M IND-ENERGYLECTURESANDESSAYSBY HENRIBERGSON MEMBEROPTHltFRENCHACADEMYItROFESSORINTHBCOLLa GSDBFRANCKT RANSLATE DBY H.WI LDO NCARR HON.D. LI TT. PROFESSORINTHBUNIV8 RSITYa llLONDOW NEWYORKHENRYHOLTANDCOMPANY1920187 VI INTELLECTUALEFFORT AnArticleintheR evuePhilosophique,"January,1902. UTHEproblemwithwhichIamgoingtodealisdistinct fromtheproblemofattentionasithasbeendiscussed byrecentpsychology.Whenwecalltomindpast deeds,interpretpresentactions,understandadis-course ,followsomeone'strainofthought,attendto ourownthinking,whenever,infact,ourmindis occupiedwithacomplexsystemofideas,wefeelwe cantakeuptwodiffer entattitudes,oneoftension, theotherofrelaxation,andtheyaremainlydistin-guishedbythefeelingofeffortwhichispresentin theoneandabsentfromtheother.Istheplayof ideasthesameineachcase?Aretheintellectualele-mentsofthesamekind,andhavetheythesamerela-tionsamongthemselves?Doesnottheideaitself, donottheinternalreactionsitbringsabout,theform, movementandgroupingofthesimplerstateswhich constituteit,providethemeansofdistinguishingthe thinkingwhichsimplyletsitselflivefromthethinking whichconcentratesitselfinaneffort?Indeed,inthe feelingwehaveofthiseffort,doesnottheconscious-r86 INTELLECTUALEFFORT nessofacertainquitespecialmovementofideas count forsomething?ThesearethequestionsIhaveset myselftoanswer.Theycanallbesummedupinask-ing:Whatistheintellectualcharacteristicofintel-lectualeffort? Inwhateverwayweanswerth e, question,weleave untouchedtheproblemofattentionasformulatedin recentpsychology.Forpsychologistshavebeen mainlyconcernedwithsensoryatt ent ion,th atis,the attentiongiventoasimpleperception.Now,asthe simpleperceptionaccompaniedbyattentionisaper-ceptionwhichwouldunderfavourablecircumstances presentthesamecontent,ornearlyso,ifattentionwere notjoinedtoit,itis outsidethiscontentthattheyhave hadtolookforthespecificcharacterofattention. Th eidea,whichRibotsuggested,ofattributingde-cisiveimportancetotheconcomit antmotorpheno-mena,andespeciallytoactionsofarrest,islikelyto becomeclassicalinpsychology.But,inproportionas astateofintellectualconcentrationiscomplicated,it becomesboundupwiththeeffor twhichaccompaniesit. T herearesomement alworkswhichcannotbecon-ceivedasperformedwitheaseandfacility.. Could anyoneinventanewmachineorevensimplyextract asquarerootwithouteffort?Theintellectualstate, insuchcase,bearsinsomesortimpr esseduponitthe markofeffort.Thisis as muchassayingthatthereis her eanintellectualcharacteristicofintellectualeffort. 188 MIND.ENERGY Now,ifthischaracterexistsinideasofacomplexand superiororder,theremustbesomethingofittobe discov eredinthesimplerstates.Itisnotimpossible, then,thatwemaydiscovertracesofiteveninsensory attentionitself,althoughitprobablybecomesherean accessoryandstandsinthebackground. Tosimplifythestudy,Iwillexaminethedifferent kindsofintellectualworkseparately,startingwiththe easiest,whichisreproduction,andendingwiththe mostdifficult,whichisproductionorinvention.Let usdealfirstthenwiththeeffortofmemory,ormore exactlywiththeeffortofrecollection. InMatterandMemo ryIshowedthatwemustdis-tinguishaseriesofdifferent"planesofconsciousness ," beginningwiththeplaneof"purememory"notyet translatedintodistinctimages,andgoingdowntothe planewh erethesamememoryisactualizedinnascent sensationsandincipientmovements.Thevoluntary callingupofamemoryconsists,Isaid,intraversing th eseplanesofconsciousnessoneafteranotherina definitedirection.Atthesametimethatthebook appeared( 1896), Witasekpublishedaninteresting andsuggestivearticle(intheZeitschriftfurPsycho-Logi e)October1896)inwhichthesamementalwork wasdefinedas"apassagefromthenon-intuitiveto theintuitive."Goingback,then ,tosomepointsof mybook ,withthesuggestionofWitasek'sarticle,I willdealfirst,inthecaseoftherecallofmemori es, INTELLECTUALE F F O RT189 withthedifferencebetweenthe vol untaryideas. Speakinggener ally,whenever spontaneous welearn andthe alessonby heartortrytofixagroupofimpressionsinour memory,ouroneobjectistoretainwhatwelearn. W edonottroubleaboutwhatv}eshallhavetodo lat erinordertobringbacktomindwh atwehave learnt.Themechanismoftherecallisindifferent tous;theessentialthingisthatweshallbeableto evokethememory ,itmattersnothow,whenweneed it .Thisiswhyweusesimultaneouslyorsuccessively th emostdifferentprocesses,bringingourmechanical aswellasourintellectualmemoryintoplay,juxta-posingbetweenthemauditive,visualandmotorimages andthusretainingthemintheirnaturalstate,or else,onthecontrary,substitutingforth emasimple ideawhichexpressestheirmeaningandwhichenables ustoreconstitutetheseriesofthemwheneverwewant to.Andthatiswhy,wh enthemomentofrecall comes,werecurneithertothereflectiveconsciousn ess nortotheautomatismexclusively,automatismand re flexionbeingsocloselyinterwoven,imag ecalling upimage,whilethemindisatworkonlessconcrete ideas.Thencetheextremedifficultyweexperience indefiningexactlythedifferencebetweenthetwoat-titudesthemindtakeswhenitrecallsmechanically allthepartsofacomplexmemoryandwhen,onthe cont r ary,itactivelyreconstructsthem.Thereisal-190MIND-ENERGY mostalwayspartlymechanicalrecollectionandpartly intelligentreconstruction,andsocompletelymingled thatwecanneversaywhereonebeginsandtheother ends.However,someexceptionalcasesoccurin which wesetourselvesthetaskoflearningacomplicate d lessonwiththeideaofitsinstantaneousand,sofaras possible,mechanicalrecollection.Ontheotherhand, therearecasesinwhichweknowthatthelessonwe arelearningwillneverhavetoberecollectedallat once,butthatitmustbetheobjectofaslowand reflectivereconstruction.Letusthenfirststudythese extremecases.Weshallseethatweadoptquitedif-ferentmethodsofretentionaccordingtothekindof recallitistobe.Ontheotherhand,thetwodifferent kindsofworkwhichweaccomplish,whilsta.cquiring amemory,inorderthatanintellectualeffortforrecal-lingitshallbecomepossibleor,onthecontrary,shall berendereduseless,maythrowsomelightonthe natureandconditionsoftheeffort. RobertHoudin,inaremarkablepassagein Confidences,publishedinParis,1861(vol.i.p.8f.), explainshowhesetaboutdevelopinginhisyoungson anintuitiveandinstantaneousmemory.Hebegan byshowingtheboyadomino,thefive-four,asking himthetot alofthedotswithoutlettinghimcount them.Hethensetbesidethisdominoanother,the four-three,againrequiringanimmediateanswer.This endedthefirstlesson.Thenextdayhesucceededin INTELLECTUALEFFORT 191 makinghimaddatasingleglancethreeorfour dominoes;thedayafter,five;andwitheachday's progressaddedmoreuntilhewasabletoobtain instantlyatsightthesumofdotsonanytwelve dominoes."Whenwehadgainedthisresult,we settoworkonataskofadifferentkindofdifficulty, andgaveourselvesuptoitformorethanamonth. MysonandIpassedfairlyquicklybeforeashopof children'stoysorbeforeonefurnishedwithdifferent kindsofcommodities,castingonitanattentivelook. Afewstepsbeyond,wetookapencilandpaperfrom ourpocketandtriedseparatelywhichofuscould writedownthegreaternumberoftheobjectswehad noticedinpassing....Itoftenhappenedthatmy sonwouldwritedownfortyobjects."Theaimofthis specialeducationwastomaketheboyabletoap-prehend,inasingleglanceroundanassembly-room, theobjectswhichtheindividualsin theaudiencecarried ontheirperson.Then,withbandagedeyes,hesimu- -latedsecond-sight,describingonaconventionalsign fromhisfatheranobjectchosenatrandombyoneof theaudience.Thisvisualmemoryhaddevelopedto suchapointthat,afterafewmomentsinfrontofa book-case,theboywouldheabletoretainaverygreat numberoftitles,withtheexactplaceofthevolumes. Hetook,asitwere,amentalphotographofthewhole, andthisenabledhimimmediatelytocallupadirect recollectionoftheparts.Butintheveryfirstlesson, 1Prendergast,Thomas,TheMasterySeries(London,1868.) " andparticularlyinnotallowingtheboytoaddthedots ofthedominoes,wemayseetheprincipalspringof thismemoryeducation.Allinterpretationofthe visualimagewasexcludedfromtheactofseeing.The mindwaskeptontheplaneofvisualimages. Toproduceamemoryhabitofthesamekindfor theear,weshouldhavetoleavethemindonthe planeofauditiveorarticulatoryimages.Amongthe methodsproposedforteachinglanguages,animport-antoneisthatofPrendergast,"theprincipleofwhich hasbeenmorethanonceutilized.Itconsistsinmak-ingthepupilbeginbypronouncingsentencesthemean-ingofwhichheis notallowedtoask,- neverisolated words,alwayscompletepropositionswhichhemust repeatmechanically.Ifthepupiltriestoguessthe meaning,hespoilstheresult.Ifhehesitatesfora moment,ithasalltobeginagain.Byvaryingthe placeofthewords,bypractisingexchangeofwords amongthesentences,itcomesaboutthatthemeaning iscaughtofitselfbytheearinsomefashionwithout theunderstandingbeingmixedwithit.Theobjectis toobtainfrommemoryaninstantaneousandeasyre-call,andthecontrivanceconsistsinmakingthemind moveasmuchaspossibleamongimagesofsoundsor articulationswithoutthemoreabstractelements,ex-ternaltotheplaneofsensationsandmovements,in-tervening. 193 INTELLECTUALEFFORT Thefacilityofrecallofacomplexmemoryseems, then,tobeindirectproportiontothetendencyofits elementstospreadthemselvesoutononeandthe sameplaneofconsciousness.Eachofuscanverify thisforhimself.Supposeaverseofpoetrylearntin ourschool-daystohaveremainedfixedinourmemory. Weperceive,inrecitingit,thatwordcallsupword, andthatreflexiononthemeaninghindersratherthan helpsthemechanismofrecall.Memories,insuch case,maybeauditiveorvisual,buttheyarealways atthesametimemotor.Indeed,itisdifficultfor ustodistigunishbetweenwhatisearmemoryand whatishabitofarticulating.Ifwestopinthemiddle oftherecitation,ourfeelingof"incompleteness"ap-pearstoconsistsometimesinthefactthatthere-mainderoftheversegoessingingoninourmemory, sometimesinthefactthatthemovementofarticula-tionhasnotgottotheendofitspushandwantsto completeit jsometimes,andmoreoften,itisbothat thesametime.Butwemustnoticethatthesetwo groupsofmemories,- auditivememoriesandmotor memories,- areofthesameorder,equallyconcrete, equally neartosensation.Theyare,tousetheexpres-sionalreadyemployed,ononeandthesame"planeof consciousness." If,onthecontrary,recallisaccompaniedbyan effort,themindissuretobeseenmovingfromone planetoanother. MIND-ENERGY 192 194 MIND-ENERGY How,indeed,dowelearnbyheartwhenitisnot instantaneousrecallwehaveinview?Treatiseson mnemonicstellus,buteachofuscandiscoveritfor himself.Wereadtheattentively,thenwe divide itintoparagraphsorsections,payingparticularatten-tiontoitsinternalorganization.Inthiswayweob-tainaschematicviewofthewhole.Thenweinsert intotheschemethemostnoticeableexpressions.To thedominantideaweattachthesubordinateideas,to thesubordinateideasthedominatingandrepresenta-tivewords,andlastlytothesewordstheintermediate wordswhichbindthemtogetherasinachain."The artofmnemonicsconsistsinseizinginapassageof prosethesalientideas,theshortsentences,thesimple wordswhichinvolvewiththemwholepages,"2soone treatiseexpressesit.Anothergivesthefollowing rule:"Reduceintoshortandsubstantialformulre, ...noteineachformulathesuggestiveword,... associateallthesewor ds togetherandformin thisway alogicalchainofideas."3Here,then,wenomore attachtogethermechanicallyimagestoimages,each intendedtobringbackthatwhichcomesafterit;we jumptoapointwherethemultiplicityoftheimages seemstobecondensedintoasingle,simpleandun-dividedidea.Itisthisideawecommittomemory. Then,whenthemomentofrecallcomes,weredescend 2 Audiberr,Traltedemnemotechni generate(Paris1840),p.173.8Andre,Mn emotchnit.rationnelle(Angers, 1894 ) .INTELLECTUALEFFORT19'5 fromthetopofthepyramidtowardsthebase.We passfromthehigherplane,inwhichallwasgathered upintoasingleidea,tolowerandlowerplanes,nearer andnearertosensation,wherethesimpleideaisdis-persedinimages,andwheretheimagesdevelopinto sentencesandwords.But,then,recollectionisno longerimmediateandeasy.Itisaccompaniedbyef-fort . Inthissecondmethodmoretimenodoubtisre-quiredforrecollecting,butlesstimeisspentinlearn-ing.Theperfectingofmemory,ithasveryoftenbeen said,isnotsomuchanincreaseofretentivityasa greaterskillinsub-dividing,co-ordinatinganden-chainingideas.ThepreacherquotedbyWilliam James(PrinciplesofPsychology,i 668)says:"Before twenty,ittookthreeorfourdaystocommitanhour-longsermon;aftertwenty,twodays,oneday,halfa' day;andnowoneslow,analytic,veryattentiveor adhesivereadingdoe'sit."Theprogresshereisevi-dentlyonlyagrowingaptitudetomakealltheideas, alltheimages,allthewordsconvergeononesingle point.Itisgettingholdofthegoldcoin,insteadof havingthesilverorcopperchangeforit. Whatisthegoldcoin?Howaresomanydifferent imagesheldtogetherimplicitlyinonesimpleidea? Ishallhavetocomebacktothispoint.Letmefirst suggestatermbywhichtocharacterizethesimpler ideawhichisabletodevelopintomultipleimages. 196MIND-ENERGY Letmesay,borrowingfromtheGreek,thatitisa dynamicschem e.1meanbythis,thattheideadoes notcontaintheimagesthemselvessomuchasthein-dicationofwhatwemustdotoreconstructthem.It isnotanextractoftheimages,gotbyimproverishing eachofthem;ifitwere,Ishouldnotunderstandwhy theschemeenablesus,asitdoesinsomanycases,to recovertheimagesintegrally.Itisnoteith er-oratleastitisnotonly - theabstractideaofwhat alltheimages,takentogether,mean.Doubtlessthe ideaofth emeaninghasalargeplaceinit;but,be-sidesbeingdifficulttosaythisideaofthemean-ingoftheimagesbecomeswhenwedetachitcom-pletelyfromtheimagesthemselves,itisclearthatthe samelogicalmeaningmaybelongtoquitedifferent seriesofimages,andth atconsequentlyitwouldnotbe enoughtomakeusretainandreconstructonedefinite seriesofimagestotheexclusionofothers.The schemeissomethingnoteasytodefine,butofwhich eachofushasthefeelingandofwhichweshallun-derstandthenatureifwecomparewithoneanoth er differ entkindsofmemories,especiallytechnicalorpro-fessionalmemories.Iwillnotenterhereintodet ail. Iwill,however ,callattentiontoakindofmemory whichinrecentyearshasbeentheobjectofspecially carefulinvestigation- thememoryofchess-players! Binet,Psychologiedesgrandscalculateurset[oueursd'ichecs (Paris,1894).-, ' . INTELLECTUALEFFORT197 Askilfulchess-playermaybeabletoplayseveral gamesatoncewithoutlookingatthechess-boards. Ateachmoveofoneofhisopponents,thenewposi-ti onofthepiecemovedisindicatedtotheplayer.He thenmovesapieceonhisside,andthus,playing blindly,picturingmentallyateachmomenttherespec-t ivepositionsofallthepiecesonallthechess-boards, heisabletowin,oftenagainstgoodplayers,games simultaneouslyplayed.T aine,inawell-knownpas-sage in L'Int ellig ence(vol.i. p.81),hasgivenatheory ofthewaythefeatisperformed:hederiveditfrom indicationsfurnishedbyaplayer,oneofhisown friends.Accordingtothistheory,theplayeruses hereapurelyvisualmemory .Heperceivescontinu-ously,IIasinaninnermirror,"theimageofeachof the chess-boardswithitspiecesasitappearswitheach new move. AlfredBinet,however,investigatedthementalpro-cedureinthecaseofanumberofblindfoldplayers, andreachedaquitedefiniteandentir elydifferent conclusion.Theimageofthechess-boardwithits piecesisnotpresentedtothememory,cleancutand re adymade,IIasinmirror,"butateverymove inthegamestheplayerhastomakeaneffortof reconst ruction.Whatisthateffort?Whatarethe element sactuallypresentinthememory?Onthis pointtheinvestigationyieldedunexpectedresults. T he playersallagreedthata mentalvisionofthepieces 198MIND-ENERGY themselveswouldbemoredisturbingtothemthan useful.Whattheykeepinmindisnottheexternal aspectofeachpiece,butitspower,itsbearingandits value,infactitsfunction.Abishopisnotapiece ofwoodofmoreorlessfantasticshape:itisan "obliqueforce."Thecastleisacertainpowerof "goinginastraightline."Theknight,apiece "whichisalmostequaltothreepawnsandwhich movesaccordingtoaquitespeciallaw,"andsoon. Somuchforthepieces.N owforthegame.What is presenttothemindoftheplayerisacompositionof forces,orratherarelationbetweenalliedorhostile powers.Theplayerremarkesmentallythehistoryof thegamefromthebeginning.Hereconstitutesthe successiveeventswhichhavebroughtaboutthe presentsituation.Hethusobtainsanideaofthe wholewhichenableshimatanymomenttovisualize theelements.Thatabstractideaismoreoverone. Itimpliesreciprocalpenetrationofalltheelements inoneanother.Whatprovesitisthateachgame appearstotheplayerwithacharacterentirelyitsown. Itgiveshimanimpressionsuigeneris."Igraspit asamusiciangraspsachord,"sooneoftheplayers describedit.Anditisjustthisdifferenceofphy-siognomicalexpression,sotosay,whichenablesthe playertokeepseveralgamesinmindwithoutcon-fusingthem.Sothen,hereagain,thereisanideal schemeofthewhole,andthisschemeisneitheran INTELLECTUALEFFORT199 extractnorasummary.Itis ascompleteastheimage willbewhencalledup,butitcontains,intheestate ofreciprocalimplication,whattheimagewillevolve intopartsexternaltooneanother. Analyseyoureffortwhenyoufinddifficultyinevok-ingasimplememory.Youstartwithanideain which youfeelthereareverydifferentdynamicalelements impliedinoneanother.Thisreciprocalimplication, andconsequentinternalcomplication,issonecessary, itissomuchtheessenceoftheschematicidea,that ifitbejustasimpleimageyouaretryingtoevoke, theschememaynotnearlysosimple.Ineednot gofarforanillustration.Sometimeago,when jottingdowntheplanofthepresentarticleandnoting thelistofworkstoconsult,Iwantedtoincludethe nameofPrendergast,theauthorwhoseintuitivemethod Ihavespokenofandwhosearticlesonmemory, amongothers,Ihadpreviouslyread.ButIcould notthinkofthisname,norrecollecttheworkinwhich Ihadfirstseenit.Irememberprettywellthephases oftheworkbywhichItriedtoevoketherecalcitrant name.Istartedwiththegeneralimpressionwhich Ihadofit.Itwasanimpressionofstrangeness,but notofstrangenessingeneral,- ratherofacertain definitekindofstrangeness.Therewas,asitwere, adominantnoteofbarbarism,rapine,thefeelingthat wouldhavebeenleftononebythesightofabirdof preypouncingonitsvictim,grippingitinitsclaws, 200MIND-ENERGY carryingitoff.Inowsaytomyselfthatthewor d "prendre"(snatch),whichwasalmostfiguredbythe twofirstsyllablesofthenameIwastryingtothinkof, musthavehadalargeshareinmyimpression.ButI donotknowifthisres emblancewouldhavebeen enoughtodetermineashadeoffeelingsoprecise,and inseeingwithwhatobstinacythenameof"Arbo-gaste"comesuptodaytomymindwhenIthinkof "Prendergast,"IaskmyselfwhetherperhapsIhad notblendedtogetherthegeneralideaof"prendre" andthenameof"Arbogaste."Thisname,which goesbacktothetimewhenIlearnedRom anHistory, evokedinmymemoryvagueimagesofbarbarism.I amnotsure,however,andallIcanaffirmisthatthe impressionleftonmymindwasabsolutelysuigeneris, andthatittended,inspiteofinnumerabledifficulties, totransformitselfintoapropername.Itwases-peciallythelettersdandrwhichwerebrou ghtback tomymemorybythatimpression.Buttheywerenot broughtbackasvisualorauditiveimages,orevenas ready-formedmotorimages.Theypresentedthem-selvesespeciallyasindicatingacertaindirectionof efforttofollowinordertogetatthearticulationof thenameIwastryingtothinkof.Itseemedtome, - wronglymoreover,- thattheselettersmustbethe firstlett ersoftheword,justbecausetheyhadthe appearanceofpointingouttomearoad.Isaidto myselfthatintryingwiththemthediffere ntvowelsby INTELLECTUALEF FORT201 tu rn ,Ishouldsucceedinpronouncingthefirstsyllable, andsogetanimpetuswhichwouldcarrymeallalong theactualword.Wouldsuchaworkhaveendedsuc-cessfully?Idonotknow,forithadnotgonevery farwhensuddenlyitcameintomymindth atthename occurredinanoteofabookbyKayontheeducation ofmemory,andthatitwasthere,moreover,that Ihadbecomeacquaintedwithit.ItistherethatI wentatoncetofindit .Perhapsthesuddenresurrec-tionoftheusefulmemorywastheeffectofchance; butperhapsalsotheworkwhichwasdestin edtocon-ver ttheschemeintoanimagehadpassedbeyondits end,evoking,inste adoftheimageitself,thecircum-I st anceswhichhadoriginallyenframedit . Intheseexamples,theeffortofmemoryappears tohaveasitsessencetheevolvingofascheme,if notsimpleatleastconcentr ated,intoanimagewith distinctelementsmore,orlessindep endentofone another .Whenweletourmemorywand eratwill withouteffort,imagessucceedimages,allsituatedon oneandthesameplaneofconsciousness.Onthe ot herhand,whenwemak eanefforttor ecollect ,it seemsthatweareconcentratingonahigh erplanein or dertodescendprogressivelytowardstheimageswe wanttoevoke.If,inthefirstcase,associatingimages withimages,wemoveonasingleplanewithamove-mentwhichIwillcallhorizontal,theninthesecond casewemustsaythatthemovem entisverticaland 202 203 MIND- ENERGY thatitmakesuspassfromoneplanetoanother.In thefirstcase,theimagesarehomogeneousamong th emsel ves,butth eobjectsrepresentedbytheimages arediffer ent;inthesecond ,thereisbutoneidentical objectthrough outallstagesoftheoperation,butitis r epr esent eddi ffer entl y,- Ime anrepr esent edby het erogeneousint ell ectualstates,sometim esschemes andsomet imesimages,theschemestri vingtow ards th eimageinpro portionasthedescendin gmovement isaccentua ted.Inshort,eachofushastheverydis-tinctf eelingofanoper ationwhichiscarri edoutin extensionandsuper ficiall yintheonecase,inintensity andindepthonth eoth er. Itisr are,mor eover ,thatthetwooperationsare perf ectlydistinct ,pureandunalloyed.Mostact sof r ecoll ectionarcatthesametimeadescentofth e schemetoward sth eimage,andamovingofth emind amongth eimagesth emselves.Thisamount stosay-ing,asIindicatedatth ebeginnin gofthisstud y,that anactofmemoryordinarilyincludesapartwhichis effortandap artwhichisautomatism.Iamthinking atthismomentofalongjourneywhichImadesom e yea rsago .T heincidentsofthejourneycometomy mindinnoparticu larorder,onemechanicallycallsup oth ers.ButifImakeanefforttorem emberapar-ticul arperiod,th enIgofromthewhol eoftheperiod tothepartswhichcomposeit ,thewholeapp earingto meatfirstas anindividualscheme,havingitsparticular INTELLECTUALEFFORT affect ivecolourandtone.Oft en,too ,theimages whichhavebeensimplycall eduponeaf teranot herin mymindbidmegototheschemet ocompl et ethem. ButwheneverIhavethefeelingofeffor t ,Ifindmy-selftravellingfromtheschemetotheimage. Sofar,then , wemayconclud eth attheeff01tofre-callconsistsinconver tingaschematicidea,whoseele-me nt sinterpe netrate ,int oanimage didea,t hepartsof whichareju xtapo sed. Wemustnowstudyth eeffortofint ell ectioningen-eral,theeffortwehavetoputforthinord ertocom-preh endandint erpr et.Iwillconfinemyselfhereto afewhints,referringfortheresttomyformerwork (Matt erandMemory,pp.89- 141) . Intellectioniscontinu allygoingon;itisnoteasy, th erefore,tosaywher eint ell ectualeffor tbeginsand whereitends.Allthesame ,ther eisacert ainkind ofunderst andingandint er pretin gwhichworkswit h-outeffort ,whileth er eisanot herkindwhich,thou gh notnecessaril y implyingeffort , is generallytobefound whenaneffortISbeingmade . Int ellectionofthefirstkindconsist s,whencon-fr ontedwithaperc ept ion,inrespondin gautoma t ically byanappropriateact .W ha tisr ecognizinganor-dinaryobject,ifnotkno winghowtouseit?And whatis"knowinghowtouse"but ,whenwehave aperception,sketch ingmechani call ytheactionwhich 20 4 MIND-ENERGY customhasassociatedwithit?Thefirstobserversof psychicalblindnessgaveitthenameofapraxia,ex-pressingtherebythatinaptitudeinrecognizingordi-naryobjectsisaboveallinabilitytousethem."This completelyautomaticintellectionextendsmuch 'fart her thanweimagine.Currentconversationiscomposed ingreatpartofready-maderesponsestoconventional questions,theresponsesucceedingthequestionwi th-outintelligencebeinginterestedinthemeaningof either.Thus,patientsinastateofdementiacan keepupanalmostcoherentconversationonasimple subject,althoughtheyhardlyknowwhattheyaresay-ing."Wesometimesfindourselvesstringingwords together,guidingourselvesasitwerebythecompati-bilityorincompatibilityoftheirmusicalsound,and soformingcorrectsentenceswithoutourintelligence beingconcernedinthematteratall.Insuchcases, theinterpretationofsensationsismadeatonceby movements.Themindremainsononeandthesame "planeofconsciousness." Quitedifferentistrueintellection.Itconsistsina movementofthemindcontinuallycomingandgoing betweenperceptionsorimages,ontheonehand,and 5Kussmaul,DieStorungenderSprache;AllenStarr,"Apraxiaand Aphasia,"MedicalRecord(Oct.1888).CfLaquer,N eurologtsches Centralblatt(June1888);Nodet,Les/l gnoscles(Paris,1899);and Claparede," Revuegeneralssurl'Agnoscie,"Anniepsychologique (1900),vi.pp.85If. 8Robertson,"ReflexSpeech,"JournalofMentalScience(April 1888);Fere,"LeLangagereflexe,"Revuephilosophique(Jan.1896). INTELLECTUALEFFORT2 0 5 theirmeaning,ontheother.Whatistheessential directionofthismovement?Wemightsuppose thatinthiscasewestartwithimagesandproceedto thediscoveryoftheirmeaning,becausetherearesome imageswhicharegivenfirstofallandbecause"un-derstanding"consistsininterpretingperceptionsor images.Whetherwearefollowinganargument, readingabookorlisteningtoadiscourse,thereare alwaysperceptionsorimageswhicharepresentedto themindforittotranslateintorelations,asthoughit mustgofromtheconcretetotheabstract.Butthis isnomorethananappearance,anditiseasytosee thatinfacttheminddoestheexactoppositeinthe workofinterpretation. Itisevidentinthecaseofmathematicalcalculation. Canwefollowacalculationexceptbygoingoverit onourownaccount?Doweunderstandthesolution ofaproblemexceptbysolvingtheprobleminour turn?Thecalculationisexposedontheblack-board, thesolutionisprintedorexplainedvivaJ' lvocejbut thefiguresandsignsweseeareonlyfinger-poststo whichwerefertoensurethatwearenotonthewrong road;thesentencesthatwereadorhearhaveacom-pletemeaningonlywhenweareabletomakethem upourselves,tocreatethemanew,sotosay,bydraw-ingfromourselvestheexpressionofthemathematical truthwhichtheyteach.Allalongtheargumentthat wearehearingorreadingwecatchafewhints,choose 206 MIND-ENERGY afewguidingmarks.Fromthesevisualorauditiv e imageswejumptoabstractideasofrelation.Th en, settingoutfromtheseideas,weevolvetheminto imaginedwordswhichcoalescewiththewordsweate readingorhearing. Now,isitnotthesamewithan,y workofinterpre-tationwhatsoever?Wearguesometimesasthough readingandlisteningconsistedinusingthewords seenorheardasspring-boardsfromeachofwhichwe jumptothecorrespondingidea,andthensettheideas sidebyside.Theexperimentalstudyofreadingand ofhearingwordsshowsusthatwhathappensisquite different.Inthefirstplace,incurrentreadingall thatweseeofawordamountstoaverysmallmatter, aletterortwo-lessthanthateven,afewstrokesor characteristicfeatures.TheexperimentsofCattell, GoldscheiderandMuller,Pillsbury(criticized,itis true,byErdmannandDodge)seemtobeconclusive onthispoint.NolessinstructiveareBagley'sex-perimentsonthehearingofspeech;theycompletely confirmthefactthatwhatwehearis onlya partofthe wordspronounced.But,apartfromanyscientific experim ent,everyoneknowstheimpossibilityofper-ceivingdistinctlythewordsofaforeignlanguagewith whichoneisunfamiliar.Thefactisthatmerevision andhearingarelimitedinsuchcasetofurnishingus withguidingmarks,orrathertodrawinganoutline whichwefill inwithmemories.Itisagreatmistake, INTELLECTUALEFFORT 27 whendescribingherethemechanismofrecognition,to supposethatwebeginbyseeingandhearing,andthat afterwards,havinggottheperception,wegolooking foramemorylikeitinordertorecognizeit.The factisthatitisthememorywhichmakesusseeand hear,andtheperceptionisincapablebyitselfofevok-ingthememorywhichresemblesit,because,todothat, itmusthavealreadytakenformanditselfbecom-plete;now,itonlybecomescompleteandacquiresa distinctformthroughthatverymemory,whichslips intoitandsuppliesmostofitscontent.Ifthisbeso, then,itmustbethemeaning}beforeeverything,which guidesusinthereconstructionofformsandsounds. Whatweseeofthesentenceread,whatwehearof thesentencespoken,isonlywhatisnecessarytoplace usinthecorrespondingclassofideas.Then,setting outfromideas,- thatistosay,fromabstractrel a-tions,- wematerializethemimaginativelyinhypo-theticalwordswhichtrywhethertheycancoverex-actlywhatweseeandhear.Interpretationisthere-fore,inreality,areconstruction.Aslightcontact withtheimagesactuallyperceivedthrowsabstract thinkingintoadefinitedirection.Theabstract thoughtthendevelopsintocompleteimag es,merely represented,whichintheirturncomeandtouchthe perceivedimages,followthemastheygoalong,en-deavourtocoalescewiththem.Wherecoincidence isperfect,theperceptionisperfectlyinterpreted. 208 MIND.ENERGY Thisworkofinterpretationistoorapid,whenwe hearourOwn language,toallowustimetodecompose itintoitsdifferentphases.Butwehavetheclear consciousnessofitwhenweconverseinaforeign languagewhichweknowonlyimperfectly.Wereo alize,then,thatthesoundsdistinctlyheardarebeing usedbyusasguidingmarks,thatwejumpatonce toacertainclassofabstractideas,andthat,whenwe haveadoptedthisintellectualtone)weadvancewith theconceivedmeaning,tomeettheperceivedsound. Iftheinterpretationistobeexact,theonemustbe abletojointheother. Indeed,wouldinterpretationbepossibleifwehad togofromwordstoideas?Thewordsofasentence havenotanabsolutemeaning.Eachofthemborrows aspecialimportfromwhatprecedesitandfromwhat followsit.N orareallthewordsofasentencecapa-bleofevokinganindependentimageoridea.Many ofthemexpressrelations,andexpressthemonlyby theirplaceinthewholeandbytheirconnexionwith theotherwordsofthesentence.Hadthemindcon-stantlytogofromthewordtotheidea,it'wouldbe alwaysperplexedand,sotosay,wandering.Intellec-tioncanonlybestraightandsureifwesetoutfromthe supposedmeaning,constructedbyushypothetically, thendescendfromthemeaningtothefragmentsof wordsreallyperceived,andthenmakeuseoftheseas INTELLECTUALEFFORT 29 simplestakestopegoutinallitssinuositiesthespecial curveoftheroadwhichthemindistofollow. Icannotdealwiththeproblemofsensoryatten-tion,butIthinkthatvoluntaryattention,- attention whichisormaybeaccompaniedbyafeelingofeffort, - differspreciselyherefrommechanicalattentionin this,thatit putsin operationpsychicalelementssituated ondifferentplanesofconsciousness.Whenwepay attentionmechanically,certainmovementsandatti-tudesfavourabletodistinctperceptionrespondtothe appealofconfusedperception.Butitdoesnotseem thatthereisevervoluntaryattentionwithouta"pre-perception,"tousethewordproposedbyG.H. Lewes,"thatis tosay,withoutanidea,whichmaybean anticipatedimage,orevensomethingmoreabstract,-forinstance,ahypothesisrelativetothemeaningof whatweareabouttoperceiveandtheprobablerelation ofthatperceptiontocertainelementsofourpastex-perience.Therehasbeenmuchdisputeastothetrue natureoftheoscillationofattention.Someholdthat thephenomenonhasacentral,othersthatithasa peripheral,origin.But,evenifwedonotwholly acceptthecentralorigintheory,wemustadmitthat therecanbenoattentionwithoutacertaineccentric projectionofimageswhichdescendtowardspercep-7G.H.Lewes,ProblemsofLifeandMind(London,1879),vol.iii. p. 106.. 210 211 MIND-ENERGY tion.Onlyinthiswaycanweexplaintheeffectof attention,whetheritbetointensifytheimage,assome writersmaintain,oronly,asothersthink,torenderit clearerandmoredistinct.Woulditbepossibleto understandthegradualenrichmentofperceptionby attentionifthebareperceptionweremorethana merehint,anappealmainlyaddressedtomemory? Thebareperceptionofthepartssuggestsaschematic ideaofthewhole,andtherebyoftherelationsofthe partstooneanother.Developingthisschemeinto memory-images,wetrytomakethesememory-images coincidewiththeimagesperceived.Ifwedonot succeed,straightwegotosomeotheridea,someother scheme,fromwhichweshallalsograduallydescend. Here,again,thepositive,usefulpartoftheworkis thegoingfromtheschemetotheimageperceived,. Theintellectualefforttointerpret,tocomprehend, topayattention,isthenamovementofthe"dynamic scheme"inthedirectionoftheimagewhichdevelops it .Itisacontinuoustransformationofabstractre-lations,suggestedbytheobjectsperceived,intocon-creteimagescapableofrecoveringthoseobjects.No doubtafeeling'ofeffortdoesnotalwaysintervene duringthisoperation.Weshallseepresentlyinwhat particularcircumstancestheoperationtakesplace wheneveraneffortistobefoundaccompanyingit. Butitisonlyduringsuchanoperationthatwecan becomeconsciousofanintellectualeffort.Th efeel-INTELLECTUALEFFORT ingofeffort,inintellection,is producedonthepassage fromtheschemetotheimage. Ihavenowtoverifythislawinthecaseofthe highestformsofintellectualeffort- Imeaninthe effortofinvention.AsRibothasobserved,tocreate imaginativelyistosolvea problem."Now,whatother wayisthereofsolvingaproblemthanbysupposing italreadysolved?Wesetbeforeourselves,asRibot says,acertainideal,thatis,wepresenttoourmind acertaineffectasalreadyobtained,andthenweseek todiscoverbywhatcompositionofelementswecan obtainit .Wepassataboundtothecompleteresult, totheendwewanttorealize,andthewholeeffortof inventionisthenanattempttofillupthegapover whichwehaveleapt,andtoreachanewthatsame endbyfollowing,thistime,thecontinuousthreadof themeanswhichwillrealize.Buthowisitpossible toknowtheendwithoutthemeans,thewholewithout theparts?Wecannotknowthisendorwholeunder theformofanimage,becauseanimagewhichwould makeusseetheeffectbeingbroughtaboutwouldshow us,withintheimageitself,themeansbywhichthe effectisobtained.Itmustnecessarilybeassumed, then,thatthewholeispresentedasascheme,andthat inventionconsistspreciselyinconvertingthescheme intoimage. 8 Ribot,L'Imaginationcreatrice(Paris,1900),p.130. 212 MIND-ENERGY Theinventorwhowishestoconstructacertainma-chineformsanide aoftheworkitistodo .The abstractformofthisworkevokessuccessivelyinhi s mind,bymeansoftent ativeexperiments,theconcr ete formofthedifferentelementarymovementswhichwill r eali zethetot almovement,thenthepartsandcom-binationsofpartsofthemachinewhichwillproduc e th eseelementa rymovements .Itispr eciselyatthi s momentth attheinventiontakesform:theschematic ideahasbecomeanimagedidea.Theauthorwritin g anovel,thedramatistcreatinghischar act ersandsitua-tions,themusici ancompo singasymphon y,thepoet compo singanepic,allhaveinmind ,firstofall,some-thin gsimpl eandabst ract ,something,sotosay,in-corporeal.Forthemusicianandpoetitisanewim-pr ession,whichtheymustunfoldinsoundsorill imagery.Forthenovelistandthedramatistitisa themetobedevelop edintoevents,afeelin g,individual orsocial,tobemat erializedinlivingperson ages. Theyst artworkwithaschemeofthewhole,andthe endisobt ainedwhentheyreachadistinctimageof theelements .M.Paulhanhasshownbysomehighly int er estingexampleshowliteraryandpoeticinvention thusproc eeds"fromth eabstr acttotheconcr ete"; tha tistosay,fromthewholetotheparts,fromthe schemetotheimage. v Wemustnotbeliev e,however,thatth escheme 9Paulh an,Psychologi sdel'inoention(Pa ri s,190 1 ) ,ch.iv. INTELLECTUALEFFORT213 r emainsunchang edthr oughoutth eoperation.Itis modifiedbytheveryimagesbywhichitendea voursto befilledin.Sometimesth er er emainsnothin gofthe primitiveschemeinthefinalimage.Th einventor , whi lstworkingoutthedetailsofhismachine,finds himselfcontinuallygivingupsomepartofwhathe wantedorgettingittodosomethi ngelse.Th echar-acterswhichthepoetorthe novelistcreat esarealways rea ctingontheideaorthefeelingwhichtheyare int endedtoexpress.Inthisespeciallyisth epartof theunforeseen;itis,wemightsay,inthemovement bywhichtheimageturnsroundtow ardsth escheme inordertomodifyortr ans formit.Buteffort ,inthe str ictmeaningoftheword,isonlytobefoundonthe wayfromthescheme,whetherunchangedorchangin g, totheimageswhichwillfillitin. Norisitnecessaryth attheschemeshouldalways explicitl yprecedetheimage.Ribothasshownthat wemustdistinguishtwoformsofcreati veimagination - oneintuitive,theotherr eflective."T hefirstpro -ceedsfromtheunitytothedetails...thesecond goesfromthedetailstoth e unityvaguelyapprehended. I tbeginswithafragm entwhichlur esiton,andis gr aduallycompl et ed....Kepl erspentpa rtofhis lif eintry ingtoworkoutextravaganthypoth esesuntil oneday,discoveringtheellipt icalorbitofMa rs,all hisformerworktookshapeandor gani zedits elfinto asystem."Inotherwor ds,inplaceofasingl e 21 4 MIND-ENERGY schemewithfixedandrigidlines,giventousimmedi-atelyinadistinctconcept,wemayhaveanelasticor mobileschemethecontoursofwhichourmindwill notfix, becauseitwillgetthesuggestionofthedefinite shapefromtheveryimageswhichtheschemeiscalling upinordertobeembodiedinthem.But,fixedor mobile,itis whiletheschemeisdevelopingintoimages thattherearisesthefeelingofintellectualeffort. Bringingtheseargumentsintolinewiththeformer, wegetaformulaofintellectualwork- thatis,ofthe movementofthemindwhichcan,incertaincases,be accompanied , byafeelingofeffort.Toworkintel-lectuallyistotakeoneandthesameideaandleadit throuqbdifferentplanesofconsciousness,inadirection whichgoesfromtheabstracttotheconcrete,fromthe schemetotheimage.Whatwenowhavetoascertain isinwhatspecialcasesthismovementofthemind (whichperhapsalwaysincludesafeelingofeffort, thoughoftensoslightorsofamiliarthatitisnot distinctlyperceived),givesustheclearconsciousness ofanintellectualeffort. Tothisquestionsimplecommonsenserepliesthat thereiseffort,inadditiontowork,whentheworkis difficult.Butbywhatsigndowerecognizethediffi-cultyofthework?Bythefactthattheworkdoes not"goofitself,"thatitmeetswithahindranceor anobstacle,orthatittakesmoretimethanweshould INTELLECTUALEFFORT21 5 wishtogiveinordertoattaintheend.Effortmeans th atthereisaslowingandholdingback.Onthe otherhand,wemayinstallourselvesinthescheme andwaitindefinitelyfortheimage,orwemayslacken theworkindefinitely,withoutanyconsciousnessofan effort.Itmustthenbeonthewayinwhichourwait-ing-timeisfilledthatthefeelingofeffortdepends, tha tistosay,onthequitespecialdiversityofstates which' followoneanotherinthewaiting-time.What ar e thosestates?Ihavejustsaidthatthereis a move-mentfromtheschemetotheimages,andthatthe mindisatworkonlywhenconvertingtheschemeinto images.Thestateswhichfollowoneanothermust th ereforecorrespondtosomanytrialeffortsofthe imagestogetinsertedinthescheme,oragain,in cert aincasesatleast,tosomanymodificationsunder-gonebytheschemeinordertogetitselftranslatedinto 'images.Inthispeculiarkindofhesitationislikely tobefoundthecharacteristicofintellectualeffort. Icannotdobetterthanreproducehere,adapting ittomypresentpurpose,aninterestingandprofound ideaputforwardbyProfessorDeweyinhisarticle onthepsychologyofeffort."Thereiseffort,accord-ingtoProfessorDewey,wheneverweuseacquired habitstolearnanewexercise.Inparticular,inthe caseofbodilyexercise,wecanonlylearnitbyutilizing 10Dewey,"ThePsychologyofEffort,"PhilosophicalReview(Jan. 1897) 216 MIND-ENERGY ormodifyingmovementstowhichwearealreadyac-customed.Buttheoldhabitisstillthere,anditre-siststhenewhabitwewishtosetupbymeansofit. Effortsimplyexhibitsthisstruggleoftwohabitsat oncedifferentandalike. Letmeexpressthissameideaintermsofschemes andimages.Iwillapplymyformulatobodilyef-fortofthekindwhichDeweyhasinmind,andsee whetherbodilyandintellectualeffortdonotthrow lightononeanother. Whenwewanttolearn,unaided,acomplexexercise suchasdancing,howdowesetaboutit?Webegin bylookingatpeopledancing.Inthiswaywegeta visualperception,say,ofthewaltz-movement,ifthat bewhatwearewantingtolearn.Thisperception weconfidetoourmemory,andouraim,then,isto getourlimbstoperformmovementswhichwillgive oureyesanimpressionlikethatwhichweremember havingseen.Butwhatis .thatimpression?Canwe saythatitistheclear,definitive,perfectimageof thewaltz-movement?Thatwouldimplythatwecan perceiveexactlythemovementofthewaltzwhenwe donotknowhowtowaltz.Nowitisquiteclearthat if,inordertolearnthedance,wemustbeginbyseeing itdanced,ontheotherhandwecanonlyseeit,inits detailsandevenasawhole,whenwehavelearntto someextenttodanceit.Theimagewhichwear e goingtouseisnot,then,aclean-cutvisualimage;itis INTELLECTUALEFFORT21 7 notcleancut,becauseitistovaryandgrowprecise inthecourseofthelearningwhichitisitsbusinessto direct;neitherisitentirelyvisual,because,ifitbe-comesperfectedinthecourseofthelearning,- that is tosay,in thecourseofouracquiringtheappropriate {I motorimages- thereasonisthatthesemotorim-ages,calledupbythevisualimage,butmoreprecise thanthevisualimage,invadeitandgraduallytakeits place..Infact,theusefulpartoftheimageis neither purelyvisualnorpurelymotor;itis bothatonce, being theoutlineoftherelations,especiallytemporal,be-tweenthesuccessivepartsofthemovementtobe executed. Animageofthiskind,whichexhibitsre-lationsratherthanthings,isverylikehatIhave calledascheme. Now,weonlybegintoknowhowtodancewhenthisscheme,supposedcomplete,hasobtainedfromourbodythesuccessivemovementsthemodelofwhichitsetbeforeus.Inotherwords,thescheme,anideamoreandmoreabstractofthemovementtobecarriedout,mustfill itselfwithallthemotorsensationswhichcorrespondtothemovementbeingcarriedout.Thisitcanonlydobyevokingonebyonetheideasofthesesensationsor,inthewordsofBastiantheIIkinaestheticimages,"ofthepartial,elementarymovementscomposingthetotalmovement:thesememoriesofmotorsensations,totheextentthattheyarerevivified,areconvertedintoactualmotorsensa-, 218MIND-ENERGY tions,andconsequentlyintomovementsactuallyaccom-plished.Ofthesemotorimages,then,wemusthave beenalreadypossessed.Soitcomestothis:inorder tocontractthehabitofacomplexmovementlikethe waltz,wemustalreadyhavethehabitoftheelement-arymovementsintowhichthewaltzcanbedecom-posed.Infact,itiseasytoseethatthemovements towhichweresortforwalking,forraisingourselves onthepointofthetoes,forturninground,arejust thosewhichweutilizeinordertolearnhowtowaltz. Butwedonoutilizethemexactlyastheyare.Itis necessarytomodifythemmoreorless,toinflecteach ofthemwiththegeneraldirectionofthewaltz-move-ment,andespeciallytocombinethemtogetherina newmanner.Thereis,then,ontheonehand,the schematicideaofthetotalmovementwhichisnew, and,ontheotherhand,thekinaestheticimagesof someoldmovements,identicaloranalogoustotheele-mentarymovementsintowhichthetotalmovementhas beenanalysed.Learningthewaltzconsistsingetting fromthesedifferentkinaestheticimages,alreadyold, anewsystematizationwhichwillallowallofthem togethertobeinsertedinthescheme.Hereagain, then,wehavetodowiththedevelopingofascheme intoimages.Buttheoldgroupingstrugglesagainst thenewgrouping.Thehabitofwalking,forex-ample,interfereswiththeattempttodance.The totalkinaestheticimageofwalkingpreventsusfrom INTELLECTUALEFFORT219 gettingatoncetheelementarykinaestheticimagesof walkingtocombinewithothersandformthetotal kinaestheticimageofthedance.Theschemeofthe dancedoesnotsucceedrightawayinfillingitselfwith appropr iat eimages.Doesnotthisdelay,causedby thenecessityinwhichtheschemefindsitselfofbring-inggraduallythemanifoldelementaryimagestoa newmodusvivendiamongthemselves,causedalso,in manycases,bymodificationswhichtheschemeitself undergoesinordertobecomecapableofdeveloping intoimages- thisdelaysuigenerismadeupoftenta-tives,ofmoreorlessfruitfultrials,adaptingimages totheschemeandtheschemetoimages,lettingthe ideasinteractandintermingle- doesnotthisdelay measuretheintervalbetweenthedifficultattemptand theeasyexecution,betweenthelearningandthedoin g oftheexercise? Now,itiseasytoseethatthesamekindorprocess occursineveryefforttolearnandtounderstand,inall intellectualeffort.Considertheeffortofmemory.I haveendeavouredtoshowthatitisproducedinth e transitionfromtheschemetotheimage.Butthere arecaseswherethedevelopmentoftheschemeinto theimageisimmediate,becauseoneimagealonepres-entsitselftoperformthatduty.Andthereareother caseswheremanyimages,analogoustooneanother, presentthemselvesconcurrently.Ingeneral,when severaldifferentimagesarecompetitors,itmeansthat 220 221 MIND-ENERGY noneofthementirelyfulfilstheconditionslaiddown bythescheme.Andth atiswhy,insuchcase,the schememayhavetomodifyitselfinordertoobtain developmentintoimages.Thus,whenIwantto recallapropername,Iturnfirsttothegeneralim-pressionwhichIhavekeptofit;thisiswhatwillact asthe"dynamicscheme."Atoncedifferentele-ment aryimages,corresponding,forexample,tocer-tainlettersofthealphabet,presentthemselvesto mymind.Theselettersseekeithertoformawhole togetherortosubstitutethemselvesforoneanother, inanywaytoorganizethemselvesaccordingtothe indicationsofthescheme.Butoften,inthecourse ofthework,thereisrevealedtheimpossibilityof reachinganyformoflivingorganization.Hencea gradualmodificationofthescheme - amodification requiredbytheveryimageswhichtheschemehas arousedandwhichmayyetindeedhavetobetrans-formedoreventodisappearintheirturn.But whethertheimagessimplymanageitbetwe enthem-selvesorwhetherschemeandimageshavetomake reciprocalconcessionstooneanother,theeffortof recallalwaysimpliesaninterval,gradu allyfilledin ordiminished,betwe entheschemeandtheimages. Themorethisbringingtogetherneedsgoingsand comings,oscillations,struggleandnegotiation,the morethefeelingofeffortisaccentuated. Nowhereisthisworksovisibleasintheeffortof INTELLECTUALEF FORT invention.Herewe havethedistinctfeelingofa form oforganization,variablenodoubt,butanteriortothe elementswhichmustbeorganized,thenofacompeti-tionbetweentheelementsthemselves,andlastly,if wesucceedininventing,ofanequilibriumwhichisa reciprocaladaptationoftheformandofthematter. Theschemevariesfromoneoftheseperiodstothe other;butineachoftheperiodsitremainsrelatively unchanged,anditisthebusinessoftheimag esto fitintoit.Itisjustasthoughwehadtostretcha pieceofIndiarubberindifferentdirectionsatthesame timeinordertobringittothegeometricalformofa particularpolygon.Itshrinksatsomepoints,accord-ingasitislengthenedatothers.W ehavetobegin overandoveragain,eachtimefixing th epartialresult obtained;wemayevenhave,duringtheoperation,to modifytheformfirstassignedtothepolygon.Sois itwiththeeffortofinvention,whetherittakeseconds orwhetheritrequireyears. Now,doesthiscomingandgoingbetweenthe schemeandtheimages,thisplayoftheimagesagree-ingorquarrellingamongthemselvestoenterthe scheme,inshort,doesthisparticularmovementof ideasformanintegr alpartofth e f eelingthatwehave ofeffort?Ifthisplayofimag esispr esentwhenever weexperiencethefeelingofintellectualeffort,ifitis absentwhenthatfeelingisabsent,canwethinkthat ithasnothingtodowiththefeelingitself?Butthen, 222MINDENERGY ontheotherhand,howcanaplayofimages,amove-mentofideas,enterintothecompositionofafeeling? Recentpsychologyinclinestoresolveintoperipheral sensationswhateverisaffectiveinaffection.Andeven ifwedonotgosofar,stillitseemsthataffection isirreducibletoideation.What,then,isexactlythe relationbetweentheaffectivetonewhichcoloursall intellectualeffortandtheveryspecialplayofideas whichanalysisdiscoversinit? Iamquitereadytograntthatinattention,in andgenerallyinintellectualeffort,theaffec-tionexperiencedcanberesolvedintoperipheralsensa-tions.Butitdoesnotthereforefollowthatthe "playofideas"Ihaveindicatedascharacteristicof intellectualeffortdoesnotalsomakeitselffeltinthat affection.Wecanagreetoboth,ifonlyweassume thattheplayofsensationsrespondstotheplayofideas andisanechoofit,sotosay,inanothertone.That istheeasiertounderstandinasmuchaswearenotin factdealingherewithanidea,butwithamovementof ideas,withastruggleorwithaninterferenceofideas withoneanother.Wemayconceivethatthesemental oscillationshavetheirsensoryharmonics.Wemay conceivethatthisindecisionofthemindiscontinued inadisquietudeofthebody.Thecharacteristicsen-sationsofintellectualeffortarelikelytoexpressthat verysuspensionanddisquietude.Inageneralway, maywenotsaythattheperipheralsensationswhich INTELLECTUALEFFORT223 analysisdiscoversinanemotionarealwaysmoreor lesssymbolicaloftheideastowhichthatemotionis attached,andfromwhichitisderived?Wehave atendencytoplayourthoughtsexternally,andthe consciousnesswehaveofthisplaygoingonissent backtothethoughtbyakindofricochet.Thus arisestheemotion,whichusuallyhasanideaasits centre,butinwhichthereareespeciallyvisiblethe sensationsin whichthatideais prolonged.Sensations andideaaremoreoversocontinuousherewitheach otherthatwecanneversaywheretheideaendsor wherethesensationsbegin.Andthatiswhycon-sciousness,placingitselfmidwayandcontentedwith themean,erectsthefeelingintoasuiqenerisstatein-termediatebetweenthesensationandtheidea.ButI shallnotpressthis.TheproblemthatIhaveraised canhardlybesolvedinthepresentstateofpsycho-logicalscience. Itremains,inconclusion,toshowthatthisconcep-tionofmentalefforttakesaccountoftheprincipal effectsofintellectualwork,andthatitisatthesame timethatwhichmostnearlyapproachespureand simpledescriptionoffactandhasleastresemblance toatheory. Itisanacknowledgedfactthateffortgivestothe ideagreaterclearnessanddistinction.N ow,anidea istheclearerthegreaterthenumberofdetailsthat 224 MIND-ENERGY standoutinit,anditisthemoredistinctthebetter itisisolatedanddifferentiatedfromalltheothers. Butifmentaleffortconsistinaseriesofactionsand reactionsbetweenaschemeandimages,weshouldjust expectthisinwardmovementontheonehandto isolatetheideaandontheotherhandtoincreaseits content.Theideaisisolatedfromalltheothers,be-causetheorganizingschemerejectstheimageswhich arenotcapableofdevelopingitandconfersthusareal individualityonthepresentcontentoftheconscious-ness.Ontheotherhand,itfills itselfwithanincreas-ingnumberofdetails,becausethedevelopmentofthe schemeisbroughtaboutbytheabsorptionofallthe memoriesandalltheimageswhichtheschemecan assimilate.Thus,intherelativelysimpleintellectual effortinwhichconsiststheattentiongiventoapercep-tion,itseemsindeed,as Isaid,thatthepureperception beginsbysuggestingahypothesisintendedtointerpret it,andthatthisschemethendrawstoitmanifold memorieswhichittriesonthevariouspartsofthe perceptionitself.Theperception,then,enrichesitself withallthedetailsevokedbythememoryofimages, whilstitremainsdistinguishedfromallotherpercep-tionsbytheoneunchangedlabel,sotosay,whichthe schemehasaffixed toitfromtheverybeginning. Ithasbeensaidthatattentionisastateof"mono-ideism!"11andithasbeennoticed,ontheotherhand, 11Ribot,Psychologiedel'Attention,p.6(Paris , 1889) . INTELLECTUALEFFORT2125 thattherichnessofamentalstateisinproportionto theefforttowhichitbearswitness.Thesetwoviews areeasilyreconciledtogether.Inallintellectualeffort thereisa multiplicity,visibleorlatent,ofimageswhich crowdandpresstoenterintoascheme.But,the schemebeingrelativelyoneandinvariable,themani-foldimageswhichaspiretofill itareeitheranalogous tooneanotherorco-ordinatedwithoneanother. Thereis,then,mentaleffortonlywherethereare intellectualelementsontheirwaytoorganization.In thismeaning,everymentaleffortisindeedatendency tomonoideism,buttheunitytowardswhichthemind movesisnotinthatcaseanabstractunity,dryand void;itistheunityofa"directiveidea"commonto agreatnumberoforganizedelements.Itisthevery unityoflife. Fromamisunderstandingofthenatureofthisunity havearisentheprincipaldifficultieswhichsurround thequestionofintellectualeffort.Thereisnodoubt thatthiseffort"concentrates"themindandmakesit bearona"single"idea.Butitdoesnotfollow,be-causeanideaissingl e,thatitisalsosimpl e.Itmay, onthecontrary,becomplex,andwehave"shownthat thereisalwayscomplexitywhenthemindmakes effort:inthat,indeed,istobefoundthecharacter-isticofintellectualeffort.Thisis whyIhavethought itpossibletoexplaintheeffortoftheintellectwithout goingoutoftheintellect,simplybyacertaincom-226 227 MIND-ENERGY position,orbyacertaininterference,ofintellectual elementsamongthemselves.Butifwetakeunity toimplysimplicity,ifwesupposethatintellectualef-fortcanbearonasimpleideaandtheidearemain simple,howarewetodistinguishanideawhenit islabouredfromthesameideawhenitiseasy?How willthestateofintellectualtensiondifferfromthe stateofintellectualrelaxation?vVeshallhaveto lookforthedifferenceoutsidetheideaitself.We shallhavetomakeitresideeitherintheaffectiveac-companimentoftheideaorintheinterventionofa "force"externaltointelligence.But,then,neither thisaffectiveaccompanimentnorthisindefinablesup-plementofforcewillexplainhowandwhyintellectual effortisefficacious.Whenthetimecomestogivean accountoftheefficacy, itwillbenecessarytoleaveout everythingwhichisnotidea,placeoneselfconfronting theideaitself,andlookforaninternaldifferencebe-tweenthepurelypassiveideaandthesameideaac-companiedbyeffort.Andthenwemustnecessarily perceivethattheideaiscomposite,andthatitsele-mentshavenotineachcasethesamerelationbetween them.But,iftheinternalcontexturediffers,why seekelsewherethaninthisdifferencethecharacteristic ofintellectualeffort?Sincewemustalwaysendby recognizingthatdifference,whynotbeginwithit? Andiftheinternalmovementoftheelementsofthe ideaaccountbothforwhatislaboriousandforwhat INTELLECTUALEFFORT isefficaciousinintellectualeffort,whynotseeinthe movementtheveryessenceoftheeffort? WillitbesaidthatIampostulatingtheduality ofschemeandimage,andalsoanactionofoneof theseelementsontheother?. But,inthefirstplace,thereisnothingmysterious norevenhypotheticalaboutthescheme.Thereis nothinginitwhichneedshockthesusceptibilitiesof aprofessionalpsychologist,accustomedtoresolveideas intoimages,oratleasttodefineanyideabyitsre-lationtoimagesrealorpossible.Itisindeedasa functionofrealorpossibleimagesthatthemental scheme,suchasithasappearedthroughoutthisessay, shouldbedefined.Itconsistsinanexpectationof images,inanintellectualattitudeintendedsometimes topreparetheadventofonedefiniteimage,asinthe caseofmemory,sometimestoorganizeamoreor lessprolongedplayamongtheimagescapableofin-. I sertingthemselvesinit,asinthecaseofcreative imagination.Theschemeistentativelywhatthe imageisdecisively.Itpresentsintermsofbecoming, dynamically,whattheimagesgiveusstaticallyas alreadymade.Presentandactingintheworkof callingupimages,itdrawsbackanddisappearsbehind theimagesonceevoked,itsworkbeingthenaccom-plished.Theimage,withitsfixedoutline,pictures whathasbeen.Amindworkingonlywithimages couldbutrecommenceitspastorarrangethecongealed 228 229 MIND-ENERGY element softhepast,likepiecesofmosaic,inanother or der.Butforaflexiblemind,capableofutilizingits pastexperiencebybendingitbackalongthelinesof thepresent,theremust,besidestheimage,beanidea ofadifferentkind,alwayscapableofbeingrealized intoimages,but,alwaysdistinctfromthem.The schemeisnothin gelse. Theexistenceofthisschemeisfact.Itisthe reductionofallideationtoclean-cutimages,copied fromexternalobjects,whichishypothesis.Letme addthatnowh erei stheinsufficiencyofthehypothesis soclearlyshownasinthesubjectwithwhichweare dealing.Ifimagesconstitutethewholeofourmental life,howisth estateofmentalconcentrationdifferen-tiatedfromth estateofintellectualdispersion?We mustsupposethatincertaincasestheysucceedone anotherwithoutanycommonintention,andthatin othercases,bysomeinexplicab!echance,alltheim-ages,simultaneousandsuccessive,groupthemselvesin amannerwhichoffersanevernearerapproachtothe solutionofoneandthesameproblem.Shallwebe toldthatitisnotchance,buttheresemblanceofthe images,whichmakesthemcalluponeanother,me-chanically,accordingtoagenerallawofassociation? But,inthecaseofintellectualeffort,theimageswhich followoneanothermayjusthavenorealexternallike-nessamongthemselves.Theirresemblancemaybe whollyinternal;itisanidentityofmeaning,anequal INTELLECTUALE FFORT capacityof' solvingaproblemtowardswhichtheyoc-cupyanalogousorcomplementarypositions,despite theirdifferencesofconcreteform.Th eproblem itself,therefore,mustbestandingbeforethemind,not atallasanimage.Wereititselfanimage,itwould evokeimagesresemblingitandresemblingonean-other.Butsinceitstaskis,onthecontrary,tocallup andgroupimagesaccordingtotheirpowerofsolving thedifficulty,itmustconsiderthispoweroftheimages andnottheirexternalandapparentform.Itisthere-foreamodeofpresentationdistinctfromtheimaged presentation,althoughitcanonlybedefinedinrel a-tiontomentalimagery. Itisfutiletoobjectthatthereisdifficultyincon-ceivingtheactionoftheschemeontheimag es.Isthe actionofanimageonanimageanyclear er?When wearetoldthatimagesattracteachotherbyreason oftheirresemblance,arewecarri edbeyondpureand simpledescriptionoffact?AllIaskisthatnopart ofexperienceshallbeneglected.Besid esth einfluence ofimageonimage,thereistheattractionortheim-pulsionexercisedontheimagesby- thescheme.Be-sidesthedevelopmentofthemindononesingleplan e, onthesurface,thereisthemovementofth emind whichgoesfromoneplan etoanot her ,deeperdown . Besidesthemechanismofassociation,th ereisthatof mentaleffort.Theforcesatworkinthetwocasesdo notsimplydifferinintensity,theydifferinth eirdirec-23 MIND.ENERGY tion.Astoknowinghowtheywork,thisisaquestion whichdoesnotonlyconcernpsychology;itispartof thegeneralandmetaphysicalproblemofcausality. Betweenimpulsionandattraction,betweentheefficient causeandthefinalcause,thereis,Ihold,something intermediate,aformofactivityfromwhichphiloso-phershavedrawn,bywayofimpoverishmentanddis-sociation,inpassingtothetwooppositeandextreme limits,theideaofefficientcauseontheonehandand offinalcauseontheother.Thisoperation,whichis theveryoperationoflife,consistsinthegradualpas-sagefromthelessrealizedtothemorerealized,from theintensivetotheextensive,fromareciprocalim-plicationofpartstotheirjuxtaposition.Intellectual effortis somethingofthiskind.Inanalysingit,Ihave pressedasfarasIcould,onthesimplestandatthe sametimethemostabstractexample,thegrowing materializationoftheimmaterialwhichischaracter-isticofvitalactivity. VII BRAINANDTHOUGHT:APHILOSOPHICALILLUSIONApaperreadattheInternationalCongr essofPhilosophyat Gen evain1904 ,andpublish edinthe"R evueden.lta-physiqueetdemorale"underthetitleLeParalogisme Upsycho-physiologique." THEideathatthereisanequivalencebetweena psychic stateanditscorrespondingcerebr alstateiswidely accept edinmodernphilosophy.Philosophershave discussedthecausesandthesignificanceofthisequiv-alenceratherthantheequivalenceitself.Bysome, ithasbeenheldthatthecerebralstateisreduplicated incertaincasesbyapsychicalphosphorescencewhich illuminesitsoutline.Byothers,itissupposedthat thecerebralstateandthepsychicstateformrespec-t ivelytwoseriesofphenomenawhichcorrespondpoint topoint,withoutitbeingnecessarytoattributetothe cerebralseriesthecreationofthepsychic .All,how-ever,agreeinadmittinganequivalenceor,asitismore usualtosay,aparall elismofthetwoseries.Inorder toexpresstheidea ,Iwillformulateitasathesis: IIGivenacerebralstate,therewillensueadefinite psychicstate."Oritmaybestatedthus:"Asuper-231