Alissa V. Tolstokorova

Independent Expert in Gender Issues, Kiev, Ukraine

Abstract

Is labour migration a viable strategy, indispensable for the solution of the

socio-economic consequences of transition to free market economy? If so,

what are its social and demographic implications for Ukraine as a labour

exporting country? This paper reviews the issues pertaining to international

labour migration in Ukraine throughout the years of transition to free market

economy, placing special emphasis on the role of the human factor in the

process of economic mobility and on the social costs of the human capital

loss for the nation. It traces migration incentives of Ukrainian ‘movers’,

outlines the typology of migration flows, examines the multidimensional

outsourcing from Ukraine due to migration and considers its effect on the

wellbeing of the society.

Introduction

The demise of the socialist system and the transition to liberal market

economy propelled multiple transformations in the post socialist societies.

Throughout the years following the dissolution of the USSR, the social status

of the bulk of the population changed. The ‘shock therapy’ in early 1990s

entailed the emergence of unemployment, the outspread of poverty and a

rapid social polarization of the hitherto homogeneous society. The survival

potential of individuals in the changing economic environment was

preconditioned by their flexibility and adaptability to the process of increasing

social, occupational and geographic mobility. Thus, according to the data of

the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, while in 1986, i.e. at the beginning of

‘perestroyka’, the total of border crossings did not exceed 43,000, in 1991 this

figure increased to 2.3 mln (taken from SIFY, 2004, p. 14). However, if under

socialism the purposes of international travels were mainly business, cultural

and academic cooperation or tourism and leisure, then over the years of

economic reforms the goals of international journeys changed to search for

income and employment abroad. Thus, the so-called “mobility for

Bitter Berries of Better Life: Socio-

Demographic Costs of Labour

Migration for the Ukrainian society1

Enquire 3(1): 58-80

©The Author, 2010

58

1Current work is a revised copy of the draft paper, presented at the International conference

“Facing Tragedies” held at Salzburg University (Austria) on May 6 -9, 2008.

Enquire 3(1)

profit” (D’Ottavio, 2006) became a fundamental factor of postsocialist

transformations.

The Ukrainian labour migration is a comprehensive process, affecting

from 10% to 20% of the working age population (see in more detail below).

Together with family members, it encompasses over 1/3 of the Ukrainian total

population. Indeed, considering the scope, this process invariably transforms

the society. However, the social implications of this change for the nation and

the individual are still awaiting for their conceptualization, insofar as

Migration Studies in Ukraine are but in their infancy, being focused mainly on

the macro- and micro-economic analysis, but still lacking theoretical insights

into the human dimension of increasing economic mobility.

Therefore the goal of this paper is to answer the following questions: is

labour migration a viable strategy for the alleviation of the negative socio -

economic consequences of transition to free market economy? If so, what are

its social and demographic implications for Ukraine as a donor society?

The key argument of the paper is that labour migration entails the outflow

from Ukraine of the most economically proactive, socially and geographically

mobile, skilled and educated cohort of the population, a social backbone of

the modern Ukrainian society who traditionally compose a national middle

class and are viewed as the principal investors into the human capital of the

nation. The lack of this “creative class” (Florida, 2005) in the socio -

demographic structure of the society is one of prime challenges to the

wellbeing and security of the society in the future.

Given that the social implications of labour migration for the Ukrainian

society is a relatively under-researched domain, the paper uses statistics,

reports of sociological polls and analytical materials gleaned from various

secondary sources on Ukrainian labour migration, combined with the results

of the author’s earlier research on this issue.

The Typology of Migratory Flows from Ukraine

Throughout the transition, international economic mobility became

commonplace in Ukraine. Official statistics reflect its dramatic rise over this

period. Thus, if in 1996 it encompassed 11,800 people, in 1998 it nearly

doubled and amounted 24,400, in 2001 - 36,300, and in 2002 reached 40,683

people (SCSU, 2002, p. 177). Experts argue, however, that the officially

registered statistics does not reflect the real situation of labour migration in

the country, inasmuch as it does not consider undocumented migration, which

outnumbers the administratively reported one in dozens times (Vorona,

Shulgha, 2004). Thus, according to a 2001 study of the West -border oblasts2

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Tolstokorova

in Ukraine, it exceeded the official records in 70 times (Libanova, Poznyak,

2002, p. 78). Overall, in regards to migration outflows from Ukraine, national

experts identify four principal kinds, contingent upon ‘legality rate’:

1. Official (documented) labour migration: refers to Ukrainian citizens

who officially declare employment abroad as a goal of their travel

and who acquire a status of legal labour migrants in recipient

countries. It is this category of migrants, who are documented by

official statistics.

2. Undocumented legal migration: border crossing by Ukrainian

citizens, who leave the country with the officially reported goal of

tourism, family visiting, business trips, studies, and so on, but on

arrival to the destination country secure legal employment and

acquire an official residence permit. In Ukraine, these travellers are

not documented by national statistics as official labour migrants, but

in recipient countries they may acquire a legal status as such.

3. Successful undocumented migration: international travels, resulting

in unauthorised, but legal employment, officially recognized by

legislation in the destination countries.

4. Forced migration of criminals’ victims: human trafficking and other

kinds of coerced detention of Ukrainian citizens, often in inhuman

conditions, with the purpose of enforcement into illegal labour

abroad. (SIFY, 2004, p. 14-15)

I argue, however, that this classification lacks at least one more kind of

migration, which requires recognition. It is a clandestine (illicit) kind of border

crossing, either on foot or by air, most often to Ukraine’s border countries:

Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. It is connected with life

hazardous conditions of border crossing, for instance, in refrigerators, engine

sections of air-jets, boots of trucks etc. Although this kind of migration is not

as wide-spread as those above, nonetherless, in 2005 alone the Polish

Border Guards arrested 1388 citizens of Ukraine (including 888 on the Polish

border with EU states) for clandestine border crossing (Jaroszewics,

Szerepka, 2007, p. 91). In 2006, the stock of Ukrainians, trying to cross the

border with Slovakia illicitly, encompassed 264 people (Dušan, 2007). This is

why the above classification should be supplemented by the clandesdtine

border-crossing as a criminal form of migration, which requires closer

attention of migration services in terms of its efficient control and

counteraction.

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2Oblast is an administrative unit in Ukraine, equivalent to a county.

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Incentives for Migration

As research literature maintains, the migration decisions of the majority

of Ukrainians of both sexes are triggered primarily by the outspread of

poverty, low cost of the workforce and dramatic lack of possibilities for gainful

employment (SIFY, 2004, p. 9). Emergence of social inequities in the access

to higher education in the post soviet period serves as an additional motive,

heating economic mobility of young people (Tolstokorova, 2007). In the 2007

sociological poll, 26.7% of the interviewee aged 18 -40 reported to be

considering migration as a viable option for themselves against economic

exigencies at home, among them 19% reported a high probability of leaving

for earnings abroad within the two years ahead (GFK, 2008, p. 4).

As evidenced by a number of polls (SCUFY, SIFY, 2003; SIFY, 2004;

Parkhomenko N., Starodub, 2005), economic motivations for labour migration

are pivotal. Among them, above of all, the intention to advance one’s own

material/economic wellbeing, to earn money to start one’s own business, to

provide for the wellbeing of dependents. Non-economic incentives, such as a

possibility to acquire access to other cultures and to learn a foreign language,

to familiarize oneself with international business standards, to secure

professional experience in a foreign setting, appear to be less significant

(SIFY, 2004, p. 9). Table 1 reflects the dispersion of incentives for

international mobility among potential migrants aged under 40.

It is notable, however, that the majority of Ukrainian migrants,

interviewed in these sociological polls, reported that they would never leave

to work abroad, should there be opportunities for gainful employment at home

(SIFY, 2004). This confirms the opinion of an ILO officer Patrick Taran,

conveyed in the interview to Deutsche Welle, that labour migrants would stay

home if there were no work for them, for example, in Germany (taken from

Gerter, 2005). Indeed, it is obvious that “if there were better opportunities for

economic development in source countries, people would think twice before

making a decision to migrate” (Petrenko, 2006). This is why in regards to

labour migrants from Ukraine, and similarly from other transition societies, the

“migration myth” about the voluntary character of foreign employment,

especially in sex industry and in sweat labor, often undocumented and low -

paid, is entirely groundless. The enforced nature of Ukrainian migration as a

result of economic shock and political crisis as well as its adverse

implications for migrants were admitted in many studies. Thus, as shown by

the Human Development report on Ukraine for 2006, Ukrainian laborers in the

EU are being paid 4-5 times lower than native workers doing the same work.

According to IOM, 46% of them worked 12 hours per day, every fourth – 13

hours and more, 60% had no fixed days off, while 25% did not have days off

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at all. As few as 15% of Ukrainian labour migrants had documented jobs.

Throughout the ten years covered by the Report, over one thousand of

Ukrainian undocumented migrants were detained abroad. They were being

robbed, tortured and abused in jails, treated beyond any legal regulations.

According to the Ministry of International Affairs, over the time span of two

years, more than 2500 Ukrainian citizens were reported perished in 69

countries across the world. In 2003, only on the territory of Russian

Federation 250 Ukrainian labourers were reported missing (taken from

Libanova, 2006, p. 160-161). For them, migration was not a matter of a free

choice, but an enforcement and an imposed survival strategy. Most

Ukrainians, especially the young, seek employment abroad because they

have no other choice to provide decent conditions of life for themselves and

their families. Therefore, I want to emphasize once again the opinion voiced

in my earlier work (Tolstokorova, 2009a) that labour migration from

economically disadvantaged countries to affluent ones should be categorized,

Table 1: Responses of potential migrants to the question regarding their incentives to

leave aboard to work (%)

Motives for leaving abroad %

To advance the material/economic wellbeing 46

To solve housing issues 12

To secure funding for studies 10

To provide for elderly parents 13

To provide for the children 16

To earn money for medical treatment 8

To earn money start one’s own business 20

To pay the debt 5

Unwillingness to live in Ukraine 10

Absence of employment possibilities in Ukraine 14

Willingness to see the life abroad 19

Search for adventures 11

Positive international experience of one’s acquaintances 12

Escape from family violence 0.3

Escape from complications in daily life (in work, studies, etc.) 0.9

Marriage possibilities 4

Other 2

Source: SCUFY, SIFY, 2003, p. 42.

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albeit only theoretically, as “enforced employment displacement” and

“economic asylum seeking”, while labour migrants should be identified as

“victims of structural economic violence” and “economic refugees”. Together

with that, coerced migration or labour exploitation in any labour sector,

including manufacturing, agriculture, service work, domestic work and sex

work, should be treated as trafficking (Chang, 2008).

‘European Vacuum-Cleaner’: Draining Ukrainian Resources

The above classification of migratory flows, pinned mainly on

undocumented kinds of migration, enables a suggestion that the actual scope

of external economic mobility in Ukraine tangibly exceeds the official data.

Thus, according to the state statistic reports, the actual stock of Ukrainian

citizens temporarily employed abroad in 2001, was no less than 1 mln people

(Libanova, Poznyak, 2002a, p. 78). Sociological polls carried out that year by

the State Employment Centres allowed for a conclusion that the total stock of

labour migrants in Ukraine could amount around 2 mln (MLSPU, TSAT, 2002,

p. 41), which was confirmed by the IOM statistics (IOM, 2006). The

information by Caritas and the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of

Sciences of Ukraine evidenced 4.5 mln Ukrainians working abroad (Markov,

2009, p. 59), which is not in stark contrast to the figure of 4.93 mln by the

National Bank of Ukraine (Gajducky, 2007). According to the assessments of

the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine, the stock of Ukrainian citizens

annually working abroad may reach from 5 to 7 mln (Ombudsman of Ukraine,

2003), although experts find these data unrealistic.

Throughout the last decade, the geography of labour migration from

Ukraine tangibly expanded, resultant from the development of new trends in

the labour market, transparency of state borders, the emergence of close

family ties and crossborders community connections. While hitherto the

principal target countries for migration were the closest geographical

neighbours to Ukraine - Russia and Poland – thereafter affluent Northern

economies, mainly OECD members, have joined the list of favoured

destinations. This can be attributed to better living conditions offered by these

societies and liberal immigration legislation, enabling foreign employees to be

more readily legalized. Table 2 provides a summary of key destinations of

Ukrainian migratory flows and their socio-demographic composition.

The Name of the Game: Brain Drain or Skill Drain?

Grouping of the Ukrainian labour migrants by the level of educational

attainments evinced the following distribution: the largest share are skilled

labourers: 38.2% of them have University training, 38.3% - secondary school/

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college education with professional training, 22.5% - secondary school

education and 0.8% - unfinished University studies (Parkhomenko, 2005,

p.78). According to official data (Libanova, 2006, p. 159; Ombudsman of

Ukraine, 2003), up to 30% of Ukrainian researches and scientists work

abroad, the “brain drain” entailing over $1 bn of financial loss annually. Thus,

the US National Science Foundation reported that 45,000 researchers and

technical personnel moved from Ukraine to US alone (Civic Space portal,

2007). Drawing upon these data, the Ombudsman of Ukraine expressed an

opinion that Ukraine turned into a supplier of cheap skilled labour force to

developed societies (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2003). Hence, the society

forfeits “the gold depository” (Libanova, 2006, p. 160) of its intellectual

potential, thereof it can hardly hope for high level of socioeconomic

development.

It is argued, however, that there are no grounds to speak of the ‘brain

drain’ from Ukraine, firstly, due to the lack of accurate statistics, and

secondly, due to the ambiguity of the term ‘highly qualif ied professional’,

which some experts apply only to researches and academics of the top

category (Parkhomenko, 2006). Thus, the statistics on the educational

attainments of Ukrainian migrants, made public in November 2004 at the

Parliamentary hearings “Situation and challenges to legal and social status of

current Ukrainian labour migration”, revealed the following picture: the

average level of education among Ukrainians working abroad was but

insignificantly lower as compared to those staying in Ukraine (10.9 years of

studies vs 11.4 years respectively). High level of education was recorded

among Ukrainians employed in the UK (12.5), USA and Canada (12.3),

Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxemburg and France (11.8).

Education rate of Ukrainians working in Israel (11.5), Spain, Greece and

Portugal (11.0) exceeded the average. In the Russian Federation, the Czech

Republic, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic it was below 10.7 years

of studies (Parliamentary hearings, 2004). It is questionable, however,

whether these educated people have been employed at positions requiring

their respective level of qualification or they were deskilled as a result of

downward occupational mobility.

Thus, the conclusion of national expert based on these figures is that

labour migration from Ukraine throughout 1990s - early 2000s was primarily

an outflow of ‘labour-hands’, but not of the qualif ied professionals or

academics. However, my opinion is that even if it is true that there are no

grounds to speak of ‘brain drain’ from Ukraine, nonetheless, the above figures

evidence the existence of ‘skill drain’, which is no less detrimental to the

national economy. In particular, experts contend that technological and

ecological disasters, commonplace in Ukraine over the last years, are due Ta

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Enquire 3(1)

primarily to the lack of skilled engineers, technical and administrative

personnel resultant from their outflow abroad. The dilapidated system of

public education does not inspire any hope that the prospective generations

of skilled laborers, who will take over the places of the ‘old guard’ in the

labour market, will be equally efficient (Pylynsky, 2007). The so -called “talent

deficit” (Florida, 2005) that ensues, leads to the degradation of the

intellectual potential of the society, and its proletarization, especially in the

long run.

“Vital Energy Drain”: Out -migration of Youth and Persons of

Working and Reproductive Age

Statistics maintain that Ukrainian labour migrants, for the most part, are

middle- and young-aged. The share of youth aged below 28, that is, the most

socially viable and mobile group, amounts around 20 -30% of the total stock of

migrants (SIFY, 2004, p. 10). Furthermore, the share of youth steadily

augments, while the average age of ‘movers’ gradually decreases

accordingly. Thus, if in early 1990s, the average age was 36.0 -37.0 years

(MLSPU, TSAT , 2002), in 2001 it was 33.4-36.0 (Libanova, Pozdnyak, 2002b)

and in 2002 – 33.0 years (Pribytkova, 2002). These figures make plain that

the out-migration from Ukraine is not least a movement of people of the

working age, but most importantly, an outflow of the population of the active

reproductive age. From this, labour migration may be regarded as “vital

energy drain”, if to put it metaphorically.

This kind of a drain is especially challenging if to consider that it is

accompanied by the increasingly gendered character of economic mobility,

entailing regional gender asymmetries in the labour force composition. For

example, in Doneçk, a regional capital of the Ukrainian East, the State

Employment Centre reported a persistent lack of a male labour force and a

surplus of vacancies requiring men, ensuing the outflow of men to work at

construction sites in Russia (DREC, 2005). Meanwhile, in the West -border

oblasts, where females increasingly leave to work as domestics in the EU,

there is a lack of female labour force (Tolstokorova, 2009b, p.66 -67). These

regional disparities in the gender composition of the work force due to the

gendered character of labour out-flows, create a challenge to the

demographic structure of the society, preconditioned by the following

variables: 1) numerical increase in the migration loss of the population of

reproductive age overall; 2) decreasing fertility and birthrates in transnational

families, resultant from the “fragmentation” of their family life (Libanova,

Poznyak, 2002a, p. 18; Tolstokorova, 2009a); 3) increasing gender disparities

in regional marriage markets (SIFY, 2005, p. 22-24) entailing the decline of

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marriage rates3.

Additionally, it is argued that the core of the migratory cohort is

composed by the most economically and socially proactive and self -reliant

people with selforganization skills and entrepreneurial potential, who leave

abroad because they lack opportunities to realize their talents at home

(Vavryshuk, 2006). Thus, despite all the challenges to Ukrainian small

business, the willingness to acquire a capital to start their own business was

one of key migration incentives for around 20% of potential ‘movers’ (SCFY,

SIFY, 2003, p. 42). The outflow of this cohort entails “the flight of the creative

class” (Florida, 2005), which jeopardizes the entrepreneurial and creative

potential of the nation and has adverse implications for the human capital of

the society. Additionally, in the long run, the lack of this proactive group in

the social structure of the society may slow down the efficacy of structural

economic reforms in Ukraine.

Feminization of Migration: Female Drain and Care Drain

In 1990s, when the construction industry was the principal job placement

for Ukrainian workers abroad, migratory flows were composed, for the most

part, by males. In 2000s, however, a wave of female migration started (GFK,

2007, p. 9) in response to “changing labour markets globally, particularly the

massive demand for cheap female labour from poor countries to fill the

growing demand for caregivers in rich countries” (UN -INSTRAW, 2007a, p. 1).

Therefore, it was caused by the so-called “care deficit” (Hochcshild, 1997) in

the First World and the ensuing “care crises” (UN -INSTRAW, 2007b). Hence,

the feminization of Ukrainian low-cost migrant force, if seen in larger terms,

was preconditioned by new requirements in the labour markets in societies

‘on the demand side’.

For one hand, it was connected with the age related problems, which

cause nowadays the most serious concerns in the post -industrial world

(European Commission, 2005). Northern societies are ageing rapidly, the age

pyramid being turned on its head as long as birth rates fall down and life

expectancy rises up. Feminist scholarship convincingly demonstrated that the

socio-economic underpinnings of ‘care deficit’ encompass the following key

determinants: a massive entrance of women into the labour market of paid

professions coupled with the traditionally unequal distribution of household

responsibilities between the sexes; a dramatic aging of the population

accompanied by a grave health-care crises; the deconstruction of the welfare

3Thus, for instance, in the ChernivcyWest-border oblast alone, the most highly affected by

migration, marriage rates throughout 1990-s dropped in 1,3 times (SCSU, ChRD, 2001, p.

235).

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state and the ensuing relocation of care work from the state to the family

(Aronson, Neysmith, 1996; Ungerson, 2000; Degiuli, 2007). The combination

of these factors created a high demand for paid care services, hitherto

performed by the unpaid “labour of love” (Bock, Duden, 1977) of women and

girls in the family. Thus, a large informal “care economy” emerged, also

referred to as “invisible economy” (UNRISD, 2007), or “other economy”,

aimed to maintain the direct production and maintenance of human beings

(Donath, 2000).

For the other hand, feminization of migratory flows was propelled by the

processes of accelerated urbanization and the rise of “world

cities” (Friedman, Wolff, 1982), shaped to a large extent by gender roles and

relations. As discussed in my earlier paper (Tolstokorova, 2009c), these nodal

megalopolises are “vital to the smooth functioning of the global

capitalism” (Prol-Position News, 2005, p. 8), because they concentrate

advanced services of international level, have decision -making abilities and

represent a dimension of global economic command (Agibetova, Samson,

2008). Furthermore, they perform the functions of management, banking and

finance, legal services, accounting, technical consulting, telecommunications

and computing, international transportation, research and higher education

(Friedman, Wolff, 1982), requiring highly paid, skilled professionals, ready to

work long hours. As was shown in a number of works (Hochcshild, 1997;

Sassen, 1998; 2001; Parreňas, 2001), to be able to work full -time, employees

in these highly competitive urban sectors tend to relocate a growing share of

domestic and care work from the household onto the labour market, by hiring

domestic and care workers. To sustain this sector of the high -paid ‘while

collars’ and to enable them to work full -time, a labour market of low skill

workers is required to fill the ‘care deficit’ in homes of the former, starting

with office and house cleaners to carers for the children and the elderly.

Therefore, the acceleration of these elitist urban sectors is accompanied by a

concurrent growth of a labour market of low paid and low status workers,

recruited mainly from deprived social groups: women, retired persons,

migrants from poorer countries, etc. Hence, ‘world cities’ depend on migrant

labour, primarily on females as traditional careers and domestic workers.

From this, the ‘care crises’ coupled with the development of a network of

‘world cities’, were the “motors of the feminisation of migratory process’,

because they ‘have opened up labor opportunities mainly available to women

in the area of care giving” (UN -INSTRAW, 2007b, p. 2-3). This lead to the

outflow of care labour force, i.e. mainly females, from the source countries

and therefore entailed “care drain” (Hochschild, 2000) and “female drain” from

these economies. The adverse effect of these kinds of outsourcing on the

Ukrainian family and community was the case in point in my earlier papers

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(Tolstokorova, 2008; Tolstokorova, 2009a; Tolstokorova, 2009b), so, I will not

dwell on them here. What is important to accentuate however, is what can be

identified as a ‘Deae ex Machina effect’ of this kind of outsourcing, outlined

by feminist scholars (Fodor, 2006; Lyberaki, 2008). Thus, it is argued that the

deterioration of the economic situation of women in countries of collapsed

state socialism, followed by the outflow of females for earnings aboard,

“strikingly coincided” (Fodor, 2006) with an emerging demand in female

labour in countries of the collapsed welfare state, and thus ensured a “sudden

supply of –relatively cheap and flexible – immigrant labour” (Lyberaki, 2008,

p. 1) to compensate for the shrinking labour market of domestic workers

“exactly at the time” (Fodor, 2006) when it was most required by ‘the demand

s i d e ’ , t h u s e n s u r i n g t h e s o - c a l l e d “ j u s t - i n - t i m e w o m e n ’ s

migration” (Karjanen,2008). Considering a UN -INSTRAW argument that the

regulatory frameworks of immigration policies in destination countries play an

important role in channeling migration by directly or indirectly promoting the

immigration of particular groups according to the requirements of their labour

markets (UN-INSTRAW, 20007a, p. 2), these observations enable a

conclusion that the emergence of the class of “new domestics” (Lutz, 2008,

p.4), represented mainly by women, was due not to the requirements of the

supply side, triggered by the desire of impoverished women to seek ‘better

life’ “in countries where standards of living and thus salaries are much

higher” (Lutz, 2007, p.189), but primarily, due to the requirements of the

demand side. In particular, due to the fact that “Europe's population would

decline without migrants” (Phillips, 2008) and because “Europe will, on

current trends, come to rely ever more on immigrants to balance supply and

demand in labour markets, and more generally to fuel economic

growth” (OECD, 2007, p. 11).

Children Drain and Teenage Drain: a Challenge to the Nation’s

Demographic Future

The outflow of women from Ukraine entails another kind of drain as a

“chain reaction of the care crisis” (Prol -Position News, 2006, p. 12). More

specifically, it goes about such a recent trend in migration flows as the

increase in family reunifications due to achieved legislative regularizations

with some countries. However, this process mainly entails the reunification of

migrant mothers with their children in the country of work. Less often it

encompassed the reunification of migrant wives with their husbands or

migrant husbands with their wives, leave alone a reconjunction with elderly

parents. Therefore, ‘female drain’ invariably develops into ‘children drain’

from Ukraine, thus accelerating the trend of the aging society and increasing

the demographic pressure on the working age generation. This tendency is

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accompanied by the growing numbers of babies born in Ukrainian families

abroad. For example, according to the data of the Ukrainian embassy in Italy,

in 2006 alone, 1,700 newborns of Ukrainians living there, were registered as

citizens of Ukraine (taken from Kudryk, 2007). It should be noted, however,

that parents of babies born aboard (which often automatically secures them a

citizenship in the hosting country), who are young and middle aged people

often with a status of documented workers, are the least likely to ever return

to Ukraine, because they are the most integrated category of migrant couples.

Furthermore, now that the Act of the Parliament from September 2008

prohibited double citizenship in Ukraine, it is most unlikely that the choice of

citizenship will be made by migrants in favour of the home country, which is

not ready to accept its citizens back (Tolstokorova, 2009a).

A tangent effect of the female out -migration is what is being referred to

as “a changing gender consc iousness o f m igran t women ’s

children” (Cherninska, 2007), which in the long -run may entail a ‘teenage

drain’ from Ukraine. This phenomenon implies that due to the absence of

parents, these “social orphans”4 are bereft of the natural experiences of

family socialization and samples of gender roles arrangements (Nikolayevsky,

2007, p. 123). Therefore, they have no opportunities to learn such survival

skills as self-organization, individual responsibility, emotional maturity, and so

on. Put otherwise, migration fosters a generation of young Ukrainians, who

are reluctant to work, but instead choose to live on remittances sent by their

parents, wasting them on their whims, if not vices (Kyrchiv, 2004) They do not

see how hard their mothers (and fathers) work abroad to provide for the

wellbeing of their children. What they do see is remittances arriving from

abroad. So, in effect, they often regard their parents as ‘paycheck

fathers’ (Mummert, 2005) and ‘private ATM machines’ (Tolstokorova, 2009a),

emitting banknotes for them. They associate international employment with

easy money and dolce vita, and grow up with a belief that making money is

worth only abroad. Being financially better -off than children from non-migrant

families, they are perceived by their peers as a telling example of the validity

of this belief. It comes as no surprise than, that a sociological poll among

migrants’ children at a number of Kyiv high schools showed that 86% of them

did not see their future in Ukraine, while 65% of school -graduates were willing

to leave abroad by all means and as soon as possible (taken from Kyrchiv,

2004). This means that children of labour migrants represent a ‘lost

generation’ for Ukraine and a cohort of new potential ‘movers”, unlikely to

contribute to the national economy.

Additionally, the ‘children drain’ via labour migration is exacerbated by

4Social orphans are “children deprived of parental care”, or “children who are left without care

of their parents” (MUFCYA, CSREC, 2004, p. 76.)

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the growing number of adoptions of Ukrainian children by foreign nationals

from low fertility nations, primarily from Italy. Thus, according to the expert

assessments, throughout the years of independence, over 30,000 of

Ukrainian minors have been adopted by foreigners (Komsomol’skaya Pravda,

2009). Furthermore, there is a growing number of trafficked children, used for

sexual exploitation, organ/tissues donation, forced begging and involuntary

servitude in the agriculture (Chaloff, Eisenbaum, 2008). In Ukraine, in

conditions of the increasingly aging society, the outsourcing of children,

teenagers and young adults, combined with the outsourcing of women of

reproductive age, means the outsourcing of the nation’s ‘genetic depository’,

which jeopardizes the reproductive potential of the nation and may have

devastating consequences for the demographic structure of the society both

in the short and in the long run. Some experts speak about the effect of

“decreasing passionarity”5 of the nation resultant from the out -migration

(Nikolayevsky, 2007, p. 121).

Thus, for the efficacy of migration policy in Ukraine, it is necessaary to

take into account the gender and age dimentions of the economic mobility, so

that to efficiently regulate challenges, caused by the socio -demographic

specificities of the labour force flows. Likewise, it is necessary to consider

increasing feminization of migration from Ukraine to Northern economies so

that to make women-migrants and their exigencies visible and address them

within the framework of the state migration policy and management.

Conclusions: Migration as a ‘Danaorum dona’6 of

Democratisation

As various studies have demonstrated (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 1995;

Isbister, 1998), migration scholarship in labour exploiting societies, echoed in

global reports by the World Bank (2007), OECD (2007), UNDP (2009), favours

an apologetic approach to migration, highlighting its overall positive effect

and a progressive role in promoting the ‘supply and demand’ balance in the

labour markets on both sides of migration circuits. Furthermore, remittances

became a sort of ‘migration mantra’, seen as a panacea against economic

hardships in families of migrants and source societies at large, and a key

5“Passionarity” is a term coined by a dissident Soviet historian, ethnologist and anthropologist

Lev Gumilyov (1912-1992). It is the central concept of his “Passionarity Theory of

Ethnogenesis” and may be explained as the level of vital energy and power, characteristic of

any given ethnic group. Retrieved January 30, 2010, from www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Lev_Gumilyov

6“Gifts of Danaans”, from Vergilius’s: “Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes “ (lat.) - Beware of

Danaans (Greeks) even if they bring gifts.

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‘silver lining argument’ for those who are mindful of negative repercussions of

outsourcing. Yet, what is silenced is that remittances accelerate inflation in

the receiving countries, and therefore, shrink the consuming potential of the

population (SIFY, 2004, p. 21). Additionally, the benefits of remittances “may

not offset the losses of the local social protection systems and/or budget

deficits resulting from the fact that the migrant workers do not pay taxes in

their home countries, but their families use public goods (healthcare,

education and other public services” (Góra, Rohozynsky, 2009, p. 11).

Equally, while foregrounding the financial benefits of labour export for the

source societies, this approach often neglects the social and human costs of

migration, especially in the medium and the long run. Hence, the focus in

migration research and management is not on the individual as a subject in

the “emerging system of international labour mobility” (OECD, 2007, p.12),

but on the economic outputs of human activities. This explains why the

phrase “We asked for workers but people came”, became an “oft -repeated

aphorism” (taken from OECD, 2007, p. 23.)

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian sources gleaned in this paper make plain that

the voices from the ‘supply side’ are not as optimistic. For, while

acknowledging that labour migration is “a plus for the economy’, the national

media, the academic community and the civil society emphasize that first and

foremost, it is ‘a minus for the society” (Volyanska, 2005). The nodal among

its adverse implications is the loss of human resources, accompanied by

social and emotional costs for the individual, the family and community. In

turn, this position is criticized as “anti -modern”, “conservative” and

“traditionalist” (Zimmer, 2007) by those voicing the interests of the labour

exploiting side.

As was shown in this paper, the post soviet transition, allegedly aimed to

provide a ‘better life’ by means of the democratization of all sides of life in a

hitherto totalitarian society, in essence turned Ukraine into the supplier

country in the world economic system, exposed to multiple drains in favour of

its core: brain drain and skill drain, female drain coupled with care drain,

children and teenage drain, the drain of the nations’ vital energy accompanied

by the outflow of the ‘creative class’. This multidimensional outsourcing

gradually changes the status of the country in the new global economic order,

moving it from the semi-periphery, where it resided hitherto as a society of

state socialism (Lane, 2004), into the direction of “the bottom billion” (Collier,

2007). Not surprisingly, in the World Bank Report for 2006 (World Bank,

2007), Ukraine was ranked the 3rd among the top ‘labour exporting countries’

in the world. Having less than 46 million of the total population, it exports

more labour force to the Northern economies than India and Сhina. The pull

of remittances Ukraine receives from the citizens working abroad, by analysts’

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assessments, may amount between 0.7% to 25% of GDP (GFK, 2008, p. 5).

Thus, according to the National Bank of Ukraine, in 2006 alone Ukraine

received $5.6 bn of remittances from its migrant workers (taken from

Gajducky, 2007), the IFAD statistics for that year was $8.47 bn (IFAD, 2007,

p. 12). Meanwhile, by the estimates of Ukrainian experts the real sum may

reach up to 10-20 bn (taken from Fedorak, 2007), considering that Ukrainians

do nut trust the national bank system and prefer unofficial means of credit

transfer. By contrast, the foreign direct investments Ukraine attracted

throughout 16 years of the state independence, did not exceed $24 bn (Kyiv

Post, 2007). In the most economically disadvantaged oblasts, as for instance

Ternopil and Chernivcy, this contrast is even more remarkable: the ratio

between foreign investments and informal migrant remittances into the

national economy amounting 1 vs 40 (Parkhomenko, Starodub, 2005, p. 20).

Alongside with that, Ukraine among other postsocialist states, is qualified by

international organizations as one of the main countries of origin of trafficking

in women, men and children, sold in slavery abroad with the purpose of

sexual exploitation and forced labor (US Department of State, 2006).

Therefore, my general conclusion is that the post soviet “school of

democracy” (Homra, 2000) instead of placing the Ukrainian demos in the

heart of the societal system, has converted it into the principal “export

commodity“ (Tolstokorova, 2009a), generating foreign exchange for the home

economy (Seguino, Grawn, 2006), and an object of lucrative trade by the

“cosmopolitan, comprador, bourgeois” elites (Soskin, 2007, p. 3), enabling

them to survive in the globalized economic system, maintained by the ‘three

whales’: trade in goods, capital flows and movement of people. From this, the

answer to the key question of this paper, formulated in the introduction, is

rather negative than positive, because the materials of this paper showed that

for the counteraction of socio-economic challenges of postsocialist transition,

migration is not a viable strategy: while resolving some immediate economic

problems, it fosters new exigencies instead. That is, although it may have

some economic benefits in the short run due to remittances, in the long and

medium run it will have, and already has had, devastating socio -demographic

consequences for the society at large. Indeed, migration can be seen as a

temporary solution to economic hardships of the transition period, and at the

onset of economic reforms this approach was sound and commendable.

Nowadays, however, given the loss of migration flux in Ukraine amnounting

20-30% of its total stock, it is already obvious that labour migration from

Ukraine to Western Europe, North America, Israel and Oceania has been

acquiring a permanent pattern (Libanova, 2006, p. 160), confirming the

aphorism that “nothing is more permanent than a temporary

immigrant” (OECD, 2007, p. 23). Thus, the “bitter berries of better life” in

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Ukraine are in the irreparable loss of the most creative bulk of the nations’

human resources.

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