b. pablo montagnes department of political science emory ... · mass purges b. pablo montagnes...

Mass Purges

B. Pablo MontagnesDepartment of Political Science

Emory University

.

Stephane WoltonDepartment of Government

L.S.E.

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Epigraph

Party struggles lend a party strength and vitality; thegreatest proof of a party’s weakness is its diffuseness andthe blurring of clear demarcations; a party becomesstronger by purging itself.

From a letter of Lassalle to Marx, of June 24, 1852

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Lenin’s Epigraph to What is to be done?

Party struggles lend a party strength and vitality; thegreatest proof of a party’s weakness is its diffuseness andthe blurring of clear demarcations; a party becomesstronger by purging itself.

From a letter of Lassalle to Marx, of June 24, 1852

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Evidence on mass purges

Purge:

I Today: broad usage of the term purge

I Originally: “Periodic membership screenings of the ranks ofthe party” (Getty, 1987, 38)

I Target: Political class composed of millions of individuals(Teiwes, 1993, 5)

Common in communist regimes:

I USSR (chistka:“a cleaning”): 1919, 1921, 1928, 1929, 1933,1935, 1951-53, 1971

I 1919: Lenin purges 50% of Bolsheviks

I 1935: Stalin purges 10% of CPSU (≈ 100,000 members)

I China (qungchu: “to weed out”): 1947-48, 1950, 1951-54,1953, 1957, 1957-58, 1959-60, 1960-61, 1962-63, 1964, 1965

I 1957-58: Mao purges approx. 9% of CCP (≈ 1m members)

I Nowadays: Xi Jinping purges ≈ 190,000 members from CCP 3 / 34

Evidence on mass purges

Mass purges linked to importance of the Party in totalitarianregimes (Linz, 2000, 73-83)

Main reasons for being purged:

I Careerism, passivity, moral corruption (Getty, 41; Teiwes, 6)

I Minority of expulsions due to power struggle between leaders(Getty, 38)

Objectives of mass purges:

I Sustain high level of activity (Teiwes, 37)

I Renewal of cadres (Teiwes, 42-43)

I Recruitment facilitated by pool of candidates to the Party

Mass purges conducted by special team ⇒ Informational problem4 / 34

Mass purges as an Accountability tool inAutocracies

Democracy (Many-to-One accountability): Voters select onepolitical representative

I Agent forms beliefs about preferences of principals

Autocracy (One-to-Many accountability): Autocrat selects manyparty members

I Principal must form beliefs about agents’ characteristics

Different problems, different tools: Mass purges are scaled toautocrat’s problem

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Features of a Mass Purge

I Breadth: The number/proportion of members purged

I Nature: Who is targeted

I Discriminate: Set of purged members clearly delineated

I Semi-indiscriminate: No performance indicator guaranteessafety

I Indiscriminate: No clear set of purged members

I Violence: The costs imposed on purged members

I Expulsion, Loss of Status and Resources, Death, CollectivePunishment

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Specificities of One-to-Many Accountability

Possibilities to separate from “bad” type and escape purge affect amember’s incentives

I Depend on other members’ actions

⇒ Pool size effect

Quality of signal affects autocrat’s willingness to purge

I Depends on all members’ actions

⇒ Pool make-up effect

⇒ Existence of “General Equilibrium” effects

Are mass purges effective? Study ideological mass purges

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Ideological mass purges

Partially effective in shaping party membership

Effort is non-monotonic in purge breadth

Nature of purge depends on violence

I Low violence ⇒ discriminate purge

I High violence ⇒ semi-indiscriminate purge

Breadth of purge is non-monotonic in violence

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Literature review

I Elite purges: Svolik (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2008 and 2009),Egorov and Sonin (2011 and 2015), Bueno de Mesquita andSmith (2015)

I Accountability in autocracy: Egorov et al. (2009), Lorentzen(2014), Gehlbach and Simpser (2015), Jiang and Montagnes(2015)

I Accountability in democracy:

I Many-to-one accountability (elections): Ashworth and Buenode Mesquita (2006 and 2008)

I One-to-one accountability (cabinet management): Dewan andMyatt (2007 and 2010)

I Punishment and coercion: Bernhardt and Mongrain (2010),Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011)

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Model: Players

Two-period game with a single autocrat (A) and a [0, 1]continuum of party members

A party member (m) and is characterized by ideology (τ ∈ {i , o}):

I ideologue (i), Pr(τ = i) = λ

I opportunist (o)

Purged party members replaced by new members

Proportion ri is ideological

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Players’ actions

Each member exerts costly effort e ∈ [0, 1] on individual project

More effort increases probability of success: Pr(Success) = e

Autocrat decides purge breadth κ

Costly to engage in purging (human capital loss, cost ofdeportation, etc.): Convex cost c(κ)

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Payoffs

Party member m’s payoff:

Um(e; τ, θ) = (1− km)

{I{τ=i}b success

0 failure+ km(−L)− e2

2(1)

km = 1: purged

b: ideological payoff

L: cost of being purged, violence

Autocrat’s payoff depends on average effort e =∫ 1

0 emdm

UA(κ) = e − c(κ) (2)

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Timing

Period 1:

1. Member m chooses effort em1

2. Project outcome (success/failure) determined and observed byautocrat. Autocrat chooses the purge breadth κ

3. Purged members are replaced by new party members

Period 2:

1. (Surviving and new) member m chooses effort em2

2. Project outcome determined.

3. Game ends and payoffs are realized.

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Party members’ efforts

Efforts ⇒ Members endogenously sort into successful andunsuccessful pools

When deciding his effort, member m considers:

(i) Payoff from successful project

(ii) Payoff from surviving purge

(iii) Purge inference as a function of pool membership

(i) and (ii) greater for ideologues

⇒ Success = signal of ideological congruence

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Effort: Illustration

IdeologuesOpportunists

Unsuccessful Pool Ex-Ante Distribution of Types Successful Pool

!=.5

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Effort: Illustration

Unsuccessful Pool Ex-Ante Distribution of Types Successful Pool

!=.5

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Purge and effort

Discriminate purge: only unsuccessful members purged

⇒ Success very valuable

I Enjoy payoff from first-period success

I Fully inoculated against purge

I Enjoy second-period expected payoff

Semi-indiscriminate purge: all unsuccessful members and somesuccessful members purged

⇒ Success not so valuable

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Strategic interdependence

Risk of being purged depends on size of target pool andanticipated purge breadth (κa)

I Size of target pool depends on other members’ efforts

I More effort ⇒ thinner unsuccessful pool

⇒ Pool size effect

Discriminate purge: Pool size effect increases effort

I Fewer failures ⇒ More purged from unsuccessful pool

⇒ Increases cost of failure

Semi-indiscriminate purge: Pool size effect decreases effort

I Fewer failures ⇒ More purged from successful pool

⇒ Decreases benefit of success17 / 34

Effort

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Effect of violence on effort

Greater violence increases cost of being purged

Direct payoff effect ⇒ more effort

But greater effort ⇒ Indirect pool-size effect

Directions of payoff and pool-size effects:

I Similar in discriminate purge ⇒ Effort increases

I Opposite in indiscriminate purge

On average, payoff effect dominates ⇒ Average effortincreases

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Effort: increased violence

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Autocrat’s Benefit of purging

Autocrat prefers ideologue: Expected second-period payoffW2(i) > W2(o)

Autocrat does not observe effort, but success or failure of projects

Form posterior about member’s ideology based on project outcomeanticipating efforts: µS(ea1(i), ea1(o)) and µF (ea1(i), ea1(o))

Benefit of purging an unsuccessful and a successful party member:

WF = (ri − µF (ea1(i), ea1(o)))︸︷︷︸Better replacement

(W2(i)−W2(o))︸︷︷︸Payoff gain

(3)

WS =︷︸︸︷(ri − µS(ea1(i), ea1(o)))

︷︸︸︷(W2(i)−W2(o)) (4)

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Autocrat’s purging decision

Posterior plays a critical role in autocrat’s purging decision

Posterior depends on both types’ (anticipated) effort: Endogenoussorting

⇒ Pool make-up effect

Effort depends on anticipated purge breadth

⇒ Thought experiment: How do benefits vary with anticipatedpurge breadth?

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Anticipating Discriminate Purge

Unsuccessful Pool Successful Pool

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μS=3/8 μS=5/8


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μF=1/5 μS=2/3


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The effect of anticipated purge breadth:Discriminate purge

Effect depends on differential exit rate from unsuccessful pool

∂µF∂κa

∝

[∂e∗1 (o,κa)

∂κa

1− e∗1 (o, κa)−

∂e∗1 (i ,κa)∂κa

1− e∗1 (i , κa)

]︸︷︷︸

Differential exit rate

(5)

Ideologues:

I have more to gain from surviving purge

I less likely to be in unsuccessful pool

⇒ Faster exit rate

Greater anticipated purge breadth ⇒ Positive pool make-up effect

⇒ Greater benefit of purging24 / 34

Anticipating Semi-indiscriminate Purge


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μF=2/7 μS=5/8


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μF=2/5 μS=5/8


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The effect of anticipated purge breadth:Semi-indiscriminate purge

Effect of anticipated purge breadth depends on differential exit ratefrom successful pool

∂µS∂κa

∝

[−∂e∗1 (o,κa)

∂κa

e∗1 (o, κa)−−∂e∗1 (i ,κa)

∂κa

e∗1 (i , κa)

]︸︷︷︸

Differential exit rate

(6)

Ideologues:

I have more to lose from being purged

I more likely to be successful pool

⇒ Ambiguous effects

CES cost of effort ⇒ Pool make-up effect is null26 / 34

Benefit of purging

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Equilibrium Purge

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Equilibrium effect of violence

Two effects on ideologues and opportunists

I Payoff effect: Same for both types

I Pool-size effect weighted by survival payoff: Greater forideologues

Discriminate purge:

I Positive pool-size effect ⇒ Ideologues increase effort more

I Positive pool make-up effect on unsuccessful pool ⇒ Benefitof purging increases

Semi-indiscriminate purge:

I Negative pool-size effect ⇒ Ideologues decrease effort more

I Positive pool make-up effect on successful pool ⇒ Benefit ofpurging increases

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The non-monotonic effect of violence

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The non-monotonic effect of violence

Discriminate purge: More violence increases purge breadth

Semi-indiscriminate purge: More violence increases purge breadth

But WS <WF :

Exhausting unsuccessful pool ; Purging from successful pool

Increased violence ⇒ Thinner unsuccessful pool ⇒ Smaller purgebreadth

Violent purge ; Large purge

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Non-monotonous effect of violence

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Violence and nature of the purge

Violence always increases average effort

More violence

I Thinner unsuccessful pool

I Greater benefit of purging

⇒ Violent purges are more likely to be semi-indiscriminate

In line with historical evidence (Teiwes, 1993, 25-27):

I Chinese purges: more lenient, more predictable (specificbehavior targeted)

I Stalinist purges: more violent, “flouting command courtsdanger, but even enthusiastic compliance is no guarantee ofsafety”

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Mass Purges

Mass purges as an instrument of political accountability intotalitarian regimes

One-to-Many accountability:

I Pool size effect: Efforts are interdependent

I Pool size effect exacerbates or mitigates effect of purges

I Pool make-up effect: Purging incentives depend onendogenous sorting

Purges:

I can increase effort, but non-monotonous effect

I some success in screening party members

Violent purges:

I More likely to be semi-indiscriminate

I Not necessarily greater breadth34 / 34

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