Chapter 11

Asian Approaches to Human Security

William T. Tow

More than a decade since the United Nations convened its 'Millennium summit' in September 2000, the credibility of'human security' as an approach to Asia-Pacific stability remains tenuous. The two core human security principles - 'freedom from fear' and ' freedom from want' - are being tested by global economic forces and international strategic developments in ways that c learly challenge their relevance to greater Asia. The intensification of great power rivalry between China and the United States is combining with the aftereffects of the global financial crisis to render the struggles of individual Asians in such areas as human rights, forced migration, health, famine and environmental degradation less important to Asian security politics than more traditional, state-centric preoccupations with sovereign control, territorial purview and military balances. Certainly, human security dialogues remain prominent between regional actors and within various regional instrumentalities. Human security-related actions such as the disaster re lief efforts which were implemented after the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, and following the 'triple tragedy' that hit Japan in March 2011, are noteworthy. Yet, two fundamental conclusions reached by a definitive UNESCO study released in 2004 on East Asian frameworks for promoting human security seem at least as applicable now: most Asians remain tied to the concept that 'it is an individual sovereign nations own duty lo secure its citizens' physical safety' and Asians remain largely opposed to human security postulates that they regard as originating from extra-regional values (Lee 2004: 37- 8, emphasis in original).

However, different analysts, both w ithin and outs ide the region, would contest this observation. Insisting that human security can be viewed as a 'distinctive notion ' within Asia, Amitav Acharya observes that it ' resonates' with such regional ideas as 'comprehensive security ' and 'cooperative securi ty' which relate directly to the national security and economic development concerns of Asian states - although human security is more 'people-centred' and ' needs-based ' than comprehensive security (Acharya 200 I). Tsunao Akaha argues that human securi ty is gradually being ' institutionalised' through regional consultative dialogues (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and its action programmes) and through regional actors' increasing systematic interaction with extra­regional parties and global organisations (Akaha 2009; see also Sni twongse and Bunbongkarn 2001 ). Other authors have observed that 'functional' components -development politics, drug-trafficking, cyber-crime and sustainable development - are related to more politically sensi tive issues such as human rights, democratic

176 New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific

governance and ethnic conflict, thus forming coherent human security policy agendas. Such observers also contend that the traditional concerns of Asian policy elites for achieving state-centric security and national prosperity are gradually being complemented - or supplanted - by a greater will ingness to acknowledge and confront ' li fe-damaging issues' (Umegaki 2008: 7- 8; Burke 200 1).

It is argued here, however, that notwithstand ing how honourable the sentiments driving such human security-centric observations may be, they are largely misplaced in an Asian securi ty context. The core of the human security idea -to emphasise the importance of individuals and communities as the appropriate object and beneficiary of security analys is and policy - remains compelling .Yet, such observers as Roland Paris and Edward Newman are on solid ground when they note that the human security concept is often so generalised and so elastic that all potential issues of concern are 'securitised' in ways that the systematic prioritisation of both human security problems and their solutions remains highly elusive.1 Asian policymakers in particular are largely uncomfortab le with the human security paradigm, instead favouring clearly demarcated policy objectives and tangible means-ends strategies to realise their basic security objectives. Even the redoubtable diplomatic style of ASEAN member-states - commonly known as the 'ASEAN way' - has been grounded in state-centric norms as evidenced by the policy approaches of their primary instrument for generating regional security dialogues - the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (see Nishikawa 20 10: 128- 9; Anwar 2003). The Asian financial crisis and 11 September 2001 only briefly created openings for human security norms to penetrate ASEAN deliberations. These have since been overridden by state-centric preoccupations such as the rise of China, concerns about the Korean peninsula and ongoing territorial d isputes in the East and South China Seas (Cheeppensook 2007).2

This does not mean that human-centric security approaches have virtually no place in Asia's security politics. Indeed, a major concern of this chapter is to what extent we can 'find the right fit ' for human-centric security approaches within the

Paris (2001: 92) notes that this is the case 'because of the broad sweep and definitional elasticity of most fo rmulations of human security but also - and perhaps even more problematically - because the proponents of human security are typically reluctant to prioritize the jumble of goals and principles that make up the concept' . Newman (2010: 82) observes that '[h]uman security is normatively attractive, but analytically weak. Through a broad human security lens, anything that presents a critical threat to li fe and livelihood is a security threat, whatever the source. If individual security is the dependent variable, then it is possible to identify and codify every physiological threat. But this would be of little use,

as it would generate an unmanageable array of variables'. 2 Kasira Cheeppensook is optimistic that ' human-centric' norms are gradually

penetrating the 'ASEAN way' but admits that state-centric security norms still predominate. Singling out Thailand as a potential spearhead for leading the transition from state-centric to human-centric norm orientation, the author could not have been aware of how seriously Thailand's own domestic politics would constrain Bangkok from assuming such a role during the two years subsequent to the paper's presentation.

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ent human security policy 1al concerns of Asian policy al prosperity are gradually ,villingness to ackno\vledge '-8· Burke 2001). ,v h~nourable the sentin1ents tnay be, they are largely · the human security idea -munities as the appropriate _ reinains compelling .Yet,

0 are on solid ground when

0 generalised and so elastic in \Vays that the syste1natic .eir solutions retnains highly ,\y uncomfortable with the lemarcated policy objectives sic security objectives. Even r-states - com1nonly known ~ntric norins as evidenced by generating regional security ee Nishikawa 2010: 128-9; eptember 200 I only briefly ,trate ASEAN deliberations. eoccupations such as the rise )ngoing territorial disputes in ).2

approaches have virtually no oern of this chapter is to what ,curity approaches within the

·cause of the broad s\veep and irity but also - and perhaps even security are typically reluctant to he concept'. Newman (2010: 82) but analytically \veak. Through a il threat to life and livelihood is a is the dependent variable, then it at. But this \vould be of little use,

ln-centric' nonns are gradually security nonns still predominat~.

)' the transition from state-centnc ~ave been a\vare ofho\V seriously ~kok fron1 assu111ing such a role

)0.

Asian App1vaches to H11111an Security 177

Asia-Pacific's do1ninant state-centric security paradign1. It is asserted here that doing so is critical for realising the region's stability. In the absence of such a 'fit', the peoples and states of the region are destined to re1nain n1ired within a natTO\V and highly nee-realist frarne\vork of unretnitting regional crises and relentless state-centric con1petition. Such rivalries \viii intensify even \Vhile global security challenges are intensifying the imperative for regional states to diversify their security postures and readjust their strategic capabilities.

Human security is relevant to Asia-Pacific security dynan1ics because it offers policy options for dealing \Vith an ever expanding and diverse array of regional security challenges. Even if regional security elites continue to be do1ninated by state-centric security preoccupations, nonnative in1peratives and fundarnental hu1nan deprivations are sufficiently nurnerous and con1pelling to \Varrant consideration of ho\v Asia-Pacific governments can better serve the basic needs of their citizens (in Bangladesh, for example, which hardly faces any external milita1y threats, but where millions of people die of preventable disease). Such consideration is appropriate even if hu1nan security approaches cannot asstune immediate core status within regional states' traditional national security planning.

The analysis that follows considers how this policy dichotomy can be reconciled by evaluating three relevant aspects of hu1nan-centric and state­centric security integration. Initially it briefly reviews the tension generated by the co-existence of two competitive security approaches in conte1nporary Asian security politics. It then applies the key generalisations we derive about this policy tension by briefly reviewing two 'cases' relating to the short-range stability of the Asia-Pacific security environment: North Korea, and the 'arc of crisis'. Both cases focus on states that confront im1nense and incessant non-traditional security challenges. North Korea, in particular, is a 'high profile' case because it figures so prominently in the traditional strategic calculations of other regional actors. It needs to be exa111ined for no other reason than it provides a belhvether for the extent to which hu1nan security politics can be effective \vithin the broader Asia­Pacific security environment.

A concluding section offers some views on the feasibility of realising an appropriate 'nexus' bet\veen hutnan security and state-centric security politics in the Asia-Pacific.

Traditional Security Versus Human Security: Understanding Incongruities

Htunan security discourse in Asia has been shaped by contradicto1y developn1ental and htunan rights concerns. Many developing states in Asia are still coming to tenns \Vi th their O\Vn national identity after centuries of colonial tutelage or occupation by outside powers. This causes most Asia-Pacific states to look at the \Vorld through 'realist' lenses and generally to prioritise the 'national interest' over the rights and welfare of the individuals. The 'Asian values' concept that was projected by various Asian elites during the 1990s and prior to the 1997-1998

178 New Approaches to H111nan Security in the Asia-Pacific

Asian financial crisis was vie\ved by 1nany as ranking collective order and social harmony over personal freedom and questioning the relevance of Western 'liberal de1nocratic values' to their own region's cultures and state-building processes (Milner 2002).3 Most Western states have, conversely, moved beyond this stage of politico-economic evolution. They are, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, more liable to 'put people first' when conceptualising the nature and scope of I security threats (Buzan 1983 ). In this context, state mechanisms of Asian political , systems actually threaten those over whom they would govern by 'securitising' the 'I power and resources needed to check anyone who would challenge their political legitimacy and authority.

Any tendency to view and treat human security as the apposite to traditional, state-centric security is not necessarily due to an inherent contradiction in the t\vo paradigms. The human security story as it has developed in Asia over the past 15 years underscores this point. The Asian financial crisis and the more recent global financial crisis have reinforced the fundamental truth that Asian states cannot insulate their own economies or polities fro1n the larger structural forces and powerful agents of change in today's world. After 1997, inclinations to demarcate state-centric and human-centric approaches began to soften as Asian political and intellectual elites such as Obuchi Keiz6, I(iln Dae-jung, Yamamoto Tadashi and Surin Pitsuwan began to e1nbrace selected human security co1nponents. As Paul Evans (2004: 269) has since recalled:

Beyond being a nice-sounding phrase, hun1an security provided a tool for

ackno\vledging that even t\vo decades of [Asian] econo1nic gro\vth and state­building had not eli1ninated severe vulnerabilities for large nun1bers of Asians.

And it at least hinted at the gro\ving role of non state actors as (I) alternative service providers \Vhen states \Vere unable to provide social \Velfare and protection for their O\Vll citizens, and (2) pa1iicipants in the policy process.

Assimilation of the hu1nan security concept by such regional institutions as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit (EAS) has been evident. So too has the vie\v that traditional 'hard power' assets such as military capabilities must be used in response to regional crises. The deployment of military forces to those areas affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, for exan1ple, has led in recent years to the conduct of disaster relief exercises within the US regional alliance syste1n \Vhile coastguards and national police forces are now collaborating across the region to stem the flow of illegal migration, drug trade and piracy (see Tammi 20 IO; NTS Alert 2009, 20 I 0).

In a similar vein, large East Asian powers such as China and Japan are coining_ under increased international pressure to beco1ne 1nore involved in hu1nanitariaH relief operations in Africa and parts of Asia. Such den1ands emanate fron1

3 More recent studies, ho\vever, call into question the extent to \Vhich authoritari orientations actually constitute an integral part of any' Asian n1ind-set'. See S.Y Kin1 (201

re Asia-Pacific

,g collective order and social relevance of Western 'liberal and state-building processes ,1y, moved beyond this stage y in the aftermath of the Cold !ising the nature and scope of

1echanisms of Asian political d govern by 'securitising' the ·ould challenge their political

as the apposite to traditional, erent contradiction in the two oped in Asia over the past 15 :is and the more recent global uth that Asian states cannot larger structural forces and

)97. inclinations to de1narcate , soften as Asian political and jung, Yamomoto Tadashi and ·.ecurity components. As Paul

:urity provided a tool for cononiic gro\vth and state­>r large numbers of Asians. lte actors as ( t) alternative rovide social \velfare and ~ in the policy process.

such regional institutions as :ast Asia Summit (EAS) has

'hard power' assets such as ,ional crises. The deployment ~n Ocean tsunan1i in late 2004, disaster relief exercises \Vi thin and national police forces are O\V of illegal 1nigration, drug 2010). .

.s China and Japan are commg 1ore involved in hu1nanitarian 11 demands emanate from the

the extent to \vhich authoritaria_n m mind-set'. SeeS.Y. Kim (2010).

Asian Approaches to Hzonan Security 179

increasing acceptance of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) as an international norm. As one of its most prominent advocates describes it, R2P is about initially preventing conflict within as well as bet\veen sovereign disputants and, if conflict is unavoidable, then about applying a host ofreactive responses (not just military actions) to realise conflict reduction and eventual conflict resolution. It involves a wide range of actors and not just those able and willing to apply coercive military forces (Evans 2012). However, East Asian powers have responded with only qualified and relatively nuanced policy adjustments. China has 'softened' its previously uncompron1ising stance on opposing humanitarian intervention. Japan has clearly opted to support forms of humanitarian relief and intervention that it believes will minimise its need to contribute hard power (the use of military force) (Prantl and Nakano 2011). An illustration of this trend is characterised as facilitating 'resilience' in the human security paradigm by developing 'the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats'. Situated in what one analyst has labelled a 'post-interventionist paradigm', threatened individuals, weak states or other potential benefactors of human security must then be expected to build material and normative capacities to neutralise future human security challenges rather than be invariably reliant on external intervention. This is appropriate to the Japanese hun1an security approach and conducive to responding effectively to Chinese ambiguities about 'when to intervene and why' (Chandler 2012).4

The large number ofissues that have been subsumed under the general 'human security' rubric have tended to obscure rather than clarify human security's regional credibility. In the absence of widespread regional consensus about human security's meaning and relevance, the gap between those supporting state-centric approaches and those backing more human-centric orientations has actually widened. How to distinguish between the two approaches has become blurred. This is particularly true in the area of humanitarian intervention. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar has observed, the region appears to be deeply divided on the question of al1owing external forces to intervene in humanitarian crises. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights activists generally endorse such intervention and a fe\V Asian governments, such as Thailand and the Philippines, during the late 1990s supported 'constructive intervention' in the fonn of collective regional action against the worst violations of human rights and in the face of unmitigated human disaster. Most ASEAN members, however, have remained relatively steadfast in opposing outside interference to domestic affairs - although such resistance has mellowed in selected instances (Indonesian criticism of Malaysian political opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's arrest in 1998, more recent disaster relief operations which have involved foreign personnel and

4 David Chandler \Vas \vriting at least in partial response to Mary Martin's and Taylor Q\ven's argument that human security 'has all but vanished' from the contemporary international security discourse, largely supplanted by the 'responsibility to protect' concept (Chandler 2012: 215). See also Martin and Owen (2010).

180 New Approaches 10 H11111an Security in the Asia-Pacific

technology conducted in China following earthquakes and floods and the Chinese/ Japanese postures regarding the 'responsibility to protect') (Anwar 2003: 556-9).5

Many Asian policymakers would agree \Vi th Chandler's critique of the hu1nan security agenda ~ that hun1an security approaches have actually been integrated into policy1naking to the extent that 1nany govern111ents believe that 'individuals, values and en1ancipato1y theory' n1uddles policy1naking clarity. Such confusion renders the world 'less open to strategic intervention' and justifies policyn1akers' adoption of state-centric-oriented approaches (Chandler 2008: 437-8). Paris has levelled a sin1ilar criticis1n about htunan security's relevance to policy forn1ulation, noting that lacking a precise definition, htunan security beco1nes <extraordinarily expansive and vague, enco1npassing eve1ything fron1 physical security to psychological well-being' (Paris 200 I: 88; for an Asian perspective, see Liu 2006; for a perspective on the 'ambiguity policy strategy', see Prantl and Nakano 2011 ).

One way to overcome this tendency is to tailor the scope of such muddling to fit the priorities and requiren1ents of policy1nakers. This 1nay fit the nation-building orientations of various Asian policy elites. It 1nay also preclude comprehensive understanding of regional insecurities in the context of strongly held' Asian values' (Liu 2006: 88 commenting on Thomas and Tow 2002 and Bellamy and McDonald 2002). An alternative approach would be to develop a 'distinctive' regional approach to hun1an security based on its philosophical heritage, political values and material interests. This could be realised through the gradual development of an 'Eastphalian order' that hannonises the pre-e1ninence of sovereignty and collective interest with selective application of individual rights and nonnative standards (S. W. Kim 20 I 0). Epistemic communities, already active in the institutionalisation of such Asian architectures as the EAS and ASEAN, might be co1nmissioned to identify points of convergence between state-centric and hu1nan­centric security approaches and \Vays to exploit their comple1nentarity.6

Both state-centric and hu1nan-centric security paradig1ns highlight conflict prevention (whether between states or individuals). Both focus on reducing vulnerability (from other threatening powers or frorn those within a state \vho threaten individuals' well-being). Both are concerned with community-building in a broader, global context. Both envision so1ne form of collective security as a means of overco1ning aggression, either by ethnic or political groups against weaker parties or against a state (Tow and Trood 2000: 22-4).

The question remains, however, as to who can advance security. Universalist and regional institutions are dependent on their n1en1ber-states. If groups of individuals clai1n they can provide for their own security they are 1nerely clai1ning the sovereign prerogative and ability to do so - the funda1nental characteristic

5 China requested foreign assistance after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. The United States and Russia provided en1ergency supplies through transport planes, Japan provided search-and-rescue and tnedical teams, South Korea and Singapore provided additional search-and~rescue personnel and Indonesia sent 1nedical supplies. See Hays (2008).

6 A step suggested by Joseph Camilleri (2000: 322) over a decade ago.

lie Asia-Pacific

'Sand floods and the Chinese/ ;tect') (Anwar 2003: 556-9).

5

indler's critique of the hu111an have actually been integrated ents believe that 'individuals, aking clarity. Such confusion m' and justifies policymakers' ndler 2008: 437-8). Paris has •levance to policy formulation, ~irity becon1es 'extraordi.narily , from physical secunty to ;ian perspective, see Liu 2006;

see Prantl and Nakano 2011 ). ;e scope of such muddling to fit his may fit the nation-building , also preclude comprehensive t of strongly held' Asian values' 02 and Bellamy and McDonald :velop a 'distinctive' regional ihical heritage, political values ough the gradual development ~-eminence of sovereignty and ndividual rights and nonnative unities, already active in the the EAS and ASEAN, might be ~tween state-centric and human-

• 6 ,eir complen1entanty. . :y paradigms highlight conflict uals). Both focus on reducmg frotn those within a state \Vho

erned with community-building e form of collective security as lmic or political groups against

2000: 22-4). LO advance security. Universalist ,ir member-states. If groups. of ;ecurity they are merely clmrr,ung _ the fundamental charactenstlc

:huan earthquake in 2008. The U~ited igh transport planes, Japan pr~~idcd and Singapore provided add1t1onal

;al supplies. See Hays (2008). ~22) over a decade ago.

Asian Approaches to Hzunan Security 181

of a state. Developments shaping the Asian regional landscape over the past two decades reinforce this hard reality. The inability of nascent regional security institutions such as the ARF to stabilise the South China Sea or the Malacca Strait has been illustrative. So too was the essential state-centric regional response -the formation of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) - to the Asian financial crisis. Perhaps the most graphic exatnple of sovereign predominance in the regional security environ1nent is China's rise, engineered through central state planning, as one of the world's foremost economic and milita1y powers. That country's formidable natural disasters and pandemics appear to be mere blips on a much broader screen of a truly formidable state-centric actor projecting incessant growth and increasing prominence within a world order still largely shaped by sovereign control of 1naterial resources.

The fundamental question as to what degree human security approaches can be integrated into traditional national security planning re1nains largely unanswered in an Asia-Pacific context. One way to test this conundrum is by case study analysis.

Case Studies Analyses

To measure the inter-relationship between human security and national security, cases must be identified where they have intersected and affected each other. Two such cases are presented here: No1ih Korea, and the so-called 'arc of crisis' that encompasses part of Indonesia, and most of Melanesia and other geographic locales in the 'wider Pacific' that are capable of generating crises that attract the concern of the Asia-Pacific's larger po\vers. In both cases, state-centric security approaches that rely on n1ilitary po\ver are seen as pro1ninent instruments for managing peace and stability. Human security politics, however, is arguably a comple1nent, and an alternative, to 1nanaging security politics in both cases. In the Korean peninsula, traditional strategies of deten-ence and diplomacy projected by the region's two major powers (China and the United States) could fail, leading to \Vide-scale conflict in which the dynamics of human security become increasingly central. The occurrence of flooding and famine, and the plight of North Korean refugees are already well-known human security co1nponents associated \vith North Korea. The survival of North Korea's population in the face of weapons of 1nass destruction use \vould be a paramount human security concern. In the \Vider 'southern Pacific', the 'responsibility to protect' has becon1e synonyn1ous with Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping ventures in Timor-Leste, Bougainville, Solomon Islands and other Melanesian crisis points. Large powers such as China and Japan have joined Australia, New Zealand and the United States in concerns about the ramifications of arc of crisis 'failed states' economic deprivation, climate change effects and other human security-related threats.

The research question that this chapter addresses is whether human security intersects or must intersect \Vith traditional national security concerns in Asian security politics. The case studies can be applied to test these propositions by

182 1Veu1 Approaches lo H1011an Security in the Asia-Pacific

comparing two key variables: (I) the extent to which human security measures are or could be more effective in modifying repressive state-centric behaviour that violates fundamental human security criteria (freedotn from fear and freedo1n from want) than traditional or national security-related hardline postures such as sanctions or deterrence; and (2) the degree to which external powers' competing geopolitical interests facilitate or mini1nise prospects for coordinating effective policy responses to repressive regime behaviour. Comparing these two factors complies with the 'structured focused comparison' tnethod of assessing a research question. By applying this method, key 'causal chains' and outcomes that influence the balance of human security and national security can be identified and hopefully provide some clues for better policy management of intersection of the two security approaches (George and Bennett 2005: 67-72).7

North Korea

Critics of traditional national security policy's applicability to contemporary international relations earmark North Korea as arguably the most graphic example of a country where power balancing, deterrence, tit-for-tat strategies and other traditional security approaches have failed to remedy a major regional instability. Despite the outside world extending massive food and energy assistance to keep the Kim family's regime afloat, North Korean policymakers have developed and tested nuclear weapons, spent one-quarter of their country's total gross national product on maintaining one of the world's largest annies, conducted intermittent and violent attacks against South Korean politicians, military units and civilians and engaged in such illicit acts as smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting and drug trafficking. Traditional state-centric responses to such provocations, including sanctions, military exercises and hard diplomatic bargaining, have proven to be unsuccessful in reforming North Korea's 'rogue state' behaviour.

Those more inclined to apply human security approaches towards North Korea debate the comparative utility of trying to hold its rulers accountable to international norms of human rights and hu1nanitarianism as opposed to focusing primarily on the survival of the North Korean population. The latter school of thought prioritises the survival objective even if this means working reluctantly with a North Korean govern1nent kno\Vn to cipher off substantial a1nounts of development assistance to other sectors than those programmes' originally intended targets (see Feffer 2010). 8 Either of these policy directions tend to downplay the value of applying 'sticks' and demonstrating resolve against North Korean provocations - such as its alleged sinking of the South Korean naval corvette, the Cheonan, in March 2010

7 A critique of this method is offered by Drozdova and Gaubatz (2010). 8 For a defence of the hutnan rights/humanitarian approach to human security as it

relates to North Korea, see Cohen (20 I 0).

~Asia-Pacific

h human security measures sive state-centric behaviour ,dom from fear and freedom ed hardline postures such as external powers' co1npeting ts for coordinating effective :omparing these two factors ethod of assessing a research chains' and outcomes that security can be identified and .geinent of intersection of the 67-72).7

pplicability to contemporary ibly the most graphic example tit-for-tat strategies and other ly a major regional instability. and energy assistance to keep cymakers have developed and country's total gross national

armies, conducted intennittent ns, military units and civilians ney laundering, counterfeiting ;ponses to such provocations, I diplomatic bargaining, have ~a's 'rogue state' behaviour. ,preaches towards North Korea lers accountable to international >posed to focusing prim~rily on tter school of thought pnontlses reluctantly with a North Korean unts of development assistance lly intended targets (see Feffer lownplay the value of applyi~g ~orean provocations - such as its te, the Cheonan, in March 2010

1a and Gaubatz (2010). . 't

10 approach to human secunty as 1

Asian Approaches to Hunzan Security 183

- in favour of conditioning longer-tern1 Notih Korean behaviour to\vard becoming less isolationist and bellicose toward the outside world.

The levels to \vhich state-centric and human-centric security outlooks intersect in the North Korean case seem to be determined by two key factors: ( 1) the unlikely prospect for alternative conduits to the North Korean government developing in that country that could be influenced by or involved with security interaction with external actors; and (2) the capacity of key external actors - China and the United States - to reach sufficient accord to coordinate development assistance, nuclear diplomacy and other key aspects of their policies toward North Korea that will not be 'played off' each other by the North Korean regime. The prospect of either of these conditions being met over the short-term is limited and the risks to Noiiheast Asian stability in the absence of such a n1odus vivendi are intensifying. In the absence of either factor developing more positively, the outlook for human security applications improving the Korean peninsula's current predica1nents is relatively bleak.

North Korea's ruling Kim family and its suppmiers have underwritten regime legitimacy and survival by perpetuating a cult of personality inherited from the founder of North Korea, Kim II-sung, and by deliberately isolating the North Korean populace from exposure to the outside world. This practice is applied to various NGOs working to extend food supplies and disaster relief to a North Korean populace that is often confronted with starvation, flooding and forced labour. In March 2009, for example, the Food Assistance Program underwritten by the United States Agency for International Development was discontinued when the five humanitarian groups involved with food distribution were expelled from the country just before it conducted missile tests and a nuclear weapons test (Young 2009; Hsu 2010). Total political control with no exception remains the most important objective for a North Korean leadership that interprets any dissent or potential for it as directly threatening national security. The North Korean political system is justified to its populace in the following terms: '[t]he Korean people are too pure-blooded, and so too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader' (Myers 2010).9 Under such conditions where the individual's rights and welfare are deemed a primary threat by North Korean national authorities determined to retain their political authority at all costs, the probabilities for human security initiatives to take hold in North Korean society are remote.

The North Korean leadership's Achilles heel is its complete failure to manage North Korea's resources or economy and its nearly complete dependence on external sources for food and fuel supplies. A united intemational community might leverage this condition in ways that would facilitate greater political moderation within North Korea. No such accord exists as China has elected to underwrite the cmrnnt North Korean regime's survival with the rationale that confronting the

9 Myers is a leading authority on North Korean propaganda \Vho teaches at Busan University.

184 New App1vaches to Hi1111an Security in the Asia-Pacific

North would only further destabilise Northeast Asia. Despite its anger over North Korea's three nuclear weapons tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009 and Februaiy 2013, China's historical and ideological ties with North Korea remain a powerful rationale for sustaining trade ties and hu1nanitarian assistance to the North. During the first half of 2010, China's trade with North Korea totalled approximately US$!.3 billion - a 15.2 per cent rise over the same timeframe in 2009 (Reuters 2010). According to various estimates, China provides up to 80 per cent of North Korea's consumer goods, 90 per cent of its energy imports and nearly half of its food (Bajoria 2009). Following massive flooding throughout many parts of North Korea in the late summer of 20 I 0, the official Korean News Central Agency reported that the Chinese government had announced the provision of an 'unspecified amount' of emergency relief materials (news.com.au 20 I 0). This trend was reaffirmed in August 2012 with an important visit to Beijing by Kim Jong-un 's uncle and key adviser, Jang Song-thaek, which resulted in a Chinese commitment to help North Korea develop special economic zones along the Chinese-North Korean border (Choe 2012).

This intensification of the Chinese-Nmth Korean economic conduit has been occurring simultaneously with the United States move to stiffen sanctions against the North Korean regime in retaliation for Pyongyang's suspected masterminding of the sinking of the Chaebol and in response to a failed North Korean missile test in April 2012. China wanted to preserve what it viewed as a stable situation on the Korean peninsula, notwithstanding how other external powers viewed North Korean behaviour. The alternatives to doing so, it surmised, could only be worse: the massive influx of North Korean refugees into Chinese territory in the event of North Korea incurring a regime implosion or the outbreak of conflict between North and South Korea which could result in US and allied forces defeating North Korea and occupying much or all of the Korean peninsula adjacent to China's current 1400 kms border with North Korea.

Traditional national security policy approaches are currently prevailing over htnnan-centric approaches in responding to North Korea's substantial econon1ic crisis and to its political differences with much of the international community. The United States and South Korea have adopted hardline postures, including the conduct of joint military exercises and the imposition of crippling economic sanctions, in response to what they deem to be excessively bellicose North Korean provocations. This posture is supported by much of the Western alliance system and by regional actors such as Japan, Australia and several ASEAN members, not to the same degree by China or Russia. This remains true notwithstanding unanimous passage ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 2087 in Jar:mai1 2013. It is questionable, however, if Chinese and Russian policy approaches motivated any more by human security concerns than their Western counterparts;_

China appears to be most concerned about stemming any tide of North Korean, refugees into China during times of \var or crisis and has signed an agreemen_t_­with North Korea that calls for enforced repatriation of any North Korean found' illegally on Chinese territory (Strother 201 O; Ji 20 I 0). Perhaps equally salienti~

/le Asia-Pacific

. Despite its anger over North )ctober 2006, May 2009 and :ies with North Korea remain unlanitarian assistance to the le with North Korea totalled e over the same timeframe in tes, China provides up to 80 cent of its energy imports and massive flooding throughout of 2010, the official Korean iverntnent had announced the relief materials (news.com.au :h an important visit to Beijing ng-thaek, which resulted in a special economic zones along

ul econotnic conduit has been ive to stiffen sanctions against ng's suspected masterminding .iled North Korean missile test ie\ved as a stable situation on >Xternal powers viewed North unnised, could only be worse: Chinese territory in the event , outbreak of conflict between d allied forces defeating North peninsula adjacent to China's

are currently prevailing over Korea's substantial econotnic ~ the international community. I hardline postures, including •osition of crippling economic ;sively bellicose North Korean >f the Western alliance system several ASEAN members, but nains true notwithstanding the

1cil Resolution 2087 in January Russian policy approaches are an their Western counterparts. ::•> ming any tide ofNorth Korean } ... and has signed an agreement :

Jn of any North Korean found 1 O). Perhaps equally salient

Asian Approaches to Hu111an Security 185

China's afore1nentioned concern about any future in1plosion of the North Korean leadership that would lead to a unified Korean peninsula potentially hostile to itself. Russian leaders likewise still view the Korean situation predominantly as an opportunity to enhance their o\Vn country's strategic influence in Northeast Asia (Kwon 2010). Western news agencies have reported that just some of the thousands of North Korean labourers who defected from terrible working conditions in forest areas near Amur in the Russian Far East over the past two decades have recently been systematically assisted by Russian human rights organisations (BBC Newsnight 2009).

In current circumstances, prospects that state-centric and human-centric security politics will intersect in a North Korean context ren1ain lo\v. There is little or no chance of an alternative form of domestic leadership that would embrace a human security ethos rising to challenge the Kim regime any time soon, short of North Korea's total implosion (an unlikely occurrence). A fresh resurgence of US and South Korean planning toward updating deterrence strategy targeted against the North seems to have had little effect on Kirn Jong-un's bellicose rhetoric or provocative behaviour directed against American and South Korean force deployments on or adjacent to the Korean peninsula (Cheon 2012; NT! 2012). The key external actors in this case - China and the United States - have been unable to coordinate their policies toward the North to the extent that their development assistance, humanitarian relief or political interaction with North Korea are sufficiently harmonious to avoid Pyongyang from leveraging for its own strategic advantage. The plight of individual Nmth Koreans suffering from fear and want has been buried in the process. Accordingly, the two key factors designated here for securing effective balancing between human security and national security - human security measures nlodifying regime oppression and effective external po\Ver coordination - are lacking in the North Korean case.

The 'Arc of Crisis'

The 'arc of crisis' (also commonly termed the' arc ofinstability') in the South Pacific became a growing concern to Australia and New Zealand - the two developed 'Pacific powers' - during the late 1980s and intensified over the following two decades. Two political coups in Fiji in May and September 1987 represented the first forceful takeover of power in a Pacific Island state. These were followed by the Bougainville crisis (1988-1997). Military contingents from Australia and New Zealand were involved in a peacekeeping role in Bougainville, but those two countries refrained from intervening in the 1987 Fiji episodes or in two subsequent coups there in 2000 and 2006. In September 1999, an Australian-led International Force East Timar deployed to that locale in response to widespread violence precipitated by pro-Indonesian militia after a referendum to separate from Indonesia was overwhelmingly passed by the East Timorese. In June 2003, Australia again led an intervention force to a South Pacific country- the Regional

186 NeH' Approaches to H111na11 Security in the Asia-Pacific

Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands - constituted largely of Pacific Island Forum member-state defence forces. New Caledonia also experienced domestic political turbulence throughout tl1e 1980s and 1990s. Vanuatu suffered political turmoil in 1988, 2001and2005, although open violence was successfully averted in that country.

Cornman denominators underlying these incidents involve a wide mixture of state-centric and hun1an-centric factors. These include co1nmon colonial experiences leading to the fonnation of weak and frag111ented states in a Melanesian sub-region populated by historically unfriendly ethnic groups, sharp disparities in \vealth and education bet\veen urban and rural inhabitants, ende1nic land and resource disputes, govern1nental co1Tuption, nepotistn and 1nis1nanagement, and a lack of capacity to respond to natural disasters or other non-traditional security challenges (these are designated by May 2003: 11-12). In the context of the structured focused co1nparison approach adopted in this chapter, the first criterion - an uncontested do111estic political regi111e - is only partially evident. The second factor - a lack of external coordination in response to state-centric and hu1nan­centric crises in South Pacific locales - is evident; only Australia, Ne\v Zealand and the South Pacific Forum have adopted actual conflict stabilisation postures over the past decade.

Australian and New Zealand roles may be increasingly challenged as South Pacific (and particularly Melanesian) states begin to assert greater foreign policy independence by cultivating a wider array of external relationships with different kinds of states. Con1111odore Frank Baini111ara111a's seizure of power in Fiji during a December 2006 coup d'etat was the most significant development illustrating this trend. Significantly, Australia and New Zealand rejected a request by the about-to-be deposed govern1nent leader, Pri111e Minister Laisenia Qarase, to intervene against the Fijian Army (which was loyal to Bainimarama) at the time. In retrospect, as Matthew Hill (2010: 111) has suggested:

The strategic reality in late-2006 \vas that Canberra and Wellington faced a co1n1nitted target over \Vhich they held little credible short-tern1 leverage

... For the Australasian po\vers, atte1npts at strongly and publically deterring Bainimara1na carried the risks of forcing the RFMF's [Royal Fijian Military Forces'] hand, \vhile playing into the regional discourse of neo-colonial

interventionis1n that had gained ground particularly in Melanesia follo\ving the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solo1non Islands.

During the ensuing years, Fiji has maintained fractious ties with its t\vo largest Pacific neighbours. Australia and New Zealand imposed travel bans on Fijian government leaders and in1ple1nented financial restrictions in response to \Vhat they viewed as the Baini1nara1na govern1nent's violations of basic freedo1ns (especially in the areas of political dissent, legal affairs and media control) and human rights. Fiji retaliated by forging intennittent coalitions with other Melanesian states that are, at times, prone to view Australia and New Zealand as

!1e Asia-Pacific

ted largely of Pacific Islan.d ia also experienced domestic ls. Vanuatu suffered political ~nee \vas successfully averted

ents involve a wide mixture e include common colonial rmented states in a Melanesian ;nic groups, sharp disparities nhabitants, endemic land and sm and mismanage1nent, and other non-traditional security

i l-12). In the context of the this chapter, the first criterion

I partially evident. The second ;e to state-centric and huinan­, only Australia, New Zealand conflict stabilisation postures

reasingly challenged as South :rin to assert greater foreign 'of external relationships with ·1marama's seizure of power in , most significant development ~ew Zealand rejected a request ne Minister Laisenia Qarase, to il to Bainimarama) at the time. gested:

iberra and Wellington faced credible short-term leverage igly and publically deterring ·MF's [Royal Fijian Military

11 discourse of neo-colonial ly in Melanesia following the

ids.

ied fractious ties with its two .ealand imposed travel bans on ncial restrictions in response to it's violations of basic freedo111s gal affairs and media. control) termittent coalitions with other v Australia and New Zealand as

Asian Approaches to Htunan Security 187

'nee-colonial' powers in the Pacific. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is one such group.'° Originally formed in 1983 and f01malised as an institution in 2007, Bainimarama hosted the 2011 MSG summit in Suva where other Melanesian participants demanded Fiji's inclusion in key regional trade discussions. The MSG has also proposed the formation of a humanitarian and emergency response force to provide a predominantly Melanesian capability for carrying out disaster relief missions and to eventually generate a peace-building capacity.

Throughout the Bainimarama years, Australia and New Zealand have consistently sustained a human security approach toward the South Pacific that assigns 'freedom from fear' equal \veightto 'freedom from want' -as their sanctions policies and other hardline measures have endeavoured to underscore. Advocates of this approach would point to what they view as recent signs that Bainimarama was 'softening' his authoritarian rule as a verification of this posture's effectiveness. Indeed, more recent developments in the 'Fiji story' could be interpreted as being relatively positive. In late July 2012,Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr and his New Zealand counterpart, Murray McCully, met with Fiji Foreign Minister Inoke Kubuobola and agreed to restore full diplomatic representation to Fiji two years after Australia's and New Zealand's high commissioners were forced to leave Suva. Travel bans on Fiji civilians working for the Bainitnarama regime would also be lifted (although they would remain in place for Fiji military personnel). This partial rapprochement was largely based on a more optimistic reading of Fiji's progress toward restoring more de1nocratic practices as it moves toward conducting democratic elections after September 2014 (Callick 2012).

It may also, however, have been the product of traditional national security calculations related to geopolitics: more specificaily, a reassessment in Canberra and Wellington about how futile the imposition of sanctions and a hardline posture led by Australian and New Zealand diplomats - especially within the somewhat irrelevant and moribund confines of the South Pacific Fonun - really were. Throughout 2012, Washington reportedly urged Australian officials to moderate their policy out of concerns that Fiji was moving closer to China in response to Australian/New Zealand diplomacy, possibly handing the Chinese disproportionate influence in such bodies as the MSG at a time when the United States planned to upgrade its own Pacific Island strategic presence as a means of bridging vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean with its newly announced staging post in Darwin (Herr and Bergin 2012a, 2012b)."

I 0 Membership of the MSG includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia.

l I For in-depth background on Pacific Island politico-security issues, see Herr and Bergin (2011). The authors note that \Vhile China is a major bilateral diplomatic actor in the region and a significant aid donor to it, Chinese officials are primarily interested in preventing the Pacific Islands from being used against China rather than in dominating the region (Herr and Bergin 2011: 33).

188 New Approaches to Hu111a11 Security in the Asia-Pacific

Non-traditional security initiatives in the arc of crisis have been relatively few and only modestly successful. As Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin have observed, this can be attributed in part to the reality that regional security challenges are both national and transnational (Herr and Bergin 2011: 35). The South Pacific Forum's 2005 'Pacific Plan' designated law enforcement and security along with economic growth, sustainable develop1nent and good governance as 'pillars' or priorities in developing regional stability and prosperity. To date, ho\vever, and with fe\v exceptions (such as the regulation of regional fisheries) progress has been mixed in meeting these objectives. Health risks, climate change, food security, energy prices, demographic change and disaster manage1nent all represent extraordinary tests for the region's underdeveloped resource infrastructures that are often riddled with corruption and technological deficiencies.

How well Pacific states are able to contain their vulnerability to external parties and forces \Vhile developing new approaches for shaping and pursuing co1nmon regional objectives and strategies will constitute a major test of the feasibility of integrating state-centric and htunan security paradig1ns. To date, the first variable no1ninated for this chapter's case study approach - 1nodifying state do1nination over its populaces (the 'freedom from fear' factor) - has clearly receded into the background if one considers recent develop1nents as a valid measure of human security progress. The second factor - external state-centric competition - seems less problematic only because China and the United States have both remained resigned not to impose their sharpening Asia-Pacific and global competition directly into the arc of crisis. This 1nay change, however, if China's comn1ercial interests (fisheries developn1ent and 1nining ventures) increase substantially over the next decade and/or the US begins to view pmts of Polynesia and Melanesia as a critical geographic bridge to its Australian presence.

Conclusion: Human Security and State-Centric Security- Chasing an Elusive Nexus

This chapter's two case studies have illustrated several funda111ental preconditions for achieving a nexus bet\veen hu1nan security and state-centric politics - or \Vhat Gregory MacCallion (see Chapter 12 in this volume) terms the 'adaptation' or 'transformation' co1nponents of his national security frame\vork. Until these preconditions are met, the prospects for hu111an security gaining substantial ground in the calculations of states' national security 1nanagers will re1nain distant.

First, geopolitics continues to tru1np states' policymakers' readiness to shift their concerns toward their populaces internal security and prosperity. This is hardly surprising in the cases of both North Korea and the arc of crisis because these states remain highly fragile and vulnerable to external challenges to the political elite's survival. Under such circumstances, state identity re1nains central and the enhance1nent of citizens' lives and prosperity can only be vie\ved as an incidental and long-term side-benefit.

--1

'he As;a-Pacijic

!risis have been relatively fe\v ,nthony Bergin have observed, al security challenges are both 5). The South Pacific Forum's security along \Vith econo1nic iance as 'pillars' or priorities date, however, and with few

ries) progress has been mixed change, food security, energy ent all represent extraordinary ·.tructures that are often riddled

rulnerability to external parties haping and pursuing co1nmon major test of the feasibility of gms. To date, the first variable - modifying state domination - bas clearly receded into the as a valid measure of human e-centric competition - see1ns ed States have both remained icific and global competition )Wever, if China's commercial es) increase substantially over of Polynesia and Melanesia as

ce.

Security - Chasing an

'ral fundamental preconditions state-centric politics - or \vhat 1me) terms the 'adaptation' or urity framework. Until these irity gaining substantial ground oers will remain distant. ~licymakers' readiness to shift :curity and prosperity. This is a and the arc of crisis because

to external challenges to the :;, state identity re1nains central ~rity can only be viewed as an

Asian Approaches to Hzonan Security 189

Second, external states' efforts to infuse hutnan security benefits into these sovereignties in conformity with the 'freedom fron1 \Vant' criterion have been, at best, only partially successful. Outside aid is often received begrudgingly and has been manipulated, particularly in North Korea, to reinforce the authority of state­based institutions and practices. In the arc of crisis, the 'responsibility to protect' has experienced qualified success as the Bougainville and Solomon Islands episodes attest - but there have been no 'responsibility to protect' operations seriously considered for regin1es such as North Korea or Fiji \Vho co1nmand sufficiently strong annies to 111ake the cost of military intervention just too great to enforce human security non11s. There is no i1nn1ediate solution to this dichotoiny as developed states - tired of absorbing tnilitary casualties in distant \Vars \Vithout clear outcomes and stretched to the limits financially - are unlikely to engage in future 1nilitary operations unless their O\vn state survival is threatened.

Nevertheless, hun1an security continues to factor into international politics as a bench1nark for advancing the nonns found in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Htunan Rights and other covenants focused on addressing and advancing the rights of individuals in an increasingly co1nplex and often inore threatening \vorld. Diplo1natic progress does intern1ittently occur as illustrated by the Six Party Talks involving North Korea, and Australia's and New Zealand's recent adjustinents in their previously hardline foreign policies directed to\vard Fiji. Sanctions are sometiines counterbalanced by disaster relief efforts geared toward modifying the effects of famine, flooding and internecine conflicts.

Perhaps the most fundatnental precondition for integrating human security and national security is to encourage state policymakers, whenever possible, to relate and justify their security policy rationales and behaviour to explicit gains for their populaces. This goes beyond the dissemination of propaganda or rhetoric that auton1atically equates state interests as synonyn1ous with the interests of those governed by the state. It instead subjects those elites and policymakers previously accusto1ned to referring to the state and its people as a unitary actor to becon1e more explicit in terms of linking what their regimes are doing relative to the long­term benefits for their citizens. The venues of accountability for i1nple1nenting this standard are hardly limited. They include international institutions, those regimes to which state-centric actors belong, epistemic co1nmunities and an increasingly sophisticated and globalised international community-at-large.

A second precondition, as Sorpong Peou has observed, is to ensure that the hu1nan security approach focuses 'on the n1ost important sources of threat to human security' so as to avoid human security meaning everything to everyone. Deriving consensus on 'what n1atters 1nost' to people's survival and welfare is a key priority in shaping human security politics and ensuring that it will relate meaningfully to those who pursue policy on the basis of interests as well as ideals (see Peou 2009: 143-5). Such consensus is best derived in liberal democracies, reflected by both the institutional checks and balances these countries impose on their own leaderships and by their sustained campaigns to infuse inten1ational egalitarian and humane nonns.

190 NeH1 Approaches lo Hu111an Security in the Asia-Pacific

The first precondition can potentially moderate the forces of political extre1nis1n within states and thus help avoid a government's arbitrary control of its people's destinies through the process of securitisation (as MacCal!ion notes in Chapter 12). With respect to the second precondition, promoting more humane norms externally is best done when liberal democracies are in accord with the type oflmman security they wish to endorse and export.

Ultimately, those who would embrace human security approaches as the desired standards for security behaviour share the responsibility with those elites whom they often target to cultivate and shape an Asia-Pacific and global security environment that is more conducive to realising such standards. Absent of such an arrangement, effective sharing of the nexus between hu1nan and state-centric security \Vill remain elusive.

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