�Homeland Defenseis a national imperative . . .

and I see the Chemical Corpsplaying a key role. �

With those words from GEN Abrams, the TRADOC commander, theUSACMLS launched itself into a new mission area. HomelandDefense is an evolving concept which is our most vital interest. From amilitary perspective we must protect strategic forces and means if we areto have a viable power projection strategy. Even more basic isthe need to protect our civilian population and critical infrastructure (tele-communication, utilities, banks, and so forth). We are sworn toprotect and defend the Constitution of the United States against allenemies�foreign and domestic. The application of military capabilityto support domestic operations ranging from natural disasters andterrorist acts is also included in this mission area.

In response to this charge, we are working to develop both doctrinalconcepts for WMD response and a training facility at Fort Leonard Woodthat leverages the capabilities of Engineers, Military Police, and theChemical Corps. A provisional office has been established under the lead-ership of COL Frank Jordan and a Homeland Defense Council is beingformed to provide guidance and direction.

This represents a great challenge to the USACMLS as wesimultaneously move to Fort Leonard Wood and launch this newmission. Exciting times, you bet!

With those words from GEN Abrams, the TRADOC commander, theUSACMLS launched itself into a new mission area. HomelandDefense is an evolving concept which is our most vital interest. From amilitary perspective we must protect strategic forces and means if we areto have a viable power projection strategy. Even more basic isthe need to protect our civilian population and critical infrastructure (tele-communication, utilities, banks, and so forth). We are sworn toprotect and defend the Constitution of the United States against allenemies�foreign and domestic. The application of military capabilityto support domestic operations ranging from natural disasters andterrorist acts is also included in this mission area.

In response to this charge, we are working to develop both doctrinalconcepts for WMD response and a training facility at Fort Leonard Woodthat leverages the capabilities of Engineers, Military Police, and theChemical Corps. A provisional office has been established under the lead-ership of COL Frank Jordan and a Homeland Defense Council is beingformed to provide guidance and direction.

This represents a great challenge to the USACMLS as wesimultaneously move to Fort Leonard Wood and launch this newmission. Exciting times, you bet!

Chief of ChemicalDirectorate UpdatesBook ReviewSubscription Page

Commandant MG Ralph G. Wooten

Supervisory Editor Dr. JoJo CorkanEditor Mattie KirbyGraphics/Layout Kathie Troxell

CML, Army Chemical Review isprepared twice a year by the US ArmyChemical School, Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. CML presents professionalinformation about the Chemical Corpsfunctions related to nuclear, biological,chemical, smoke, flame field expedients,and NBC reconnaissance incombat support. Objectives of CML areto inform, motivate, increase knowledge,improve performance, andprovide a forum for exchange of ideas.This publication presents professional in-formation, but the views expressedherein are those of the authors, notthe Department of Defense or itselements. The content does notnecessarily reflect the official US Armyposition and does not change or super-sede any information in other US Armypublications. Use of news itemsconstitutes neither affirmation of their ac-curacy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit isgiven to CML and its authors. Allphotographs are official US Armyphotos unless otherwise noted. SUBSCRIPTIONS: Available throughthe Superintendent of Documents, USGovernment Printing Office, Washington,DC 20402-9317. Third class postage for CML paidat Anniston, Alabama, and additionalmailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send addresschanges to CML, US Army ChemicalSchool, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri65473-8929.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army 04915

Official:

PB 3-99-1 January 1999

Articles

A Legend in His Own Mind

Chemical Leader Development:�Past and Present Realities

Force Protection�Friend or Foe

Biological Warfare�A Short History

The Mickey Mouse Mask

Time�and Chemical Warfare

Military Support to Civilian Emergency Responders

Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA), M22

The Return of the �Little RSCAAL�

A Chemical/Biological Terrorism Plan

3

7

11

14

18

20

27

29

31

33

Departments

2364041

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

General Creighton Abrams, former Army Chief of Staff, said it well: �The Army is not made of people; theArmy is people. By people I do not mean personnel. I mean living, breathing�human beings. They have needsand interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths and abilities. They are the heart of our preparedness,and this preparedness�depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that gives the Army�life. Withoutit we cannot succeed.�

So how do we instill this spirit in our soldiers? I believe it is through a commitment to the seven Army Values:Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. The bedrock of America�s Armywill continue to be quality soldiers who possess a strong sense of values.

These values will be readily visible as we draw to a close our twenty years of training here at Fort McClellan. Thistime span was a time of rapid growth for our Corps. As we built our strength, developed new doctrine, new equipmentand new methods of training, the Threat we faced and prepared to defeat changed also. The emphasis moved fromnuclear to chemical and now looks at the biological threat as a major focus for our training as well as the HomelandDefense portion of our mission. The challenge we are facing as we prepare to continue training here as well as start-uptraining in Fort Leonard Wood as a MANSCEN organization will require our full and unconditional commitment andsupport in every critical area. This is a requirement that extends beyond the walls of Sibert Hall. Those of you in thefield must also do what you can to support our total force mission during this difficult period.

Our leadership must be strong and focused to ensure our soldiers and civilians at every level continue to trainsoldiers and produce the training products we must have to provide a trained and chemical-ready force. It willrequire all of the Army values plus great dedication and plain hard work from everyone to face the challenges this yearwill present.

Together we will be successful. We will focus on those Core Values we understand so well and we will continue ourDTLOMS excellence.

Dragon Soldiers!

Values �the bedrock ofAmerica�s Army

History has demonstrated time and again that great armies are notdefined by sheer numbers or technological superiority. It is the rightbalance of quality people, training, leadership, doctrine and equip-ment. It is no accident that I list quality people first. They are ourmost important resource. They are, in the words of GeneralRimer, our Army�s credentials.

Chief of Chemical

2 CML

MG Ralph G. Wooten, Chief of Chemical

A Legend in His Own MindOr

By Roy D. Williams IIDirector of Chemical Branch Readiness

A successful member of the Chemical Corps must have three qualitiestechnical and tactical proficiency, the belief of a revival preacher, and theability of a world class insurance salesman.

The FutureAs Seen

By WanderingIn The Past

I was sitting in my office the first of Septemberwhen two things happened, I was asked to write anarticle for our branch magazine and a major e-mailedme a proposed new mission statement for the Corps.It�s been a few years since I wrote an article. LatelyI�ve sort of abdicated to the good works of BobNeumann and Al Mauroni, both of whom are exhibitingbetter brainpower than I. Anyway, I know the articlewas requested simply because I�ll be retiring in 1999and Dr. Corkan couldn�t resist giving me a forum forsome last words. I made no promises other than a �letme think about it� and was reading my electrons whenMAJ Drushal sent me a mission statement using termslike �WMD,� �passive pillar of theater missile defense,��counterproliferation,� and �homeland defense.� Itstarted my mind walking the path of how theCorps has changed since I was commissioned a SecondLieutenant in the Chemical Corps with a 2-year detailto the Infantry in 1965. As a proponent of putting thebottom-line up front, I�m aghast (among other things)that I�ve failed to do so. Anyway, before you get aride on my flash back�here is the gist. A successfulmember of the Chemical Corps must have threequalities�technical and tactical proficiency, thebelief of a revival preacher, and the ability of aworld class insurance salesman.

Let me offer you some vignettes from almost 15years of active duty, over 15 more years in the ArmyReserve, 19 years of Federal Civil Service and a totalof 41 years since I first put on an Army uniform(Junior ROTC). With luck you will understand whyI feel that these are the keys to success�and I�ll offeryou a definition of that too.

The Army uses the expression �technical and tacticalproficiency� often, but it fits the Chemical Corpsbetter than any other branch of service. We are by naturetechnically oriented. Our business has as its core theapplication of nuclear physics, biology, and chemistry tothe art of war. The ability to judge micro-meteorologicalconditions and advise the commander on the behaviorof artificially induced clouds of noxious matter throughthe battlespace is a key task. After an NBC event, couldyou imagine a chemical officer turning to a highlystressed brigade commander and describing the vectorsbeing applied by upper altitude winds on the fallof a nominal particle? The commander wants to knowhow the event will impact the courses of action, whenand where troops will be at risk, and how to mitigatethe risk. We must, therefore, translate the technical intothe tactical language of the commanders we serve.

3January 1999

My first experience with a technically and tacticallycompetent chemical officer was in Vietnam. After 6months in a line company (A 1/27 Inf, The Wolfhounds),I had moved up to the battalion staff as an assistantS-3. I still recall how much safer I felt by being all theway back at a battalion HQ instead of pushing a platoonon a search and destroy mission. We were under the 2dBrigade, 25 Infantry Division with headquarters in Cu Chi.My battalion commander was a MAJ (P) Guy S. MeloyIII who would win the DSC during Operation Attleboroand later command the 82d Airborne Division. He washands down the finest combat commander I ever watched.Cool and collected under fire, he had a knack for alwayslooking as if he were in complete control. My hero ofthis tale was the 2d Brigade chemical officer CPT (laterCOL) James T. Bushong. Jim was just a terrific staff of-ficer. He not only handled the usual RVN chemical thingslike herbicide, flame, RCA, and sniffer missions; he flatran the 2d Bde TOC. You needed an emergency resup-ply of ammo�call Jim. Couldn�t get a helicopter�callJim. Didn�t matter what you needed, Jim had a

(ODS) experiences as 24th ID chemical officer. He toldme it was extremely interesting being Division ChemOfor MG Barry McCaffery as he was the only divisioncommander who knew more about NBC than hisChemO. After meeting and listening to MG McCafferylater, that statement was not based on a lack ofknowledge on Russ� part. After ODS, one divisioncommander invested the time and money to bringall his principal leaders and himself to Fort McClellanand train in the Chemical Defense Training Facilitywith toxic agents. In my years, no unit was ever betterprepared to fight and win in a contaminated area than the24th. Why?�the boss believed the threat was real andhis unit would not be found unprepared. Few unitsreally care if they don�t do well on their NBC evaluationat a combat training center.

My third point concerned the abilities of aninsurance salesman. Here I have to remind you thatmany times it�s not what you�re selling, but how itspackaged that counts. During my career we�ve talked

�Instruction in chemicalwarfare has been

compartmented andits relation to normal

operations notunderstood thoroughly.�

reputation as the guy who could get itfaster than anyone else. It was drivenhome to me the night we had a patrolbecome engaged in a running firefightnear the BoLoi Woods. I was on theland line talking to the brigade S-3, alieutenant colonel, giving a SITREPwhen MAJ(P) Meloy grabbed thephone and told him to put Bushong onthe line because he had troops in troubleand they needed gunship support rightthen. Bushong got on the line and the patrol got thegunships they needed. The lesson I learned�chemicalofficers make things happen. They understand the bigpicture, know how the system(s) work (or don�t work)and, therefore, are technically and tactically proficient.

Let me offer a second vignette to support the needto have the belief of a revival preacher. Have youever met anyone who enjoyed putting on MOPP gearand doing his job? It sure hasn�t happened to me. Whywould soldiers go to MOPP4 and spend hours cookingthemselves? Two reasons: they have a clear under-standing of the threat that exists in the world today andknow that sweating in training is the only way to livethrough NBC combat, or somebody makes them do it(carrot or stick, reward or punishment). Obviously, it�smuch more effective if people train because they seeand understand the reason, than if they do because it�son a checklist in an Army Training and EvaluationMission Training Plan, or an Evaluation of a Soldier�sTraining Publication Task. I�ll never forget interviewingLTC Russ Shubert about his Operation Desert Storm

about ABC, CBR, NBC, and WMD.Principles of avoidance versusvisualization, decontamination versusrestoration, force protection versusprotecting the force versus shieldingversus Homeland Defense. The insid-ious nature of chemical, biological,and radiological agents are as likelyto produce psychological casualties asphysical. Study after study followingWorld War I emphasized the difficulty

of making troops exercise good �gas� discipline until theyactually experienced gas warfare. To quote LTG Bullard(Commander, 1st Infantry Division) �Our gas officerswere almost hysterical in their efforts to teach andimpress our new troops, but knowledge and real efficienttraining came only after hard experience.�

Take a guess when these words were written:�Instruction in chemical warfare has been compart-mented and its relation to normal operations notunderstood thoroughly. From time to time chemicalsituations will be injected in tactical exercises in orderto ensure maintenance of instruction levels and habitualproper response.� The letter goes on �In some caseschemical officers have devoted only a fraction of theirtime to chemical training�they should devote moretime to chemical training of their units.� While thiscould have been written following any of several studiesconcerning NBC training at the combat trainingcenters in the 1980s and 1990s, it is in a letter fromthe Army War College dated 23 March 1944.

4 CML

Our business has always run in cycles with boom orbust funding to support it. We must have visionaries whocan anticipate the opportunities to further our basic cause.I submit that the cause requires us to educate America�ssenior leaders as to the threat that exists�not some10-foot tall terrorist, but the intelligent, unbalanced, richorganization that can buy or create NBC weapons. Readthe Cobra Event. Read Clancy�s Executive Orders andpay particular attention to the bio scenario. Our civilianleaders have and Homeland Defense is becoming apriority mission for us. You may read priority asmeaning well funded because in these days ofdiminished resources that�s critical. Thus, I offer youthe great work done by MG George Friel to get theChemical Corps� foot in the door of force protection,domestic preparedness, training of emergency teamsCONUS wide, etc. While I may not agree with thehow behind some of this, I applaud with all my heartthe idea that education about our business is now the busi-ness of many communities across America.

The real legacy of Operations Desert Shield and Stormwas not a blocking of Saddam Hussein, but how thisnation came together and faced down a threat. Yes, itdid come back, and others will emerge to join it, but thecommunity involvement as Reserve and Guard unitsdeployed was the hallmark of our efforts.

So what am I saying, very simply, is that none ofus want to pay for insurance until we really need it.Insurance companies spend big bucks to let us knowwhat happens to those who are unprepared. It�s yourmission to educate our senior leaders as to what it takesto be prepared and convince them that 1 percent of a bud-get is not too much to spend on America�s disaster insur-ance, the Army�s Chemical Corps. It�s also your job tomake sure the Chemical Corps provides full value for themoney! At this point I know I�m less than 1 year from

retiring; and, except for spending more time in white-water sports, I have no clue as to what I�ll bedoing next. I do know that I�ll be expecting to do whatgenerations have done before me�to sleep wellknowing the Chemical Corps is deterring any enemyfrom using NBC weapons against us. Keep up the greatwork and support those who are trying to make it workat Fort Wood.

Finally, let me add that the cornerstone of deterrenceis a robust NBC Defense posture. If your readiness issuch that the enemy gains no advantage by using NBC,you have achieved my definition of success. In otherwords, success is very simple; no American has to fightin a toxic environment, and no American community hasto manage the consequence of a deliberate NBC event.

These items were taken from theChemical Warfare Service Newsletter, July 1942

More Wandering in the Past

Passed OutFor Private Jay,No week-end pass;Took off his maskTo test for gas!�Trainee Tribune.

ModernizationAccording to Memphis GeneralDepot �Denews,� the modernsoldiers� definition of cooties is�Mechanized dandruff.�

5January 1999

Roy D. Williams II is the Director of Chemical BranchReadiness, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan,Alabama. His civilian education includes a BS in Biology fromNorth Georgia College and a MS in Guidance andCounseling from Jacksonville State University. His militaryeducation includes Infantry Officer Basic Course, ChemicalOfficer Advance Course, Command and General StaffCollege, Armed Forces Staff College, Air War College,and Army War College.

Mr. Williams served on active duty with the US Army from1965 to 1980 and with the US Army Reserve from 1980 �1995 when he retired as a Colonel. His awards includenumerous civilian awards of exceptional achievement and per-formance. His military awards include the Bronze Star Medalwith V Device and 2d Oak Leaf Cluster (OLC), Purple Heart,Meritorious Service Medal with 3d OLC, ArmyCommendation Medal with 2d OLC, Air Medal, ArmyAchievement Medal, Vietnamese cross of Gallantry with GoldStar, the Combat Infantryman�s Badge, the Air Crew Mem-bers Badge, the German Military Efficiency Badge in Gold,and numerous campaign and service ribbons. He is married tothe former Kitty Starkey and they reside with four cats inGuntersville, Alabama.

A New Addition The 62d Chemical Company (Decon) recently reactivated on 16 April 1998 at CampCarroll, Republic of Korea, exactly 69 years to the day from their original activation. Thecompany is task organized as a Corps/Theater Chemical Company assigned to the 23d ChemicalBattalion, 19th Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). Captain Ricky R. Franklin and 1SGT Maria Merazare the company commander and first sergeant of thenewly activated company which has lineage back to the1920s. First constituted as the 412th Chemical DepotCompany in the Reserves on 16 April 1929, the unit sawduty in the Pacific Theater in WWI as the 62d ChemicalWarfare General Service Company. The unit was awardedthe Philippine Presidential Unit Citation Streamer,embroidered 17 October 1944 to 04 July 1945 forservice in the campaign to retake the Philippines fromImperial Japanese Forces. The unit was redesignated,activated, and inactivated several times prior toits reactivation in April. The 62d Chemical Company is the second of four com-panies planned to be activated under the 23dChemical Battalion in the Republic of Korea. Like the61st Chemical Company that activated in October 1997,the 62d �Cougars� are organized with 48 US Armyofficers, NCOs and soldiers, and 62 Korean Augmenta-tion to United States Army (KATUSA) soldiers. Thisunique structure gives these companies a truly combinednation approach to fixed-site decontamination operationson the peninsula focused primarily on APODs, SPODs,C2, and Logistics Nodes. KATUSA soldiers form more than half of the soldiersassigned to the 62d Chemical Company. These soldierseither volunteer to be KATUSAs for their 2-yearmandatory service following graduation from the ROKArmy �basic� training, or are selected based on theirEnglish capabilities and character. Once selected, theyattend the KATUSA Training Academy (KTA) for3 weeks before they arrive at their gaining unit. Sinceour KATUSA soldiers do not receive specializeddecontamination training at the KTA, the 23d ChemicalBattalion had to design and operate a DecontaminationTraining Academy�Korea (DTA-K) at Camp Carroll.The DTA-K provides the KATUSA soldiers a rigorous

62d Chemical Company (Decon) reactivates

By 1LT Laura J. Owens

7-week training regimen focused on the basic principlesof chemical decontamination, driver�s training, andother specific military skills to assist them in quickly in-tegrating into their assigned chemical companies. The 62d Chemical Company has already initiated atraining plan focused on the progression of individualtasks learned in the DTA-K and geared toward trainingsquads and platoons in collective tasks required toperform fixed-site and terrain decontamination. Thecompany will integrate all tasks, both individual andcollective, to reach METL proficiency which will beevaluated during a company ARTEP later this year. Within the next 6 months, the company will conductseveral field-training exercises, ranges, and STXs in orderto reach ARTEP proficiency. The company will also re-locate from Camp Carroll to a location about 150 milesnorth to Camp Long in October. Relocating the 62dChemical Company to Camp Long directly relates to thechemical threat in theater. Strategic positioning of heavydecontamination assets throughout the peninsula willfacilitate rapid response to a chemical attack and providemaximum through-put of replacement personnel andlogistics at the critical APODs and SPODs. The 62d Chemical Company rejoins the ChemicalCorps with dignity and honor. Two more chemicalcompanies, the 267th and 501st, will soon follow suitwithin the next 12 months. The reorganization of the23d Chemical Battalion, and activation of the fourdecontamination companies, significantly increases thenumber of command and leadership opportunities forchemical officers and soldiers in the US Army. Thisgrowth in Corps enhances the prestige of the chemicalsoldier worldwide. We here in the 62d ChemicalCompany are proud to be a part of this winning team.

MOON CHI JA! TOGETHER!CHEDOK JUNSA! DECON WARRIOR!

23d CM BN

6 CML

Chemical Leader Development:Past and Present Realities

�If one has never personally experienced (chemical) war, one can not un-derstand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really exist, nor why a(chemical leader) should need any brilliance and exceptional ability.� Carl von Clausewitz

What Makes a Chemical Leader?

Any leader who has experienced war possesses anunderstanding of physical and psychological stress.An NBC environment creates such stress, and anyleader�s effort to overcome that stress is a factor thatrequires understanding. It�s very important for chemicalleaders to gain experience during extended NBCoperations to successfully understand physical andpsychological stress. Clausewitz states that, �Amongthe many factors in war that cannot be measured,physical effort is the most important.� The Army wouldbenefit from chemical leaders that understand thefriction of extended operations in an NBC environment.The question is where, when, and how to develop such achemical leader?

The Chemical School should develop chemicalleaders with this experience by:

leaders. However, the Chemical School can take this op-portunity to improve readiness and develop better chemi-cal leaders.

The Army has three leader development pillars�institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Operational assignments are the �successfulapplication of the knowledge and skills acquired frominstitutional training.� Direct involvement by command-ers is critical during operational assignments. Leader de-velopment programs in operational assignments must bebattle focused and trained in skills demanded by a unit�sMETL and the �professional development needs of thejunior leaders.� For example, the Infantry School (insti-tutional training) develops specific infantry skills, andeach operational assignment provides an opportunity toapply these infantry skills. This cycle undoubtedlydevelops infantry leaders with specific and expectedexperience. On the other hand, the opportunity to applychemical institutional knowledge in a �combat�operational assignment is minimal.

Chemical leaders need chemical operations experi-ence. Historically, the Chemical Corps� training mission,even wartime mission, lacked the command emphasis thatquickly produce chemical leaders. Presently, combat armsunits should develop chemical leaders during their op-erational assignments; however, the NBC trainingopportunity seldom occurs. Lastly, third world states, thatmix terror with chemical and biological weapons, threatena future peaceful world. Therefore, every combat unitneeds a chemical leader with extended NBC operations

By CPT James R. Sekelsky

Incorporating realistic extended NBC operations in allofficer and noncommissioned officer courses.Conducting exercises that possess friction and pro-duce understanding. Produce a challenging standard oftactical and doctrinal training.Providing each chemical leader a basic understandingof how to chemically support combat operations.

Quite simply, operational assignments fail to providethe opportunity to broaden and sharpen chemical leader-ship abilities. Understandably, this article can neitherattempt to fix this problem, nor can it develop chemical

7January 1999

experience; a chemical leader with his head in theoperation and not in the books; a chemical leader withanswers based on experience, not hope. The ChemicalSchool can guarantee its institutional leader developmentdelivers a chemical leader who can advise commandershow to survive the NBC battlefield of tomorrow.

History of Chemical Training

The Leavenworth Papers, No. 10 point out howunprepared the United States Army was before andduring World War I. If the US Army had studiedGerman gas doctrine before the war, the commanders andstaffs would not have had �difficulty adjusting their think-ing and planning.� Clearly chemical training has lackedcommand emphasis and has received priority at the �lastsecond.� The Chemical Corps must develop and main-tain its own chemical leaders and send them to the com-bat units. Only the Chemical School can provide the suc-cessful application of doctrine to training, developexperienced chemical leaders during the school phase ofthe leader-development cycle, and conduct and evaluateoperational training in the schools in order to ensurefuture readiness.

The low priority that chemical training receives isnot a new phenomenon. World War I was the last timeit was a priority. Shortly after World War I militaryunpreparedness for chemical warfare was due to lowfunding and the �animosity toward gas evidenced by theChiefs of Staff, which precluded command emphasison gas training.� These Chiefs of Staff were witnessesto the demoralizing effects of chemicals during WorldWar I. During World War II, military leaders thoughtchemical warfare was a defensive weapon, which nei-ther attracted their attention nor received much trainingemphasis. World War II was chemical free and the needto train �chemical leaders� for such operations dwindled.

The training that Chemical Warfare Service (CWS)officers received prior to World War II �providedlittle�[operational] experience for solving complextraining problems.� Prior to World War II the Chemical

Warfare School faced the same problem that plagues thepresent Chemical School�chemical leaders in differenttypes of combat units. Therefore, most local and basechemical schools focused on training the simple �dutiesat hand.� Unfortunately, realistic operational training(which develops experience) was not realized until 2years after the start of World War II. Successfulchemical operations of any unit require instinctiveactions and decisions from chemical leaders�units mustdevelop and maintain these traits.

The avoidance of giving chemical training priority con-tinued. For example in 1982, at NATO exercises, Coulanand Fisher observed how commanders avoided NBC at-tacks because �they disrupt the command and controlprocess and undermine the other purposes of the exer-cise.� Unfortunately, these combat arms commanders stillignore chemical leader development 15 yearslater. Chemical attacks and extended chemical operationsdisrupt the balance of combat training. Because of thissituation in combat units, the �leader development� cycledoes not function. As chemical leaders have done sinceWorld War II, they still compete for training time in theclassroom and in the field.

Chemical Leaders at Operational Assignments

Operational assignments do not develop the �neces-sary confidence� required of a chemical leader in anNBC environment. Most captains or sergeants first classattending an advanced course admit that chemicaltraining seldom occurs in most combat units. Further-more, it is unsettling to contemplate how to lead acombat unit through 24 hours of MOPP4, when the leasttrained company has done only 2 hours in the past year.Moreover, the significant impact of any �real world�extended NBC operation could humiliate the best of ourbrigade combat teams. Chemical training does occur incombat units; however, only to the extent that it does notupset the balance of their combat operations.

Chemical leaders familiar with extended operationsin an NBC environment are �invaluable� and are thebest combat multipliers. The Army�s field manual onPsychological Operations refers to value in NBC opera-tions as preparedness: �commanders�must deal withthe psychological impact on their personnel before,during, and after an NBC attack. Preparedness and strongprofessional leadership are crucial to combatingpsychological effects�� In fairness to combat units,it�s difficult to create and sufficiently maintain thecomplex NBC environment during operational assign-ments�NTC, CMTC, and JRTC are the exceptions. Inorder to add this extra value to our chemical leaders, the

...the significant impact of any�real world� extended NBCoperation could humiliate

the best of our brigadecombat teams.

8 CML

Chemical Corps must use its own �farm system��theschool. The school provides the time, trainers, resources,and realism. Confident, competent chemical leaders donot suddenly appear; they are developed.

Combat arms commanders must keep the demon-strated potential of their chemical leaders in focus andbalance at all times. Commanders can best assess theirchemical leaders during training exercises. Once again,if chemical training does not occur, the potential ofthe chemical leader is not assessed, and the balance orquantity of leadership is unknown. Any combat unitwhose chemical leader demonstrates the ability to affectmission focus and balance is a combat multiplier. TheCANE tests conducted in May 1983 were the closestassessment of leader potential in an NBC environment;the results were startling. Command and controlwere degraded up to 80 percent and platoon leaderswere killed 67 percent of the time when in MOPP4as opposed to 50 percent when not. Colonel Chuck Kelly,a former director of combat development at theChemical School, said: �The squad leader, the platoonleader, (and) the company commander work at 150percent of their normal energy.� When the potentialof the leader is greatly affected, a new balance mustdevelop between this potential, the mission, andneeds of the unit. The Chemical School can develop aknown potential for all chemical leaders before they reachtheir operational assignments. Furthermore, chemicalcommanders can conduct initial assessments basedupon standardized, sequential, and challenging chemicalleader development program.

The Chemical School is the best arena in whichto develop and maintain chemical leaders. The weakestpillar of Army leader development, for chemicalleaders, is operational assignments. The assignments nei-ther provide adequate training time nor permit theapplication and development of specific and complexNBC decisions. However, chemical leaders require suchexperience. The school can challenge and developchemical leaders by incorporating physical andpsychological stress into exercises. Training, handicappedby such stress, reveals the weakness of conventionalleadership techniques. An NBC environment requireschemical experience. Chemical leaders taught toinstinctively react to this stress are combat multipliers. Asuccessful chemical leader can demonstrate theability to balance the mission and the needs of his unitduring extended NBC operations. Finally, experiencedchemical commanders from the school can provideassessment and feedback to junior leaders before theydepart to operational assignments.

Chemical Leaders and the Present Threat

Chemical and biological warfare are real threats. TheChemical School possesses the latest information toprepare chemical leaders. The CIA has advertised forrecruits with NBC experience for the past 2 years. It seemsthe United States is concerned with third world countriesinvolved in planning potential (stateside and overseas),NBC targets. The US Secret Service has recentlyconsulted with the Army�s chemical/biological anti-terrorism team on how to protect President Clinton fromCB terrorism. Chemical warfare is still a threat on thebattlefield due to its usefulness in mountainous anddifficult terrain where conventional artillery is noteffective. The Russians, using chemicals, killed a reported3,000 Afghanis who fought on such terrain from 1979through 1981. Lastly, the Defense Intelligence Agencystated that third world countries are seeking to employ�old Soviet� expertise in chem/bio warfare: namely, Iran,Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The Chemical corps needs toensure every chemical leader is developed enough toaffect and understand the future battlefield.

In May 1991, former President George Bushreversed the US�s policy of retaining a small reserveof chemical munitions and the right to retaliate withchemical weapons, if attacked with chemical weapons.Despite the ex-president�s chemical weapons initiative,it did not guarantee future elimination of all chemicalweapons in the rest of the world. The Japanese cult, whichattacked civilians with sarin in 1995, just reinforced

The CANE tests conducted inMay 1983 were the closest

assessment of leader potentialin an NBC environment;the results were startling.

Command and control weredegraded up to 80 percentand platoon leaders were

killed 67 percent of the timewhen in MOPP4 as opposed

to 50 percent when not.

9January 1999

concerns of a modern threat. The present ChemicalWarfare Convention (CWC) bans chemical warfareagents and their components and was signed by 160nations. However, the Clinton administration and theUS Senate openly doubted that the treaty could �keep thearms out of so-called rogue states.� With theabandonment of retaliation as a deterrent, the UnitedStates must have a robust chemical defense. TheChemical Corps can start by taking the responsibilityto develop its own experienced chemical leadersat the Chemical School.

The Chemical School has the capability to train itsleaders on all the latest equipment. A chemical leadercan deploy within 24 hours to areas with NBC orenvironmental threats, like Iraq and Bosnia, respectively.Chemical officers must prepare to operate in old andnew trouble spots. The Kurdish people of Northern Iraqwere gassed from 1984-1988. Once again there areproblems in the Kurdish area where there is a UN/USpresence. Not too far from the Kurdish areas, inthe Caucas Mountains of Russia, is another possibletrouble spot of Chechenya. The Chechens provedthey could move dangerous nuclear fuel material intoMoscow. Reports also confirm biological and nuclearmedical wastes (for example, leaking containers ofcobalt-60 and cesium-137) were unsecured andunmarked in the Republic of Georgia. Lastly, a typicalcity like Austin, Texas has 23 sites where hazardousmaterials are stored, with an average of 12 differentchemicals at each site. The preceding informationindicates that a combat unit with urban terrain in itssector needs an experienced chemical leader. TheChemical Corps should have all its chemical leadersprepared to affect an operation in an NBC environ-ment and provide balance to a combat mission.

�As with a man of the world, instinct almost becomes habit, so that healways acts, speaks, and moves appropriately...so only the experiencedofficer will make the right decision...Practice and experience dictate the an-swer--this is possible, that is not.� Carl von Clausewitz

Summary

Webster�s dictionary defines leadership as thecapacity to guide or lead along a way. The �way� inan NBC environment is foremost the physical andpsychological stress. That very point has never beendebated since World War I; however, the responsibilityto train chemical leaders to a professional standard hasbeen underemphasized and ignored. The �chemicalleader� is best developed during operational assign-ments with combat arms units. Frankly, the combat armsunits are too busy; and besides, the responsibility isbest handled within the Chemical Corps. The ChemicalSchool must recognize the potential impact of such aleader development program. Our best officers andnoncommisioned officers who have extended NBCoperations experience, although they are few, arespread out in many different areas. Although theChemical School will provide training opportunities thatoperational assignments should provide, the ChemicalSchool can develop chemical leaders with chemicalexperience and an understanding of the challenging andcomplex NBC environment. This chemical leaderdevelopment program permits a better assessmentand maintenance of chemical leadership. Clausewitz�s as-sessment of an experienced officer is fitting: �Aswith a man of the world, instinct almost becomes habit,so that he always acts, speaks, and moves appro-priately�so only the experienced officer will make theright decision�Practice and experience dictate theanswer�this is possible, that is not.� The ChemicalSchool can produce �leaders� through operationaltraining and their experience will have an immeasurableeffect on the battlefield of tomorrow. The only compo-nent of the Army that knows exactly where, when, andhow to develop a chemical leader is the Chemical Corps.

10 CML

comfort to our soldiers. Some of these improvements in-clude the Joint Service Integrated Suit Technology(JSLIST) which protects against chemicals and biologicals.Using the Joint Service concept minimizes the numberof different suits among the services, reduces heat stress,and improves comfort by using a lighter material. Thefinal example of chemical protection improvement ison the M40-series protective masks. A quick-doffhood, second skin, canister interoperability, voiceamplification, new nosecup, and vision correction add tothe current M40-series mask. These masks provide both

By CPT Becky A. Cate

Friend...or Foe?

Are we putting our lives in the hands of computers instead of working people?

Advancing technology provides us with thecapability to improve chemical and biological protectionand detection methods. Even though we, as a militaryforce, are not reliant on technology for individualprotection, we are heavily reliant on machines andcomputers to detect the presence of chemical andbiological agents. What does the future hold for us?Are we putting our lives in the hands of computersinstead of working people? This article discusses thefuture of chemical and biological protection, upcomingdetection methods, and how technology affects ourfuture of protecting the force.

. . . we do not need anycomputerized equipmentto protect the soldiersagainst chemical agents.

Developed throughout theyears, individual chemical equip-ment has provided the soldier withprotection against chemical agents.Tests and studies of this equipmentindicate that we do not need anycomputerized equipment to protect the soldier againstchemical agents. Today�s MOPP suit and mask areenough to minimally protect the soldier. Improvementsin this equipment will afford even more protection and

chemical and biological protection.Since we are protected using suitsand masks, there is no reliance ontechnology for surviving chemicalattacks. We do rely on technologyfor improving our protection andincreasing the comfort level.

Medical and scientific breakthroughs have recentlyreduced the risks of biological agent contamination.Some of the methods available to the military includevaccinations, antiserum, antibiotics, and individual

11January 1999

ForceProtection:

sensor and ground temperature to provide actualweather conditions, and an improved marking system.The backup systems for chemical agent detection are theM8A1 alarm, CAM, M8 and M9 paper, and M256 kits.The new system will allow the vehicle commanderbetter command and control and the ability to monitorhis crew.

Present biological detection consists of theBiological Integrated Detection Systems (BIDS) andLong-Range Biological Standoff Detection Systems(LR-BSDS). The BIDS is able to cover large areas

and report any detection of biological agents in lessthan 45 minutes from cloud arrival. The drawbackto the system is that it must be stationary and in thebiological cloud before it can detect any agents. TheLR-BSDS, mounted in an UH-60, can track out to 30kilometers and complements the BIDS. This systemprovides early detection of a long-line source ofbiological attacks and discriminates between man-madeand natural clouds. It does not identify the agents, butit does cue the BIDS so they are able to identify thespecific agent, thus increasing soldier readinessand awareness of biological agents.

Biological detection systems being developedand tested include the Integrated Biological AgentDetector System (IBADS), Joint Biological PointDetection System (JBPDS) and Airbase and PortAdvanced Concept Technology Demonstration(Portal Shield). The IBADS is simply a point detectorwith a local alarm. The IBADS detects backgroundchanges and sounds the alarm but does not identifythem. The IBADS also includes hand-held assaysto manually detect biological agents. The JBPDSis a fully automated system detecting and identifyingbiological agents. Extremely rapid and sensitive, thissystem allows for more warning time to troops. Thefinal development, ACTD, is a fixed-site biologicalagent detector and identifier. It will not replace the BIDS,but will fill the gaps between the current systems�theBIDS and JBPDS. Employed around airbases andports of embarkation, Portal Shield requires littlemaintenance and no specialized training to operate.Rapid detection is the key to survivability; so PortalShield was developed to detect in as little as 5 minutesand uses an automated warning system to send outcontamination warnings.

Whether we want it or not, technology has aprofound effect on our future. Protecting the forceremains simple with MOPP suits and masks, requiringno computers or machines to protect the troops. Thereliance on technology remains with vaccinations,antiserum, and antibiotics. Following development,administration to the force is simple.

protection. Vaccinations provide immunity to a certainbiological agent and can last for years. Research continueson vaccines, the future involving recombinant proteins,simply lowering the required dosage. A second methodused is antiserum. It provides immediate protectionagainst Botulinum Toxin for a limited time but is veryexpensive. Antibiotics are also available for Anthrax,Tularemia, Plague, and Q Fever and are not administereduntil after contamination. They provide immediateprotection but are not effective against toxins or viruses.Chemical suits and masks are the best protection againstbiological agents currently available.

Today, the military relies heavily upon technologywhen detecting chemical and biological agents. Modify-ing current systems results in detecting vapors, liquids,and clouds further away in order to increase warning time.The only difficulty is that there are separate pieces ofequipment to detect chemicals and biologicals.

The M93 NBC Reconnaissance System (Fox) is thesystem currently used for chemical detection. A newmodel, the M93A1 NBCRS will replace the M93 NBCRSin the next few years. The M93A1 NBCRS will consistof the equipment already in the M93 NBCRS in additionto the Multiple Integrated Chemical Agent Detector(MICAD), a ground temperature probe and meteorologi-cal sensor, improved sampling collection and stowagesystem, and the M21 Remote Sensing Chemical AgentAlarm (RSCAAL). These improvements to the Foxvehicle allow for a 5-kilometer standoff detectioncapability of nerve and blister agents, meteorological

Whether we want it or not, technology has a profoundeffect on our future. Protecting the force remainssimple with MOPP suits and masks, requiring nocomputers or machines to protect the troops.

12 CML

Detection of chemical and biological agents on theother hand, seems to be the most important, yet wecannot detect these without computers and machines. Thebackup method for detecting chemical agents is theM256 Kit, but what about biological agents? Theyare becoming a bigger threat to us because they areinexpensive to make and easy to disseminate. The onlybackup methods we have for detecting biologicalagents are by observing animals and humans in theenvironment and by sampling the soil and the waterusing the issued test kits. By then it may be too latefor some.

In conclusion, technology is furiously overtakingus. We need to sit back and examine the possibilities ofinoperable systems and look for other methods ofdetection that do not rely completely on the use of

At the time this article was written, CPT Becky A. Cate wasa student at the Chemical Officer�s Advanced Course at FortMcClellan, AL. CPT Cate has a BA in biology/chemistryfrom Mount Marty College/University of South Dakota. Hersource of commission is ROTC from theUniversity of South Dakota. She is a graduate of AirborneSchool and Chemical Officer Basic Course. Previousassignments include S1, 83d Chemical Battalion, Fort Bragg;Platoon Leader, 1-1st Chemical Company, Fort Bragg; andBattalion Chemical Officer 1-229th Aviation Battalion, FortBragg, NC.

computers and electronics. Upon detection of achemical or biological agent, individual protectivemeasures will follow. We must keep the goal of forceprotection in our focus and make it our friend,not our foe.

A�s for the Arsenals that turn out our �stuff� �Edgewood and Huntsville, and also Pine Bluff.

B is for Bombs of Magnesium brand,Combatted with spray and with buckets of sand.

C stands for Chlorine, the first warfare gas,Through it, in training, all troops have to pass.

D is for Dugway, our new proving ground,Afar out in Utah its tests will resound.

E stands for ED, the �Enemy�s delight,�Its venemous fumes put opponents to flight.

F is for flame-throwers, used at close range,Creating a scene which is fearsome and strange.

G is for Gas of the poisonous kind;Too bad if you leave your gas mask behind?

H stands for HS, the blistering hell,Which causes the skin to burn and to swell.

I is the letter for Incendiary,Of which air wardens are taught to be wary.

J is for January, June and July,For nothing else rhymes howsoever we try.

K�s for the Key to Chemical KnowledgeAcquired at Edgewood as well as at college.

L is for Lacrimators, smarting the eye,Which will make �Japanazis� suffer and cry.

M is for M1, the symbol for Lewisite;Germanium fragrance and blistering bite.

N�s for the Names in �Nomenclature�Appearing throughout our literature.

O stands for Odor, the kind that you smell,When detecting the gas from an enemy shell.

P is for Porter, Major General and Chief;He likes our reports to be thorough and brief.

Q�s for the Questions which plague us each dayTo test our I.Q. in a technical way.

R stands for Retorts, with Ring of benzene,Our symbol of service since 1918.

S is for �Sniff Set� of various gases,A sampler of whiffs for civilian classes.

T is for Thermit, nicknamed �the heat,�As hot babies go it�s among the elite!

U�s for the Unit each officer serves �The Regulars, AUS�s, and CW Reserves.

V is for Vesicants, painful and searing,Which troops unprotected are constantly fearing.

W � P stands for White Phosphorus cloudThat often is used, in warfare, to shroud.

X �marks the spot� where a gassing attackHas succeeded in forcing the enemy back.

Y is for yellow, the marking for smoke,It�s painted on shells that cause you to choke.

Z�s for the Zeal which our leaders inspire,And also the Zenith to which we aspire.

An ABC of the CWSTaken from Chemical Warfare Service Newsletter, May, 1942

13January 1999

Biological warfare (BW) began long before humansdeveloped an understanding of bacteria, viruses, andtoxins. The earliest accounts of BW are contained inancient Greek, Persian, and Roman literature. Whilethese incidents were isolated and limited in scope, suchas poisoning adversaries� wells with cadavers, theydemonstrate that some forms of biological warfare arepossible by even the most low-tech societies. One of the most infamous cases of primitive biologicalwarfare occurred in the 14th Century. In 1346, after athree-year unsuccessful siege on the Crimean seaport ofCaffa (present day Feodosija), the Mongols placedplague-infected cadavers on their catapults and flung theminto the walled city. The cadavers proved considerablymore effective than stones. The plague quickly spread throughout the city and theGenoese inhabitants fled by sea, landing in Sicily,Sardinia, Corsica, and eventually Genoa. Several medicalhistorians believe �Black Death,� the pandemic thatbegan in Genoa and spread throughout Italy and theentire European continent killing nearly one-third of theEuropean population, actually began on the catapults atthe siege of Caffa. One of the first known uses of biological warfarein North America occurred in 1763, and was welldocumented in official correspondence between SirJeffrey Amherst, the British Commander-in-Chief ofNorth America, and Colonel Henry Bouquet, the rankingofficer for the Pennsylvania frontier.

In the spring of 1763, Bouquet reported to hiscommander that he faced two serious problems: anoutbreak of smallpox in his troops and Indian scalpingparties that were �laying waste to the settlements,destroying the harvest and butchering men, women, andchildren.� The letters that passed back and forthbetween these two officers detailed a plan to provide�peace offerings� to local Indian chiefs�blankets andhandkerchiefs from the British smallpox hospital near FortPitt. Later that year and on into the next Spring, smallpoxdecimated several Ohio and Shawanoe tribes in WesternPennsylvania. While it is not possible to prove by any scientificstandard that the smallpox plague that ravaged theseIndian tribes could be attributed to the actions of ColonelBouquet, there is no question the officers conspired toattack the Indian population of western Pennsylvaniawith biological agents. The first modern use of biological agents in warfaremost likely occurred during World War I. According tothe Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), Germany was accused of using cholera in Italyand plague in St. Petersburg in 1915. SIPRI also claimsthere was evidence that the Germans used glanders andanthrax to infect horses and cattle in Bucharest andMesopotamia in 1916. The first and possibly the only modern use ofbiological warfare in the United States also occurredduring World War I. There is substantial evidence that

Clearly, the history of biological warfare did not end with the unilateraldisarmament of the US program, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, orthe Cold War. Unfortunately, it seems quite possible that the most dramatic andcatastrophic period of biological warfare awaits us in the 21st century.

By Colonel (P) Randall J. Larsen with Robert P. Kadlec, M.D.

14 CML

BiologicalWarfare

A short history

This article is reprinted from the January 1996 issue of CML

hemorrhagic fever, cerebrospinal meningitis, and otherdiseases that resulted in the deaths of more than 10,000individuals. Between 1940 and 1945, both units testeddelivery systems for plague and anthrax on humansubjects, including allied prisoners of war. Numerous field tests were also conducted. Unit 731distributed typhoid-laced dumplings to 3,000 Chineseprisoners of war and then freed them to return to theirhomes to determine if this would be an effective meansto spread the disease. During a five-month period in 1940, 70 kg of typhusrickettsia, 50 kg of cholera bacteria, and 5 kg of plague-infested fleas were spread through the Ning Bocommunity south of Hangzhou. More than 500 villagersperished during these tests, and plague epidemics,virtually unknown in this region, recurred in 1941, 1946,and 1947. A documentary film was made of the NingBo expedition by the Japanese Army. By 1945, Unit 731 had stockpiled more than 400 kgof anthrax to be used in specially designed fragmenta-tion bombs. General Ishii�s plans to attack US forces withthese bombs, which would have been delivered by largeballoons, were canceled by the Japanese Army Chief-of-Staff and Surgeon General. In May 1945, General Ishiireceived approval to drop plague-infested fleas on theAmerican airfield on Saipan. The operation, however, wasfoiled when an American submarine sunk the ship thatwas carrying the Unit 731 technicians to Saipan. Unit 731 reached peak production in June 1945.General Ishii�s facilities were producing plague, typhoid,cholera, and anthrax in quantities that could have infectedhalf the population of the world. The new breedingmachines were producing 100 million fleas every few daysand Ishii�s quartermaster was ordered to obtainsufficient grain by September to feed 3 million rats.However, on August 13, four days after an atomic bombwas dropped on Hiroshima and the Russians invaded Man-churia and Korea, Ishii ordered the destruction of all bio-logical warfare facilities, bringing an abrupt ending toJapan�s brief but nefarious history of biological warfare. The details, or even the very existence of theJapanese biological warfare program was not widelyknown outside the BW community until the mid-1980s.The reason is simple. All information gathered by the USgovernment following World War II was classified TopSecret. Once the information was analyzed,

While there was no widespread battlefield use ofbiological agents during World War II, every majorcombatant had a biological warfare program.

German agents, working out of a small house in SilverSprings, Maryland, attempted to infect horses andmules with anthrax and glanders prior to their shipmentto France. There is, however, no definitive evidence onthe effectiveness of these biological warfare activities. Despite the questionable effects of biological warfarein World War I, there was no question concerning theeffects of chemical agents. As many as one millionsoldiers and civilians were killed or injured by chlorineand mustard gases. In response, 40 nations, including theUnited States, signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 pro-hibiting the first use of chemical and biological weapons. No restraints, however,were placed on research,development, weaponization, and stockpiling of chemicaland biological agents, and during the world wars, themajor powers, including the United States, Britain, andJapan, continued research and development efforts. While there was no widespread battlefield use ofbiological agents during World War II, every majorcombatant had a biological warfare program. In theUnited States, the War Research Service (WRS)coordinated the work of biologists in 28 universitiesincluding Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Notre Dame, andStanford. In 1942, the British began testing anthraxbomblets on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland,and in 1943, British technicians were assisting in thedevelopment of anthrax bombs in the United States. Bythe end of the war, the United States had developedlarge-scale research, development, production, andweaponization facilities. The program included bothanti-personnel and anti-crop agents. Japan was the only nation that actually used biologi-cal weapons during World War II. In 1940, plague-in-fected fleas and grain (which attracted rats) were droppedfrom aircraft on 11 Chinese cities. Although there weresome unverified reports of biological weapons use againstRussian troops, there is no question about the large-scale laboratory and field testing on human subjectsaccomplished by the Japanese. Between 1932 and 1945, Unit 731 (commanded byGeneral Shiro Ishii) and Unit 100 conducted biologicalwarfare research in Manchuria and China. Duringlaboratory tests, human subjects were infected withplague, typhus, smallpox, yellow fever, tularemia, hepati-tis, gas gangrene, tetanus, cholera, dysentery, glanders,anthrax, undulant fever, tick encephalitis, epidemic

15January 1999

delivery) and that the effectiveness of the Japaneseprogram was not considered militarily significant. The security classification given to the Japanesebiological warfare program resulted in some individuals,particularly within the academic community, doubtingits existence when reports first emerged in the openpress. This changed, however, in 1982, when theJapanese government released a report by the SocialWelfare Ministry to the lower house of the Dietconcerning the Imperial Army�s Unit 731. State MinisterKumio Tanabe declared that experiments occurred�during the most extraordinary wartime conditions� and�were most regrettable from the viewpoint of humanity.� During the past several years, considerable informa-tion has become available through the Freedom ofInformation Act. Numerous detailed accounts have sincebeen produced including documentaries by a Tokyotelevision station (which included interviews with formermembers of Unit 731), the BBC, �60 Minutes,� andseveral books and journal articles by both Japanese andAmerican historians. From 1945 to 1969, the United States continuedresearch and development efforts. Some individualsrefer to the period between 1959 � 1969 as the �goldenage� of biological warfare research. This rather macabredesignation comes from the fact that major scientificadvances were achieved in:

On 25 November 1969, President Nixon announced aunilateral ban on the use of biological agents andweapons. All future biological research was limited todefensive measures such as immunization, detection, andsafety. Because the issue of toxins was omitted from thedeclaration (a technical oversight), a similar statement wasissued on 14 February 1970, banning both biologicallyand chemically produced toxins. By the summer of 1972, US stocks of biologicalwarfare agents had been destroyed, and on 22 January1975, President Ford signed the Biological WeaponsConvention (BWC) prohibiting the development,

� Large-scale production of bacteria,viruses, rickettsia,and their metabolic byproducts (toxins)

� Stabilization and preservation in both liquid and dry forms� Weaponization efficienceies (aerosol dissemination)� Production safety

production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biologi-cal) and toxin weapons. The Soviet Union and 151 other nations also signedthe BWC; however, Western intelligence agenciessuspected that the Soviets were continuing to work on anoffensive program. The highly classified nature of theirprogram compounded by their �closed society� and theinherent difficulties of verification in the BW arenamade it impossible for Western governments to obtaina �smoking gun.� Further evidence emerged in the spring of 1979 whenan outbreak of anthrax occurred in the city of Sverdlovsk,USSR, resulting in numerous deaths. Soviet officials ac-knowledged the incident, but blamed it on blackmarket meat, a rather dubious claim, since local doctorswere reporting severe pulmonary edema�symptoms notassociated with ingested anthrax bacteria. In 1989, the �smoking gun� was finally obtained. ARussian microbiologist, Vladimir Pasechnik, defectedwhile attending a conference in London. His highlydetailed, first-hand knowledge confirmed the West�sworse fears. According to Pasechnik, the Sovietswere deeply involved in research development, andproduction of an offensive BW program, including agenetically engineered, dry form of antibiotic-resistant su-per plague. Pasechnik also stated the Soviets haddiscussed providing BW agents to terrorist organizations. Despite confrontations by both President Bush andPrime Minister Thatcher, President Gorbachev andForeign Minister Shevardnadze strongly denied anySoviet involvement in illegal BW activities. However, during a February 1992 visit to the UnitedStates, Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged theSverdlovsk incident was the result of an accidental re-lease of aerosol anthrax spores from a nearbybiological warfare production facility. And in September1992, Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Berdennikov said,�Activities banned by the convention (1972Biological Warfare Convention) were in progress from1946 until March 1992.� The bottom line on the Soviet/Russian BW program isthat research, development, and production ofoffensive weapons continued 23 years after the USunilaterally banned such activity in 1969, a period in whichan incredible revolution in biotechnology occurred. Mosthistorians now agree the �gaps� of the 1950s and

however, it was evident that a major breakthrough hadnot been achieved by the Japanese (such as aerosol

16

Some individuals refer to the period 1959-1969 asthe �golden age� of biological warfare research.

CML

Are you getting what you pay for? Are you one of our many subscriberswho pay for your subscription to CML, Army Chemical Review? If you are,inquiries about missing magazines, changes of address, or renewalsshould be sent to Government Printing Office, PO Box 371954,Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250-7954.

Missing your CML?

17January 1999

and missile gaps. Unfortunately, there is no question thata very real and serious gap in BW technology andcapability exists today. Both the biotechnology andcomputer revolutions began in the 1970s. Being 23 yearsbehind the Russians in BW research is somewhatcomparable to being 23 years behind in computertechnology. Another recent occurrence of offensive BW activitywas the Iraqi program. The Iraqis had undertaken alarge-scale research program and were capable ofproducing weapons quantities of a wide variety of BWagents. The full story of Iraq�s BW program has not yetbeen written. The history of biological warfare provides severalcogent lessons for the future.

� It dispels the myth, �since biological weapons havenot been used before, they will not be used in thefuture.� This section only highlighted a few examplesof BW use. A complete account would requireseveral hundred pages to document. Clearly, theJapanese used a wide variety of biological warfareagents during the 1940s, and had they been able todevelop an efficient aerosol dissemination system, thehistory of World War II would read quitedifferentlytoday.

� The siege at Caffa, with its possible links to the spreadof Black Plague across the European continent andthe smallpox plague that decimated Indians tribes inWestern Pennsylvania can arguably be linked toprimitive forms of biological warfare. These earlyincidents pale in comparison to those possible today.

� The difficulty of maintaining an international con-trol regime to check the proliferation of offensive bio-logical warfare capability is readily apparent. With-out a �smoking gun,� it is virtually impossible to prove

that a nation is actively engaged in anoffensive, and therefore, illegal, BW program. Mod-ern procedures allow for extremely rapid productionof these agents. To go from legitimate �laboratoryquantities� to �weapons quantities� is a matter of daysor weeks, not years. In other words, the notion of a�biological warfare nonproliferation controlregime� is arguably an oxymoron.

� Clearly, the history of biological warfare did not endwith the uniteral disarmament of the US program, theBiological Weapons Convention of 1972, or the ColdWar. Unfortunately, it seems quite possiblethat the most dramatic and catastrophic period ofbiological warfare awaits us in the 21st century.

At the time this article was written, Colonel (P) Randall J. Larsenwas the Deputy Commander of the 43d Air Refueling Group,Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Prior to assuming this position, Colo-nel Larsen served as a National Defense Fellow at the Matthew B.Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, Universityof Pittsburgh. Colonel Larsen earned a BA degreein Criminology from Southwest Texas State University in 1974.In 1983 he earned his MS degree in National Security Affairs/Asian Studies from the Naval Post Graduate School. His militaryeducation includes Squadron Officer School, Air Command andStaff College, Air War College, and Defense IntelligenceCollege.At the time this article was written, Lt. Col Robert P. Kadlec,USAF, was a physician assigned to the Office of theSecretary of Defense for International Security Policyas a Senior Assistant for Counterproliferation. He is adistinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy.He holds a Doctorate of Medicine and a Masters Degree of Tropi-cal Medicine and Hygiene from the UniformedServices University of the Health Sciences. He also holdsa Masters Degree in National Security Studies from GeorgetownUniversity.

MickMickMickMickMickey Mouse Maskey Mouse Maskey Mouse Maskey Mouse Maskey Mouse MaskTheTheTheTheThe

By Major Robert D. Walk

The United States Army Chemical Museum has a very special gas mask.It looks like Mickey Mouse(� Disney)!! This mask was produced early in 1942to protect children in case of a chemical attack on the United States.

18 CML

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attackedPearl Harbor, Hawaii with massive force that destroyedthe battleships of the Pacific Fleet. In the dark daysof early 1942, the US government was faced with thespecter of defeat and gloom. Our military was fightinga losing battle on all fronts and fears of saboteurs andsubmarines attacking the US were high. A critical needexisted to protect the civilian population, especiallychildren, from gas attacks. Hawaii was of specialconcern and thousands of US military training maskswere rushed in for the civilian population�s use. Nomasks were available to protect children, so the Hawai-ian Department used a locally fabricated expedient thatconsisted of a hood with bunny ears.

At the time this article was written, Major Robert D. Walk wasthe Weapons of Mass Destruction Individual and InstructorTraining Officer at the US Army Reserve Command. He is agraduate of the Command and General Staff College (Residentand Correspondence), the Combined Arms and Services StaffSchool, the Chemical Officers Advanced Course, and theChemical Officers Basic Course. Previous assignments includeCommander, 184th Chemical Detachment; Commander, HHC,59th Ordnance Brigade; Acting Commander, 1st Battalion,377th Regiment, 95th Division (Institutional Training); S-3,1st Battalion, 377th Regiment, 95th Division (InstitutionalTraining); S-3, 197th Ordnance Battalion; Chemical Officer,Readiness Group Stewart; and Chemical Officer, 60thOrdnance Group.

On January 7th, 1942, one monthafter Pearl Harbor, T.W. Smith, Jr.,the owner of the Sun RubberCompany, and his designer, DietrichRempel, with Walt Disney�s approvalintroduced a protective mask forchildren. This design of the MickeyMouse Gas Mask for children waspresented to Major General WilliamN. Porter, Chief of the ChemicalWarfare Service. After approval ofthe CWS, Sun Rubber ProductsCompany produced sample masksfor review. Other comic bookcharacter designs were to follow,depending on the success of theMickey Mouse mask.

The mask was designed sochildren would carry it and wearit as part of a game. This would reduce the fearassociated with wearing a gas mask and hopefully,improve their wear time and, hence, survivability.

The protection of children was a primary concernof all nations during World War II. Germany had achild�s gas protective crib for infants and a protectivehood for toddlers and children unable to wear the adultnoncombatant mask. The United Kingdom had a similarprogram. In the United States, the M1 Infant Protectorwas developed, using a standard civil defense filter withbellows to push air into a layered protective sack. TheM1 series of Noncombatant Gas Masks was producedin large numbers for older children and adults. TheMickey Mouse Gas Mask was designed for smallchildren in a valiant attempt to give them something thatwould work and still be fun. Ultimately, the Office ofCivil Defense bought the M2 Noncombatant Gas Mask

for small children to protect them from chemical agents.In tests, with proper coaching and good salesmanshipby the leader, young children could be induced towear the gas mask for extended periods.

The Mickey Mouse Gas Mask was produced as partof the war production program. The Sun Rubber Company produced approximately 1,000 Mickey Mousegas masks and earned an Army-Navy �E� for excellencein wartime production in 1944. Overall, production ofthe Noncombatant Gas Masks (and in fact, all gas masks)was one of the most successful production programsof the war. In fact, production had to be curtailedearly due to the vast quantity produced.

Thankfully, no chemical attacks oc-curred in the United States. MickeyMouse Gas Masks were distributedto senior officials and others during thewar as keepsakes. When the warended, further desire for the maskvanished. It became an old idea whosetime had passed.

Very few of the Mickey Mousegas masks survived. The US ArmyChemical Museum at Fort McClellan,Alabama, has a hand-made prototype.The 45th Infantry Division Museum,Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, has aproduction specimen on permanentdisplay with other gas masks in thecombat support area of the museum.The Walt Disney Archives, Burbank,California, has a facepiece without

ears, lenses, or a canister, and a mask owned by thefounder of the Sun Rubber Company was on display atthe Summit County (Ohio) Historical Society�s �ToysMade in Summit County� exhibit in 1982. Have you seenone of these masks?

�

19January 1999

Time�and chemical warfare

By MG John G. Appel (deceased) As published in the Spring 1986 Army Chemical Journal

The following article contains the substance of a speech givenin October 84 by MG John G. Appel (retired) at the TechnologyApplication in Chemical Operations Symposium at Brooks Air ForceBase in San Antonio, Texas. The content of this 14-year old speech is still valid andshould serve as a bench mark to those of us involved in chemicalwarfare issues. MG Appel actively participated in defense-oriented organiza-tions. He spoke and wrote extensively on defense issues as aconsultant in the fields of management operations, training,research and development. MG Appel urges action in a number of areas of chemicalwarfare that were, and are, of urgent concern. Many areas havebeen addressed, are being addressed, or have been resolved byactions taken by Congress, the US Army, and/or the Chemical Corps. The obvious objective of his speech�to spotlight CWinadequacies as he perceives them, and spur corrective action�remains an ongoing objective of all those interested and involvedin CW deterrence, defense, and retaliation. The edited version ofMG Appel�s speech follows.

Our chemical warfare posture today is inadequate; we�ve advanced little over thepast decades. We haven�t left square one in some areas�especially defense. We�renot at the forward edge of modern technology in chemical warfare (CW). It�s pasttime we were. We must become more innovative and do it faster than we have in thepast. Time is critical from a number of points of view. Time may seem like an unusual approach to a discussion on CW. An apparent lackof appreciation as to how time affects CW, offensively and defensively, prompted meto address the CW operational challenge this way. Technical efforts offer minimal chances of success unless research is timely andthe relevance of time is fully understood. Individuals engaged in applied research anddevelopment need to keep tactics and strategy in focus, and, more importantly, theultimate user�the soldier, marine, sailor, or airman in combat.

Our chemicalwarfare posturetoday isinadequate...

20 CML

Alarming CW Disparity

I�m sure you are aware of the alarming disparity between our CW posture andthat of our allies�especially in NATO�and that of the Soviet Union. The SovietCW capability far exceeds requirements for defense, and they continue to expandthat capability. Given their advantage in CW and their strategy and doctrine, if the Soviets decideto attack NATO�a big if, but they have the attack option and NATO does not�thereis a greater than 50 percent chance they will include CW with conventional muni-tions. Having made the initial decision to attack makes the CW initiationdecision easy. The Soviets would not need to include nuclear weapons and mightnot initially. Conventional and chemical warfare could take place under a nuclearand space parity. The Soviets take bigger risks than we, accepting a chemical casualty as �anothercasualty.� They feel gains made in both time and mission accomplishment justifypersonnel losses. On the other hand, we look for nearly 100 percent protection of personnel andnearly 100 percent decontamination. We stand to lose the battles as well as the warwhile �molecule hunting.� It is time we found and accepted the balance, trade-offs,or risks needed to cope with CW, its impact on mobility, and the sustainability ofcombat effectiveness.

Disparity Invites Attack

The only effective counter to CW is CW. No other weapons system degradesbattlefield mobility or individual effectiveness as extensively as CW. Obviously Con-gress doesn�t know this, or doesn�t want to know. If it did, it would haveapproved funds to upgrade our CW stockpile, which is inadequate by every militarilysignificant measurement. It is old and deteriorating rapidly. Only 10 percent of themunitions on hand today, limited to the few ground weapon systems having a rangeof less than 15 kilometers, can be delivered. Therefore, our CW response capability is inadequate in terms of agents, quantity,and range. We lack the muscle to adequately counter-degrade Soviet mobility. On theother hand, the Soviets have a variety of ground and air systems that can reach anytarget in NATO. This disparity invites attack. And, in our preoccupation with theSoviet CW threat, let�s not overlook third world nations that have or can acquire aCW capability and with whom US forces may be involved in the future. In three words, the US CW policy is to deter, defend, and retaliate. The order hereis very significant. To be effective and credible, all three elements must be inbalance, like the three legs of a stool. With the retaliatory leg virtually nonexistent,the deterrence leg is short. As a result, we are unrealistically trying to do a balancingact on a single leg! In CW treaty discussions, we find ourselves negotiating from weakness. Moreimportant, should deterrence fail, by design or miscalculation, we stand to lose.Because of our inability to adequately retaliate to a CW attack, we increase the riskand probability of nuclear war. The field commander probably will be unable to oper-ate effectively in a conventional and CW weapons environment. He probably will beunable to retaliate with CW to degrade the enemy to a level corresponding to his levelof degradation in mobility, and the tide of battle will go to the initiator of CW. In NATO, the field commander, and of course the heads of state, must choose be-tween defeat to conventional and chemical weapons, and initiating nuclear weapons topreserve NATO. Not only is there no assurance that this will work, it could lead to astrategic nuclear exchange�which no one wants. Said another way, our vulnerability inCW is our Achilles� heel! This is�or should be�totally unacceptable.

No other weaponssystem degradesbattlefield mobilityor effectiveness asextensively as CW.Obviously Congressdoesn�t know this...

21January 1999

How long can we go on living with this vulnerability? Perhaps only the Sovietsknow, but it seems prudent for the United States to eliminate this vulnerability. Timeis not on our side. Yet, given the circumstances and threat to our national security,there is not the sense of urgency there should be in Congress; within DOD; inportions of the Army, Navy, Air Force; or even within the Chemical Corps.

Funding Erratic

Over the past several decades, erratic congressional funding for research anddevelopment and production has been costly and inefficient, resulting in erosion ofthe technical base essential for both short- and long-range payoffs. Regardless offunding levels, research and development remains a means to a military capability.You do not win battles or deter war with research and development. It is the end resultof production in trained hands that produce the military capability to deter, and shoulddeterrence fail, the means to survive and win. Currently, it is doubtful we will see adequate congressional support in timeto �get well� after years of neglect. Getting Congress to provide for an adequateretaliatory capability will continue to be difficult. How much time do they thinkwe have to prepare? General Pershing said it most appropriately after World War I when he stated,�Whether or not gas will be employed in the future is conjecture, but the effect isso deadly to the unprepared, that we can never afford to neglect the question.�When we neglect the question, we neglect the consequences. We have not done enough to explain our vulnerability; too few really understand itand the role of CW in war. One place to start would be to undertake a positive infor-mation program�an education program�in the Department of Defense andfor the Congress and the public. With public support we should get better supportin Congress. We need to replace our �no comment� attitude with an affirmativeprogram that sets the record straight with facts. We should no longer continue tolose public support by default.

Must Overcome Obstacles

We cannot just sit back and blame Congress, the press, the critics, or whomever.In spite of many obstacles, we have a responsibility to try to find ways to make thepolicy effective. It is time we did; but it will take a greater sense of urgency, somebold decisions, new policies, and innovative approaches. CW degrades mobility. Mobility often is the key to victory on the battlefield andimmobility the cause of defeat. Degradation of mobility is the primary role of CW onthe battlefield provided it is used in quantity. This cannot be achieved using CW in aharassment and interdiction role. Producing casualties is the second role. The protective overgarment degrades mobility, restricts dexterity, and causesheat stress. As a result, simple tasks take too long. In far too many situations,the soldier is unable to perform the combat mission; individual failures lead tounit mission failure. In detection, it is as important to know where chemical agents are not as wellas to know where they are. With point source alarms and detectors, troops areseverely handicapped. Each operation requires too much time and too many tests.Additionally, there aren�t enough detectors in the units. Detection becomes almostimpossible at night, when chemicals are most likely to be encountered.

�Whether ornot gas will beemployed inthe future isconjecture, butthe effect is sodeadly to theunprepared,that we can neverafford to neglectthe question.�

General Pershing

22 CML

Decon System Antiquated

Then there is decontamination. Our decontamination system is antiquated.Not only is it too time consuming and ineffective, but it creates an unacceptable logis-tical burden. We use streams of water instead of chemical technology. Rinse watersare not recycled; instead, they generate hazardous runoffs. We waste timeand materials decontaminating areas, personnel, and equipment that do not needdecontamination. We do not know when decontamination is complete�at least notquickly enough. A soldier in MOPP4 on top of an armored personnel carrier �slopping�decontaminants around with a string mop has to be a sure sign of our technicalincompetence. A nighttime operation is a nightmare. It is pathetic to see thetechnology used in unit decon stations. The decontamination problem is getting too little attention from the passive pointof view. We still see too many nooks and crannies on most military equipment�toofew covers and shields. Too little attention is paid to remaining operational ina CW environment. Passive defense efforts offer a tremendous payback in bothdeterrence and defense. We talk about this, but do little about it. Too many itemsand systems designed to operate in a conventional and even nuclear environment willfail in a CW environment. It is time those outside the CW community contributed to CW deterrence.Deterrence is not just a Chemical Corps problem or an Army problem. In the finalanalysis, CW degrades the mobility of all services because it takes too much timeto cope with it.

Mixed Signals Sent

All actions and inactions generate signals. These signals�both positive andnegative�are sent within the Chemical Corps, to the chemical industry, throughoutthe Army, to the other services, to our allies, and especially to our potentialenemies. For example, a few years ago there were six major generals in the Armywith Chemical Corps backgrounds�that�s positive. Not one was assigned in the chemi-cal business as a primary mission�that�s negative. We standardized the 155-millimeter GB round. This would appear to be positive;however, we fired very few rounds, developed no confidence or firing tables, are nottesting now, and have not produced a single round from production facilities. The Soviets know it. That�s negative. The assignment of a chemical generalofficer at Fort McClellan and the Army Materiel Command and ChemicalResearch and Development Command at Edgewood are positive signals. But thereis no chemical general officer on the Army staff in CW�that�s negative. Following the decision by the Army Chief of Staff to disband the ChemicalCorps in 1973, negative signals went out in every direction. Perhaps fate was onthe side of the United States, because in 1973, the war in the Middle East revealedthe great extent to which the Soviets had prepared for CW. This brought abouta new assessment, a revitalization of the Chemical Corps and the re-establishmentof the Chemical School. These were very positive signals. This was followed by another positive signal in 1981: the development andapproval of the Army Chemical Action Plan, which outlined what was needed toenable the United States to �get well� in CW, after more than a decade of neglect.

23January 1999

Deterrence is notjust a ChemicalCorps problem oran Army problem.In the final analysis,CW degrades themobility of allservices becauseit takes too muchtime to cope with it.

Retaliatory Option Denied

Without adequate retaliatory capability, the United States is denied a military op-tion and risks losing by default to an option initiative given to any potentialenemy. Without an adequate retaliatory capability, we run the risk of causing acredibility gap in the minds of field commanders. They need positive signals, like congressional support of the national policyin terms that provide military capabilities. Although CW superiority is not neededto deter, commanders do need a spectrum of agents and air and ground delivery sys-tems capable of reaching deep CW targets and of countering the existing Soviet CWcapabilities. Bulk chemical agents in storage, in and of themselves, hardlyconstitute a useful military item or contribute to deterrence. Commanders need to see firing tables based on extensive testing together withstockpile positioning and logistical support plans. These provide the capability andconfidence needed in both the chemical munitions and the delivery systems. Theseare essential to doctrine, operational planning, and training. The lack of positive signals confuses and frustrates field commanders, who facea real dilemma. They are expected to counter CW, but have no realistic capabilityto do so. Poor detection capabilities and antiquated decontamination equipment andprocedures hamper them. This dilemma is made worse by the fact that the field commander really has adefense-only capability, which, because there is no retaliatory threat, invites attack. Itdenies us the very deterrent capability we seek. Most important, it puts the United States in a no-win position. We cannot win atanything with a defense-only posture. Defense-only means the best we can hope foris a tie! That may be acceptable to a rebuilding sports team, but our nation may not geta next season. Even an adequate defense-only posture cannot be achieved or main-tained without the challenges and inputs of an offensive counter effort. What I have said regarding chemical can be applied to biological defense. We areeven more vulnerable to biological warfare, and our defense-only approach is a joke�but not a very funny one!

Interim Solutions Needed

Too many staffers and researchers in government and industry still want to makea career of a serious national security problem, instead of demonstrating a propersense of urgency. Initial operational capability dates in the late 1980s and 1990s offerlittle to deterrence or to the hope for early solutions to the current threat and existingequipment deficiencies. We need to implement procedures that permit the adoptionof interim solutions in months instead of years. Significant negative signals emanate from research and development. Whileconsiderable funding has recently been provided, other factors degrade our ability toclose the CW gap. Our research and development system takes too long and there istoo much �business as usual� in the essential support areas of personnel, contracting,and construction. One final signal. Examine the CW training that�s done, and you will see howconfusing tactical exercises become with chemical play. Units cannot begin to dotheir tasks as efficiently as they can under non-CW conditions. This indicates therole CW plays. This should highlight the dilemma of the field soldier and fieldcommanders and, in turn, stimulate more training efforts by units in the field; ithas not�not as much as it should. If we can�t use live agents as the Soviets do,we must stress ways to provide realistic CW training.

The lack ofpositive signalsconfuses andfrustratesfield commanders,who face a realdilemma. They areexpected to counterCW, but have norealistic capabilityto do so.

24 CML

We must address and balance all of the elements of deterrence if we are torealize a credible deterrent posture. We need commanders at all levels in eachservice spending more time thinking through the CW threat and CW operations, think-ing about how to cope with CW before it is initiated against us and, especially, think-ing about how to survive and win after its initiation by the enemy. Equipment by itself is not the answer. We all know that. There are some reallyvital things we might do to overcome our obstacles, greatly improve our deterrentposture, and contribute significantly to winning, should deterrence fail.

To Offset Handicap

We may have to continue to face a significant threat with a limited and inadequateretaliatory capability. The single most important development that could offset thishandicap and deter CW would be an airborne or space area detection system. An areasystem would revolutionize CW defense. We need it now. It could even chase CWoff the battlefield. Video screens could display operational and logistical areas with unit locationsand boundary lines superimposed on the screen. They could also depict areascontaminated with chemical agents. Commanders could know almost instantlywhich units were affected and which were not. They could plan actions and maneuverto avoid contamination, while still pursuing the assigned mission. If we can predict crop yields and losses due to diseases from the air, why can�twe detect CW agents from the air? Can it be done with infrared, ultraviolet, lasers,or other means? My guess is it can�at least for higher concentrations. From therewe could expand, if necessary, to provide zones of safety. The platform couldbe a drone, aircraft, or satellite. This is the direction we need to be going, and weneed to prioritize the CW agents we need to detect. The next item should be a surface detector to identify areas in whichdecontamination is needed and where it is not needed for individuals, weapons,equipment, vehicles, aircraft, and supplies. It would get us away from inefficientpapers, crayons, and the like. It could be along the lines of a hand-held radiationmonitor. An array of such devices or a single device might be used on largepieces of equipment. This would be the companion to the area detector. The firstone may be in sight. Such detection systems will greatly help our efforts to manage decontaminationmore effectively. We must find ways to reduce the current logistical burden that domi-nates decontamination procedures. It cannot be done with streams of water.It may be done with better equipment and weapon designs, shields, coatings,chemistry, and jet blasts, if these are coupled with realistic operational doctrineand acceptable risks. Our CW doctrine and research and development effort in decontaminationneeds to reflect better detectors, contamination avoidance, simple ways toremove and control contamination, anti-CW features in all material design,better decontamination systems and procedures, and integration of the entireeffort through a total system approach. Protective gear needs to wear longer and give greater protection, yet significantlyreduce heat stress. The logistical burden also must be reduced. What aboutincorporating space technology air or liquid cooling systems into materials?Heat pipes are a possibility. Another development priority is in the area of medical prophylaxis. It is pasttime we had a realistic handle on treatment and handling of CW casualties.The medics also are engaged in a �molecule hunting� dilemma of their own. Hereagain, new rapid detectors could play a vital role.

25January 1999

We must addressand balance allof the elementsof deterrenceif we are to realizea credibledeterrent posture.

Weapons: Ground Zero

Every weapon has a ground zero. It�s a point for a bayonet or a bullet; an area ofvarying size�relatively small for shells, small rockets, and some bombs, but largerfor nuclear weapons. Soldiers who find themselves at ground zero for any weaponsystem have problems. They are at the wrong place at the wrong time. Survivalborders on a miracle. We must accept that. For chemical weapons, initial excessive agent concentrations and fragmentationcompound the problem. Survival against both ranges from difficult to impossible.Let�s not try to do the impossible nor have our requirements call for the impossible.We do not expect 100 percent protection from other weapon systems; let�s not forCW. Unrealistic requirements delay research, development, and fielding, and are un-professional. Overprotection for CW greatly increases risks to other systems, andmay even prevent mission performance. Fielded solutions in any or all of these very critical materiel areas would maketruly significant contributions to the defensive dilemma and to deterrence: The threatis now. We can�t close the gap overnight, but we must close it. Available equipment and procedures force today�s soldiers to struggle in copingwith CW. They must not be left in this dilemma. Much of their dilemma isyour challenge. I hope each of you can and will rise to meet the challenges anddo so in time. How much time do we have? I pray we have enough.

We can�t closethe gap overnight,but we mustclose it...How much time dowe have? I praywe have enough.

Major General John G. Appel

Major General Appel retired from the Army in 1974, after a distinguishedcareer that dated from his commission as a second lieutenant in 1941. Heheld many key assignments in the Chemical Corps, including commands ofPine Bluff Arsenal and the Desert Test Center. From 1970 to 1973, he wasDirector of the Chemical and Nuclear Operations Directorate in the Office ofthe Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development at Headquarters, Depart-ment of the Army. His final Assignment was as Director of Logistics for theUnited States European Command. His many achievements include the Dis-tinguished Service Medal, three Legion of Merit awards, and an honoraryDoctorate of Engineering. After his retirement, General Appel wrote and spokewidely on chemical warfare and maintained a very active interest in the Chemi-cal Corps. Prior to his death, he was Honorary Colonel of the ChemicalCorps Regiment and Chairman of the Board of the Chemical Corps Regi-mental Association.

26 CML

Recent events illustrate the presence of a very real threat of domestic terrorism usingweapons of mass destruction (WMD). The materials to make WMD are widely available forlegitimate commercial purposes while the technology used to make WMD is increasinglyavailable via the Internet. The terrorist attack using Sarin gas (GB) in the Tokyo subwayresulted in over 5,000 casualties, many of them being the emergency responders who initiallyresponded to the scene. Concern over similar or larger events are the basis for legislationand programs directed at preparing and assisting emergency responders.

By: Mike Sheheane, Chief of Functional Courses

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass DestructionAct of 1996, better known as the Nunn�Lugar�DomeniciAct, mandates the enhancement of domestic pre-

paredness and response capability to terroristattacks involving chemical, biological, and radiologicalweapons. Funding was provided to improve thecapability of federal, state, and local emergencyresponse agencies to respond to domestic terroristincidents involving WMD. Acknowledging that theDepartment of Defense (DoD) possesses the subjectmatter expertise required to support this action, DoDwas given the lead with the Secretary of the Armydesignated as the Executive Agent for implementa-tion. Program management responsibility was delegatedto the Chemical Biological Defense Command(CBDCOM) and the Domestic Preparedness TrainingProgram was developed and implemented. The goalof the program is to provide training to the largest 120

toCivilian Emergency

Responders

cities in the United States. One only need to look at the terrorist bombing ofthe World Trade Center in New York and the MurrahFederal Building in Oklahoma City to recognize thetremendous emergency response requirements of suchincidents where large explosive devices were used.Had chemical, biological, or radiological weapons beenemployed, the results could and most probablywould, have been even more staggering. Few, if any,communities have the organic response capability toadequately deal with a chemical, biological, or radio-logical attack; nor do they have the assets to sustain theresponse operations. Obviously, there is a requirementfor a concerted, coordinated effort between local, state,and federal government agencies to meet the varioustechnological, medical, and rescue demands posed bysuch an attack. The DoD anticipates requests for supportfrom civilian agencies responding to WMD attacks andplans to augment the local response capability with

27January 1999

Military Support

expertise, manpower, and equipment.The mechanism for this support is theRapid Assessment and Initial Detec-tion (RAID) Element. In FY99, 10 RAID Elements willbe organized within the NationalGuard. These units will be mannedby 22 Active Guard and Reservesoldiers with the mission of rapidlydeploying to the incident site toassess the situation and provideinitial identification or confirmationof WMD. The RAID will be com-prised of highly trained experts in across discipline of functional areas.The Table of Distribution andAllowances (TD) for the elementis shown to the right. The total number of RAIDElements to be organized is stilluncertain; however, the first 10 havebeen assigned to the 10 states whereFederal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) Regional Head-quarters are currently located. Thesestates include: Massachusetts, NewYork, Georgia, Texas, California,Missouri, Illinois, PennsylvaniaColorado, and Washington. The RAID is organized as anelement under the peacetime controlof the State Adjutant General. It hasthe capability to rapidly deploy toan incident site and provide initialsupport to the incident commander.The element has the organic capa-bility to conduct reconnaissance,provide medical advice and assis-tance, perform detection, assessmentand hazard prediction, and technicaladvice concerning WMD incidentsand agents.

C2Commander (O5)Deputy (O4)Ops SGM (E9)Ops/Tng NCO (E7)Pers/Admin NCO (E7)

6 OFF16 NCOs22 Total

Recon Medical Security Logistics Air Liaison Commo1 OFF6 NCOs

3 OFF1 NCO

2 NCOs 1 NCO 1 NCO 2 NCOs

Photos by PFC Carrie L. Fotovich,Public Affairs Office

At right, Mr. Al Rosser, Anniston ArmyDepot, helps RAID students don thelevel A protective suit that may beused by RAID Elements.

28 CML

The fielding of the Automatic Chemical AgentDetection Alarm (ACADA) will fulfill the Army�s needto replace the currently fielded M8A1 detector. As anautomatic point detector the ACADA will also augmentthe Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) as asurvey instrument. The ACADA will be used across thespectrum of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Units. The ACADA is an automatic, advanced point-sampling chemical warfare agent detection system.The ACADA is also man-portable, able to operateunattended after system start-up, and provides anaudio and visual alarm and a communication interfaceto support battlefield automation systems. While serving as the primary area-warning devicein a defensive posture, the ACADA will also have anexpanded role over the M8A1. The system offersimproved sensitivity, response times, and interferentrejection as well as concurrent nerve and blister

detection capability. The system functions as an airmonitoring device under all environmental condi-tions, within mobile and stationary, standard wheeledand tracked tactical vehicles and collective protectionshelters. The detector will sound an alarm whenthe quantity of chemical agent exceeds defined limits,and shall display information identifying the detectedagent by class.

Development

The ACADA was selected from several non-developmental items (NDI), candidate items througha competitive evaluation program. The ACADAwas developed and is being produced by GrasebyIonics, LTD. in the United Kingdom. Graseby wasalso the original developer of the Chemical AgentMonitor (CAM).

AUTOMATICCHEMICALAGENTALARM(ACADA), M22

By Timothy L. McGuirk, Chief, New Systems Training Division, USACMLS

29January 1999

System Characteristics

The ACADA system consists of a vapor agentdetector, battery box assembly, M42 remote alarmunit, transit case and on-board spares. Auxiliaryequipment includes the power supply, and vehicle mount.The detector unit is comprised of the agent sensormodule (which utilizes ion mobility technology fordetection), electrical interfaces, adjustable audio alarm,and display. The detector with battery box attachedand batteries in place weighs less than/equal to 0.5cubic feet and less than/equal to 15 pounds. The systemcan operate on power supply, vehicle power, or standardArmy lithium batteries.

Key features

� Requires minimum training for operation, imposing noadditional burden to the troops.� Provides monitoring for collective protection enclosures.� Will interface with automated battlefield communica-tion systems such as the Multipurpose Integrated Chemi-cal Agent Alarm (MICAD).� Vehicle mounts will enable mobile detection whileintegrated with the on-board communications system toprovide advance warning to troops.

Fielding/Training

The program manager, Nuclear, Biologicaland Chemical Defense Systems (NBCDS), fielded150 ACADAs to the US Army Chemical School(USACMLS) in late July 1998. The USACMLS kept 134ACADAs and gave 16 to the U.S. Army Military PoliceSchool (USAMPS). Instructor and Key Personnel (IKP)training was conducted for initial receivingunits during the week of 27 July 1998. Classroomtraining on the ACADA will begin at the USACMLSin January 1999.

Pre-Programmed Product Improvement (P3I)

A hand-held probe is being developed to attach to theACADA inlet which will allow the ACADA to be usedas a surface sampler/survey instrument. This probe shouldbe available during the 1QFY00.

Conclusion

The fielding of the ACADA will help to meet theArmy�s Force XXI plan to man the battlefield with thelatest detection equipment available today. The ACADAwill allow the U.S. Army to better meet the challengesof the 21st Century and beyond.

I would like to thank Mr. Rod Pearce, US Army Chemical School and Mr. John Jump,Chemical and Biological Defense Command for their expertise and help with this article. Timothy L. McGuirk

30

The doctrine division of the USACMLS now has a web page that is upand functional. It provides information on the doctrine division�s mission,organization, and the status of all proponent publications from Army toMulti-service and Joint. There is an additional page from which doctrinalitems can be downloaded. These items provide a glimpse into minor changescurrently under consideration. The web page also discusses the CombatTraining Center (CTC) Review program that the doctrine division man-ages. Access the page at the following link:

http://www.mcclellan.army.mil/usacmls/doctrine/docindex.htm

New Web Page

CML

The Returnof the�Little RSCAAL�Introduction

The United States Army possesses limited equipmentto detect chemical agents in a timely manner at astand-off distance. The current standoff detector doesnot have the ability to detect chemical agents from afar.Additionally, the next generation of detection equipmentcapable of standoff detection is over 5 years away fromfielding. In order to provide robust standoff detection,this paper proposes modifying current technology andemployment doctrine of the M21 Remote SensingChemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), as well as off-the-shelf procurement to enhance detection.

Current Standoff Detection Equipment

The US Army�s Fox Nuclear, Biological, ChemicalReconnaissance System Block I Modification allows thedetection of �chemical contamination in its immediateenvironment through point detection and at a distancethrough the use of the M21 RSCAAL.� The M21 detectsnerve and blister agent vapor clouds at line-of-sightdistances out to 5 kilometers. However, it must remainstationary during operations to make valid detectiondecisions. The crewmembers of the Fox can mount the M21 onits telescoping mast, or they can download it to become aground-mounted system. While mounted on the mast, theM21 draws its power supply from the vehicle, and a cam-era allows a crewmember to use line-of-sight toproperly orient the detector. In the ground-mountedsystem, the M21 requires a power source (if notco-located with the Fox), as well as a crewmember tooperate it and report its findings. In this mode onlytwo personnel will man the Fox, versus a normal crewstrength of three.

Three inherent problems exist with the current M21:it requires a dedicated power source; maximum effectivedetection limited to 5 kilometers; and in the ground-mounted system, an operator to report detection since theM21 lacks the ability to forward its findings. In order to operate, the M21 requires a powersource within 21-30 volts DC power through its maincable, with 28 volts DC power for optimal performance.Since many military vehicles operate off a 24-voltsystem, the M21 can use a myriad of vehicles for itspower source. The current power cable supplied withthe M21 has a standard North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion (NATO) power adapter; however, the M21 requiresa trained operator. To classify the M21 as a true long-range detector,it must have the means to report its findings withouthaving to rely on an operator. The Army can accomplishthis by creating a joint venture between the Chemical andSignal Corps to develop an FM processor that can trans-mit detection and cueing information from theM21 to either the Fox or the brigade-level or higherNBC section. The Army may also use the technologydeveloped in the Multipurpose Integrated Chemical AgentAlarm (MICAD), which �interfaces with existing anddevelopmental sensors, detectors, alarms, and communi-cations systems�and provides automatic transmissionof NBC alarms and data�� The RSCAAL �can detect nerve and vesicant agentclouds at ranges up to 5 kilometers.� On the mechanizedbattlefield, the tactical area may stretch over 50 kilometers.In order to detect and provide warnings of actual chemicalattacks, the range of the RSCAAL needs to be extended, orthe US Army must find a means to take advantage of itslimited range. Because of technological limitations inthe M21, the Army cannot extend its range. However,

Sniffing out contamination

by CPT Donald J. Hazelwood, Jr.

31January 1999

with off-the-shelf procurement and modifying current equip-ment, the range of the RSCAAL and other detection equip-ment will extend greatly, thereby enhancing force protec-tion. Additionally, using off-the-shelf equipment in a phasedarray of mobile detectors affords the ability to range a chemi-cal cloud; in other words, providing the ability to accuratelylocate the leading edge of a chemical cloud.

Extending the Range of Current Detectors

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provide the USArmy with the ability to extend the detection range of theRSCAAL and other detectors. Because of the bulkyweight of the M21, only two types of UAVs can carryit�the Bell/Boeing D-340 Pointer and the MollerAerobots M25F30. In both cases, each UAV maintainsthe capability for vertical take-off and landing, allowingfor the M21 to operate in a stationary mode to make validdetection decisions. Through the use of the remotecontrol, both UAVs can land forward and shut down,thereby eliminating the vibrations of the UAVs duringoperations of the M21. Patterned after the V-22 Osprey�s tilt-rotor technology,the capabilities of the Pointer �range from hovering overa target, low orbital loiter speed, and landing to �groundloiter� if required, combined with a fairly high dashspeed�production configuration could easily accommo-date a variety of mission equipment payloads.� The payload limit for the Pointer allows for up to 45.4kilograms of equipment or 99.88 pounds. The Pointerwith a mounted M21 will enable the US Army to maintaina mobile detection capability, able to fly for up to 5 hours.Within those 5 hours, it would have the ability to landand detect on station until needed. The Moller Aerobot family of unmanned aerialvehicles are��powered by one or more horizontally

turning ducted fans�they can take off and landvertically, and hover.� The fuel powered Aerobots varyin size and payload capacity, from a 4.5 kg payload to a340 kg of useful payload. Current military applicationsfor Aerobots include surveillance and airfield/battlefielddamage assessment. Modifying the current Aerobots withchemical detection equipment allows a phased arraydetection system throughout the depth of the battlefieldas mentioned previously. A phased array of the chemicalagent monitors (CAM) mounted on a smaller Aerobotplatform allows for detection of vapor contamination,while a phased array with M8 chemical detectorsprovides information on vapor clouds.�

The Little RSCAAL Grows Up

The United States Army has the capability to detectchemical agents in a standoff mode, but with certainrestrictions. With the threat of weapons of massdestruction, the United States cannot wait for the nextgeneration of standoff detection equipment. Instead ofwaiting for a solution in 2002, current technology,combined with innovative thinking and off-the-shelfprocurement, can counter the threat and immediatelyprovide improved long-distance standoff detection andranging capabilities for chemical agents.

At the time this article was written, CPT Hazelwood wasattending the Chemical Officers Advance Course. Previousassignments includes Battalion Chemical Officer and S-2 for1-7FA, Platoon Leader and XO at the 59th Chemical Com-pany, and Chemical Officer of the 10th AviationBrigade Chemical Officer at Fort Drum, New York. Afterthe advanced course, CPT Hazelwood is scheduled togo to Korea.

32

New Training Videos to LOOK for:

TVT 3-112 PIN 711103 �US Army Chemical Corps�Dragon Soldiers�TVT 3-113 PIN 711191 �NBC Threat�TVT 3-114 PIN 711192 �Effects of Toxic Agents�

CML

A Chemical/Biological

By 1LT Andrew C. Richert

It was a calm morning on the subway as passengers prepared for work unaware ofthe coming terror. The train headed for the central government district in Tokyo. A man gotoff at a stop but left a package. Soon after, the people on the train were coughing, feelingdizzy, and bleeding from the nose and mouth. A dilute solution of sarin, a nerve agent, hadbeen released from the package. It was March 20, 1995, and it marked a day in historywhen all nations started to fear the threat of chemical terrorism.

The threat of terrorism is greater now in the UnitedStates than ever before with the bombings at theOlympic games in Atlanta and in Oklahoma City. Thesafe haven of the United States has been terrorizedand is susceptible to terrorist use of �weapons ofmass destruction.� The incident in Tokyo shows howeasy terrorists can use chemical weapons. Now theChemical Corps should stand up and lead the way ina joint anti-terrorism program.

Any nation or organization can easily obtain chemi-cal or biological material that can be used as a weapon.Phosgene, a choking agent, is a common industrialchemical. The blood agent hydrogen cyanide is easyto make from rat poison that contains cyanide. Nerveagents, like sarin, are harder to develop, but aknowledgeable chemist could synthesize it in a lab.Biological agents are just as easy to come by. Anthraxand small pox are just two biological agents that acountry can do testing on for research purposes. Thecultures can then be incubated and weaponized.

The armed forces are the main combatants in this war.They are familiar with these weapons and have ways todeal with them in time of war. These situations need tobe altered to include the terrorist threat. The two leading

components in the fight are the Marines� Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and theArmy�s Technical Escort Unit.

The CBIRF deploys to incident locations by the mostexpeditious means possible. Once there, they coordinateinitial relief efforts and provide security and areaisolation at the affected site. The unit is highly mobileand provides everything from security to medicalattention. They then begin detection, identification, anddecontamination. Surgeons and medics on the teamassist the local medical authorities and give servicesupport assistance if required. The 350-man unit willcombine Marines and Sailors into four elements:command, nuclear/biological/chemical, security, andmedical. Once on the scene, the IRF will assist thecommander at that site with detection, determination anddecontamination, medical preventive measures andtreatment of casualties, security and containment-relatedfunctions, and command and control functions.

The Army�s Technical Escort Unit works on a smallerscale and serves as an emergency response force for allmissions where chemical agents are expected. TechEscort�s mission is escorting, sample verification,disposing, and identifying chemical and biological

The threat of terrorism is greater now in the United States than ever before . . .

33January 1999

Terrorism Plan

hazardous material. They are trained in identifying andhandling ordnance, radiography, chemical handling,chemical/biological detection and monitoring, hazardousmaterial, medical response, and government regulations.

The civilian side is still in the planning phase.A combination of the Nunn-Lugar II-Domestic Prepared-ness Plan and the Federal Response Plan gives anadequate response. The Department of Health and Hu-man Services designated 27 selected major cities to startmobile metro response teams (MMRTs) to respondto NBC incidents. The organization of these teamswill consist of medical operations, law enforcement,logistics support, communications team, andadministration. Their focus is on decontamination ofpersonnel. Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) would control these groups if an incidentoccurred. Right now, the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) labs, environmental response teamsunder FEMA, and the Army�s Technical EscortUnits would handle chemical attacks. The EPA andenvironmental response teams are set up for oil spillsor other environmental hazards. For biological attacks,the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC), national medical response teams, and theMarines� CBIRF would be called in.

The plan for responding to an NBC terrorist attack issignificantly lacking in many areas. The Nunn-Lugarplan states some of the shortcomings of the system,to include: training of first responders; appropriatedetection, monitoring, and decontamination equipment;treatment protocols; and a centralized informationsource. Right now the first responders (police, firemen,

EMS) are not well trained on how to react to a chemical/biological hazard. The major cities either lack theproper equipment for detection, monitoring, and decon-tamination or have outdated equipment. FEMA isonly a figurehead and has to share the responsibilitywith the FBI.

I recommend a four-phase plan.

Phase I�Funding: The United States government needsto budget money for this program to succeed. The moneyis well worth the lives and safety of the people of theUnited States. The money would be used for training andproviding proper equipment for all cities.

Phase II�Training (crawl): Establish an anti-terrorismschool so major cities can send their response teams andfirst responders to receive proper training. Also a mobiletraining plan of instructors giving refresher or briefclasses to cities needs to be established to ensure allworkers are informed. A national campaign on how toreact to an attack should circulate throughout the US toteach the public and keep them informed.

The school should focus on joint training of Tech Es-cort, CBIRF, and civilian personnel. It should incorpo-rate four major areas: reaction to a chemical attack, con-tainment of the agent, evaluation and treatment of casu-alties, and decontamination of the area, as a minimum.At this time the Tech Escort and CBIRF soldiers shouldfamiliarize and train the civilians on the equipment.

Phase III�Combined Plan (walk): In this phase eachcomponent should have a working knowledge of the plan

The plan for responding to an NBC terrorist attack issignificantly lacking in many areas . . . Right nowthe first responders . . . are not well-trained on howto react to a chemical/biological hazard. The majorcities either lack the proper equipment . . . or haveoutdated equipment.

The beginning of a program is coming . . .This is where the Chemical Corps stands up.We are the leaders . . .

34 CML

and how each agency should work together. In case of anincident, the first responders react followed by theMMRTs. At this time FEMA should take controlof the operation and enlist the help of the CBIRFand Tech Escort Units. A written formal plan wouldbring this unity together.

Phase IV�Joint Training Exercises (run): Nowmesh together, practice, and evaluate all the schooling,training, and command relationship of the units. Allplayers should work together in a training exerciseto ensure the plan works. FEMA should select a cityand allow the system to work the practice situation.This needs to occur in different cities periodicallyto test each area.

Some of this has occurred. The Public HealthService, a team from the National Medical Response, andCBIRF conducted an incident exercise in Tampa, Floridaon May 4, 1997. Tech Escort and CBIRF tested biologi-cal detectors and trained together at DugwayProving Grounds on June 2-5, 1997. Also, a $2 millionbill passed in Congress to establish an anti-terrorismtraining center at Fort McClellan.

The beginning of a program is coming, but it needs tobe focused and supervised. This is where theChemical Corps stands up. We are the leaders inchemical and biological situations. The Chemical Corpscould come up with the combined plan, focus theindividuals involved, and supervise the combinedtraining events. With the threat of this becoming morereal every day, we, as a nation, should ensure we are se-cure and ready.

35

JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine For NBC Defense, 10 Jul 95. The Joint Warfighting Center completed the CINC Assessmentof JP 3-11 on 13 Jun 97. The assessment concluded that the manual requires a complete revision with many additionaltopic areas to develop. The First Draft was released for staffing on 16 Mar 98 with a suspense of 1 Jun 98 for CINC/Service comments. Additionally, the JWFC and USACMLS hosted a working group meeting from 6 through 8 Oct 98to review comments. A new format was selected and restaffing will occur in Mar 99.

FM 3-4, NBC Protection, 29 May 92, C1 28 Oct 92, C2 21 Feb 96. C3 is in development which will rescind the annualpeacetime filter change-out criteria, correct unmasking procedures w/o M256 Kit, and provide guidance for the JointService Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) to include new MOPP guidance for new suit. It will alsoincorporate data policy guidance from TC 3-41, PATS as the TC is phased out.

FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, 12 Dec 90. Manual being revised andretitled, Technical Aspects of Chemical Agents and Compounds. Worldwide comments have been incorporated toproduce the DRAG version. The final draft is on the USACMLS doctrine net.

FM 3-14, NBC Vulnerability Analysis, 12 Nov 97. New manual that consolidates all vulnerability analysis proceduresunder one manual. Manual is current. Approved version is available on the Dragon�s Lair BBS and ADTL.

FM 3-19, NBC Reconnaissance, 19 Nov 93. Manual being revised and retitled, NBC Reconnaissance andSurveillance. Manual will now integrate into the surveillance portion of doctrinal fundamentals for biologicaldefense from 3-101-4/6. Program directive and outline will be complete Nov 98 with Initial Draft expected Apr 99.

Status Notes on Doctrine Initiatives

January 1999

At the time this article was written, 1LT Andrew C. Reichertwas assigned to C Company, 84th ChemicalBattalion at the Chemical Advance Course. 1LT Reichert hasa BS in Pre-Medicine from McMurry University. His sourceof commission was ROTC at Hardin-SimmonsUniversity. He is a graduate of the Chemical OfficerBasic. Previous assignments include Platoon Leader in68th Chemical Company, 1st Cavalry Division; Chemical Of-ficer for 1-9 Cavalry Infantry, 1st Cavalry Division;and Chemical Officer for 4-6 Cavalry Aviation, 6thCavalry Brigade.

Directorate UpdatesDirectorate of Combat Developments

Chemical Vision 2010. Chemical Vision (CV) 2010 is currently under development and staffing. The Army willtransition from Force XXI through Army Vision 2010 (AV 2010) to the Army After Next (AAN). The Chemical Corps�support to our transitioning Army must leverage DTLOMS integration to achieve the draft ChemicalVision 2010 principles of:� sense the battlespace to identify all NBC hazards.� shape the battlespace to mitigate threat use of NBC weapons.� shield the force to avoid contamination or provide protection if avoidance is not possible.� sustain the force to quickly restore combat power and for smoke and obscurants.� shape the battlespace with smoke and obscurants to support information dominance.

AV 2010. AV 2010 will support Joint Vision 2010 full spectrum dominance through the following patterns ofoperation: � Protect the Forceoperation: � Gain Information Dominanceoperation: � Decisive Operations

The Chemical Corps clearly has a role in all six patterns of operation; however, CV 2010 has focused on our role inProtect the Force and Information Dominance.

� Protect the Force� Sustain the Force� Shape the Battlespace

Figure 1: CV 2010 support to AV 2010 and JV 2010.

36 CML

Directorate of Training1. We were proud to promote the Director of Training,LTC Chapman, to Colonel on 5 October 1998. Nowthat he�s finally a Colonel, we�ll naturally be expectingtwice the work out of him!2. DOT has finally entered the execution phase of theSchool�s move to Fort Leonard Wood. We sent our firstAdvance Party, CPT Kent Soebbing, to Fort LeonardWood to assist in the final work to bring the new CDTFon-line. For those of you that have not heard, the newCDTF will be bigger, better, and more capable than theone we have here at Fort McClellan. CPT Soebbingwill be followed shortly by more elements of the CDTF,and then in March 1999 we will move the TrainingDevelopment and Training Devices and Simulationsfunctions to Fort Leonard Wood. Most elements willmove in June-August 1999.3. Even though we�re in the process of moving, thereare still some great initiatives on-going within the DOT.On 26 October 1998 presented our first course to theRapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) TeamCommanders. It consisted of a week-long focused

pre-command course. Other courses for the RAIDteam members are in the works. We also recently upgraded the Fox�s Den to reflect theM93A1 configuration and added the capability for thesimulators to operate in a distributed simulationmode that can allow the two simulators to work as ateam, or to even connect with other simulators withthe Armor, Aviation, or Infantry Schools for a taskforce type operation. Finally we just finished training the first group ofsoldiers on the new PrePlanned Product Improved(P3I) Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS).This group of soldiers, and the ones that follow, willform the 7th CM Co (BIDS) at Fort Polk, LA. Inaddition to the field training, the soldiers are receivingtraining on state-of-the-art BIDS computer simulatorsand workstations. We could go on and on about all the great things thatare going on in DOT, but there are soldiers to train, andwe�ve got to get to our real work!

37January 1999

Directorate UpdatesTRADOC PAM 525-20, Operational Concept for NBCDefenseThe draft TP 525-20 is currently under review atTRADOC. Once released by TRADOC, USACMLS willconduct worldwide staffing. TP 525-20 supports ArmyVision 2010 and Chemical Vision 2010. The principlesfor NBC defense contained in TP 525-20:� sense the battlespace to identify all NBC hazards.� shape the battlespace to mitigate threat use of NBC

weapons.� shield the force to avoid contamination or provide

protection if avoidance is not possible.� sustain the force to quickly restore combat power.The milestones for TP 525-20 are: TRADOC review com-plete: 1 NOV; Worldwide staffing complete: 20 JAN 98;Final draft to TRADOC for approval: 15 FEB 99.

TRADOC PAM 525-3, Operational Concept forSmoke and ObscurantsTP 525-3 is currently under revision. The draft principlescontained in TP 525-3:� Shape and Control the S/O Environment - Control and management of S/O systems - Deception - Disrupt enemy�s offensive capability

� Sense and Attack Hostile RISTA - Detect - Counter-RISTA - Counter-stealth� Shield Friendly Forces - Enhance own offensive capability - Deny enemy use of S/OThe milestones for TP 525-20 are: TRADOC reviewcomplete: 1 MAR 99; Worldwide staffing complete:JUN 98; Final draft to TRADOC for approval: AUG 99.

Operational Concept for WMD�Homeland DefenseIn one of his first actions as the TRADOC CommandingGeneral, GEN Abrams tasked the Chemical School tochampion TRADOC and Army efforts on Weapons ofMass Destruction (WMD)�Homeland Defense. Thiswill include briefing the Chief of Staff of the Army andstanding up a Homeland Defense Training Center inOCT 99 at Fort Leonard Wood. A proposed integratedconcept team has begun efforts on drafting an operationalconcept for WMD�Homeland Defense. This concept isdivided into two key components:� Protection of Strategic Forces and Means� Domestic SupportThe milestones for this concept have yet to be established.

Directorate of Chemical Warfighter Operations

Future of DCWOAs the Chemical School prepares to move to FortLeonard Wood, the Directorate of Chemical WarfighterOperations (DCWO) will begin a transition to becomepart of the new Directorate of DTLOMS Integration(DDI). We have accomplished the major foundationalrequirement of our mission�to discover those keyproblems that are hindering the ability of warfightingcommanders and their chemical staffs to accomplishtheir missions in an NBC environment. Our initial stab ata model that illustrates the problems and relationshipscan be found in the next section. We will continue to re-fine the model in the next few weeks and submit a finalreport to MG Wooten. Actions have already beeninitiated that are designed to fix identified problems.

Foundational NBC Readiness ProblemsExercise after action reviews, agency reports, andassistance visits reveal that inadequacies in the relation-ships depicted below are at the root of current problemsof NBC readiness in the armed forces. Virtually everymajor problem associated with NBC DTLOMS canbe described using the diagram below:

to warfighter skepticism and non-inclusion in exercises.Command Emphasis. There is an overall lack of com-mand emphasis on NBC defense initiatives and training asevidenced by GAO reports, DODIG reports, exerciseAARs, and assistance visits. Despite sincere rhetorical em-phasis placed on WMD defense from our top political andmilitary leadership, adequate manifestations of this em-phasis are seldom seen in exercises, training, or NBC staff-ing. Sophistication in WMD considerations is lacking andleads to cursory, �check-the-block� actions. Lack of com-mand emphasis stems from one of two problems or a com-bination of the two:1. WMD Staffing. Expert WMD staffs do not exist or

are not well represented in many important staffs andcommands. In many cases, where they do exist, theydo not possess adequate rank to give them access

to key decision makers or provide influence. For example, there are no NBC subject matter experts at CJCS J7 or ACOM J7. This has a tremendous negative impact on joint NBC training.2. Senior Leader Education. Senior leaders get very little

formal training in WMD considerations as part of theirmilitary education. No matter what the branch of

Service, little or nothing in the way of NBC is presented at the staff college level. An example is the

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) that alljoint staff officers are supposed to receive. NeitherJPMEI, taught at all Service staff colleges, nor JPMEII,taught as a stand-alone course, includes a single

mention of NBC.

CGSC Curriculum Enhancement RecommendationsA 1996 Government Accounting Office (GAO) reporthighlighted problems with senior leader education as onereason that NBC was not receiving the emphasis requiredfor effective NBC training and readiness. As a result, theU. S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS) contractedBattelle Memorial Institute to analyze the curriculum at allService staff and war colleges. Battelle examined the learn-ing objectives of each lesson in the core curricula and de-veloped recommended NBC discussion point inserts andassociated materials. Battelle also developed a genericsenior-level NBC elective. CGSC has tentatively agreedimplementation will occur over several years, thecomposition of the branches and functional areas withinthe four career fields is rapidly nearing completion.It is imperative that all officers become familiar withOPMS XXI and the new DA Pam 600-3. The OPMS

Directorate Updates

Threat. Current depiction of the NBC threat is notrealistic and still depicts cold war thinking. NBC defensemust be predicated upon realistic and appropriate portrayalof the NBC threat. Correct portrayal of likely enemy orterrorist use of weapons of mass destruction will lead torealistic training and exercises. Unrealistic portrayal leads

38 CML

Reserve Component Institutional Training

Reserve Component institutional training will transitionto Fort Leonard Wood in FY 99. Three of the total Armyschool system (TASS) chemical battalions will teach the54B10, 54B20/30, chemical BNCOC and chemicalANCOC at Fort McClellan in the spring of 1999. Threeother TASS chemical battalions will teach the samecourses at Fort Leonard Wood in the summer, starting inJuly. The seventh TASS chemical battalion will teachBNCOC and ANCOC at Fort Dix, NJ. The location ofthe chemical MOS qualification courses is driven by therequirement to train in the Chemical Defense TrainingFacility (CDTF). Enforcing this standard ensures all 54Bsoldiers, Active Component as well as Reserve Compo-nent, are given the opportunity to train with live toxicagents in this state-of-art facility. The new CDTF atFort Leonard Wood is projected to be operational by July99. Current plans for FY00 call for all seven TASS chemi-cal battalions to conduct their annual training at FortLeonard Wood and use the newly constructed CDTF.Unit training officers and unit administrators should usethe Automated Training Resources and RequirementsSystem (ATRRS) to enroll soldiers in the chemical MOSand NCOES courses.

NBC Defense Course

The new NBC Defense Course was distributed in July 98to the organizations authorized to teach this course. Thisincluded all TASS chemical battalions and several Armyinstitutions. The NBC Defense Course is designed toqualify both active and reserve officers and NCOs,as additional duty NBC personnel at the company ordetachment level. The new course has less radiologicaldefense training and more unit NBC training andmaintenance instruction. Additional information on thiscourse can be obtained at:

Chemical SchoolATTN: ATZN-CM-RCFort McClellan, AL 36205-5020

E-mail crowd@mcclellan-cmls-army-milPhone 256-848-3476 / DSN 865-3476

web site is www.army.mil/opms. DA Pam 600-3should be posted on the Army Publications web site(www-usappc.hoffman.army.mil) in mid-October. YearGroups 80, 86 and 89 officers should have received a

Directorate Updatescareer-field designation preference packet mailing inOctober. Make sure you register your career fieldpreference. Contact MAJ Warren, the PersonnelProponent Chief, at DSN 865-4036 for more information.

The Total Force

39January 1999

Update: The Chemical Corps Print

The Chemical Corps print by Don Stivers will be finished soon. The initial runwill cost $125.00 each, but when the run is sold, prints normally double in value.E-mail your requests to: Warrenm@mcclellan-CMLS.Army.mil

Include your name, address, and e-mail address.

A comprehensive history of the Chemical Corpsin the Gulf War, written by Chemical Corps ReserveOfficer, Mr. Al Mauroni, is a well-researched book wellworth your time. Mr. Mauroni begins with the Chemical Corps�reaction to the situation in the Gulf. He pulls no punches.That the Army was not ready for NBC warfare is welldocumented, and the massive efforts to prepare itwhen the dangerous situation was realized show thatgiven the impetus to �fix� a situation, the Army canmove like lightening. Still, although the troops in the Gulf were preparedfor chemical warfare in a general way, all was notperfect. The lack of proper overgarments was never fullyovercome and the troops in the desert had little detectionapparatus for bio weapons. The author shows in detail how the ChemicalCorps proceeded to protect the force. It was not aneasy mission, and one that took every ability theChemical Corps possessed both individually andcollectively to get the job done. But it was done. Peopleare aware that smoke was used successfully in theGulf by several units. Smoke is often the forgottenpart of the Chemical Corps missions because so muchhas been focused on the chemical and biological sideof the house. One of the most interesting parts of the book isthe chapters dealing with the Gulf War Syndrome.The author details the appearance of the GWS and its

various mutations since it was identified. Of particularinterest is a detailed look at the demolition of theKamasiya ammunition dump by EOD personnel, andthe various downwind predictors of possible contamina-tion. The author also details the various experimentsconducted in this country to replicate the explosionand the efforts by the government to uncover whatreally happened. His information is so extensive that thereis no evidence to indicate any type of a cover-up. Mostof the misunderstandings between the veteransand DOD revolve around the often-mishandled effortsto uncover what could be called the �smoking germ.�That is, the one and single cause for the sicknesses thathave befallen some Gulf War veterans. The author supplies the reader with a considerablenumber of appendixes ranging from a comprehensivelist of Chemical Corps units that deployed to SW Asiato a XVIII ABN Corps G-3, NBC Significant Eventslog from 24 January through 18 March 1991 to anextensive glossary. The individual chapter notes are also includedas an appendix, and they show an extensive array ofreferences ranging from unit documents, throughindividual interviews, to government documentsand many, many secondary sources. This history should be a part of every chemicalofficer�s library. It shows the Corps at its finest�protecting the force. It also provides sobering testimonythat this mission has to be continued into the future.

Chemical-Biological Defense �U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War,

Al Mauroni. New York: Praeger, 1998, 236 pages.

By USACMLS Command Historian,Dr. Burton Wright III.

40 CML

41

New Subscriptions: Use the subscription form below. Cost for a subscription is $5.00 (domestic and APO/FPO) or $6.25 (foreign).

Renewal Subscription: To keep subscription prices down, the Government Printing Office mails each sub-scriber only one renewal notice. To be sure that your service continues without interruption, please returnyour notice promptly. If your subscription service is discontinued, simply send your mailing label from anyissue to the Superintendent ofDocuments, Attn: Mail List Branch, Mail Stop: SSOM, Washington, DC 20402, with the proper remittanceand your service will be reinstated.

Address Changes: Please send your mailing label, along with your new address to the Superintendent ofDocuments, Attn: Mail List Branch, Mail Stop: SSOM, Washington, DC 20402.

Inquiries About Subscription Service: Please send your mailing label, along with your correspondence, toSuperintendent of Documents, Attn: Mail List Branch, Mail Stop: SSOM, Washington, DC 20402. Tele-phone number (202) 512-1800.

Subcribe to CML, Army Chemical Review

Subscription Order Form

Credit card orders are welcome!Fax your orders (202) 512-2250Phone your orders (202) 512-1800

United States GovernmentINFORMATIONOrder Processing Code:*5907 YES, please send________subscriptions to:

CML, Army Chemical Review (ACJ) at $5 each per year.The total cost of my order is $________. Price includes regular shipping and handling and is subject to change.

City State Zipcode+4

Name or title (Please type or print)

Company name Room, floor, suite

Street address

//

Daytime phone including areacode

Purchase order number (optional)

Check method of payment:Check payable to: Superintendent of DocumentsGPO Deposit AccountVISA Mastercard Discover

(expiration date)

Authorizing signature

Mail to: Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954Important: Please include this completed order form with your remittance.

Thank you for your order!