaasate || [1:7]

n yat shrotreNa na shRîNoti yena shrotram idam shrutam.h |n tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upaasate || [1:8]



n yat praaNena na praaNiti yena praaNaH praNiiyate |n tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upaasate || [1:9]

n Thus it repeats that statement five times indicating the importance n of the statement. It says the object of upaasanaa or meditation n cannot be Brahman - it is anaatma. The meditator is Brahman. When n one cannot even do any upaasanaa on Brahman, where is the question of n Brahma upaasanam producing moksha.

n Thus the fourth argument is Brahma upaasanam is not possible because n brahmanaH avishhayatvaat (Brahman is not an object - it is seeing the n truth as the truth - like seeing rope as a rope and it is not n acquiring, reaching or producing - aatmani atmanaa atmaanam pastyet - n realization of ones own self by oneself in oneself.).

n This completes the four arguments of Shankara that Brahma upaasanaa n is not possible and is not required for moksha. Only knowledge is n the solution to the problem since the problem is caused by adhyaasa n or an error in the vision - To understand the nature of adhyaasa one n should go back and study again the adhyaasa bhaashhyam of Shankara n (Ch. III in this 'Notes on Brahmasuutra').

n We will try to complete the discussion on Suutra 4 soon.


n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.***

n -- n K. Sadanandan Code 6323n Naval Research Laboratoryn Washington D.C. 20375n Voice (202)767-2117n Fax:(202)767-2623n From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>n Date: Fri Jun 29, 2001 6:53 amn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1K

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1K


n I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva whon is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and alln the way up to my own teacher.


n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond then three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of



n purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, ton his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - In spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1K

n Shankara presented four arguments why Brahman cannot be result of n upaasanaa and hence brahma-upaasanaa is not needed, or required or n even valid after one obtains brahma j~naanam. The last argument was n that Brahman is not an "object of", but is the upaasakaa himself, who n is the subject, and subject cannot be an object. In response to the n last siddhaanta, puurvapakshi raises a counter objection as follows:

n If vedantin argues that brahma upaasanaa is not possible because it n is not an object, then the vR^ittikaara asks a counter question. In n that case, he says even the brahma j~naanam is not possible, since n brahma j~naanam involves Brahman becoming an object of knowledge. In n fact in the same Upanishad, it says - anyat eva tat viditaat atho n aviditaat adhi | (Kena 1-4). Further it says:

n yasya amataM tasya mataM mataM yasya na veda saH |n avij~naataM vijaanataaM vij~naatam avijaanataam.h || (Kena 2-3)

n Those who think they do not know, they know, and those who think they n know, do not know, since Brahman is not an object of knowledge. Thus n the Upanishad very clearly says Brahman cannot even be an object of n knowledge. Hence if siddhaantin claims that Brahma upaasanam is not n possible then puurvapakshi argues that, in that case even brahma n j~naanam is also not possible, since Brahman can not be an object of n knowledge. Then the statement brahma j~naanena mokshaH is also wrong n since BrahmanaH aprameyatvaat, avishhayatvaat, avij~neyatvaat ca. If n you accept that brahma j~naanam is not possible then you cannot n declare that Vedanta is pramaaNam for brahma j~naanam because n pramaayaaH eva asambhave pramaaNasya pramaaNatvam katham siddhayet. n If it is not an object to be known, then where is the question of n validity of means of knowledge. PramaaNa is meant for gaining valid n knowledge and if that knowledge is impossible, how can Vedanta be a n valid pramaaNa? - Then the third suutra, shaastrayonitvaat will be in n trouble since there is no valid pramaaNam, while the suutra claims n that Vedanta shaastra is the pramaaNam. Therefore siddhaantin is n totally wrong.

n For that Shankara answers - yes Brahma j~naanam is not possible - in n fact Brahma j~naanam is not required. This is because we have n repeatedly said that Brahman is all the time evident in the form of n consciousness. It is swayam siddhaH or swayam jyotiH bhavati.

n atraayam purushham svayam jyotiH bhavati - BR i.Up (Ref?)

n jyotishaam api tat jyotiH tamasah param uchyate| Giita 13-18

n na tatra suuryo bhaati na chandrataarakaMn nemaa vidyuto bhaanti kuto.ayamagniH |n tameva bhaantamanubhaati sarvaM



n tasya bhaasaa sarvamidaM vibhaati || ( Katha-2-2-15)

n Nothing is required to reveal consciousness because consciousness n reveals everything - shaastram need not reveal consciousness - in n fact consciousness reveals shaastram too.

n Hence Shankara repeatedly says- na aatma j~naanam or Brahma j~naanam n sampaadaniiyam - There is no need to gain aatma j~naanam or brahma n j~naanam. We need not work for one thing and that is to gain the n knowledge of Brahma j-naanam. Then why all these suutra-s starting n with atha ataH brahma jij~naasa - then therefore inquire into the n nature of Brahman? Why then does the advaitin talk about acquiring of n brhamaj~naanam - brahma j~naanena mokshaH (if it is swataH siddham n where is the need of brahma j~naanam) and also the need of shaastram n as pramaaNam that says - tat vij~naanaartham sa gurum eva n abhigachchhet - to gain that knowledge one should approach a teacher. n These are important questions raised.

n Now Shankaraacharya explains these using samanvaya adhikaraNam - n Hence the beauty of Shankara Bhaashyam - where many of the questions n an advaitic student has, are methodically answered by Shankara in the n pretext of puurvapaksha-siddhaanta bhaashya. That is an important n reason why one should study suutra bhaashya - which is to establish n oneself firmly in the abiding knowledge of the nature of the reality.

n Shankara says our problem is not in knowing aatman or Brahman, our n problem is the misconception or misunderstanding of aatman which n requires a correction. The self-evident 'I' is mistaken for n something other than 'I'. The mistakes have to be eliminated. The n unmistaken I remain - Shankara says in Upadesha Saahasrii (II-18-4)

n siddhaat eva aham iti asmaat yushhmat dharmaH nishhidyate |n rajjvaam iva ahidhiiH yuktyaa tat tvam iti aadishaasanaiH ||

n Similar to the negation of the notion of snake from a rope based on n pratyaksha pramaaNa, notion of non-self from everything seen is n negated from 'I', based on shruti pramaaNa that says 'that thou art'. n So when I used the word aham 'I' , two things are evident - the I- n the self is evident as the aatma, and the anaatmaa - the body mind - n is also evident as 'this'. The self is evident as a n self-consciousness entity and this - the whole world including idam n shariiram etc, are also evident because of the same consciousness. n (Refer to the definition of adhyaasa - satya asatya mithuniikaraNam - n mixing up of real and unreal is adhyaasa). Thus two things are n shining intimately one is self-shining and other anya adhiina n prakaashaH - shining in the light of consciousness - tasya bhaasaa n sarvam idam vibhaati. When two things are shining intimately the n anaatma dharma or properties of non-self are superimposed on n consciousness out of sheer ignorance - I am father, mother, son, n employee, sukhii, duHkii etc due to this superimposed limitations of n the anaatma on the self. Hence shaastram is required not to reveal n Brahman but to remove the false notions of limitations due to n superimposition or adhyaasa. This removal of limitations is in the n form of vR^itti - a mode in the mind - and that vR^itti is called n 'aham brahma asmi'. In the antaH karaNam a thought should take place n or a cognition should take place as aham brahma asmi. When it is n said - aham brahma asmi - I am not knowing any thing new - but I am n freeing ignorance that made me superimpose the limitations of anaatma n on myself. The limitations of anaatma still remain, I also remain as



n I am - but what is negated is I am 'this' is negated (this standing n for all upaadhi-s) and "I am what I am" as brahma asmi is realized. n The dropping of the limitations is an intellectual process involving n vichaara or inquiry using shaastra as pramaaNa. This process is n called aatma j~naanam or brahma j~naanam. In this j~naanam - I am n not seeing anything new, I am not experiencing anything new, I am n only removing something old - or dropping of something - that is my n wrong notions about myself. This is just like dropping of the notion n of a snake which is never there to start with, in the knowledge of n rope. We are not gaining rope as if it is new - it was rope all the n time but we are dropping our notions that it is snake in the light of n knowledge of the truth. I am not acquiring, seeing or experiencing n anything new. Another example is 'snaanam iva' - like taking bath. n Why one should take both? -One can formally say that I want to gain n freshness - but what is actually done is getting rid of the dirt in n the body which does not belong to the body. The dirt is adhyaasa or n superimposed on the body and getting rid of it using a detergent is n the means of attaining what is swataH siddham or reaching my natural n state. The role of detergent is not to bring freshness but to get n rid of adhyaasa that does not belong to one. In the processing of n taking bath, both dirt and the detergent that is used to remove the n dirt, both are removed leaving myself to myself.

n Hence aatma-j~naanam is possible not in the form of new experience n but in the form of intellectual elimination of limitations. Shankara n writes in his bhaasyam - pramaatRî pramaaNa prameya ruupa tripuTii n nivRîttiH eva aatma-j~naanam - elimination of three aspects - n knower, known and knowing is the role of aatma-j~naanam. akarataa, n abhoktaa - aj~naataa- aham eva - see adhyaasa bhaashya for details. n Such an aatma-j~naanam can come only through shaastram - hence n shaastram is the pramaaNam. brahma bodhaka ruupena shaastram na n pramaaNam, parantu ahdyaasa nivartaka ruupena shaastram pramaaNam n -not for teaching the knowledge of brahman but for eliminating the n superimposed error shaastra is pramaaNam. In fact Shankara quotes a n suutra -siddhantu nivartakatvaat - shaastram is pramaaNam not because n it reveals Brahman but because it removes the superimposed n limitations. Hence such a pramaaNam is called nishheda ruupa n pramaaNam. Hence brahma j~naanam is possible in this sense and n shaastra pramaaNam is also possible.

n With this the fourth argument is completed: that is- brahma upaasanaa n is impossible but brahma j~naanam is possible indirectly in the n elimination of aj~naana.

n Until now Shankara was refuting the arguments of a vRîttikaara in a n general sense, hereafter Shankara takes up specific statements and n questions of vR^ttikaara and answers them.

n 1) The first argument is related to vRîttikaara statement in n parallel to bhaaTTa and praabhaakara matam-s that kevala j~naanena n prayojanam na asti - mere knowledge is useless. It has to be combined n with karma or upaasana to be effective. In support of this, all of n them quoted jaimini suutra - 'aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat n aanarthakyam atadarthaanaam' - Veda will be useful only if it n instigates one into some action or other. Statements that do not n propel one into action are useless or apramaNam - kriyaa sambandha n rahitam vaakyam apramaaNam. Hence vidhi vaakyaani pramaaNaani, n arthavaada vaakyaani apramaaNaani - statements of command are n pramaaNam and statements of non-commands are apramaaNam, since they



n do not involve action. Shankara negates them through a wonderful n argument. - Shankara asks -do you accept nisheda vaakyams in the n vedas as pramaaNam? These are statements of don't-s, like hi.nsam n na kuryaat - you should not harm anyone. kalamjam na bhakshayet - n you should not eat meat. suram na pibet - you should not drink liquor n - these are nishheda vaakyaani. The puurvapakshi-s accept that they n are pramaaNa vaakyam as valid as vidhi vaakyams. Now Shankara asks - n what action is involved in nishheda vaakyam-s for them to be n accepted as pramaaNam. I should not drink liquor - is the statement - n after knowing that from veda-s what action is expected of me? n Shankara says - avoidance of action is an absence of action. Hence n nishheda vaakyam-s do not instigate any action but only instigate n inaction - it is audaasiinyam - When we ask somebody what are you n doing and he may answer - I am doing nothing - but doing nothing is n not a doing - it involves doing no action. nishheda vaakyam only n instigate actionless-ness but not action. Hence even though kriyaa n sambandham is not there, the puurvapakshi-s have accepted nisheda n vaakyam-s as pramaaNam. Shankara extends their own logic and states n that kriyaa sambandha rahitam vedaanta vaakyam api pramaaNam eva, sa n prayojanatvaat, nishhedha vaakyavat. vedaantan vaakyam-s are also pramaaNam even though no action is involved, n exactly like nisheda vaakyam. Hence the above jaimini suutram cannot n be applied indiscriminately.

n 2. Puurvapakshi asks if brahma j~naanam gives moksha then all the n students of Vedanta should be mukta purusha-s or liberated n individuals since they all studied Vedanta and gained knowledge. n Puurvapakshi says I have interviewed several who have studied Vedanta n for many many years and even teach vedanta to others. But if you ask n them if they are liberated - we hear only if's and but's and no one n claims himself as jiivanmuktaH. It is obvious that Vedanta j~naanena n moksham na sidyati - upaasanena sidyati - is the claim of n vR^ittikaara. Shankara says - I have never said a student of vedanta n will be free - only a knower of Vedanta is free from samsaara - n avagata brahmanaH or j~naata brahmanaH na tu sruta brahmanaH - the n one who has understood Vedanta is free not one who has listened to n Vedanta. ( One gentleman approached Swami Chinmayanandaji and asked n - swamiji I have been hearing your lectures. I understand it very n well. I understand that I am brahman and not this upaadhiis, the n body, mind and intellect - but then how come I am still suffering? n Swamiji smillingly asked him back - Sir this is also my question -why n are you suffering when you understood that you are Brahman? (JK n puts this beautifully- It is an understanding as "understanding as a n fact", not as an understanding as an "understanding as a thought"). n Hence true knowledge and sa.nsaara can never go together. As long as n I doubt, my freedom and my knowledge is doubtful. As long as n knowledge is clear, the freedom can never be doubted. j~naanam and n bandha can never go together. If there is a doubt - the doubt will n be in the form - I know aatma or brahman is free but only my doubt is n whether I am free or not - that means there is still a doubt whether n I am aatma or Brahman or not. If I know I am aaatma and if I know I n am Brahman which is free from all limitations then where the n question of bondage? Hence listeners are many but knowers are few. n Knower is the one for whom "I am free" is a fact and not a thought. n Listener is one for whom "I am free" is the information contained in n the upanishads. A listener will say - upanishads say I am free - , a n knower will say - I am free is not an upanishadic information it is n ever established fact- Hence Shankara reiterates that where there is n j~naanam there is no question of sa.nsaara. Therefore after j~naanam,



n no upaasanaa is required.

n 3) VR^ittikaara's next question was if vedanta-j~naanam -aham n brahmaasmi - gives moksha then why does Vedanta prescribe n nididhyaasanam after Vedantic study. aatmaa vaa are drashhTavyaH,n shrotavyaH mantavyaH nididhyaasitavyaH - it prescribes after mananam n nididhyaasanam which clearly means meditation which is nothing but n upaasanam. Hence after the study of Vedanta, scripture says the n nididhyaasanam must be done which is nothing but upaasana. By saying n nididhyaasitavyaH, it is imperative that one must do upaasanaa. n Hence through upaasanaa alone one gains moksha.

n We will for the next post for Shankara's answer to this important n question of vR^ittikaara.

n End of the postn ********n Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed atn http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/n for personal study.

n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.***n -- n K. Sadanandan Code 6323n Naval Research Laboratoryn Washington D.C. 20375n Voice (202)767-2117n Fax:(202)767-2623

n From: "K. Sadananda" <[email protected]>n Date: Wed Jul 18, 2001 7:15 amn Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1L

n Notes on BSB I-i-4-1L


n I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva whon is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and alln the way up to my own teacher.


n Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond then three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source ofn purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, ton his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.n ---------------------------------------------------------------------------n samanvaya adhyaaya - I



n spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- in samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4n suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1L

n We are discussing vRîttikaara-s argument that the upanishads say n that after gaining Brahma-j~naanam, one must do nididhyaasanam. This n implies that upanishads prescribe upasanaa after gaining n Brahma-j~naanam. Since it says nididyaasitavyam implying that it is n vidhi or one must do, it is clear that upaasanaa shruti declares that n Brahma-j~naanam is not sufficient and one must do upaasanaa to attain n moksha.

n Shankara says -what vRîttikara says is right- that nididhyaasanam is n important. But what it implies is that shravanam, mananam and n nididhyaasanam- all are meant for j~naanam only. They are not n practised after j~naanam, they are practised for j~naanam. How can n one prove that all these three are meant for j~naanam only? (This n answer is from sub-commentators) Shravanam is the main saadhana, n which gives j~naanam - it is called angi saadhana or mukhyasaadhana. n Shravanam reveals my true nature 'tat tvam asi'. Hence the emphasis n on the Vedantic or scriptural study as the most important saadhana - n Systematic, consistent listening to the scriptures. But even though n j~naanam takes place through shravanam, there are obstacles, n pratibandhaa-s, obstructing j~naanam from giving moksha. There are n two obstacles - one is doubt with regard to the goal - whether aham n brahmaasmi is a fact - this doubt can arise from my own intellect or n can come from other systems of philosophy. For example n vishishhTaadvaitam says 'you can never be Brahman'. It is sacrilege n and it is impossible - all you can be at the most is become a part of n Brahman. It is sheshha-sheshhii bhaava. There is an organic relation n between the jiiva and Brahman. Jiiva is only of the size of anu or n atom or finite and is part of Brahman and cannot be Brahman who is n infinite or ananta. In Advaita jiivanmukta is possible; in n VishishhTaadvaita jiivanmukta is not possible, only vidheha mukti. n Now both Advaita and VishishhTaadvaita are put forth by great n aachaarya-s - How can I decide who is right? Acceptance of one n philosophy is automatically is a rejection of the other. Similarly n several daarshanika-s have proposed philosophies that contradict one n another. In the adhyaatma vidya, my intellect cannot be diplomatic n and accept all. It has to accept one and accepting one involves n rejecting the rest. Thus intellect will have to be sure about the n nature of oneself and the nature of Brahman. As long as there is a n lingering doubt, it does not come under 'dRîDha j~naanam' or firm n understanding - it comes under sa pratibandhaka j~naanam - incomplete n understanding. Thus samshhayaH or lingering doubt is the first n obstacle.

n The second obstacle is the habitual notion that aatma is something n else other than I. We hear an advaitic vedanta student complaining - n I know I am Brahman, but I have problem with my wife or job, my son, n my neighbor or my employer etc. Such a self-contradiction is the n result of incomplete understanding due to habitual notion of taking n aatma as an entity other than oneself - this is called vipariita n bhaavana. (The purpose of serious study of brahmasuutra and other n scriptures as well as participating in Vedantic discussions should n become very clear now - it is to establish a firm logical foundation n for an understanding of the nature of the problem and the nature of n the solution. By discussing puurvapakshaa-s and siddhanta-s the



n intellect is provided a field of inquiry to investigate and n understand clearly the fundamental problem of adhyaasa and firm n understanding that takes one beyond ones habitual notions). Because n of this vipariita bhaavana, we have only sa pratibandhaka j~naanam - n Hence mananam and nididhyaasanam removes the obstacles - mananam n removes doubt - whether I am Brahman or not - this should become n clear - with conviction one must accept one philosophy rejecting all n other systems of philosophies and any other interpretation of n Vedanta. It is not a fanatical approach to Vedanta, due to some n reverence to a tradition or to an aachaarya or to an upbringing, but n conviction based on clear understanding of the nature of the problem n and solution to the problem. I have to think, weigh and analyze the n philosophies presented - all the darshhana-s that have been put n forth as well as any other interpretations and in the final analysis n come to firm conclusion in my mind of what is right and what is wrong n and, thus I should be completely doubt free in my own mind.

n This doubt-free knowledge involve four things: 1. One should know n what is right as right and 2. Should also know what is wrong as n wrong, 3. Why the right is right i.e. logically able to establish in n my own mind that, that right is right or that right cannot be wrong n and 4. Why wrong is wrong - what is wrong with the wrong or why it n cannot be right. In fact the second chapter of Brahmasuutra n discusses exclusively what is wrong with the wrong. Respecting a n person is one thing but accepting the philosophy that he preaches is n another. Hence one can have respect for Shankara or Ramanuja or n Maadhva, Kapila or Jaimini etc- but one should have firm conviction n what is the right philosophy and why is it the right philosophy and n what are the wrong philosophies and why are they wrong philosophies. n Respecting is the sign of a cultured person, but accepting all n philosophies is the sign of a confused person. If one is not n fanatical but convinced in one philosophy one should able to n communicate his knowledge without disrespecting the others.

n Hence mananam removes samshaya pratibandha. Nidhidhyaasanam is meant n for removing the second obstacles - vipariita bhaavana - looking upon n aatma or Brahman as something other than oneself- it is this that n makes one to ask or state - I have studied all scriptures and n understand Advaita Vedanta, now what should I do? Enough of n intellectual analysis - it is useless - I want to withdraw myself or n want to devote myself (to non-intellectual?) to something more n useful. When Vedanta says it is swataH siddham - ever existing n eternally present - how does doing something or not-doing something n help or obstruct? But the very question and the statement implies the n vipariita bhaavana or habitual obstacles due to taking anaatma as n aatma and aatma as anaatma - that is looking aatma as some third n person. The solution is to start looking aatma as the first person n that is I am that aatma and I am not this anaatma. - I should not n wait for moksha or liberation - since moksha is here and right now.

n I heard people saying Advaita is very difficult to understand and n follow and in the kaliyuga it is simpler and easier to get liberated n by kiirtana or through bhakti, etc. The fact is there is nothing to n practise in Advaita - it is some thing to be - as one's own self or n owning one's own self. Nididhyaasana involves firm establishment in n the correct understanding that there is nothing to do or achieve, and n one is already liberated - I am sidhha suddha mukta swaruupaH. This n is called changing the thought pattern or reorientating the ways of n one's thinking. A complete over-haul of one's mind. Nididhyaasanam



n does not give j~naanam, it does not give moksha - it removes the n obstacles for j~naanam - It converts sa pratibandhaka j~naanam to n apratibandhaka j~naanam. Thus all the three- shravanam, mananam and n nidhidhyaasanam- are meant for dRîDa j~naanaartham eva - for firm n abiding knowledge only. This can be illustrated by a simple example. n We know as soon as we turn on the switch, the electric bulb glows and n instantly the light of the bulb eliminates the darkness. Suppose when n the switch is turned on and the darkness still remained. Upon n inquiring we find there is nothing wrong with the switch nor with the n bulb nor with the line in between and we also know that current is n flowing and the bulb is also burning. Further investigation revealed n that the darkness is still there because the light from the burning n bulb is obstructed by two thick dark opaque sheets of clothes. Hence n even though the electric current has done its job and bulb is also in n working condition, yet the darkness remained only because of the n obstruction of the light coming from the bulb. All one has to do is n to remove the obstructing material and that very instant the darkness n will be removed by the light from the bulb. Now, the question is what n removed the darkness - is it light from the bulb or the action of n removing the covering sheets. Action of the removing the covering n sheets is required in this particular case but what actually n contributes to the removal of darkness is the turning of the switch n that resulted in passing the current to the bulb, which caused to n emanate the light. It is the light that is opposite to darkness. n Everything else is required but they are not the primary cause for n the removal of darkness. In the same way the Nididhyaasana is like n removing obstacles that obstruct the removal of darkness of ignorance n by the light of knowledge which is already glowing in the bulb of n intellect. Hence mananam and nididhyaasanam removes the two obstacles n for knowledge, the samshhayaH and vipariita bhaavana, but j~naanam n alone removes the ignorance and leads to moksha.

n Hence the arguments of Shankara can be brieflyn a) Nididhyaasanam is not after j~naanam but for j~naanam only. It is n not a upaasanaa after j~naanam as vRîttikaara argues but it is part n of the process for j~naanam. Hence there is big difference between n the role of nididhyaasanam in the vRîttikaara outlook versus an n advaitin outlook. b) The second difference is for vRîittikaara n nididhyaasanam is a karma that comes after j~naanam whereas for n Vedantin nididhyaasana is not a karma after j~naanam, but a process n of j~naanam. c) In the vRîttikaara mata nidhidhyaasana as upaasanaa n produces a puNya phalam where as in Vedanta, it is not karma n producing a positive result as adRîshhTa phalam but for Vedantin it n only removes our habitual dehaatma-buddhi which is the dRîshhTa n phalam. d) In upaasanaa one expects moksha to happen in future, an n event in future, a result after an action. In Vedanta nidhidhyaasana n is not with an expectation of moksha, but it is knocking of an n expectation of moksha - I am free here and now and not an event in n future will be the affirmative knowledge. Thus even though both n Vedantin and vRîttikaara translates nidhidhyaasana as meditation - n the connotation and its implication are different. Hence from n Vedantin's perspective all the three, shravanam, mananam and n nididhyaasanam put to together as one gives the knowledge. Of these n shravanam has the positive role of producing knowledge and mananam n and nididhyaasanam have the negative roles of removing doubt and n habits, respectively. Thus all the three play different roles but the n ultimate result is j~naanam and after j~naanam there is nothing else n to be done.



n Next comes the last puurvapaksha. Up to this point Shankara has n established using various arguments that there is no karma involved n in Vedanta. While negating karma he negated upaasanaa also since it n is only a karma but at mental level. Now vRîttikaara puts forth his n last straw. If Vedantin says there is no moksha by karma and upasanaa n since they are activities, then j~naana also cannot give moksha since n it is also a kind of action involving mental activity or maanasika n vRîtti. If upaasanaa involving meditation is considered as a mental n activity then j~naanam should also be considered as a mental n activity, since both involve manasika vRîtti. Hence if upaasanaa is n negated as not a means for moksha, then j~naanam also gets negated n since it is also equally a karma involving mental activity. The n argument can be stated as - j~naanam karmaruupam, maanasa vRîtti n ruupatvaat, upaasanavat. j~naanam is also a type of karma, since it n involves a mental activity, just like upaasanaa. This is the n vRîttikaara's argument.

n Shankara refutes by this saying that j~naanam does not come under n karma. Even though upaasanaa and j~naanam both are maanasika n vRîtti-s, upaasanaa comes under karma but not j~naanam. Why is it n so? Shankara gives two arguments in support of this - these n arguments are presented in three stages.

n 1) The first difference between j~naanam and karma is j~naanam n depends on the object of knowledge - vastu tantram where as karma n depends on the subject of action - kartRî tantram. For example n student who comes to the class performs two types of efforts - one is n a student is using the ears, j~naanedriyam to hear and he takes the n role of hearer. After hearing the student wants to take the notes. n Then he takes the role of kartaa, a writer of the notes. The moment n one becomes hearer, what one hears is not under the controller of the n hearer, it is under the control of speaker or a teacher since he n determines what the student hears. Thus what one hears does not n depend on the subject, the hearer, but the object of hearing. n J~naanam vastu tantram or prameya tantram and not pramaatRî tantram. n Where as the moment the student becomes a note-taker or writer, what n one writes using the karmendriya-s depends on the writer. Hence the n first difference is j~naanam is vastu tantram where as karma is n kartRî tantram.

n 2. The second difference is actually the same as the first but put in n a different way. j~naanam is dependent on the type of pramaaNam one n uses - pramaaNa tantram whereas karma, particularly shaastra karma or n ritual, depends on shaastra vidhi or chodana -hence it is chodana n tantram. If I am using ears for j~naanam then I am using shabda n pramaaNam, if I am using eyes for j~naanamm then ruupa prapancha. n Hence as a pramaataa or knower, the knowledge I get depends on the n type of pramaaNam that I use to gain the knowledge - I, the n pramaataa, cannot decide -or rather cannot choose - the choice n depends on the pramaaNa or the type of objective knowledge - is it n some thing to see, some thing to hear or something to taste or n something to smell etc. Thus it depends on pramaaNa. Karma is n chodana tantram, that is shaastric injunction will determine the type n of karma that one must perform. Shankara give a beautiful example n here - In Chandogya upanishad there is pa~nchaagni vidya. In that n context the upanishad talks about a type of meditation to be done n which is termed as pa~nchaagni vidya. In that meditation various n things in the creation are to be seen as agni. At the end of that n meditation as a final part it instructs - "purushhaH vaava



n goutamaagniH | "- May you look upon the male or the father as the n fire principle. Finally it says "yoshaa vaava goutamaagniH | "-May n you look upon the mother or female also as fire principle. This is a n kind of upaasana or meditation. This type of meditation is chodana n tantram or shaastra vidhi or injunction by shaastra as karma. n Suppose a person sees a man as a man and woman as woman. Is it n because of shaastra vidhi or injunction by shaastra? Looking at man n as a man and woman as a woman is not considered as shaastra vidhi or n injunction by shaastra since it is natural to look woman as woman and n man as a man. It is not a chodana tantram whereas seeing a man as a n fire or anything other than a man is chodana tantram or an injunction n by shaastra. Hence seeing man as a man is j~naanam or knowledge n while seeing man as a fire is upaasanam. Seeing a stone as a stone n is j~naanam, seeing a stone as Vishnu is upaasanaa. Seeing a stone as n a stone does not depend on our choice, but seeing the stone as Vishnu n depends on seer's choice. A DMK fellow may not choose to look upon n the stone as God to do puuja for it, unless it is the statue of his n DMK founder! Hence j~naanam is pramaaNa tantram, karma or upaasanaa n is chodana tantram.

n 3. Karma can produce four types of results that we discussed before n -aaptiH or reaching a place; utpattiH or producing a new thing; n sa.nskaaraH or purifying a thing; and vikaaraH or modifying a thing. n Where as j~naanam does not produce any one of the four results. It n only reveals a thing as it is but it does not produce. Suppose I n learned about Himaalaya-s from a book. By that knowledge - there is n no reaching of Himaalayas. Similarly j~naama does not produce n anything - Reading a cook book does not produce a dinner on the n table. Similarly knowledge does not purify - knowledge that the house n is dirty does not clean the house. Action only cleans the house - n Hence Shankara says in VivekachuuDamanin -n chittasya shuddhaye karma na tu vastu upalabdhaye |n vastusiddhiH vichaareNa na ki~nchit karmakoTibhiH ||

n Karma (yoga) purifies the mind only but does not help to gain the n knowledge. Only by inquiry into the nature of reality can one gain n the knowledge, and not by performing countless actions. Hence if you n want chitta suddhi mere knowledge will not do, you have to do karma n yoga. Does j~naanam modify any thing - knowing that I am fat does n not make me slim. Thus karma produces one of the four results where n as j~naanam does not produce these four results. Hence j~naanam and n karma are not identical. Hence self-knowledge is not a type of n karma. It does not produce anything -including moksha! j~naanam only n reveals the fact as a fact - the fact that I was, I am, I ever will n be a mukta purushhaH - thus it only reveals a fact! It does not make n one to reach, produce, purify or modify - it reveals the fact that I n am nitya muktaH. Therefore I have nothing to do. Thus j~naanam is not n karma and after j~naanam no karma is required either. Then why n karmaakaaNda- since there is no need of karma after j~naanam? Before n j~naanam it is useful - as the above vivekachuuDamani sloka n emphasizes, for chitta suddhi or for acquiring saadhana chatushhTayam n that is required before Brahman inquiry can be done as discussed in n Suutra 1.n With this Shankara concludes the vR^ittikaara khanDana also.

n With this we end our discussion of the word 'tu' in the suutra ' tat n tu samanvyayaat'



n Conclusion:

n Now the conclusion where we present the fourth suutra in the standard n technical format.

n vishhayaH - subject matter - vedanta shaastram

n vishayaH or sa.nshayaH - doubt - whether it is karma param or brahma n param -some action to be done or just revealing Brahman.

n puurvapaksha - karma param - Vedanta shaastra prescribes action - n karma alone gives one something whereas mere knowledge does not give n any benefit. Theory has to lead to technology for it to be useful.

n siddhanta: Vedanta shaastram is brahma param - since ignorance is the n root cause for the human suffering, the knowledge alone is the n solution to this problem. Just as by mere knowledge of the rope the n fear associated with snake etc are gone. Karma cannot get rid of n ignorance. No action is necessary or possible for getting rid of n ignorance. Gaining knowledge does not involve action although n thinking or inquiry is involved in that process. Thinking or inquiry n is not an action like upaasana which for example involves visualizing n Vishnu while one is seeing a stone. Hence gaining j~naanam involves n no action - there is nothing to do but something to know. In fact it n involves in knowing that one is akarthaa or a non-doer.

n sa~NgatiH -How is related to previous adhikaraNam-s? It is aakshepa n sangatiH - the fourth adhikaraNam is an answer to the objection, n which is raised on the third adhikaraNam. Brahman is the subject n matter of Vedanta is the third adhikaraNam and based on that n objection that Brahman is not the subject matter but karma is the n subject matter of Vedanta. That objection is answered - by tat tu n samanvayaat - that Brahman alone is the subject matter.

n With this fourth adhikaraNa and forth suutra is over.n ----------------------------------n Generally people stop the study of Brahmasuutra-s with this fourth suutra.n But we will continue thanks to the help of Geetha, Sunder and Dennis n in making sure I work hard along with them.n End of the postn ********n Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed atn http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/n for personal study.

n ***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.***n -- n K. Sadanandan Code 6323n Naval Research Laboratoryn Washington D.C. 20375n Voice (202)767-2117n Fax:(202)767-2623

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AdhyasaADHYAASANotes on Shankara's exmination of the nature of 'Error' in the introduction to the Brahmasutra. These notes are essentially a rewording, omitting most of the Sanskrit, of the notes provided by Kuntimaddi Sadananda on the Advaitin List and I gratefully acknowledge his permission for this. In turn, he wishes that I acknowledge his own indebtedness to H.H. Swami Paramaarthaananda of Madras, himself a student of Swami Chinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. His lectures form the basis of these notes. The Brahmasuutra is the third of the so called 'Three pillars of Vedanta', the first two being the upanishhad-s (shruti - the scriptures 'revealed' and not 'authored' by anyone) and the Bhagavad Giitaa (smRRiti - the 'heard' scriptures passed down by memory). The Brahmasuutra is a very terse and logical examination of the essential teaching of the upanishhad-s, seeking to show the nature of Brahman and the superiority of the philosophy of Vedanta. It is usually studied with the help of a commentary or bhaashhya, the best known being the one by Shankara. It is in the nature of man, with his intellect, that he seeks to enquire into the causes of observed phenomena. The six topics of enquiry for a 'student of life' relate to the individual, the world, the cause for these two, suffering, liberation from this suffering and the means for attaining such liberation. Any consistent explanation for all of these is deemed a philosophy or darshana. There are 12 specific philosophies identified in India. Six of these are called aastika and the other six naastika. Aastika refers to those systems which accept the Vedas as a valid means for acquiring knowledge. Conversely, the naastika philosophies do not recognise the Vedas as valid or reliable sources of knowledge. These latter philosophies prefer to rely upon direct perception and inference or reasoning as the means for knowledge. The first of the six naastika philosophies is materialism, said to originate with the teacher of the Gods, BRRihaspati. It is said that this was devised in order to mislead the demons so that they could be destroyed. It emphasises the sense pleasures as being the purpose of life and does not accept such things as heaven and hell, the soul or Vedas. Modern science, with its belief that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, may come close to this philosophy. Materialism only recognises direct perception as a valid means of knowledge. This philosophy is not discussed in the Brahmasuutra since it is not considered worthwhile. The second naastika philosophy is Jainism. Some aspects of this are discussed and refuted later. The remaining four cover the various aspects of Buddhism. Buddha himself did not teach any real system of philosophy; he only had various dialogues with his disciples. Hence Buddhism was not initially well-developed. Later however it developed into four branches, each of which is analysed and criticised in the Brahmasuutra. Although all of the six aastika philosophies accept the Vedas as a valid means of knowledge, three of them do not accept Brahman and four of them given more importance to reasoning than to the Vedas. Only two give primary importance to the Vedas. One of these however, considers that the first part of the Vedas - the one concerned with ritualistic action - is more important than the upanishhad-s. The second gives primary importance to the last portion of the Vedas, and it is this that is the principal subject of the Brahmasuutra-s.



A suutra literally means 'a thread'. It is a very concise statement expressing the essential meaning of a given idea in a logical manner, free from any defects. A simple translation is therefore not adequate on its own and requires additional explanation in the form of a commentary or bhaashhya. Because there exist possibilities for ambiguity, the various commentaries have led to 10 different teachings each claiming that theirs represents the intended meaning. The three most popular (in historical sequence) are known as Advaita, VishishhTaadvaita and Dvaita,. The commentary by Shankara is concerned with Advaita. A brief outline of the brahmasuutra. The Brahmasuutra consists of four chapters; each chapter is divided into four sections and each section is divided into topics of which there is a total of 191 or 192 depending on how the suutra-s are divided. Most of the topics are concerned with statements in the 10 principal upanishhad-s. The topics are divided into suutra-s of which there is a total of 555. Each of the four chapters is concerned with a particular theme. The first chapter endeavours to establish that the central theme of the upanishhad-s is Brahman. This is necessary because some of the other philosophies do not accept this. The second chapter shows there are no contradictions in the teaching since this would constitute a defect. There are three types of contradiction defined - internal (i.e. the Vedic statements themselves contradicting each other); contradiction with statements from smRRiti; contradiction with logic. The third chapter discusses the means for attaining Brahman, both direct and indirect (the latter covering such aspects as ritual etc., which are merely means for purifying the mind). The fourth chapter is about the 'fruits' of knowledge of Brahman, namely liberation from bondage and suffering, both delayed and immediate.Each topic consists of 5 aspects. The first is the 'subject', which is usually an idea from one of the ten principal upanishhad-s. The second element is the 'doubt' inherent in the subject (if there is none, there is no need for enquiry). Thirdly, the objections and reasoning of other philosophies are considered. Fourthly, these objections are logically refuted and a conclusion consistent with Advaita is drawn. Finally, the connection with the previous topic is shown. Shankara's introduction to the bhaashhya (called adhyaasa bhaashhya) is central to the entire advaitic philosophy, covering the explanation of the basic errors or mistakes (adhyaasa) that we make that lead us to our belief in a separate existence and hence to the eternal cycle (samsaara) of suffering. Prior to discussing this, however, there is an introduction to the use of inferential logic, since this is fundamental for understanding the arguments of the Brahmasuutra. A distinction is made between valid and illusory knowledge. What constitutes a valid means of knowledge is crucial to the understanding of this subject of adhyaasa. (Indeed, all Indian philosophies discuss epistemology before moving on to ontological issues.) The senses are usually regarded as our principal source of knowledge but, apart from the fact that information from the senses is not always reliable, much of what is discussed is not directly observable to the senses. Thus we have to be aware of the source of the information and the types of error that can occur in using this as a means of knowledge. There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramaaNa. The first is direct perception either through one of the senses or possibly imagined by the mind (of things which are not directly present). The senses are however very specific. For example the eyes can only detect colour and form and are unable to hear sounds from an object. In fact, each pramaaNa has validity in its own sphere. If something is directly perceived, inference is not needed; if something can be inferred, the shaastra-s are not required. The next valid means of knowledge is inference from something that cannot be directly perceived. If something cannot be seen directly, nor inferred, it may it be reported in the scriptures or science or directly from someone who can be



trusted. For this latter means, the principal source is the Vedas. It is believed that the Vedas were not written by humans and are thus free from the defects associated with human authorship. Effectively they are presumed to have been revealed to the sages, who then passed them on to their disciples by word of mouth. Since they are heard from a teacher they are called shruti. The three remaining means of knowledge are considered as part of inference itself. The Brahmasuutra relies heavily on inference and shruti as sources of knowledge. It should be noted that the Brahmasuutra itself was written by a human and therefore cannot itself be considered as a valid means of knowledge.Inference Before inference can occur, there needs to be some valid data which is itself gathered directly or indirectly through direct perception. Otherwise, the inference could only be a speculation or imagination. For example one could not infer the age of the Moon just by looking at it and estimating it. Data must be collected first e.g. rocks could be brought back and carbon dated. Four aspects are involved in the process of inference. These are the subject or 'locus' of the discussion, the objective or 'conclusion' - that which is to be inferred or concluded, a 'basis' for the argument and finally an 'analogy'. An example given in the scriptures is the inference that there is a fire on a mountain because one is able to see smoke there, just as might happen in a kitchen. Here, the mountain is the 'locus'; to infer that there is a fire on the mountain is the 'conclusion'; the 'basis' is that smoke can be seen and the 'analogy' is that when one sees smoke in the kitchen, it is invariably associated with fire (this is in the days before electricity!). The 'locus' has to be something that is partly visible and partly unknown; otherwise, it cannot be a matter of dispute. Whether or not there is a fire on the mountain is not visible or known - hence the dispute. Since we cannot see whether or not there is a fire, we must use inference. The 'conclusion' - that there is a fire on the mountain - is not observable or directly provable. The 'basis' is that smoke can be seen and it is on the mountain. This 'basis' is observable. Thus, in the example, the 'locus' and the 'basis' are both visible while that which is to be inferred, the 'conclusion' is invisible. In order for the 'analogy' to be valid, both 'conclusion' and 'basis' have to always be experienced simultaneously with the same locus in those examples that have been directly perceived, i.e. on which the inference is based. In this case, the listener is aware that fire invariably exists with the smoke when it is encountered in the kitchen. (It has to be this way around and not that smoke invariably occurs when there is fire.) In order to use inference them, one has to have a basic knowledge of the relationship between the conclusion and the basis, which has been gathered through perception. Here, the knowledge is that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Once this concommitant relationship has been established through repeated observation, only then can it be used to infer that same relationship in a situation where the conditions cannot be directly perceived. Also, direct perception forms the basis for the implied relationship from which the inference is drawn.An inference can only be made about a specific object if the perceptible data has been gathered from that object. For example one cannot make conclusions about Mars if the data has been collected from the Moon. All observable data derive from the perceptible universe. The aatman is not perceivable. From this, it follows that, by using scientific observation one cannot arrive at any conclusions about the aatman. Hence, the whole of scientific reasoning is called 'commonplace inference' and can only deal with objects that can be perceived. 'Commonplace inference' has no access to knowledge of the aatman. To attempt to do so is like trying to hear through the eyes and constitutes an invalid means of knowledge. Instead of using data collected through the senses, inference may also make use of data collected from the shaastra-s. Here, inferences may be made about the nature of the aatman, since this is the subject of the shaastra-s. The



implication of this is that the shaastra-s must be accepted as a valid source of observation. Once this has been done, the validity of the data need not be questioned, although different theories may be put forth to explain the same data. The theories may be incorrect but not the observations. All of the aastika philosophies have accepted the shaastra-s as a valid source; they have just reached differing conclusions. Without valid data, there is no basis for inference, only speculation or belief. Since inference based on the shaastra-s assumes that the shaastra-s are a valid means of knowledge, this method is only applicable to aastika philosophies. The naastika-s do not accept the shaastra-s. Therefore the Brahmasuutra is of no value to them. Inference or logic, which is based upon perception, could be called scientific reasoning. This is still used in the Brahmasuutra though, as noted above, it cannot make any statements about the aatman. Equally, it cannot be used to disprove Vedantic teaching. This is a mistake that many naastika philosophers make. The Brahmasuutra uses the same technique to disprove their claims. (They would not accept inference based upon the shaastra-s in any case.) It is also used to show that Vedanta is not illogical. In fact, it is beyond the realm of logic.AdhyaasaAdhyaasa means error or mistake. This is the basis of Advaita Vedanta and of Shankara's interpretation of the Brahmasuutra. The doctrine of Advaita Vedanta rests upon the four aphorisms in the Vedas: consciousness is Brahman; that thou art; I am Brahman; this self is Brahman. Shankara's aim is to show that the Brahmasuutra is compatible with Advaita Vedanta. His claim is that adhyaasa causes the cycle of birth and death with its concommitant suffering. Once the error is removed, that is the end of the cycle. Errors can arise for various reasons. When I act without knowledge, I commit an error. Even if I know that I am ignorant I am still making a mistake. For example, lack of knowledge of Sanskrit can cause errors in these notes. Even if I know the word I may still make typographical mistakes. Here the error is due to lack of awareness, which is also effectively ignorance, since I am not conscious that what is being typed is not what was intended. Errors may also arise if the instruments of knowledge are defective, for example if I am colour-blind or if there is insufficient illumination. In all of these cases, I am ignorant of the truth and, more importantly, I take the false as real and possibly the real as false. The price of these mistakes is suffering. Ignorance is the source of error and error causes suffering. The solution is therefore knowledge - knowledge of Brahman (Brahmavidya) brings realisation and release from suffering. All techniques, yoga, paths etc. are only methods for preparing the mind to receive that knowledge. Analogy of the Rope and the Snake This example originates from the commentaries of GauDapaada on the MaaNDuukya upanishhad. Seeing a rope in the dark, it is mistaken for a snake - an error or adhyaasa. We mistakenly superimpose the image of an illusory snake onto the real rope. In just such a way we superimpose the illusion of objects etc. upon the one aatman. If there is total dark, we would not see the rope so could not imagine it to be a snake. Hence 'ignorance is bliss', as in deep sleep - there can be no error. Similarly, if there is total light we see the rope clearly - in complete knowledge, we know everything to be Brahman. Knowledge is also bliss! The error occurs only in partial light or when the eyes are defective. Then there is partial knowledge; we know that some 'thing' exists. This part, that is not covered by darkness or hidden by ignorance is called the 'general part' and is 'uncovered' or 'real'. That the 'thing' is actually a rope is hidden because of the inadequate light or knowledge. This specific feature of the thing, that it is a rope, is called the 'particular part' and is covered. In place of the covered part, the mind substitutes or 'projects' something of its own, namely the snake.



In the example then, when we say "there is a snake", there is a real part and an unreal part. The real part is "there is"; this is the 'general part'. The unreal part, the snake, only appears to be there because the 'particular part' - the rope - is covered. If light (i.e. knowledge) is made available, the rope is now seen. The 'general part', "there is" remains unchanged but the 'particular part', which was previously projected by the mind, is now uncovered and revealed to be a rope. The snake has not 'gone away' since it never existed, except in the mind of the observer, where it might have given rise to very real fears and physical effects (fast heartbeat, sweating etc.). From the point of view of actual reality (paaramaarthika), only the rope is real, the snake does not exist. For a perceiver who sees a snake, that snake is 'relatively' real (vyaavahaarika) and causes as much mental suffering as would a truly real snake. There only ever was a rope but the ignorance of this in the mind of the perceiver creates the illusion of a snake and the suffering follows. Once light (i.e. the light of knowledge) is introduced, the mistaken perception of the particular part is corrected; the unreal snake disappears and the real rope is revealed. The associated fear etc. also disappears. What has happened is that a valid means of enquiry has been undertaken into the nature of the particular part to reveal the truth of the matter. The valid means of enquiry in this example was the torchlight. It was appropriate because the mistake was brought about by the dim light. Prayer or meditation would not have been appropriate and would not have revealed the rope. The method has to be appropriate to the nature of the error. Since ignorance of our true nature is the reason for samsaara, the appropriate means of enquiry for removing the error is self-knowledge. Comparison with our own situation The analogous statement that Shankara uses is 'I am a sa.nsaari', i.e. one who is subject to the cycle of birth and death. He could just as well have said 'I am a person' or individual. Here, 'I am' is the general part and is true. It refers to a conscious and existent being. It is 'uncovered'. There is no doubt in our minds that it is true; we need no external means of knowledge to verify it. 'A sa.nsaari' (or 'a person' etc.) is the particular part and is unreal, like the snake. In this case, the truth of the situation is covered over, rather than projected, but is just as unreal. That we 'are' (sat) and that we are 'conscious' (chit) is known from the general part. What is hidden in the particular part is that we are bliss (aananda) (or unlimited, complete, infinite etc.). In its place, we perceive unreal aspects such as misery, limitedness, incompleteness etc. This error is the cause of all our suffering. In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to apply the torchlight of Vedantic knowledge to reveal the real particular part - not 'I am a sa.nsaari' but 'I am Brahman'. Mixing of real and unreal When a mistake of this type occurs, what is happening is that a real part and an unreal part are getting mixed up and this is effectively how Shankara defines adhyaasa - the mixing up of real and unreal. In the case of the rope and snake analogy, the error can be viewed as a 'misperceiving of the rope' or as the 'superimposition of a snake' or as 'the mixing of part of a real rope and part of an unreal snake'. When we say "there is a snake", 'there is' is the general part, which could be viewed as belonging to the rope, which is real, while 'a snake' is the unreal, mentally projected, particular part. The mixing up of real and unreal effectively creates a third entity that is partly real and partly unreal. When someone refers to the 'snake', he does not realise that there are two aspects, one real and one unreal. If he says, "there is a long snake", the adjective 'long' in fact refers to the rope, which is real whilst, if he says, "there is a poisonous snake", the adjective refers to the unreal part. Similarly, when someone says, "I am a shopkeeper" (or whatever), he does not realise that the attribute 'shopkeeper' refers to the unreal part. He does not know that there are two parts, only one of which (I am) is real. In the mind of



the ordinary 'person' these two things are mixed up and a single, false, jiiva is created. It is this mixed-up jiiva who is striving for liberation. The purpose of the Brahmasuutra is to enquire into the nature of the jiiva, by directing the knowledge of Vedanta so that we can discard the unreal part and become established in the knowledge of the real part. When this happens, realisation takes place and sa.nsaara is dissolved as unreal. Shankara's discussion of adhyaasa This effectively divides into six topics: - the definition of error, objections to the theory as described, answers to these objections, showing the possibility for error, proof of the theory, conclusion. Definition of adhyaasa: - Shankara gives two definitions. The simpler is that it occurs when the attributes of one thing are superimposed on another. Thus a snake is seen instead of a rope or silver is seen on the inside of a shell. The second suggests that it occurs when a previously experienced object is seen instead of the actual. This accounts for the fact that a snake could not be seen instead of the rope unless the observer knew what a snake was and had previously seen a real one (or an image of one). A third indirect definition is the one mentioned earlier; that it occurs when real and unreal are mixed up. Objections to the theory: - Other systems of philosophy claim that, although the rope-snake error is acceptable, the superimposition of anything onto the aatman is not possible. The argument is that any superimposition requires four conditions to be satisfied. 1. Perception. The object being covered must be directly perceivable, as is the rope in the rope-snake example. The aatman is not an object and cannot be perceived. 2. Incompletely known. The object must be incompletely known, as one is ignorant of the fact that the rope is a rope. In the case of the aatman, however, the advaitin accepts that the aatman is self-evident and always conscious - how can there be ignorance with regard to something that is self-evident? 3. Similarity. There must be some similarity between the actual object and its superimposition, just as a rope and snake have a basic similarity (one could not mistake the rope for an elephant, for example). But there is total dissimilarity between the aatman and anything else. E.g. aatmaa is the subject, anaatmaa is the object; aatmaa is conscious and all pervading, anaatmaa is inert and limited etc. 4. Prior experience. In order to make the mistake, we must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed. We could not see a snake where the rope is unless we knew what a real snake was. Whilst this is possible in the case of the rope-snake, it is not possible in the aatmaa-anaatmaa case because we would have to have prior experience of a 'real' anaatmaa and it is part of the fundamental teaching of Advaita that there is no such thing; there is only the aatman. Accordingly, in the case of the aatmaa-anaatmaa, not one of these four conditions is satisfied. Therefore superimposition of anaatmaa onto aatmaa, the fundamental cause of our error according to Shankara, is not possible - so says the objector. Answers to these Objections and Showing the possibility for adhyaasa: - 1. "The object must be directly perceivable." This is not strictly true. It is certainly the case that the object must be known. It is not possible to make a mistake about something about which we know nothing at all but it is not necessary that the object be immediately in front of us. This first condition should be restated as 'the object must be a known, existent entity'. Now, there is no problem since the aatman is known even though it cannot be seen (we know that we exist). 2. "The object should be incompletely known." This is equivalent to saying that we should have partial, but not complete ignorance about the object. This is precisely the case with the aatman. We know that we exist (sat) and are conscious (chit) but we do not know that we are bliss (aananda). We have partial knowledge. Thus there is no valid objection.



3. "There must be a similarity between the object and its superimposition." The counter-argument here is that this is a general rule and that exceptions are possible. E.g. it is a general rule that the intelligent cause or creator is different from the material cause just as a potter is different from the clay from which he makes his pots. However there are exceptions such as the spider and its web. Here the material for the web comes from the spider's own body. Similarly a dreamer creates her dream from the thoughts and memories in her own mind. Shankara argues that this is such an exception to the general rule and that it is not necessary for similarity to exist. This argument on its own may seem a bit feeble. Shankara says that we know of cases where adhyaasa takes place when there is no similarity and gives an example to support his claim. We know that the sky is really colourless but nevertheless we see it as blue. We might also claim that it is polluted. But these are superimpositions by us of 'blue' or 'polluted' upon a sky which is without colour or form. This error takes place without there being any similarity between 'sky' and 'blue' or between 'sky' and 'pollution'. (As written, this argument carries little conviction . It is slightly better if 'air' or 'space' is understood rather than 'sky' - the Sanskrit word 'aakaasha' can mean either sky or space.) 4. "We must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed." Shankara agrees that, in the rope-snake analogy, we must have had prior experience of a snake but says that it does not have to be a real snake; experience of a false snake would have left a suitable impression, too (e.g. we might have seen the snake in a movie). Another analogy encountered in the scriptures is seeing a ghost instead of a post and we all accept that we do not have to have seen a real ghost for this since we mostly do not believe such a thing exists. It is sufficient to have read about them. Similarly, in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa, we project an unreal anaatmaa. And where did we encounter the unreal anaatmaa before? In a previous adhyaasa, says Shankara! This leads to an infinite regress, of course, and Shankara claims that 'we never talk about the beginning of adhyaasa' - it is beginningless! Therefore (he says), there is no real anaatmaa and it is not necessary for there to be a real one for adhyaasa to occur. Thus all conditions are effectively fulfilled. In the first, the object is evident rather than actually perceived; in the second, the object is partly unknown; the third condition is not compulsory; the fourth condition is effectively fulfilled because we have prior experience of an unreal anaatmaa. Therefore the objections are not valid and the adhyaasa is possible.In fact, this is only a provisional refutation of the objector and a defensive argument, to satisfy both aastika and naastika philosophies. It uses the same scientific reasoning that was used for the objections. He then goes on to provide a more complete response and offensive argument for aastika objectors. He says that the entire rope-snake analogy is only an illustration of the concept of adhyaasa and is not intended to be used to prove the aatmaa-anaatmaa situation This must use the Vedas as pramaaNa (a source of knowledge) and not rely solely on scientific reasoning. In fact, even if scientific argument disproved the rope-snake adhyaasa, this would not affect scriptural based arguments for the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Furthermore, Shankara points out that the other aastika philosophies have already implicitly accepted the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. All of these systems talk about aatmaa and accept the Veda's assertion that it is eternal. They realise that it refers to 'aham' or 'I' and claim that this is immortal. And yet they are conscious of the their experience of 'I am a human being', 'I am a father' etc., which clearly refer to anaatmaa. Therefore, according to their systems, these statements must be erroneous. Statements such as 'I am the body' are examples of superimposition of the gross body onto the aatmaa; a form of adhyaasa. If they deny this, they will be reduced to the stance of materialism. Thus they cannot object to this special case of aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Therefore they must accept the more general case, even though they might not



have realised it. Because they had already implicitly accepted the aatmaa-body adhyaasa without applying their four objections, they have forfeited the right to claim that these apply in other cases. For example, as has already been said, the aatman is not directly perceivable. But this did not stop the objector accepting that the aatman was not the body. Shankara goes on to say that, although the example of the rope and snake is not based on shruti, we cannot legitimately object to that either because, like it or not, that is our experience. The objector can try to explain it but he cannot question it. The aatmaa-anaatmaa error, on the other hand, is based on shruti so that, again, we can try to explain but we cannot question it. The explanations given by the various philosophies may differ but the error cannot be denied.Degrees of Error In fact the aastika philosophies all agree that there is aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa; they just disagree about the extent to which this occurs. If the three statements: - I am mortal; I am a doer; I am an enjoyer; are considered, the Nyaaya and Vaisheshhika schools of philosophy claim that the first statement is an error but the second two are facts. Saa~Nkhya and Yoga schools, on the other hand, say the first two are errors and only the third is a fact. According to an advaitin, all three are errors. Proofs for Adhyaasa There are two shruti-based pramaaNa-s for adhyaasa, the first is 'postulated' and the second 'inferred'. Postulated The first takes an observed fact - for example I wake up one morning and find the road outside is flooded - and postulates an explanation for this - e.g. heavy rain occurred whilst I slept. Since I slept soundly, I have no direct knowledge of any rain but, without such a supposition, I have no reasonable way to explain the observed phenomenon. Other 'unreasonable' explanations may be put forward but the one suggested is the most plausible to the rational mind. In order to justify an improbable explanation, the more plausible must first be discredited. Since the observed fact can only be explained in this way, the explanation becomes a pramaaNa or valid means of knowledge. This pramaaNa is 'perception-based'. as opposed to 'shruti-based'. Shankara's concept of adhyaasa is in fact a shruti-based 'postulate' since there is no mention of the subject in the Vedas themselves and it is in this way that it becomes a valid knowledge in its own right. Just as this principle can be used to explain the flooded streets, shruti-based postulates can be used to explain that the ideas that we are mortal, doers and enjoyers are all due to error. For example, the Kathopanishad II.19 says "If the slayer thinks that he slays or if the slain thinks that he is slain, both of these know not. For It (the Self) neither slays nor is It slain." Also the Giitaa V 8 tells us that one who knows the truth understands that we do not act. We are not 'doers' or 'killers' or 'killed'. Therefore, any statement such as 'I am a doer' or 'I am an enjoyer' must be an error, from shruti (and smR^iti) based postulate. Similarly, the notion 'I am a knower' is an error. The MaaNDuukya Upanishad, for example, says that the aatmaa is not a knower in the waking state, the dream state or the deep sleep state but is pure consciousness. Thus shruti-based postulate shows that this idea, that 'I am a knower', is false. (Unlike the idea 'I am consciousness', which is not an error.) Another statement in the shruti says that the aatman is changeless (indestructible and incombustible). To be a 'doer' would involve change since this is an experience. All experiences, enjoying, knowing etc., are processes involving a modification of ones state e.g. from ignorance to knowledge. In fact, the suffix -er after a verb implies this modification by indicating an action or process. Since the aatman cannot change, it follows that the aatman cannot be a doer, enjoyer or any oth-er. The concepts must be errors or adhyaasa.



A final argument is that, in order to be a 'doer' one would need an associated 'instrument'; for example, mind is an instrument of thought and sense organs are instruments of perception. A 'doer' would have to be associated with an instrument of 'doing' and an 'enjoyer' with an instrument of enjoyment. But the scriptures say that the aatmaa is not associated with anything and so cannot be a 'doer' etc. Another adhyaasa is 'I am limited' e.g. ' I am here' (and not elsewhere). The kaThopanishad (I-3-15) for example says that the aatmaa is beyond the five sense perceptions, is eternal and unlimited, beginningless and limitless. Since it is unambiguously stated that we are limitless, the idea that I am limited must be an error, by shruti postulate. The notion 'I am an individual' is false; I am Brahman is the reality. The last example here is the idea that there are many aatmaa-s. This, too, is an error. Many of the philosophies do claim multiplicity of aatmaa - saa~Nkhya, yoga, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa and even vishishhTaadvaita and dvaita (which both recognise the importance of Vedanta. But Shankara cites the shvetaashvatara upanishad as clearly implying that aatmaa is one and the iishaa upanishad (V7) says "He who perceives all beings as the Self. for him how can there be delusion or sorrow, when he sees this oneness (everywhere) - all in all?" Thus, shruti postulate has shown that the ideas that we are mortal, doers, enjoyers, knowers, limited and many are all false. Inferred Earlier, the process of inference was explained as involving four aspects - the 'locus' of the discussion, the 'conclusion' that will be reached, a 'basis' for the argument and an 'analogy'. The example used was ' whenever there is smoke, there is fire'. (The full form used for the analysis was '(we infer that) there is a fire on the mountain because we can see smoke, just as in a kitchen there is always fire when we see smoke'). Shankara's analysis of adhyaasa can be put into the first form by saying that 'wherever there is transaction, there is adhyaasa'. He uses the example of using grass to catch a cow. The cow comes to the grass because, believing itself to be the body, it has notions such as 'I am hungry and the grass will remove the hunger, giving satisfaction'. It is the mistaken belief or adhyaasa 'I am the body' that causes the cow to come to the grass, 'going after things conducive to happiness'. Conversely, if instead of holding out grass, we take a stick to the cow, the cow senses danger and moves off, 'going away from things causing unhappiness'.This is again caused by the mistaken idea 'I am the body'. In fact, in this latter case, it is the belief that 'I am this physical body' (as opposed to the subtle body, which cannot be harmed by the stick). This provides the 'analogy' for the inference. Man goes after things he likes and avoids those that he dislikes, just as the cow comes to the grass and runs away from the stick. The full form of the inference then becomes: '(We infer that) all human activities are based on error, because all activities can be considered as either coming towards or going away, just as in the example of the cow with the grass or stick'. "Human activity" is the 'locus'; "that it is based on adhyaasa" is the 'conclusion; "all activities are either coming towards or going away" is the 'basis'; the example of the cow, grass and stick is the 'analogy'. Implication of adhyaasa In everything that we do, we make the error of confusing what is real with what is unreal. We have a single experience but our understanding of it is confused. It is just like the example of the rope and snake. In our ignorance we have a single experience - there is a snake - but in fact two things are being mixed up viz. a real rope and an unreal snake. When I say 'I know', we think there is a single entity - a 'knower' but in fact there is a real, conscious self and unreal, inert thoughts. In the sentence "I am a knower", 'I am' is the 'general' part, referring to a real, conscious and existent being, while 'a knower' is the



'particular' part and is unreal. The two aspects are confused and adhyaasa occurs. The changeless part (existence and consciousness) belongs to aatmaa and the changing thought process belongs to anaatmaa. The two are mixed up and the idea 'I am a knower' is the result. Aatmaa cannot be a knower since it is changeless and thus cannot go through a 'knowing process'; anaatmaa cannot be a knower since it is inert. The two are mixed up to form a new entity, a 'knower', as a single experience but this is adhyaasa. Conclusion of adhyaasa commentary This understanding is not simply of academic interest; it is the source of the belief that we are mortal and thus brings about our fear of death and consequent insecurity. This then generates our constant concern with food and shelter etc. and hence our obsession with money. The fact is that money can only provide comforts; the basic insecurity does not go away however much money we may have. Adhyaasa thus directly gives rise to samsaara. Because we believe we are limited, we are continually trying to get those things we like in order to remove the perceived limitations. The belief that we 'do' anything, that we are 'doers' is due to adhyaasa and such actions result in the merits and demerits of karma and in samsaara. All of the suffering, from birth through disease, old age and death results from this fundamental error that we make. And so it will continue until the ignorance that is the cause of adhyaasa is removed. Actions are only a movement within nature, the 'play of the guuNaa'; there is no doer. The mistake takes place at all levels. With the thought 'I am the knower', the anaatmaa of the mind and intellect is superimposed upon the aatmaa. At the level of perception, a statement such as 'I am blind' superimposes the anaatmaa of the sense organ upon the aatmaa. At the level of the body, ideas such as 'I am a man' superimposes the anaatmaa of the body upon the aatmaa. All of these various ideas are deemed to be properties of the Self, thus mixing up aatmaa and anaatmaa in a disastrous mistake. And so it goes on. Because of the identification with the body, we become entangled in relationships with 'others' and imaginary 'needs' for 'external objects' etc. The aatmaa has no relationships (there is only the aatmaa) but because of the adhyaasa, the roots of samsaara spread everywhere. The solution is to remove the ignorance of the Self. Only this can have the required effect - removing any other ignorance will not affect this. Any amount of education or knowledge in other subjects will only result in an educated samsaari, someone who is knowledgeable about the anaatmaa. The error is in respect of the Self, so samsaara can only be removed by knowledge of the Self. The ignorance is not total. We already know that we exist and that we are conscious, just as in the rope and snake metaphor, we know that 'something' is there (if we did not there couldn't be any error). The aspect about which I am still ignorant is that I am Brahman. When we talk about searching for knowledge of Brahman, we are not endeavouring to find out about some new thing called 'Brahman' but about coming to realise our true status as Brahman. Whilst this true status is not understood, we exist under the mistaken impression that we are 'individuals' or 'jiiva-s'. It is the purpose of the Upanishads to remove this adyhaasa. Herein lies the difference between Vedanta and many other religions, together with science, that they begin with the assumption that we are inferior or 'sinners' and that we have to better ourselves. We waste our whole lives trying to improve our status. Vedanta tells us that this assumption of an inferior status is mistaken; we do not have to try to improve ourselves, we are already perfect, whole and without limitation of any kind. We need to enquire into the nature of Brahman and thereby remove our adhyaasa.



brahma sutra notes by sadananda

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