attitudes on water management practices -...

Chaophraya 11Pakistan’s Water Discourse

A Jinnah Institute Research Report

Attitudes on Water Management Practices

Chaophraya 11Pakistan’s Water Discourse

Attitudes on Water Management Practices

About Jinnah Institute

Jinnah Institute's Strategic Security Initiative (SSI)

Jinnah Institute (JI) is a non-profit public policy organisation based in Pakistan. It functions as a think tank, advocacy group, and public outreach organisation independent of the government.

JI seeks to promote knowledge-based policy making for strengthening democratic institutions and to build public stakes in human and national security discourse. It remains committed to investing in policies that promote fundamental rights, tolerance and pluralism.

JI actively seeks to articulate independent national security strategies for Pakistan that incorporate the country's stated policy imperatives while making room for voices from civil society, parliament, academia and media experts. Jinnah Institute's SSI also encourages constructive engagement between the international community and local policy and opinion makers on key national security interests, with the goal of seeking broad strategic convergences in multilateral and bilateral forums.

Jinnah Institute runs leading peace initiatives with India through sustained Track II engagement. It has been at the forefront of bringing together stakeholders from India and Pakistan to develop bilateral strategies for regional security and stability.

JI is committed to broadening Pakistan's stake in pursuing informed and inclusive polices on regional and global relationships with India, Afghanistan, other South Asian countries, China, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Contents

Perceptions on Transboundary Water Management

Recommendations

Appendix: List of Organsations Surveyed

Preface

Pakistan and the Indus BasinOverview

Perceptions on Water Management within Pakistan

Water quantity and quality

Storage and environmental hazards

Water pricing

IRSA and interprovincial water-sharing

Climate change

Gender

Social equity and local communities

Religion and resource conservation

The Indus Waters Treaty and relations with India

Water-sharing with Afghanistan

Perception Variation

04

05

06

07

07

07

08

09

09

09

09

10

10

11

11

12

13

15

Methodology 06

innah Institute and Chatham House undertook this research study to document prevalent attitudes Jand perceptions about water management

practices in Pakistan. This endeavour is part of a wider research exerc ise t i t led ‘ I magining Water : Understanding the Political Economy of South Asia’s Rivers’ that has been replicated in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal.

This report collates the knowledge and attitudes of a broad range of Pakistani policy stakeholders about the political economy, key drivers, and building blocks of the public discourse on water. In particular, the report attempts to trace the evolving discourse as a product of the country’s transforming demographic, socio-political and environmental metrics. The research findings canvas a large thematic field, divided into internal water management prac t ices and transboundary water-sharing challenges, and have been reported as accurately as possible from the spectrum of views gathered during fieldwork conducted between March and November 2013.

A brief backgrounder to Pakistan’s river systems is provided herein, followed by an overview of significant themes and recommendations made by respondents. It is hoped that this report will be useful to all those interested in water management practices across Pakistan, and spur positive policy debate.

The authors and research team thank all respondents for sharing their insights for this study.

Preface

Pakistan’s Water Discourse 04

he Indus River is one of the most integral water systems in Asia. It originates in China on the TTibetan Plateau and runs for 3,200 kilometres

across northern India and length of Pakistan before emptying into the Arabian Sea, near the port city of Karachi. Of its 27 major tributaries, six branches (Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, Jhelum, Beas and Indus itself ) flow through India before entering Pakistan and a seventh major tributary, the Kabul River, flows east from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The Indus Basin spreads over 1.12 million square kilometres, with 47 per cent of its expanse located in Pakistan, 39 per cent in India, eight per cent in China and six per cent in Afghanistan. In turn, 65 per cent of Pakistan's total landmass; 14 per cent of India; 11 per cent of Afghanistan; and one per cent of China lie within the Indus Basin.

The upper reaches of the Basin cover a mountainous region with alpine and highland climates, where precipitation occurs during winter and spring, and forms snow at higher elevations. Towards the south, the Lower Basin extends over plains that have subtropical arid, semi-arid or temperate and sub-humid climates, and annual precipitation can range between 100-500 millimetres in the lowlands to more than 2,000mm in the Himalayan foothills and above.

As many as 300 million people inhabit and depend on the Basin, of which the largest population cohorts are based in India and Pakistan, representing almost all the demand on the Basin's resources. According to one estimate, Pakistan accounts for 63 per cent usage of water in the Basin and allocates a staggering 90 per cent to its primary sector. Agriculture engages approximately half the country's workforce and generates as much as 22 per cent of the total GDP. Annual per capita water availability stood at over

3 35,000m at the time of Partition, but fell to 1,394m by 32011 and is further estimated to drop below 1,000m

Pakistan and the Indus Basin


over the next decade. This sharp decrease is as much a result of infrastructure mismanagement as rapid demographic change which creates new pressures on water availability per capita everyday. Sustainable access to safe drinking water remains an elusive goal among other determinants of human development in Pakistan and is estimated to impact the economy by 3.8 per cent each year.

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT ) has governed transboundary water management between India and Pakistan since 1960. The IWT divides rivers of the Indus Basin between the two countries in 'eastern' (Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) and 'western' (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) allocations, of which India controls the eastern tributaries and retains limited rights over the western ones; Pakistan controls the western rivers. The regulation of the IWT is carried out by the Permanent Indus Commission. There is no formalised water sharing mechanism between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Kabul River.

thThe 18 Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan devolved water to the legislative purview of provinces, although the federal government has some regulatory authority to ensure access and equity in resource sharing between provinces. The Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the Standing Committee on Water and Power are parliamentary bodies overseeing the regulation of water, whereas the Water and Power Development Authority ( WAPDA) carries out development schemes. The Indus Rivers System Authority (IRSA) is a statutory authority mandated to regulate inter-provincial water sharing according to the Indus Apportionment Accord of 1991. At the provincial level, regulatory frameworks are specified by provincial Irrigation Departments, Irrigation and Drainage Authorities and Environment Protection Agencies (EPAs). At the community level, Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) are responsible for the provision of drinking water and sanitation needs.

ver the course of 90 stakeholder interviews, water was flagged as one of the foremost Osecurity challenges that confront Pakistan, at

par with the threat of terrorism. A significant proportion of the respondent pool linked the internal water challenge to Pakistan's growing urban population, arguing that rapid demographic change is altering both the nature of industry and water consumption patterns across the countr y. Respondents linked water availability to Pakistan's search for energy security, which confronts large shortfalls in 2014 and has resulted in mass power cuts and industrial closures over the recent past.

Insufficient water storage capacity impacts the availability of water, while public debate on developing new infrastructure has stalemated. The limits of state capacity in addressing water related challenges, underpinned by inadequate social infrastructure, lack of political consensus, financial constraints, policy and planning were cited as structural roadblocks by a majority of respondents. Government bodies tasked with disaster relief and management have learnt critical lessons in recent years that help staunch and pre-empt environmental hazards, although early warning systems are not yet in place.

Inequity in the surface irrigation system and rapidly declining water quality – more than quantity – has created socio-political complexities. Marginalised communities, as well as rural women, find their lives and livelihoods threatened in the search for fresh water sources. Water availability per capita has been gradually dropping since many years. Climate change poses a host of challenges that are not fully understood

“Pakistan is the worst country when it comes to creating capacity for storage

and maintaining infrastructure.”


as a result of data gathering deficits, although both state-led and non-government organisations agree on improving existing data-collection and other research to assist public policy interventions. Groundwater recharge is another focus area that merits further research, having been adversely impacted by over-pumping and outmoded water pricing policies for irrigation.

Opinion remains divided on whether the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has served to protect Pakistan's interests. The Treaty has provided a fairly successful model of conflict resolution, albeit its inadequacies on environmental flows and climate change may be addressed in a supplementary protocol in future. Political distrust between India and Pakistan inhibit any real cooperation in the Indus Basin. Meanwhile, the Kabul River flowing between Pakistan and Afghanistan needs a treaty to be brought in place.

Overview

90 exert interviews were conducted between March and November 2013, across all four provinces, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, based on a specific set of themes addressing water consumption, conservation, management, popular perceptions and policies in Pakistan.

The field work in Pakistan was conducted as part of a wider research exercise in South Asia, looking at prevalent attitudes towards water in the region. The study held in Pakistan was geared towards local understanding, attitudes and policy prescriptions for water related challenges. Similar studies were conducted in India, Afghanistan, Nepal and Bangladesh during the same timeline.

The study reached out to a broad sample of respondents to ensure that diverse views and expertise can be encapsulated. Respondents belonged to backgrounds in legislation and policy planning; agriculture, food and irrigation; research and academia;

Methodology

development; media; civil service and military. A complete list of organisations surveyed may be found at the end of this report.

Responses were analysed along three vectors namely; baseline responses, innovative thinking and missing discourse. Baseline response looked at the dominant themes running across all responses, innovative thinking examined instances of alternative concepts emanating through interviews, and missing discourse analysed aspects of the debate that failed to come up during interviews. All responses were collated within indentified themes and vector responses within each theme were then cross referenced across all qualitative interviews.

The authors of this report have attempted to document the views of respondents as accurately as possible, paying close attention to alternative voices, at par with commonly articulated or mainstream viewpoints.


broad variety of opinion was expressed in the 90 stakeholder consultations. Thematically, Athese related to water quantity and quality,

storage and environmental hazards, water pricing, the role of the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), climate change, gender, local communities, and religion.

Water quantity and quality

Storage and environmental hazards

A majority of respondents explained how quantity per capita of available water in Pakistan has declined substantially; however, the absolute quantity of water has remained the same as a result of cyclical replenishing through glacial melt. It was seen that additional water in the form of floodwater and glacial melt could be harnessed through developing more water storage infrastructure. Respondents were of the view that increasing population, inadequate storage capacity and water losses were the root causes of decreasing per capita water availability. One view held that some quantity of water was lost because of unchecked upstream construction by India, which decreased water flows in Pakistan's rivers.

Pakistan is in dire need of additional water storage capacity, best addressed through the construction of new infrastructure. However, the size of storage proved to be a source of contention within the respondent pool: the Kalabagh Dam and other large projects were both criticised and commended. Instead of developing new projects, some respondents argued for repair and maintenance of existing infrastructure that can address, for instance, the problem of canal leakage.

“Two-thirds of all water flowing through the Indus Basin is lost in transmission.”

Water Management within Pakistan

Perceptions on

Arguably, the construction of new dams cannot prevent transmission losses that amount to roughly two-thirds of the river flows, according to one estimate. Priming the system through methods such as intermittent canal lining would result in the reduction of water losses. Many interviewees saw water storage and water conservation as two sides of the same coin. The lack of coherent water conservation-related policy or legislation was flagged as a concern, especially after

t hthe 18 Constitutional Amendment devolved environmental issues to the provinces. Respondents also highlighted coordination challenges between government institutions in the water sector.

Pakistan still has a long way to go in improving capacity to deal with floods and droughts, with many interviewees citing the 2013 floods as evidence of institutional unpreparedness. Some respondents stated that government bodies including the Federal Flood Commission, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) had all learned critical lessons regarding flood rehabilitation from the 2010 floods; however, financial constraints continue to limit their capacity. Government officials were of the view that there had been tangible improvements in Pakistan's ability to deal with floods, and that the country was moving from a response-oriented approach to a pre-emptive approach. They cited the inauguration of the Integrated Flood Management Plan-IV and the remodelling of barrages to support this new strategy. However, they also felt that early warning systems were needed throughout the Indus Basin, and there remained a critical gap between planning and implementation.

Water pricing in Pakistan is categorised according to irrigation, domestic and industrial tariffs. A large segment of respondents described Pakistan's policies on water pricing as satisfactory, with many urban respondents expressing their willingness to pay more if required. Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) officials, however, explained that their requests to raise domestic water tariffs were repeatedly denied by provincial governments.

Water pricing


Many respondents maintained that low irrigation tariffs were also responsible for water wastage, and essentially rooted in political compulsions. One observer held that tariffs for the use of surface water (regulated by provincial governments) were much lower than for groundwater usage; irregular electricity meant farmers had to rely on costly diesel power to operate water pumps.

A few stakeholders were of the view that domestic tariffs should be completely subsidised by the state, based on the belief that access to clean drinking water was a basic right and should be provided free; others conceded that some basic cost to cover operating overheads was permissible. It was seen that commoditisation of drinking water was likely to emerge as a major political-economic issue in the future.

Respondents from Sindh, meanwhile, made reference to the challenge posed by unruly 'tanker mafias' in Karachi, that were seen to be stealing water from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) by breaking pipelines and tapping leakages. As a result, citizens ended up paying up to three times the standard amount to buy water from tankers. Respondents explained that tanker mafias continued to flourish, particularly in those parts of the city that had witnessed a surge in violence in recent years.

“Surface water pricing is ridiculously outdated; it has not been revised since

1972. Pakistan needs to remove the groundwater subsidy on tubewell

electricity. For the supply of water in urban areas, there isn't much of a water supply to begin with, so you really can't charge people for the air coming out of

their taps.”

“Now these mafias have guns, it is hard to control them. And they survive because

citizens keep buying from them.”

IRSA and interprovincial water-sharing

Climate change

“IRSA lacks the technical and managerial skill to regulate current water resources

[between the provinces].”

A sizeable proportion of respondents appreciated the role of IRSA, pointing out that the interprovincial water regulator represented – at the very least – a rare provincial political accord on water-sharing. Several experts commended the water-sharing formula stipulated in the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, although a few noted that this formula was based on a presumed minimum annual availability that, for various reasons, had never been met in practice. One view held that the Apportionment Accord was a step taken by the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) government to establish provincial political consensus for the construction of the Kalabagh Dam. Furthermore, when asked which province had the best policies with regard to water management, respondents for this report identified Punjab as demonstrating the most coherent and progressive management policies, although a few felt that Punjab's better water management could be attributed to the concentration of infrastructure, as well as to the abundance of water naturally available to the province.The main grounds for dissatisfaction with IRSA's role, meanwhile, lay largely in issues of representation from all four provinces.

A strong opinion held that Pakistan stands on the brink of an environmental disaster, as the country's seasonal monsoons have shifted away from the traditional catchment areas towards Afghanistan. This trend, exacerbated by climate change, exponentially increases the likelihood of extraordinary rainfall patterns, cloudburst and flash floods. At another level, reduced storage capacity of the Mangla, Tarbela and Warsak dams as a result of annual siltation inhibits the government's responsiveness in dealing with climate change.

Respondents also felt that the significant loss of soil and groundwater overdraft particularly affected Balochistan; this view was confirmed by disaster


management officials, who further explained that Pakistan had incurred an estimated $16 billion in economic losses since 2010 because of disastrous flooding, and that urgent sectoral reform and policy planning was required to 'climate-proof' the Indus Basin. No urgency could be sensed on the part of policymakers and implementers. Downsizing the Ministry for Climate Change to a Climate Change Division, and slashing its budget indicated to some respondents that climate change is not a priority area for public policy, albeit there was growing awareness in the public discourse about climate change related phenomena.

Survey respondents were nearly unanimous in expressing that existing water management practices did not take into account the needs of women, and that the discourse itself needs to be gender-sensitised in both rural and urban contexts. However, when asked to identify ways in which water management practices disadvantaged women, only a select few could explain how: water collection was still a 'female' burden in rural households, made perilous by violent conflict in parts of the country. Where physical mobility for women is threatened or inhibited, households invariably experience a significant socio-economic handicap.

Farmland across rural Punjab has traditionally been a site for resource control, dominated by a feudal elite that monopolises water flowing through canals and hold back water from smaller landholders. Respondents explained that estates belonging to feudal landowners were situated upstream in Punjab, and that these landlords often 'flooded' their own fields before releasing the remaining water. The needs of downstream landowners or even skirting feudal estates are routinely usurped, creating gross inequities.

Gender

Social equity and local communities

“Mobility is a problem for women in Pakistan, and water management

in terms of drinking water does not adequately address that concern. The

space for women is shrinking.”

Interestingly, respondents from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa felt that this was not the case in their province, where rural water distribution benefited from more equity-based landholding practices.

It was also felt that the interests and needs of local communities were rarely met through existing water management practices in Pakistan. Respondents discussed the role of governance at the local level, arguing that the availability of clean drinking water should be prioritised over irrigation and industrial needs. Communities along the Indus River have become marginalised – particularly in Punjab, where the system of issuing fishing contracts remains in place. Additionally, large engineering projects often result in the direct or indirect displacement of local communities. One respondent observed that the lives and livelihoods of fisher folk and herders had been severely impacted in remote districts of Punjab and Sindh because of contamination and diminishing water tables.

Respondents were divided on the question of whether religion could be utilised in successful public messaging for water usage and conservation. A segment of respondents felt that religious arguments could greatly assist policy planners in a traditional society like Pakistan, and pointed to a rich body of ahadith that support resource conservation and environmental protection. Others were sceptical about the effectiveness of such messaging, but felt that school and madrassah curricula could be developed to support this. Stakeholders identified the value of involving local religious leaders and Imams in such initiatives, suggesting that public welfare messages focused on best practices could be disseminated during Friday sermons.

Religion and resource conservation


espondents debated the degree to which a 'basin-wide' approach could be utilised in Raddressing transboundary water issues in South

Asia. They acknowledged that several countries did manage upper–lower riparian dynamics effectively, but the case of India and Pakistan was made more complex as the Basin's rivers were divided rather than shared. There was categorical agreement that the entire basin must be looked at when devising any conceptual framework, although this might not always be easy to translate into practice.

Respondents argued that greater attention needs to be paid to the drastic reduction in available water in South Asia, as well as to exponential increases in demand; it was suggested that this can be realised through a grand 'South Asia Water Compact'. Several respondents were of the opinion that the partitioning of rivers had irreparably damaged river health; no real case could be made for cooperation at the basin level as long as the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)'s structural binds remain in place.

An alternative view expressed was that pursuing a basin-wide or regional approach would jeopardise Pakistan's interests in the short-to-medium term. Several participants recommended that existing water agreements between South Asian countries had to be scrupulously followed, and that conflict resolution mechanisms provided therein should be invoked as needed. Where such agreements did not exist, a mutually agreeable bilateral review would be best suited to resolve disputes.

Perceptions on Transboundary Water Management

The Indus Waters Treaty and relations with India

A majority of respondents expressed confidence in the IWT as offering a broad scope for cooperation between Pakistan and India. Respondents felt that the Treaty could be creatively interpreted to safeguard Pakistan's interests, emerging from new economic imperatives and demographic changes. Safeguarding livelihoods was critical in areas that depended on the Indus' tributaries. It was further pointed out that the IWT had enabled a successful arbitration dynamic for transboundary water disputes: the politics of the Baglihar and Kishenganga projects notwithstanding, both cases were cited as examples of a highly effective dispute resolution process that catered for the presence of a neutral expert and set precedents for future litigation.

Respondents observed that the Treaty's shortcomings on climate change and environmental flows on the one hand, and excessive focus on engineering and design on the other, were a function of the scientific state of play at the time of ratification in 1960. It was argued that challenges related to climate change could best be addressed in supplementary protocols to the IWT, but that the Treaty itself should not be discarded. Any deficiencies of the IWT were compensated for by its success in bringing order to an otherwise vexed political relationship between India and Pakistan. In comparison with other outstanding issues between the two countries, respondents felt that the IWT had mitigated water-related conflict since an early stage. However, the Treaty's clauses on future cooperation remain underutilised as a result of political differences between the two countries. While Articles 6–8 of the IWT provide for joint projects between India and Pakistan, most respondents felt that such projects could not be envisaged in the near future owing to the prevalent climate of political distrust.

Many respondents felt that India was entitled to its share of water – including the building of dams – under the IWT, and the impression that India was 'stealing' Pakistan's share was not based on any real empirical evidence. However, the rapid scale of upstream construction had arguably impacted cumulative flows, and some respondents flagged the unverifiable flow


data provided by India as a source of concern. A minority view held that India was engaging in 'water aggression' and was willfully not adhering to the IWT in letter or spirit.

Only a fringe minority was aware of whether groundwater extraction across the border in India could affect Pakistani aquifers. For the most part, interviewees agreed that the issue of groundwater lay outside the purview of the IWT, which itself was primarily a surface water treaty. It was generally felt that groundwater issues predominantly related to agricultural practices and food production. Respondents stressed the need for further research on Pakistani aquifers to broaden an understanding of groundwater sources and their recharge.

On the question of whether Pakistan should trade water with India for non-water benefits such as electricity, respondents largely answered in the negative, maintaining that water should not be traded for short-term gains. Others felt this was an agreeable notion, but unlikely to materialise in the near future.

A significant majority of stakeholders held that Pakistan and Afghanistan needed an agreement for transboundary water sharing. The government in Afghanistan was seen to be building capacity in this regard; it was recommended that both Islamabad and Kabul should undertake measures to shore up confidence and prevent disagreements over the Kabul River. With Afghanistan's other security challenges looming large, it was generally felt that water would not be included on the bilateral agenda for some time. However, many informants believed that a purposeful dialogue could be started between the two neighbouring countries, and that Afghanistan could even be assisted by Pakistan in developing infrastructure along the Kabul River.

Water-sharing with Afghanistan

e s p o n s e s f r o m s e n i o r e x p e r t s w e r e characterised by hydrological considerations, Rwith only a few respondents touching upon

environmental flows and social equity in water distribution. The nexus between access to clean drinking water, health and development was established by a lone respondent, who felt that impure drinking water was a clear determinant in Pakistan’s social indicators. While a great deal of emphasis was given to certain aspects of water management, such as the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, other views were also commonly accepted and shared: irrigation consumes more than 90 per cent of water resources in Pakistan; primary sectors employ nearly half the country’s workforce; agriculture contributes as much as 20 per cent to the total GDP. A few respondents pointed out the gross dependency of Pakistan’s bread basket and economic growth on the Indus river system. They also raised important questions regarding GDP-to-water consumption trade-offs and alternative development models. One respondent mentioned the recent completion of the Mangla Dam Raising Project and the additional storage capacity created therewith.

Over the course of the stakeholder consultations, the variation in responses and perceptions on the subject of water across different provinces and professions also created an interesting study in comparative analysis. There was a great difference in opinion as to the causes

“Pakistan has the largest contiguous irrigation system in the world. Managing

that is quite a feat. In spite of all its problems, it is still producing a large part of Pakistan's food supply. In spite of stress

to the system, barrages and dams have withstood. The system largely works.”


of Pakistan’s decreasing freshwater quantity. Technical experts maintained that in the absence of water-flow data, the absolute amount of water in the Indus Basin remained the same. However, there seemed to be broad understanding among non-technical experts that Pakistan’s water quantity had reduced. This difference in perception can perhaps be understood in the context of access to water: while the absolute amount of water in the system may be the same, rising population, over pumping of groundwater and contamination of water by way of industrial and agricultural effluent have greatly reduced access to clean water.

Government officials suggested that capturing rainwater could be significantly beneficial to aquifer recharge in Lahore, adding that their attempts to obtain approval vis-à-vis changes in bylaws for ra inwater har vest ing had been repeatedly unsuccessful, underscoring inadequate political attention given by the provincial government to develop Lahore’s water-resource portfolio. On the subject of urban water tariffs, there was broad agreement that domestic water pricing was low. However, few respondents offered an alternate framework for water pricing. Respondents from WASA recommended a revision in domestic water tariffs and increasing revenue to cover operation and maintenance costs. Few responses spoke of the need to protect consumer rights, minimum consumption, or the need to recover environmental costs associated with the supply of water and provision of sewerage. Few respondents discussed Kashmir, other than referring to it as an obstacle in transboundary water-sharing with India. Dissenting views held that the people of Kashmir had not been signatories to the IWT and that the distribution of water in Pakistan was between four federating units, without considering the needs of the population in Azad Kashmir. Furthermore, the right of the Kashmiri people over the Indus waters was inalienable. While there was broad agreement that Punjab maintained the best water practices, respondents from Balochistan explained that that only a fringe corner of

Perception Variation

the province received its share from the Indus and that portion too was lost to the sea, as there was no storage infrastructure in Balochistan’s mountains. As most of Balochistan was mountainous, harnessing rainwater from the mountains was possible and cost effective; conservation practices in Balochistan, including legislation enacted for groundwater conservation, was cited to be a model for replication.


General observations

Need for accurate data and information

Specific areas of water management – i.e. building dams, maintaining infrastructure, tackling pollution, changing agricultural practices or water conservation – should not be invoked sequentially. Instead, these areas should mutually reinforce each other within the public discourse.

The Council of Common Interests (CCI) ought to focus more on resolving interprovincial water issues. At the same time, flood response mechanisms should be institutionalised at the district level. While provincial and federal level planning and organisation for flood control is well-established, researched and staffed, individual districts lack resources and attention. Unrestricted construction activities in urban centres – particularly those that put groundwater quality at risk of contamination – ought to be regulated.

There is a pressing need for accurate real-time data on water flows and aquifer storage and recovery, and for the scientific updating of stream flow formulas in the Indus Basin. A glaring lack of reliable water data is seen to be the major reason for an ill-informed public debate and policy engagement on water issues. A uniform method of measuring river flows should be institutionalised; utilising IRSA’s telemetry tools can help ascertain water flows more accurately. Glacial melt should also be recorded and greater elementary geomorphologic research and awareness needs to be

“Until we know scientifically where we stand with river flows and rain inflows, we

will never know which solutions to prioritise. It is like asking a doctor to give a

prescription for a dying patient just by looking at him from four feet away.”

Recommendations


promoted to break the hold of ‘stone and cement’ water experts on policy planning. A concert of satellite imaging technology and scientific data should be employed to facilitate better informed public debate.

Agricultural best practices

Pollution control

Curbing water wastage

Making the discourse inclusive

There is a growing need to move towards a ‘more crop per drop’ method of assessing agricultural productivity. Flood irrigation should be regulated; more scientifically proven techniques such as drip irrigation and sprinkle irrigation should be promoted. Similarly, urban rainwater harvesting should be employed to save water for domestic usage.

Pollution control should be modelled on an ecosystem-based approach, with an emphasis on the preservation and protection of catchment areas. Industrial waste is the primary cause of water pollution in the Indus Basin and industries ought to treat their waste before discharging it into water bodies. Individual industries should be penalised for polluting the Indus and its tributaries.

The Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 could be implemented to control freshwater wastage in the relevant riverine areas. In relation to urban water management practices, the example of Karachi’s housing schemes should be emulated: these townships purchase water in bulk from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), and then supply directly to individual homes that are electronically metered to record water consumption.

Greater numbers of women should be consulted in water management projects at both the community level as well as higher levels of policy planning. Increased female representation in dialogue and advocacy forums across South Asia is necessary to ensure that their voices are heard. There should also be greater investment in community participation at multiple stages of policy planning, as part of a wider strategy to reduce top-down policy direction.

Capital Development Authority (CDA)Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS)EcoEnergy FinanceExpress TribuneFarmers’ Association of Pakistan (FAP)FATA Research CentreFederal Water Management Cell (FWMC), Government of PakistanFreshwater Action NetworkGender Equity Programme (GEP)Geo TelevisionGovernment College, University of FaisalabadHaggler Bailly PakistanHeraldHisaar Foundation for Water, Food and Livelihood SecurityIndus River System Authority (IRSA), Government of PakistanIndus Water Commission (IWC)Institute for Strategic Studies and Research Analysis (ISSRA)Institute of Regional Studies (IRS)Institute of Rural Management (IRM)Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI)International Water Management InstituteJinnah InstituteLahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD)Lodhran Pilot Project (LPP)Members of ParliamentMembers of Provincial AssembliesMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Government of PakistanMinistry of Science and Technology, Government of PakistanNational Defence University (NDU)National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)National University of Science and Technology (NUST)Nawa-i-Waqt Group of NewspapersOrangi Power Project (OPP)


Pakistan Water Partnership (PWP)Pakistan-China InstitutePlanning Commission, Government of PakistanPunjab Irrigation DepartmentPunjab Water Council (PWC)Quaid-e-Azam UniversityRizvi Isa Afridi Angell (RIAA)Strengthening Participatory Organisation (SPO)Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)The News InternationalUnited States Agency for International Development (USAID)United States Institute for Peace (USIP)Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Government of PakistanWater and Sanitation Agency (WASA)Water Management Research CentreWorld Wildlife Fund (WWF) Pakistan

Appendix: List of Organisations Surveyed

Email: [email protected]

attitudes on water management practices -...

Documents