arunachal issue

8/8/2019 Arunachal Issue

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While revealing the µground situation¶ of Indo-China border in Arunachal Pradesh, the preliminaryreport of the BJP fact finding committee said that Thagla Ridge which is about 60 km away fromZemithang on the north-westerly side of the border, Namka Chu and Sumdrong Chu Valley is underChinese occupation since 1986. As a result, lot of traditional grazing land of local people has been lost,affecting the livelihood of the local herdsmen.

In Bumla sector, the Indian Army post is located not on Mac Mohan Line, Therefore, here the Line of

Actual Control (LAC) is not corresponding with the Machmohan Line, recognized by India.

In Tingbu sector, vast area of traditional grazing land of the local people has been encroached byChinese Army, the report said. Even an important and sacred Buddhist statue has been displaced bythe Chinese Army, it added.

In Upper Subansiri district, the Asa-Pila-Maya Army camp which was in Indian Territory is now underChinese occupation, the report claimed. In Dibang Valley district, the Athu-Pupu range one of theimportant sacred historical place of the local people is now under Chinese occupation since 2006.

In Chaklagam range the three mountain ranges frequented by Indian hunters have been occupied bythe Chinese since 2006.

In Kurung Kumey district, prior to 1962 war, there were nine Army base camps till the actual border.Today, only two of those camps are under the Indian Army control. Seven of them have beenoccupied by the Chinese Army.

Referring to India¶s recent troop deployment in Arunachal Pradesh and the construction of anew airbase at Tezpur, Assam, Zhang Haizjou writing in China Daily on June 10, 2009 statesthat ³India is attempting to extend its control over a disputed border area«´ Similarly, LiHongmei writing in the People¶s Daily has held India responsible for hiking tension overArunachal Pradesh by harbouring ³awe, vexation, envy and jealousy ± in the face of itsgiant neighbour´ China. These are the latest in a spate of recent writings in the officialmedia blaming India for increasing bilateral tensions by deploying troops in ArunachalPradesh. The sheer barrage of these scathing writings makes it prudent for India to takenote of the trends in Chinese thinking on India¶s border areas. It appears that at the

moment China might choose to raise its concerns over Indian troop deployment in theregion at the forthcoming Special Representatives level meeting scheduled in August.

China appears to have taken India¶s recent strategic moves in Arunachal seriously,portraying them as a ³complex development´ in the bilateral relationship. The Chinesereaction appears resolute. A mixture of anger, concern and anxiety is visible among Chinesescholars, party officials and media analysts trying to identify the rationale behind India¶sstrategic decision to revitalize its North-East region. Two dominant discourses are visible.One, to understand and evaluate India¶s strategic/military moves in the North-East region.Two, to gauge India¶s competitiveness both in protecting Arunachal and in comparison toChina¶s overall progress. For instance, referring to India¶s increasing military presence in theregion, Bi Mingxin emphasizes (Xinhua, 15 June 2009) that ³capable of carrying nuclearweapons and tailor-made for Indian specifications « Tezpur has become the third dedicatedSukhoi-30MKI airbase in the country after Pune in Western India and Bareilly in NorthernIndia.´ The piece goes on to outline that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the process of upgrading ³five bases in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country, includingTezpur, Chabua, Jorhat (Assam), Panagarh (West Bengal) and Purnea.´

Chinese writings also display concern over India¶s strategic competitiveness on a range of issues. A prime example is the piece titled ³India¶s unwise military moves,´ published in theofficial Global Times on 11 June 2009, which states:



³India likes to brag about its sustainable development, but worries that it is being leftbehind by China. China is seen in India as both a potential threat and a competitor tosurpass. But India can¶t actually compete with China in a number of areas, like internationalinfluence, overall national power and economic scale « China won¶t make any compromisesin its border disputes with India « India¶s current course can only lead to rivalry betweenthe two countries. India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of

a potential confrontation with China.´ An interaction with leading Chinese experts from SIIS, SASS, CIIS, CICIR and governmentofficials indicates that China is in no mood to relax its stance over Arunachal. In fact, thereis a growing feeling that India will have to ³manage´ its relationship carefully with a moreassertive China. There seems to be a consensus among leading Chinese experts ininfluential think-tanks that ³India is adopting the military means in the north-eastern sectorto have a good control over the disputed issue of Arunachal Pradesh.´ China has beenparticularly riled by the Asian Development Bank¶s (ADB) approval of a loan worth US$60million for infrastructure development in Arunachal Pradesh. Reacting strongly to thedevelopment, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang had commented that the ADB¶sfinancial approval ³cannot change the existence of the China-India territorial disputes, norChina¶s position on the issue.´ Beijing had strongly opposed the loan, though India

resolutely managed to push through with the strong support of the US, Japan and SouthKorea.

In principle, public opinion in China is in favour of taking an official call on ArunachalPradesh by denouncing the earlier ³agreed official principles´. Interactions with Chineseexperts confirm the fact that their understanding is that ³mutually agreed principles´ haveonly a tactical value for them. The Chinese have no hesitation in unilaterally rejecting anyprinciple if it creates barriers to the promotion of their national interests. The recent mediaand scholarly discourse on how to respond to India¶s strategic move in Arunachal Pradeshunderlines this fact ± that China should not hold sacrosanct the settled principles forboundary demarcation agreed upon in 2005 that ³in reaching the boundary settlement, thetwo sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.´ Publicly renouncing this provision on 6 June 2007, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that

³mere presence´ in populated areas would not affect China¶s claim. Earlier, the formerChinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi remarked on 20 November 2006 on CNN-IBNTelevision that ³historically, the whole of Arunachal Pradesh´ belongs to China.

At the very least, this Chinese posture may be seen as a pointer to the danger of Chinamaking its campaign public that ³Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory´. China hasconstantly been referring to Arunachal Pradesh as a ³complex historical chapter´ in theChina-India border dispute. Most Chinese experts refer to the fact that the sixth Dalai Lamahailed from Monyul in Arunachal Pradesh. In the Chinese contention, three parts of thisregion ± Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul ± were under the Tibetan administrative and

jurisdictional control. Though it has officially claimed time and again 90,000 sq. km. of landin Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, Beijing¶s primary interest is limited to Tawang. A leadingexpert in Shanghai asserts that ³historically, Tawang belongs to Tibet; and India should

realize this fact quickly in order to avoid a situation like 1962.´ Today, public opinion in China is keen on once again taking a strong position on Arunachal.In the wake of India¶s strategic planning in the North-East, Chinese experts rue theirgovernment¶s mistake in not gaining control of Arunachal Pradesh during the 1962 War. Ascholar in Shanghai points out, for example, that ³it was a costly error on the part of China´ to have declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November 1962 without gaining control overthe region.



Experts cite several assumptions as to this ³great political mistake´ was made. One, thoughnot the primary reason, was that the Chinese military was short of ³logistical support´. Moreimportantly, the military decided to retreat from Arunachal because it wanted to uphold theprinciple of ³peaceful solution´ to the boundary issue with India in future. An expert inShanghai opines that the Chinese political leadership did not set much store on gainingcontrol over Arunachal because it never anticipated that the Tibet crisis would hurt the

Chinese as deeply as it does today. A well-known expert on India in Beijing holds the viewthat external factors like the anticipated US support to India and the problematic Sino-Soviet relationship forced the Chinese to retreat from Arunachal Pradesh.

To this day, China refers to Arunachal Pradesh as ³Southern Tibet´ and lays claims to thisterritory. Though the Chinese rhetoric does not get much notice in India, these publicoutbursts on India¶s strategic planning in Arunachal reveal the Chinese anxiety. To anextent, many in Beijing possibly believe that the time has come to get tough on the issue.Assumptions and assessments are still being made in the Chinese public discourse overArunachal in the context of its past, present and future. Officials and experts remain quitealert when it comes to affairs related to Tibet and the China-India boundary issue. ThoughChinese have not reacted publicly to India¶s recent moves in the region, it goes withoutsaying that the issue of Arunachal is taken very seriously both within the government and in

the public discourse. At the moment China¶s views on Arunachal appear more complex thanever.

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