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Beyond Aggression:

Considering alternative scenarios to the status quo

By Andres Aguilera

Korea University

Graduate School of International Studies

The world is changing; it has already changed dramatically in the last couple of decades;

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf Wars, 9/11, the “Global War on Terror”, the

rise of China, the election of an African American President to the White House, just to

name a few. However, not many things have changed in the tense situation of the Korean

Peninsula; the inter-Korean conflict feels so anachronistic, belonging to a long-gone Cold

War.

In fact, it seems the situation has reached new levels of hostility and aggression with the

escalation of the nuclear proliferation issue, the abandonment of the Six Party talks and

the recent tests of missile technology all by the North (not to mention the seasonal brawls

and complaints1), these events have sent potent shockwaves to the security structure of

Northeast Asia.

Given the multiple complexities of the issue at hand, the lengthy and tiring conflict, thenuclear component, the current stalemate situation and the high level of uncertainty and

unpredictability shown by the North Korean regime, a wide set of scenarios need to be

depicted not only as thought experiments2 but as risk mitigation strategies to handle black

swans or fat tails3 that may appear in this process.

On this matter “Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative,

Long-Term Policy Analysis” by Robert J. Lempert et. al provide some insight on the issue:

“scenario-based planning is designed precisely to grapple with this multiplicity and

unpredictability. Scenario-planning can crystallize the understanding that the long term future

1The exchange of fire by the North Korea and South Korean Navies in late January 2010, or the

denunciation by North Korea of the annual joint military drills between South Korea and the United States.2

A thought experiment is considered as the testing (examination) of a hypothesis without the actual

experimentation but imbedded in strong theoretical rigor.3

The idea of black swans or fat tails implies the occurrence of highly improbable events but with

significant consequences.



may be very different from the present, and it can also help decision makers choose strategies

based on this recognition.”4

Bringing this analysis model to the North Korean case there is a fairly recent Special

Report by the Council for Foreign Relations titled “Preparing for Sudden Change in

North Korea.”5 One of key developments in the news is Kim Jong-Il health condition

and the implications of this issue in the case of Sudden Change in the North Korean

regime. This report devised three scenarios for change: 1) managed succession; 2)

contested succession; 3) failed succession. However the authors doubt that political

change might come from below: “There are certainly good reasons to be skeptical about the

possibility of fundamental political change in North Korea, certainly through a “people-power”

type social movement that have toppled dictatorships elsewhere. The country’s cult-like political

system, its relative geographical and political isolation, the absence of any real civil society , and repressive state control all clearly reduce the impetus and opportunities for change from

below.”6

The first scenario described as managed succession implies a smooth transition in power

from Kim Jong-Il to a handpicked successor; no evident internal struggle and no

significant change in the regime’s posture. Some media sources have speculated this

successor might be Kim Jong-Un (Kim Jong-Il’s third son).

The second scenario depicts a contested succession, basically struggle of power between

competing factions or individuals. This scenario may imply the eruption violence and

unexpected consequences like regime change but not necessarily in a desired direction,

consequently creating internal instability.

The third scenario is a failed succession, sending North Korea to a failed state condition

(if is not already one?) with dire humanitarian consequences for its population and

creating tension all over the region, especially in the Chinese border.

But no interested party wants North Korea to fail. The costs, risks and challenges are just

too big for all the players.4

Lempert, Robert J. Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, Long-Term

Policy Analysis. RAND, 2003. Online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1626/

(Accessed October 19, 2009)5

Stares, Paul B. and Joel S. Wit. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea. Council of Foreign

Relations, January 2009. Online at

http://www.cfr.org/publication/18019/preparing_for_sudden_change_in_north_korea.html (Accessed

February 25, 2009)6

Ibid, page 3. (boldface included by me)



Post-conflict scenarios have included the option of unification; some of these scenarios

consider the German case7

as model. The German process is an outstanding precedent but

a bad example. The border on the 38th

parallel was drawn arbitrarily in accordance with

the post war state of affairs; however the consequences and outcomes in either side of the

border were hardly predictable back then. Unification is very unlikely; the political,

economic, social, demographic and technological cleavages are too deep and the cost of

unification too high.8

Back to the Negotiation Table

In recent days, media sources reported a call from Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi

to restart the Six Party talks, another Chinese official told the same newspaper that China

hopes to restart the Talks by the first half of 2010. 9 The purpose of the Six Party

negotiation is clear; the denuclearization of the Peninsula, not an easy task to achieve due

to North Korea’s erratic policy and the fact that the nuclear factor is the only bargaining

power that North Korea actually has and will cling to it. The Global Security Newswire

reported on February 26, 201010 that U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth gave some

hints of a peace treaty negotiation after the resumption of the Six Party Talks. These

recent developments suggest that there is political will by the interested parties in moving

beyond the current stalemate situation. The tentative peace negotiation might provide a new common ground between the parties

and if successful, (that is a big assumption) this treaty would provide the necessary

assurance for stability and security within the Northeast Asian region. The move towards

a peace treaty is definitely a desirable scenario and why not, a logical geopolitical move

beyond aggression.

7 Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 188 “ A Unified Korea?” September 21, 2009. Found online

at http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/global_economics_paper_no_188_final.pdf (AccessedOctober 27, 2009)8

German unification costs have been calculated up to €1.3 Trillion. See Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A613B20091107 (Accessed March 10, 2010)9

China.org.cn “ Resumption of six-party talks hopeful: FM” Found online at:

http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2010/2010-03/07/content_19547441.htm (Accessed on

March 9 2010)10

GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, “U.S. Could Consider Korean Peace Accord Once Nuke Talks

Restart, Envoy Says” February 26, 2010. Found online at:

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100226_4095.php (Accessed on March 10, 2010)

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