Introduction

On 06 April 1994, the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi

crashed under very mysterious circumstances while preparing to land at

Kigali International Airport killing all on board and initiating an event the

world became witness to through television coverage in the days that

followed. A well-planned genocide ensued for some 100 days that brutally

ended the lives of close to 800,000 Rwandans. Canada’s then Brigadier-

General Dallaire was the Force Commander in Rwanda who found himself

in the untenable position of trying to do the impossible and stem the tide of

violence that pervaded the country. It was impossible as the United Nations

Assistance Mission for Rwanda was scaled down from a force size of 2519

to just under 500. There is much that has been written about the catastrophic

events that took place in Rwanda to include the award winning book by

Senator Romeo Dallaire “Shake Hands with the Devil, The failure of

Humanity in Rwanda.” This remains the enduring story of this tiny sized

Central African country as Rwanda continues even today to find

reconciliation. Yet there are other stories.

There is an untold story of some 350 Signallers who deployed to Rwanda

beginning in late June 1994. These professionals of all ranks were from the

1st Canadian Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment who found

1

themselves thrust into a mission in very short order that saw them deploying

to a country most had never heard of. An operationally focussed, highly

respected mission commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Hanrahan, led

them. He formed the deploying unit primarily from his Regiment, with

additional augmentees coming from the 1ST CANADIAN Division

Headquarters, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and the 3 rd Canadian

Support Group to name a few. The focus of this story is on the soldiers who

were thrown into the middle of ‘chaos’ and in the end showed everyone how

good they were. They achieved all assigned objectives and more. They

epitomized the great qualities we have in our non-commissioned ranks and

why we consider them the best soldiers in the world.

The contributions of the Signal Regiment go far beyond the vital

command and control that was urgently required by General Dallaire’s

headquarters and delivered by the Canadian Signal Squadron. Indeed this

was probably the easy part of the mission for there were many other

Canadian contributions that are very worthy of mention to include the many

specialists that accompanied the Signallers.

In support of this story it is important to have an appreciation of

Rwanda’s magnificent geography. It is quite mountainous, lush with

2

tropical forests, and not always easy to traverse. This reality challenged the

Regiment’s deployment plan once in country.

Trying to pinpoint Rwanda on a map is a challenge. It is a small, densely

populated landlocked country bordered by the neighbours of Uganda in the

north, Tanzania the east, Burundi in the south and by the ever turbulent

Democratic Republic of Congo in the West. The Regiment was based in the

capital of Kigali and had at the same time Signal detachments in the

Rwandan towns of Rhuengeri, Giseyni, Kibuye, Cyangugu, Gikongoro,

Butare, Byumba, Kibungo and Gabiro.

Rwanda is known as the land of a ‘thousand hills’ and a long chain of

mountains running from south to north reaches a height of 15,000 feet at

mount Karisimbi and literally divides the country in two. This presented a

significant communications and logistics challenge for 1 CDHSR, which

was overcome through great planning, and even better execution.

Incidentally the series of volcanic mountains in the northern region of

Rwanda bordering with the DRC and Uganda is where the Naturalist Diane

Fossey made a name for herself studying and protecting the Mountain

Gorillas. It is also where the movie “Gorillas in the Mist” was set. This is

an area of the world where gorillas still live and roam in complete freedom.

Many soldiers from 1 CDHSR had the opportunity to visit the gorillas in

3

Volcanoes National Park escorted by Park Guides who came out of hiding

after the genocide. It was a captivating moment for many when they sat no

more that ten feet away from a very imposing silver back gorilla and

watched as he and his tribe viewed the odd looking blue beret’d soldiers

from Canada.

This was just one of the unique opportunities that came along for the

men and women of 1 CDHSR during the mission.

The road network allowed the Regiment good access to main areas of

the country. All secondary roads were dirt and in various states of repair

depending on the time of year and amount of rain. All of the high features

were quite difficult to reach by road and in some cases accessible only by

helicopter. One significant vehicle roll over involving an MLVW with a

water trailer occurred on the road between Kigali and Rhuengeri involving

Corporals Norris, Beyers and Lapalante. All were fortunate to get away

with no injuries.

The historic social problems in Rwanda run very deep. The

demographic reality to keep in mind is that the population in 1994 was about

7 million people with the vast majority of them being Hutu while the

minority elite came from the Tutsi tribe. There was also a marginalized tribe

called the Twa. The aristocratic Tutsi’s had traditionally been the upper

4

class of Rwandan society while the Hutus were the blue collar workers, kept

in feudal dependency by the Tutsi’s. The Tutsi domination of the Hutus led

to a rebellion in 1959 resulting in the overthrow of the ruling monarchy.

The Hutu revolution and the abolition of the Tutsi kingdom created more

that 100,000 Tutsi refugees who fled the country. Many of the refugees

sought safe haven in neighbouring Uganda. The deposed Tutsi’s formed the

Rwandan patriotic front or RPF. The Rwandan government army or RGA

backed the Hutu led government, yet the composition of both forces was

never clear-cut as the Tutsi lead RPF included a fair number of Hutu

moderates.

In October 1990 the RPF with an estimated gorilla force of 10,000

crossed the border from Uganda into northeast Rwanda and attacked the

government forces. These attacks continued until March 1993 when a

cease-fire agreement was signed between the Rwandan government and the

rebels. The RPF remained contained in the north of the country and a 19

kilometre wide de-militarized zone was set up. An agreement was

negotiated between the two groups in August 1993 referred to as the Arusha

Peace Accords. These five protocols looked to establish a broad based

government with equal representation from Hutu and Tutsi tribes, a Joint

5

Army, and free elections. The UN was asked to implement and oversee the

Arusha Accords. Unfortunately the agreements were never implemented.

From the moment of the aircraft crash on 06 April total and complete

anarchy reigned in the country until the end of July 1994. The RPF

eventually completed the liberation of Rwanda by the end of July. The

former government forces were in shambles and on retreat into the DRC

where they continue to exist to this day. France became involved in Rwanda

by establishing a safe haven in the south-western part of Rwanda for those

people fearing recrimination from the RPF. This was referred to as the

“turquoise” zone. The RPF distrusted the French forces and were certainly

suspicious of the Foreign Legion soldiers that were deployed in the region.

Due to the effects of the civil war there was widespread damage to

much of Rwanda’s entire infrastructure to include their television, radio,

satellite earth station and telephone systems. They were cut off from the

outside world and unable to communicate within. Virtually all of the UN

communications collapsed within days. The Force Commander was unable

to communicate beyond the limits of Kigali.

In May of 1994 the UN Security Council expanded the force size to 5500

strong. The new mission of UNAMIR was to pursue a cease-fire and assist

with the enormous humanitarian effort. The concept was for the

6

peacekeeping to be carried out by African troops, while the non-African

countries were asked to provide the force level combat support and combat

service support. In turn Canada was asked to provide the Force level

communications for UNAMIR. Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel

Michael Hanrahan deployed on a staff assistance visit to Kenya, Uganda,

and Rwanda in early June 1994. He accompanied the Canadian Deputy

Minister, the DCDS and a few NDHQ staff officers. The aim of this visit

was to establish the overall requirement in support of the mission.

General Dallaire, made it quite clear that he wanted Canadian soldiers

committed. His concept of operations was to expand his UN Headquarters

and establish a series of UN sectors (each based on an infantry battalion)

throughout the entire country. The military signals unit would be

responsible for the establishment and maintenance of communications links

between and among the force commander and his HQ, his regional sector

commanders and their HQ and other designated sites and key command

centres. The staff assistance visit confirmed the requirement for a radio

heavy signal squadron sufficient in size to support a brigade size formation.

This requirement included the necessary headquarters support, along with

voice and data communications links.

7

The detailed reconnaissance that took place at the end of June 1994

confirmed the overall mission requirement to deploy a flexible, highly

mobile, and secure communications unit, and a strong logistics element to

support the deployment of UNAMIR’s forces into Rwanda. The deployment

plan was to be very fluid and the communications systems had to cater to all

of the changes.

The main UN headquarters itself in Kigali was in a shambles. The

staff were ineffective and dispirited. They focused a majority of their time

on survival with little left for work. General Dallaire was in desperate need

of organization and rigour in his key command and control node. 1 CDHSR

was definitely up to the task and challenge.

The situation remained very complex in Rwanda with French troops

continuing to occupy the south-western part of the country. France agreed to

remove their troops provided the UN took control of the protected zone and

assured the security of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people within

it. The communications requirement began to expand as more sectors were

established. In the end there were eleven sectors, two force headquarters

and three independent UN locations within Kigali all requiring Canadian

Signal support. The Canadian Signal Squadron provided the means and

support for all.

8

The Canadian Signal Squadron’s mandate involved four main

objectives. The first was to establish a country wide communications

network (voice and teletype) between UNAMIR HQ in Kigali and each of

the sector headquarters. At the same time it would be crucial to provide HQ

support at both main locations in Kigali and Butare. Thirdly, it was

important to assist the UN field services organization in re-establishing the

UN communications system for this would then allow the Canadian

signallers to transition and eventually withdraw. Finally 1 CDHSR would

assist the legitimate government of Rwanda in re-establishing their

communications infrastructure.

The first two tasks were stated and clearly understood. However the

establishment of a tactical headquarters at Butare was an additional

requirement that developed once on the ground. Assisting UN Field

Services was vitally important to gain the confidence and cooperation of the

government and the Rwandan Patriotic Army. It was the Rwandan Army on

the ground that controlled the areas of the country that the Signal Squadron

required access to.

The concept of operations was straight forward. The Canadian Signal

Squadron would establish sector headquarters on a priority basis as the

9

infantry battalions deployed into them. The Canadian signallers worked

very closely with the UNAMIR staff throughout.

Support to General Dallaire’s HQ had to commence immediately so as to

allow the military staff to get on with overseeing the broad mission mandate.

It was then Lieutenant Dan Gagnon’s troop of personnel that managed to

transform UNAMIR HQ in short order. He and his band of mission

focussed soldiers allowed the staff to focus on their primary role as a force

level headquarters in the planning and directing of vital operations.

It was important that the Canadian Signal Squadron personnel be involved in

the sector reconnaissance’s so that the eventual selection of HQ locations

was done keeping communications utmost in mind. This ultimately meant

choosing the high ground given the significant challenges with the

mountainous terrain. With Canadian involvement it was easy to convince

the Battalion commanding officers of the advantages of locating their HQ’s

on the dominant features and reinforced through communications checks.

This further allowed for a professional working relationship between

Battalion Commanding Officer’s (CO’s) and their Canadian signal

detachments. It also became apparent that some CO’s were not convinced of

the requirement to have their signal detachments co-located with their

headquarters. They were quickly convinced of this need when on more than

10

one occasion the force commander summoned them to converse over the

communications network.

The overall communications plan involved the great work of officers such as

then Captain Luc Angiolini who was the Squadron’s Operations Officer,

Lieutenant Tom Long who commanded the troop that deployed troops to the

sectors, and Chief Warrant Officer Bruno Savard, the Chief

Communications Operator along with many others. They were diligent and

thorough in their assessment and planning of what could and had to be

achieved.

The plan accomplished all it set out to do. However there were delays in the

initial implementation due to the flow of equipment and personnel into

Rwanda from Canada. This is one of the significant challenges that will be

commented on at the end.

Thus taking into consideration the geography of the land, the equipment and

personnel shortages in the early stages the aim was to establish country wide

communications in three phases.

Phase one would see a country wide voice network established between

Kigali and all Sector Headquarters along with commencing the much needed

HQ support at Kigali and the tactical HQ at Butare.

11

Phase two would see the deployment of radio re-broadcast detachments on

top of Mount Karongi and transition to a secure voice network along with

the establishment of a secure teletype network.

The final phase would see the transition from the Canadian military

communications system to that of a comprehensive un one.

In the end the plan followed these phases. The advance party arrived into

theatre by the third week of July 1994. They were to lay the groundwork for

the deployment of the Signal Squadron proper once it was declared

operational. Reality demanded the deployment of soldiers and equipment

take place soonest after arrival into theatre in order to support General

Dallaire’s aim of establishing a UN presence countrywide as soon as

possible.

Thus four hastily constituted two-man detachments were sent to Giseyni,

Kibuye, Ginongoro and Cyangugu. They each had a high frequency radio

manpack radio and an INMARSAT satellite telephone system. This was the

defining moment of communications on a shoestring, but in the end it

delivered. The equipment and personnel situation improved and the flow of

soldiers and the necessary equipment continued over the next 8 to 10 weeks.

By the end of August 1994 Phase one was complete.

12

By 26 September 1994 a well-defended radio re-broadcast location was

established on the top of Mount Karongi (2600m elevation) thanks to the

outstanding efforts of Lieutenant Tom Long and his troop warrant officer

Lopes. This location allowed 1 CDHSR to communicate by secure voice

countrywide to all sector HQ’s and was certainly a gratifying moment for

the planners and executer. They clearly showed their strength as

communications specialists. One week later the teletype network was

operating and by the middle of September 1994 the Canadian Signallers

were ready to assist the UN Field Services in establishing their

communications network.

The transition plan called for a shift of UNAMIR’s communication system

comprised of military and civilian personnel and equipment to an entirely

civilian based system provided by the UN Field Services. This transition

was accomplished by the end of January 1995.

Transition to a UN System

It is important to point out some of the highlights of the transition. To

begin, the relationship between the Force Signal Officer, then Major Paul

Rutherford, and the UN Chief Communications Officer, (CCO Tad?) was

crucial in Rwanda. There are separate reporting chains for civilians and

military thus the CCO reported to the Chief Administrative Officer and

13

ultimately to the Senior Representative of the Secretary General. On the

military side the Force Signal Officer worked for the Force Commander and

through the military staff. Despite there being no formal command

relationship between the Force Signal Officer and the CCO it became very

clear that the overall success of the communications plan rest in a productive

working relationship between the two. Both individuals worked hard at

ensuring this relationship worked and that both organizations therefore

worked well together. This was the reason for the overall success of the

communications plan.

The CCO and his staff were not necessarily the best planners but they were

top rate technicians who knew their systems well. The Canadian Signal

Squadron on the other hand had the necessary planning staff to arrive at a

well sequenced transition plan. It resulted in both organizations working

very close together to arrive at the common goal. Indeed technical

assistance teams were formed made up of both military and civilian

personnel to travel to the sector HQ’s and complete the necessary

installations.

In the end the military communication system was replaced by a

combination of Motorola radio, rural telephone lines and satellite

14

communications. These systems were in place by January 1995 and

therefore allowed for the removal of Canadian communications assets.

It is important to comment about the business of supporting a headquarters.

Signallers in the Canadian Army understand this role well. Indeed our

present day Brigade Signal Squadron’s and Joint Signal Regiment provide

the vital support to allow headquarters to function properly. Again this was

a crucial requirement at UNAMIR HQ. The introduction of a Headquarters

troop in early August 1994 was extremely well received. The functional

areas that were addressed were, the camp commandant function (overall HQ

management), HQ orderly room for the effective management of

information, information system support, and signal dispatch service.

General Dallaire commented himself that the troop transformed his HQ and

allowed it to function again.

Contingency operations were continually being developed for the

overwhelming displaced persons problem which the government of Rwanda

faced after the genocide. It is believed that more than a million people were

displaced into the DRC or into camps within Rwanda. The overall aim of

planning was to return people to their homes and establish a degree of

stability within Rwanda.

15

The Canadian signal squadron was involved in communications planning

required to support a number of contingency operations such as those in the

safe haven in the southwest of Rwanda, the refugee camps outside of

Rwanda, and the displaced people’s camps inside Rwanda.

In order for 1 CDHSR to be able to undertake any type of contingency

operation it was necessary for the UN communications transition plan to be

in effect. Emphasis was therefore placed on the transition plan in order to

free up the required military signals resources. By the end of October 1994

the Motorola radio system was in place which allowed for the removal of up

to 18 radio vehicles and the associated personnel.

The only contingency operation undertaken during the 1 CDHSR tour was in

December. The displaced people’s camps in the southwest of Rwanda west

of Butare were allegedly being used as a refuge for undesirables, specifically

persons responsible for inciting massacres and genocide. The plan was to

use the African infantry troops to go into the camps accompanied by

observers who would strive to separate the good from the bad. The bad

element would then be relocated out of the safe haven.

The necessary Canadian military communications detachments were rolled

back from the sectors and re-deployed in support of UNAMIR’s contingency

operation. In the end it was a successful four-day deployment.

16

There was a significant amount of assistance provided to the Rwandan

government by 1 CDHSR throughout the tour. The United Nations quickly

recognized the new government of Rwanda so that from that point on there

was no perceived impartiality. The Canadian military deployed there were

clearly helping the legitimate government of Rwanda.

Albeit 1 CDHSR provided no equipment directly to the government, the

Regiment was very active repairing damaged systems. The signal squadron

and specifically the linemen and Technicians provided extensive support in

repairing their satellite earth station, the countries telephone system, and the

FM radio broadcast capability. The repair of their satellite earth station

allowed them to re-establish communications with the outside world. The

repair of their radio broadcast station was crucial to allow the government to

reach the people and convince them to return to their homes. It is important

to note that the former government forces in exile had a similar mobile FM

broadcast capability operating at the same time. This was used to incite

further violence amoung the confused and battered Rwandan society through

the transmission of extreme propaganda.

The Rwandan government was understandably nervous and suspicious as it

quickly found itself in power after more than 30 years in exile. The

Canadian military support to the government was well received and

17

therefore allowed the unit’s personnel to access to areas required in support

of the UN communications plan. In the end all of the assistance provided

fell under the humanitarian aid umbrella

Final Remarks

There were many challenges and hurdles overcome during the deployment

of 1 CDHSR to Rwanda. In virtually all instances they were championed

through great planning, anticipation, phenomenal teamwork and a

fundamental desire to try and make a difference in a country that had been

devastated by civil war and Genocide. Whether the successes were

technical, procedural or negotiated it is evident that the unit overcame most

obstacles encountered.

The one area that was a problem, not only for Canadians but for all

contributing Nations, was the inability of the UN to deploy into Rwanda

quickly and decisively with the necessary soldiers and equipment so as to

have an impact on the ground. The strategic lift issue is one that resonates

with many. It fundamentally speaks more to the willingness of UN Nation

states to respond to crises situations. Many a Canadian signaller on the

ground in Rwanda would perhaps offer the comment that if a responsive

solution had been found and troops deployed into theatre far quicker than

actually occurred then there could have been a difference made to the

18

horrible situation that took place in Rwanda. This will never been

reconciled in terms of the numbers of lives lost. This will always be a

challenge facing United Nations planners.

In conclusion 1 CDHSR’s deployment to Rwanda can be counted as a

success from the point of view of achieving its stated objectives. However

by no means do those successes overshadow the overall failure of the UN

mission. Indeed as general Dallaire quite eloquently titled his book, “shake

hands with the devil – the failure of humanity in Rwanda” points a finger at

the world, the UN, the West, who could have certainly made a difference

had they acted sooner.

For the soldiers of 1 CDHSR it was a very challenging yet rewarding

mission from a soldiering and communications point of view. The

deployment and re-deployment took place within the forecasted period and

there were no rotation of Signals personnel.

The three major lessons learned were that our body of professional

Signallers were professionally prepared for the diverse challenges of the

deployment. The lead up to deployment, pre-deployment training, execution

of the tasks, and re-deployment was well done. The regiment employed the

fundamentals of battle procedure religiously and successfully

19

The inherent flexibility factored into 1 CDHSR in terms of soldiers and wide

range of capabilities allowed the unit to reconfigure to the tasks required.

This occurred on more than one occasion.

Specifically the Signal Squadron adapted the motto of maximum flexibility

or in short “max flex”. This term went a long way to instil a fierce pride in a

group of widely dispersed Canadian Signallers who traveled a long way

from home to try and help a country find peace.

The reconciliation in Rwanda continues to this day some 18 years after the

events unfolded. All 1 CDHSR personnel who travelled to this tiny country

were affected by the enormity of the situation and some more so than others.

Under the leadership of a highly decorated and respected commanding

officer, Colonel Michael Hanrahan led a mission that albeit was fraught with

many challenges from the outset, managed to deliver on its tasks and even

deliver some good to a country that needed help. Some of our personnel

have returned to Rwanda to see for themselves the efforts of a country trying

to heal from within. All Canadian Signallers who deployed to Rwanda as

part of 1 CDHSR can hold their heads high as they delivered the best

possible given the circumstances.

20