beckford, sociology, social science and the definition of religion

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James A. Beckford, Ph.D.Professor of SociologyUniversity of Warwick

England

SCIENTOLOGY ,SOCIAL S CIENCE AND

THE D EFINITION

OF R ELIGION

FREEDOM PUBLISHING



James A. Beckford, Ph.D.Professor of SociologyUniversity of Warwick

England


THE D EFINITION

OF R ELIGION

FREEDOM PUBLISHING



FREEDOM P UBLISHING

6331 HOLLYWOODBOULEVARD, SUITE 1200LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA90028-6329TEL: (213) 960-3500FAX: (213) 960-3508/3509



I. FUNCTIONALIST DEFINITIONS . . . . PAGE 2

II. SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONS . . . . PAGE 2

III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . PAGE 4

TABLE OFC ONTENTS



Scientology,Social Scienceand theDefinition ofReligion

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THE D EFINITIONOF R ELIGION

M y rem arks are addressed to the question o f w hether Scientology w ould b edefined as a religion according to the criteria conventionally used by social scien-tists specialising in the analysis of w hat they consider to be religious phenom ena 1.

There is considerable d iversity am ong the concep tualisations and definitions of

religion em ployed by social scien tists. The choice of conceptualisation and defini-tion reflects bo th a w ide variety of underlying assum ptions about the nature ofsocial reality and variations in the purpose of conceptualising or defining religion.G iven the generally instrum en tal (and distinct from appreciative or evaluative) char-acter of social scien tific understanding, it is not surprising that concepts and defin-itions are judged not in term s of their truth or falsity but, rather, in term s of theirrelative usefulness. In particular, their differential capacity to set a given phenom e-non clearly apart from other phenom ena in such a w ay that the d ifferences can beshow n to reveal significant facts about them is the m ain m easure of the usefulnessof com peting definitions and concep tualisations.

D efinitions 2 m ay vary, then, w ith the purposes in hand, but this does not m eanthat there is total relativity or anarchy. There are tw o broad types of definitions ofreligion in use am ong psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists: functionalistand substantive. W ithin each typ e there are further sub-typ es. I shall argue that, onthe basis of personal contacts w ith Scien tologists and scholarly study of

James A. Beckford, Ph.DProfessor of SociologyUniversity of Warwick

England

1. Professor Beckford w rote this pap er in 1980.2. For stylistic reasons I shall no longer m en tion “conceptualisation”, but it does constitute aseparable an alytic process w hich usually p recedes the p rocess of defining p henom ena.



Scientology’s teachings, practices, organ isation and consequences for its follow ers’lives, I believe that it can be m ore helpfully defined as a religion than as any o therkind of en terprise.

I. FUNCTIONALIST DEFINITIONSA functionalist definition is one w hich focuses attention on the contributions

allegedly m ade by the phenom enon in question to the stability and/or survival of asocial or cultural entity. Thus, phenom ena can be show n to be functional for enti-ties ranging from the individual person to the w orld-system . The fact that this m an-ner of defining things raises m any philosophical problem s and has exercised them inds of m any logicians has not prevented it from achieving popularity am ongsocial scientists — especially in connection w ith religion.

It m ay be said that religion has the functional cap acity:(a) at the p ersonal level to help people overcom e problem s of personality

im balance, self-identity, m ean ing in life, m oral reasoning, etc.,(b) at the com m unal level to integrate potentially rootless people into groups

and associations w hich provide direction and m ean ing in personal life as w ell ashelpful points of reference in large-scale societies w here the individual m ay feelvulnerable to an all-pow erful bureaucracy or system , or

(c) at the societal level to provide legitim ation for the prevailing social order;com pensation for felt dep rivations; and m oral regulation of the interrelationshipsbetw een m ajor social institutions.

The basic teachings of Scien tology on the spiritual nature of the thetan (spiritu-

al being) and on the E ight D ynam ics; the p ractical objectives of its training cours-es and counselling services; and the reverential, reflective tone of som e Scien tologycerem onies all persuade m e that, in com m on w ith o ther religions, Scientology m aybe usefully described as functional at each of the above levels. This is not, ofcourse, to claim that only religions have these fun ctions. It is m erely to argue, first,that Scien tology does share them w ith other religions and, second, that its particu-lar w ays of fulfilling them are m ore closely akin in appearance and objectives tothose of com m onsensically-defined religions than of, say, political groups or w el-fare agencies.

D efining religion in term s of function m ay be helpful in som e cases of social sci-

en tific analysis: light can thereby be cast on m any interesting aspects of its variedcontribution to social life. In view of the obvious difficulty o f distinguishing in thisperspective betw een religion and ideologies, how ever, a functionalist definitioncannot go far tow ards em phasising religion’s distinctiveness. For this reason a sub-stantive definition m ay be m ore useful.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONSIt is clear to m e that Professor Parrinder, Professor Pocock and Canon D rury

have each suggested criteria by w hich a phenom enon m ight qualify as religious ina substantive sense. B y this I m ean that various grounds are p rovided by them for

Scientology,Social Science

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Religion

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restricting the application of the term “religion”to phenom ena displaying definiteproperties w hich do not occur together in o ther phenom ena.

The strongest form of substantive definitions holds that religion has an essenceor essential nature w hich can be know n for certain only by intuition and intro-spection. Thus, Rudolf O tto claim ed that religion w as a “... prim al elem ent of ourpsychical nature that needs to be grasped purely in its un iqueness and cannot itselfbe explained from anything else”. ( The Idea of the Holy. H arm ondsw orth: PenguinB ooks, 1950, p. 141.) In his opinion the uniqueness of religious experiences lay intheir radical differences from all other experiences: they w ere the experiences of the“w holly o ther”. The elem ents of circularity and tim elessness in this kind of reason-ing are p roblem atic and have deterred m ost social scientists from m aking use ofessentialist definitions. The attractions are, how ever, unden iab le.

M ore frequen tly social scien tists have been disposed to use “stipulative”defini-

tions of religion. B y this m eans they have stipulated that, for their purposes andw ithout claim ing universal validity for their view s, “religion”shall be identified byreference to certain characteristics. For the anthropologist M . Sp iro, e.g., religion is“an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction w ith culturally postulat-ed sup erhum an beings. (“Religion: problem s of definition and explanation”in M .B anton ed. Anthr opological Approaches to the Study of Reli gion . London: Tavistock,1966, p. 96.) N ot all social scientists insist, how ever, on the reference to “superhu-m an beings”. P. W orsley, another anthropologist, finds it m ore useful to define reli-gion as a “dim ension beyond the em pirical-technical realm ”. ( The Tru mpet Shall Sound. London: M acG ibbon & K ee, 1957, p. 311.) This preference for a substantive,

but fairly inclusive, definition is shared by m any sociologists. The w ell-know n andau thoritative definition by R . Robertson, e.g., stipulates that,

Religious culture is that set of beliefs and sym bols ... pertaining to adistinction b etw een an em pirical and a super-em pirical, transcendentreality: the affairs of the em pirical being subordinated in significanceto the non-em pirical. Second, w e define religious action sim ply as:action shaped by an acknow ledgem ent of the em pirical/super-em piri-cal distinction. (The Sociological Interpretation of Religion. O xford:B lackw ell, 1970, p.47.)

N o good purpose w ould be served by adding further exam ples of stipulative sub-

stantive d efinitions, since the quoted exam ples are rep resentative of the com m onw ays in w hich religion is defined for the purpose of social scientific analysis.U sing the definitional criteria im plicit in Spiro’s, W orsley’s and Robertson’s defi-

nitions, there can be no doubt that Scientology qualifies for the purposes of socialscientific analysis as a religion. Its underlying philosophy o f m an assum es that theperson is com posed of both a m aterial body and a non-m aterial spirit w hich enjoysim m ortal life in a non-em pirical realm . B elief in the reality of thetans is a logicalprerequisite for subscription to Scientology’s rituals, courses of practical training,counselling services and program m es of social reform . There w ould be no cogentjustification for Scientology’s particular form s of religion in the absence of belief in



the existence and the superiority of a non-em pirical, transcendent reality. Indeed,in the view of the author of the m ost authoritative sociological analysis ofScientology the m ovem ent’s founder and leader becam e progressively m ore ori-ented tow ards questions about the origins of the thetan, know ledge of past livesand “the supernatural abilities that the individual can acquire through the p racticeof Scientology”. (R. W allis, The Road to Total Freedom. London: H einem ann,1976, p. 124.)

The actions of a com m itted Scientologist w ould be shaped and guided by theem pirical/super-em pirical distinction. Professor Parrinder has dem onstrated effec-tively how the rituals of Scientology em body an elem ent of w orship and venera-tion w hich is consonant w ith the underlying teachings about non-em pirical realityand Professor Pocock has em phasised the clear parallels betw een Scientology andthe G reat Traditions of the H indu and B uddhist religions in respect of their sim ilar

understanding o f the im m anent relationship betw een G ods or spirits and m ankind.

III.CONCLUSIONM y conclusion is that Scien tology, w hilst clearly d iffering from the m ajority of

Christian churches, denom inations and sects in beliefs, practices and organisation-al structures, nevertheless satisfies the criteria conventionally applied by social sci-en tists in distinguishing b etw een religion and non-religion.

The fact that the m aterial basis for the religion of Scien tology is organised in abusiness-like m anner can have no im plications for its status as a religion. D oes a

w ork of art cease to be a w ork of art w hen it is efficiently p roduced for sale o rexchange? It is naive to think that any new religious m ovem ent could survive in them odern w orld w ithout a business-like m aterial basis for its op erations, and asCanon D rury has pointed out, even the ancient Christian churches are now adaysnot averse from engaging in business affairs in order to sustain or prom ote theirservices to actual and potential m em bers. Lacking the benefits of inheritedproperty-w ealth, endow m ents, patronage and a “birth righ t”m em bership, new reli-gious m ovem ents m ust either act in a business-like m anner or perish.

Jam es A . B eckford

D ecem ber 1980

A B O U T T H E A U TH O RWhen Professor Beckford wr ote “Scientology, Social Science an d th e Defin iti on of Religion ” in 1980 , he was Sen ior Lectur er i n Sociology at the Uni versity of Dur ham . He is cur ren tly Professor of Sociology at the Uni versity of Warw ick.

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and theDefinition of

Religion

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beckford, sociology, social science and the definition of religion

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