bargainingggg over proliferation

8/13/2019 Bargainingggg Over Proliferation

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Bargaining over Proliferation

William Spaniel

[email protected]

wjspaniel.wordpress.com/pscir106


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Big question: Why do statesdevelop weapons?


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Big question: Why do states notdevelop weapons?


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Why Not Proliferate?

1. Threat of preventive war

2. Costs of proliferation

3. Bribes


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Modeling Proliferation Pre-Shift Bargaining

Declining state offers a bribe.

Rising state accepts, rejects, or builds a nuke.

Post-Shift Bargaining


Rising state accepts or rejects.


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Post-Shift Bargaining Bargaining model of war: fighting is costly, so

states should reach a peaceful settlement.

But in post-shift bargaining, the rising state

has nuclear weapons.

So the declining state needs to offer larger bribes.


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Modeling Proliferation Pre-Shift Bargaining


Rising state accepts, rejects, or builds a nuke.

Post-Shift Bargaining

Ends peacefully with rising state receiving great

concessions.


8/49Cost of Nukes

P

owerS

hift


9/49Cost of Nukes

P

owerS

hift

Too Hot for Proliferation


10/49Cost of Nukes

P

owerS

hift


Too Cold

forProliferation


11/49Cost of Nukes

P

owerS

hift


Too Cold

forProliferation

Bargaining!


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Why Bribes Work Works even if the rising state could freely

proliferate.

No quid-pro-quo bargaining necessary.

Again, rising state is already getting what it wants.


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Why This Matters Iran has a nuclear program.

They swear its not a weapons program. Nobody

believes them.

Much of the policy debate in the U.S.

presupposes nothing will stop Iran from

building a weaponexcept war.


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But The model shows this isnt true.

It is very easy to convince the other side to

settleas long as you commit to giving them largeenough offers.

Does Iran believe the U.S. will continue to give

nice offers in the future?


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A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian

Relations


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1979


18/491979-1981


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September 11, 2001


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Invasion of Afghanistan, October 2001 Iran was initially supportive of the U.S. in the

aftermath of 9/11.


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aftermath of 9/11.

Who was the Northern Alliance?


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aftermath of 9/11.


A group of Afghan rebelsan alliance that Iran

had built up.


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aftermath of 9/11.


A group of Afghan rebelsan alliance that Iran

had built up.

Quiet Iran-U.S. meetings held to coordinateaction in Afghanistan.


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January 29, 2002

Axis of evil.

What up with that,

bro?


27/493/20/2003


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Also in 2003


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5/1/2003


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Later that week


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The Iranian Olive Branch 5/4/2003: Swiss Ambassador delivers a path-

to-peace document from Iran.

Offers: End to nuclear weapons program,assistance against al-Qaeda, end to Hezbollah aid,

recognition of Israel.

Demands: Full diplomatic recognition and aprisoner swap.


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We donttalk to evil.


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6/24/2005


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2005-2009


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2008


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3/20/2009

Hey, this is crazy,but heres my

number. So callme maybe?


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3/20/2009

Hey, this is crazy,but heres my

number. So callme maybe?

Im just notthat into

you.


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Ayatollahs Response Two days later

Where is the change? What has changed?

This is not change. This is deceit.


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Ayatollahs Response Two days later

Where is the change? What has changed?

This is not change. This is deceit.

Change repeated thirty times.

Ayatollah interrupted twice by death to

America chants.


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In the meantime


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8/2003


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Cost of Nukes

PowerShift


Bargaining!


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War Exhaustion As war exhaustion decreases, the U.S. finds

preventive war more attractive.

Thus, the U.S. is willing to prevent under a widerrange of circumstances.


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Cost of Nukes

PowerShift

Iran worries that we will

be here in five years.


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War Exhaustion As war exhaustion decreases, the U.S. finds

preventive war more attractive.

Thus, the U.S. is willing to prevent under a widerrange of circumstances.

But if Iran already has a nuke, it is too late for

this to make a difference.


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Irans Decision1. Accept bribes now, risk that the bribes will

disappear as soon as U.S. war exhaustion

disappears.2. Build now, pay the costs, and ensure the U.S.

will give concessions in the future.


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Policy Implication

Current policy discussion in the U.S. focuses

entirelyon the credibility of Iranian

commitment to a deal. But commitment is easy as long as the bribes are

good enough.

U.S. should spend more time discussing thecredibility of its own offers.

bargainingggg over proliferation

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