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By Judd Devermont, Amelia Cheatham, & Catherine Chiang | June 2019

Chinese investments in sub-Saharan African ports1 present potential threats to U.S.

influence in sub-Saharan Africa as well as African sovereignty. A recent CSIS report, Influence

and Infrastructure: The Strategic Stakes of Foreign Projects, identifies some of the strategic risks

posed by the three stages of Chinese infrastructure projects, enabling Beijing to potentially

restrict access to its rivals, exploit ports during conflict, and collect intelligence. Drawing on

English-language press releases and open-source reports, the CSIS Africa Program identified

46 sub-Saharan African ports with financial, construction, or operational involvement by

Chinese entities.

Some caveats are needed. The data presented in maps and charts here does not represent

an exhaustive list of Chinese involvement in African ports nor does it capture the value of

funding shares or the precise stage of completion due to limited information.2 Despite its

shortcomings, this approach applies a methodology to distinguish which ports are more

vulnerable to Chinese strategic intervention and provides practitioners and scholars a

foundational framework from which to build future research. While it does not purport

to reveal the next Djibouti military base or Hambantota port in Africa, the data indicates

where Beijing is making a bigger bet on a port’s potential and reveals which ports are more

susceptible to Chinese influence and control.

Why Ports?

Sub-Saharan African ports play an integral role in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the

sprawling network of Chinese infrastructure projects linking China with Europe, East Africa,

and Southeast Asia. With the launch of BRI in 2013, President Xi sought to open China to

1. The CSIS Africa Program reviewed all projects relating to overall port investment including, for example, investments in harbors, terminals, berths, quays, piers, etc. The data covers a wide range of port projects (e.g., container ports, oil ports, multipurpose ports, and roll-on roll-off vessel ports, which vary widely in size, operation, and structure). 2. Information on Sino-African port contracts is limited to statements made by both parties. Notably, Chinese compa-nies are accused of embellishing the number and progress of their investments which could lead to inflated counts.

Assessing the Risks of Chinese Investments in Sub-Saharan African Ports

ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 2

new markets, expand his country’s political influence globally, and secure military access and

mobility across regions. Forming the backbone of China’s “Maritime Silk Road,” investments

in African ports provide a gateway to the region’s trade and economic development, empower

China with political leverage and clout on the continent, and provide a foothold for People’s

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities.

The 46 ports identified in this data align with broader Chinese military, commercial, and political

objectives. One of the key challenges is decoupling these three objectives, distinguishing which

ports have security dimensions from those that offer purely commercial gains.

There are signs that Beijing plans to use these port investments to increase its military and

political reach. The various Chinese entities driving African port development have deep ties

to Beijing.3 At least six of the ports captured within this data were also visited by Chinese

naval vessels or are dual-use civilian-military ports.4 Seven of the eleven ports operated

by Chinese entities are deep-water, opening the possibility for larger commercial, but also

military, vessels to dock.5

Not all Chinese port investments, however, pose a direct security risk to U.S. or African

interests. Most are likely pursued for commercial gain. China has risen in the last decade as

the continent’s main trade partner, and port investments are just one of the main avenues

through which it is establishing commercial supremacy in the region. Not only do many

Chinese-backed ports found within our data hook into other BRI projects, but Chinese

companies have directed resources towards ports with the most commercial potential.6

Moreover, port expansion and rehabilitation projects are key to furthering African growth and

development. Ninety percent of African exports depend on ports. Chinese investments that

aim to address congestion and outdated port infrastructure, which currently limit trade flows

on the continent, are projected to contribute toward regional GDP growth.7 These port projects

consequently, not only fuel African growth, but also reinforce China’s image as a development

partner and boost its political influence. At a ceremony celebrating China Harbor Engineering

Company’s project at Walvis Bay Harbor, Namibia, the Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Zhang

Yiming said:

3. Our research uncovered about 18 state-owned enterprises with interests in African ports. China’s central govern-ment allegedly also influences Huawei, one of two private companies identified. Major Chinese players in African ports include China Communications Construction Company Limited and China Merchants Group Limited, the latter of which makes up about 40 percent of the ports operated by China. 4. Data on dual use ports is found here: https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/. Data on Chinese port visits was compiled from news reportage of the Chinese naval hospital vessel, the Peace Ark, voyage in African waters. These data sources were then cross-referenced with ports known in our data in which the Chinese invested (Dar es Salaam Port, Momba-sa Port, Djibouti Port, Freetown Port, Port of Pointe Noire, Walvis Bay).5. Lekki Deep Sea Port; Kribi Deep Sea Port; Autonomous Port of Abidjan; Lomé Port; Port of Djibouti; Bagamoyo Port; Port of Pointe Noire. 6. PwC projects that the Ports of Durban, Abidjan, and Mombasa will lead their sub-region’s trade as commercial hub ports, with Lagos-Apapa, Tema, and Djibouti or Dar es Salaam close behind. Chinese entities have invested in all seven of these ports. 7. PwC estimates that a 25 percent boost in port performance would coincide with a 2 percent rise in regional GDP.

DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 3

[T]his is the benchmark project for China-Namibia friendly and pragmatic cooperation, which

symbolizes the great attention of our leaders to our relations and the brotherhood between our people.

Mapping Chinese Port Investments

There are at least 46 existing or planned port projects in sub-Saharan Africa, which are

funded, built, and or operated by Chinese entities. Chinese investment was present in

roughly 17 percent of the 172 sub-Saharan African ports captured in the 2017 World Port

Index.8 These ports are positioned along each coast, providing Chinese access to main

maritime routes and chokepoints.

MAURITANIA

SENEGAL

GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE IVORY

COAST

BENIN

NIGERIA

CAMEROON

GABON

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

ANGOLA

NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICA

TANZANIA

KENYA

SOMALIA

DJIBOUTI

ERITREACAPE VERDE

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPLE

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR

TOG

OGHANA

SUDAN

CHOKE POINT

NOUADHIBOU

NOUAKCHOTT

MINDELO

KAMSAR

CONAKRY

PEPEL

FREETOWN

ABIDJAN

ATUABO

TAKORADI

JAMESTOWN (ACCRA)

TEMA

LOMÉ

TIN CAN ISLAND (LAGOS)

APAPA (LAGOS)

LEKKI

DOUALA

KRIBI

BATA

LIBREVILLE

FERNÃO DIAS

POINTE-NOIRE

CAIO

CABINDA

LOBITO BAY

WALVIS BAY

DURBAN

MATUTUINE DISTRICT (MAPUTO)

AMBODIFOTATRA (NOSY BORAHA)

TOAMASINABEIRA

MTWARA

DAR ES SALAAM

BAGAMOYO

MPIGA DURI

MOMBASA

LAMU

DJIBOUTI CITY

MASSAWA

MATAKONG

CALABAR

RICHARDS BAY

TADJOURAH

DAMERJOG

NARINDA BAY DEEP-WATER PORT

SHAIKH IBRAHIM LIVESTOCK PEIR

= Operator

= Builder

= Funder

= Multiple ports

CHINESE PORT INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA

= Ports

= Main shipping route

= Minor shipping route

= China Maritime Silk Road

View the interactive map: https://csis-ilab.github.io/mapbox-custom/africa-ports/

Strategic Opportunities to Exploit Port Infrastructure

Further research is essential to separate port projects that pose a security threat to African

governments, the United States, or other international partners from those that are made

with commercial intent. In the sections below, the CSIS Africa Program has enumerated the

security risks tied to each phase of port investment. We identify operation/ownership as the

most immediate risk to U.S. interests followed by financing and construction.

8. Sixteen of the ports found in our data were not within the World Port Index, in part because they still in a pre-con-struction or construction phase, or otherwise initiated in 2017 or after.

ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 4

Operation. Chinese port ownership or operation pose immediate risks to U.S.

interests,9 potentially allowing China to extract intelligence, block the U.S.

government from accessing territory or services (such as critical port access at

Djibouti City), and use ports to dock military vessels. China’s technical knowledge

and operation of ports spread across the region may also provide strategic depth to

preposition, deploy, and refuel its naval fleet, as well as block adversaries, during

periods of conflict. Notably, port investments do not always precede Chinese military

access to ports. China, for example, secured the right to dock military vessels at

Seychelles through a separate bilateral military agreement. Neither do operation rights

ensure that an African government will allow a Chinese military vessel to dock in

their waters. The port authority’s role in operations and its lease agreements, as well

as the relationship between the host government and Chinese state are factors that

future research should consider.

Chinese entities operate 11 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified (see below

Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities). Seven are situated on the west coast and

four on the east coast. The Doraleh Multipurpose Port in Djibouti City is currently the

most concerning port given its proximity to a maritime chokepoint and U.S. military

base. If counting its naval base, China currently controls two of the five terminals at

the Port of Djibouti. Additional research could reveal the strategic significance of the

other 10 ports.

Financing. Through funding, China can solicit projects that further its policy objectives,

feed corruption, and influence local politics. In addition, funding allows China to favor

Chinese construction companies, negotiate operational control and access to resources,

and potentially seek further concessions if African countries renege on debt payments.

Chinese entities financed 27 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified.10 Chinese

entities operate 75 percent of Chinese financed ports, and Chinese entities also

constructed 90 percent of these ports (see below Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese

Entities and Figure 2. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities).

Construction. Construction enables China to collect intelligence on port infrastructure,

establish a dependency on Chinese technology and expertise, and ensure long-

term interoperability with Chinese materials and technology. Chinese entities have

overseen construction projects at 41 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified

(see below Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities and Figure 2. Ports Financed or

Constructed by Chinese Entities).

9. Operation is defined here as ports in which Chinese entities are contractually granted the right to operate facilities or ports in which Chinese entities own more than a 50 percent equity share.10. Financing is defined here as Chinese-backed loans or the purchase of minority equity shares. Notably, information on minority versus majority equity holdings is limited.

DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 5

PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS

West Africa

Lekki Deep Sea Port Lagos, Nigeria X X X In Progress

Tonkolili Iron Ore Project, Pepel Port & Tagrin Point Port Pepel, Sierra Leone X X X Various Stages

Kribi Container Terminal, Kribi Deep Sea Port

Mboro Village (Kribi), Cameroon X X X Various Stages

Various Projects, Autonomous Port of Abidjan Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire X X X Various Stages

Tin-Can Island Port Container Terminal Limited,

Tin Can Island Port

Tin Can Island (Lagos), Nigeria X Completed

Lomé Container Terminal, Lomé Port Lomé, Togo X Completed

East Africa

Doraleh Multipurpose Port, Port of Djibouti Djibouti City, Djibouti X X X Completed

Bagamoyo Port Bagamoyo, Tanzania X X X Stalled Indefinitely

Maruhubi Multipurpose Port Mpiga-Duri, Tanzania X X X Announced

Shaikh Ibrahim Livestock Pier, Port of Sudan Port Sudan, Sudan X X Completed

Central Africa

Pointe Noire Mineral (Ore) Port Project, Port of Pointe Noire

Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo X X X Announced

Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities*

* See footnote 9 for the definition of “operation” applied throughout this review.

ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 6

PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS

West Africa

Conakry Container Wharf Expansion Project,

Port of Conakry Conakry, Guinea X X Various Stages

Various Expansion Projects, Friendship Port of Nouakchott Nouakchott, Mauritania X X Various Stages

Tema LNG Terminal, Tema Port Tema, Ghana X X In Progress

Takoradi Port Takoradi, Ghana X X In Progress

Bakassi Deep Sea Port Calabar, Nigeria X X In Progress

Multipurpose Terminal Project, Apapa Port Apapa (Lagos), Nigeria X X Announced

Mindelo Deepwater Port Mindelo, Cabo Verde X X Announced

Kamsar Fishing Port Economic Zone Kamsar, Guinea X Announced

Mineral Port of Nouadhibou Nouadhibou, Mauritania X Completed

Atuabo Free Port Atuabo, Ghana X Stalled Indefinitely

Queen Elizabeth II Quay Expansion Project,

Freetown PortFreetown, Sierra Leone X In Progress

Douala Chanel Expansion Project, Douala Port Douala, Cameroon X Various Stages

Jamestown Fishing Port Complex Jamestown (Accra), Ghana X In Progress

Simandou Iron Ore Project, Makatong Deep Water Port Matakong, Guinea X Stalled

Indefinitely

Figure 2a. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities

DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 7

PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS

East Africa

Tadjourah Port Tadjourah, Djibouti X X Completed

Djibouti Damerjog Industries Development Damerjog, Djibouti X X In Progress

Various Expansion Projects, Dar es Salaam Port Dar es Salaam, Tanzania X X Announced

Expansion Project, Mtwara Port Mtwara , Tanzania X In Progress

Various Expansion Projects, Massawa New Port Massawa, Eritrea X Completed

Lamu Port Lamu, Kenya X In Progress

Construction of Three Berths, Mombasa Port Mombasa, Kenya X Various Stages

Central Africa

Expansion and Rehabilitation Project, Port of Bata Bata, Equatorial Guinea X X Completed

Deep Sea Trans-Shipment Port Fernão Dias, São Tomé e Príncipe X X Announced

Various Expansion Projects, Port Mole Libreville, Gabon X Stalled

Indefinitely

Figure 2b. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities

ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 8

PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS

Southern Africa

Various Expansion Projects, Port of Lobito Lobito, Angola X X Completed

Caio Deep Water Port Caio, Angola X X Stalled Indefinitely

Rehabilitation and Expansion Project, Beira Fishing Port Beira, Mozambique X X Completed

Various Rehabilitation Projects, Port of Durban Durban, South Africa X X Various Stages

Various Renovation Projects, Port of Ambodifotatra

Ambodifotatra (Nosy Boraha), Madagascar X In Progress

Tamatave Deepwater Harbour Toamasina, Madagascar X Announced

Narinda Bay Deep-Water Port Bay of Narinda, Madagascar X Announced

Various Expansion Projects, Port of Walvis Bay Walvis Bay, Namibia X In Progress

Port of Cabinda Cabinda, Angola X Various Stages

Shipbuilding and Repair Facility, Richards Bay Port Richards Bay, South Africa X Announced

Deep Water Port of Techobanine

Matutuíne District (Maputo), Mozambique X Announced

Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies in Washington D.C. Catherine Chiang is a program coordinator and research assistant with

the CSIS Africa Program. Amelia Cheatham was a former intern with the CSIS Africa Program.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Figure 2c. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities