January 31, 1993

Croatia, at a Key Strategic Crossroad, Builds Militarily and Geographically

The January 25, 1993, Croatian National Guard's surprise offensive into the Krijena region of what has now been recognized as part of the Croatian State was the start of the end of Croatia's image abroad as the "injured party" in the current Balkan conflict. A tenuous peace had been in existence in and around the historically Serbian enclave of Krijena for more than a year. The main Croatian objective seemed to be to disrupt the Bosnia and Herzegovina peace negotiations which were coming to fruition in Geneva. The Croatian Government had said that it accepted the draft peace proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but then intentionally ensured a breakdown in the overall Balkan peace process.

Croatia's military objectives in the offensive were blurred. The stated intention of recovering the bridge which linked northern Croatia to its Dalmatian coastal region, and to seize the airport, were not valid. It was already clear that these targets were ready to be handed over peacefully by the Serbs as part of a long-term settlement which would have allowed the Krijena Serbs to administer their own affairs. The Krijena offensive demonstrated Croatian military strength, but it also raised the question to an international audience as to whether the shape of Croatia itself, so hastily agreed by the European community and then the UN, is in fact legal or valid. Krijena was never a Croat area, and, indeed, Dalmatia itself was historically never part of the region normally associated with Croatia.

The offensive sent US and EC military and political policymakers and analysts scurrying for information on Croatian military capability. Croatian secrecy meant that there was almost no information available. Croatia's defense posture was, from the achievement of independence from the old state of Yugoslavia in 1991, conditioned primarily by the antagonism of the Croatian Government toward its neighbor, the "new" Yugoslavia. The Croatian Armed Forces, mainly built around the Croatian National Guard ground force, was created just before independence a a mobile, light force, relying heavily on German guidance and equipment, along with an assortment of illegally-acquired Western and Eastern bloc systems. The secondary consideration in the structure and mission of the Croatian Armed Forces rests in the country's expansionist aims within the region. This includes projection into the neighboring former Yugoslav state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where -- by early 1993 -- Croatia had deployed 65,000 ground troops in 10 to 12 brigades of its approximately 77 National Guard brigades. [See map: Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, December 31, 1992. Croatian deployment into Bosnia and Herzegovina had reached only 40,000 by early December 1992.]

The Croatian Armed Forces acquired considerable quantities of weapons which had been cached in the republic by the old Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In addition, during 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993, Croatia continued to acquire considerable quantities of Western and Eastern bloc equipment.

The effective annual defense expenditure of Croatia could not be easily identified, even by the

Croatian Government. Much of the acquisition of weapons and systems has been undertaken through barter for Croatian goods and services, and much has been provided as covert aid from other friendly powers (Germany, principally is believed to have provided goods from the former East German Armed Forces inventory at little cost).

Weapons have come from a wide range of sources, even though German or other brokers participated in the embargo-busting. A squadron of ex-Soviet Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft was believed to have been negotiated from former Soviet stocks in the now-independent Republic of Georgia.

The principal force in the Croatian Armed Forces is the National Guard (Army). The Air Force began to acquire aircraft in 1992, however, and acquired the former Yugoslav Air Force bases which had been located in Croatia.

The Air Force itself is primarily equipped with former Soviet combat aircraft, although the international embargo on the provision of weapons into the region has meant that, by working illegally around the United Nations sanctions, Croatia has obtained a variety of different aircraft.

The Croatian Navy, formed on the effective secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991, inherited few vessels from the Yugoslav Navy. All mobile vessels in the Yugoslav Navy moved from Croatian ports, which had been its main bases for more than seven decades, to Montenegrin ports. Only those vessels left in drydock in such Croatian ports as Split and Dubrovnik were left by the Yugoslav Navy for Croatia. These totaled only some 13 patrol vessels.

No clear definition was available as to the command and control structure of the Croatian Armed Forces at the start of 1993. A number of ultra-nationalist Croatian forces were created in Croatia, and within the Croat community in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1990 and afterwards. The extent of control over these groups by the Government varies.

Croatia's defense industrial capacity is fairly well advanced, despite the fact that some of the machinery and expertise in the facilities created by the Yugoslav Government was withdrawn when Croatia seceded from the federation. Croatian small arms factories are producing weapons, including an indigenously designed submachinegun, and it is believed that the M-84 main battle tank production line has been re-opened. This is highly significant in terms of its contribution to Croatia's order of battle. The M-84 is a highly-successful development of the Soviet T-72 design, but with far greater fire control sophistication. Kuwait, which has the M-84 (the only export customer from the old Yugoslavia), claims it to be superior to the US General Dynamics M-1A1 MBT.

It is believed also that the M-84 production line has been re-established inside new Yugoslavia, based on capacity and expertise removed at the time the federation began to break up.

Croatia, once part of Yugoslavia and before that part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is a crescent-shaped Balkan state in Europe, bordered on the north-west by Slovenia; on the west by the (Yugoslav) Serbian district of Vojvodina; on the north-east by Hungary; and on the west and north-east by Bosnia and Herzegovina. To the south-west it faces the Adriatic Sea.

Croatia, which had never in the modern context been an independent state, was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I. The end of that conflict, and the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, caused the Croatian National Sabor (parliament) to vote on October 28, 1918, for Croatia and Slavonia, with Rijeka and Dalmatia, to secede from Austria-Hungary. At the same time, a general convention in Ljubljana announced Slovenia's secession from Austria and its unification with Croatia and Serbia. The state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was formed, and a parliament created for the new multi-state entity: the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, based in Zagreb.

On November 24, 1918, a special mission was appointed by the National Council to negotiate with the Government of Serbia. The negotiations resulted in the creation of the united Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 20, 1918, under the national leadership of what had, until that time, been the Serbian crown. When they joined the new Yugoslav Kingdom in 1918, Croatia and Slavonia with Srem had a territory of 42,533 sq.km. Medjumurje, totalling 775 sq.km. in area, was also under the jurisdiction of the Government of Croatia and Slavonia. [Modern Croatia, the boundaries of which were formed later by the Croatian leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz "Tito," now has a territorial area of 56,538 sq.km., the additional land having been taken away from Serbia and what had been Dalmatia.] Dalmatia was an independent state at the time of its accession to the Yugoslav state, and had been self-governing since ancient times. Dalmatia's earlier roots had been with the Venetian Republic, unlike Croatia's roots in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, commonly known as Yugoslavia, the land of the Southern Slavs, changed its name officially on October 3, 1929, to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Croatia, coming under the Austro-Hungarian Empire for many centuries, was European in orientation. Its language -- Serbo-Croat -- is almost identical to the language spoken by Serbs, but it is written in Latin characters, whereas Serbian is written in cyrillic characters. As well, because of its history, Croatia has traditionally been a Roman Catholic Christian area, whereas Serbs have traditionally been Serbian Orthodox Christians.

Yugoslavia was originally divided into 32 administrative districts and then, in 1929, into banovine (regional units ruled by a ban). This new set of internal districts was not based on nationalism (ie: ethnicity), but on economic, geographic and other criteria.

Croatia, despite the fact that it had voted to join into the new Yugoslavia, remained passionately nationalistic throughout the years between 1918 and the start of World War II in 1939. That war was to prove the watershed for Yugoslavia, which stood in the path of Germany's access to the Eastern Mediterranean, an area vital to German reach toward the Middle Eastern oil reserves, and, among other things, the East-West trade links through the Suez Canal. the Armed Forces of Adolf Hitler's nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia without declaring war on April 6, 1941.

The surprise attack left Yugoslavia at Hitler's mercy, and an "Independent State of Croatia" (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska: NDH) was declared on April 14, 1941, the same day the German 14th Tank Division entered the Croatian capital, Zagreb. The NDH and the Croatian people as a

whole overwhelmingly embraced the new German overlords of the "independent" state under the fascist head-of-state, Poglavnik (leader) Ante pavelic, head of the Ustaše movement.

The new NDH Government worked actively with the Germans to implement "ethnic cleansing" programs, but broadened the scope of the campaign to include the eradication of all Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. The NDH Government, through Dr Milovan Zanic, said at the time: "This will be a country of Croats and none other, and we as Ustaše will use every possible method to make this country truly Croat and purge it of the Serbs. We are not hiding this, it will be the policy of this state and when it is carried out, we will be carrying out what is written down in the Ustaše principles." The accession of the new NDH Government brought about an immediate campaign of genocide, principally against the Serbs, but also against Jews and Gypsies.

The NDH Government lasted only as long as Germany's nazi Third Reich survived, and collapsed in 1945. By that time, however, the NDH and its Ustaše Government had killed at least one-million Serbs, most of them by methods so brutal that German officers attached to Ustaše units complained to Berlin about the barbarity of their hosts.

The NDH Government established the largest concentration camp in the Third Reich at Jasenovac in August 1941. The Jasenovac Concentration and Labour Camp covered 210 sq.km. in the area around the confluence of the Una and Sava rivers, and comprised a series of specialist camps, including at least one for infants. Jasenovac itself saw the deaths of some 600,000 people in 1,334 days and nights of killing. Some 20,000 children under the age of 14 were killed in the Jasenovac sub-camp at Donja Gradina. Roman Catholic Croatian priests worked actively to support the Ustaše, and one was commandant of Jasenovac for four months (during which time he personally killed at least 100 people and sent some 30,000 more to their deaths). [See also, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, December 31, 1992.]

The end of World War II saw the collapse of the Nazi puppet NDH state. Most of its leaders, and the Ustaše who were involved in the mass killings, fled the country. Ante Pavelic himself fled into Austria, where he was protected in Roman Catholic churches. From there, he fled to Rome with the help of false papers provided by the Roman Catholic church, and he his there in the Croatian Roman Catholic sanctuary of the Vatican, known as the San Geronimo Brotherhood. When it was known that the United States security forces were attempting to capture him, Pavellic was smuggled out by the brotherhood to Argentina, where he became a security adviser to Argentine President Juan Peron. Pavelic died peacefully in Argentina some years later. The Peronist Government subsequently gave 35,000 Ustaše visas to enter Argentina.

The comprehensive escape route and support apparatus for Ustaše war criminals became known as the "ratlines." Many of its membership were to return for the independence celebrations of the new state of Croatia when it once again became independent -- again with the help of Germany -- in 1991.

The collapse of Germany and the NDH saw the revival of a unified Yugoslavia, under the leadership of the communist partisan leader Josip Broz, known as Marshal Tito. Tito's partisans were under the control of his Communist Part of Yugoslavia, an organisation which had been initially established by the Soviet Comintern (Communist International). Leadership of the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia during that period was substantially Croat and Slovene. But the partisans had also received considerable Allied assistance during World War II, to bolster the fight against the occupying German forces. The Allies had, in fact, favored Tito, despite his communism, over the royalist Col. Drazu Mihajlovic and his cetnik forces, which would have favored the restoration of the exiled monarchical Government after the ouster of the nazis.

The victorious Allies recognized the new Government under the Croatian communist Tito, who, on November 28, 1945, named the "second Yugoslavia" as the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia at a session of the Constituent Assembly. The Federal People's Assembly, on April 7, 1963, re-named it The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Tito, who was to all intents the sovereign leader of Yugoslavia until h is death, decreed that no discussion was to take place of the Croatian genocidal war against Serbia, and in the years that followed none of the anti-communist Croats in exile were seriously harried by Tito's security forces. Serbian anti-communist exiles were, however, constantly harried, even in remote countries such as Australia or the United States. As a result, an effective and wealthy expatriate Croatian community grew up outside the country.

During this period Croatia and Slovenia maintained their own national communist parties, while there was no communist party in Serbia. As a result, with the backing of the Comintern, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin, the new, post-World War II communist leadership of Yugoslavia was heavily structured in favor of the Croats and Slovenes, and against the Serbs. The Communist Party was the sole legal party of Yugoslavia from 1945 until the multi-party elections in the national republics in 1990.

During World War II, even before the occupying Germans were removed, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, under Tito, determined the new internal boundaries of the post-war federation. These federal units, or republics, reflected the decisive input of Tito and the Slovenian, Edvard Kardelj. As a result, post-war Yugoslavia showed internal federal, or republican, boundaries within what became known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which favored Croatia and Slovenia territorially. There was little historical justification, for example, in lumping Dalmatia into Croatia, other than to give that republic strong sea access.

Tito knew that these artificial boundaries would not be accepted as "national" units, despite the fact that they bore nominal designation as the Republics of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia, etc. There was no discussion of these boundaries in legal terms either before the creation of the SFRY or afterwards. Tito himself said that the frontiers between the internal Yugoslav republics were only "administrative." Despite this "assurance," it was this boundary structure which was to be used as the legal definition of what were to become, in 1991, the independent and sovereign states of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

Tito was particularly suspicious of the Serbs who, although they were the most committed to the concept of a federal Yugoslav entity, were also regarded as the fount of the monarchy and "intrinsically monarchist," as opposed to communist. The result was that Croats and Slovenes were moved into the position of greatest power within Yugoslavia, despite the fact that some 70 percent of the officers in the Yugoslav Armed Forces were Serbs.

Tito died in May 1980, and was succeeded by a Collective Presidency which, despite the nationalist aspirations which began to re-surface, managed to hold Yugoslavia together until the 1990 multi-party elections. The new Government in Slovenia unilaterally declared its sovereignty, and then its independence from Yugoslavia, in 1991. Slovenia's independence and sovereignty were immediately, and unilaterally, recognized by Germany, forcing other European Community states, and then the United States, into recognizing the new status.

Meanwhile, in Croatia, the HDZ had won control of the Sabor on May 30, 1990, and had elected Dr Franjo Tudjman as President of the Republic. The Republic of Croatia was, at this time, still part of the broader Yugoslav Federation.

The German recognition of Slovenia pre-empted any opportunity for a peaceful break-up of the SFRY. Croatia followed Slovenia's lead, with Germany's support, declaring its independence and sovereignty. First, the sovereignty of Croatia was declared by the ruling HDZ in the Sabor on December 22, 1990. A new Croatian constitution was introduced by President Tudjman defining the state as the national state of the Croatian people "and others," immediately and pointedly relegating the Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians and others to second-class status.

By early 1991, Croatia was preparing for full unilateral separation from Yugoslavia. A rally at the Zagreb football stadium on May 28, 1991, saw the parading of a large, well-equipped Croatian Army unit, which was inspected by Pres. Tudjman and other senior ministers. This was the National Guard Corps, which formed the basis of the new Croatian Armed Forces, along with the Ministry of Interior Affairs units, and "volunteer units." The first Minister of Interior Affairs in the HDZ Government, Martin Spegelj, was a senior general in the Yugoslav Armed Forces (JNA) at the time of the creation of the new Croatia. He said, on January 20, 1991, while the JNA was still officially the common army of Yugoslavia: "We are in the war with [ie: against] the Army (JNA). Should anything happen, kill them all in the streets, in their homes, through hand grenades, fire pistols in their bellies, women, children . . . We will deal with [the Croatian Serbian area of] Knin by butchering . . ." The new Croatian offensive of January 1993 was aimed directly at Knin, the capital of the historically Serb region of Krijena.

The rallies announcing Croatia's new freedom were marked by the official showing of the new State's symbols, which included the same red-and-white chequerboard shield which the Ustasha used before and during World War II. President Tudjman had already made his position clear: he invited to the first Convention of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Zagreb more than a hundred Ustaše who had been declared war criminals as a result of World War II. They had come back to Croatia, often with their sons, from hiding in such countries as Australia, Argentina and elsewhere. At that convention, Tudjman defended the 1941-45 Independent State of Croatia as being not merely a "quisling creation," but also "an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people for an independent state of their own and recognition of international factors -- the Government of Hitler's Germany in this case."

Revival of Croatian genocide against the Serbian residents of the state began before mid-year, 1991. Many Croatian Serbs packed, and began fleeing to Serbia where, by early 1993, there were

some 800,000 refugees from the violence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many left the Balkans altogether. By late 1991, Croatia began an organised elimination of Serbs in the districts of Grubisno Polje, Moslavina and Slavonska Pozegra. Many Serb residents fled first to Bosnia, and then were forced by additional fighting to flee to Serbia. The campaign by the Croatian Armed Forces spread throughout the republic wherever there were Serb villages or communities.

The violence against Serbs -- the "ethnic cleansing" of Croatia -- revived on a scale and method which reminded the victims of the genocidal actions during the 1941-45 days of the Independent State of Croatia. Some 450 Serbian Orthodox churches had been destroyed by Croats in that conflict. Between the beginning of 1991 and early 1993, Croats and Bosnian Muslims had destroyed a further 300 Serbian Orthodox churches.

The JNA was still officially engaged as the rear guard of the old Yugoslavia in 1991, and attempted vainly to withdraw without conflict into the new boundaries which were being created de facto for Yugoslavia: the boundaries of the states of Serbia and Montenegro. But there were aras where the JNA tried to stop the renewed genocide against the Serbian and other minority communities. Serbian groups within Croatia rallied and formed units such as the Serbian Volunteer Guards, and fought alongside the JNA in Laslovo and other areas, and in the attempt to free the city of Vukovar from Croatian control before all the Serbian residents were killed.

The Croatian Ustaše regarded Vukovar as one of the most important targets in the (1941-45) Independent State of Croatia. In one drive alone, during World War II, the Ustaše killed some 10,000 Serbian residents of Vukovar and surrounding areas. The Ustaše again took control of Vukovar and neighboring borovo between June 1 and November 23, 1991. At the Borovo footware factory at the exit from Vukovar, the Croats established a new concentration camp, rounding up and interning local Serbian civilians. At this site the Croats interned some 5,000 Serbs, and there and at the Rowing Club of Vukovar, the almost ritualistic killing of Serbs began again. The basement of the Borovo-komerc concentration camp also housed the headquarters of Marko Filkovic, commanding officer of the ZNG, the official Croatian National Guard Corps. More than 1,000 Serbs died in these two facilities, and on the streets and in their homes, before the JNA fought its way into Vukovar on November 23, 1991.

It was during the Vukovar conflict that the Croatian authorities began successfully experimenting with image-manipulating propaganda, forcing captured and inured Serbs to state in the Vukovar hospital, in front of video cameras, that they were being well-treated. Videotape was released to the international media and broadcast extensively worldwide. The statement did not save the prisoners, who were subsequently killed.

Germany was by this time fully supporting Croatia, and providing it with arms and other military supplies (as it h ad done before the official break with Yugoslavia). Germany's support contravened German and international laws, but fell in line with a German strategic outreaching of a type not seen since the end of World War II.

Pres. Tudjman claimed during 1991 and 1992 that Croatia was part of the European democratic and free market system, but some 90 percent of the economy by early 1993 was still in state hands, and the democratic freedoms typical in the rest of Europe were increasingly not in

evidence in Croatia at that time. Freedom of speech was being curtailed throughout the country. The media was purged of Serbs, and editors — particularly in Dalmatia, which was never historically part of Croatia — were forced to toe a strict HDZ party line.

The HDZ, by late 1992, was attempting to assume the mantle of a Christian Democratic party, of the type prominent in Western Europe, despite the fact that its leadership was comprised largely of former senior communists of the Titoist and post-Tito SFRY years.

Croatia had, by late 1992, deployed some 40,000 of its forces, in 10 to 12 brigades, and backed by at least 60 main battle tanks and 80 heavy artillery pieces, into Bosnia and Herzegovina to aid Croats of that state to combat Serbs and Muslims, and sometimes to work with Muslims against Serbs. By early January 1993, the deployment had escalated to 65,000 troops. As well, Pres. Tudjman in 1991 ordered all the buildings and remaining structures at the World War II concentration camp of Jasenovac to be razed — with many of the artifacts and records inside — to make way for a "rare bird sanctuary". The move destroyed one of the reminders of Ustaše genocide of World War II, while the World War II Ustaše flag has been raised again.

Despite Tudjman's attempts to align with the European Christian Democratic movement, Croatia has been edging closer toward a one-party state structure. Tudjman does not stand on the extreme right of Croatian politics, despite his clear support for Ustaše genocidal and national-socialist policies. His move to have the HDZ totally dominate Croatian politics is a move to eliminate the ultra-Ustaše elements who feel that the President is not sufficiently rabid in his prosecution of Croatian geographic expansion and ethnic purity. He is, nonetheless, moving rapidly toward consolidating Croatia's current geographic gains.

Croatia: Defense BasicsMinister of National Defence: Gojko Susak. Total armed forces: 170,000.Paramilitary forces: Extensive, but numbers not known.Numerous paramilitary factions not entirely under Government control, some answering to opposition political factions (but which support "Croatia for Croatians" policies).Available manpower: 1.888-million men between 15 and 49 years of age, with 43,000 reaching military age each year. National Guard Corps Battle Order Manpower: 167,000.Organization: 77 brigades

Equipment:

Armor: 270 main battle tanks of T-54/55, T-32 and M-84 types. Additional 130 T-72 MBTs being delivered.

Armored vehicles: 380 armoured personnel carriers of various types. 200 additional armoured vehicles being delivered.

Artillery: 820 heavy artillery pieces, comprising Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL); M-63 Plamen; M-77 Obanj; 105mm, 122mm, 152mm, 155mm and 203mm towed howitzers; 122mm SP howitzers; 67mm and 130mm guns.

AT Rockets: 2,500+ Armbrust, RPG-7, Mamba launchers.

ATGW: Euromissile Milan (reported).

SSMs: Unknown quantities of R-300 Scud SSM. Assorted other missiles.

SAM: 100+ Short Blowpipe and numerous GD Stinger (manportable). Some ex-Soviet heavy SAM systems believed acquired.

AAA: 600 assorted anti-aircraft artillery systems.

Mortars: M-82, 60mm, 82mm and 120mm.

Small arms: Principal infantry weapon is AK-47. Locally-produced Sokac submachinegun introduced April 1992.

Foreign deployment: 65,000 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NB: Negotiations currently (end-January 1993) underway for the acquisition of 300 further T-72 MBTs, additional Armbrust AT rocket launchers, additional GD Stinger man-portable SAMs, and SA-7 Grail man-portable SAMs. Naval Battle Order Manpower: 1,000.

Organisation:

4 patrol boats.

2 rocket boats.

1 torpedo boat.

6 assault boats.

24 small craft.

Coastal artillery: Several coastal batteries with 85mm, 88mm and 90mm guns. 16 coastal

artillery batteries with 130mm guns.Major naval bases: Split, Rijeka, Dubrovnik.

Air Force Battle Order Manpower: 2,000.

Organisation:

2 air combat/ground support squadrons with 25 MiG-21s.

1 ground attack squadron of Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot.

At least one multi-purpose squadron with at least 40 propeller-driven aircraft of various types, possibly including two Saab 105s.

Helicopters: 24 helicopters of various types; mostly armed. 12 Mi-2, 6 Mi-8, 2 Puma and four Gazelle helicopters ordered, probably delivered.

Trainers: Some propeller aircraft (above) may be used for training. Four L-59 jet training/light attack aircraft ordered and possibly delivered.Major Air Bases: Zagreb, Krk, Pula.

NB: Negotiations currently (end-January 1993) underway for unspecified numbers of MiG-29 air combat aircraft, MiG-21 air combat aircraft, Il-76 transport aircraft, An-2 transport aircraft, Mi-8 helicopters, various aircraft bombs and air-to-air missiles, air defense radar systems, surveillance radar systems.

January 31, 1993

The New “Euro-Bantustans”Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. European governments and successive US administrations fought vigorously against the attempts in the 1970s and early '80s by South Africa to divide itself into nationally-based "homelands": bantustans (after "bantu," meaning "people"). This was based on the understanding that modern statehood automatically meant the acceptance of citizens of diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Indeed, Europe carried this modern concept of statehood (as opposed to nationhood) further, with the creation of the extremely diverse new superstate, the European Community. It was surprising, then, when, without further thought, the European Community bowed to Germany's first major post-World War II initiative to recognise the individual sovereignty of the member units of the federation of Yugoslavia. Germany argued successfully for the recognition of individual states for the Slovene and Croat ethnic groups, and to give a state (more-or-less) to Muslim Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This process was a complete reversal of the European Community's own approach to statehood, and also to its views on what should occur in South Africa.

Clearly, the views represented a double standard: what was not acceptable for South Africa was acceptable for the former Yugoslavia. The only problem was that the "national" boundaries devised for "Croatia," "Slovenia" and "Bosnia and Herzegovina" were totally artificial, having been drawn up by former Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito (a Croat) for his own internal management purposes. These were not borders which were meant to be workable representations of population groups, economic units, or anything else. Indeed, they were specifically designed so that they could not be used as sovereign boundaries; that would have encouraged the break-up of Yugoslavia. What has become increasingly apparent is that none of the borders of the now-separate former Yugoslav states is an adequate reflection of popularly-supported boundaries. The only people who accept without reservation the new borders of the former Yugoslav stats are officials in Germany, the EC itself, the US and -- because the major powers have told them to do so -- the UN. the Serbs, Croats, Muslims and (although to a lesser extent) Slovenes, all recognize the impracticality of what are now recognized as the national borders of these Balkan states. The fact that they are so unworkable as to be the basis for war has already been demonstrated.

Why is the "international community" attempting to force upon the former Yugoslavia borders which have been proven to be patently unworkable and which are known to be unacceptable to all the parties to the partition of that former federation? Are borders there merely for the convenience of the "international community" or should they reflect the declared interests of the residents and citizens of those states? And, while we're at it, perhaps we should attempt a little greater consistency in applying standards for other countries to follow.

This publication was approached in January by members of the intelligence service of a NATO state asking for further information on certain aspects of the Balkan crisis. The information was not sensitive. Indeed, it was commonplace, deriving from a number of books on recent history in the area. We referred the callers to their own research library, to be told: "We no longer have a normal research library. We couldn't get the budget to maintain it. So, if it isn't available electronically -- from a research database -- we can't check on it." All of the major electronic information databases, commercial and government, dwell primarily on current events, and its difficult enough for them to keep up with the news. Few have the capacity for extensive historic archives. Even the ubiquitous Nexis, owned by Mead Data Central in the US, has had to abandon storage of Encyclopedia Britannica and Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook, to make way for current news. So, unless historical background has been published within a current article, analysts in many government intelligence organizations do not have ready access to the essential background to today's crises.

Never before has history been so important to an understanding of the world's troubles, whether they be in the Balkans, the former Soviet Empire (and before that the Russian Empire), or in Ethiopia. And yet today we see intelligence services moving more and more toward becoming handlers of current data -- able to report solely on current events and current statements -- and losing all ability to understand the history and geography of events. Which is why history must repeat itself so often.

March 31, 1993

Conflict Resolution in the Balkans: The Issue of Leaders and Symbols

By Gregory Copley, Editor-in-Chief

Three major leaders, pushed and pulled by a number of leaders of smaller groups, dominate the Balkan conflict. And the question of leadership and nationalism, right and wrong, is being swayed by the most powerful psychological warfare of the past 50 years, the Soviet campaigns notwithstanding. How can the questions of leadership, symbols and psychological warfare be fused into the quest for peace, instead of the pursuit of vengeance? Editor-in-Chief Gregory

Copley looks at the options.

Conflict resolution as a principal, short-term goal of the major powers is now more important than at any time since, perhaps, the late 19th Century. Internal and regional conflicts pose the greatest threat to global political and economic stability, and there is no prospect of a general methodology or framework being developed for peaceful resolution of the most important of the crises within the near future. The domestic chaos of Russia and many of the other Commonwealth of Independent States' member nations, the civil war in Georgia, the growing anomy in Iran and Ethiopia, the Liberian-Sierra Leone war, the internal and regional communal conflicts arising in South Asia, the collapse of all law and order in Somalia, the ongoing delicacy of Cambodia's return to peace, and -- dominating the headlines and policy discussions -- the war in the former Yugoslavia: all these are currently outside the scope of resolution through current systems and forces.

Is the answer that these conflicts must be allowed to reach full maturity, burn themselves out of their own accord, and to the victor the spoils? Or is it feasible for the United Nations to develop the capability to provide a framework for conflict resolution across such a broad scale of conflict types?

At present, the UN lacks the finances, the organization, the mandate and the methodology to provide the enormous array of forces, skills and other resources necessary to address the conflicts currently facing the world, let alone those expected to arise in the coming decade. More than that, the UN and its principal members lack the intelligence collection and analysis resources required. The member states gather intelligence for their own national or alliance purposes; the UN has no real, independent intelligence capacity and is therefore subject to various national interests and media pressure to determine policy. As a result, any UN peace initiatives are usually based on flawed or biased policy analysis input, or must content themselves with attempting to marginally modify the status quo.

The original concepts of the UN as a body to guarantee fundamental rights of member states and their peoples has disappeared in the mists of expediency. The variety, intensity and speed with which new conflicts are arising means that policymakers can no longer base their attitudes on informed intelligence (in many instances) or an inherent understanding of the causes of the situations. Policymakers are, in most instances, forced to a reactive approach to each problem at

a time when most leaders must contend with unstable and unfavourable domestic and international economic situations.

And it is this global economic malaise which exacerbates the individual conflicts themselves and the transition of the troubled states (as well as the major powers themselves) from the older, bipolar global structure.

Clearly, no single methodology for conflict resolution can be applied to the wide variety of problems now destabilizing the world. What is equally clear is that three principal factors must be considered in each situation:

* Specialised intelligence: rapid response intelligence collection (passive and active; open source and clandestine HUMINT, as well as technical means) must be developed for each specific situation;

* Leaders: Existing and potential leaders and leadership organizations must be studied for each situation and potential situations. The long-term, as well as the short-term aspects of leaders and leadership structures must be considered in light of the underlying long-term cultural and historic norms of the area or state in question. And all this must be considered in the light of history;

* History: Full attention must be given to the historical antecedents of each conflict, and this must take priority over reaction to superficial current intelligence or news reporting. It can be argued that basing national policy, or UN policy, merely on initial current intelligence reporting or news media coverage is guaranteed to lead to the wrong long-term policy being developed by external states, with the result that no meaningful or acceptable solutions can be proposed or imposed by outside pressure or forces. This is the most dramatic lesson of the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

The current Balkan crisis shows that current intelligence collection and current news media coverage can so easily be distorted by skillful and deliberate psychological strategy and operations. That crisis also shows that very few intelligence organizations around the world had the inherent historical knowledge of the area and, as a result, seriously misjudged the true nature of the conflict or how to advise policymakers on methods of settlement. Very few intelligence organizations had either the resources, the time or the inclination to study the historical underpinnings of the current crisis.

How did it happen that the Western industrial powers allowed themselves to get into this position of total unpreparedness for the growing global disorder?

The Western Alliance states -- the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- devoted a half-century to opposing and confronting the Warsaw Pact states: the Soviet Empire. The political threat of an all-out nuclear exchange meant that all forms of confrontation short of war were acceptable aims in the confrontation. The Soviet leadership, highly conscious of the frailties of its Empire's infrastructure and concerned over the legal status, or legitimacy, of the administration following the communist usurpation and regicide of the Tsarist monarchy, devoted considerable attention to political and psychopolitical warfare in an attempt to have the

Soviet Empire perceived abroad and at home as monolithic, unified and the exemplification of the "inevitability of universal communism".

It was only natural that the confrontating NATO states strived to demolish the myth of inevitable, legitimate and monolithic communism. A principal aim of NATO states was the fragmentation of the USSR and all other communist states, including the Yugoslav Federation. Yugoslavia, and Russia before the USSR, begun as monarchies but later became communist dictatorships. The new communist leader sought to project images of solidarity and military power to the outside world. Through this the USSR and Yugoslavia attracted hostility; this in turn showed that they were being taken seriously. This reflected back into the (then) communist Soviet and Yugoslav federations as "legitimacy". "If the world believes that we are the leaders [of the USSR or Yugoslavia], then we must, de facto, be legitimate."

The West was taken by surprise by the collapse of communism and the USSR. The ultimate competition from the West -- largely the United States and United Kingdom -- was an economic-military-technology mix, based around the race to control ballistic missiles from space: the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) versus the Soviet energy weapons programmes.

The collapse of the Soviet system was also exacerbated by demographic changes, in which the ethnic Russians began to be outnumbered by Turkic and other races of the Soviet Empire. And modern communications beamed in messages of change around the world, fuelling and unrest. The bitter losses of the Afghan War further fuelled the exhaustion of the Soviet system.

The collapse of the USSR and communism as a pervasive and "modern" ideology nonetheless took the Western Alliance by surprise. Toward the end, its impending collapse had gone unnoticed, so intent was the West on pursuing its own agenda. The final collapse came with no preparaton on the Western side. The result was that the NATO states were as shaken and disrupted by the collapse as was the USSR.

Yugoslavia's own and quite separate collapse had more to do with the death of its former leader, Marshal Tito, and some of the European Community's subsequent push for a break-up of the Federation along more-or-less communal lines. It was the "more-or-less" communal lines which were to lead to the current conflict. Again, if the EC leaders had allowed themselves the luxury -- and it is a luxury, given current pressures -- of studying history and demographic patterns, then these accepted communal borders would have been seen to have been unrepresentative: merely the administratiive marks drawn on the map by a single man; Tito. But these borders were acceptable to the main group seeking independence -- Croatia -- because they gave Croatia far greater land and resources than history or demographics would have allowed.

And Croatia's historic ties to Austria-Hungary and Germany meant that Croatia had considerable support within Europe for these borders to be legitimised. That much is history (and has been dealt with in the past four editions of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy). The problem today is how to deal with the conflict which currently exists, and find ways of cooling it down.

What seems certain is that all parties to the conflict, possibly except Croatia and Slovenia, will come away from any settlement disappointed with the outcome, and even Croatia will complain

at whatever settlement is reached. Justice may well be denied to virtually all the parties to the disputes (and there are many parties, as well as many separate disputes within the "Balkan crisis"). Such residual rancor must ultimately be addressed, or be seen as the cause of future conflicts. But "future conflicts" can only be seen in the light of the prospect that "current conflicts" will be resolved.

How can these current conflicts be resolved in the Balkans, while attempting to lay the best possible groundwork for a meaningful and peaceful resolution of the underlying problems facing all parties to the wars?

"Justice", as it is perceived by the different parties, can only be achieved one step at a time, in the same way that trust between the divided factions can only be restored gradually. This is no excuse to ignore fundamental flaws in any proposed agreement, merely on the basis that all wrongs cannot be resolved in the first instance. But it is clear that the process must start somewhere.

It is equally clear that the very separate conflicts in the Balkans should not be all wrapped into the perception that they are a single problem. At present, the international community is attempting to punish Serbia -- the dominate sub-state within the new Yugoslavia -- for what it perceives are the "crimes" of the Serbian community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Setting aside the question of whether or not these media-promoted perceptions of "Serbian agression" are correct, we can see that the Serbian Government in Yugoslavia is being confused with the very separate Government of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is, in no small measure, like blaming Britain for the mistakes of Australia, just because the two share a common ethnic, linguistic and communal history to a large degree.

There is real irony -- and proof of the value of controlling the psychological warfare high ground -- in the fact that the new state of Croatia is not being attacked for the excesses of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that the Croatia State has, in effect, militarily seized and now controls totally a significant portion of the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But that is the nature of current conflict: misunderstanding is perpetuated accidentally and deliberately. Conflict resolution will not begin until the external policymakers are able to separate the issues so that they can be understood and dealt with separately.

That is a basic position. But what is more deeply entrenched is the fact that the leaders of the three main states of the former Yugoslavia -- Croatia, (Muslim) Bosnia and Herzegovina (as opposed to that part of the state not effectively controlled by the Muslims), and Serbia -- are not merely seen as leaders but as representatives of certain entrenched factional viewpoints. The various perceptions held of the three leaders by all participating and observing groups, particularly the international media, means that it is almost impossible for any of these leaders to be the first to make overtures toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The leaders, in other words, are also prisoners of the situation, regardless of their wishes.

The current international perspective, or at least the one given most currency in the Western media, is that an external force -- the United Nations, the European Community, the Western European Union, NATO, etc. -- should enforce a solution. The difficulty of this just with regard

to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has become evident: the UN-EC (Vance-Owen) plan makes none of the participants happy, and may founder because the logjam cannot be broken. The earlier Carrington (EC) peace proposals were far closer to a plan which the combatants could accept.

Jingoistic calls for direct foreign military intervention are being evaluated more rationally by defense planners in NATO (and other states) who can see that at least a half-million foreign troops would be needed to maintain any enforced peace, and massive military casualties would result for that foreign force.

It is possible to see the sharp escalation of tensions just by the legally questionable injection of German military personnel in military relief operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina during March 1993 and into April. German Luftwaffe crews aboard NATO-Boeing E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft will be one thing; German airdrops of relief supplies expressly to the Muslims and Bosnian Croats is quite another. Bosnian Serbs are well aware that Germany has been the prime supplier of weapons, ammunition and other military support to the Croats, and a significant supplier to the Muslims, and there will be a general belief that Germany would use these airdrops to provide additional military, rather than humanitarian, aid.

And if Germany can fly "relief" missions to the Balkans, despite the questionable legality of deploying its forces abroad in a conflict zone, then what is to stop other UN member states, such as Turkey or Iran, demanding that they be able to fly such "relief missions". Iran and Turkey are among those states which have already been flying combat personnel and defence supplies into Croatia and to Bosnian Muslims in defiance of the UN embargo.

Even short of full military intervention, the creeping military intervention of Germany and others into the conflict is an attempt to impose an external perception of a resolution onto the conflict. This, however, is clearly escalating, rather than resolving the conflict. Some external leaders and individuals in fact seem anxious for the conflict to escalate, rather than be resolved. The former German Defence Minister, Manfred Worner, now Secretary-General of NATO, is one of these. He has lobbied in Europe and (in March) in Washington DC for armed intervention, despite the clear and vocal opposition of all NATO military commanders to such a concept. There is a growing belief in many circles that Worner has taken this line to force a split in NATO: leaving the US and UK one one side, and a German-dominated European group on the other.

But if this form of externally imposed solution is proving unworkable, that still leaves the question at to what will help start the process of conflict resolution. Part of the requirement, as noted above, is for all participants and analysts to begin separating out the various conflicts, differences and requirements, so that they can be handled in a more-or-less orderly fashion. This will mean that, for example, the Bosnian Serbs, who have their own democratically-elected and independent Parliament, cannot expect the Republic of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be seen to be answerable for the Bosnian Serbs' actions. Indeed, the governments of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (made up to the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) also have a duty to stand clear of the Bosnian Serbs, regardless of how sympathetic they feel toward their Bosnian counterparts.

A clearly-perceived separation of the Bosnian Serbs and the Yugoslav Serbs will do one other thing: it will highlight the fact that there is no separation between the Croatian Government and the Croat areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will then become apparent that one of the issues is the development of a "Greater Croatia", which is already underway, rather than the creation of the oft-claimed "Greater Serbia" which is a diversionary canard by anti-Serb propagandists.

Separating the identifying the issues, studying the history, and achieving better human intelligence (HUMINT) on the ground, is the first step. The second step entails a study of the ways to enable the established leadership clusters to move toward an acceptable resolution. None of the leadership groups trust the leadership groups of the neighboring states. As a result, the reconstruction of trust between these states is severely hampered. What, then, can be done to break the logjam?

Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the Bosnian Muslims, has very little maneuvring room; any compromise o his hard-line position will cost him his legitimacy, both with his own hardline factions and with his supporters in Iran and Turkey. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has similar problems: as right-wing as his administration seems, there are Usiaše groups even further to the right ready to apply pressure if he deviates from his vitriolic, nationalistic stance. There is even the question as to whether he can control his own military forces.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is also a hostage to his electorate and cannot be seen to be abandoning the interests of Serbia and those ethnic Serbs outside his own Republic. But the Republic of Serbia is part of a larger sovereign entity: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The creation of the "new Yugoslavia", after the collapse of the old, larger federation, meant that the Yugoslav Federal leadership appeared to be dominated or bypassed by the Serbian Government, which maintains its own Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry. The Yugoslav Armed Forces, however, answer to the Federal Yugoslav Government, under President Dobrica Cosic and his new Administration under Prime Minister R. Kontic.

President Cosic and Prime Minister Kontic have a low profile in the international media. Certainly, they have not attracted the opprobrium which hostile propaganda has visited on Serbian President Milosevic. The total preoccupation of the new Yugoslavia with its regrouping following the secession of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia has meant that little effort has been devoted to bringing Yugoslavia back onto the world stage.

The United States of America, for example, has not transferred its recognition of the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia automatically to the new Federal Republic, although the UK, for example, has. So, with all the preoccupation of dealing with a war, restructuring the federation, international trade sanctions, and anywhere from 600,000 to one-million refugees in its midst, the new Federal Yugoslav Administration has not been able to make its presence felt in international affairs. This, in some ways, may have preserved it as the one vehicle able to break the deadlock in regional negotiations.

Senior political figures in Washington DC, London and in some European capitals have told Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy that they would welcome the emergence of strong, clean and acceptable signs of Yugoslavia's legitimacy. The only such "symbol" which has the

capacity to restore the historical continuity of Yugoslavia is the Karadjordjevic dynasty which has traditionally led Serbia, and then Yugoslavia. There are probably only two Karadjordjevic princes capable of focusing national attention and legitimacy: Crown Prince Alexander, son of the last Yugoslav monarch, King Peter II, and his uncle, Prince Tomislav, son of King Alexander of Serbia and (later) Yugoslavia. King Alexander was assassinated by Croatian terrorists in France in 1934.

Senior US official are extremely uncomfortable with Alexander as, indeed, are many Yugoslavs, who view his lack of Serbo-Croat language fluency as being among his detractions for a key role in Yugoslavia's reconstruction at this particular time. But it is significant that senior US officials, including some at the State. Department, are comfortable with Tomislav, who is seen as political, untainted by scandal or political affiliations, and completely dedicated to humanitarian work in the Balkans. He is also fluent in Serbo-Croat and with his wife, Princess Linda (who is of US and English extraction and also a Serbo-Croat speaker), spends most of his time on refugee and other humanitarian work on behalf of all the nationalities with-in the new and old Yugoslavia.

One of US Congressional leader suggested that Prince Tomislav could become officially recognized for what he already is, a symbol of Yugoslavia's historical ability to live in multi-cultural harmony. This does not necessarily imply, at this stage, fully resurrecting the Crown. There would be no constitutional necessity for such a post to obviate the post of President and/or Prime Minister of Yugoslavia: the executive arms of government. They would remain. As a constitutional regent or as a special envoy, Prince Tomislav could help refocus the members of the new Yugoslavia, as well as those in the former Yugoslav republics, on communal harmony.

Initially, it was suggested, Prince Tomislav could act in a broader role as a peace emissary, perhaps helping to weld the humanitarian efforts of all parties -- including the United Nations -- into a more workable operation. This would begin the process of rebuilding trust between the communities of the region.

Re-establishment of trust (and therefore harmony) between communal groups in the Balkans means an end to the conflict. Lines on maps have, in the Balkans, historically been the lines leading toward animosity and conflict. One of the only symbols of communal harmony in the area of the old Yugoslavia today is Prince Tomislav.

It is clear that all of the efforts by the European Community, the United Nations and the United States have been marked to various degrees by ignorance, impatience, vested interest and lack of any means by which to bring the warring factions together. These outside bodies, many of which contributed to the start of the conflict in the first place, have not allowed the states themselves to come forward with their own peace envoys. Perhaps it is true that none of the combatants, until now, were in a position to do so.

Today, given the failure of outside efforts to end the conflict, the combatant states should be encouraged to come up with their own peace envoys who, separate from the national and military leaders, can bring down the level or intensity of the communal hatreds. Prince Tomislav is one candidate for the task.

Graphics: Cover Photo, German crews on NATO E-3A AWACS and Luftwaffe transport aircraft have joined operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Picture 1, German Luftwaffe crews aboard NATO Boeing E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft is one thing; German airdrops of relief supplies to the Muslims and Bosnian Croats is another. Bosnian Serbs are well aware that Germany has been a prime supplier of weapons to the Croats and Muslims; there will be a fear that Germany would use these airdrops to provide additional military, rather than humanitarian, aid; Picture 2, A political leadership: Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic of Yugoslavia and Princess Linda at their wedding at St. Lazar church in Birmingham, UK, in October 1982. Both now work on non-partisan humanitarian relief projects throughout the Balkans.

April-May 1993

The Balkan Debacle Could Have Been AvertedBy Professor Walter Roberts, author and former US diplomat. Appeared in April-May 1993

edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy.

International political and media thought today is that the current Yugoslav crisis was an unavoidable resurgence of centuries-old hatreds. But it was neither inevitable nor logical, says

Professor Walter Roberts, author and former US diplomat who served in Belgrade.

The impression conveyed by newspapers, magazine articles, television, and by popular pundits and commentators, high-ranking military and government officials, and even some old "Yugoslav hands" of the diplomatic corps is that the former Yugoslavia is an area where hundreds of years of deep hatred erupted again in bloodshed and murder with the demise of its post-World War II leader, Marshal Tito, whose communist government had held the country together and forcibly suppressed ethnic loathing. I challenge this facile picture. A great deal of rewriting of history is being done these days in order to prove whatever favorite political point is advanced.

The argument that the South Slav people have been murdering each other for generations is simply not true. That the Serbs opposed their Ottoman rulers -- the world "Chetnik" emanates from those days, not from World War II -- is, of course, a fact. It is also true that some of the wars like the two Balkan wars were bloody. The opposition of the Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, and, of course, the Serbs, to the Austro-Hungarian Empire is equally undeniable. There was, however, no internecine warfare of Slavs within Austria-Hungary. Indeed, Serbs Croats and Slovenes connived with each other against Austria-Hungary, and it was they who in 1918 formed a new country: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. That new country was not an artificial Allied creation, as some now say.

Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia were, before World War I, part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Only the Kingdom of Serbia, which had re-emerged from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century, had become an independent entity. Important Croat, Bosnian and Slovene personalities, together with Serbian leaders with similar ideas, were influenced by parallel 19th Century movements for cultural and national identity, and they

agitated for a form of union of South Slavs.

They succeeded in their aspirations when Austria-Hungary was defeated in World War I. Looking to the postwar future, it was far preferable for Croats, Bosnians and Slovenes to ally themselves with Serbs who, unlike themselves, had fought on the winning side and were thus allies of Britain, France and the United States, rather than to remain under foreign rule or obtain a separate but weak sovereignty over only a small piece of territory. Separate, their territories would indeed have been small. Without union, the victorious Serbs would have succeeded in enlarging the territory of pre-war Serbia to include sections of Croatia and Bosnia where hundreds of thousands of Serbs lived under Austrian-Hungarian tutelage.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as it was called before the name Yugoslavia was adopted in 1929, lasted from 1918 until 1941. It was not a happy marriage, yet it did not break up. While there were tensions and even assassinations (eg: the Croatian leader in Parliament was shot by a Serbian member; the King, a Serb, was assassinated by an agent of Croatian fascists), the populations lived peacefully together; they intermarried, moved and traveled freely about the country.

When Hitler's Germany attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Croats, for the most part, welcomed the nazi troops, while in Belgrade the Germans were received with icy stares. What transpired after Yugoslavia's quick defeat is pivotal to today's tragedy. The Germans and Italians created a fascist state of Croatia, which included the present Bosnia-Herzegovina. This state, during its short existence, massacred hundreds of thousands of Serbs, and thousands of Jews and Gypsies.

Croatian troops, including Muslim units, fought on the side of the Axis during World War II, and participated in military actions against both the Yugoslav resistance movements: the Mihailovic-led Serbs and the Tito-led partisans. To compound the situation, the two resistance movements fought each other. It is a fact that most of the two-million Yugoslav casualties during World War II were the result of internecine warfare. This internal conflict was, at the same time, a struggle to realign the distribution of power in a disintegrated pre-war political order.

Tito, who was of mixed Croat and Slovene background, emerged victorious. He created a communist state with new internal borders: a country largely free of ethnic problems. The only obvious antagonism was the legacy of World War II, putting Titoites against adherents of Mihailovic. Even this problem receded as the years passed.

People who today present themselves as Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, and Serbs, were only a few decades ago proud to call themselves Yugoslavs. Was this all due to the overpowering personality and shrewd policies of Tito? The answer, largely, is yes.

Not only did Tito not award Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia as the Serbs had wished, but he created a new Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby endearing himself to the many Muslim Slavs residing there. He also detached Macedonia from Serbia, creating a new Republic of Macedonia, a measure which Bulgarians and Albanians living in that republic wholeheartedly approved. He went even beyond these steps: creating within Serbia two autonomous provinces,

Kosovo and Vojvodina. This act was applauded by the Albanians and Hungarians resident in those respective areas. The Serbs were stunned, but, having lost the civil war, were in no position to resist.

Tito, after purging the holdover Mihailovic adherents, then moved to soothe the Serbs. The capital of Yugoslavia remained Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Important government jobs went to prominent Serbs or Montenegrins: Milovan Djilas, Alexander Rankovic, Koca Popovic, etc. And, very importantly, the Army and internal security services were largely Serb-dominated. As well, in one instance, the pre-World War I borders of Serbia were redrawn favorably, with a large part of Slavonia going to the Serbs.

The communist idea initially proved relatively strong as a force for maintaining the cohesiveness of the Tito Administration throughout Yugoslavia, but Tito cleverly used international factors to solidify the country. When, at the behest of Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Tito, the communist, adroitly evoked in the country an anti-Soviet mood which helped him solidify the Yugoslav concept. And when, after a few years, the anti-Soviet concept began to lose its luster, he promoted the idea of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Yugoslavia was suddenly placed in the center of this world, hosting non-aligned leaders from dozens of countries: Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana, the Shah of Iran. In turn, Tito went on state visits around the world: to London, Washington, Paris and Moscow.

Yugoslavia, under Tito, saw different nationalities moving to other parts of the country for various reasons -- business, family or climate, for example -- so that each republic represented more of a mix of ethnic origins than ever before.

Tito, in his 35 year reign, several times faced nationalistic problems within the League of Communists, as the communist party renamed itself after is was expelled from the Soviet bloc. He knew that these problems could get out of hand, and dealt quickly with the problems, deposing Croatian and Serbian party leaders and naming new ones who would play by his rules.

The strong unifying forces disappeared with Tito's death in 1980. Economic difficulties, long ignored, arose. Submerged ethnic tensions resurfaced, fed by the weak governmental structure which Tito had bequeathed, and a power struggle emerged within the upper reaches of the ruling party. The signs of disintegration were first apparent in Kosovo, where a growing Albanian minority demanded the transformation of its status as an autonomous province within Serbia to that of a republic with the right to secede from Yugoslavia.

Kosovo is sacred to the Serbs, who regard it as the cradle of their civilization and religion. It was there, in 1389, that the Serbs finally lost their independence to the Ottomans, something which they were not to regain for almost 500 years. Kosovo today, however, has become 90 percent Albanian, because of the immigration and high birthrate of this non-Slav, Muslim group, accompanied by continuing Serb departures -- forced and unforced -- from the region.

The relationship between action and reaction is often complex and unclear, as it is in the case of Yugoslavia's disintegration. The marriage which was entered into in 1918, and which had its

rough times in the inter-war periods, was foundering. The Serbs say that the Slovene, Croat and Bosnian leaders were unwilling to negotiate a fair secession [from Yugoslavia], while those leaders say that they could neither negotiate nor live with Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic. There is probably truth on both sides.

Two Western ambassadors stationed in Belgrade offered contradictory interpretations: one said that Slovenia and Croatia would never have seceded had the Serbs had a leader other than President Milosevic. The other said that they would have seceded even without Milosevic.

The Yugoslav constitution, while recognizing the right to secession of "nations," does not specify a legal way in which this might be achieved. The then-President of Yugoslavia, Borisav Jovic, a Serb, stated in 1991 that all Yugoslavs would have to agree to a secession, and not only the republic concerned. So there was basic disagreement as to how secession could be effected. Parenthetically, in the United States (where the Civil War was, in essence, a conflict over secession), the Supreme Court has held that secession is not a right.

Several scholars have declared that the manner in which the break-up of Yugoslavia has occurred was in contravention of international law.

The incontrovertible facts, however, are that Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia, took unilateral actions which they must have known would lead to bloodshed; and that these actions were abetted by several European countries, primarily Germany, which bear a heavy responsibility for the tragedy.

The world was warned by the US intelligence community (among others) as early as the Fall of 1990 that Yugoslavia would break apart within 18 months and that civil war was highly likely. This was confirmed in an article by David Binder in The New York times, of November 15, 1990, in which he disclosed the contents of a National Intelligence Estimate. The international community failed to arrest these developments.

Since bloodshed was anticipated should Slovenia and Croatia secede from Yugoslavia, why was the strongest international pressure not applied to nip the situation in the bud?

The member governments of the European Community (EC), as well as the Government of the United States, failed. EC and US policy should have clearly stated that unilateral secessions would not be recognized; that while self determination of the different Yugoslav nationalities was not opposed, the new countries would be recognized only after successful secession negotiations. If these negotiations could not be resolved amicably, then the US and EC should have insisted that the parties submit the conflict to the United Nations for adjudication and if necessary to compulsory arbitration.

It is true that the US Secretary of State, James Baker, went to Belgrade on June 21, 1991, and met with leaders of all six Yugoslav republics and urged them not to act unilaterally. But he was not sufficiently forceful. Slovenian and Croatian leaders promised Secretary Baker that they would not so act, but they reneged four days later.

Secretary Baker regarded these acts as "devious treatment," but he made no decisive declaration when the two states seceded.

Why did the international community before June 1991 not pressure Germany to stop supporting Slovenia and Croatia in their plans to secede? Why did the international community act only after the secessions were fact and hostilities had broken out?

Even then, six months after Slovenia and Croatia seceded, but before Bosnia declared its independence, the foreign ministers of the EC, meeting in Maastricht, were pressured by Germany -- despite urgent pleas to the contrary by the UN Secretary-General and the EC Yugoslav negotiator, Lord Carrington -- to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries.

The vote in this gathering was eight to four against recognition, but the German Foreign Minnister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, insisted that the would not leave the table until the EC foreign ministers would unanimously support him. It was 10pm. By 4am the next morning he had his way.

Would it not have been wiser if the British and French foreign ministers had declared that they would not leave the table until Germany and its three allies agreed with the majority not to accord recognition?

Mr Genscher's sudden resignation as German Foreign Minister a few months later may have had something to do with his over-zealous Yugoslav policy. There is now much soul-searching in Bonn as to whether the German policy was not, after all, a tragic mistake. Had the EC and US not recognized Croatia and Slovene, then Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have taken the fateful step of declaring its independence, and the present bloodbath could have been avoided.

There were excellent reasons for the international community to take an anti-recognition stand; not only the likelihood of bloodshed in the light of the World War II history [see Strategic Policy, December 31, 1992], but the very real question as to the status in international law of the member republics of the Yugoslav federation. They were created in 1945 by Tito, with borders drawn simply in accordance with the predilictions of the local communist party apparatchiks.

It must be stressed that the internal borders drawn in 1945 are completely different both for the pre-1914 borders of comparable regions, and from the 1918 borders which divided the then-new Kingdom into nine districts named after important local rivers.

It is precisely because the 1945 borders were never conceived as international borders that the secessions were so unpalatable to the Serbs. It was one thing for a Serb to live in Croatia or Bosnia as long as there existed a national Yugoslav Government with Serbian cabinet members, but quite another thing for three-million Serbs to suddenly find themselves living in foreign countries. Particularly in countries whose previous leaders were responsible for the most outrageous anti-Serb atrocities 50 years earlier, and whose present leaders made statements -- oral and in writing -- which could only arouse more fears among the Serbs.

There were two obvious solutions: either negotiated border rectifications or wide autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. But Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian leader, and Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian leader, were unwilling to agree to one or the other course. The international community should have insisted that they take either of these steps before secession. But instead, the West declared that it regarded the internal administrative borders as internationally binding. And not until hostilities had broken out did the West push the Croatians into recognizing the Serbs' minority rights and come up, for its part, with the Vance-Owen plan to restructure Bosnia-Herzegovina.

June 30, 1993

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis Is Finding Its Own Level, One Outsiders Fail to Understand

The shape of society in Bosnia-Herzegovina is emerging from the fog of war. But the shape which emerges is not what the West planned for or understands. Clearly, however, it is

emerging as a workable modus vivendi.

The seemingly intractable Balkan crisis showed signs that it was taking a path toward resolution in June. Ironically, there was considerable reluctance in many of the foreign ministries of the European Community (EC) and other states to accept that this was progress. Certainly, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl attempted to derail the peace process, and widen the conflict, in the former Yugoslavia by pushing fellow EC leaders into arming the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim community. The response to the German initiative was a proposal that Germany's principal ally in the Balkans, Croatia, should be the subject of United Nations sanctions for its part in widening the war.

Such a move would place Croatia under the same economic hardship as Yugoslavia. Croatia, however, has a less viable indigenous economy at present, and would buckle far more rapidly than Yugoslavia under the weight of sanctions. As well, the move would damage Germany's credibility in the Balkans still further. EC leaders now privately -- although often not quietly -- express their anger at Germany's role in forcing the EC into premature recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, thus precipitating the current war. And Germany's current economic plight makes it less able to wield pressure on the smaller EC states to support its Balkan policies than was the case a year earlier.

Where is the process moving?

Firstly, it is clear that the United Nations' Vance-Owen Peace Plan is dead. The plan had envisaged for Bosnia-Herzegovina a complex cantonal arrangement with which none of the three major communal groups were happy. It therefore merely contained the seeds of future conflict.

Secondly, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim community is severely split. It has become apparent to the EC and UN, finally, that the Muslim community in the country is, in fact, several Muslim communities, with different leaders and aspirations. Alija Izetbegovic, who headed the collective

presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is now not seen by all Muslims as the leader of a Bosnia-Herzegovina independent Muslim state. He is now merely a leader. Indeed, he is no longer legitimately President even of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His presidency was due to rotate to another member of the collective presidency in December 1992. The leadership post, however, was never passed on. Izetbegovic's extreme politics and his attempts to bring all of Bosnia-Herzegovina under a radical Islamic government are now seen to have gone against the grain of many Muslims in the region.

Moderate Islamic states which were keen to support Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina have now halted much of their funding and arms aid. Iran, Izetbegovic's principal ally, appears to have cut its support significantly. Turkey, which pumped in arms and mercenaries to support Izetbegovic, has also cut its aid. Much of this is due to the death on April 17, 1993, of President Turgut Ozal, who had seen support of the Bosnian Muslims as a significant lever in Europe. He had also been forced into the position by the fact that Iran had "outflanked" Turkey by taking the Islamic lead in Europe.

Thirdly, the Croatian community in Bosnia-Herzegovina have, for many months, acted as though Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer existed. Or if it did, then it was of no consequence. Bosnian Croats have, or are eligible for, Croatian passports. The Croatian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are totally and effectively integrated into the Republic of Croatia. Great Croatia exists, de facto. It is, as the US saying goes, "a done deal". This has already meant that Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer exists, in real terms, as a sovereign independent state as it was conceived and recognized following the collapse of the old Yugoslavia.

The move by the Zagreb Government to bring the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatian territories into the Republic of Croatia makes it difficult for it to protest on moral grounds over the referendum within the Serbian enclave of Krijena -- inside the recognized borders of Croatia -- which decided that Krijena should merge with the Serbian part of what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina and, possibly, later with the Republic of Serbia in what is now the (new) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

What would remain of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then, would be a number of Muslim enclaves. The largest and most viable of these is the 500,000 population area led by Fikret Abdic, a long-time rival of the leader of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic. The collective presidency had said that Ejup Ganic, a Muslim member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina collective presidency, would head the delegation to the Geneva peace talks in late June. But in the end it was Mr Abdic who headed the delegation in reality, and it was clear that he was prepared to negotiate with the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs who wanted to end the unworkable structure of the state.

On June 20, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban met in Montenegro and agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be transformed into "a confederation, with some form of association based on the freely expressed will of all three peoples". The question remains: where, then, is all this going?

* Bosnia-Herzegovina, as noted, will probably not long survive as a sovereign independent state;

* Greater Croatia has already come into being, and incorporation of the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be officially acknowledged and recognized within the foreseeable future;

* The various Serbian communities of Krijena and Bosnia-Herzegovina will probably seek some form of confederation with or within the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although retaining autonomous government;

* Some of the Muslim cities and enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina will probably seek accommodation to become autonomous, self-governing units within an association with Yugoslavia. Those Muslim enclaves which remain "independent" would have to develop a modus vivendi in the same way that, say, Monaco has with France.

Such developments presuppose the collapse of the Izetbegovic radical wing of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims. And there is clearly bloodshed to come before the package settles into place. But what shocks and confuses EC observers is that the "implacably hostile" foes in the region seem to be working toward their own solution. The economic sanctions against Yugoslavia now seem all the more irrelevant to the solution of the crisis.

August 31, 1993

Iranian and Bosnian Leaders Embark on a New, Major Escalation of Terrorism Against the West

Bombings in Rome, Florence and Milan mark the start of a new wave of Islamist terrorism which has added Italy, Croatia and Germany to the list of major target states. Iran has decided that its "moderation" did not yield dividends, and has returned to terrorism. Contributing Editor Yossef

Bodansky reports.

By Yossef Bodansky, Contributing Editor [now Senior Editor]. Iran, Syria and their allies have recently intensified their preparations for the launching of a wave of terrorism in Western Europe, according to reports received by Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy. The first shots of this campaign have already been fired in Italy in the form of a series of car bombs in Rome, Florence, and Milan.

The primary objective of this terrorist campaign is the overall escalation of the Islamist struggle against the West. Both the urgency for, as well as the rationalization of and justification for this terrorist campaign are derived from the plight of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Special effort is being made to further ferment and radicalize the Muslim population in Western Europe to the point of active participation in subsequent acts of terrorism. Recently, the Muslim émigré communities in Western Europe have been under growing pressures and siege, ranging from right wing violence, to strict limitation of emigration, to outright public hostility and discrimination. As such, they are more susceptible to the Islamists' recruitment efforts.

Tehran began to actively prepare for the current terrorist assault in the summer of 1992 as part of

the anticipated escalation in its covert struggle against the enemies of the Administration. Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Hussein Khamene'i, acknowledged that terrorist organizations were an integral part of Iran's long arm. He warned the West against confronting Iran, pointing out that "they should know that the strength of the Islamic Republic of Iran is in the strength of faith of its HizbAllah forces".

Iran was further tightening its control over the Islamist international terrorist movement, ensuring that it constituted an instrument of Tehran's policy. Ali Fallahiyan-Khuzestani, the Minister of Intelligence and Security Forces (VEVAK), explained that Iran has "a foreign intelligence department that collates the conspiracies hatched by world arrogance against the Islamic Revolution", and that toward this end Iran "even infiltrated the highest levels of government in some countries". He acknowledged that Iranian intelligence conducted violent covert operations all over the world, and that "those activities are on the increase every day".

Tehran's decisions were being quickly implemented in the field. Most notably, VEVAK, now operating directly under President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was directed to collect intelligence on potential objective for the al-Quds forces, ranging from enemies of the Administration to be assassinated to targets for sabotage in the anticipated escalation of international terrorism.

Indeed, since the fall of 1992 the VEVAK's Western Countries Department has been expanded rapidly to include in addition to Western Europe also North America. The al-Quds Forces were established back in early 1991 from the ranks of the IRGC special forces and intelligence in order to "advise and train Muslims all over the world" on how to accelerate their "struggle" against the West, as well as carry out special operations on behalf of Tehran. Ahmad Khomeini's Service to Islam Organization was incorporated into the new organization, and Khomeini assumed the leadership the al-Quds forces.

Meanwhile, in the Autumn of 1992, the IRGC markedly expanded the training of Sunni Islamist terrorists in Iran. The main training center is the Imam Ali department in Saadabad (the former palace in northern Tehran) where al-Quds forces are being trained.

The chairman is Gen. Muhammad Shams (of the Iranian Army), and his deputy is Gen. Aruji. The commander of al-Quds Forces is Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, formerly the head of the Information Department, the terrorists are primarily trained as instructors and commanders to run and expand networks in their home lands, as well as receive sophisticated sabotage training.

Candidates from "secular" states first receive theological and ideological instructions and tempering in Qom, and only then are sent to military training in the Saadabad camp near Tehran.

Concurrently, the leaders of the Islamist networks in Western Europe were ordered to closely check the strength of networks and theatre conditions in the priority target areas.

The Islamist terrorist strategy for the forthcoming terrorist campaign in the West, and especially the US, underwent a major revision in a special conference of some 300 senior terrorist commanders and Iranian intelligence officials held in Tehran from February 2 to 9, 1993. The primary objective of the conference was to formulate and define the grand strategy of Iran-

sponsored international terrorism and set operational guidelines for all other Islamist terrorist groups. Hashemi-Rafsanjani and other Iranian and HizbAllah leaders conceded that Iran's "moderation" had failed to attract the hoped-for Western economic assistance and investment, and that instead, the West (especially the US) was increasingly preoccupied with Iran's power and the spread of Islam.

Therefore, Tehran decided that there was no alternative to the resumption of an uncompromising terrorist struggle against and in the West. Because of its far reaching strategic ramifications, this new terrorist campaign will be conducted under the tight control of Iranian intelligence. Fallahiyan-Khuzestani reiterated Tehran's resolve to support the escalation of "Jihad in all regions where . . . Islamist movements are threatened". Special attention was paid to discussing the revival of "spectacular" terrorist operations such as the kidnapping of foreign, mainly US, hostages, political assassinations of "enemies of Islam", hijacking or blowing up of transport aircraft, and major sabotage operations. In this context, Sheikh Fadlallah delivered a major sermon in which he justified and legitimized the resumption of international terrorism from an Islamic stance. He dwelt on the theological bridging of differences between Shi'a and Sunni Islam with emphasis on key aspects of international terrorism such as martyrdom, that is suicide, operations and the cross-trend issuing of Fatwas, a crucial issue for authorization of spectacular terrorist operations in the West. The conference also decided that many of the terrorist attacks will be attributed to various Islamic "causes" worldwide in order to create the impression of a joint pan-Islamic struggle again the US and the West. Ayatollah Khamene'i, Shamsoddin Wahabi, and Asfar Ali Zadeh emerged as the leaders of the new terrorist surge.

Meanwhile, since the autumn of 1992, and more so since the spring of 1993, there has been a marked expansion of Islamist terrorist infrastructure in Western Europe. At first, HizbAllah teams, led by Hajj al-Latif Salah, began organizing an expanded logistical support system throughout Western Europe. Of special importance is the arrival of senior representatives of major organizations fighting throughout the Muslim World (such as FIS, Nahdah, HizbAllah, HAMAS, etc.). Their presence permits the conduct of Islamist terrorism under the banner of localized causes. There is a growing flow of highly trained terrorists mainly from Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan under the banner of "revolutionary fundamentalist groups." Some 100 to 120 Iranian terrorists and intelligence operatives infiltrated into Western Europe in the spring of 1993 to augment local HizbAllah networks. Their primary expertise was dealing with the enemies of the Administration. A second wave of terrorists, mainly experts in sabotage and dealing with local networks, began arriving in the summer of 1993. At present, some 30 to 40 of them are already in Western Europe, as others keep arriving.

Germany is the organizational center. The Islamist operational headquarters is in Hamburg where Muhammad Baqir Ansari, the personal representative of Ayatollah Khamene'i, is the head of the Islamic Center and Mosque. The political center is in the UK, under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi. It constitutes a regional supreme headquarters. Ghannouchi's deputy is Habib Mokhni who is based in Paris. Mokhni maintains the relations and communications with Tehran, and travels to Iran very frequently ostensibly to gain assistance for Algerian humanitarian causes.

Germany has become the center of the Islamist radical trend, riddled with Islamist terrorist

networks from countries as diverse as Algeria and Turkey. They all answer without doubt to the Iranian nominated leadership operating out of the Shi'ite Big Mosque in Hamburg. It is noteworthy that this Mosque is open to Sunnis and has special ecumenical services for all in order to ensure acceptability by all extremist branches and organizations.

In addition, the Syrians maintain a center in Aix-la-Chapelle from where Syrian Intelligence works to both entrap followers of the Muslim Brotherhood and run Islamist terrorist operations in the West.

France is one of the primary manpower pools. The radicalization of the three- to five-million strong Muslim community is reflected in the sudden increase in Islamist associations and institutions from 1,050 in 1991 to over 2,000 at present. There is a large community of dozens of militant leaders and hundreds of terrorists from the Maghreb in France, involved in terrorism in home countries and Western Europe. They are reinforced by a steady flow of highly trained "Afghans" from all over the Muslim World, as well as expert terrorists from the Maghreb, especially Algeria, who arrive as refugees. The Hizb-Allah has its own dedicated Ahl-ul-Bayt network led by Muhammad Fadlallah, Sheikh Fadlallah's nephew. It provides support to the new center of Islamic Jihad and the HAMAS in France and Germany.

The militant Islamist influence is already showing. On December 26, 1992, in a gathering of Islamist activists in Paris organized by Algerian militants, there was a call for armed jihad: "The choice of jihad is confirmed by the law of Islam! The ungodly power should be fought with arms!"

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the primary catalyst of the Islamist jihad in and against Western Europe. Indeed, the Bosnian Muslim themselves already threatened to use terrorism against Western targets if their demands were not met. Most reliable was the threat made in late January 1993 by Sefer Halilovic, then the Commander in Chief of the Bosnian Army: "If Europe does not change its attitude, we well take steps and unleash terrorist actions on its territories. Many European capitals will be ablaze." Little wonder, therefore, that the "absolute priority" of the Islamists of Western Europe is "participation in the fighting of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina." There is a constant and growing flow of volunteers to the ranks of the Mujahedin in the Balkans. Tehran and its allies are already well underway to incite and exploit these sentiments in order to further their designs for an escalation of the terrorist campaign in Western Europe.

Back in the summer of 1992, Tehran urged and actively supported the establishment of "volunteer forces from all over the Muslim world who would rush to help their brothers in faith in the Balkans." Indeed, Iran has begun active preparations for the establishment of a terrorist infrastructure in the Balkans. In July 1992, the then HizbAllah representatives in Zagreb, Hassan Haidar Dzabom and Radwan Khatounom, convened a conference with several Islamist activists, mainly Arabs and South Asians from the UK, to discuss methods to expand their network through the cover of humanitarian activities. It was decided that support networks would be established by operatives working as volunteers in Islamic and European charities.

The core of the Bosnia-Herzegovina-based Islamist terrorists come from the ranks of the Islamic

Jihad forces which are the elite component of the Movement's "international legion" which is led by "Afghans". Meanwhile, since the autumn of 1992, Iran has been maintaining a core of highly professional operatives, mainly Iranians from the Pasdaran and Lebanese from the HizbAllah, who provide expert training and assistance, as well as conduct the most sensitive covert operations (intelligence and terrorism). Tehran continues to provide Sarajevo with weapons and experts. In early-November 1992, more than 50 expert terrorists and instructors of the HizbAllah and the Tawhid (its Sunni counterpart under Sheikh Sha'ban) were sent from Baalbak to Bosnia-Herzegovina to train local cadres and launch terrorist operations on their own. In early 1993, some 60 more members of Iran-controlled terrorist organizations, who had been trained in special camps in Sudan, were went to Bosnia-Herzegovina to help escalate the war. These trainers spearhead an ongoing Iranian effort to deploy a 2,000 strong brigade of Al-Quds Forces. These forces receive substantial Iranian military assistance.

Recently, however, the threat of Islamist terrorism surging out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and being waged in the name of the plight of the local Muslim population has become much more a realistic threat. The turning point was June 8, 1993. On that day, in a special session chaired by Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency decided on the creation of a new position -- Commander of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Army -- and nominated Rasim Delic, then the head of the group for operational and strategic planning of the army, to that new position. Although formally Delic continued to answer directly to Sefer Halilovic, the Chief of the General Staff, there were persistent reports that Delic would be superior to Halilovic. Moreover, by then, Halilovic had already taken over the conduct of intelligence, counter-intelligence and special operations which shifted his attention away from the military.

As a result of this and comparable personnel changes, a new leadership, whose members rose from the ranks of the Army and Intelligence, has emerged in Sarajevo. These leaders are characterized as "angry Muslims" by observers in both Zagreb and Belgrade. The new leaders are convinced that the Islamists' argument that there can be no compromise with, let alone genuine support from, the West to a Muslim state in Europe is correct.

They are committed to, and since mid-June 1993 are preparing for, a long-term war of revenge and terror. In mid-July, Rasim Delic, now the commander of the Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, predicted that reaching an agreement in Geneva "means the continuation of the war without end. We are now forced to continue the war until we secure a just peace. We have no other choice: : war or destruction."

Delic is committed to the terrorist struggle in the context of Balkan war. Delic vowed to expand the territories held by the Muslims and improve their military capabilities. In this context he warned the "if the arms embargo is not lifted, the war will only drag on. . . . By attacking the enemy where he least expects it we shall more easily deal with the much better equipped aggressor." Moreover, the Islamist Mujahedin would play an important role in the Bosnian strategy. Delic "knows perfectly well that on the front . . . the militia are sometimes controlled by the mafia. These armed gangs infiltrated by some 'mujahedin' [sic.] are perpetrating senseless massacres, like their enemies. 'They are kamikaze, desperate people,' he [Delic] said."

By the summer, the threat of escalating Islamist terrorism has become a form of ultimatum used

by Sarajevo in an attempt to impose its will on the international community. In late June, Ejup Ganic anticipated that if Sarajevo did not gain what it wanted, the war will "drag on for 15 years and spawn terrorist attacks in Europe by angry refugees who have flooded out of the republic." He urged the West to comply before it was too late. "I don't want to be responsible for terrorism, but it will happen, especially in Europe. I don't want to participate in that," Ganic said. "The threat by Bosnian Vice President Ganic, to react . . . with attacks must be taken very seriously," warned Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle. He anticipated that if Sarajevo's demands are not met, "the Muslims will react like radical PLO members".

Simultaneously, in early June 1993, the entire leadership in Tehran emphasized Iran's commitment to redressing the plight of Muslim communities such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a gathering of some 200 high-level visitors from Muslim countries and 4,000 other overseas pilgrims to Khomeini's tomb, Ahmad Khomeini stressed that "defending the rights of the oppressed Muslims throughout the world is one of the unalterable principles of Iran's foreign policy." Hashemi-Rafsanjani threatened the West with reprisals for suppressing Muslims and ignoring legitimate rights of Islamist movements world wide. Iran has a direct and legitimate reason for that because the US and the West are "taking revenge on Bosnian and Palestinian Muslims because of their inability to confront Iran." Tehran, on the other hand, does have the means to strike back. "Those who are suppressing Muslim nations under the pretext of fundamentalism, massacring their peoples because of upholding the banner of Islam, and accusing Muslims of having links with Iran, are mistaken," Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned, "they are repeating the Shah's experience". Ayatollah Khamene'i further escalated Iran's message of defiance, resolve, and combative attitude. "Iran will stand steadfast against all plots. Of course in a combat, both side receive some blows and losses. But the question is that the side which surrenders and accepts defeat will be exposed to the hostilities of the opposite side. . . . I say that the people of Iran will stand steadfast with all their strength in the face of this abject plot. We will not allow the principles that are the pillars of the Islamic Revolution and are the cause of the hostility of the enemies to be placed in jeopardy."

In early July 1993, Iran continued to agitate the Muslim World. Tehran declared defiantly that it would only escalate its worldwide struggle against Western influence. "The Iranian nation and government will not help the establishment of the US-style peace, rather consider it a duty to caution the world people against the US conspiracies." Tehran means more than just words, for, Tehran stresses, "the enemies of Islam are not safe from Muslims' anger in any part of the world".

This sudden burst of warnings and threats about Islamist terrorism is not accidental. In July 1993, Slovene intelligence officials warned that "Europe, and also other continents, are to be gripped soon by a wave of Bosnian Muslim terrorism, in comparison with which previous actions [by] Islamic fundamentalists and other terrorist groups are only an innocent child's game." In a policy document, Fikret Muslimovic defined the terrorist operations as "warning the world public about its intolerable passivity in the face of genocide against Muslims and the obvious planned suppression of members of the Islamic faith". Delic explained in reference to the possible revival of the partisan/irregular warfare experience of World War II that "we [his forces] have already resumed the special purpose [arms] production in the free parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina." [See story, page one.]

Preparations for the terrorist campaign are being conducted under the responsibility of a group of senior officials of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by Sefer Halilovic, Rusmir Mahmutcehavic, and the chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina's military intelligence, Fikret Muslimovic. These terrorist capabilities have become possible with the completion of the first phase of preparations. Since early 1993, Bosnian intelligence and special forces officers have been preparing for the launch of a major terrorist campaign and related contingencies with the help of "volunteers and experts on subversive actions who have come from Syria" with Sarajevo's guidance. The center of the terrorist preparations is the Soda-So factory in Tuzla which was turned into barracks. Foreign experts are based there as well as members of the Bosnian special forces (who commit the ethnic cleansing). Sefer Halilovic is responsible for the operation as far as Sarajevo, and Hamdija Dervisevic is the on-site commander, responsible for interface with the foreign experts and their parent services.

Meanwhile, a comprehensive terrorist and intelligence network is being consolidated all over Europe in order to facilitate these terrorist strikes. Slovene intelligence officials pointed out that "in Croatia, Austria, Slovenia, and other Western countries[,] and extremely effective intelligence-sabotage network is already operating within the framework of various Islamic humanitarian organizations; it includes mostly former and current members of the Iranian, Egyptian, and Afghan armies". Their task, according to Muslimovic, is to "monitor important facilities in individual countries and collect information on them, to monitor the flow of people through individual facilities, and also the security systems for facilities and public and political figures who are known for anti-Islamic statements or who oppose the delivery of weapons to the Muslim people". Slovene intelligence officials stressed the importance of the "assault-sabotage groups" composed of Bosnian volunteers led by two or three expert terrorists, some of whom had already worked with the Bosnians as instructors and advisers. The groups' task is to determine "the situation at facilities suitable for attack" with the assistance of locally based intelligence officers of the supporting states as well as their local assets. Then, the teams "plan and propose plans for sabotage and diversions at specific facilities". Once an operation is approved, it will be carried out by a joint team comprised of Bosnian and Middle Eastern terrorists.

One of the specters of this anticipated new wave of Islamist international terrorism is the possible use of chemical and biological weapons.

The presence of chemical weapons in the Tuzla area, the center of the terrorist preparations, was confirmed by the Bosnian Government. On June 9, 1993, Salih Brkic reported on Radio Sarajevo that the Tuzla District Council decided "to use chlorine and other chemical agents for defense purposes" as a last resort against the Serbs. Andjelko Makar, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps of the Bosnian Army based in Tuzla, declared that "the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will also use unconventional weapons, such as chlorine and other chemical weapons". On the use of chlorine in Tuzla, Gen. Delic acknowledged that "if we had to cause a disaster to prevent the Serbs from invading Tuzla . . . we would do so." [ellipses in original] Even President Alija Izetbegovic "could not dismiss the possibility of using chemical weapons" under extreme conditions. [See page 16.]

The initial objectives of the current Islamist terrorist struggle are Italy, Croatia and,

subsequently, Germany.

ITALY was chosen as a target for a combination of Islamist interests and expediency. From an ideological viewpoint, Italy, as the site for NATO aircraft which can strike the Serbs, serves as a proper place to pressure the West for action, as well as avenge the lack of bombing. Italy is also a critical place for punishing Christianity for its conspiracy against Islam, especially in the Balkans. There are also practical reasons for the selection of Italy. When Sarajevo and its allies reached the decision to move, they could rely on an already active Islamist network in place, with preparations for escalation in progress. This Iranian network, along with local 'partners' from organized crime, has been implementing punishment for the collapse of a major nuclear weapons deal in February. The follow-on operations augmented the existing networks, expanding their scope of motives and selection of targets.

It is noteworthy to note that back in the autumn of 1992, Tehran decided to closely examine the escalation of terrorist operations in Italy in connection with the Bosnia issue. Therefore, Muhammad Baqir Ansari traveled to Busana in November 1992 where he organized a conference of Islamist terrorist leaders to discuss options, possibilities, and the status of their networks in Italy. It was decided then to establish a center of operations in Italy in anticipation for the escalation. Consequently, the Islamic Institute in Milan has become the headquarters for Iran, the HizbAllah and Islamist terrorists. The new organization was soon operational. They provided support for an Al-Quds Forces hit team that killed Muhammad Hussein Nagdi in Rome on March 16, 1993.

Meanwhile, in February, the breakup of an organized crime ring in Florence resulted in the collapse of the Iranian deal to purchase "fissionable nuclear material in sufficient quantities to make nine atomic weapons". There emerged a dire need in Tehran for both a revenge and warning for the disruption of such an important deal. The technique and explosives used in the May 27 car bomb in Florence closely resemble known patterns of Iran-sponsored terrorism as reflected in recent IRA and New York bombings.

The escalating terrorist bombing campaign in Italy is an expansion of the original cycle. The first cycle was the May 14 car bomb in Rome, the May 27 car bomb in Florence, and the June 2 car bomb found in Rome. They were essentially an indication of the crucial importance of the Mafia's nuclear trade to Middle East radical states, notably Iran and its allies. Nevertheless, Serb and Croat organizations claimed responsibility for the first two bombs.

Meanwhile, the mandate of the Islamist networks in Italy, and Western Europe as a whole, was being expanded to include the objectives of the Bosnian terrorist campaign. In July 1993, Fikret Muslimovic defined the objective of these terrorist operations as being "to prevent the fulfillment of the Christian plot against the Muslim people. . ." (It should be remembered that Tehran, Khartoum, and the Islamist leadership have a bitter grievance with Pope John-Paul II, especially since his recent visit to Sudan.) Moreover, additional Iran-controlled expert terrorists were deployed to Europe, including to Italy, to augment the local networks. The next wave of terrorism reflected the expanded agenda. On the night of July 27, car bombs damaged two Rome churches, including the Pope's own St. John Lateran Church, as well as a museum in Milan. The bombs were of the same composition as the previous car bombs. While Milan is a site of

previously foiled Iranian-Mafia activities, mainly the seizure of large quantities of counterfeit US dollars, the bombs in Rome were aimed directly at the Church.

CROATIA is the objective of bitter revenge. Zagreb is the perpetrator of the great betrayal which Sara jevo attributes, not without Tehran's agitation, to the machinations of the Catholic Church. The Croats also resist Sarajevo's desire for access to the Adriatic Sea. Consequently, the Bosnian Muslim's desire to inflict immense punishment raises the possibility of Croatia becoming the first target for chemical and biological terrorism in Europe.

The extent of bitterness and hatred felt by Sarajevo toward Zagreb was expressed in a statement of profound importance made by Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic on July 29. "We are much closer to the Serbs than to the Slovenes and Croats. It was really a mistake to conclude an alliance with the Croats," Ganic stated. "If the Serbs conclude an alliance with anyone, they will rather do so with us because strictly speaking, viewed historically, we are Serbs." (Ganic repeated himself, asserting that the alliance with Croatia "was a serious mistake, because the Bosnian Muslims were originally Serbs, who were 'Islamized' [sic] by the Turks. . . . We are related much more closely with the Serbs than with the Slovenes and Croats. We speak a dialect that is more similar to Serbian than Croat. The same goes for mentality, habits, and customs.") Ganic stated that Sarajevo was considering cooperation with the Serbs against the Croats. "The Serbs are just waiting for us to say yes. They have long been prepared to help us in the struggle against the Croats. . . . If we have to choose -- and we have long gotten into this situation -- we prefer the Serbs who are much stronger." Ganic disclosed that the Bosnian Muslims "have already had secret talks with them [the Serbs] . . ."

Ganic stated that Sarajevo has "been cheated" by Zagreb and threatened, "One day Croatia will have to pay for it." The bitterness and hatred he expressed go beyond coming to grips with a failed policy. Ganic lamented that the Croats refused to recognize the Bosnian Muslims as equals and Europeans. "We believed that now we would have to fight alongside the Croats because we are a European people. We form part of the Western World. It was an error." Ganic conceded that Sarajevo has concluded that Western Europe refuses to accept the Bosnian Muslims as an integral part of the Western World. This reality has a direct impact on Bosnian forces. "After all that has happened, the Muslims in Army have also become "fundamentalists'. That cannot be disputed," he acknowledged. "There are no innocents anymore in the current confusions."

This hatred is reflected in the special attention paid by the Bosnian intelligence and terrorism establishment to settling scores with their erstwhile allies, the Croats. In July, Muslimovic specifically told his forces that "the activity of special units is necessary to establish a liberated area in territories where the Croats are settled now, and to reduce their number actively and passively. Particular attention should be paid to activating the operatives who were already included in Croatian units previously as volunteers. It is necessary to act psychologically and also militarily against all Croatian forces, and civilians should be dealt with in the same way as the Army."

Muslimovic anticipates widespread terrorism and sabotage not only against civilian infrastructures such as "electricity transfer installations and strategically important bridges and viaducts," but, specifically, "it is also necessary to poison or contaminate by biological means the

water in strong bases of the hostile aggressor force".

GERMANY is also being singled out for the escalation of Islamist terrorism because of its staunch support for the Croats, as well as the determination by the HizbAllah's Special Operations Group to bring about the release of their member, Muhammad Ali Hamadi, from German jail. There are active preparations by Iranian and HizbAllah operatives all over Germany to agitate and incite Muslim émigré communities, especially the Turks, Kurds, Bosnians and Arabs. In mid-July 1993, despite the release of Abbas Hamadi (and rumored clemency of Muhammad Ali Hamadi), there were strong indications in Germany of an impending escalation of HizbAllah-led terrorism by a combination of terrorist experts arriving from the Middle East and activated local assets. German security authorities anticipate a cycle of strikes in Germany and elsewhere throughout Western Europe.

Western Europe may have only been exposed to the first shots in the forthcoming joint Iranian-Bosnian escalation of Islamist terrorism. The active preparations in the field, including the deployment of terrorist experts, clearly reflect the determination of the controlling states to unleash this revenge. What is left to be done is for Tehran and Sarajevo, or perhaps Tuzla instead, to give their operatives the green light.

As the bombings in Italy suggest, this "Go Ahead" order may have already been given.

December 31, 1993

US CIA Forecasts An End To Yugoslav Sanctions

A leaked US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report has predicted that economic sanctions against Yugoslavia would have to begin being dismantled within six months. The report, allegedly by the CIA's chief analyst for Yugoslavia, D. Kanin, said that the result of the present war in the former Yugoslavia would be a greater Serbia, greater Croatia and a greater Albania. The report was leaked to The New York Times in December, just as France was pushing the US Administration to become militarily involved, on the ground, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The White House and State Department have yet to concur with the CIA.