black soldier/ white army the 24th infantry regiment in korea (front)

7/28/2019 Black Soldier/ White Army The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (Front)

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BLACK SOLDIER

WHITE ARMY

The 24TH InfantryRegiment in Korea

William T. Bowers

William M. Hammond

George L. MacGarrigle

United States Army

Center of Military History


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William T. Bowers

William M. Hammond

George L. MacGarrigle

Center of Military HistoryUnited States Army

Washington, D.C., 1996

BLACK SOLDIERWHITE ARMY

The 24TH InfantryRegiment in Korea


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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bowers, William T., 1946Black soldier, white army : The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea / byWilliam T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, George L. MacGarrigle.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references.1. Korean War, 19501953Regimental HistoriesUnited States.

2. United States. Army. Infantry Regiment, 24thHistory.3. Korean War, 19501953Afro-American participation. 4. United

States. ArmyAfro-American troopsHistory. I. Hammond, WilliamM. II. MacGarrigle, George L., 1930 . III. Title.DS919.B68 1996951.9042dc20 9314052

CIP

CMH Pub 7065


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The story of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Koreais a difficult one, both for the veterans of theunit and for the Army. In the early weeks of the

Korean War, most American military units experi-enced problems as the U.S. Army attempted totransform understrength, ill-equipped, and inade-quately trained forces into an effective combat teamwhile at the same time holding back the fierceattacks of an aggressive and well-prepared oppo-nent. In addition to the problems other regiments

faced in Korea, the 24th Infantry also had to over-come the effects of racial prejudice. Ultimately thesoldiers of the regiment, despite steadfast courageon the part of many, paid the price on the battle-field for the attitudes and misguided policies of theArmy and their nation.

Several previously published histories have dis-cussed what happened to the 24th Infantry. Thisbook tells why it happened. In doing so, it offersimportant lessons for todays Army. The Army andthe nation must be aware of the corrosive effects of

segregation and the racial prejudices that accompa-nied it. The consequences of that system crippledthe trust and mutual confidence so necessaryamong the soldiers and leaders of combat units andweakened the bonds that held the 24th together,producing profound effects on the battlefield. Iurge the reader to study and reflect on the insightsprovided in the chapters that follow. We must

ensure that the injustices and misfortunes thatbefell the 24th never occur again.

Six people deserve special acknowledgment forthe roles they played in the production of this study.Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh first recognizedthe need for this work and monitored its early stages.A concerned veteran, Mr. David Carlisle, pushedcontinually for its completion. General RoscoeRobinson, before he passed away, read initial draftsof the early chapters and made valuable comments.

Col. John Cash collected many of the documents,conducted nearly three hundred oral history inter-views, walked the battlegrounds in Korea, and draft-ed an early account of the regiments history. TheAssistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower andReserve Affairs, Hon. Sara E. Lister, supported ourwork during the past two years. The Secretary of theArmy, Hon. Togo D. West, Jr., approved its publica-tion. Special thanks is extended to each, as well as toBrig. Gen. (Ret.) Roy Flint, a combat veteran andscholar who prepared an introduction placing this

study in its larger historical context. We are also grat-ified to report that the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, isonce again serving proudly as part of the 1st Brigade,25th Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Foreword

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLEBrigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

Washington, D.C.21 August 1996


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WILLIAM T. BOWERS received his B.A. and M.A.degrees in history from Texas Christian University.Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1969, heserved in Vietnam in the 1st Cavalry Division andlater as an adviser. He has commanded fieldartillery units in the United States and Germanyand has served as a staff officer in the office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans inWashington, D.C., as well as in the JointHeadquarters of the Central Army Group and the

Fourth Allied Tactical Airforce (NATO) inHeidelberg, Germany. He has taught history at theU.S. Naval Academy and has been a guest lecturerat the Army War College and at the NATO Schoolin Oberammergau, Germany. In 1992 he joined theCenter of Military History as chief of the HistoriesDivision. Having retired from the Army in 1995, heresides in Burke, Virginia, where he remains activein the field of military history.

WILLIAM M. HAMMOND graduated from the

Catholic University of America, where he earnedthe S.T.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. He currentlyserves as a historian with the Center of MilitaryHistory, where he has authored a two-volume his-tory of official relations with the news media dur-ing the Vietnam War, Public Affairs: The Military andthe Media. He has also authored the Armys historyof the selection and interment of the VietnamUnknown Soldier, The Unknown Serviceman of the

Vietnam Era; a monograph entitled Normandy,released in 1994 by the Army to mark the 50thanniversary of the invasion; as well as numerousshorter articles and publications. He is currentlypreparing a volume in the Armys Cold War seriesentitled The Army and National Security: TheEmergence of the Cold War, 19451953. Dr.Hammond has taught at Trinity College inWashington, D.C., and at the University ofMaryland, Baltimore County. He currently doubles

as a Lecturer in University Honors at the Universityof Maryland, College Park, where he teaches cours-es on the Vietnam War and the military and thenews media in American history.

GEORGE L. MACGARRIGLE is a graduate of theUnited States Military Academy and has receivedan M.A. in history from Pennsylvania StateUniversity. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in1952, he served with the 1st Cavalry Division inKorea as a rifle company commander and again

with the 1st Cavalry Division during the VietnamWar as an infantry battalion commander. He direct-ed the military history program while assigned tothe ROTC at Pennsylvania State University. He cur-rently serves as a civilian historian with the Centerof Military History, where he has authored TheYear of the Offensive and is working on a secondvolume, The Tet Offensive, both of which tell theArmys story of combat in Vietnam.

The Authors


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In late September 1950, two months after thebeginning of the Korean War, the commander ofthe 25th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. William B.

Kean, requested that the Eighth Army disband theall-black 24th Infantry Regiment because it hadshown itself untrustworthy and incapable of car-rying out missions expected of an infantry regi-ment. Thus began a controversy that has contin-ued to this day. Critics of the racially segregatedregiment have charged that the 24th was a dismal

failure in combat. The African-American veteransof the organization and others have responded thatthe unit did far better than its antagonists wouldconcede and that its main problem was the racialprejudice endemic to the Army of that day. Militaryhistorians have tended to cite the lack of trainingand preparation afflicting all of the U.S. Army unitsentering combat during the early weeks of theKorean War and the inability of senior comman-ders to remedy deficiencies of leadership in the24th within a reasonable period of time.

For a while, with the integration of the armedforces, the talk on all sides subsided, but when theU.S. Armys official history of the Korean War, Southto the Naktong, North to the Yalu, authored by Roy E.Appleman, appeared in 1961, it reignited the con-troversy by publicizing the background of Keanscharges. During the late 1970s, as a result, a numberof individuals began an effort to persuade the Armyto revise its history to reflect a more balanced view of

the regiment. In 1987 Secretary of the Army John O.Marsh, Jr., directed that the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History undertake a definitive evaluation ofthe 24ths role in the Korean War. If the regimentsperformance was commendable, the record could beamended. But if its service was less than successful,the reasons behind its shortcomings ought to beexamined for the lessons they might convey to thesoldier of today.

Col. John A. Cash began the effort in 1988.

Over the next several years he and several assistantsconducted nearly three hundred oral history inter-views, visited the battlefields in Korea, researchedofficial records in the National Archives, and com-pleted part of an initial draft outline for a final man-uscript. Cash retired in 1992. Shortly thereafter theCenter formed a team of three historians to con-duct additional research and interviews and tocompose a final study.

This history is the result. It analyzes the opera-tions of the 24th Infantry during the Korean War to

determine how well the unit and its associatedengineers and artillery performed. In the process itasks whether deficiencies occurred, seeks their mil-itary causes, and looks at how those influences andevents intersected with the racial prejudices preva-lent in that day.

Starting with a brief rendition of the backgroundof the African-American soldier in the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries, the study shows that

Preface


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segregated regiments and divisions performed wellwhen called upon during the American Civil Warand throughout the nineteenth century. In the sameway, the men of the all-black 93d Division foughteffectively under French command during World

War I, as did the experienced black tank and tankdestroyer battalions that often spearheaded the finalAllied drive into Nazi Germany during World WarII. In that light, if the 24th Infantry faltered duringits first two months in Korea, the color of the major-ity that constituted its companies and battalions wasnot the reason. More obvious answers lay in the defi-ciencies of leadership, training, supply, and supportthat burdened the entire United Nations force,whether white or black, during the first months ofthe war in Korea. Those causes nonetheless seemedonly a beginning because they exist in every war andhave time and again given way to the solutions thatgood leadership inevitably supplies. If the 24thsproblems lasted longer than a brief period, deeperreasons would thus have to be found, and theywould inevitably have to reside in considerationsthat distinguished the 24th from all-white units, par-ticularly the racial bias and discrimination, bothopen and covert, that the regiment and its peopleexperienced throughout the units existence.

As authors, we faced major challenges in deter-mining what happened. Few historical problems aremore demanding than those that accompany anattempt to reconstruct the performance of a militaryunit in combat. Every platoon, company, battalion,regiment, and division has its own character, andeach one consists of subunits that are in turn unique.All are composed of thinking human beings who actas individuals. Even so, the people who composethose units or any group will not always behave asthey might on their own. A dynamic can come into

play among them when unusual circumstancesintrude, and the effects it produces, whether acts ofextreme bravery or of mass confusion, may at timesseem hardly rational. Much depends upon the bond-ing that exists among the groups members and thetrust they place in one another and in their leaders.In addition, a groups identity can take new formsover time as circumstances and personalities change.Given those uncertainties and the many variables

involved, the attributes that produce success in com-bat are not always discernable. Well-experiencedunits with unsurpassed achievements may some-times fail while worn units with less than perfectrecords may pull together at a moment of supreme

terror to succeed.Indeed, the nature of combat is such that it is

difficult even for participants coherently and com-pletely to describe the events that occurred. Danger,chaos, confusion, and stress distract attention fromthe main course of the fighting. Meanwhile, per-spectives vary widely, depending on an individualsresponsibilities and his location on the battlefield.The view and understanding of a private will hardlyresemble those of a unit commander. Each willreflect the truth of what happened in his own way.On top of that, the emotional intensity of combatmay deepen the natural tendency of a soldier to for-get embarrassing and unpleasant events and to focushis attention on aspects of the fighting that appeal tohis sense of self-worth.

As combat historian S. L. A. Marshall discov-ered, if time, patience, and special skills are neces-sary to reconstruct what happened even immediate-ly after a battle, it is still more difficult to explain whyit occurred. Marshall brought together all the sur-

vivors of an action and questioned them as a group.Each participant contributed his own view of thebattle, starting at the beginning and moving step-by-step through events as they developed. At first, noone would have a complete understanding of whathad occurred or why events had transpired the waythey did. But after three or four days of effort, a fair-ly coherent picture would begin to emerge.

Nothing of the sort was possible in the case ofthis study. No time or opportunity existed during theearly days of the Korean War for extensive combat

interviews. Events were moving too fast. As a result,we had to rely upon contemporary descriptions ofcombat compiled by the units involved.

Those materials were often extensive. Officers atcommand posts in the field would keep daily jour-nals, collect folders of operations orders and mes-sages, and, from time to time, compose memoran-dums for the record. Once a month, those at battal-ion would draft a war diary, later called a command

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report, for their unit and submit it to the regimentalheadquarters. Using those diaries along with its ownjournals and reports, the regiment would then com-pile a report of its own for submission to the divisioncommand. The division would do the same, and so

on up the line. Each report was accompanied byannexes describing particular problems that devel-oped, lessons learned, and the personnel and supplystatus of the command. There were also maps,graphs, and overlays.

Despite the wealth of information that thosematerials presented, as the study proceeded itbecame clear that all of those sources, particularlythe war diaries, were deficient. Unit records andhuman memories were sometimes incomplete orinaccurate, and those flaws might be carried overinto a narrative. Compounding the problem, wardiaries, although due within a few days after the endof each month, were sometimes actually writtenweeks after the events they described had occurredbecause the demands of combat had intervened. Bythen, daily journals and other unit records mighthave been destroyed or lost, some participants in theaction would have fallen in battle, and the chronicleof what had happened would have had to be recon-structed from fragmentary records and scraps of

memory. On occasion as well, the narratives wereself-serving, presenting a more favorable view ofevents than the facts warranted or covering up therole that poor leadership and decision makingplayed in some military failures. Overall, if some wardiaries were thus beautifully detailed and even bru-tally honest while others were incomplete and lessthan candid, few written records of any consequencespeculated on why events had occurred in the man-ner that they did.

Those difficulties forced the authors to make

heavy use of oral history to bridge gaps and correcterrors in the official records. Yet that approach hadits own problems. The participants in a past action,recounting their experiences in interviews, had tostruggle against their own imperfect memories. Theyhad little access to official records, maps, and over-lays and, except in rare instances, few opportunitiesto revisit the terrain they were attempting todescribe. If they had kept a personal diary, it was

often incomplete. And even where a veteran had agood recall of events, details of one combat actionsometimes merged with those of others until nonebore much resemblance to what had actually hap-pened. Complicating matters, perspectives and per-

ceptions had changed over time where race andother issues were concerned. The influence of thecivil rights movement and the spread of the ideal ofracial equality had worked their way so thoroughlythrough American society that it was often difficultto perceive where a man had stood on the issue dur-ing the war. If some of those interviewed hadchanged very little, others had clearly matured. Menwho had earned reputations as racists among theirsubordinates and colleagues during the war hadbecome remarkably more tolerant and objective overthe forty years between then and now.

Some of the sources that proved most valuableto the study were the transcripts of interviews con-ducted by inspector general teams during the courseof three official investigations into the 24ths perfor-mance in battle. Those materials must be used withgreat care because they are, at times, racially biasedand self-serving. Nevertheless, they contain a greatwealth of information about the fighting, some of itgathered within days of the events described from

witnesses who would soon be killed in combat. Tobe sure, many whites in those interviews blamedtheir black subordinates or enlisted soldiers for everyproblem, and the blacks, on occasion, held theirtongues or played blatantly to the prejudices of theirinterviewers to preserve or further their careers. Butstatements of that sort were easily balanced againstone another and against those of individuals whowere willing to speak their minds, whatever the con-sequences. In addition, some of them are virtualduplicates of stories told by other veterans long

afterwards and of events detailed in radio logs anddaily journals.

We employed caution in dealing with all thosematerials. In the case of documentary evidence, wesought to verify controversial occurrences by seekingout multiple sources for the same information. Ifonly one source existed, we checked the reliability ofprevious assertions from that source and, if anydoubt remained, attempted to verify the account by

PREFACE vii


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getting the comments of veterans who had alreadyproved themselves forthright and knowledgeable.After that, if doubts still persisted, we did not use theinformation.

The same sort of approach applied to oral histo-

ry interviews. We attempted in every case to corrob-orate stories from one source with material from oth-ers or from written records. Where that provedimpossible, the credibility of the source became aconcern. Was that person in a position to know? Didhe have something to gain from the statement? Wasthe rest of the information he provided reliable andaccurate as far as it was possible to tell? Had he beenwilling at times, to paint himself in a bad light todepict the truth? If the responses to those questionswere adequate, in important cases we used the mate-rial but always with an explanation in a footnote. Inthe same way, we tried to label hearsay and rumor assuch throughout the study, but whether or not acomment was well founded, the mere fact that anumber of soldiers said substantially the same thinggave it weight as an indicator of the morale andcohesion of the regiment. In some circumstances,assertions were made in interviews that could havebeen proved only by an official investigation at thetime. Once again, after the proper labeling, we used

these comments if they seemed an adequate reflec-tion of the thoughts of the men at the time. The raceof an individual can of course play a role in how heperceives an event. Because of that, we made it apoint whenever possible to label the race of officersmentioned in the body of the text. Enlisted men andnoncommissioned officers are all black unless other-wise identified.

When a historian examines the history of a mil-itary unit in detail, problem areas tend to eclipsematters that went well. To achieve balance, the suc-

cesses of a unit must be told along with its failures,and what went poorly must be seen in the perspec-tive of what other military units were doing at thesame time and in the same place.

We sought to do that in this study but encoun-tered problems in making the attempt. Since the wardiaries we consulted often tended to be bland orlacking in fine detail, we frequently found it difficultto identify and reconstruct episodes in which all but

the most singular achievements had occurred. In thecase of Medal of Honor winner Pfc. WilliamThompson, for example, unit histories were com-pletely silent until 4 January 1951, five months afterthe day on which the soldier earned his award by

giving his life for his fellow soldiers.As in the case of Thompson, we attempted to

underscore the special deeds of units and individu-als by making the best use wherever we could of ourinterviews and the records and depositions accom-panying award citations. In that way, we were able tosingle out some members of the 24th who overcamethe burdens not only of unpreparedness and weakleadership but also of racial prejudice by performingexemplary acts of achievement during the war.

Over the first two months of the fighting, how-ever, the exploits of those men tended to pale in thecontext of what was going wrong elsewhere in theregiment. The situation changed following thebreakout from Pusan, after the troops and their lead-ers had time to train and mend. From then on, theregiment performed more or less on a par with therest of the Eighth Army.

Overall, we found that comparisons between the24th and the other regiments fighting in Korea weredifficult to make, not only because no two military

units are precisely the same, but also because noneof the other regiments experienced the particularsocial and psychological burdens segregationimposed. A lack of resources was also an impedi-ment. Interviews with almost four hundred individ-uals, two-thirds of them African-Americans, wentinto the research behind the study of the 24th. Aneffort to do the same for other regiments serving inKorea at the time was impossible.

Within those limitations, we did attempt to pro-vide a context for the 24th by pairing it with several

similar units, the 5th, 27th, and 35th InfantryRegiments, all of which served in the same vicinityand experienced the same sort of combat. In doingso, we drew upon the official records of those unitsand conducted a number of interviews with theirveterans to determine the quality of their leadership,the conditions their men experienced, and how wellthey fared in combat. Although the work was hardlyas exhaustive as what was done for the 24th, we are

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confident that it was adequate to show how well the24th performed by comparison.

Many people contributed to the successful com-pletion of this book. Although we cannot mentionall of them here, a number deserve special thanks.

Several Chiefs of Military History, Brig. Gens.William A. Stofft, Harold W. Nelson, and John W.Mountcastle, provided continual moral and materialsupport. The Chief Historian, Jeffrey Clarke, likewiserendered important advice and assistance. Col. JohnCash, Bernard Muehlbauer, Maj. Timothy Rainey,and Young Gil Chang, who has since died, conduct-ed the initial interviews and completed essential pre-liminary surveys of relevant documentation. MaryHaynes, Edward Drea, Terrence Gough, and Maj.Constance Moore, all of the Centers Research andAnalysis Division, assisted with further research andinterviews when the need arose. The Centers librar-ian, James Knight, and archivists Hannah Zeidlikand Donald Carter responded cheerfully to everyrequest for books and documents, even the mostarcane. John Wilson of the Centers OrganizationalHistory Branch was similarly helpful when confront-ed with urgent requests for information on obscuremilitary organizations. Robert J. T. Joy, a professor ofmilitary medicine at the Uniformed Services

University of the Health Sciences, was a constantresource for medical aspects of the study. The EighthArmys historian, Thomas Ryan; Richard Boylan ofthe National Archives; David Keough of the U.S.Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania; and the staff of the Army ReferenceBranch at the National Personnel Records Center inSt. Louis also contributed heavily in locating relevantdocumentation on file with their respective agencies.Col. Clyde Jonas, John Elsberg, Albert Cowdrey,Graham Cosmas, Mary Gillett, and Joel Meyerson of

the Center, along with the late General RoscoeRobinson, Morris MacGregor, Bernard Nalty, andRichard Ruth, read initial drafts of various portionsof the book and made many valuable suggestions.The authors are also grateful to Mr. David Carlisle,who pushed for the manuscripts completion.Meanwhile, Lt. Gens. Julius Becton and Sidney

Berry, Maj. Gen. Oliver Dillard, Brig. Gen. Roy Flint,Cols. John Komp and Gustav Gillert, Sgt. Maj.Richard Sanders, Stephen Ambrose, Clay Blair, PeterBraestrup, John Butler, Richard Dalfiume, RobertGoldich, Joseph Glatthaar, Phillip McGuire, David

Segal, and Frank Schubert evaluated the final draft.Gaye Patrick deserves special thanks for han-

dling correspondence and arranging the interviewsummaries in a useful database form. Thanks shouldgo as well to John Birmingham, who designed thelayout for the book; Beth MacKenzie, who locatedmany of the photographs; and Sherry Dowdy, whoprepared the maps. We are also grateful to our edi-tors, Diane Arms and Diane Donovan, who shep-herded the manuscript through to final publication,as well as Susan Carroll, who compiled the index.

The members of our families merit particularmention for their patience and the constant encour-agement they provided. They contributed muchmore than they will ever know.

Finally, the historian who finds imperfections inthe written records he uses and in the memories ofthose he interviews must recognize that he has thesame flaws in himself. Having done that, he mustmake a special effort to cast off his intellectual pre-

conditioning, to step out of himself and into themoment he is trying to re-create, and to feel as hissubjects felt. Only then can he begin to understandwhy they acted as they did. The reader of this studywill have to decide whether this work succeeds indoing that. For the rest, since the historian must betrue to his own instincts about his material, we, theauthors, are alone responsible for all interpretationsand conclusions that appear and any errors that haveoccurred. Our views do not reflect the official policyor position of the Departments of the Army and

Defense or the U.S. government.

ixPREFACE

WILLIAM T. BOWERSWILLIAM M. HAMMOND

GEORGE L. MACGARRIGLE

Washington, D.C.21 August 1996


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Black Soldier, White Army is a shocking book. Sosaid Clay Blair after reading it. Blair was shockedby the violence of combat in Korea and by the

unreadiness of the 24th Infantry Regiment and therest of the Army to deal with that violence early inthe war. Most of all he was outraged by the decisionof political leaders to send an unready Army to war.This response by the author of The Forgotten War:America in Korea, 19501953, one who has thoughtlong and hard about Korea, suggests that others who

read this book will more clearly understand theKorean record of the 24th Infantry in the broadercontext of the postWorld War II history of thearmed forces and the Army in particular.

There has never been a decade quite as turbu-lent as that which followed World War II. Atomicpower, military demobilization and industrialreconversion, leadership in the United Nations(UN), hostility between the Western allies and theSoviet Union, the Berlin blockade, creation of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, and

Communist Chinese ascendancy in Asia definedthe American response to the Cold War. For thefirst five years there was little confrontation by mil-

itary forces. Then the Korean conflict surprisedWestern policy makers and their constituents,causing the old Western alliance of World Wars Iand II to form again, this time against the SovietUnion and its allies, North Korea and the PeoplesRepublic of China.

Looking back from the eve of the Korean War,it is clear that the United States had undertakeninternational responsibilities that became militaryrequirements in the years that followed. To help

guard against the revival of fascism and to begin thepolitical reconstruction of its former enemies, theUnited States agreed to station occupation troops inGermany, Austria, Trieste, Korea, and Japan.Military leaders believed that the nations commit-ment to occupy and govern the defeated territoriesdemanded conventional military forces both in theUnited States and overseas. But even before the warended, the United States began to reduce its armedstrength from about twelve million to a postwargoal of about a million and a half men.

Demobilization was a political imperative in1945. Meeting demands to bring the troops home,the Army discharged 4 million men in the first six

Introductionby

Roy K. Flint

Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, United States Army (Retired), served as company commander and battalion operations officerin the 23d Infantry during the period immediately following the Korean War and as battalion commander in the 22d Infantryduring the Vietnam War. He holds a doctorate in military history from Duke University. Prior to retirement in 1990, he was

professor and head of the Department of History and dean of the Academic Board at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.General Flint has been the president of the Society for Military History since 1993.


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months and would release most of the remainderby the middle of 1946. The Air Force cut itsstrength in half, from 218 groups to 109, and theNavy reduced the fleet strength by deactivatingships, aircraft, and their crews and halting con-

struction on those ships in the yards at the end ofthe war. Still, the demand for demobilization con-tinued through 1946 and into 1947.

Dismantling the armed forces at the same timethe nation increased its international obligationsalarmed the military professionals. The forces inthe United States were cut to a nucleus of the need-ed reserve, while overseas troops were thinlystretched. Moreover, as the breach between theSoviet Union and the Western European allieswidened, Soviet military forces quickly replacedresurgent fascism as the main military threat to theinterests of the United States. If the Soviets resort-ed to war, they would be able to employ over-whelming land forces almost immediately againstthe nations of Western Europe and the occupationforces of the United States. Moreover, the Sovietscould support ground operations with powerfultactical air forces. At sea the Soviet surface navy wasa negligible threat, but the Soviet submarine forcewas growing. The Soviet Union had abundant

resources and could develop an industrial capacityfar exceeding its achievement in World War II.Soviet potential, in the long term, was seen to bevirtually unlimited; the essential question was:when could the Soviets effectively employ the newair-atomic weapons system?

Not surprisingly, on the eve of the Korean Warthe solution to the American strategic problem wasto deter war by threatening air-atomic retaliation.The purpose of this deterrence was to defendEurope and the continental United States against

the Soviet Union. To implement a single enemystrategy, the United States built an air force capableof air-atomic delivery that was adequate as long asthe American monopoly on atomic weapons andtheir means of delivery existed. But by concentrat-ing on the purchase of long-range bombing aircraft,the United States acquired atomic delivery at theexpense of conventional air, land, and sea capabili-ty, a more costly and politically less attractive alter-

native. As a consequence, the Air Force was shortof aircraft for the close support of ground forces;the Army was ill equipped and understrength; andthe Navy, although able to employ powerful carriertask forces almost immediately, lacked the long-dis-

tance troop-lift capability upon which the Armydepended. Under these circumstances, untilWestern European nations were rearmed and ableto assume the burden of their own protection, therecould be little or no conventional defense ofWestern Europe. Everything depended upon deter-ring Soviet expansion by threatening atomic retali-ation. Up to the outbreak of the Korean War inJune 1950, deterrence was understood to be work-ing because, for whatever reasons, it had not yetbeen tested by the Soviets. In concentrating on pre-venting a big war, however, the nations leaders hadfailed to conceive of a more conventional conflict.

Ironically, the United States was actually betterprepared to fight in Korea than anywhere else inthe world. Although the administration andCongress wanted to adopt air-atomic deterrence tothe exclusion of more expensive conventionalforces, the bureaucratic bargaining between theJoint Chiefswho were also chiefs of the four ser-vicesand the secretary of defense prevented that

solution and forced a roughly equal division offunds that ensured that a ground force was avail-able to fight in Korea. Specifically, in or near JapanGeneral of the Army Douglas MacArthur com-manded 4 reduced-strength Army divisions of theEighth Army; 18 fighter squadrons and a lightbomber squadron of the Air Force; and 1 cruiser, 4destroyers, and a number of amphibious vessels ofthe Navy. In addition, the Seventh Fleet, a power-ful carrier strike force, was available if needed.

Although it may have been difficult for

American leaders to understand that summer nightin June 1950, the North Korean attack was to pointwith unmistakable clarity at the deficiencies in thecombat readiness of the United States. Called uponto meet the North Korean ground attack, the Armyrevealed the inadequacies of a minimalist conven-tional military policy. For as events turned out, theNorth Koreans were simply undeterred by theatomic power of the United States because they had

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no vulnerable industrial targets upon which theyrelied. Moreover, they were strong in mobilizedmilitary manpower, the principal weakness of theUnited States, South Korea, and those countriesUN allies. In time this weakness would be reme-

died, but until the winter of 19501951 Americanand South Korean soldiers suffered terrible casual-ties holding the line against a well-trained, well-armed, and tactically effective enemy army.

So the weakness of the initial military responsein Korea was a result of prewar diversions fromconventional forces of men, money, and materiel tobuild air-atomic deterrence of the Soviet Union. Asa result, MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker,the Eighth Army commander, committed forces toKorea that were flawed. When Walker arrived inJapan in 1949, he had made individual trainingfirst priority in Eighth Army. After receiving rein-forcements, he filled battalions sufficiently toenable realistic training. But he was still limited inhis ability to maneuver offensively and defensivelyby regiments that had only two battalions insteadof three; he could never fill his manpower or equip-ment shortages; and he could not create trainingareas adequate for Infantry-Armor-Artillery com-bined arms training. While individual soldiers

might develop skills, combat readiness sufferedfrom a lack of unit and combined arms prepara-tion. In this regard, the 24th Infantry Regiment wasno worse than any other unit and better off organi-zationally because it was the only regiment inEighth Army with three battalions.

When MacArthur moved combat troops toKorea early in July 1950, the consequences ofcommitting a flawed Army to battle becameapparent. The first American troops to meet theenemy were virtually isolated on the battlefield

and stretched by extended frontages. They werewithout allies, combat support, and sources ofresupply. Moreover, the North Koreans attackedwith a well-rehearsed and effective scheme ofmaneuver: they fixed the American front with atank-infantry-artillery attack, enveloped bothflanks, attacked command posts and mortars inthe rear, and then formed roadblocks to cut offreinforcements and prevent escape. Once in the

rear, North Korean units disrupted the defensephysically and psychologically because thedefenders were ill prepared to fight surrounded.Often the primary concern of the defenders was toescape. MacArthur tried to remedy the problem

by rushing troops to Korea, not only to buildresistance to the North Koreans in their south-ward drive, but also to create a viable theater ofwar capable of sustaining combat forces on thebattlefield. Belatedly, the tasks were accom-plished, but the folly of unreadiness was madeindelible by the mounting casualties.

While all units struggled to overcome organiza-tional obstacles, the 24th Infantry Regiment expe-rienced the especially difficult circumstancesdescribed in Black Soldier, White Army that led to itsinactivation in October 1951. The decision to inac-tivate the 24th was certainly a result of dissatisfac-tion with its performance, but it was also the cul-mination of a gradual change in Army policytoward segregated units that had been under waysince early 1950. In January Army regulationsdirected efficient employment of manpower with-out regard to race, and in March the Army did awaywith quotas that restricted the recruiting of blacksoldiers. As a result, enlistment of black men

increased well beyond the requirements of the seg-regated units. Commanders therefore began assign-ing black soldiers wherever they were needed andexpressed satisfaction with the results. Fears of hos-tility and tension between blacks and whitesproved unfounded, and performance improved inthe integrated combat units.

A segregated Army was always a bad idea, root-ed in the social standards of white Americans in thetwentieth century every bit as deeply as it was inthe nineteenth century. Given the tensions of the

Cold War and the need for economical use of man-power in the modern armed forces, it was a foolishwaste. Regardless of the sentimental attachment ofblack veterans of the 24th Infantry and the blackbattalions in the 9th and 15th Infantry Regiments,segregated units had to go. Unfortunately, beforeKorea no one in responsible positions had the willto overcome personal prejudice or to confrontpolitical opposition to integration. Among the

xiiiINTRODUCTION


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senior Army officers who recognized this fact andhad the courage to act was General Matthew B.Ridgway, Eighth Army commander followingWalkers death in December 1950 and the architectof the UN drive north of the 38th Parallel in the

spring of 1951.After replacing MacArthur as Far Eastern com-

mander in April 1951, Ridgway proved to be thecatalyst that resolved the dilemma over segregatedunits. His purpose was to improve combat effec-tiveness in all units within the Far EasternCommand, so in May, only a month after takingcommand, he recommended assigning black troopsto all of his units in Japan and Korea. He also rec-ommended inactivating the 24th and assigning itstroops to other all-white units in the theater. TheDepartment of the Army approved his recommen-dations in July and directed integration of combatunits over a six-month period; service units were tointegrate after the combat battalions. While inacti-vation of the 24th may be seen by some as an actunrelated to efficiency, it was in fact a highly visiblesymbol of Ridgways dedication to a ready Army:manned, organized, trained, equipped, and sup-plied to go to war at a moments notice. Therewould be no more Koreas.

Understandably, winding down the war inKorea sidetracked the measures needed to achieveRidgways goal. Nevertheless, even before theSupreme Court ruled against separate but equalin 1954, near the end of the decade followingWorld War II, the Army was well on its way to cre-ating a merit-based system that served as a model

of desegregation for the civilian community. Onceundertaken it was so successful that a black soldier,General Colin Powell, eventually served as chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff some thirty-fiveyears later.

Black Soldier, White Army is first and foremostan important social history of black soldiers in theUnited States Army. It explains in vivid detail theclimate of racial prejudice surrounding the regi-ment in Japan and Korea and then in equallyharsh terms, it uncovers the legacy of that preju-dice in combat. Therefore, the unfolding story isalso a military history of the 24th InfantryRegiment in the first fifteen months of the KoreanWar. Black veterans of the 24th may be unhappywith this book as a regimental history because ithas so much to say about the events leading to theinactivation of the regiment in October 1951. Sotoo will white officers who served in the regimentand who must come to grips with the authorscarefully supported portrayal of bigotry anddownright bad leadership that had so much to dowith the troubles of the 24th and that make thebook such an important social history. Similarly,all officers, noncommissioned officers, and sol-diers who served prior to Korea must feel uneasy

about the policies and practices that maintained aracially segregated Army. The attitudes about racethat so damaged the morale and sense of self-worth of the men in the 24th emanated fromevery level of command from the battlefield toTokyo and Washington. This is what Black Soldier,White Army is all about.

xiv THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA


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Contents

Chapter Page

1. Prologue: Two Centuries of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Turbulence and Reappraisal, 19451950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3. Gifu: Our Own Little World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Okinawa and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Life at Gifu, 19461948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

A Time of Change, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4. Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

The 24th Infantry Prepares for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The Journey to Korea and First Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Yechon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

5. Sangju . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

The 24th Moves South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Incidents Near Idang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Combat, 2631 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

6. The Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

The Eighth Army Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Combat, 515 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

7. The Great Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

The 25th Division at the End of August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

The North Koreans Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Colonel Corley Takes Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
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8. To Kunu-ri and Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Breakout and Move North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

The Push Toward the Yalu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

The Chinese Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199The 3d Battalions Ordeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

9. Across the Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

The Eighth Army Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Time To Mend, JanuaryMarch 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

The Han River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Crossing the Hantan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

The Chinese Spring Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

10. Last Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

11. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Appendixes

A. Infantry Regiment Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

B. Black Units Serving in the Korean War, September 1950September 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

Bibliographical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Tables

No.

1. 24th Infantry Strength, 19461947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2. Percentage Distribution of AGCT Scores of Men in Army, 19491950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3. Eighth Army VD Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4. GCT Breakdown25th Division Units (As of 19 September 1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

5. Racial Distribution of Officers When the 24th Infantry Deployed to Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6. 25th Division Losses by 31 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1597. 24th Infantry General Courts-Martial, JulyOctober 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Maps

1. Korea and Japan, 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2. The U.S.ROK Front, 13 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
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No. Page

3. Battle for Yechon, 2021 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

4. 24th Infantry Regiment, Sangju Area, 22 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

5. 24th Infantry Regiment, Sangju Area, 2631 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

6. The Front Moves South, 14 July4 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267. Task Force Kean, 712 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

8. 24th Infantry Regiment, Haman Area, 1626 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

9. The North Korean Naktong Offensive, U.S. 25th Division Sector,

31 August1 September 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

10. The Pursuit, 2330 September 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

11. Battle of the Chongchon, 2528 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

12. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kunu-ri Area, 2325 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

13. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kunu-ri Area, 2630 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

14. Battle of the Chongchon, 28 November1 December 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

15. Eighth Army Withdrawal, 1 December 195024 January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

16. Operation RIPPER, Western Front, 631 March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

17. Han River Crossing, 715 March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

18. Operations on the Western Front, 122 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

19. 24th Infantry Regiment Advance North of Hantan River, 722 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

20. The Chinese Spring Offensive: The Main Effort, 2230 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

21. Eighth Army Advance, 20 May1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

22. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kumhwa Area, 31 August 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Illustrations

Civil War Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Bvt. Brig. Gen. Ranald S. MacKenzie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6The 24th Infantry Marching in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The 24th Infantry Attends Sick Call in Siboney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11American Negro Troops in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15A Kitchen and a Dining Room in a Trench in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17The 24th Infantry Before Going Out To Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Truman Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Aerial View of the 24th Infantry Area, Gifu, Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Enlisted Men of the 24th Infantry Ride Through a River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Camp Majestic, Near Gifu, Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44White Stucco Building at Camp Majestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Members of the 24th Infantry Band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Colonel Halloran With a 24th Infantry Boxing Team Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Troops of the 25th Infantry Division Unload Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61Col. Horton V. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Maj. Gen. William B. Kean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
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Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80The 24th Infantry Waiting To Move Out From Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Soldiers on a Flatcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Troops of Company G, 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Yechon Burns After Being Shelled by American Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Yechon From Top of a Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94A Patrol Moves Up a Hill To Observe North Koreans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97North KoreanHeld Territory West of Sangju . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Members of Company M, 24th Infantry, in the Sangju Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Pfc. William Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Col. Arthur J. Champeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132Men of 159th Field Artillery Battalion Fire a Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Gold Mine in Which Communist-Led North Koreans Hid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Sunday Morning Services Along the Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152The Enemy Side of Rocky Crags on Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161General Douglas MacArthur With Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Mountain Mass West of Haman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Members of the 24th Infantry March Behind Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180Lt. Col. John T. Corley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181Members of a Communications Element Checking Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184Bivouac Site of a Headquarters Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Preparing To Leave an Assembly Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210Men From a 24th Infantry Company Await Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211A Soldier Relays a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225General MacArthur Salutes the Men of the 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226General MacArthur With Sgt. Curtis Pugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226General Omar N. Bradley Meets Troops of the 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Men of the 24th Regimental Combat Team Shield Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Col. Henry C. Britt After Receiving the Silver Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236Men of the 24th Infantry With Korean Porters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238Capt. Oliver W. Dillard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241Men of the 24th Infantry Fight With Chinese Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242Companies B and C, 24th Infantry, Battle Communist Counterattacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249The 24th Infantry Fighting South of Chorwon, Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250Battling a Chinese Counterattack South of Chorwon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251Men of the 3d Battalion Withdraw After Heavy Counterattacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252Ready and Waiting in a Bunker for the Chinese Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254Sgt. Cornelius H. Charlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256Men From Company D After Thirty-Eight Days on the Front Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Members of Company M Prior to Inactivation of the Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 21, 32, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 61, 63, 80, 84, 85, 86,93, 94, 97 (left/right), 111, 132, 136, 138, 152, 161, 166, 170, 180, 181, 184, 198, 210, 211, 225, 226(left/right), 227, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 257, 262, National Archives; and pp.4, 9, 11, Library of Congress. All other illustrations from the files of the Department of Defense.
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black soldier/ white army the 24th infantry regiment in korea (front)

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