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Mind Association

Acting From VirtueAuthor(s): Robert AudiSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 415 (Jul., 1995), pp. 449-471Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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Acting From Virtue

ROBERTAUDI

Virtueethics shouldtell us not onlywhat virtue s but alsowhatconsti-tutes actingfrom t,Merely o do the right hing,say fromself-interest,s

not to live up to a standard f virtue.But despite he extensiverecentdis-

cussionof virtueethicsthe notionof acting romvirtuestill needs clarifi-

cation.The problem s especiallychallengingbecause t straddles thics

and actiontheory. t cannotbe solved withoutanadequate nderstandingof virtue,butthe relationof actions romvirtue o thevirtues hey expressis-I shall argue-mainly a question of how such actions are to be

explained.Aristotle s highly instructive nthis problemandis my pointof departure.t is alsorewardingo considerKant'sconceptionof actingfrom duty,construedas a case of acting from moralvirtue,for instance

from rectitude, nd viewed as a foil for Aristotle'snotion of such action.

Even if Kantian ction romdutyoughtnot tobe so viewed, Kantian th-

ics, like any rule ethics,needsanaccountof something losely analogous

to actingfromvirtue:acting romwhatever ule-guided lementsof char-

acterrender he actions hatexpress hemmorallypraiseworthy.My firsttask will be to sketch-of necessitywithoutdoing detailed extualanaly-

sis-Aristotelian and Kantianconceptionsof actingfrom virtue.I shall

then constructa generalaccountof actingfrom virtue.The finalsection

will show how the accounthelpsin answeringan important uestionof

generalethics:whether egularly cting romvirtue-and therebyachiev-

ing the chief normativegoal of virtueethics-is sufficient ora morally

good life.

1. Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions of actionfrom virtue

Aristotledistinguishesbetweenactingfrom virtueandacting merelyin

accordancewith it. Thiswording, hough rue oAristotle, ecallsKant'sdistinctionbetweenactingfromdutyandmerely actingin conformity

' This is not exactlyhiswording,but the distinction eemsclearly mplied nhiscontrast etweenmerelydoing ust and emperate eedsanddoing hem n the"wayin whichjust and temperate eople do them".See NE 1105a25-1105b 5.Terence rwin's ranslation1985) is used throughout.

Mind, Vol. 104 . 415 . July 1995 ? Oxford University Press 1995



ActingFrom Virtue 451

not a behaviouraloncept, n thesense of onedefined n termsof what saccomplished,as opposed to how. Thus the adverbialforms of virtue

terms suchas "courageously", honestly", nd"justly"-can apply to

actionsnotperformedrom herelevant irtues,andeven to actionsaimedatpretendingo manifest hosevirtues.Given histhinuse of virtue erms,

thedistinction etweenactionmerely nconformitywith virtueandactionfrom tmay be regarded s a specialcase of adistinction etweenconduct

of a behaviourally pecified ype, e.g. metingoutequalshares,and con-ductdescribedmainly n termsof how it is to be explained,e.g. as donefroma sense of justice.

Threefurther ointsin thepassagehelpto explain ts centralcontrast.

Suppose am theagent.First, mustknowthatIam,say,metingoutequalshares;t will notdoif, insigningan orderbywhichIdothis,Imistakenlytake t tobe a check.Callthistherecognition equirement.econd,Imustdecide on this equal distributionnd decide on it for its own sake.Thisimpliestwo conditions: hatmy actionmust be (a) decidedupon-callthis theselectionrequirement-and b) ina specialwaymotivatedby therelevant virtue-call this the intrinsic motivation requirement. Not just

anyintrinsicmotivationwill do, however;twouldnotsuffice o make he

distributionor its own sake, in the way I do thingsfor their own sake

whenIdo themsimply orpleasure, s whereI swimsimplybecauseI likedoing it. Aristotle eemstorequirehatI decideonthe actiononthebasisof a conceptionof it as, say, ust,orasrenderingach a deserved hare,oras something lse thatconnectsmydeedwith usticeas an element nmycharacter. his intrinsicmotivation equirements confirmedthoughnot

entailed) by his third condition: that one must act from a firm and

unchanging haracter.f Jack is usuallymotivatedby greed but,aftera

movingmoralexhortationroma colleague,passesinto a temporaryustdisposition, hen even if Jack'sresulting ust behaviour owarda hated

rivalmeetsthe otherconditions,t doesnotexpress he virtueof justice.Call this the characterrequirement:irtues are elements of character;those elementsare"firmandunchanging"; ence,an action from virtuemustbe froman elementwith theappropriatentrenchmentndstability.

Some of the deontologicalcounterparts f these requirements eemimplicit n Kant'sconceptionof actingfromduty.3Actingfromduty, or

him,seemsnecessary oractingfrom moral virtue.If we mayconceive

good will as roughlythe mastervirtue,thispointis easily explained,at

leastin so far as actingfromduty is a case of acting from good will. AI Kant ays,e.g., "virtue ignifiesa moral trength f will ... the moral trength

of a manswill [asopposed othatof a "superhuman"eing] n fulfillinghisduty,a moralnecessitation by his ownlegislativereason n so faras reason tself con-stitutesa power of executing the law."See the "Introductiono the DoctrineofVirtue"1964, p. 66,A. 404).



452 RobertAudi

stronger equirementor Kantian ction romduty s suggestedby Kant'ssecondprincipleof morality:"Anactionperformedromduty does nothave its moralworth nthepurposewhich is to be achieved hrough tbut

in the maximbywhich it is determined"p. 400). Taken n thecontextofhis examples, hisrequirementuggeststhatKantconceives actionfrom

dutyas motivated olely by a commitmento a suitableprincipleof duty.

Evenpromoting ne's happiness romdutymust be grounded n a com-mitment o thedutyof so doing,andnot thehappinesso be achieved p.399). This positionparallelsAristotle's ntrinsicmotivation equirement.If we suppose hat action on a maximrequiresa decision favouring hatactionover one or morealternatives,henKant, ikeAristotle,wouldhavea selectionrequirementn actingfromdutyandtherebyon actingfrom

moralvirtue.

One thesis of Kant's, however, has no exact counterpartin the

NicomacheanEthics:"asanactfromdutywhollyexcludesthe influenceof inclination .. nothing remainswhich can determine he will objec-tively exceptthelaw,andnothing ubjectively xceptpurerespect orthispractical aw" (p. 401). This exclusiveness requirement ules out anymotiveother handutyas actuallymotivatingan actiontrulyperformedfromduty. Aristotle does not say that an action cannot expressvirtue

unlessnothingelse (i.e., nothingbesideselements n the virtue)playsapartin motivating t, thoughhe might perhapshave said, what Kant'soverallpositionseemed to allow Kantto say,thatan actionpurelyfrom

virtuemustmeetthe exclusiveness equirement.shallreturn othis ques-tion.4

Aristotle's electionrequirementmaysoundpsychologicallyunrealis-

tic, but I do not thinkhe shouldbe readas holding hata virtuousaction

mustarise romapieceof deliberation.oronething,hestresses hathabit

is requiredo developvirtue,andhe allows thatacting romvirtuecanbe

an expressionof habit;it can even be a habitualaction.Moreover,he

describes hegrammarians ananalogueof thevirtuousagent: he"way"the formerproducesa grammatical equenceis to producesomething"expressinghegrammaticalnowledge hat s inus"(1105a25);presum-

ably,Aristotleconceived suchknowledgeas capableof yieldingaction

quicklyandwithoutourconsidering lternatives. imilarly,Kant'snotion

4 Fordiscussionof someof thepossiblekindsof mixedmotivation nd someof Kant's heoreticaloptionsconcemingthem,see Audi (1989, ch. 3). I would

add,on thebearingof thecategoricalmperative,hat(1) we surelyneed not betreatingpeoplemerelyas means,or failingto treat hem as ends,if we actjustlytoward hembothfromajust characternd from ove; (2)perhaps n such a caseonemightstillregardhe relevantmaximof the actionas oneformulablen termsof the ust motivealone.Themotiveofjusticemighthavetobenotonlysufficientbutprimary elative o thatof love;but even thenthe motiveof love couldplayasignificantmotivationalole.




of maxims from whichwe act does not seem to.require heir conscious

rehearsal eforeaction.Granted,n reconstructinghe genesis of an action

with a view tojudgingthataction,Kant maginesagentscarefully ormu-

latingmaxims aswith his famous ourexamples);buthe does not require

this kind of reflection or acting from duty in general.It may sometimes

be neededto determine ne'sduty,but not forsimplyactingfroma grasp

of what thatduty is, as where t is obviousthatone is to tell the truth.5

2. The motivationand range of actionfrom virtue

Myown accountof acting romvirtuepresupposesome of whatAristotle

andKantsay,extendsotherpointsthey make,andsets forthrequirements

not containedn their reatments f thetopic.Ibeginwiththequestionsof

intentionality, eliberateness,nd voluntariness.

An action that,undera given description, s performed romvirtue,

must at leastnormallyalso be intentionalunder hatdescription.6To be

sure, if I do somethingknowinglybut not intentionally, s where,on a

weekendvisit, I benefitone childas a foreseenbutnot intendedconse-

quenceof giving its siblinga Ping-Pongset, I am not acting merely naccordancewitha relevantvirtue,say generosity.My benefiting he sec-

ond child is not merely fortuitous; nd moreimportant,his predictable

resultof my generositymightbebothanincentive owardmy actingfrom

thatvirtueagainandan indicationhatIhavedonesomethingromvirtue.

A deednot done fromvirtuemaystill be at oncea resultof virtue,a nat-

uralsignof it,and denticalwithan action hat,underanotherdescription,

is performedromvirtue.

An action fromvirtuemay,however,be intentionalwithoutbeing pre-meditatedor even deliberaten the strongsense thatimplies underlying

deliberation. erhapsnsomeplacesKantconceivedaction romvirtueas

emerging rompiecesof practical easoningand,on thatground,consid-

I For a defence, see Audi (1989, ch. 3). Note that Aristotle's termprohairesisis usually translated as "decision", when Aristotle himself describes it as "delib-erative desire" (1 13alO). Meyer calls it "the desire most importantto virtue andvice of character"(1993, p. 24). Cf. Broadie (1991, pp. 78-9). If it is any kind ofdesire, "decision" is not quite the right word, since, unlike desires, decisions aremade and are events in the ordinary sense entailing change.

6 Even qualified by "normally"this point may be too strong. If a humble per-son characteristically and "automatically"does not intervene in an argument be-tween parties who, though competent, know less about the topic, might this beboth an action from humility and non-intentional? Supposing the answer is af-firmative, it still appears that an action from virtue must have some descriptionunder which it is performedfrom virtue and intentional, e.g. avoiding the appear-ance of instructing people.



454 Robert Audi

eredsuchactiondeliberaten thestrongsense.7Dependingon thecondi-

tions for actingon the basis of practicalreasoning,suchdeliberateness

mightbeentailedby Kantian ction romvirtue. prefer oconceiveprac-

tical reasoningas possiblewithoutsuchdeliberation,orinstancewhereone seeks a means, reasons nstrumentallyo the conclusion hat it will

achieve one's end, andconcludes n favouror it, butneverweighs anyalternative.8

Thematterof voluntarinesss moredifficult. f "having o do" some-thing,sayreprimand friend,because t is a duty, s a case of not doing it

voluntarily,henobviouslyactingfromvirtueneed not be voluntary.Let

us call thisdiscretional involuntariness: you act not atyourpleasurebut

becauseyou "must"; et you do something hatis "upto you".By con-trast,volitional involuntariness, the kind reflex "actions"exemplify,bypassesthe motivationalystem, "thewill".Discretionalvoluntariness

maybe set aside as clearlynotnecessary oractingfromvirtue,whereasvolitionalvoluntarinesss necessary:actions from an inescapableduty

may expressvirtue, nthatspecialway impliedby actingfromduty; nvol-

untary"actions" onotgo throughone's will andcannotexpressvirtue.

The more difficult ssue is lack of voluntarinesswingto (non-moral)

compulsion-coercive involuntariness. If,under hreat, amcompelled o

keepapromise,canmykeeping tbe done fromvirtue,sayfromfidelity?One would thinknot;but thereis at least one hard case. Supposethat

although wouldkeepthepromiseowingtothethreat, wouldalsodoso

fromduty,andeach reason igures n me as anactual,causallysufficient

motiveforthedeed.Mightwe saythat heaction sperformedpartlyrom

virtue?Arguably,tcanexpressvirtue n therightway; tsimplyexpressesfearaswell. This s apermissive iew,allowingboth hatactions romvir-

tuebeheterogeneouslymotivated nd hatmotivesof virtuenot be neces-

saryconditions or theagent'sperformingheactin question.Onemightinsteadhold the strongview thatthemotive of virtuemustbe at leasta

necessaryconditionfor the action.(Therethe elementsof compulsionwould not be sufficient: f the compulsivepressurewould not succeed

without hecooperationf the virtuousmotive, hen heaction s not com-

pelled.)Kantwouldprobablyequire tillmore: hatamotiveof dutyoper-ateas bothnecessaryandsufficientn theactualgrounding f theaction.

Boththepermissiveand hestrongviewhave someplausibility,houghthestrongview is less plausiblewhenseparated romcompulsion, ince

compulsionmaybe felt to beapre-emptive rather hanmerelycooperating

7 Kant's amous ourexamples n Sc. 2 of theFoundations, specially n theirfirstoccurrencentendedo illustrate niversalizationf maxims,wouldbeacasein point.

8 A possibilityargued or in Audi(1989, ch. 5). Cf. Broadie 1991, pp. 85-9).



Acting From Virtue 455

motive, eliminating rather han enhancing the effect of any virtuous

motivethat s alsonecessary or the same action.I doubt hatcompulsion

mustbe pre-emptive;9n anycase, the wisest course s to allowdifferent

degrees o which actionsmaybe performedromvirtue,and hencepro-gressively tronger onceptions f acting romvirtue.Actionsmaybe per-

formed wholly fromvirtue when no other kind of motive cooperates;

partly rom virtuewhen anotherkinddoes; and,in this mixedcase, they

maybe performedromvirtue o variousdegreesdepending ntherelative

weightsof thearetaicandnon-aretaicmotives n producing rsustaining

theaction.Thenotionof sustenance s crucial,especially oractionsand

activities-which I amnotheredistinguishingromactions-that take a

significantamountof time,such as givinga lesson as a fulfilmentof thedutyto instruct.Self-interest nddutycould alternate s sustainers, nd

an actionI amperformingromdutyatone momentmightbe performedfromself-interest t the next.Thispossibility s not ruledoutbyAristotle's

character equirement;oreven a firmlyentrenched irtueneed notpre-

empt a quite different, independentmotive that is aligned with it.

Entrenchment f a trait n one's characters onething;exclusivityof its

motivational nfluenceon a givenaction s quiteanother.

Perhaps ven morethanKant,Aristotleexpresseswhat seemsa strong

requirement n the contentof the motivationunderlyingan action fromvirtue.WhenAristotle aysof anaction romvirtue hatone must"decide

on it for its own sake",he may appearo be implying hat f anaction s

virtuous undera description,the agent must decide on it under that

description orunder hecorrespondingoncept, he oneexpressedby the

relevantdescription-the requirement ouldnot belinguistic).Butsurely

his examplesandoveralldiscussionallowa widerreading:heremustbe

some descriptionof the action relevant o the virtue suchthat(roughly

speaking)the agentdecideson the action on account of its fittingthatdescription.This thesis needs bothqualificationndexplication.'0

If decidingon an action mplies selecting t fromamongoptions, hen

the view thatanactionfromvirtuemustbe decidedupon-the selection

requirement-seemsmistaken.Thereneedbe no question n the agent's

mindof options,e.g. of alternativeso givingeachneedypersonanequal

9Whatchieflymakes t seem so is thatfortypicalcompulsions heagentwillbe preoccupiedwith, e.g., avoiding he threatenedonsequence; utpreoccupa-tion with one motivating cenarioneed not be proportionateo its impacton ac-

tion: people can do things mainly for prestige or money while stressing tothemselvesandothers hat hey areactingfromcharityor friendship.

I0Cf.theview,commonlyattributedo Aristotle, hat"Our ational ctions in-cludingactions romvirtue]are heactionswe perform ecausewe think heywillcontributeo our happiness"Meyer 1993, p. 25). Rationalaction s subordinateto ourdesire or happiness, ut I doubtAristotle mplies hatall such action s di-rectlyaimedat it. For a defence,see Audi (1989, ch. 1).



456 RobertAudi

amount f rice.If Aristotle'spoint s that he action s in some sense"cho-

sen," t isprobablyrue,atleast f simplychoosing o do somethings dis-

tinguished rom choosingit fromamongalternatives.But if decidingon

anaction mplieseither ts priorconsiderationr, especially, ts selectionfromone or morealternatives,hendeciding s not necessary or action

fromvirtue.

The largerquestionhereis nothowthe elementsunderlyinghe action

interactn the mindto produceor sustain hataction,butwhatthose ele-

mentsare.What s it thatmakesa descriptionelevant o the virtue n the

rightway. That is, what reason-indicatingdescriptionof a would-be

actionfromvirtue s such that f oneperformshe actionfor a reason he

descriptionndicates, henit is anactionfrom he virtue n question?Nonameof thevirtueneed occurin the description;my equaltreatment f

thosein mycarecanbe intentional nddonefrom usticeevenif I donot,

internallyor aloud,describeor conceiveit specificallyasjust. Mustthe

description ntail hat he action s of thekindthat"bydefinition"maybe

saidto instantiatehevirtue,e.g. justice(asthatvirtueapplies o action)?

I thinknot.Foronething, t is enough f there s astrongpresumption,ay

a strongprobabilityhat ustice is servedby proportioninghe pay one

givesto severalhourlyco-workerso their imeonthe ob;thedescriptionof thisact wouldnotbe, by definition, caseofjustice (notaneasycon-

dition to satisfynon-trivially,n anycase).Foranother, n action canbe

donefromvirtuewhenthere s only goodreason or theagentto believe

thatit meets an appropriateondition.Virtueallows for fallibility,and

although herearelimitsto how faroff themarkone canbe, actionfrom

virtue s consistentwithsome degreeof "unavoidable"rror.

Justwhat s requirednthe virtuous gent'sconceptionof theaction, f

thataction s tobeperformedromvirtue?Theproblems tocapturewhat

I shall call areta-iconnectedness,he connectionbetween heactionand

theagent'sbeliefs anddesires, hatwe mustclarify n order o understand

actionfrom virtue.Perhapst is in partthe difficultyof explicating his

specialconnection,as distinct rom hecommonlydiscusseddifficultyof

formulating ulesfor virtuousaction,that led Aristotle,and leadsother

virtuetheorists, o tryto understandirtuousaction,in the sense of the

kind of actionappropriateo a virtuousagent, n termsof what is conso-

nantwith virtuous haracter,s opposed o understandinguchagents n

terms of dispositions o performa kindof actionspecifiable ndepend-

entlyof thevirtue, ayintermsof thecategoricalmperative,heprinciple

of utility,orRoss'sprima acie duties.Doingtherightkindof deedin the

wrongway is not virtuous,even if the deed is just the one requiredby

soundprinciples.




Wemightbegin,inthespiritofAristotle,with theidea that herelevant

rangeof descriptionss of a kindby which a personof practicalwisdom

would, nexercisingvirtue,be motivated, ndthat hesewill fall onsome

dimension from excess to deficiency.This is vague, but if we try toachievespecificitynsomeof thestandard ays,we encounteralsehood;

e.g., notjust any description mplying hatthe actionmaximizeshuman

happinesswill serve:one couldwantto dothe deedfor thewrongkindof

reason and therebyfail to qualify, at the time, as a (morally) virtuous

agent.Forinstance,beingmotivatedby considerationsf aggregatehap-piness might ead one to makean optimificbut inequitable istribution f

rewardso employees.Moreover, irtue heorists,at least,seem commit-

ted to denying hataretaic onnectedness anbe captured y descriptionswhich, in the light of rules(such astheprincipleof utility),determine he

appropriatection.

One mightthinkthat a Kantianapproacho actingfromvirtuecould

lead us to a solution of the aretaicconnectednessproblem.But if that

approachs to be morethanschematic,t musttakeus froman accountof

action froma morally acceptablemaximto an accountof actingfrom

someappropriatelyelatedvirtue.Itmightbe argued hat all Kantianism

needs here is a notion of actingfrommoralvirtueconceived as dutiful-

ness, andit matters ittle how we distinguish,say, the virtue of justice

from thatof fidelity,since, independentlyf theseterms,our overalleth-

ical theorywill requirehe sameactions nany givencircumstancealling

for moral decision.But thishigh-handed pproachwould leave us with

too thin a theoryof how to describe,credit,criticize,and even educate,

people morally.Even if all we caredaboutweregettingpeopleto do the

right thingfromsome appropriatemoralreason,we must surelyteach

moralityntermsof morespecificcategories-and quitepossibly nterms

of the"departments"f moralityhat hevirtuescanbetaken orepresent.I believe, then,thatfor both normativeandanalyticalpurposeseven a

well-developedKantian thicsneedsa betterwayof clarifyinghe notions

of virtueandof actionfrom t.

3. Thecognitive and motivationalgrounding of actionfrom

virtue

I want now to proposean accountof acting from virtuebuilt around ix

notions,correspondingosituational, onceptual, ognitive,motivational,

behavioural, ndteleologicaldimensionsof such action.These dimen-

sionsare,first, he ield of a virtue,roughly he kindof situation n which



458 RobertAudi

it characteristicallyperates; econd,the characteristicargets t aims at,suchas thewell-beingof others n thecase of beneficenceandthe control

of fearin the case of courage; hird,the agent'sunderstanding f that

field; fourth, he agent'smotivation o act in thatfield in a certainway,where hatway is appropriateo thevirtue; ifth,theagent'sactingonthe

basis of thatunderstandingndmotivation; ndsixth,thebeneficiaries f

thevirtue,aboveall (andperhaps olely)theperson(s)whoproperlyben-

efit from our realizingit: forbeneficence,other people in general;for

charitableness,he needy;forfidelity, amilyandfriends;etc. Thesesix

notionsarespeciallyappropriateo explicating ction romvirtue and, o

a lesser extent, action from emotions and vices), as opposed to actions

from very different ortsof dispositions, .g. boredom, atigue,and mis-apprehension.None of thoseactionshas, forinstance,a distinct ield or

target, houghemotions, uch as love (of onekind)mayalso have benefi-

ciariesor, like vices, characteristicufferers, uch as the victimsof pas-

sionate anger;and with fatigue, at least, while the "from" s (as in

combinationwith action-locutionsn general) explanatory,t does not

implywhat it most often does with those locutions:a motivationalxpla-

nation. Let us firstconsider he field of a virtue.

The field ofjustice mightbe roughlyretribution ndthedistribution f

goodsandevils;thatof fidelitymightbe conductrequired y explicitor

implicit promises;andso forth. Such fields may overlapother aretaic

fields,buteach hassome distinctive eature(s).Howdoesa virtuousper-sonunderstandhe fieldof, e.g., fidelity? t wouldbenaturalortheappro-

priateunderstandingo manifest tself inbelievingthatpromisescreatea

duty okeepthem, hatworkingwithothersgenerates bligationsothem,

andso on. Butsupposesomeonedidnotusetheconceptsof dutyorobli-

gation(atleasthere)andthought implythat t is good to keeppromises

andgoodtocriticizepeoplewho do not.Avirtuouspersoncouldbe skep-tical aboutmoralconceptsor thinkthemindistinguishablerom aretaic

concepts ngeneral.We canimaginesomeonewho, uponmakingaprom-

ise, wants to keepit becausethatis appropriateo humanrelationships,

and tendsto feel disapproval f anyonewho doesnotkeeppromises,on

theground hatthe behaviour s inappropriateo suchrelationships.And

of course,a personmightwantto keep a promisebecausepromise-keep-

ing is commanded y God.A moral ield cannotbe understoodwithouta

I I thank he Editor or drawingmyattention o this contrastwhichdeservesindependent laboration n another ccasion).I mustalso forgoaddressing on-trastsbetweenactionsfromvirtueand(certain)actionsfromvice (e.g. slovenli-ness) and fromemotion (e.g. anxiety).Still, some of whatis said below aboutaction romvirtue houldhelp nclarifying ction romvices andemotions,espe-cially wherethe latter s intentional nd to the extentthatvices or emotionsareconstituted y desiresor beliefs orcombinationshereof.



ActingFromVirtue459

senseof its (moral)normativity, utthat sense is notrestricted ithertovirtueconcepts(asAristotlemay seemto imply) or to hedonicones (assomeutilitarianserhapsend to think)or to deontologicalprinciples as

Kantiansmay tend to think).It does appear hattherearesome generalrequirementsorunderstandingnymoral ield,e.g. thata kindof impar-tialitybe recognizedas necessary, hatthewell-being of peoplemustbegiven someweight,andthattherelevantnormsbe, if not "designed"ooverrule elf-interest,hencapableof conflictingwithit. 2 Itmay be thataction romvirtuerequires n exerciseof somenormative oncept, f onlythatofwhat s insomeappropriate ay good orbad;andcertainlyhe pos-sessionof a virtueentailsa recognitional apacity.A loyalperson,e.g.,musthave a sense of when toactin support f friends: his is partof what

it is to understandhefield of a virtue,and without t one wouldnot actfromvirtue.But neitherthis specialrequirementorunderstandinghefield of a virtuenor the generalrequirementsor comprehensionof amoral ieldentail hataction romavirtuemusthaveanyparticularmotiveamongthoseappropriateo its field.

With all this in mind,we can see thataretaicconnectednessneednotproceed hrough nydirectapplication f a moralor even a virtueconcept(thoughthis apparently oes not holdfor all normative oncepts).This

pointbearsespeciallyon themotivational imensionof actingfrom vir-tue. Most important,actionfrom a given virtueneed not be internallymotivated,.e. (roughly),performedroma desire to realizethat virtue.Let me clarifythisby example irst, henin general erms.SupposeI seetwo childrendividingapples heyhave ustpicked,andI notice that heirpickingsare aboutequal.I see one childtake far morethanhalf, andI

wantto intervene.I do so in order o persuade he greedyone to shareequally. maysee thispersuasion sjust;butI mayalso see it as appro-priateto theirsimilarinvestmentsof time andenergy;as imposingon

them the way civilizedpeopleshouldtreateach other;as affirming heequalityof the two as persons;as promotingharmonybetweenthem;orin othernormativeways appropriatelyonnectedwithjustice. If I am

12 Oneproblems how to characterizehemoralpointof view. Fordiscussionof this see Kurt Baier's book of that title (1958); Frankena 1973); and Gert(1988). I assume hat ustas one cantakethemoralpointof view even if onere-gards t as derivative romthatof rationality, eople can take the moralpointofview even if they considermoral tandardsheologically rounded, nd hat hereis thusaway to conceivedivinecommandso thatobedience othemcan bemor-

ally,not ustreligiously,motivated.A similarproblems how to squarehepossi-bility of conflicts betweenmoralityand self-interestwith the kindof egoismapparentlymplicit n Aristotleandotherswho offera plausibleethicaltheoryfromegoistic startingpoints.Thebeginningof an answer s that forAristotle,while moralvirtue s essential o ourflourishing ndhencemoralconduct endsto serveself-interest,ong-run elf-interest associaldimensions ndcantherebyconflictwithmoraldemands.



460 RobertAudi

motivated o intervene nthe basis of anyof theseconceptions,myactionseemssuitably onnectedwith ustice for meto countasacting rom t:inthefirstcase theconceptofjusticeappliesdirectly,nthe others onplau-

sibleassumptions)ndirectly.fI actfromanyof thesemotives,I actfromjustice and, f theyareproperly roundednmy character,romvirtue.3

Wecan discern, hen, wowaysinwhich,on thebasis of anunderstand-ingof thefieldof a virtue,anagentcan act from t:directlyand ndirectly.Both notions which we might pair with direct and indirectaretaicgrounding-need explication.I act directlyfrom,say,justice providedthat,first,an adequate onceptof justice(whether woulduse thewordornot) figurescentrallynniymotivation;econd, hecontentof mymoti-

vation s appropriateojustice,as whereIwanttocompensate victim ofwrongdoing; ndthird, hemotivationtself,e.g. a desireto treatpeopleequally ndistributivematters,s properly roundednmycharacter. actindirectlyrom usticewhenanadequateubsidiaryoncept,suchas fair-ness, is motivationallyentral n thatway,orwhere(a) mymotivation s

appropriatelyubsumable nder herelevantvirtueconceptor a subsidi-aryone,saywhereI actinorder o dividethechildren'sakings naccord-ance with theirefforts,and (b) the relevantmotivation has a specificcontentappropriateojusticeand is sufficiently onnectedwith the rele-

vantaretaic lements o groundheaction n them.(Themotivation f anactionfromvirtueneednot,however,be a standing lement n theagent,e.g. a long-termcommitmentto the moraleducation of children,as

opposed o adesirerespondingo aunique ituation.)Thesecond, ndirectcase is morecomplicated.Suppose hatneed,in addition o effort, s cru-cial forthe usticeof thedivision nquestion;henmy(exclusive)concernwith equalityof effortwill not sufficeto subsume,under he conceptof

justice, my attempto distributen accordwitheffort: am too far offthe

mark.I mightqualifyas trying to act from ustice,and even as comingclose;butthere s a limittohow muchone canmisunderstandhe featuresof a situation elevant o avirtueand still countas acting rom hatvirtueas opposed o unsuccessfullyrying o do therelevantkind of action.

Oneway to give a theoretical ccountof acting ndirectly romvirtueis to assume hatanaction'sbeingperformedromvirtuesupervenesonnatural roperties f theaction,or atleastonsome setofproperties nder-lyingitsvirtuousness. he ideawouldbe thatan action romvirtue s suchbecause of itsmorebasicproperties,uch as beingmotivatedby a belief

that hechildren houldhavesharesof applesproportionateotheireffortsin pickingthem.Thesuggestion s meant o be minimallycontroversial,

II Actingfrom usticewouldbeacting ortherelevant eason.Actingfor area-son is a complicatednotionwhich I presupposehere;an accountof it, andap-praisalof otheraccounts, s given inmy (1986).




andforanyonewho finds he notionof supervenience nhelpfulwe could

also putthepoint n termsof adependence f the virtuousness f anaction

on otherproperties f it.Thus,even an ntuitionistwho thinks hat heobli-

gationof beneficencesnormatively asiccouldallowthatan actioncouldbeperformedfromeneficencewhenmotivated y propertiesf the action

that are,for the agent,psychologicallymorebasic than its beneficence.

The agentmight,e.g., conceivethe actionthat n factis performedrom

beneficence,notintermsof beneficencebutsimplyas relievingsuffering.

It is difficult o specifyin a generalway what properties re basic to an

actionfromvirtue,butsuppose or thesake of argumenthat,say,gener-

osityin an actionsupervenes n its character sagivingof something ol-

untarilyandin the(reasonable) eliefthat t will benefit herecipient asopposed o givingit froma sense that t is owed).We can now saythatan

action s indirectly roundedn a virtueprovidedt is notdirectlygrounded

in it butis basedon the agent'sbelieving he action ohave a suitable ub-

set of the basepropertiesor thatvirtue thoughnotnecessarilyunder his

or any other technicaldescription).Roughly, he difference s between

aimingat the targetof the virtueunder he relevantaretaicconceptand

aimingatit under omeappropriateescriptionramed n termsof thebase

properties f actionfrom hatvirtue.This need not be all of thoseproper-

ties:if Carolgivesmoretimeto students hanshe thinks heydeserve, norder o teachthemmore,thismaybe enough o qualifyherpedagogical

actionsasperformedromgenerosity.Butone canactfromavirtuebyact-

ingfrom tsgroundswithouthaving hatveryvirtue n mind.This is apat-

terncharacteristicf indirectaretaicgrounding.

The case of generosityraises the questionwhether, or some virtues,

indirect retaicgroundings theonlykindpossible.Suppose giveaPing-

Pongset to a child,not in order o benefit hechild,butsimplybecause,

afteryearsof preferringhesibling,I want to behavegenerously owardthischild. Can his actbeperformedromgenerosityand herebydirectly

groundedn it)?Actingfromgenerosity s surelynot entailedby acting

froma desire to be generous.Even if one has this virtue,one mightbe

insteadacting or thewrongkindof reason, hough naccordwiththevir-

tue.Surelymy actionhere,unlikeajustdeed performedroma desireto

bejusttoward hose concerned,would not be anactionfromvirtueat all

and so would not exhibitdirectaretaicgrounding.'4

14 This sortof problems insightfullydiscussedbyWilliams 1985, pp. 10-1).He has suggested in conversation)hat ustice is one virtuesuchthataction romit mustbe intemallymotivated. usticedoes seemthebestcandidate or a virtuemeeting his condition,butI doubt hat t does-unless, perhaps,we restrict t toa specifickind,e.g. the "trait" f being retributivelyust (Broadie1991, p. 88). Ifwe construe ny traitnarrowly nough,actions rom t will be correspondinglye-stricted s to appropriate otivation.



462 RobertAudi

Suppose,however, hatI givethePing-Pong et bothbecauseI wantto

benefit he childfor ts own sakeandbecause want o behavegenerously.

Perhaps may now be acting from virtue thoughnot purely so. This

wouldbe a case of partialdirectaretaicgrounding.The actionwould alsobe performedn the service of virtue, since I act partly from a second

orderproattitudeowardgenerosity. uchhigherorderattitudes re,how-

ever,notnecessary orhavingvirtue,nordoes acting rom hementailact-

ing from virtue.Acting froma virtue requirespromotingor otherwise

properlydealingwith certainelements n its field-its beneficiaries, ay

childrenor the needy or the oppressed,where the beneficiaries igure n

thetargetof thevirtue.Acting ntheserviceof a virtuerequires romoting

the virtue.Doingthatmayaffect he beneficiariesittle or notatall.Thereis no need to explicatehereall the categories hese pointsbringout. It is

enoughto haveprovideda framework ordoingthatand to have shown

thatanaction'sbeingexplicitlydirected owardpromoting virtue s nei-

thernecessarynor sufficient orits constituting ctingfromvirtue.

The distinctionbetweendirectand ndirectgroundingn virtue s neu-

tralbetween Kantianand Aristotelianconceptionsof virtue andacting

therefrom:tapplieswhether irtuesare nternalizationsf independentlyknowablemoral(or other)principlesorwhether,on the contrary,moral

(or other)principles reknowableonlyasgeneralizationsrom he behav-iour of people with virtues of character.The distinction s also neutral

with respect o the problemsof cooperatingmotives nethical heory.My

conceptionof actingfromvirtuedoes notrequire hatone be motivated

solely by the relevant aretaicground(s),the ground(s) appropriateo

actionfrom hatvirtue.Thisexclusivityof motivation s required nlyfor

actingpurelyromvirtue. fone acts fromboth oveanda senseofjustice,

one doesnotactpurely rommoralvirtue;but ove is notacompanionhat

mustprevent,as opposedto outshining,one's actingfromthe virtueofjustice.

Imagine, however, thatby contrast with a cooperatingnon-moral

motive,I haveafurther reason;e.g., I ampersuadinghegreedychildren

to shareequally,not for itsownsake butin order o promotehumanhap-

piness,or in order o abideby thewill of God.Thereare at least two rel-

evantpossibilities bothalsoapplicableo non-moral irtues): irst, hatI

takethe further nd to bemorallyrelevant, .g. to be anappropriate oral

groundof theaction,andsecondly, hatI take he further ndto be an ade-

quategroundbut have no moralconceptionof how this is so. Inthe first

case,we couldsaythat he ultimate nd ofmyaction s moral;and n partin thelightof such cases wemightadoptwhatI shall callthemoralmoti-

vation thesis: that an action from(moral)virtuemust be morallymoti-

vated, houghnot always ntrinsicallyomotivated, .g. performedor the



ActingFromVirtue 463

sake of justice.Heremy actionservesa moralend, butnot directly,"initself'; if it is from,e.g., justice, it need not be internallymotivated,although t wouldbe motivatedby someconsiderationonsonantwith an

aretaicallynternalmotive, such as to rectifyanunequaldistribution.The secondcasesuggestsa moralconnectionhesis: hatgiven a suita-

ble immediatemotive connected n therightway withthe moralfield ofthevirtue, he actioncanbeperformedrom hatvirtueeven if theaction'sultimate motivationis not moral.'"Acting ultimatelyfromlove, e.g.,seemsconsonantwithacting(partly) rom ustice,provided he immedi-atemotivationof the action is of the rightkind, say a determinationotreatpeopleequally.This wouldbe abeneficent,perhapsa natural,kindofjustice.6 If naturalusticeexists,it showsthatactionfromvirtueneednot be fromasinglevirtue-a pointthat s inanycaseimplicit nthepos-sibility of actingat once from,say, courageandjustice, as where onejustly andcourageously eniesan unfairrequestmadeby anintimidatingemployee.

Themoralmotivation hesisseemsplausible: t appears haracteristicof acting rommoralvirtue hat heagentactatleast ndirectlyroma suit-able moralmotive. The moralconnection hesis,whichdenies thatevenultimatemoralmotivation s necessary oractionfromvirtue,alsoseems

plausible,but is hardero assess (thereare of coursecounterpartretaicconnectionandmotivationheses,norshouldwe presuppose sharpdis-tinctionbetween moral andothervirtues).Whatif moralobligation srooted n (non-moral) onsiderations f happiness, r in God'swill, con-ceivednon-morally?f this is possible,then t shouldbepossiblefor con-siderations f humanhappiness r of divinewill to groundmoralactions,andhence to be ultimate, ndependentmotives for actions fromvirtue.Perhapswe mustallowthatpossibility f we areto have anaccountof act-ing fromvirtueneutralwithrespect o all ofthemajormoral heories.For

supposethat a hedonistic or divine commandview of the groundsofmoralitys correct.Why,then,couldI not be actingfrommoralvirtue fI ammotivatedbyhedonicconsiderations,rbydivinecommand, ven if

II An immediatemotiveis one that heaction s performeddirectly) n orderto satisfy,as whereonedrinks imply o slakethirst;but onecould drink o rehy-drate hebody,whichone does in tumto avoidsuffering. f one does notavoidsufferingn order o satisfya still furthermotive, this (self-protective)motiveisultimate.Motivationalhainscan be long, so that heconnectionbetweenanac-tionanda virtueultimatelygroundingt maybe extended; ndsince the (direct)

in-order-toelation s non-transitiveinthesensethatonecanA inorder o B andB inorder o C,yetnotA inorder o C), anaction'sultimatemotivesneed notun-derlie t intheway its immediatemotivesdo.

16 Thiscontrastswiththeaustereprincipledkind of justiceKantwouldhaveus cultivateandact from.He is not,however,committed o treating cting fromvirtueas somethingwe cando "atwill",nor is therea directdutyto satisfythisdescription.



464 RobertAudi

I see no connectionbetween hosemotivesandmoralityas such(perhaps

becauseI simplydo not operate,directlyat least,with moralcategories)?

I am, afterall, actingfromthe groundsof suchvirtue,andto thisextent

one might regardmy actionas (indirectly)aretaicallygrounded.Therewouldthusbea connection,whichI could come to see,betweenmycon-

ceptionof the actionand moralvirtue; till, my actingfrommoralvirtue

wouldnot requiremy being, n any directway if in anyway at all, morally

motivated.

Therightconclusion odrawheremaybe that t is simplynotclearhow

narrowlywe shouldconstrue cting rommoralvirtue or acting romvir-

tue simpliciter). t is best to distinguisha narrower nd broadernotion:

Onemightholdthat n the case of actingultimately or a non-moralpur-pose, sayfroma desire o treat omeone ovingly, heagent, f actingfrom

a moralvirtue, s nonethelessnotdoingso in a moralway.Perhaps o;but

must we requireof all actionsfroma moralvirtue hattheymustbe per-

formed na moralway? If acting romvirtuewereequivalentoactingforthesakeof it (in somesensesof thisphrase), hatmightbe so;butacting

forthe sake of virtue s notnecessary oractingfrom t.Thisappliesboth

to actingfor the sakeof thevirtuepromotionally, s whereone tries to

enhance he amountof honesty n theworld,andto actingfor the sake of

it acquisitionally, swhereoneactstotryto produce he virtue n oneself.

Thelattercase showsthatactingforthe sake of a virtue s also not suffi-

cientfor actingfrom t.

We should add,then,to the distinctionamongdegreesof acting from

virtuewhichemergewhen we consider he cooperation f virtuouswith

non-virtuousmotives, a distinctionbetween(a) acting,to any degree,

froma virtue, n theway(s) (conceptually peaking)mostclosely tied to

it as to the groundsof the action, particularlyn regard o the action's

beingconceivedin termsof the relevantconcept,e.g. justiceorfidelity,and(b) simplyactingfrom t insome otherwaythatmanifests hatvirtue.

Theformercases are most often foundamongactionsthat exhibitdirect

aretaicgrounding;ne actsbothfrom he virtueand na certainwayunder

the concept of it. The latter are most often foundamongactions that

exhibit ndirectaretaicgrounding; ne actsfromthevirtuebut not under

the conceptof it, only undersome suitablyconnectedconcept.Aristotle

sometimeshad nmind heformer, tronger otion-acting fromvirtue n

thewaymostcloselytied to itas to thegrounds f theaction;buthisover-all moral heory, ike themost plausiblevirtueandrule theories n ethics

generally, eaves roomfor the weakernotion.It is clear hat n eithercase

the actionis rooted n theagent n a way thatmakes it plausiblebothto

say,withAristotle,hat he actionexpressesvirtueasafeature f character

and,withKant,thatit manifestsgood will. These points, in turn,make



ActingFromVirtue 465

clearer an importantpoint suggested above: action from virtue, as

opposed o actionmerely n conformitywith virtue, s veryimportantn

appraising eople: the former,unlike the latter, s commonlya reliable

indication f theiraretaic haracter.'7

4. The moral scope of acting from virtue

In the light of theconnectionsnowapparent etweenvirtueconceptsand

moregeneralones,bothmoralandnon-moral,we canexplore he moral

scope of action fromvirtueand, nparticular, hetheractionfrommoralvirtue s sufficiently omprehensiveora morallyadequateife. Suppose

(artificially)hatone actedonlyfrommoralvirtue,andalwaysfromsome

moralvirtueappropriaten the circumstances.Would his suffice for liv-

ing a morallyadequateife?

An affirmative nswer s certainlyplausible,at least forthose views

thattake the possessionof the moralvirtues o be the internalizationf

some comprehensiveet of soundmoralstandards.f,however,we tryto

framea list of moralvirtues ntermsof whichto focusthequestion, hereis greaterdifficulty.One problem s gettinga sufficiently omprehensive

list of virtuesfromthemoraldomainalone:wouldjustice,fidelity,hon-

esty, andbeneficencebe sufficient,f broadlyconstrued, rmust we add

to theagent'srepertoire, ay, courageand even intellectual irtues,since

these seem requiredorrealizing he moralvirtueswheredangerproduces

fear, or where insufficientinformation hreatensto make reasonable

choiceimpossible?A moredifficultproblems howto coveraretaic con-

flicts: just as obligationsof beneficenceandfidelitycan conflict when

beneficentlyhelpingsomeonein distressrequiresbreakinga promise,a

virtuousagentcanbe pulledin two directionsby differentvirtuous en-

dencies.Herepracticalwisdom s requiredn the samewaythat, orRoss,

it seemsrequiredo deal withconflictsamongtheprima acie dutieshe

thoughtmorallyfundamental.'8Practicalwisdom is not a specifically

moralvirtuebutahigherorderoneapplicableo reflections nddecisions

concerningmoralandotherkindsof virtues. f, as is likely,it is required

for amorallyadequateife on thepartof anotherwise irtuous gent, hen

II Hume goes so far as to say it is the motive, not the action, hat (directly?)deservespraiseor blame Treatise,p. 477;cf. p. 464).

18 SeeespeciallyRoss(1939,ch.2).The sortsofproblems mergingnthe textmayindicateonereasonwhyAristotlemighthavethought he virtuesunified;re-flectionon the problems ertainly uggests hat na virtuouspersonat least manyvirtuesare interconnected, utthatby no meansrequires strongkindof unity.



466 RobertAudi

theexerciseof moralvirtuealoneis not sufficient or such a life, even if

theexerciseof virtue, overall, s.

To say,however, hatacting rommoralvirtue s not sufficientby itself

for a morallyadequateife does not entail that virtueethicsis not suffi-cient for the action-guidingask of normative thics.By virtueethicsI

meanroughly he kind of ethicalpositionaccordingo whichthefollow-

ing two ideasare central:irst, he fundamentalmoralconceptsare virtue

concepts,as opposed,aboveall, to ruleconcepts;andsecond,the basic

normative ims of moralagentsarearetaically etermined,nthe wayswe

haveseen, by the requirementsf actingfromvirtue,as opposed,say,to

beingdictatedby a commitmento followingcertaindeonticrules.Aris-

totlecan be read as holdingsucha view in someplaces, for instance nsayingthat

actionsare called ust ortemperatewhentheyare the sortthatajustortemperate ersonwoulddo. Butthe ustand emperate er-son is not onewho [merely]doestheseactions,buttheone whodoesthem n theway inwhich ustortemperate eopledo them.(1 105b6-9)19

Takenas a statement f virtue heoryasapplied othesetraits,hispassage

impliesthatwhatmakesanact,e.g.,just,is itsbeingthe kindajustperson

as such would performina certainway);we donot explicatewhatajustperson s by first dentifying ertain ypesof actsandthencharacterizing

thatkindof person ntermsof a suitabledispositionoperform cts of that

kind.20Thismetaphysical onceptionof virtue ethicsis consistentwith

takingpracticalwisdomor otherhigherordervirtuesas crucial ordirect-

ingthe virtuousagent n everydayife. Thus,a virtueethics s at least not

preventedon thatscore fromprovidinga basis for themorallyadequate

life.

Thereremains,however,a significant roblem.Evenif the notion of a

virtuous personis metaphysicallymore basic than that of a virtuous

action, here s theepistemological ifficulty f determining hat, or even

who, a morallyvirtuousperson s withoutalreadyknowingwhat sortsof

thing such an agentwould do. Canwe reasonably ake someone as a

modelofjusticeorfidelitywithout elyingon some ideaof whatdeedsare

appropriateo such a person? f not,how can a virtuetheoryever tell us

whatwe shoulddo, evenin the matterof buildingcharacter,f we do not

alreadyknow?OneAristotelianansweris thatif we know ourproper

functionand see how it is properly xercised, .e., so exercisedas to pro-19Cf. NE 1129a7-9,whichseemsat least to reverse heemphasis:"thestate

everyonemeans n speakingofjusticeis the state hatmakesus doersof just ac-tions".

20 A contemporaryefender f virtue heoryespecially ensitive o some of theconceptualproblemsarisinghere s JorgeGarcia e.g., Garcia1989,pp. 277-83).




ducea life of flourishing,we cansee howthe agent n question-the vir-

tuous agent-chooses in matters involving pleasureand pain, which

constitute he larger ield of moralvirtue. In roughterms, the virtuous

agentaimsattargetsappropriateo human lourishing ndacts so as tohita mean betweenexcess and deficiency.Suppose his is correct.There s

still a normativenotionbuilt ntoflourishing, ndthis would seem at best

difficult o discernwithouta senseof whatbehaviouralutcomes are obe

sought.Some such outcomesseem essentialfor hittingthe righttargets.

Are we happywhen merelycontent,ormustwe perform ertain ntellec-

tual, aesthetic,and physical askswith a certainkind of result?Are there

not intellectual tandards,uchas thoseof logicandmathematics,tleast,

thatmustbe broughto ouractivitiesasguideswithinwhichvirtuedevel-ops? (Aristotlehimself must have thoughtso, for he consideredphilo-

sophical contemplationthe highest happiness and surely saw it as

governedby logicalandepistemic tandards.)21

It is truethat once we haverolemodels,virtuecan be taughtby their

exampleand withoutantecedent propositional)tandards.Historically,

then,virtueethicsmightoperatendependentlyf ruleorothernon-virtue

accounts,such as intuitionism.But conceptually,virtue notions seem

dependent n othernormative oncepts.

This negativeconclusionmust not be overstressed. t remainsquite

possiblethatthe moral worthof actionsdependson theirbeing actions

from virtue:even if virtue concepts cannotby themselvestell us what

conductbefits us as moralagents,it maybe that the only (or the most)

morallycreditablewayto do thethings n question s fromvirtue.A sec-

ondmajormoralthesis is also left open:that eventhe moralworth-in

thesenseof goodness-of persons ies in theirvirtuous haracterorlack

of it).22Togetherhese theses constitutea virtuetheoryof moralworth,

andthey maybe regarded s partially xplicatingwhatit is for characterto be morallyfundamental.Thiskind of virtueethics is consistentboth

withKantianism nd with otherviews commonlycontrastedwith virtue

ethics whenthe latter s construed s embodyinga theoryof moralobli-

gation.23

21 Some of thelarge iteraturenAristotle's onception f happiness upportsmy points here. See, e.g., Cooper (1975); Kraut (1979); Maclntyre (1981);Broadie 1991); and Prior 1991).

22 Moralworth n the sense of dignity s a different, apacitynotion;but it is

related: t is largely hecapacity or good character.23 RegardingKant,wewouldhave o assume hatactions romduty,whichhave

moralworth,arealsoperformedromvirtue.Somepassages n Humesuggesthemightbe committed o thevirtue heoryof moralworth,e.g., "'Tisevident, hatwhen we praiseanyactions,we regardonly the motives thatproduced hem ...The externalperformance as no merit .. all virtuousactionsderivetheirmeritonlyfromvirtuousmotives,andareconsider'dmerelyas signsof thosemotives"



468 RobertAudi

If there s a conceptualdependence f virtueconceptson othernorma-

tive concepts, t does not indicatea one-waystreet.Anymoralruleswith

enoughspecificity o guide day-to-daybehaviour eed interpretationnd

refinemento be usefulin makingmoraldecisions.It couldturnout thatpracticalwisdom s indispensablenusingtheserules,and hatabasic ele-

ment in such wisdom is a tendency to seek a reflective equilibrium

betweenplausiblerules and virtuous nclinations.Eventhoroughgoing

virtue heorists angrant ulesaplace.Suchrulesasthey countenance re

generalizationsrom virtuousconduct, or instance romthe choices of

thephronimos, atherhan,say,formulae oroptimizingnon-moral ood

(as forutilitarianism),rspecifications f obligatory ct-types asforthe

Kantianradition).But these rulesstillhavea degreeof authority ndcan

override irtuous nclinationsn some cases.Atworst, he rulesarea gen-

eralizationrommanysuchinclinations, ndthese rulesmaythus imply

that nclinations onflictingwith themarearetaically eviant.Even mak-

ing virtuesconceptually undamental eed not makethemindefeasible

sourcesof moralauthority.Similarly, f one could specify the types of

actionsa virtuousagentshould n generalperform,practicalwisdomand

a virtuousdispositionwouldberequiredorapplyinghe relevant ules n

particular ases.

Conclusion

Onthe broadconceptionof acting romvirtuedevelopedhere, t is areta-

ically grounded ntentionalaction: t is action groundedn virtue either

directly, swhere heagentactsexplicitly nthelightof theconceptof the

virtue n question,orindirectly, s whereoneactson thebasis of a differ-entkind of considerationhat s suitably elevant o the virtue n termsof

its field andtarget.Suchaction s, then,fromvirtue nbeing explainedby

(1888, pp. 477-8). Evena utilitarian an holdthe virtue heoryof moralworth-thoughonly as a contingent ruth-since virtuous haracter, r itsproducing c-tions, need not contribute o intrinsicvalue.Frankena uggeststhat "a man andhis actionsaremorallygood if it is at least true hat,whateverhis actualmotivesin actingare, his senseof dutyor desire o dothe right s so strong n him that twouldkeephimtrying odohis dutyanyway"1973, p. 70).Thisdiffers rom hevirtue heoryof moralworth nat leasttwoways:the relevant ctionsneednot beperformedfromirtue(sincetheactualmotivesarenotcrucial);andthe contentof the relevantmotivation s bothspecificallymoraland indeedrestricted o thedeonticconceptof rightandduty. However, see nothing n Frankena'sverallposition hatrequires isholdingeither hefirst,permissive, hesisor thesecond,restrictive ne.)




beliefs and desiresproperlyconnectedwiththe appropriateretaicele-

mentsin character,ndit is virtuous both becauseof its connectionwith

thoseelementsand becauseof what kind of action it is. Thisconception

of actionfromvirtueprovidesa model forunderstanding oralaction n

general,conceived as actionhavingmoral worth: ust as action from

moralvirtuedoesnotrequireactingfor the sake of moralvirtue,and can

be grounded nlyindirectlyn it throughbeliefs andmotivation ppropri-ate to the moralvirtue in question,moralaction,even conceivednon-

aretaically, eednot beperformedor the sakeof a moralprinciple reven

as an applicationhereof,and can be grounded nly indirectly n sucha

principle.Moreover,herearedegreesto which onemayact fromvirtue,

dependingespeciallyon the extent to whichnon-virtuousmotives con-tribute o the actionin question.Themoralworthof an action can also

dependon the balanceamongmoralandnon-moral nfluenceson itsper-

formance, ndthispointapplies o non-virtue heoriesas well as to virtue

theories.

One of thelargestquestions aisedbythe accountof actingfromvirtue

presentedhere s whatvalues, f any,constrain hedevelopment f virtue.

If the notion of virtue s notmerelyhistorical,notjust a notionrooted n

the establishedpracticesof one or another ociety, f instead t belongsto

a universallyvalid ethic, thenit is apparently ot entirelyautonomouswithrespect o moralandothervalues.Moralvirtueseemsbest construed

as a kind of internalizationf moralvalues orperhapsmoralprinciplesor

otherstandards f moral conduct.It is not theirground, houghit may

influencetheir contentthrough he effortwe regularlymake to achieve

reflectiveequilibriumbetween virtuous nclinationsandgeneralprinci-

ples.Moralvirtuemay groundmoralconductgenetically,butnot concep-

tually; and this is confirmedby the way in which we must understand

actingfrommoral virtue:not simply in relationto people with certaintraits,butin relation o the reasons or whichtheyact, above all the kinds

of reasonspertaining o what is of moral value or to what is morally

required y generalrulesor standards.

Inthetheoryof moralworth,however,virtue s absolutely entral.This

pointis easilyobscuredby the commonattempto construevirtueethicsas providingby itself anadequate heoryof moralobligation.Virtuecanbe the groundof moral worth even withoutbeing the groundof moral

rightnessor obligatoryconduct.Agents cannottrulyact morally if, asmoralnihilismhas it, thereare no soundmoralstandards; ut accordingto bothvirtuetheoriesand otherplausibleethicalviews, actionsgain nomoral worthby mereconformitywith sound standards f conduct: herightactionsperformedn thewrongway, andespeciallyfromthe wrong

motives, have no moralworth. The mereexistence of objectively true



470 RobertAudi

moralstandards,even togetherwith ourregularconformity to them,wouldnot guaranteemoralaction-action fromvirtue or from duty orfromany othermorallyappropriateround-and mightfor thatvery rea-

sonbringno moralgoodness nto theworld.Virtueneednot be acquired,moreover,romstudyingmoralvaluesas

such; t is normallyacquired y imitation ndsocialization, ndit proba-blycannotbe taughtwithoutmodels.These wo truthsdomuch o account

for theappearancef conceptual utonomyhenotionof virtueseemstohave. In normalhuman ives, virtuemay be geneticallypriorto moral

principles. t also has a kind of operational utonomy,bothin the sense

that one can act from virtuewithoutbeing motivatedby any aretaically

external tandards ndeveninthe sense thatone's immediatemotivation

need not be moral at all. Whether he fundamentalmoralstandards re

rules or intuitionsor non-moral oodsor somethingelse again,virtue srequired o realize those standards, nd actingfrom virtue is the mainbasisof the moralworthof agents.24

Department of Philosophy ROBERT AUDIUniversity of NebraskaLincoln, Nebraska 68588-0321

USA

REFERENCES

Aristotle:NicomacheanEthics. Translated y TerenceIrwin1985.Indi-anapolis:Hackett.

Audi, Robert 1986: "Acting for Reasons". ThePhilosophical Review 95,

4, pp.511-546.

1989:PracticalReasoning.LondonandNew York:Routledge.Baier, Kurt 1959: The Moral Point of View. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press.Broadie, Sarah 1991: Ethics withAristotle. New York and Oxford:

OxfordUniversityPress.Cooper, John: 1975. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Cambridge,

Mass:HarvardUniversityPress.

Frankena,WilliamK. 1973:Ethics.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Garcia, orgeL.A. 1989:"TheProblem f Comparative alue".Mind98,390, pp. 277-283.

Gert,Bernard1988:Morality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.24 An earlierversionof thispaperwas given atSantaClaraUniversity'sCon-

ferenceonVirtueEthics nMarch1994,andI benefitedromdiscussionwith theotherspeakers, speciallyPhilippaFoot.I also wantto thankNormanDahl,JuliaDriver,PhilipKain,Christopher ulp,MichaelMeyer,WilliamPrior,ElizabethRadcliffe,andtheEditorandananonymous eferee orhelpfulcomments.




Hume, David 1888: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-

Bigge.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Kant, Immanuel:Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated

by LewisWhiteBeck 1959. New York:LiberalArtsPress.: "Introductiono the Doctrine of Virtue".Translatedby Mary

McGregor1964. New York:Harper ndRow.

Kraut,Richard1979:"TwoConceptions f Happiness".ThePhilosophi-cal Review88, 2, pp. 169-197.

Maclntyre,Alasdair1981:AfterVirtue.NotreDame:Universityof NotreDame Press.

Meyer, Susan Sauve 1993: Aristotle on Moral Responsibility. Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.

Prior,William J. 1991: Virtue ndKnowledge.Londonand New York:

Routledge.

Ross, W. D. 1939: TheRightand theGood. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Williams, Bernard1985: Ethics and the Limitsof Philosophy. Cambridge,

Mass:HarvardUniversityPress.

audi - acting from virtue

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