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American Academy of Religion

Gersonides, Providence, and the Rabbinic TraditionAuthor(s): Menachem Marc KellnerReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 673-685

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Gersonides,Providence,and theRabbinicTradition*MENACHEMMARC KELLNER

views concerning God's providence.' Either providence extends to allmen, to some men, or to no men. By providence Levi usually meansguidance, although sometimes he uses it in the sense of retribution. Understood inthe first way, the three possible views about providence are that God guides allmen, some men, or no men. Understanding providence in the second sense, thethree possible views are that first, all good deeds are rewarded and all bad deedspunished; second, some good deeds, but not all, are rewarded and some evil deeds,but not all, are punished; third, no good deeds are rewarded and no evil deeds arepunished. In his Milhamot Adonai Gersonides generally uses providence in the

*This s anexpandedversionof a paperread to the MedievalJewishPhilosophysectionof themeetingsof the AmericanAcademyof Religion,SoutheasternRegion,Chattanooga,Tennessee, on March 15, 1974. I would like to thank Steven Schwarzschild,NorbertSamuelson,SeymourFeldman,BairdTipsonandHarryGamble or theirhelpfulcommentson earlierversions of this essay.IGersonides'doctrineof providencesfoundinhisCommentaryo Job,which sprintedin all editions of the Mikraot Gedolot Bible, and in the fourth book of his philosophicmagnumopus, MilhamotAdonai (Warsof the Lord).Milhamot Adonai was published nRivadi Trento,1569and in Leipzig,1866.The Riva diTrentoedition wasphoto-duplicatedby PhilipFeldheim,New York,nd. (All references o theMilhamot willcite book number,chapter number,and page number of the Leipzigedition.) Books one throughfour ofMilhamotAdonai have been translated nto Germanby BenzionKellerman,Die KampfeGottesvon Lewiben Gerson Berlin:Mayeand Muller, 1914).Booksthreeand four havebeentranslated nto Frenchby CharlesTouati, Les Guerresdu Seigneur(Paris:Mouton,1968).Book Three has been translated'intoEnglish by NorbertSamuelson n hisexcellentdoctoral dissertation, The Problem of God's Knowledge in Gersonides(unpublished,IndianaUniversityDepartmentof Philosophy,1970).Gersonides'Commentaryo the Bookof Job was translatedby AbrahamLassen(New York:Bloch, 1946)underthe title, TheCommentaryof Levi ben GersonGersonides)on the Book of Job. (All references o theCommentarywill cite chapternumberand'page numberof the Lassentranslation.)Thefollowingis, withthe exceptionof purelybibliographicworksand encyclopediaarticles,abibliographyof scholarlyworks on Levi ben Gerson. Nima H. Adlerblum,A Study ofGersonides n his Proper Perspective New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1926).J.Carlebach,Levi ben Gerson als Mathimatiker 1910). Curtze, "Levi ben Gerson fiber

MENACHEMMARC KELLNERPh.D., Washington University) is a member of theDepartmentof Religionat the Collegeof Williamand Mary.He is the authorof variousarticles n Sh'ma,Elul,and Tradition.He is workingon a book on the theologyof LevibenGerson.673

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674 MENACHEMMARC KELLNERfirstsense; n hisCommentaryo Job he generally sesit in thesecondsense.2Inbothworkshe dentifiesheview hatprovidencextendsonomenwith heviewsof JobandAristotle.Thecontraryiew, hatprovidencextends oallmen,he identifieswith heopinion fthemasses f theJewishPeople ndwithEliphaz,Bildad,and Zophar.The last opinionhe identifiesas belonging o Elihu,Maimonides,nd himself.Herejectshe Job-Aristotleositionon thegroundshat t iscontradictedyTrigonometrieundJakostab,"BibliothecaMathematica1898),97-112.SeymourFeldman,"Gersonides n Creation,"Proceedingsof theAmericanAcademyof JewishResearch NewYork, 1967). Bernard R. Goldstein, "PreliminaryRemarks on Levi ben Gerson'sContributionsto Astronomy," Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences andHumanities (1969), 239-254. Julius Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism, chapter onGersonides, New York, 1966).JuliusGuttmann,"Leviben GersonsTheoriedes Begriffs,"Festscriftzum 75JahrigenBestehungdes Jud. Theol.Seminars,Vol. 2 (Breslau,1929),pp.131-49:reprintedas "ToratHamusagshel Ralbag," n Guttmann,Dat uMada(Jerusalem,1960).IsaacHeinemann,Ta'ameiHamitzvotb'SafrutYisrael,Vol. 1(Jerusalem,1954),97-201. E. Hoffmann, "Levi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph,"Monatschriftfu'r dieGeschichte und Wissenschaftdes Judentums 10 (1860). Isaac Husik, "Gersonides,"nPhilosophical Essays (Oxford, pp. 172-85. Issaac Husik, History of Medieval JewishPhilosophy, chapter on Levi ben Gerson (New York, 1940). Isaac Husik, "Studies inGersonides," ewishQuarterlyReview n.s.)7(1916-1917),pp. 172-85and8(1917-1918),pp.113-56and 231-68;reprintedin Philosophical Essays, pp. 186-234.J. Karo, KritischeUntersuchungen u Levi ben Gersons Widerlegungdes AristotelischenZeitbegriffen,(Leipzig, 1935). Manuel Joel, Levi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph Breslau, 1862).GeorgeSarton,chapteron LevibenGerson,Introduction o theHistoryof Science,Vol.3,Part 1 (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1947), pp. 594-606. Norbert Samuelson,"Gersonides'Account of God's Knowledge of Particulars,"Journal of the History ofPhilosophy 10, (October, 1972), pp. 399-416. Norbert Samuelson, "Philosophic andReligiousAuthority ntheThoughtof MaimonidesandGersonides,"CentralConference fAmerican RabbisJournal(hereaftercited as CCAR Journal) (October,1969),pp. 31-43.NorbertSamuelson,"TheProblemof Free-WillnMaimonides,Gersonides,andAquinas,"CCAR Journal(January, 1970),pp 2-20. Norbert Samuelson,"The Problem of FutureContingents n MedievalJewishPhilosophy,"Studiesin Medieval Culture6 (1972).IsidorWeil, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson (Paris, 1868). Harry Wolfson,"Maimonidesand Gersonideson Divine Attributesas AmbiguousTerms,"MordecaiM.KaplanJubilee Volume New York, 1953),pp. 515-30.

2 Gersonides'account of his doctrineof providence s found in Book IV of MilhamotAdonai (Wars of the Lord) and throughout his Commentaryto Job. There are nodifferences f substancebetween hepositionsdescribed n the two books. Not onlydoesheconstantlyrefer one to the other, but he uses identical arguments,and often identicalpassages, in them both. This supports Nima Adlerblum'scontention (in A Study ofGersonides n His Proper Perspective New York:1926],p. 29n)that Levi "workedout thesubstanceof all his books simultaneously." ee, forexample,MilhamotAdonai,Book IV,Chapter4, p. 165and hisCommentaryo Job38,Lassen,pp.232-33.Levi'sHebrew erm or"providence"s "hashgaha".His discussion of providence n the MilhamotAdonai is basi-callya sequelto his discussionof God'sknowledgeof particularsn Book III. Most of hisexamples,therefore,relate o thewaysin which God does anddoes not extendprovidentialguidanceto individualmen. In his Commentary o Job he discussesthe same issue withrespect o thequestionof how God'sguidingprovidencerelates o rewardand punishment.Most of his examples,therefore,relate to retribution.The theologicaland philosophicalproblems,however,are the same.

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 675sense experience:3 we all have experience of dreams, divination, and prophecy, allof which indicate that God does indeed guide his creatures.4Gersonides rejects the popular position on the grounds that it, too, contradictssense-experience: we all have experience of the righteous suffering and the wickedprospering. Levi discusses three attempts at circumventing this difficulty. The firstis that of Zophar, who maintains that we confuse the righteous with the wicked.The second is that of Bildad, who maintains that we confuse good with the evil.The third attempt is that of Eliphaz, who argues that God does reward and punishin accord with desert, but that the good and evil which befalls men unjustly doesnot come from God.

Gersonides points out that Zophar and Bildad are basically appealing tomystery.5 But then they are neither following the evidence of sense experience nor,indeed, showing the justice of God's ways.

Eliphaz, Levi explains, must hold either that divine providence extends to allindividuals but does not govern all the details of their lives or that divineprovidence extends to some men and not to others. We know that he rejects thesecond view while the first also fails to show the justice of God's ways.More generally, Gersonides argues against the second view in the followingway:

We have already provedthat God's knowledgedoes not extend to particularsinsofaras theyareparticulars.6He knowstheseparticulars s theyareorderedbythe spheresand stars... He also knows that man's free actionsmight upsetthisordering.Now if God rewardedor punishedeachmanin accordwith hisactions,one of these two thingswould have to betrue.EitherGodrewardsandpunishes naccordwithwhat He knowsfrom theheavenlyorder,orjudgesthem naccordwiththeirdeeds,whethergood or bad. Butif we saythat Hejudgesthem naccordwithwhat Heknows of theiractionsfromthe[heavenly]ordering, herewillbeinjusticein God'sverybreast ortheymightnot haveacted naccordwiththatordering.Butthis is exactly the oppositeof what those who hold this position wanted!On theotherhand, if we say that Godjudgesthemin accord with theiractions,it is thennecessarily the case that He knows their actions insofar as they areparticularand we have already shown that to be false. Further, it is self-evidentlyclearthat evilcannot come from Godexceptbyaccidentor thenecessityof matter...7

3Gersonideswas a thorough-going mpiricist in theAristotelian,not Humean,sense).Thefollowing s typicalof his view:". .. unlessmen deriveknowledge romsenseexperienceit is valueless" Commentary o Job, chap. II, veryend; Lassen,p. 87).4 Gersonides,MilhamotIV, 3, p. 159.5Commentary o Chapter11, end; Lassen,p. 87.6 For a detailedanalysisand criticism of Gersonides'account of God'sknowledgeofparticulars, see Norbert Samuelson, "Gersonides Account of God's Knowledge of

Particulars," ournalof the Historyof Philosophy 10(October 1972),pp. 399-416and hisexcellent and exhaustive dissertation, The Problem of God's Knowledgein Gersonides(IndianaUniversity, 1970).7MilhamotIV. 3, p. 159. Leviaccounts for the existence of evil in the sequel to thispassage(p. 160)and in the introduction o his Job Commentary Lassen,pp. 7-9).(Inthispassage n the Commentary,by the way,he refers o the MilhamotAdonai.) Hetraces hesource of all evils happeningto man to the hylic cause (i.e., man's materiality)and toaccident. Evilsconsequentuponthe hyliccauseoriginate n the recipientof the evil andaredue eitherto his temperament i.e., the combinationof his bodily humors)or to the evil

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676 MENACHEMMARCKELLNERHavinghusrefutedhetwoextreme ositions,Gersonidesmaintainshat hethird, ntermediateositionmustbe true,since hese hreearetheonlypossiblepositionsn this matter.Gersonides rticulates his purportedlyorrectview of providencen thefollowingway:Living eingsn thesublunar orld arynterms f theirproximityto the ActiveIntellect.8 hosecloser n degree o the ActiveIntellect rebetterpreparedo guard heirwell-beinghan animals artherromit. Amongmen,similarly,omearecloser o theActive ntellecthanothers.Those hatarecloserto theActiveIntellect eserveo beguidedmorethanthosefarfrom t. Totheextent hatmanactualizes ismaterialntellect e achieves nionwith heActiveIntellect. uchmencanseemoreclearlyhanotherswhateventswillbecaused ytheiractionsandby the actionsof their ellowsand can thus ake henecessarymeasureso increaseheirgoodandminimizeheirpain.Menbecomeworthy fdivineprovidence,hen,whentheyfulfilltheirend as men:theperfection fthemselvesnknowledge,haracter,nd morals.9InhisCommentaryo Job he writes:Elihuexplains hatman's owstate,as comparedo God,does notinanywaypreventhe latter romextendingo himHis Providence... Man s "mightyfheart";amely, e ispotentiallyble oconceivedeas. f this s thecase,wehavethen,on theonehand,Godgreat nunderstandingnactuality nd,on theotherhand,manof greatunderstandingn potentiality.t is also known hatwhat sactualcompleteshat which s only potentialand helpsto bring t out intoactuality.We ind, hen, ntheendeavor fa man orealize isconceptionsromthepotentialtate o theactual, qualitywhichuniteshimwithGod nacertainway,inasmuch s actuality f thought s common o bothof them, hough nwidely ifferingegrees.tis thenevident hat tis notrighthatGoddespiseman,butonthecontrary,naccount f hisstrivingorunitywithandcleavingoHim, t

propensitiesof his (material)soul. Evils consequentupon accidentare those whicharisethroughexternal causes and are due eitherto the behaviorof others(traceable n turntotheirtemperaments r souls)or to naturaldisasterswhichare purelyaccidentalbutwhichoccur in order to keep the elementsin equilibrium.8 The Active Intellect s the intelligenceof the lunarspherewhichgoverns he sublunarworld.Ithastwofunctions: irst,to endow sublunarnaturewiththeintelligenceandpurposevisible in its processesand evolutions;second, to actualizeman'spotentialforknowledge.(Cf. Gersonides,MilhamotAdonai, Book I, 5, pp. 35-36;Husik andGuttmann,chaptersonGersonides, assim.;Samuelson,dissertation,p. lxxii, andtext footnotes27, 128, 130,131,339, 344,349,354, 374, 377,565,and607.)Theknowledgewhichmanactuallygains s calledtheacquired ntellect Book I, 10)and is theimmortalpartofman. Levimaintained hat thepurposeof the observanceof themitzvot"is to guideus to trueperfection" nd thusenableus to earn eternal life by teaching us true opinions. Cf. Yitzhak Heinemann, TaameiHamitzvotB'SafrutYisrael,Vol. 1 p. 97 (Jerusalem,1959).9Ibid., IV, 4, pp. 164-5. In his Commentaryto Job (Introduction, Lassen, p. 9)Gersonideswrites:It is worthwhile or you to know that theseevils thataccruefrom badorderingare not properhumanevils for human evils should happento that part of manwhereproperhumangood occurs,as the subjectwhereincontrarietiesoccuris alwaysthesame.Now sinceproperhumangood pertainingo thepartof thesoul,whichwecallreason,is not in the nutritiveor sensory parts,for thesepartsdo not belongto manquaman,it isevident that properhuman evils also pertainwholly to this part,and just as we call theperfectionof human reasonproperhumangood, so we shouldcall lack of thatperfection,properhumanevils.

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 677is meet that He watchover man in a completemanner.Andsince thisunityarisesthrough man's actual attainmentof conceptions, not because of his potentialcomprehensivepowerwhichis possessedby the entire humangenus, it is evidentthat the providenceextendedto the intellectualman is primarilybecause of hisindividualcapacity to bring his potential power of conception into a state ofactuality.It is thereforelear hat Goddoes notforsakeheindividuals f thehumanspeciesbecause f their owstate,but watches ver ntellectualmen;andsincewickedness reventsmenfromconceivingxalted deas,as wasstatedby Jobhimself,tfollowshatnoprovidencesextendedo thewicked ut heyare eft otheevil atedestinedor hemby heconstellations,nd heyalso ack hesalvationofthesoul..... But t is meet hatweunderstandhatDivineprovidencearieswiththedegree f itsrecipient,amely,hat hemoreman ndeavorsounitewithGod,thegreaters thedegree fprovidencextendedohim;but his squite videntoeveryonetudying urwords.'Havingthus characterized he correct view of providence,Levi, in the sixthchapterof Book IV of the Milhamot,arguesthat his viewisconsistentwith thatofthe Torah and the Rabbis."IThisargument s interestingboth in its ownrightandfor the further ight it sheds on Levi's views.Levi first shows that his theory has sound biblical warrant.Indeed, he citestwenty-threedistincttextsfrom all threeportionsof the biblicalcanoninproofofhis theory.Since one can use isolated Bible versesto provealmostanything,thispart of the argument s of little interest.Levi then points out that the sages held that reward and punishmentwerereserved or theworld to come and thatit isnot necessary hat materialretributionbejustlyapportioned n thisworld. Levi welcomesthis view,of course,because thelpsto explainthe evidenceof oursensesthat therighteoussufferandthewickedprosper.He couldacceptthis viewbecausehe felt thatthegoods andevilsenjoyedand suffered n this earthlylife are not trulyhumangoods and evils.12Leviwasindeed forced to adopt this view becauseit is clear that on his theory the mostundeserving ouldlead lives of near-perfectmaterial)bliss were hat ordained orthem in the stars.Levithen notes two problemswithhis position. First,how canhe accountforthe fact that the Torah often speaks of Israel and other nations sufferingpunishmentat God'shands?Second,the Torahclearlystates, nmany places,thata man is judged by all his actions, be they good or evil. The first is a problembecauseLevidenies hat evilcan come from God. This we saw above. The second sdifficult to reconcile with his position because he denies that God knowsindividuals n theirparticularity.He knows whatpeople are ordainedto do, andHe furtherknows that they might exercise their freedom in not doing what isordained,but Hedoes not know whatthey actuallyendupdoing. How, then,canHe reward hem for theirgood deeds and punishthem for their wickedones?Leviasserts hatthe firstproblem s not difficult o solve. All the punishmentsabout which the people of Israel are warned are not punishmentsso much asinstances of guidingprovidencecausingthe peopleto turn fromtheirevil ways.They are thus more properlyconstrued as rewards.10Commentary,end of Chapter38; Lassen,pp. 232-33." Pp. 179-84.12Ibid., pp. 181-82.

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678 MENACHEMMARCKELLNERSimilarly, evi inds ittledifficultyndealingwith heproblemaisedbythesuffering f nationsother hanIsraelwhich s attributedo God. Suchsufferingserves as a demonstrationto the righteous, or actually protects the righteous.

Thus, these evils too are really examples of providential guidance and reward forthe righteous.13In dealing with the second problem with his theory, that of the repeated claimsin the Torah that each man is judged by all his actions, Levi writes:It is clearthatthisproblem s not beyondsolution. This s so because,according oour theory,eachman is trulyrewarded or hisrighteousnessandsurelyrewardedfor hiswickedness.Hisrewardconsistsin successof the soul,hispunishmentnitslack. It is furtherclearthat eachman is materiallypunished or his wickedness othegreatest xtent consistentwith orderand ustice.Theprovidential uardingof aman from evil will extend to the righteous accordingto theirgoodness and belackingto the wicked. It is thus clearthat it ispossible to say that man is judgedwithreference o allhisactions,betheygood or evil. Withthis,the secondproblemis solved.14

These "solutions," however, raise serious problems of their own. It is to theirarticulation that I now turn.Gersonides argues, in effect, that there are two types of providence. A generalprovidence, extending to the entire world, and manifested in the good order wefind in nature.'5 This ordering, on its own, generally rewards the righteous andpunishes the wicked. In his Commentary to Job he argues... God possessesall the possiblewisdomand mightto bring good to this lowerexistence,andthat He does extendHisprovidence o itinthe best mannerpossible.God also mentioned,in his reply[to Job] the fact that the createdthingsfromwhichevil ensues, bringalso somegood, namely,the punishmentof the wicked.Thisthoughtis contained n theexpression"Andthewickedwillbe removed romit."(Job38:13)Thisshows thattherighteousare notaffectedbytheseevils,for it issaid,"thewicked,"sincetheyaloneare thusharmed,as Elihuexplained(Job 35).Fromthepunishmentof the wickedgreatuse is derived,for otherpeople will betherebychastened ndturn o Godandthusattainthe salvationof theirsouls.Nowjust as nature mplanted n plantsa powerto repelthat which does not agreewiththeiressence,in orderthattheybe not injured, ikewise Godplacedsuch forcesinthe world, which,in some way, driveout the wickedfrom humansocietyso thatother menshall not beharmedbythem. This saccomplishedbytheaccidentalevilensuingfromthe orderdeterminedby the heavenlybodies,whichevil, as said, isintended to harm the wicked.'6A more specific providence is extended to the righteous, who, through theunification of their intellects with the Active Intellect, are thus able to foreseeevents ordained by the order of the stars and take appropriate pre-emptivemeasures. We see here, by the way, how the two senses of providence distinguished

above come together. God guides the righteous and thus assures their (material)rewards; they are protected from avoidable evils. By punishing the wicked, Godfurther guides the righteous, encouraging them to eschew evil and thus win thedelights of the world to come (eternal unification with the Active Intellect).13Ibid., pp. 183-84.14 Ibid., p. 184. Emphasisadded.15Gersonides,MilhamotIII, 1, p. 123.'6 Commentary o Chapter49, end; Lassen,p. 252.

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 679This two-fold theory of providenceraises a number of problemsof whichGersonidesfails to take explicit account. Basically,Gersonidesarguesthat thewickedarepunishedbytheveryfactthattheydo not unifytheir ntellectswiththe

ActiveIntellectand thus cannot avoid evils ordainedby the stars. But, beyondthat, the wicked arepunishedbythe loss of immortalitywhichgoes handin handwith unificationwith the Active Intellect.Thereis one immediatetechnicalproblemwith this approach.The materialpunishmentof the wicked consists in their being left to their fate. This fate,however,mightbe good, not evil! Indeed,sincethe orderof the universe s suchthat it maximizes all possible good, it is likelythat theirfate will be good. This,Gersonides recognizes, is the reason the wicked may prosper. Their realpunishment,however,is saved for their deaths, whenthey sufferdeprivationofeternallife.We are faced with a more serious problem, however, when we seek tounderstandpunishmentsmeted out to the people of Israel as a whole. God cannever be sure thatabandoningthemto their fatewill reallychastise them:evenifthe fate ordained or themis evil (not necessarily he case) they can changeit bytheir own free action. More troublesomethan this problemis the fact that, onGersonides' ccount,punishmentsnflictedon thepeopleof Israelare not so muchpunishmentsas instancesof God'sguiding providence.But,as the peoplebecomemoreevil, theybecomelessworthyof divineprovidence,and thusthere s lessof alikelihoodthat God will reward hem;yet the chastisementsareexactlyrewards.Furthermore,unificationwith the ActiveIntellect s supposedto lead to materialreward(as well as eternal life). Why should that unification be rewardedwithmaterialpunishments?Last,andI think,most important,Levi is failingto liveupto his own empiriciststandardshere. He is, indeed, grotesque.He is forced tointerpret reatcalamities the destructionof thetwotemples,theexpulsionfromSpain,evenI imagine, heholocaust- as instancesof God'sspecial ove andfavorfor Israel. That, surely, is to turn upsidedown the evidenceof both sense andreason.Levialsoseemsto befalling nto the sametrapwhich,hesaid,undid Bildad.Hewrites in his Commentaryto Job or Ch. 11 that Bildad holds "that what weconsideran evil is not an evil, because t ultimatelybringsgood and the apparentgood which comesto the wicked sinrealityevil,for itultimatelybringsevil." 7Hethen rejectsBildad'sview (along with that of Zophar)becausethey

made onfusedtatementsndtookno account f sense xperience;heymerelyattemptedo remove ifficultiesysayinghat hethings remysterious.ut f thecase sso,how hen an heymaintainhat hingsnthisworld reconductedntheproper rder nd ollowaplanofjustice?Whenceotheyknow hat, ince here samysterynvelopinghese hings, heyhavenocriterionor estingheknowledgethereof? otonlywillthisprinciple ithwhich heyoperated reventhem romreachinghe truthnthisdisquisition,utonewho ollowstwillneverbeable oreach ruthnanything,orunlessmenderive nowledgerom ense xperiencetis valueless.'"'7Chapter11; Lassen,p. 84.'8 bid., p. 87.

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680 MENACHEMARCKELLNERNow Gersonides ould, think,rejecthiscriticismortwo reasons.First,hewouldprobablyrguehathedoesnotdeny hatmaterialvilsareevil,merelyhattheyarenotproper uman vils; his,hewouldundoubtedly aintain, ullifieshe

charge hat he is appealingo mystery ndignoringhe evidence f oursenses.Second,he wouldprobably ointoutthathenowhere ssertshat all"thingsnthisworldare conductedn theproperorderand followa planofjustice."Levi's eply,however, aisesa veryseriousquestion,not abouthisinternalconsistency - he is nothing if not internally consistent - but about the extent towhich his views may be said to be consistent with those of the rabbis.The problem may be made clearer if we summarize what we have said to thispoint. Levi would like to say that failure to unify one's intellect with the ActiveIntellect leads to material punishment. But, because of the order inherent in theworld, and because of pre-ordained fate, it is likely that a miscreant will prosper.Levi is thus forced to say that there is no justice in this world and that true rewardsare of the soul and pertain to the world to come.There are a number of ways in which this theory of providence would seem tofall clearly outside of the realm of rabbinic thought on the subject. It clearlyviolates the spirit of the vast number of rabbinic dicta concerning God's personaland very intimate love for each and every one of His creatures. Levi recognizes thisand tries to accommodate the two views.19 But there would seem to be no way thatLevi could accommodate his view to the rabbinic claim that all retribution is donemeasure for measure (midah k'neged midah). Further, in denying that all mattersof this world are governed in accord with justice, Levi is clearly flying in the face ofthe near-absolute rabbinic unity behind the claim that God orders everythingjustly.Levi himself was well aware of how innovative his ideas were, and recognizedthe tension between his position and that of the rabbis. In concluding hisdiscussion of the problems raised for his theory by the rabbinic position, he writes:"It is thus clear that it is possible [yitakhen] to say that a man is judged withreference to all his actions, be they good or evil." 20Gersonides seems to assertingthat his position is formally consistent with rabbinic thought on the subject, even ifit does not approach it in the same spirit. In this I think that he is wrong.

19 ob 39:1:"Knowest houthe timewhenthe wildgoatsof therockbring orth?Or canstthou markwhenthe hindsdo calve?"Gersonidessays:"Thisanimal[the wild goat of therocks],according o therabbis,ascends,at timeof givingbirth,to arock,andGodsends,atthe particularmoment,aneagleto receive henewlybornbabyon itswings,so thatit shouldnot fall off the rock. If such is the case, then this is the meaningof the verse. If not, themeaning s, according o ouropinion,asfollows:Theyoungof this animal sbornwithgreatdifficultyand dangerand therefore pecialcare s takenby God to bringtheyoungforthinsucha state thattheydo not dieat birth .." (Commentaryo Job 39:1).Levi is referringothefollowingpassage BabaBathra16a-b):"'Knowest hou the timewhenthewildgoatsofthe rockbring orth?Orcanstthou markwhenthehindsdocalveTThis wildgoatis heartlesstowardsheryoung.Whenshecrouches ordelivery,shegoes upto the top ofa mountainsothat theyoung shall fall down and be killed,and I [God] preparean eagle to catch t in itswingsand set it beforeher,andif theeaglewereone secondtoo soon or too late it wouldbekilled. I do not confuse one moment with another .. ." For a generaland very helpfuldiscussionof Gersonides'understanding f the Torah'sauthority,seeNorbertSamuelson,"Philosophicand Religious Authorityin the Thought of Maimonidesand Gersonides,"CCARJournal(October,1969),31-43.'0MilhamotIV, 6, p. 184.

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 681The ideaof retributionn kind(midahk'negedmidah) s firmlyentrenchednrabbinic iteratureand is nowhereseriouslydoubted.The pithiest,and certainlymostfamousexpressionof thisopinionis thesayingattributed o Hillelin Avot II,

7:"Moreover,he sawa skullfloatingon the face of the waterandhesaid: Becausethou drownedst heydrownedtheeandin theend, theythatdrowned hee shallbedrowned.'"It is even confirmednthewell-knownmishnaicattempt o spiritualizethe doctrineof retribution:"Ben Azzai said: 'Be swift in fulfillingeven a lightpreceptand flee fromtransgression.For the rewardof a precept s a precept,andthe rewardof a transgression s a transgression"' Avot IV, 2). Therecan be nodoubt that in denying the principle of measurefor measure in rewardsandpunishmentsin this world, Gersonides is stepping out of the mainstreamofnormativerabbinicJudaism.Indenying hat strict usticeobtainsin thisworld,Gersonidesstakingamuchbolderstep.Thedoctrineof God'sunfailing ustice,extendingto all His creaturesat all times is basic to the rabbinicworld-view.2'Levi bases his claim on twopassages n theTalmud.In Kiddushin39bwereadthat"R.Jacobsaid:'There snoreward orthe fulfillmentof precepts nthisworld.'"This,saysLevi,implies"thatit is not necessarythat physical reward and punishmentbe justly apportionedhere."22 ersonides ontinuesthecitation fromKiddushinbyrecounting hestorytold thereof howElishabenAbuyahcameto sin. It came about thatElishasawason fulfillinghis father'scommandto ascenda treeto getbirdseggs(thusfulfillingthe commandment o honorone'sparents,the promisedreward or which s"thatthy days may be prolonged"[Deut 5:16]). When the boy reachedthe nest hefulfilled the commandment o chaseawaythe mother bird beforetakingtheeggs,the promisedreward or whichis "that t may be well with thee and thou mayestprolong thy days"(Deut 5:22).Whendescendingfrom the tree, the boy slipped,fell, and died. Elisha saw this and exclaimed:"Where s this boy'shappinessandwhere is his prolongingof days?"He thereuponbecamean unbeliever.But R.Jacob, Elisha'sgrandson, interpreted he verses in the following way: "But'inorderthat it maybewell withthee,'means on thedaythat is wholly good;and'inorderthat thy days may be long,' on the daythatis wholly long."Bothpromises,R. Jacob seems to be saying, referto the next world. True reward comes afterdeath.Levi citesone otherpassage n supportof his position, from Moed Katan 28a:"Lengthof life, children, and sustenancedepend not on merit, but rather onmazal."23 The fact that Gersonides cites only two supporting texts is itselfinstructive. His general tendency is to quote supportingtexts at interminablelength, when they are available. Moreoverthe texts which Levi quotes herearehardlytypicalof rabbinicutteranceson the questionof justicein this world.Notonly that, but they reallydo not do whathe needs them to do. Neitherexplicitlydenied that "things of this world are ordered in justice," nor need they beinterpretedin that way. Indeed, given the overwhelmingpreponderanceofrabbinicopinionto thecontrary, t would bepresumptuous o so interpret hem.

21 See, forexample,GeorgeFoot Moore,Judaism n the FirstCenturies f the ChristianEra NewYork:SchockenBooks,1971),Vol.1,pp.357-400. eeespecially ages379and388andthesources herecited.22MilhamotIV, 6, p. 180.23Ibid.

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682 MENACHEM MARC KELLNERInfact,Leviwrencheshesepassages utof context, otallyobscuringheir

meaning. In the first instance he says of the rabbis: "They said: 'There is no rewardfor precepts in this world.' "24Levi was referring to a passage in Kiddushin 39bwhere Raba says: "This latter agrees with R. Jacob, who said: 'There is no rewardfor precepts in this world."' Raba, in turn, was referring to (and indeed,immediately cites) the following passage at the very end of Hullin 142a: "It wastaught: R. Jacob says: 'There is no precept in the Torah, where reward is stated byits side, from which you cannot infer the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.' "It is clear that R. Jacob was not trying to imply, as Levi maintains, that there is nojustice in this world, but was trying to prove the doctrine of resurrection. R.Jacob's point was that one ought not to expect rewards for his good deeds (andpunishments for his evil ones) in this life. But even this claim is modified in thesequel:

But did not R. Eleazar aythat thoseengaged n theperformance fa preceptnevercome to harm?R.Jacob hadcited, nproofof hisdictum, heexample,mentionedabove,of theboy fallingfrom the tree afterbothobeyinghis fatheranddismissingthedam.]Whenreturningromtheperformance f aprecept t isdifferent.But didnot R. Eleazarsaythat thoseengaged n apreceptnevercometo harm,eitherwhengoing to perform t or whenreturning rom theperformancehereof? t musthavebeen a brokenladderthat was used, so that injurywaslikely;and where njury slikely,it is different,as it is written:"And Samuelsaid,'HowcanIgo?IfSaulhearit he will kill me.' "The Gemara asserts here, then, that R. Jacob is basically wrong. Generallyspeaking, one is rewarded for precepts in this world, except in cases where suchreward would depend upon a miracle, contravening the general principle that onemay never rely upon a miracle (ein somkhin al hanes). It is only in these instancesthat there is no reward for precepts in this world. The tendentiousness of Levi'sreading of R. Jacob's claim is thus clear.Levi follows up his use of R. Jacob's dictum with the following:

It hasalreadybeenexplainedto you that rewardandpunishmentdo not occur nphysicalgoodsandevils andit is thusnot impossible hattheyoccurwithoutorderand ustice.They[the rabbis] aid:"Lengthof life,children,and sustenancedependnot on merit,but ratheron mazal."It is clearthattheydid not meanto differ herewith the Torah which promisedin many places that physicalrewardsaccruetothose who walk in her paths, but only that this matter is dependent upon theprinciplesof mazal.Therefore, t shouldnot be a cause for doubtif the wickedarerewardedmaterially, or these rewardsaccrueto them by the workingsof mazal,not by virtueof theirevil deeds.25Levi, again, is building a lot on one short quotation. Material reward and

punishment is governed, not by justice, but by mazal, "luck," "destiny," "thatwhich is determined by the stars." And again, the context of this quotation isinstructive:Raba said: "Lengthof life, children,and sustenancedepend not on merit,butratheron mazal. For, take Rabbah and R. Hisda. Both weresaintlyrabbis;one

24Ibid.25Ibid.

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 683masterprayedfor rain and it came. R. Hisda lived to the age of ninety-two.Rabbahonly lived to the age of forty. In R. Hisda's house there were held sixtymarriage easts,at Rabbah'shouse there weresixty bereavements.At R. Hisda'shouse there was the purest wheaten bread for dogs, and it went to waste;atRabbah'shousetherewasbarleybread or humanbeings,and that not to be had."

Now, in the first place, Raba says that three things, and three things only,depend upon mazal: length of life, children, and sustenance. The specificity of hisclaim is made clear by the anecdotes about Rabbah and R. Hisda. In the secondplace, the Gemara (Shabbat 156a and b) argues at great length that Israel isimmune to mazal. Thus, at the very best (from Levi's perspective) the view he citesis that of a minority of one and the view itself is much more restricted thannecessary for his purposes.

Indeed, in the one instance where a rabbi explicitly uttered the view that there isno justice in this world he was immediately and harshly silenced by none otherthan Rabbi Akiba who, in his long life, was given plenty of reason to questionGod's justice on this earth.R. Pappiasalso expounded:"But He is at one with Himself,who can turn Him?(Job 23:13)Hejudgesall that come into the worldby Himselfand there is none toargue againstHis words."Said R. Akiba to him:"That s enough,Pappias."He,then,saidto him:"How do you interpret,ButHe is at one with Himself,and whocan turn Him?"'Akiba said to him: "There s no possibleargumentagainstthewords of He who spokeand the world cameinto being,foreveryword s inaccordwith truth,and everydecisionin accordancewithjustice."26

Rabbi Akiba's judgment here is final, unequivocal, and fully representative ofrabbinic thought on this issue.I am not trying to imply here that the rabbis were blind to the problem of therighteous suffering and the wicked prospering. They expend much energy in tryingto deal with this problem. Their general approach, however, is that of RabbiYannai who said (Avot IV, 19):"Within our reach is neither the tranquillity of thewicked nor even the suffering of the righteous." This is generally understood tomean, in the words of the Mahzor Vitry (ad loc.), that "it is not within our power tounderstand why the way of the wicked prospers and why the righteous are made toendure sufferings." The rabbis recognized the seeming injustice in the world; butthey refused to take the logical step of affirming that the injustice was real andplace responsibility for it with God. It remained for them a problem. ForGersonides this approach was impossible. The problem of justice and providencewas, he was convinced, a genuine problem which needed a genuine solution. Thishe provided.Levi ben Gerson expounds his doctrine of providence through hisCommentary to Job. It may be that he finds support for his position in that bookand can claim biblical, rather than rabbinic authority for it. This possibility iscertainly worth examining.

The Book of Job can certainly be interpreted as expounding the doctrine thatthere is no justice in this world. Throughout the book Job's friends enunciate a26Mekhilta, TractateBeshallah, Chapt. VII (to Exodus 14:26-31),ed. Lauterbach(Philadelphia:Jewish PublicationSociety, 1933),Vol. 1, p. 248.

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684 MENACHEMMARCKELLNERveryconventionaliewofretribution,nsistinghatJobmustbeguilty f some in,for otherwise e wouldnot be suffering. ob consistently enieshis guiltandaffirms is nnocence. hroughouthebookhecallsuponGod opresentHimselfbeforehebarofjustice, s twere,otestify nhisbehalf.Thequestion fwhowasright Job orhisfriends is decisive ere. fJob sright, henwecannotavoidthe conclusion hat there s nojustice n thisworld.There s strongevidenceo supporthe claim hatJobwascorrect.Theveryfirstverse nforms hereaderhat"Therewasa man n the andofUz,whosenamewasJob and thatmanwaswhole-heartedndupright, ndonethatfearedGodandshunnedvil."GodHimself ttestso Job's ighteousness:AndheLord aiduntoSatan:Hast houconsideredmyservant ob,thattheres none ikehim ntheearth, whole-heartednduprightman,onethatfearethGodand shunnethevil?"' Job1:8).Thesource fJob's rialssclearlytated: wager,neffect,betweenGodandSatan.Thebook'sprologuemakestclearbeyond nydoubt hatJob's ufferingwasgratuitous,otallyundeserved.obrepeatedlyallsuponGod otestifyothisfact,to affirm is(Job's)nnocence.Nowhere,t shouldbenoted,doesJobdoubtGod'spower,onlyHisjustice, huspresentingheproblem f evilinits starkestform.Thepresumptionf Job's nnocences strengthenedhenGoddoesexactlywhat Job demanded, nswering imout of the whirlwind. ot onlydoes Godaccede o Job'sdemand, utHecastigatesob's riends: Andtwasso,thataftertheLordhadspokenhesewordsuntoJob,theLord aid oEliphazheTemanite:'Mywrath s kindled gainst hee,andagainst hytwofriends;orye havenotspokenof Me thething hat is right,as Myservant obhath'" Job42:7).GodHimself hus attests o Job's nnocence, learlymplyinghat there s no strict,isomorphicustice in this world. If the world were ordered ustly, Job'srighteousnessouldhaveprotected im fromsuchsuffering.ButGod's peechesmustnot beignored.Goddoestestify oJob's nnocence,implying hat his sufferingwas undeserved.At the sametime, however,Godcastigates ob for doubtingHisjustice:"TheLord answered ob out of thewhirlwind, nd said: 'Who is this that darkeneth ounselby wordswithoutknowledge?Girdup nowthy loinslikea man; or I willdemand f thee,anddeclare hou unto me"'(Job38:1).Traditionally, od'sspeeches re takento mean hatHisjusticecannotbecomprehendedy manand thattheymustaccept t on faith.This,however,scertainly ot theonlyreasonableeading f the text. God's peeches,withtheiremphasis n cosmicphenomena,nd couchedas theyarein verybroad erms,mightbe taken o be ademonstrationf theperfect nd ustorderingfthewholeuniverse. heuniverses a wholemaybe ust,even fthatjustices notmanifestedin all its parts.Thus,God is just,and there s, at leastfromourperspective,injusticen thisworld.Gersonideseemso beleaningowards omevariant f thispositionwhenhesays:

God,in Hisdiscourse,eproachedob for hisjudgingDivineactionsas beingdefective ndimperfect.Hereferredo Job'scomplaints,irst,whyGodplacedhumanndividualsnder heorderwhich nsues rom heactivity f theheavenlybodies,nwhich here s njusticesmanifestedy heprosperityf thewicked ndthesufferingf therighteous.econd,f itwerempossibleoarrange ifferently,

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GERSONIDES, PROVIDENCE, AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION 685whyhen idGod reateheunfortunatenes owhom eathspreferableo ife?"

Tomeetheseomplaints,odunfolds eforeob hewonderfulanoramafHisactionsn heUniverse.his nfoldingas wopurposes:irst,o tell ob hatitisnotrightorhim o udgeHisactions,ince edoesnotconceivehem,ndajudgemust,irst fall,haveompletenowledgef he hingse udges.econd,tmaybecomevidentohim hatGod ossessesll hepossible isdomndmighttobringoodothisowerxistence,nd hatHedoes xtendHisprovidenceo tinthebestmannerossible. odalsomentioned,nHisreply,he act hat hecreatedhings romwhichevil ensuesbringalsosomegood,namely,hepunishmentfthewicked..27He thengoeson to say:... Weretpossibleoarrangehat llpeoplehould eguardedromvil, (God)certainlyould othaveailednaccomplishingt.But placednmen,who re ttimes otprotectedy he tars, n nstrumentymeans f whichhey an avethemselvesrom he mpendingvilwhichs theirntellect.hey anbesavedftheytriveounite,ymeansf heireasoningower, ith heActiventellect.28Even f Gersonidess hereadopting omeform of theinterpretationf Jobbriefly escribedustabove and t is notclear o methathe is- this n nowaywillsavehis claim hathisviewsareconsistentwith hoseof theRabbis. nthe irstplace, they overwhelminglyejectthis interpretation.econd,the Bible asunderstoodntheTalmud, ot theBible tself, s normativeorrabbinic udaism.Gersonidesouldnot consistently ppeal o an interpretationf the Biblenotsanctioned ytheTalmud nd at the same imeclaim o beworkingwithin herabbinic radition.The conclusiono whichwe arethus orced s thatRabbiLeviben Gerson'ssolution otheproblemf divineusticen an mperfect orld striking,reative,andoriginal s it is- cannotbeeasilysquaredwith the standard iewsof thesubjectound n rabbiniciterature.Given hetendentiousature fhisattemptstoprovehisconsistency ithrabbinichoughthere sgoodreason osuspecthatGersonides asawareof thistension.Ina wider ense,however,t shouldbenoted, irst, hatLeviwashardlyhe

first oenunciate iewsonprovidenceiketheonesdiscussednthisessay.To oneextent or anotherall the JewishAristotelianswere forced o adopt positionssubstantiallyimilarohis.ButLeviwascertainlyheclearest,heboldest, nd hemostforthrightf thegroup.Second, t shouldnot be inferredrom hefactthatLevi's ositionwasstrikinglyifferentrom hatadopted ytherabbinicraditionthathe is therefore f necessity heterodoxhinker;f nothing lse,hiswritingsdemonstratehe widerange or theologicalmaneuveringvailablewithin hecontextof rabbinic udaism.2927End of Commentary o Job 39; Lassen,pp. 251-252.28End of Commentary o Chapter41; Lassen,p. 264.29Thatis not to implythat Levi didnot receivea lot of criticism.ShemTob'spunon thetitleof hisbook, WarsAgainsttheLord,becamebetterknown thanthebookitself.Indeed,it was ignoredto suchan extent that, of the originalprintededitionof the book (Riva diTrento, 1569)only seventeencopies remain.Yet, despitethis, his non-PentateuchalBiblecommentaries reprinted n the standardJewisheditionof the Bible(MikraotGedolot)andhe is everywhere onsideredby those who pridethemselveson their strictadherence o therabbinic radition o be a Rishon,one of theearlyones,astandard arlymedievalauthority,one whose statementsand decisions a later scholar cannot dispute.