bali bombings memorial

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TheBaliBombingsMonument:CeremonialCosmopolis

JeffLewis,BelindaLewisandINyomanDarmaPutra

TheJournalofAsianStudies/Volume72/Issue01/February2013,pp2143DOI:10.1017/S0021911812001799,Publishedonline:18March2013

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The Bali Bombings Monument: CeremonialCosmopolis

JEFF LEWIS, BELINDA LEWIS, AND I NYOMANDARMA PUTRA

In 2003 a monument was erected at the site of the 2002 Islamist militant attacks in Kuta,Bali. Government and other official discourses, including the design brief, represent themonument as an integrated and culturally harmonious public testimony to the victims.However, the monument is also a discordant association of ideas, meanings, and politicalclaims. While originally designed to subdue insecurity, the Bali bombings monument, infact, constitutes a site of powerful language wars around its rendering of memory andits presence in Balis integration into the globalizing economy of pleasure. This paperexamines the ways in which the monument is being articulated and consumed as asocial and cultural marker for the islands tourism geography. The paper pays particularattention to the increasing diversity of Balis visitors and the ways in which a precariouscosmopolization of the Kuta-Legian area is being experienced and expressed at themonument site.

INTRODUCTION

THE BALI BOMBINGS MEMORIAL commemorates the first of two Islamist attacks that tookplace in 2002 and 2005. On October 12, 2002, a van loaded with explosives was deto-nated outside the Sari nightclub in Legian Street, Kuta. At about the same time, and justacross the street, a pedestrian bomber detonated his backpack in Paddys Bar. At Paddysthe explosion ignited propane gas bottles, creating an intense fireball that burned alivemany of the nightclub patrons who had survived the initial blast. The official death tollfor the Sari Club and Paddys Bar bombings was around 202, though the actual figuremay have been higher as many non-Balinese Indonesians were personae non grataeand were never counted in the official figures. Around eighty-eight Australians werekilled; the other major nationalities included Indonesian, British, American, Japanese,Brazilian, German, and French.

The 2002 bombings critically damaged Balis reputation as a safe, peaceful, and har-monious tourist destination and had a devastating effect on the tourism industry and locallivelihoods. These events triggered an unprecedented social and economic crisis. Forlocal Balinese, the bombings were also associated with a deeper cosmological imbalance.The notion of Bali harmony that had for several decades underpinned the exponential

Jeff Lewis ([email protected]) is Professor of Cultural Politics in the Global Cities Institute, School ofMedia and Communication at RMIT University, Melbourne.Belinda Lewis ([email protected]) is Senior Lecturer in Health Promotion, School of Primary

Health Care, Monash University, Melbourne.I Nyoman Darma Putra ([email protected]) is Professor of Language and Culture, Faculty of Letters,

Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia.

The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 72, No. 1 (February) 2013: 2143. The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2013 doi:10.1017/S0021911812001799

growth in Balis tourism economy was called into question. In the wake of the tragedy,there was considerable reflection amongst the Balinese themselves about rapid sociocul-tural change associated with rampant and uncontrolled tourism development; seriousenvironmental degradation; uneven distribution of wealth; growing social inequalities;and increasing economic, ethnic, and religious tensions between the Hindu Balineseand outsider migrants from other parts of predominantly Muslim Indonesia. Withinthis context, the Bali Tourism Authority and religious leaders conducted extensive inter-faith, ritual cleansing ceremonies designed to restore a sense of harmony and focus on theunique characteristics of traditional Balinese culture that would contribute to Baliscapacity to deal effectively with the tragedy. The unresolved social and cultural conten-tions that had inevitably been generated by Balis modernization, increasing cosmopoli-tanism, and engagement with a globalizing economy were largely played down (Lewisand Lewis 2009b).

The Bali bombings memorial was constructed in 2003 during the three monthsbefore the first commemoration service for the 2002 attacks. Both the memorial andfirst commemoration were conceived in terms of broader processes of cosmologicalcleansing, economic recovery, and restoration of a social harmony. Set within theteeming tourist cosmopolis of Kuta, the Bali memorial was designed to reconcile theunderpinning violence, contentiousness, and impact of the attacks, creating an authorizedhomology that would contribute to spiritual, social, and cultural healing. The diversedesign elements and historical-cultural references of the memorial were drawn togetherto create a homogenizing narrative, or homology, which aimed to give a sense of cohe-sion and unity.1 This communion of aesthetic and cultural elements would transform thehorrors of the past into a comprehensible but powerful narrative that distinguishes rightfrom wrong, order from calumny, and pluralism from sectarianism. As Spiro Kostof(1987) has noted, such memorials are generally designed to transform the diverse andcomplex details of conflict events into a more integrated vision of history (see alsoLogan and Reeves 2009; Mare 2002). There is a long scholarly lineage of critiquefocused on this privileging of a particular perspective of the past as official history (Fou-cault 1977b).2

In many respects, this is precisely the official objective of the Bali bombings monu-ment. For those who commissioned and designed the monument, the site would notsimply commemorate the victims of the attacks; it would advance a common narrativeof peace and reconciliation against the ideological discord and violence that had precipi-tated the atrocity of the bombings. Thus, the Badung Regency, which presides over theKuta district, commissioned a memorial that subscribed to national government aspira-tions on security-building, unified pluralism (espoused in Pancasila, the ideological

1We are using the term homology to describe these homogenizing narratives. As indicated, theterm refers to an attempt to homogenize cultural pluralism and diversity, drawing various dis-courses and narratives into a form that subsumes the parts within a more unitary sameness.The term is the reciprocate of what Georges Bataille ([1957] 2001) describes as heterology,which is an assembly of narratives that maintain a degree of independence and autonomy.2The privileging of a particular perspective of the past as official history has been variouslydefined as ideology (Benjamin [1940] 2005), discourse (Foucault 1977b), writing (deCerteau 1988), and the imaginary (Taylor 2004). Each of these scholars has undertaken criticalanalysis of the ideological dimensions of official history and its political and social implications.

22 Jeff Lewis et al.

framework of the Indonesian state), and Balis community and economic restoration(Hitchcock and Putra 2007; ICG 2003; Lewis 2006). The memorials homologous narra-tive conceptualized the atrocity in terms of an official ideology and memory that would(re)synthesize the disparate parts of Indonesia that had succumbed to the force of global-local contentions and political violence. Balis own frequently cited disposition toharmony was therefore to be mobilized for national reconciliation and local recovery;the official memory of the events would fortify Balis own radical cosmopolizationand integration into the global tourist economy.3

This conception of official memory and the conciliatory force of Bali harmony,however, remains problematic (Allen and Palemo 2005; Hitchcock and Putra 2007;Lewis and Lewis 2009b; Robinson 1995). Indeed, the symbolic ordering that seeks toorganize and homologize the meaning of the Bali bombings monument has neitherobscured nor reconciled the complex cultural elements that comprise the bombingsas memory and representation, specifically within the peculiarly disjunctive spatial andcultural context of Kuta, Bali. Indeed, the monuments primary narrative of unity,harmony, and reconciliation is perpetually subverted by counter-narratives that invokethe very contentious issues and cultural tensions that the monument is designed to over-come. Thus, the diversity and complexity of cultural threads, memories, and practicesthat constitute the Kuta ethnoscape and its plethora of political dispositions continuallychallenge and destabilize the ideological and cultural homology that brands the islandstourist economy of pleasure. At their most acute, these language wars are expressed inthe formidable apprehensions of purist Islamists who regard the memorial and theBali pleasure zones as a profound offense against Islam and evidence of Westernmoral infamy and violent political hegemony (Barton 2004, 2010; Eliraz 2007; Ramak-rishna and Tan 2003; Sidel 2006, 2008).4

Within the shadows of these more spectacular contentions, however, there exists abroad range of alternative narratives, cultural perspectives, and counter-memoriesthe sort of fragmentation and counter-forces that Michel Foucault (1977a, 1977b,1980) describes in terms of a resistant microphysics in opposition to hegemonic poweritself. In this context, this paper has two principal and related objectives. First, thepaper examines the ways in which the homology and authorized memory of the Bali

3By cosmopolization we are referring, in particular, to the urbanization of Balis southern, Badungregion. Since the inception of mass tourism in the 1960s, this rich agricultural region has becomedensely urbanized through tourism infrastructure, and various forms of housing, retail, and indus-trial development. It is now a sprawling urban space that is a cosmopolis of transient peoples,including international tourists and Indonesians from many parts of the archipelago, includingMuslim Java and Lombok.4We distinguish in this paper between purist and militant Islamism. By purist we are describ-ing that group of Muslims who share a strong religious affiliation with Salafi andWahabbi traditions,who have a literalist interpretation of theQuran, and who are committed to the broad imposition ofIslamic or shariah law over Muslim communities and territories. While there are clear theologicaland cultural variations within this group (see Hassan 2006; ICG 2004), they share a general rejec-tion of secularism, democratic politics, Western liberalism, and any form of state authority that isnot based on Islamic theocracy. Among this group are those who adopt militant strategies forthe imposition of shariah; however, only a small proportion of Islamic purists are violent ormilitant.

The Bali Bombings Monument 23

bombings are being shaped within an overriding ideology and economy of pleasure (seeLewis and Lewis 2009a, 2010). Secondly, the paper examines the ways in which this hom-ology is being challenged and subverted through the multiplication of counter-narrativesthat are being generated through various mechanisms and processes. These mechanismsand processes are themselves the predicate of Balis own cultural instability and transi-tional disposition, including the increasing complexity of its tourist ethnoscape and itsincreasingly discordant contiguity of cultural practices. This study, thereby, contributesto broader speculations about the nature of Balis engagement in the global economyof pleasure and the countervailing conditions of global language wars and political vio-lence. The paper concludes by raising important questions about Indonesian andglobal pluralism, social harmony, and cosmopolitanization.

Inevitably, this paper situates its discussions within the broader context of the waron terror or what Jeff Lewis calls the 9/11 wars (Lewis 2005; Lewis and Lewis2009a, 2010). However, these wars and their related contentions are not of themselvesthe central focus of the paper. Rather, the paper focuses on the ways in which these con-tentions are implicated in the formation and deconstruction of the Bali monumenthomology. Thus, the paper problematizes the notion of cosmopolitanism and its assump-tions within the specific context of the Bali bombings monument. The paper seeks to elu-cidate the cosmopolization of the Kuta region, and the bombings site in particular,through the analysis of cultural narratives and practices. To this end, the paper examinesthe ways in which narratives have been inscribed into the monument site through itsdesign; it also examines the shaping of alternative narratives and meanings, specificallyas they are evinced by the sites visitors and users.

To achieve these heuristic objectives, the researchers employed a combination ofmethods, including textual and empirical analyses. While these will be more fully outlinedin the discussions below, the purpose of their use in this research can be summarized inthe following terms

1. Textual analysis

The monument is a text whose meanings can only be accessed through analysis of thepolitical and cultural conditions in which it is set. These conditions are framed throughthe application of specific concepts and a theoretical model that engages with variousforms of historical, textual, and cultural artifacts. While this part of the essay focuses prin-cipally on the ways in which the homologous narrative and memory were formed, it alsooutlines the ways in which this congregation of meanings is subverted by an alternativenarrative volition and the disposition of what Foucault (1977b) calls counter-memory,that is, the gaps by which meanings falter and subside, even through the very process ofself-assertion.

2. Interviews

The study also examines the ways in which people engage with and derive meaningsfrom the monument and its attempt to impose a specific memory and narrative. Inter-views were conducted with a range of visitors to the site over selected periods between2008 and 2010. These interviews, conducted in English and/or Bahasa Indonesia, weredesigned to access peoples perceptions and experience of the Bali monument andexplore the range of ways in which visitors were generating their own narratives and


understandings. The interviews provided valuable insights into the formation andcharacter of the Kuta monuments totemic cosmopolitanism.

3. Participant Observation

In addition to the textual analysis and interviews, the research used participant obser-vation to provide a more complete picture of peoples perceptions and practices as theyengaged with the monument and its surroundings, and with each other. Participant obser-vation enables researchers to observe peoples natural behavior, interactions, and prac-tices without the disruption of the researchers and their institutional interpellation. Itprovides a context for understanding data collected through other methods and canstrengthen the analysis by providing a complement to participants subjective reportingabout what they believe and do (Family Health International 2005; Liamputtong2007). Extensive participant observation was conducted at the monument site overselected periods between 2008 and 2010. These detailed observations about the presenceand practices of different national and ethno-religious groups provided valuable insightsand also helped to refine the interview process.

BALIS COSMOPOLIZATION IN THE ECONOMY OF PLEASURE

The Bali bombing attacks occurred as the United States, the United Kingdom, andAustralia were preparing to invade Iraq and extend the parameters of the global war onterror. The perpetrators, members of the Islamist militant organization Jemaah Islamiyah(JI), explained their actions in terms of U.S. incursions into holy Muslim lands, especiallythe Middle East and Indonesia itself. The JI leadership viewed America and its allies,including Australia, as moral contaminants and infidels, whose cultural values and prac-tices were deeply offensive to the purity of the Muslim faith (Barton 2004; Hitchcock andPutra 2007; ICG 2003, 2004; Lewis and Lewis 2009a; Sidel 2006; UNDP 2003).

In this context, the militants regarded the Balinese as collusive and treacherous alliesof the West and its imperial disposition (Lewis and Lewis 2009a; Nordholt 2007).However, purist Islamist groups like JI tend to view Balis cosmopolization as merelythe apex of an ongoing, historical betrayal. This betrayal began in 1949 when Sukarnosnew nationalist government rejected the Jakarta Charter, the precepts of shariah law,and Islam as the official national religion. In order to maintain the integrity of the newstate and support non-Muslim territories like Bali, the national governments pluralistprinciples inevitably incited a range of violent secessionist movements from DarulIslam to Jemaah Islamiyah itself (Intan 2006; Nordholt 2007; Robinson 1995).

Balis engagement with global tourism, which has brought vast numbers of non-Muslim peoples into Indonesia, has clearly served to intensify these political passions.The aggregate number of mostly Western international tourists grew from a fewhundred in 1970 to around sixty thousand by 1980. From this period, with the inceptionof Suhartos own personal investment strategy, the numbers and accompanying tourisminfrastructure grew exponentially. By 2002, tourist arrivals had grown to a record 1.2million but the militant attacks in 2002 decimated visitor numbers in the followingyear; while not as dramatic, the 2005 attacks also contributed to a significant decline invisitor numbers. A snapshot of the impact of the attacks is illustrated in figure 1 below.


While originally attracting travelers from the advancedWestern states of Europe, theUnited States, and Australia, Balis tourist cosmopolis has evolved to include visitors fromJapan, Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and various parts of Indonesia itself.This diversification in recent years is related, at least in part, to the bombing attacks.In response to the sudden downturn in tourism numbers after the 2002 bombings,especially from Australia, the Indonesian government embarked on an extensive recoveryand tourism promotion campaign (Hitchcock and Putra 2007; Pambudi, McCaughey, andSmyth 2009; UNDP 2003). With money provided by the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and World Bank, government agencies developed a new strategy that sought tostimulate domestic tourism and diversify the source of international visitors. This diver-sification was accelerated even further after the 2005 bombings, as the number of Aus-tralian visitors declined again and travel warnings in the United States and Europe werereiterated.

The execution of three of the Bali bombers late in 2008 provoked another dip inAnglophonic arrivals, as Americans, Australians, and Britons heeded their governmentstravel warnings about the likelihood of Islamist reprisal attacks. While some of this rela-tive decline in Anglophonic visitors might also be explained in terms of the emergence ofalternative, developing world tourism destinations, it is also very clear that a new wave ofnon-Western visitors (both Muslim and non-Muslim) are now arriving in Bali. Figure 2shows a 76 percent increase in foreign tourist arrivals between 2006 (the year followingthe second bombings) and 2009. The figure also presents a breakdown of the top ninenational groups arriving in Bali over the past few years. During this period, tourist arrivalsfrom Australia gradually recovered and by 2009 this country was ranked first, followed byJapan.5 The balance of other nationalities is also changing quite markedly. The pro-portional increase is far greater from non-Western countries such as China (390percent) and Malaysia (83 percent) than for the United Kingdom and Europe (averageof 58 percent).

In a peculiar way, the increase in non-Western tourism in Bali might seem to approxi-mate one of the primary objectives of the Bali bombers and purist Islam more generally,that is, the diminution of Euro-American imperialism and influence in Indonesia and the(re)colonization of Hindu Bali by Muslims from Java, Malaysia, and beyond. It is certainlyclear that domestic tourists are increasingly dominating the shopping malls and mainbeach areas of Kuta, especially during peak Indonesian holiday periods and outsidepeak Australian holiday periods. The number of Indonesian tourist visits to Bali each

Figure 1. Annual direct foreign tourist arrivals (Bali Provincial Government,2009).

5The murder and sexual assault of several Japanese tourists in 2009 and 2010 led to further dra-matic falls in Japanese visitor numbers. Political unrest in Fiji and Thailand also contributed toan increase in the number of Australians choosing to holiday in Bali and other parts of Indonesia.


year is now estimated to be approximately three times that of international visitors.Indeed, Asian peoples are outnumbering European-based peoples and cultures acrossmuch of Badung, including the new developments from Dreamlands through Kuta,Seminyak, and Tanah Lot. With the accelerating integration of the Chinese middleclasses into the global economy of pleasure, the exponential increase in PRC touriststo Bali is likely to continue, even in the face of the global financial crisis. Along withnew arrivals from places like Belarus and Russia, the domestic and other Asian touristswho now come to Bali have radically altered the islands cosmopolitan mix and culturalethnoscape. Not surprisingly, this cosmopolization of Bali is having a direct effect onthe spatial and cultural vista of Bali, and the ways in which the Bali monument isbeing used and understood, that is, the ways in which the meaning of the site is beingideologically fostered.

SHAPING THE MONUMENT HOMOLOGY

As indicated in the introduction to this paper, the Bali monument has been imaginedand established as a communal totem around which a complex aggregation of beingsmight find their common humanity. This commonality is constituted not simplythrough a shared compassion or conceived enemy (terrorists-terrorism), but through adistinctive and powerful imaginary of Bali itself. The core of the homology, that is, is

Figure 2. Direct foreign tourist arrivals and market rank 2006 and 2009(Bali Provincial Government, 2009).


an imagining of Balis own durable and self-projected conception of tradition, religion,ritual practice, and cultural harmony. These cultural conceptions of tradition arethereby mobilized through the islands transformation into a global tourist destinationand integration into the global economy.

In this sense, the homology that is shaped into the monument site is bound to thesense of Balinese tradition and its commodification in the modern tourist economy(Lewis and Lewis 2009b). This is not to suggest that the Balinese rituals and traditionalpractices are in any way artificial; it is rather to note that the imaginings of the past havebeen re-rendered into the islands transformations, including the pleasures and vicissi-tudes associated with modernization, cosmopolization, and global integration.

It is precisely these imaginings that are also central to the conception and design ofthe bombings monument. In particular, the Balinese notion of harmony-in-contention(duality and balance) was critical to the design. Balinese-Hindu mythology is stronglyfocused on the spiritual interdependence of good and evil. Within this mythology, thebhuta kala demons are not considered entirely evil, nor are their spiritual nemeses con-sidered entirely wholesome. Rather, the dialectic of evil and good that characterizes Bali-nese Hinduism and the older forms of ritual culture is formed through an eternalcontingency; evil is not subjugated, redeemed, or eradicated from the human body orspiritual world more generally since it is the predicate of good. The principle of rwabhineda or two in one conceives of good and evil in terms of a mutual identificationthat seeks merely to minimize the harm that evil may inflict on the living (and the dead).

While many Balinese communities and individuals have been able to sustain this ima-gining of a rwa bhineda harmony, even through the shock of rapid (post)modernization,the horror of the bombings tested the island peoples theological, ethical, and socialresolve. Like the revenge massacres perpetrated in Bali against Chinese and allegedPartai Komunis Indonesia (PKI; Communist Party of Indonesia) sympathizers in196566, the Bali bombings left the local people raw and disturbed (Hitchcock andPutra 2007). Since the 1970s, of course, the Balinese had been compelled to marshalthe ideal of harmony and its cultural imagining both in support of rapid tourism develop-ment and against its excesses. While delivering significant economic benefits to the islandand Indonesia more generally (Pambudi, McCaughey, and Smyth 2009), tourism andglobal integration also challenged Balis ecological, social, and cultural sustainability;the bombings, in this sense, were simply the apex of a more enduring and less visiblecrisis that perpetually destabilized the ideal of harmony and Balinese cosmopolitanism(Howe 2005; Lewis and Lewis 2009a, 2010).

Thus, while the Indonesian government and the IMF focused on the social andeconomic conditions of recovery after the bombings (UNDP 2003), Balinese communityleaders sought to restore harmony through the rebalancing of the rwa bhineda. Indeed,as Michael Hitchcock and Darma Putra (2007) have clearly demonstrated, the Balinesethemselves were concerned about the outbreak of evil that rapid development andcosmic imbalance had generated. To this end, the Bali Tourism Authority, Hindupriests, and other community leaders embarked on an intense program of ritual cleans-ing, much of which was constituted around interfaith congregation and religious dialogue.

The Bali bombings memorial and the first commemoration service were conceivedin terms of these broader processes of economic restoration, social appeasement, andcosmological cleansing. Within a week of the attack, the idea of a memorial at the site


of Balis Ground Zero was reported in the Bali Post. An academic from Udayana Uni-versity, Luh Ketut Suryani, argued at a meeting with the Badung Regency that the bomb-ings were a strong warning (peringatan keras) and punishment (hukuman) from thegods because Balis rapid tourism development had deviated radically from religiousvalues (Bali Post 2002). Thus, while the construction of the monument was clearly motiv-ated by modernist and secular concerns about the Balinese tourism economy and thecircumvention of religious or sectarian violence, the monument was also sanctified in theislands religious and spiritual aegis.

Indeed, for the Badung Regency, which commissioned the project, the secular andreligious functions of the memorial were largely indistinguishable; the bombings had cri-tically damaged Balis reputation as a safe tourist destination, but this harm was itself inte-grally linked to cosmological imbalance. This interdependence of secular andcosmological conditions was clearly a part of the design brief and the propagation ofthe monuments ideological homologya harmony that collapsed political, ethnic, andreligious difference. As illustrated in figure 3 (above), the design is composed of threeelements: a memorial wall, a replica of a Balinese-style temple, and a fountain. The struc-ture is set on a raised stage or gallery that has steps on the east and west sides. In the frontof the structure at street level is a small, decorative amphitheater that is illuminated atnight and appears as a beacon guarding the approach from the nightclub district ofLegian Street.

While there were minor modifications to the monument in 2010, the design prin-ciples have remained constant. These principles have been outlined in various forumsby the architect, I Wayan Gormuda:6

As with most Balinese temples, the shrine is marked as an elevated site, movingthe visitor toward a more transcendent perspective of heaven and purity. Themonument is therefore set on a raised platform or gallery, with steps approachingfrom the east and west sides. There is also a small amphitheater set at street level.This marks the symbolic approach to the memorial and the gateway frommaterial to spiritual conditions.

The large tree of life (kayon) represents the lives of the bombing victims andthe prayers that will guide them to heaven. The tree brings together the materialand spiritual conception of life and the peace that returns, even through tragedy.The fearsome Bhoma image, which appears at the base of the tree, is the ubiqui-tous guardian of holy shrines in Bali; the Bhoma drive away evil spirits.

The altar is a hybrid design space. The backdrop is a huge memorial board dis-playing the name and nationality of each of the 202 identified victims. On eitherside, the altar provides space for flower offerings, messages, and prayers. As withdomestic and public shrines and temples, the altar is a significant site for spiritualcleansing and daily libation.

The Balinese compass rose in the pond at the approach to the monument orien-tates the memorial and the visitor toward Mount Agung, the holiest landsite inBali and the home of the gods.

6Interview with I Wayan Gormuda by Darma Putra, Denpasar, January 12, 2009.


The triangle connecting the three half circles represents the Hindu trinity of thethree most significant deitiesBrahma, Visnu, and Siva.

While the kayon, Bhoma, temple, deities, and fountain were conceived and con-structed as symbological references within the religious traditions of Bali, the memorialboard, gallery, altar, and location of the memorial have connections with Western reli-gious and secular symbology. Moreover, the memorial board and the victims nameswere presented in a distinctly Western style, applying European-derived functionalelements; these include the gold lettering set against a polished black background, andthe names that are ordered according to nation and alphabetical listing. These rationaland lineal structures, in fact, directly challenge the universalism and cyclical nature ofthe rwa bhineda and the monuments Vedic elements.

Even so, the Regency and the Indonesian government wanted the monument to beready for the first commemoration ceremony of the bombing in October 2003 whenworld attention would again be turned toward Bali. As Lewis (2006) notes, this com-memoration was particularly important for Australia and the Australia-Indonesiarelationship. The Indonesian government and Badung Regency wanted to promote asense of restored harmony that would in turn revivify Balis reputation as a safeholiday destination. Along with other things, the Australian government used the com-memoration ceremony to promulgate its own sense of nation and validate policies onthe war on terror (Lewis 2006). With Australian troops engaged in warfare in Iraqand Afghanistan, the sense of national destiny was fortified in 2003 by news videofootage of the monument and the commemoration ceremony, which was broadcastdirectly into Australia.

Figure 3. The Bali bombings monument prior to modifications in2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.


These respective national, security, economic, and ideological claims were therebyinscribed into the complex bricolage of design elements and the ceremonial politics ofthe first commemoration (Lewis 2006). In prescribing an alignment of communal,ethnic, national, secular, and religious claims, the homology of the monument soughtto foster a miraculous ideological commonality. Not surprisingly, the precarious convolu-tion of design and cultural elements threatened to fracture as the various meanings of themonument within this secular setting began to struggle for primacy in the cosmopolitancacophony of the Legian streetscape.

BEYOND THE HOMOLOGY: BALINESE NARRATIVES OF MEMORY AND HARMONY

The Balinese themselves, in fact, identified this volatility. Many in the Balinese com-munity opposed the construction of the memorial, rejecting its claim to universal valueand reverence. There was much public debate about the issue through local radio andnewspapers, particularly the Bali Post. Among the opponents, some believed that thememorializing of a catastrophe would simply perpetuate the negative spiritual andsocial impact of the tragedy (Asmara 2002).7 In an interview conducted in 2009,Balis governor, I Made Mangku Pastika, former head of the Bali bombings investigationteam, reflected on the local and transnational value of the monument and its detractors.With the prospect of further developments on the memorial site and the establishment ofan international peace park on land at the site of the Sari Club bomb blast, GovernorPastika noted:

Some Balinese people think that it is useless to remember bad things that havehappened in the past. . . . There are many Balinese who dislike the monumentand the remembrances at Ground Zero. But, I also see it from the point of viewof the outsiders. On every commemoration, I always come. I want to respect thepeople from outside.8

In many ways, contentions over the meaning of the site for Balinese and outsiders is notsurprising since the traditions of Vedic-Balinese culture are inscribed by the divinecycle of purity, contamination, and renewal. Within this perspective, memory existswithin the hierarchy of the ephemeral material world and spiritual eternity; to fixmemory beyond the natural or cosmological rhythms of time is to interrupt the inevitabil-ity of life, death, and rebirth.

Indeed, this Western notion of cultural preservation has always been problematicin Bali since it seeks to create an atavistic relic that resists the necessity of decay. In herdiscussion of Balis colonization, Margaret Wiener (1994) points out that it was the Dutchwho imposed concepts of preservation and tradition as they supported the colonizersadministrative and political interests (see also Lewis and Lewis 2009a). In more recent

7The Bali Film Board gave similar reasons for banning the 2007 Enison Sinaro film Long Road toHeaven. The film details the story of the Bali bombings, which the Board believed would be dis-tressing to many Balinese as it would open old wounds (BBC News 2007).8Interview with Governor Pastika by Darma Putra, Denpasar, January 1, 2009.


times and as we intimated above, this idea of an authentic or traditional Bali has beenmobilized in tourism discourses in order to identify the island as a distinctive productin the global economy of pleasure. This remodeling of Balinese tradition for consumptionby domestic and international tourists represents the integration of tradition (as strate-gically conjured elements of the past) with modern economic and cultural practices. Balistourism boom and integration into the global economy of pleasure is neither arbitrary norideologically neutral. It is an interpellation within a broad cultural history that is repletewith struggle and violence, as much as harmony and cosmological balance.

Thus, debates among the Balinese about the meaning and value of the memorialand its related Peace Parkare clearly influenced by these historico-cultural elementsand also by claims to a modern, global cultural politics (Turmakin 2005, 2182). The Bali-nese, quite rightly, contemplate whether the homologous memory that the monumentis designed to represent is either culturally or morally generativewhether the monu-ment actually speaks for the hosts and host culture, or is simply an extension of theglobal economy of pleasure and the ambiguous interests of the cosmopolis. In thissense, the monument resembles the hybrid dance forms that have evolved to serve theinterests and pleasures of outsiders, most particularly as entertainment for the resortguests in Sanur and Nusa Dua. For many Balinese, in fact, the monument has addedvery little to the cleansing and interfaith rituals that local communities themselves haveinitiated. The memorial seems more credibly like a gesture of appeasement, or evenapology, to those foreign nations whose citizen-consumers have powered the tourismeconomy.

FRAGILE COSMOPOLITANISM: COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF PLEASURE AND DISPLEASURE

While Balinese traditional conceptions of history and memory are challenged by thepresence of the monument, these anxieties are linked to even deeper and more durableconcerns about the loss of autonomy associated with global integrationincluding globalgeopolitics. As noted above, Jeff Lewis (2006) argues that the Australian government andmedia used the first commemoration of the 2002 attacks to support national grieving andjustify policies associated with the global war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. Themonument was an ideal backdrop, as it propagated a sense of East-West harmony anda collaborative grieving that inspired an impression of multilateral approaches to transna-tional terrorism. Through this symbolic amplification of its own national interests and per-spective, Australia was able to imagine the memorial space as a site of reverence andremembrance, a place in which the holy force of the war on terror could be articulatedas a transnational, ideological, and even cosmological mission. Retribution, in this sense,could be reconfigured in terms of a divine purpose that transcended national, ethnic, orreligious difference: terrorists are the enemy of all humankind.

As Aristotle duly noted, memory is the most powerful faculty in the creation of nar-rative. In this context, the commemoration service sought to overlay the monument witha moral and political aesthetic, by which the memory of the attacks became ossified aspure ideology and Western knowledge systems were elevated as collective salvation.Thus, the gaps and threads of the design and construction process became sanctifiedthrough the public presentation of the monument and the broad discourse of glory.


The discourse of the commemoration, that is, sought to seal or obscure the gaps in anextravagant invocation of a unity that was propagated by the ideals of Bali harmony,economic cosmopolitanism, and a politics that transcends national, ethnic, religious,and secular boundaries. History was wound into a perfect and unitary thread thatdefied, as it mobilized, those excesses of violence upon which it was predicated, thatis, the Western model of global domination and hierarchical economic and knowledgesystems. The economy of pleasure, upon which the original violence and the site itselfwere constructed, was thus laminated into the concrete edifice, deflecting the vision ofvisitors away from the Wests own disposition of violence and toward a more benign trans-national and transcendent projection. Through the monuments homology of culturalelements, the West was able to imagine itself as the progenitor of global pluralism, inno-cence, and universal freedom.

Since the first commemoration, however, this claim to ideological purity has beencontinually tested by the immanent dynamic of culture and Balis own intrinsic crisis oftransformation. As Henri Lefevbre (1991) continually reminded us, spaces can never befixed or unified, but are besieged by cultural mutation and the counter-narratives thathuman groups perpetually generate through social change. In particular, the further cos-mopolization of the Kuta-Legian tourist zones of Bali have brought new cultural practicesand consumer modes to the area. As noted earlier in this paper, the increasing diversifica-tion of the Kuta tourist ethnoscape has contributed further to the islands complex culturalcontiguities and the contentions arising from such transient and intense modes of territor-ialization. Amidst this assemblage of bodies, desires, practices, and beliefs, the monu-ments propagated ideological purity seems extraordinarily discordant; its claims to unityand totemic cosmopolitanism sit in a peculiar disjunction with the swarm of human typol-ogies and their respective claims to primacy and pleasure.

These complexities and the fragility of Balis cosmopolitanism are evident in the per-ceptions and practices of visitors to the monument site. In order to examine this complex-ity in contrast to the monuments propagated homology, the authors conducted a series ofempirical studies from 2008 until 2010. The research included participant observationand open-ended interviews with visitors to the site. While this research does not claimto be exhaustive, it illustrates the ways in which a disjunctive mix of counter-narrativesis being generated around the monument and it highlights some important issues thatreflect more broadly on new modes of transient territorialization and cultural transitionin Bali.

While the aims of the research were outlined in the introduction, further detail onparticipants and methods is provided below. The findings from both the participantobservation and interviews have been synthesized and presented as an integrateddiscussion.

In 20082009, the research was undertaken at various times across the given year;including local Indonesian school and religious holidays and the peak periods for inter-national visitors. This phasing of the research was designed to connect researcherswith the various ethnic and national groups who visit Bali. Thus, while Australians arethe most numerous visitor group overall, they only dominate the ethnosphere of Kutaduring identified peak holiday periods. Other national groupsincluding Indonesiansthemselvesare more numerous at quite different times of the year. A further phaseof the research, conducted from June until September 2010, aimed to capture the


changing nature of peoples perceptions and practices following the implementation ofnew security measures and modifications to the monument site undertaken by theBadung Regency in April of that year. Discussion of the findings from the 20082009phase illustrates some of the counter-narratives being generated around the monument.This is followed by discussion of the findings from the 2010 phase, which reveal newlayers of complexity in the context of official attempts to restrict the practices of localand international visitors.

20082009

Most visits to the memorial occurred during the evening (6:0010:00 p.m.) with upto one thousand visitors per hour during Indonesian school holidays and/or Muslimholiday periods. In the heat of the day, the average was around one hundred per hour.These numbers do not include pedestrians observing the monument from a distanceas they passed by. The vast majority of visitors to the monument were Indonesiannationals (around 55 percent), most of whom were from Jakarta, although there werealso visitors from other parts of the archipelago. Other major visitor groups includedMalaysian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese nationals. In the course of an evening,around four tour buses per hour would bring these visitor groups directly to the monu-ment. At other times of the year when Japanese and Europeans were relatively numerousin Kuta and the surrounding tourist zone, the numbers of these visitors at the monumentwere relatively low compared with those from Asian countries. At any one time during theevening, Australians would comprise approximately 5 percent of the total visitornumbers, with this increasing to almost 50 percent during peak Australian holidayperiods. Visitors would spend an average of twelve minutes at the monument site.

Other than the numbers and ethnic derivation of the visitors, perhaps the most sig-nificant aspect of the research is the ways different groups use the monument as a publicspace. As a general observation, the behaviors and identifiable practices of visitors to thesite are influenced by the level of ethnic-national presence of the group; behavior is oftenmodified, depending on the numbers of similar and different ethnic-national groupspresent at the site.

Very clearly, the space has become a tourism memento site for the majority of visi-tors. The design of the site ushers visitors through a form of gallery experience, directingthem from one part of the site to another. At each point of interest in the gallery, themajority of visitors would pause and arrange themselves for personalized photographs.The non-Western visitors, in particular those from Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan,and China, would take photos of their various assemblages of family and friends at thefountain, the altar, and the amphitheater at the front of the monument. Only the memor-ial board, which is raised above head height, was photographed without human interpel-lation. The two Australian authors were also frequently conscripted as transnational propsin the memento photographs, providing further proof of the tourists exotic experiencesin Bali.

For most of these visitors, it is a happy occasion. The monument provides some ofthe cultural nuance that renders their holiday exotic and memorable. The Balinese cul-tural elements are well received, though the Bhoma are not particularly recognizable at


night and they are not as frequently photographed as one might expect. There is virtuallyno solemnity in the visits by these groups, even though most understand the significanceand purpose of the monument.

I am so happy I am here in Bali! This is my first holiday overseas. I want thisphoto to remember Bali. I want my family at home to see me here. Bali isvery nice place. This monument is very nice place for photo.

[Chinese woman, aged twenty-eight]

The monument, in fact, is one of Kutas few noncommercial public spaces, other thanthe beach. And it is one of the few spaces in which a visitor feels welcome and comfor-table. Virtually every other open space in the Kuta-Legian tourist zone is privately owned,a legacy perhaps of former President Suhartos appalling indifference to responsibledevelopment planning and his government sponsorship of Balis rapid and poorlyplanned tourism development by voracious private developers. As the Balinese werelargely excluded from planning and development of the Badung area, communityneeds were disregarded and public space subsumed by private interests.

To this end, the bombings memorial is quite unique. For all its very obvious aestheticand cultural failings, the space represents a new phase in Balinese autonomy in the after-math of the Reformasi, especially in terms of decentralization and the capacity of Regen-cies to be more active in local planning. While many community members may haveobjected to the structure and its informing ideas, the memorial has at least stimulatedthe sorts of civic debate that had for so long been prohibited in Indonesian public life.Moreover, the site manages, miraculously perhaps, to function as a multivalent totemthat attracts a diverse range of visitors. Indonesian nationals, in particular, feel asthough the memorial is legitimately their own public space (see figure 4).

Yah, this is important place for Indonesian people. Many people come to Bali.Many people die in the Bali bombs, many different countries. Not onlypeople from Indonesia. When we come here to see the names, we are allhere together. This is what Bali is now.

[Sumatran resident in Bali, man, aged twenty-one]

This monument is a nice place to bring my friends. Everyone is welcome here.Kuta is very exciting place. . . . But I think maybe there are problems in Bali.Look around you . . . too many people . . . a lot of drinking and drugs. So, Idont know. . . . How can people live together like this?

[Javanese woman, aged forty-six]

Australians, on the other hand, seem less comfortable in the site, especially duringthe local Indonesian holidays and religious festivals, when they become a distinct min-ority group among so many Indonesian nationals. While Australians are often solemnor at least quiet in their demeanor, their informal clothing style (sarongs, thongs,shorts) also marks a cultural distinction from the Asian visitors, especially the Indonesianswho are generally far more covered and formal, with many women wearing the Muslimhijab or headscarf (see figure 5).


Figure 5. Informally dressed Australian visitors to the monument,2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.

Figure 4. Every day, domestic tourists from across Indonesia gather indroves at the monument to make a photographic record of their visit toBali, 2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.


Australians also appear quite bemused by the joyful and happy demeanor of theAsian groups, especially local Indonesians:

I just reckon its a bit weird. They turn up in these big groups and start takingphotos of each other. Then they have a bit of a look around and take offagain. Im standing here with tears in my eyes and theyre taking photos andlaughing. . . . This is a sacred site, isnt it?

[Australian woman, aged forty-three]

I come to the monument every time Im in Bali. I just think about the tragedy ofall those young lives lost. Its bloody awful. Just kids out having fun with theirmates, not hurting anyone. This Muslim thing had nothing to do with thembut theyre the ones who cop it. It breaks my heart. . . . I dont understandhow it doesnt have the same effect on these people [gestures toward a groupof Muslim Indonesian visitors]. Its like they dont even think about what actuallyhappened. Their own people did this. Maybe they want to forget . . . to move onor something. . . . I spose you can understand it. . . .

[Australian man, aged sixty-three]

Tensions are also evident in the narratives of monument visitors around recentevents like the arrest and conviction of Australian and other Western drug couriers inBali, the passage of ambiguous anti-pornography bills in the Indonesian national parlia-ment, and the execution of three of the Bali bombers (Lewis and Lewis 2009a; van Liere2009).9 For some visitors, these new events are linked to the causes of the originaltragedy. Peoples experience at the monument is being reintensified by these eventsand the ways they represent discordant and at times dangerous claims over pleasureand displeasure:

I dont get it. Theyre still building new bars, new venues open all night. Will theyjust keep going till it happens again and the whole place collapses . . .? Most ofthe clubs here are run by Javanese businessmen who have made their fortunefrom drug-money. And yet those Bali Nine boys are still rotting in jail ondeath row! Its a disgrace. . . .

[Swedish expat resident, woman, aged thirty-four]

Yah, I can see why Bali provincial government opposed the anti-pornographybills. The economy here would collapse. Everything is open, everything isallowed. Everything is . . . not decent.

[Javanese man, aged forty-eight]

Execution of three jihadis? What good did that do? They are now where theywant to be. . . . And it is people like me and my friends who are left to build

9After the bombers execution in 2008, journalists covering the event reported from Nusa Kamban-gan prison in Java. Several journalists conducted a live broadcast from the monument in Bali,demonstrating its significance in the consciousness of Australian public.


the peace. We are Muslim women. Im really not sure how we can do that.7[Javanese woman, aged twenty-seven]

When interviewed, several Australians expressed a level of offense at the perceivedlack of respect for the meaning of the memorial, though this was generally fortified by apeculiar sort of cultural superiority that regarded the Indonesians as culturally underde-veloped or ignorant. In a moment of acidity, one Australian bemoaned, Ohmy god, whatdo the Balos [Balinese] think of all this? suggesting that the behavior and practices ofother Indonesians would somehow offend the Balinese and this notionally sacred place.

For the Balinese, of course, the monument is not sacred, despite the aggregation ofsacred symbology. Few Balinese take an interest in the monument, except as a meetingplace or a site to engage with tourists (see figure 6).

Drug users and prostitutes often frequent the areas around the site in the hope ofattracting the interest of a (usually male) tourist. On several occasions, we observed ayoung female addict using the monument site as a relatively safe place to sleep amongthe guides and other local Balinese sitting on the gallery steps. Indeed, the steps them-selves appeared to be the most popular part of the site for local Balinese youth, as theygaze at passing traffic and listen to the rising volume of electronic music in the nightclubspreparing for another night of euphoria.

Over recent years, the authorities in Bali have become increasingly concerned aboutthe diverse ways in which the homology of the Bali bombings monument is being chal-lenged and subverted. In April 2010, the Badung Regency implemented new securitymeasures and modifications to the monument site that substantially altered publicaccess to the space. A steel fence was erected around the entire perimeter of the

Figure 6. Local young women using the memorial as a meeting place,2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.


monument gallery with a single entrance gate placed at the base of one set of steps. Thegate is now locked in the evening, preventing visitors to the site from sitting on the steps,gathering on the raised mezzanine, or approaching the memorial board. Numerous flow-ering potted plants have been added to soften the visual impact of the fence and mask thisnew restriction on public access and peoples practices. According to the Lurah (villagehead of) Kuta, I Gede Suparta,

The fence was built because of many complaints from visitors and AustralianConsulate. The monument has become dirty. They worry that people hangaround at night drinking and getting drunk in the space around monument.The space is also used by prostitutes and drug addicts to hang around. Fenceswere put in to stop this. An entrance is provided for those who come to prayto the monumentwhich is what the monument is actually for. They thoughtthe fence is a good solution.10

This attempt to impose order over visitors experiences and practiceswhat theysee, do, think, and feel in the space surrounding the monumentreflects a new phasein Balis cosmopolization. Clearly, the modifications are an official strategy to regulatewhat might be seen as the abuses of the monument. The fence and security measuresminimize the mixing of visitors in the gallery and they separate visitors from the activitiesof locals who had previously been informally using the public space. By substantiallyreducing access to this public open space, this attempt to marshal the various uses ofthe monument into less diverse and more acceptable modes raises questions aboutwhose freedoms and security are being privileged.

As noted by Logan and Reeves (2009), a substantial body of research acknowledgesthat memorials are critical means of preserving the history of violent events and that theyhave the potential to affect the ways in which we confront past, present, and future. Ourresearch suggests that the claims and counter-claims on the Bali bombings monument arereshaping this space in ways that reflect a new uncertainty about cultural contiguity,belonging, and territorial legitimacy. Within the context of Balis rapidly expanding plea-sure economy, the diverse mix of counter-narratives around the monument demonstratesa growing sense that this evolving cosmopolization is both precarious and easily disrupted.

CONCLUSION

The traditional motifs and ceremonial elements that are inscribed into the monu-ment design need to be understood, not only in their own terms, but also in relationto Balis modernization processes and integration into the global economy. Quiteclearly, these cultural elements are formed through the flows of capital and competitionfor resources, which are themselves the predicate of increasing human interaction, cul-tural contiguity, pluralism, and the seemingly inevitable human recourse to aggregation,domination, and violence. These opposing dispositions to communalism on the one hand

10Interview with Lurah (village head of) Kuta, I Gede Suparta by Darma Putra, Denpasar, October12, 2010.


and violent segregation on the other are clearly manifest in the monuments agonisticreverberations of the global war on terror, as well as Indonesias own complex historyof sectarianism and political violence. The memorial is not just a shrine or a simpleexpression of indigenous remembrance. It is rather a polyglot of cultural and symbolicelements that never quite approximate the aspiration of aesthetic or politico-culturalharmony; that is, the monument never seems able to liberate itself from the range of nar-rative claims that inform and surround its guiding ideology.

Indeed, even the monuments location at the nape of the Legian Street nightclubstrip seems inevitably to compromise the dignity and unity of its reverential claims.Like the two-faced Roman gatekeeper, Janus, the monument seems more like a sentinel,welcoming visitors to the pleasure zone while warning of its inevitable displeasures anddanger. In many respects, our research confirms this perspective, as the new generationof Bali tourists swarm playfully across the memorial site and peer, somewhat timidly,toward the moral ambiguity of the Legian Street pleasurescape. Immersed in the cacoph-ony of the Kuta nightlife, the visitorsMuslim and Westernseem to be circling oneanother, seeking to read out the script of each others mysteryand perhaps fallibility.To this end, the monument stands like a totem within a peculiar and awkward courtshipof globalization.

For the members of the Coalition of the Willing, especially Australians, the bombsite is marked by heroic survival and a paradoxical form of cultural integration that reas-sures them that this spacethe Eastis not entirely alien at allbut there is a smallspace in history that they may now share within the cosmopolis of Kuta. Yet nor is thesite a marker in the progress of political Islam, despite the increasing presence ofMuslim Indonesians. For all the dangers associated with the new Indonesian anti-pornography laws, this new group of Indonesian tourists are in many ways engaged inthe economy of pleasure that is so despised by the Islamist militants who attacked thearea.

The playfulness and pleasures that the new Muslim tourists are experiencing at thebombing site should not be understood as a victory for the Islamic militants who want tocolonize the island and impose shariah law. Rather, the new Muslim tourists might beunderstood as pioneers within the more general momentum of pleasure-based globaliza-tion. And for all its horrors, globalization also represents a more hopeful form of culturaland human exchange; Indonesians have as much claim to a history of pluralism, toler-ance, and pleasure-based aesthetics as any Western social group. Thus, the playfulnessand bodily delights being experienced by the new tourists should not be interpreted asa victory for the militants or Islamic purism generallyquite the opposite. Indonesiahas a very strong tradition of pluralism, tolerance, and pleasure-based aesthetics. Thisshared space bears the possibility of a better beginning, a more complete and positiveglobalization that will unite West and East beyond the absurdity of their propagated div-isions. On the gallery floor of the monument, people meet people and discover the falla-ciousness of their monstrous unknowing.

By its very nature as public, the unfixing of the site from its ideological core hastherefore created a new zone of uncertaintya new thirdspace as Henri Lefebvre(1991) calls it. Immersed in the cacophony, sexual energy, and financial desperation ofLegian Street, the monument has thus created a new locus for the pleasure zoneitself. In the shadows and laneways surrounding the site, prostitutes and drug dealers


still solicit the interest of tourists who come by the monument and are welcomed into theJanus space. Inevitably, the sub-communities and their clients also subvert the authorityand reverence that are inscribed into the site, exposing the elemental counter-narrativesof desire that incited the bombing murders in the first instance. More generally, the sub-community members, many of whom are Muslim Javanese, invert the homology that thewhole notion of public implies. In many respects, the groups who linger in the shadowsof the monument are themselves creating a living memorial to those marginalized peoplejungkies and kupu-kupu malamwho were also killed in the nightclub attacks butwhose names have never appeared on the fatality list and authorized honor board.

For these people, the living and the dead, the Legian Street monument is merely atotem to their desperation and to the euphoria that their bodies enshrine for others. It isfrom this euphoria that the bombings memorial has been cast and ultimately obscured.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Australian ResearchCouncil.

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