art. relativism and hutcheson´s aesthetic theory

Relativism and Hutcheson's Aesthetic TheoryAuthor(s): Carolyn Wilker KorsmeyerReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1975), pp. 319-330Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708930 .Accessed: 04/03/2013 10:09

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RELATIVISM AND HUTCHESON'S AESTHETIC THEORY

BY CAROLYN WILKER KORSMEYER

In his early treatise, Part I of the Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), Francis Hutcheson outlined a theory of aesthetics in which he argued that beauty is a kind of pleasure and is perceived by a special internal sense. This aesthetic theory served in part to pave the way for the acceptance of the companion treatise, Part II, in which he argued in a similar fashion for a special moral sense for the perception of virtue.1 The rest of Hutcheson's philosophical endeavors were devoted to refining his theory of morals.2 Overshadowed by the more fully developed ethical theory, his theory of the internal sense of beauty has received comparatively little attention.

Hutcheson was one of the first eighteenth-century philosophers to analyze beauty as a kind of pleasure and to examine the different sorts of pleasures one can derive from art. He also conducted an extensive investigation into those objects which appear beautiful, in an attempt to isolate the qualities which give rise to aesthetic pleasure. He believed that both his theory of pleasure and his investigation of "beauty-making" qualities would provide a basis for the refutation of current relativistic positions.

Hutcheson was especially concerned to refute the claim of subjective relativism: that aesthetic judgments say nothing about the objective qualities of an object, and that therefore "aesthetic judgments are just matters of personal taste, and there is no disputing about taste." This view is particularly problematic for Hutcheson, since he grants that beauty is not an objective quality and that the perception of beauty is a pleasure experienced by the individual perceiver. Given this, he must show how, nevertheless, the aesthetic value judgment is not just an expression of personal liking which is relevant only to the perceiver. He must show that each individual's aesthetic pleasure is related to aesthetic principles relevant to all perceivers, and that therefore the subjective relativist is wrong.

Hutcheson's aesthetic theory makes a significant contribution to the historical development of British aesthetics, for both his attempt and (as I argue) his failure to develop a theory which withstands the challenge of relativism lead directly to the kind of aesthetics formulated later by Hume in his essay Of the

1"If the Reader be convinc'd of such Determinations of the Mind to be pleas'd with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems, it will be no difficult matter to ap- prehend another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the Moral Sense which makes the subject of the second Treatise." Frances Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 2nd ed. (London, 1726), xvii. (All quotations from Hutcheson are from this edition.)

2His major works on ethics include: An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of Our Passions and Affections (1728); Illustrations On the Moral Sense (1728); Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria (1742); A System of Moral Philosophy (post- humously published in 1755).

319


320 CAROLYN WILKER KORSMEYER

Standard of Taste (1757). In addition, the theory that beauty and pleasure are significantly connected is by no means dated, nor, for that matter, is the search for aesthetic principles.3 The problems Hutcheson encountered are fa- miliar to modern aestheticians as well, and his attempt to deal with the problem of relativism is as instructive for modern theorists as it was for Hume.

Hutcheson's immediate goal in the Inquiry was to refute the "rational interest theory" of Hobbes and Mandeville, an egoistic theory of value which maintains that the aesthetic experience (and the finding of an action or person morally good or bad) has its source in the self-interested pleasure of the perceiver. As an alternative, Hutcheson presented his theory that human beings are endowed with an inner sense, an innate propensity to take pleasure in objects and actions of a certain character, without regard for self-interest.

Taking a broader perspective, we can see Hutcheson's aesthetic theory as an attempt to deal with the problem of relativism, while yet maintaining that the aesthetic experience (i.e., perceiving something as beautiful) is a kind of pleasure. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder to the extent that it is not a quality belonging to the objects perceived but is rather a pleasurable idea raised in the mind of the observer. However, Hutcheson wishes to maintain that his theory does not entail the subjective relativity of aesthetic judgments. He argues that, since all human beings have a sense of beauty, which moreover can be shown to be sensitive to particular qualities in objects, aesthetic judgments do have intersubjective validity.

The particular version of relativism to which Hutcheson objected was that implied by the rational interest theory. Hobbes had argued that moral approbation is focused on those actions which one believes will satisfy desire or appetite. "Good," therefore, is a term which we apply to the objects of our desire, and correspondingly, "beautiful" signifies the appearance of objects which promise that they will satisfy desire. The real or imagined satisfaction of desire produces the feeling of pleasure which accompanies acts of approbation. The judgment that an object is beautiful, in short, is reducible to the claim that an object gives pleasure because it appears to be able to satisfy a person's desire.

Now if each man always strives to maximize his personal self-interest, and if the objects he sees as beautiful are a reflection of that self-interest, then it would follow that each judgment of beauty is going to be an expression of purely individual concern. The particular judgment of beauty will mean "I find x beautiful because it gratifies some imagined desire of mine." In short, one can argue that a reduction of beauty to interest entails relativism because of the subjective nature of that interest. As Hobbes said: And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appe- tites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object. ... But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these

3E.g., Monroe Beardsley, "Reasons in Aesthetic Judgments," Introductory Read- ings in Aesthetics, ed. John Hospers (New York, 1969), 245-53.


RELATIVISM AND HUTCHESON'S AESTHETIC THEORY 321

words of good, evil, contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any com- mon rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves....4

It is equally important to note the relativism that Hutcheson himself must confront, given the nature of his own ideas about beauty. He agrees with Hobbes that the idea of beauty does not mirror a quality in an object and that it does involve the perceiver's pleasure. Given this, the burden of proof is on him to show how his theory is not itself a form of relativism, asserting that "x is beautiful" is simply a personal expression of liking, idiosyncratic to the individual perceiver. What could constitute a solution to the problem of relativism and proof of the possibility of consensus on matters of aesthetic value will become clearer as we examine Hutcheson's theory of the inner sense.

Since Hutcheson agrees that the perception of beauty is a kind of pleasure, his first task in the refutation of the rational interest theory must be to show that aesthetic pleasure is not connected with interest or desire. This he dem- onstrates by pointing out that the pleasures of interest and pleasures in beauty often conflict and hence cannot be identical. The divorce of beauty from interest is obvious, he believes, from observation of our own experience. And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily5 pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Reso- lution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity in an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will make an Object grateful, nor View of Detriment, distinct from Immediate Pain in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatenings or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the Same.6

The thrust of Hutcheson's arguments is that the rational interest theory is incompatible with the facts of experience. Since in our experience beauty and

4Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (London, 1839), III, 40-41. One might argue that the Hobbesian position is not necessarily relativistic by appealing to the biological similarity of all human beings. Because human beings qua living organisms need many of the same things, it would follow that their desires would also coincide, and that perceptions of objects as beautiful might not differ substantially from individual to individual. Whereas this may hold true for the "basic" human desires (food, shelter, etc.), it probably would not be true for the vast majority of individual desires, which reflect the whims of men who need not be concerned with mere physical sustenance. Given the fact that many interests do differ, an aesthetic theory which equates beauty with perception of interest will have relativistic consequences. Hutcheson maintains that, even in cases where the interests of two individuals differ, their perceptions of objects as beautiful may not differ, thus proving that beauty is not based on interest.

5I.e., we cannot alter them at will. 6Inquiry, Section II, Article 14.



interest are separable, they cannot be identical. From this we must conclude that beauty is a species of pleasure which does not depend upon the fulfillment of desire.7

The existence of a simple idea of disinterested pleasure8 (i.e., a pleasure unrelated to desire), indicates that it is the product of a hitherto unrecognized sense.9 It is perceived passively and cannot be altered by an act of will on the part of the perceiver; it is an immediate pleasure which is enjoyed in and of itself and not for any value which it might bring as its consequent; and it is not the product of a rational process.10

Whereas Hobbes had considered aesthetic pleasure to be a rational pleasure1 brought about by the fulfillment of imaginative expectation, or pleasure in the promise or anticipation of the satisfaction of desire, Hutcheson maintains that beauty is a sensible pleasure having nothing to do with self- interest.

Hutcheson calls the sense of beauty an "inner" or "internal" sense because it does not have an organ of sensation.12 This power of perception uses the data received by the external senses, principally the eyes and the ears. Although in this respect the ideas of the inner sense depend upon ideas perceived by the external senses, they are nonetheless simple ideas immediately perceived: simple ideas of disinterested pleasure.13

If beauty is an idea perceived by this special inner sense, and if the idea of beauty is a disinterested pleasure, what would agreement over an aesthetic value judgment be? According to Hutcheson, when one perceives something as beautiful, he does not perceive or intuit any quality (e.g., beauty) which belongs to the object itself. Consequently, the aesthetic value judgment "x is beautiful" does not describe the object x. It does not attribute the property beautiful to it, despite the grammatical form of the sentence. It follows that agreement over the value judgment cannot be agreement over the truth of the property ascrip- tion, "x possesses the quality beautiful."

7Kant, who was favorably impressed with the aesthetic theory developed by Hutcheson, also characterized aesthetic pleasure as disinterested: the "First Moment of Beauty" from the Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York, 1951).

8Jerome Stolnitz has documented the origin of the notion of disinterestedness in British value theory in his "The Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness,"' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 20 (Winter 1961), 131-43.

9"The reason why Hutcheson thinks the approbation of moral sense necessary is that it had not been generally recognized that there could be a disinterested desire." D. D. Raphael, The Moral Sense (London, 1947), 24.

1?lnquiry, Section I, Article 3. "Hence Hutcheson's term, "rational interest theory." 12Hutcheson attaches little importance to the term "inner." He uses it as a matter

of convenience to distinguish the ability to perceive beauty from the ability to perceive simple ideas via the ordinary five senses, and as a more useful term with which to speak of perceiving beauty in non-sensible objects, such as mathematical theorems: Inquiry, Section I, Articles 10 and 11.

13Although he does not agree that disinterestedness is a defining characteristic of the aesthetic experience, Santayana's theory of beauty is also reminiscent of Hutcheson's. He calls beauty "pleasure objectified": Part I of The Sense of Beauty (New York, 1896).



Nor does the value judgment "x is beautiful" refer only to the feeling of pleasure perceived by the inner sense, as it would if Hutcheson were making the subjectivist claim that "x is beautiful" means "I feel pleasure upon con- templating x." Such an interpretation of Hutcheson's theory is inconsistent with his refutation of the skepticism and egoism of the rational interest theory.

It would seem, then, that aesthetic agreement consists in the similarity of feelings about the particular object in question. That is, aesthetic agreement between two perceivers over the beauty of a particular object consists in both perceivers having a feeling of disinterested pleasure of similar intensity. The value judgment itself, then, would be an expression of the pleasure aroused in the presence of x, and verbal agreement would be the expression of similar sentiments over the same object.14 That aesthetic agreement consists in feeling the same kind of pleasure is borne out by Hutcheson's remark that ". . . we find as great an Agreement of Men in their Relishes of Forms, as in their external Senses ... ."15

Hutcheson's answer to the problem of relativism thus far concentrates on the inner sense and the way it functions. Since aesthetic experience is a disinterested pleasure of the inner sense, he rules out the relevance of the disparate desires and whims of appetite which the rational interest theorists supposed would make aesthetic agreement impossible. Hutcheson has opened the door for intersubjectively relevant judgments of taste. Since all human beings possess an inner sense of beauty which operates independently of selfish desires, it is at least possible that aesthetic preferences will be the same or similar from person to person. It remains for Hutcheson to show that this is in fact the case, and that the inner sense performs uniformly from individual to individual.

Given the vast disparity of taste evidenced both from culture to culture and within a single culture, it would seem at first that Hutcheson's assumption of the uniform operation of the inner sense is not warranted. He recognizes the existence of aesthetic disagreement and answers its challenge in two ways: (1) by explaining that disagreement arises from factors which interfere with the activity of the inner sense, and (2) by revealing similarities among even those tastes which appear to be quite different, thus proving that the inner sense reacts with some regularity, even when hindered.

There are two major kinds of interference in the operation of the inner sense, he says: false belief and prejudice (frequently due to the effects of education) and associated ideas:

'4The noncognitivist strains in Hutcheson's thinking have been pointed out and given detailed analysis by William Frankena, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory," this Journal (June 1955), 356-75; William Blackstone, Francis Hutcheson and Contempo- rary Ethical Theory (Athens, Georgia, 1965); and most recently by Bernard Peach, editor's introduction to Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Cambridge, 1971). It should be pointed out that Hutcheson himself never talks about the status of statements or propositions making the aesthetic value judgment, and that the metaethical position attributed to him is extrapolated from his remarks on the inner sense and disinterested pleasure.

5lInquiry, Preface, xvii.



... our Sense acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.16 We may, for example, confuse our feelings about the makers of an object with the feeling which we would obtain from an unprejudiced contemplation of the object, disregarding our opinions about its author. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, which are sometimes true and sometimes false; and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, which in reality have no such Qualitys.... Education may make an unattentive Goth imagine that his Countrymen have attain'd the Perfection of Architecture; and an Aversion to their Enemys, the Romans, may have join'd some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd these Prejudices, had he been void of a Sense of Beauty.17

In addition to education and prejudice, associated ideas may affect the inner sense, either by causing the perceiver to find more lovely a homely item which reminds him of happy times, or by altering an ordinarily pleasant perception into an unpleasant one, ... as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation.18 The association of Ideas ... is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancies in the Sense of Beauty as well as in the external Senses.19

Without the interfering influences of these two factors, Hutcheson assumes, the inner sense would function freely and everyone would exhibit a similarity in their aesthetic preferences. However, it is clear that prejudice and associated ideas can account for only the most extreme cases of aesthetic disagreement, for anyone who has grown up in a particular society and un- dergone a certain amount of education and experience is going to have a body of beliefs and associations which will affect his inner sense. The relativist, seizing upon this fact, could quickly point out that however uniformly the virgin inner sense may be assumed to behave, by adulthood it will perform as idiosyncratically as the appetite and desire of the rational interest theory. It is doubtful that Hutcheson fully recognized the possibility of this counter-attack, for he himself had a vulnerable tendency to assume a high degree of interper- sonal agreement on aesthetic matters.20 Nonetheless, his investigation into aesthetic principles provides a possible response. Having analyzed the function of the sense of beauty, Hutcheson turns his attention to the objects which are perceived as beautiful.

Is there a quality in objects which regularly is the occasion for the perception of beauty, and is that quality always the occasion for the perception of beauty, regardless of the perceiver and the baggage of prejudices and associa-

6l nquiry, Section IV, Article 5. 7lInquiry, Section VII, Article 3. 18Inquiry, Section I, Article 7. lnquiry, Section VI, Article 11. 20He acknowledges this tendency in the Preface, xvi-xvii.



tions he may have acquired? Hutcheson answers affirmatively. Not only are all people endowed with a sense of beauty, but that sense is sensitive to a "real quality" in the objects which give rise to pleasure.21

The quality in objects which is the occasion for the perception of beauty is a relational quality which Hutcheson calls a "compound ratio of uniformity amidst variety." The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety; ... what we call Beautiful in Objects ... seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Va- riety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity.22

Hutcheson observes that this "compound ratio" is present in every instance of aesthetic pleasure, despite the diversity of preferences displayed by various perceivers. The presence of such qualities shows, he thought, that the inner sense functions with a significant degree of uniformity from person to person and from culture to culture.

There are actually two sorts of beauty, Hutcheson maintains, "original" (or "absolute") and "comparative" (or "relative"). Uniformity and variety are qualities which are found particularly in objects of absolute beauty.23 An object has absolute beauty if it is of the sort that can be enjoyed for its perceptual qualities alone without comparing it to something of which it is an imitation. In art, absolute beauty is dependent upon what we may call formal characteristics: structure, design, proportion. The qualities of a composition which allow the inner sense to receive an idea of pleasure are uniformity (for pleasing order) and variety (for pleasing intricacy); uniformity to avoid unpleasant confusion, variety to avoid monotony.

An object which has comparative beauty derives that beauty from its re- semblance to some original. The mere perception of a good imitation, according to Hutcheson, affords some aesthetic pleasure. (The object imitated need not even be lovely in nature.)24 Objects of nature can be enjoyed absolutely because they do not imitate anything. As far as art is concerned, however, any aspect of a work of art which represents or expresses or portrays something from nature has comparative beauty. Its excellence at imitation of objects of nature or of accurate interpretation of emotional or historical situa- tions is the yardstick of its beauty. Thus a Statuary, Painter, or Poet may please us with an Hercules, if his piece retains that Grandeur and those Marks of Strength and Courage, which we imagine in that Hero.25

Thus, the disinterested pleasure that marks the perception of beauty does

2lInquiry, Section I, Article 9. 221bid., Section II, Article 3. 23Although he sometimes indicates a wish to include comparative beauty under the

same principle. For example, he calls imitation a "kind of unity" (Section IV, Article 1).

241nquiry, Section IV, Article 3. 25Ibid., Section IV, Article 1:



not arise at random, peculiar from person to person. It arises with the perception of particular qualities-uniformity and variety (for absolute beauty) and aptness or likeness (for comparative beauty).

I shall concentrate here on absolute beauty and the principle of uniformity and variety. Hutcheson himself was evidently most interested in exploring this principle, although he does not make the formalist's mistake of presuming that the only legitimate aesthetic response one can have depends on compositional qualities.28 While comparative beauty of necessity applies only to art and its imitative aspects, absolute beauty can be found in mathematical theorems, nature, and the laws of nature, as well as in works of art. Further- more, a study of absolute beauty is more important in examining the problem of aesthetic disagreement, because it is more likely to be free from the interference to which Hutcheson attributed most aesthetic dispute: prejudice and associated ideas.

We can now sum up Hutcheson's anti-relativist position. Beauty is a feeling, a pleasure experienced by the individual observer. Therefore, when we speak of aesthetic agreement we mean that all people should be expected to experience similar pleasures in similar circumstances. We can claim intersubjective relevance for individual judgments of taste on two grounds: (1) all human beings are constituted with an inner sense which makes the experience of the disinterested pleasure we call beauty possible. Hence, the rational interest theory is wrong when it asserts that aesthetic preference is dependent upon an individual's idiosyncratic desires. Coupled with the inner sense, of course, we have Hutcheson's presumption that individuals constituted in a similar manner will behave similarly. (2) It is an observable, empirical fact that the compound ratio of uniformity and variety is exhibited in every case of aesthetic experience. Therefore, Hutcheson can assert that the assumption that the inner sense does indeed work on the same principle in all people is confirmed. Barring the interference of associated ideas or prejudices, each observer will see or feel "beauty" in the same or similar objects.

At this point it is clear that there are two possible positions Hutcheson could take concerning aesthetic agreement and the refutation of relativism. He could claim that all he must do to prove aesthetic agreement is show that there is a degree of similarity among all the objects which people find beautiful. By this reasoning, the fact that people still disagree about the particular instances of the compound ratio-i.e., about the particular objects which they find beautiful-is of comparatively little import: perhaps these individual peculiarities could be explained away by reference to education and associated ideas. Al- ternatively, Hutcheson could make the stronger claim that, not only does the compound ratio support the position that all perceivers will show some un- derlying uniformity in their tastes, but in addition the principle provides for

260ne can receive not only absolute and comparative beauty from the perception of works of art, but also something which he calls "moral beauty." Moral beauty, it seems, overrides aesthetic beauty in the strength and importance of the sentiment perceived, and it is perceived via the moral sense and not via the sense of beauty (In- quiry, Treatise II, Section VI, Article 7).



their agreement on the same particular objects (barring insurmountable prejudice or associations). If this is his view, then the principle of uniformity and variety which we observe to be the basis for our feelings of aesthetic pleasure can be employed to resolve instances of aesthetic disagreement. If both disputants agree about the rightness of the compound ratio as an indi- cator of (absolute) beauty, then that principle can be applied to the objects in question to discover which is really the more beautiful.

It is clear that Hutcheson makes the first claim, and he hints occasionally at the second as well. For it would seem that if uniformity and variety truly lie at the foundation of our experience of absolute beauty, then by reference to this principle one could obtain some agreement about the beauty of at least the simplest objects. In this spirit, Hutcheson begins his investigation of absolute beauty with geometrical figures, applying the compound ratio as a calculus of beauty in much the same way as he uses the calculus of moral virtues in Treatise II.27 "The Beauty of an equilateral Triangle," he writes, "is less than that of a Square; which is less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is sur- pass'd by the Hexagon."28 The reason is, of course, that all these shapes, being symmetrical, have equal uniformity; but those with the greater number of sides have greater variety and hence greater beauty.

Unfortunately, it is obvious that Hutcheson's attempt to use the compound ratio in this manner is unsuccessful and does not bring about uniformity of taste even with this simple application. One does not have to look far to find disagreement with his conclusions. Perhaps the most notable dissenting opinion comes from another eighteenth-century philosopher of beauty, the painter William Hogarth, who regarded the triangle as the best pictorial representative of compositional beauty.

. .. the triangular form ... and the serpentine line itself, are the two most ex- pressive figures that can be thought of to signify not only beauty and grace, but the whole order of form.29

It is evident that the judgments Hutcheson makes on the basis of the application of the compound ratio are controversial, even in the most elementary of cases. The difficulty of making particular judgments of comparative aesthetic excellence is one factor in disfavor of the stronger anti-relativist claim. But there is another factor, perhaps more serious, which affects both claims. When regarded as a characterization or explanation of the "beauty- making" attributes of objects, the compound ratio refers to such general qualities as to be nearly useless. Restricting ourselves to the arena of art alone, there seems to be no work which would violate the formula. There is no object in which some uniformity and variety might not be found.

Hutcheson is aware of this state of affairs:

... there are an Infinity of different Forms which may all have some Unity,

27Inquiry, Treatise II, Section III. 28Ibid., Treatise I, Section II, Article 3. 29William Hogarth, Analysis of Beauty (Chicago, 1908), 11.



and yet differ from each other. So that Men may have different Fancys of Beauty, and yet Uniformity be the universal Foundation of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as beautiful.30

He does not, however, seem to be aware of the effect of this admission on his theory. The "real quality" which he thought to be the occasion for the perception of beauty turns out to be a quality which is shared to some extent by virtually every perceptual object. His claim that all aesthetic objects have uniformity and variety is no more informative than to say that they all have some shape or other.

The combination of these two weaknesses of the compound ratio severely undermines Hutcheson's anti-relativist position. As we can see, Hutcheson has no grounds for making the strong claim that the compound ratio can offer a way for resolving particular aesthetic disagreements. It can in no way provide that all perceivers will settle upon the same aesthetic objects as the ones which give them the most pleasure and hence have the most beauty. And yet the fate of the weaker claim-that at least we can abstract a beauty-making principle which underlies the various aesthetic objects-is also unpromising. Because the compound ratio has such a wide application, it has become empty and uninteresting. It is further weakened by its inability to function as a successful criterion for beauty. In short, Hutcheson needs to be able to make the stronger claim in order to make his compound ratio significant, and yet he cannot support that claim. As a result, Hutcheson's compound ratio does little to refute subjective relativism in aesthetics, and consequently his answer to the skepticism of the rational interest theory is only partially successful.

Given Hutcheson's view of beauty, the failure of the compound ratio to provide a significant statement about objects of beauty actually should come as no surprise. The combination of his theory of the inner sense and his theory of the compound ratio is ill-fated from the start. On the one hand, Hutcheson maintains the position that beauty is an idea of pleasure. This means that whatever the object of a person's pleasure may be, that person is perceiving real beauty. Even if he is mistaken about its comparative excellence in relation to other objects, his aesthetic experience is just as bonafide as the most high- browed critic's.

A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the Architecture of his Country to be the most perfect . . . and yet it is still real Beauty which pleases the Goth, founded upon Uniformity amidst Variety.31

On the other hand, Hutcheson claims that there are characteristics which are the occasion of the perception of beauty in all cases of aesthetic experience. In view of his theory that beauty is pleasure, he must expand these beauty- making characteristics to accommodate every possible instance of aesthetic perception. It is no wonder that the compound ratio becomes overly general and unable to function as part of an answer to the skepticism of the rational in-

30Inquiry, Section VI, Article 7. 31Ibid., Section 6, Article 5.



terest theory. For anyone who wishes to stand by the view that beauty is pleasure, no matter what its objects, the appeal to aesthetic principles will be ineffectual.32

Hutcheson's successor, Hume, who shared the other's view of aesthetic sentiment, recognized the futility of appeal to aesthetic principles to resolve the problem of relativity of taste. He realized that the real problems of aesthetic disagreement arise, not with agreement as to the general principles of aesthetic excellence, but with particular judgments of merit.

Every voice is united in applauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, spirit in writing; and in blaming fustian, affection, coldness, and a false brilliancy. But when critics come to particulars, this seeming unanimity vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expressions.33

This comment is most appropriate to the difficulty Hutcheson's theory faces, for with "different meanings" comes the expansion and dilution of the compound ratio, until it becomes virtually meaningless. Perhaps the most important difference between the aesthetic theories of Hutcheson and Hume is evidenced in their differing views of the function of general aesthetic principles.34 Hume stressed the fact that the proof of aesthetic agreement lies not in accord about general qualities, but in the similarity of particular perceptions of those qualities. It is failure to recognize this particularity of aesthetic perceptions which undermines the use of the compound ratio in Hutcheson's refutation of the relativist.35

In my critical assessment, Hutcheson falls short in his refutation of the rational interest theory. He performed the important task of proving that pleasure is not necessarily connected with desire,36 thereby opening new ave- nues of inquiry in aesthetics. But his investigation into the qualities which un- derlie the perception of absolute beauty does not yield a principle which rules out the possibility that the inner sense will behave in a manner which is peculiar to the individual perceiver. Hutcheson did not recognize the incompatibility of his theory of beauty and his espousal of aesthetic principles with the particularity of aesthetic perceptions. He remained convinced of the importance of

32Although Kant agreed with Hutcheson on a number of important points with regard to the aesthetic experience, he viewed the attempt to discover empirical aesthetic principles as fruitless. ("Third Moment of Beauty," Critique of Judgment.) Kant therefore concentrated on an examination of the general subjective conditions of the aesthetic experience for proof of the universal validity of aesthetic judgments.

33Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (New York, 1965), 3.

34Part of the purpose of Hume's "ideal critic" theory is to retain the test of aesthetic excellence in the experience of a particular object by a particular perceiver, and not in the application of a principle.

35For an indication that later Hutcheson recognized the power of the skeptic's position, see Ian Ross, "Hutcheson on Hume's Treatise: An Unnoticed Letter," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 4 (1966), 71.

36Hutcheson noted his own debt to Shaftesbury for the idea of disinterested pleasure. (Inquiry, Preface.)



the compound ratio. Historically, however, it was the conviction that beauty is an idea of pleasure, no matter what its stimulating objects might be, which seems to have eclipsed Hutcheson's attempt to discover a meaningful objective principle of beauty.

State University of New York, Buffalo.


Article Contentsp. 319p. 320p. 321p. 322p. 323p. 324p. 325p. 326p. 327p. 328p. 329p. 330

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1975), pp. 195-384Volume InformationFront MatterThe Treatment of Animals [pp. 195 - 218]The Absent Angel in Ficino's Philosophy [pp. 219 - 240]Christian Wolff and Leibniz [pp. 241 - 262]Digger no Millenarian: The Revolutionizing of Gerrard Winstanley [pp. 263 - 280]Adam Smith as Critic of Ideas [pp. 281 - 296]Labriola, Croce, and Italian Marxism (1895-1910) [pp. 297 - 318]NotesRelativism and Hutcheson's Aesthetic Theory [pp. 319 - 330]Arthur Schopenhauer as a Critic of History [pp. 331 - 338]Charles Darwin and Artificial Selection [pp. 339 - 350]Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony [pp. 351 - 366]Herbert Spencer and "Evolution"--An Additional Note [p. 367]

Review-ArticleThe Nazi Holocaust as a Persisting Trauma for the Non-Jewish Mind [pp. 369 - 376]

Books Received [pp. 378 - 383]Clark Library Professorship [p. 384]Back Matter [pp. 368 - 381]

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