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Allrightsreserved,includingtherighttoreproducethisbookorportionsthereofinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, withoutpermission inwriting from the publisher.All inquiries should be addressed toStackpoleBooks.

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica10987654321

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataGeschichteder3.Panzer-Division,Berlin-Brandenburg,1935–1945.EnglishArmoredBears:theGerman3rdPanzerDivisioninWorldWarII.Vol.1/Veteransofthe3rdPanzerDivision.p.cm.Originallypublished:Geschichteder3.Panzer-Division,Berlin-

Brandenburg,1935–1945.1967.ISBN978-0-8117-1170-8eISBN978-0-8117-4847-61.Germany.Heer.Panzer-Division,3.2.WorldWar,1939–1945—Tank

warfare.3.WorldWar,1939–1945—Campaigns—EasternFront.4.WorldWar,1939–1945—Regimentalhistories—Germany.I.TraditionsverbandderEhemaligenDrittenPanzer-Division.II.Title.III.Title:German3rdPanzerDivisioninWorldWarII.D757.563rd.G472012940.54’1343—dc23

2012033432

CONTENTS

Foreword Chapter1 FromTrainingtoBaptismofFire:The3.Panzer-Divisionin

PeacetimeChapter2 FromtheSpreetotheBug:TheCampaigninPoland,1939Chapter3 FromEastPrussiatoWestphalia:BetweentheCampaigns,

1939–40Chapter4 FromtheRhinetotheSommeChapter5 FromtheSommetotheSouthofFranceChapter6 TheReturnHomeChapter7 FromtheSpreetotheBug,Part2:TheEveofOperation

BarbarossaChapter8 FromtheBugtotheDnjepr:FightingalongtheRoutesof

Advance,1941Chapter9 FromtheDnjeprtotheDessna:BreakingthroughtheStalin

LineChapter10 FromtheDessnatotheSsula:TheBattleforKievChapter11 FromtheSsulatotheUpa:TheAdvanceonMoscowChapter12 FromtheUpatotheSchat:TheBattleforTulaChapter13 FromtheSchattotheTim:TheWinterFightingforKursk Appendices

FOREWORD

Theveteran’sassociationoftheformer3.Panzer-Divisionpresentsitshistoryofthedivision.This is theresultofananalysisofdaily logs,diaries, individual letters from

the time, firsthand accounts, maps, and a gratifying number of images fromWerner Haupt of the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart. Official dailylogs were not available to any great extent. New items of information madenumerousrevisionsnecessary.Themanycollaborators—fromGeneralondownto Obergefreiter—need to be thanked one more time here. Thanks are alsoextendedtoourcomrade,GüntherRichter,forhistime-consumingpreparationsforprintinganddistributingthebook.Ifsomeformationsarementionedwithdifferingdegreesofemphasis—some

achievements and noteworthy events are not evenmentioned at all—it resultsfromtheincompletenessofthesourcematerial.Despite that, the bookwill evokemanymemories among those still living,

since it names so many persons and locations. It will also provide those leftbehindof thefallenwithapictureof theexperiencesandthesufferingof theirlovedones.Continuously renewed trust and proven comradeship have molded our

communitytogetherandenableittodowhatithasdone.Thevictimsdiscussedinthisbookarearemindertothoseresponsibletodoeverythingintheirpowertospareusthehorrorsofanewwar.

FranzWesthoven1

Generalleutnanta.D.2HonoraryChairmanoftheVeterans

Organizationoftheformer3.Panzer-Division

__________________1. In addition to commanding the 3. Panzer-Division (1 October 1942 to 15October1943),healsocommandedthe2.Panzer-DivisioninMay1944.Hewas

awarded the Knight’s Cross on 25 October 1943 for his command of the 3.Panzer-Division.Westhoven survived the war and passed away on 9 October1983.(Allnotesarebythetranslator.)2.a.D.=außerDienst=Retired.

CHAPTER1

FromTrainingtoBaptismofFire:The3.Panzer-DivisioninPeacetime

TheActivationoftheDivision

The German government issued the “Law Concerning the Build-Up of theArmedForces”on16March1935.That signaled the startof thenewGermanarmoredforce,whichwouldsteertheconductofwarfareintonewavenuesafewyearslater.Thealreadyexistingmotorizedelementsofthearmyconductedtheirtrainingandexercisesmoreintensivelyinordertoperfecttheirorganizationandweaponry. Assorted formations were consolidated into an exercise division inMay1935atDöberitz.Thetrainingexercises tookplaceunder thedirectionofGeneralmajorHoth.The I./Kraftfahr-Lehrkommando1ofOberstleutnant HarpeandothermotorizedforcesunderthecommandofMajorBreithwereissuedthefirstGermanfightingvehicle,thePanzerI.The15thofOctober1935wasthebirthdateoftheGermanarmoredforce.It

wasestablishedonthatdateasitsowncombatarmwithintheframeworkofthearmyandnot just asanaccompanyingweaponof the infantryorapartof thecavalry.The3.Kavallerie-Division inWeimar, the twomotorized instructionalcommands,allof themotorizedbattalions,a fewartillery regiments,and, lateron,thecavalrydivisionsinFrankfurtandBreslauallreassignedcompleteunitsascadreforthefirstthreearmoreddivisions.The1.Panzer-DivisionwasactivatedinWeimar.2GeneralleutnantFreiherr3

vonWeichswas itscommander.OberstGuderianassumedactingcommandofthe 2. Panzer-Division in Würzburg. The 3. Panzer-Division underGeneralleutnantFessmannwasestablishedinBerlin.The3. Panzer-Division had been in the process of being formed since the

summerof1935;by15October1935,ithadcompleteditsinitialactivation.Adivision had been created within the Germany Army that was intended tocontinue the long-standing traditions of the best regiments. The divisionheadquarters was located in Berlin, with the staff and support agency officeslocatedat thehighriseat thecornerofKurfürstenstraßeandBurggrafenstraße.

GeneralleutnantFessmannwasfifty-fouryearsoldandalongtimecavalryman,hailing from the 2. BayerischesChevaulegers-Regiment. He had already beenthecommanderofthefirstarmoredbrigadeestablishedinGermany.Thedivisionstaffconsistedof thefollowingofficersandcivilianofficials in

1935:

Operations(Ia):Hauptmanni.G.GrafvonSponeck4

Logistics(Ib):HauptmannKeppelAdjutantforOfficerPersonnel(IIa):RittmeistervonNecker5

JudgeAdvocateGeneral(III):KriegsgerichtsratDr.Schweinsberger6

Administration(IVa):IntendanturratZurNeiden7

DivisionSurgeon(IVb):OberstarztDr.Muntsch8

One armored and one rifle brigade were assigned to the division. OberstKühn9 was assigned as the commander of Panzer-Brigade 3, while OberstBernard assumed command of Schützen-Brigade 3.10 Hauptmann Thomasserved as Kühn’s adjutant, while Hauptmann Schulte-Mönting served in thesamecapacityforBernard.Themost important andmost powerful formations assigned to the division

andservingunderthecommandandcontrolofPanzer-Brigade3werePanzer-Regiment 5 and Panzer-Regiment 6. Both regiments combined old Germancavalrytraditionwiththemoderncapabilitiesofamotorizedforce.Panzer-Regiment 5: The regiment was formed by the reassignment of

elements from Kraftfahr-Lehrkommando Zossen and Reiter-Regiment 4(Potsdam). The latter regiment had already transitioned from being horse-mountedtomotorizedinthespringof1935.Panzer-Regiment5,which,outoffairness, should have received the numerical designation of Panzer-Regiment1,11sinceitstankcompaniesweretheveryfirstonesintheReichswehr,carriedonthetraditionsoftheGuardCuirassiersinits1stBattalionandthe2ndGuardsUlan Regiment in its 2nd Battalion. Oberst Zuckertort, who had previouslycommandedtheKraftfahr-Lehrkommando,becameitsfirstcommander.12MajorBreith and Major Streich were the battalion commanders. The regimentaladjutantwasOberleutnantKühlein.ThesignalsofficerwasOberleutnantVoss.Company commanders were Hauptmann Thomale, Hauptmann Volckheim,Hauptmann Schenk, Hauptmann Wagner, Oberleutnant von Heinemann, and

OberleutnantMildebrath.13

Panzer-Regiment 6: The regiment also received cadre elements fromKraftfahr-Lehrkommando Zossen and Reiter-Regiment 4. In addition, it alsoreceived a company fromPanzerabwehr-Abteilung6 (Hannover) and its sisterregiment, Panzer-Regiment 5. Reiter-Regiment 4 transferred most of its 1stSquadron,with the1st,2nd,and4thTroops.The1stBattalionof theregimentcarried on the traditions of the Garde du Corps. Oberst Meyer, the formercommander of the motorized forces in East Prussia, was named as the firstcommander.Major Lendle14 andMajor Linnarz were the respective battalioncommanders. The company commanders were Hauptmann von Lewinski,Hauptmann vonHeimendahl,Hauptmann vonHeydebreck,Hauptmann Ilgen,Hauptmann Munzel, Hauptmann von Gersdorff, Hauptmann Ziegler, andHauptmannCrohn.TheregimentaladjutantwasOberleutnantNedtwig.Thecombatforcesofthedivisionservingunderthecommandandcontrolof

Schützen-Brigade3wereasfollows:Schützen-Regiment 3: The regiment was activated in Altengrabow. The

advancepartiesfortheformationoftheregimentarrivedon15September1935,includingOberst Stumpff,15 the first regimental commander. The cadre of theregiment was received from personnel from Reiter-Regiment 716 and Reiter-Regiment11(Reiter-RegimentGera).The latter regimenthad transitionedfrombeing horse-mounted to motorized prior to being deactivated on 15 October1935.Most of its personnel went to form the 1st Battalion. Additional cadrecame from Infanterie-Regiment Meiningen of the 3. Kavallerie-Division inWeimar.Thesepersonnelhelpedformthe2ndBattalion.The1stBattalionwascommandedbyMajorvonFelbert,17whohad alreadybeen the commanderoftheII./Reiter-Regiment11.MajorvonUngercommandedthe2ndBattalion.The2nd Battalion had the following company commanders when it was raised:Hauptmann RiedererFreiherr von Paar,Oberleutnant Wellmann,HauptmannZimmermann, Oberleutnant Reckleben, and Hauptmann Hildebrandt. Theregimentmaintained the traditionsof two famousGerman formations.The1stBattalionwasresponsibleforInfanterie-Regiment“GeneralfeldmarschallPrinzFriedrich Karl von Preußen” (8. Brandenburgisches) Nr. 64 and the 2ndBattalionforthe“Armin-Dragoner”(Dragoner-Regiment12)Gnesen.Kradschützen-Bataillon3(3rdMotorcycleInfantryBattalion):Thisformation

received personnel assets from Reiter-Regiment 16 (Erfurt), from the RuralPolice Academy (Köslin), and from units of the Silesian Rural Police. The

battalion maintained the traditions of the 1. Brandenburgisches Dragoner-Regiment Nr. 2 (“Schwedter Dragoner”). Correspondingly, the motorcycleinfantryofthebattalionworethegildedeagleandking’scrownwiththemotto“With God for the King and the Fatherland” on their caps. The battalion’sheadquartersand2ndand4thCompanieswereassignedwoodenbarracksinBadFreienwalde, while the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Companies of the battalion werequarteredinthegarrisonsatWriezen.Thosesamegarrisonshadhousedelementsof the Schwedt Dragoons in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thecommander of the battalion was Major von Manteuffel.18 His adjutant wasLeutnant Pape. The company commanders were:Hauptmann Hänisch,Majorvon der Schulenburg, Hauptmann Ottens, Hauptmann Schlieckmann, andHauptmannGorn.Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3 (3rd Reconnaissance Battalion): The battalion was

formed from the oldest motorized formation of the Reichswehr, the 3.Preußische Kraftfahrabteilung Berlin-Lankwitz, which had once beencommandedbyMajorGuderian.On1April1934,ithadbecometheKraftfahr-AbteilungWünsdorfofOberstleutnantPaulus.19Thatbattalionwasredesignatedas Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3 and was moved to Berlin-Stahnsdorf. MajorSchroetterthenassumedcommand.HistroopcommanderswereHauptmannvonWietersheim,20HauptmannvonPrittwitzundGaffron,HauptmannFreiherrvonLüttwitz,andOberleutnantvonUslar-Gleichen.Thereconnaissancesoldiersofthebattalionmaintainedthetraditionsofthe1.Garde-Ulanen-Regiment.Artillerie-Regiment 75: The divisional artillery regiment was formed from

cadre from the I. motorisierte Artillerie-AbteilungOhrdruf. That battalion hadbeen formed from the 11./Artillerie-Regiment 3 (Potsdam) in 1934 andtransferred to Thuringia. The battery was expanded to a battalion there andmotorized.Whenthearmordivisionswereformed,the1stMotorizedBattalionprovided thenucleusfor the I./Artillerie-Regiment73 (1.Panzer-Division), the1./Artillerie-Regiment 74 (2. Panzer-Division), and the division’s own 1stBattalion.Effective in the fall of 1935, the I./Artillerie-Regiment was assigned to the

division. The first personnel came from Ohrdruf with the 1st Battery ofHauptmann Kiersch. Two additional batteries were provided from Artillerie-Regiment2 andArtillerie-Regiment4.All of the batterieswere equippedwiththe 10.5-centimeter light field howitzer, the leichte Feldhaubitze 18 (lFH 18).Sincetheinitialallotmentofgunswasdesignedtobemovedbyhorse—wood-

spokedwheels—and the battalion received primemovers, the guns had to beplacedoncastorsinordertotransportthemuntilnewerversionsofthegunswithbetter suspension and rubber tires could arrive. The battalion was moved toNeuruppin,whereitwasgarrisonedintheSee-KaserneandtheFriedrich-Franz-Kaserne.Thatmeant that theoldgarrison townofNeuruppinhadartillerymenwithinitswallsforthefirst time;uptothen,therehadonlybeeninfantry.Theformerlygarrisonedformation,elementsof theI./Infanterie-Regiment5,had tobemoved toNeustrelitz. The commander of the battalionwasOberstleutnantWeidling, who came fromArtillerie-Regiment 1. He was later to become thedefender of Berlin.21 The battery commanders were Hauptmann Kiersch,Hauptmann Schwarz, and Major von Colbe. The battalion adjutant wasOberleutnant Dous, and the signal officer was Oberleutnant Oll. The 1stBattalion assumed the responsibility for maintaining the traditions of the 3.Garde-Feldartillerie-Regiment from its predecessor unit, the Potsdam-based11./Artillerie-Regiment3.22

Nachrichten-Abteilung 39 (39th Signals Battalion): This battalion was alsoformed from troop elements located in Thuringia, including Nachrichten-Abteilung(mot.)Weimar,whichhad itselfbeenformed thepreviousyear fromthe 6./Reiter-Regiment 16 (Langensalza),Nachrichten-Abteilung 3 (Potsdam),andNachrichten-Abteilung13 (Magdeburg).The newbattalionmaintained thetraditionsofLuftschiffer-BataillonNr.1 (1stDirigibleBattalion).ThebattalionwastemporarilyhousedinthegarrisonsofKorps-Nachrichten-Abteilung43andArtillerie-Regiment 23 in Potsdam.When formed, the battalion consisted of aheadquartersandtwocompanies.Theseniordutypositionsofthebattalionwerefilledasfollows:

Headquarters: Hauptmann Kempf (commander); Oberleutnant Henrici(adjutant);HauptmannLackner(staffcaptain)

1stCompany:OberleutnantHeintke(commander);LeutnantÜltzen(platoonleader)

2nd Company: Hauptmann Baron von Behr (commander); Leutnant Wilff(platoonleader)

Panzer-Abwehr-Abteilung39: The battalionwas formed fromKampfwagen-Abwehr-Abteilung 3, which had previously been designated asKraftfahrabteilungDöberitz. The antitank forceswere initially assigned to theinfantrydivisions,sincetheexperienceoftheGreatWarhadshownthatspecial

weaponsandpersonneltrainedinthatspecialmissionneededtobeonhandforthe destruction of motorized and armored vehicles. To that end, the Germanengineershaddesignedalight,easilymoved,andlow-silhouettecannonwithacaliber of 3.7 centimeters. This gun was initially referred to as a TaK(Tankabwehrkanone) but later became universally known as a PaK(Panzerabwehrkanone).Lateron,insoldierjargon,thistrulygoodandpracticalgunbecameknownasthePanzeranklopfkanone,or“tankknockercannon”(i.e.,a door knocker), since the fighting vehicles of the opponents that were facedweresoheavilyarmoredthatthesmall3.7-centimeterroundwasnolongerabletopenetrate.ThebattalionwashousedintheareaaroundWünsdorf.Thecommanderwas

Major vonTippelskirch. In1937, thebattalionwasdesignated tomaintain thetraditions of the 1. Garde-Dragoner-Regiment and the 2. Garde-Dragoner-Regiment(inheritedfromReiter-Regiment9).Pionier-Bataillon39:Thisbattalionwasthelastelementthatwasassignedto

the division. Its history was different from the rest of the formations of theBerlin-Brandenburgregimentsandbattalions.Thebattalionwasformedin1935frompersonnelfromPionier-Bataillon9andPionier-Bataillon44.Theircadres,inturn,hadcomefromPionier-Bataillon4(Magdeburg)andPionier-Bataillon5(Ulm).ThebattalionwasinitiallyhousedinthegarrisonsatWittenberg(Elbe).OberstleutnantMüllerwasthecommander.In October 1937, the battalion in Wittenberg was redesignated as Pionier-

Bataillon37.Theoriginal1stCompanyfromthatbattalion(HauptmannBeigel)and another company formed from personnel from all of the remainingcompanies (OberleutnantGroeneveld) formed thenucleusof thenewPionier-Bataillon39.Itwasonlyatthatpointthatthetwocompaniesofficiallybecamepart of the 3. Panzer-Division. The new battalion was commanded byOberstleutnant Müller, who also initially continued to command the newlyredesignatedPionier-Bataillon37.23

TheYearsofPeace

The officers, civilian officials, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel,andcivilianemployeesofthedivisionhadlittletimetogetacquaintedbeforethedivision was faced with its first major mission. Armed forces draftees werebeing called up inNovember to perform their service obligations. Thatmeantthatyoungmenstartedpouringintothegarrisonsandprovisionalhousingofthe

divisionandhadtointegratethemselvesintothecohortofmenwhohadalreadyvolunteeredtoperformarmedservice.Theswearing-inof therecruits tookplace inceremonial format thevarious

garrisonsofthedivisionon7November1935.ThenewReichwarflagflutteredfromthemastandovertheassembledcolumnsandcuriouspublicinattendance.All of the troop elements in Potsdam assembled their new soldiers, includingthose ofNachrichten-Abteilung 39. They swore their oath to the flag in thepresenceoftheReichswehrMinister,GeneraloberstvonBlomberg.TherecruitsfromKradschützen-Bataillon 3 were sworn in in themiddle of the assembledbattalionsattheparadegroundatWriezen.Followingtheceremonies,thedailytraining and duties started in the garrisons, on the parade grounds, in themaintenance facilities, at the firing ranges, andat the trainingareas.Ceaselessworkandtenaciouswillpowerallowedthedivisiontogrowintoaformationofsingle-mindedpurpose.ThedivisionwasalertedattheendofFebruaryandbeginningofMarch1936

and left its garrisons in the Berlin area. The rail transports headed west. TheGeneralCommandofthePanzertruppehadassembleditsmotorizedformationsatCampStaumühle at the SenneTrainingArea for an exercise. For days andnights on end, exercises, combat drills, armored reconnaissance, and gunnery(includingfromamovingvehicle)wereconducted.Itwasnotuntilthenationalradio service announced that German forces had entered the demilitarizedRhinelandon7MarchthatthesoldiersofthedivisionknewthattheirexercisesattheSenneTrainingAreahadservedanimportantmilitarypurpose.Likeallofthe other motorized formations assembled at Senne, the division had beenearmarkedtodefendagainstanypotentialattackbythewesternpowers,whichmighthave felt threatenedby theoccupationof theRhineland.Fortunately, an“emergencysituation”didnotarise.Despite that, theexerciseswerecontinuedanddidnotenduntil7April.Some of the divisional elements did not receive their permanent peacetime

quarters until the weeks and months that followed. For instance, Panzer-Regiment 6 left Zossen on 14 June 1936. It moved as a regiment throughAltruppin to Neuruppin. During a rest, the German crown prince arrived todemonstratehissolidaritywiththeforcesthatwerecarryingonthetraditionsoftheGuards.Thatafternoon,theregimentmarchedintoNeuruppin,accompaniedby a military band. The local populace greeted its “black” soldiers24 withheartfeltjoyandenthusiasm.

Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 also received new quarters; they moved into themodern garrison in Bad Freienwalde. On 30 June, Nachrichten-Abteilung 39moved from Potsdam-Nedlitz to Stahnsdorf. As the battalion marched intoStahnsdorf, it passed in review pastOberst Kühn, the commander ofPanzer-Brigade3;OberstLöweneck,thecorpssignalofficerforMilitaryDistrictXIII;andOberstleutnantGimmler,astaffofficer fromtheSignalsDirectorateat theArmyHighCommand.For the summer of 1936, the main effort in training was directed toward

familiaritywiththenewweaponsandthevehicles.Neitherofthetwoarmoredregiments had sufficient quantities of vehicles and had to make do with“dummy”vehicles.On29July,Panzer-Regiment5went toPutlos for the firsttime for tank gunnery for five weeks. On 25 August, both of the armoredregiments were rail loaded to Döberitz, where they conducted two weeks ofgunnery anddriving exercises.At the same time, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75and the rifle brigade conducted long marches with all of its assigned andattachedelements.In addition to its engineer battalion, the division received an additional

reinforcement in the fall of 1936. Using its own personnel, the I./Artillerie-Regiment75formedthe4thand5thBatteriesofitsnewlyformed2ndBattalion.The6thBatterycameintactfromUlm,whichmeantthatthedivisionalartillerywascompletewithregard tomenandmateriel inaccordancewith its tablesoforganization. The new battalion moved into its garrison in Eberswalde,accompaniedbyabigturnoutfromthelocalpopulace.In 1936, Panzer-Regiment 6 was directed to provide officers and good

specialists for a German armor contingent being sent to Nationalist Forces inSpain. In September 1936, the German Army High Command directed theestablishmentofadirectoratetomanagearmyelementsthathadbeenearmarkedfor sending toSpain to support the trainingofNationalistForces in their fightagainst Spanish Reds25 being supported by the Soviet Union. In addition toPanzer-Regiment 6, Panzer-Regiment 4 (2. Panzer-Division) was directed toprovidetrainingpersonnelandvehiclesforthemission.Thatmeantthatofficerandnoncommissionedofficer volunteers from the twobattalionswouldbe thefirstones to lead thenewweapons intocombatand test themout.HauptmannZiegler(7thCompany)andOberleutnantWolf(4thCompany)lefttheregimentwith an additional 160 noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel toprovidethecadreforthetankbattalionthatwasbeingformedbythearmy.They

weredischargedfromactivedutysothattheycouldserveinaforeignarmy.Asearlyas1936, the first threearmoreddivisionshad to transferpersonnel

andmateriel for newactivations.For the establishmentofPanzer-Regiment 8,Panzer-Regiment5had togiveup its6thCompany.Panzer-Regiment6had togiveup twocompanies: the3rdCompanyofHauptmann vonHeydebreckandthe6thCompanyofHauptmannvonGersdorff.Panzer-Regiment6rebuiltthosecompanies from out of its own ranks. Hauptmann Schmidt-Ott assumedcommand of the newly formed 3rdCompany andHauptmann vonWinterfeldtook over the 6th Company. The commander of the armored regiment’s 2ndBattalion, Major Linnarz, was transferred to the General Command of thePanzertruppeasitsadjutant.MajorRothenburg,aPourlemériterecipientfromtheGreatWar, replacedhim;Rothenburgwas reassigned to the regiment fromPanzer-Regiment1.ThetroopelementsofthearmythatwerestationedintheBerlinareaformed

uponWilhelmsplatzontheeveningof19April1937toreceivetheirstandards.These includedelements from the3.Panzer-Division.The commanders of theregiments,battalions,anddetachmentsacceptedtheirnewcolorsinaceremonialfashion.UnteroffizierSchmidt(4thCompany)andUnteroffizierTeichmann(5thCompany)carriedthecolorsforPanzer-Regiment6.Theescortofficersforthecolors were Oberleutnant Bernewitz, Leutnant von Kiekebusch, LeutnantMarkowski,andLeutnantVoigts.On28June, thedivisionmovedout for its summerexercises in thewestern

portion of the Brandenburg Province, after special exercises for the signalelementshad takenplace inMayand thebeginningof June aroundRathenowandthetankshadconductedgunneryatPutlos.Theexerciseswereintendedtoimprovethecoordinationbetweenandamongthedifferingcombatarms,effectaunifiedcommand,andcontinue to familiarize themenwith theirweaponsandvehicles. The exercises took place in a wide area bounded by Braunschweig,Jüterbog,andHalle.An unfortunate event happened during the exercises. The division

commander’s vehicle had an accident while traveling to inspect divisionalelements.GeneralleutnantFessmannandhisoperationsofficer,Hauptmanni.G.Graf von Sponeck, were badly injured. The division logistics officer,Hauptmann Keppel, later died of his injuries. The division leadership waseffectivelyeliminated.OberstKühnwasgivenactingcommandofthedivision,while his adjutant,Hauptmann Thomas, was made the provisional operations

officer. The exercise and training continued. Combined exercises wereconducted in Jüterbog in Julywith the newly formed4. Panzer-Division. Onemonthlater,thedivisionmovedinitsentiretytotheBergenTrainingAreaintheLuneburgHeath.From14to29September,thedivisionparticipatedintheso-called“Mussolini

Maneuvers” in Mecklenburg. On 1 October 1937, Generalleutnant FreiherrGeyr von Schweppenburg was named as the division commander. Heimmediatelyworkedupanewtrainingplanforthedivision.Itwasemphasizedthat the forces were not to be found on the parade grounds but in the field!AccordingtoSchweppenburg,afuturewarwouldnotbedecidedonthegroundbyinfantryalone.Instead,itwouldinvolvealldimensionsandweaponssystems.Following the annual army maneuvers in October, a number of

reorganizations, transfers,andreassignments tookplace,since itwasnecessarytoactivatenewarmoredandmotorizedformations.Amongotherforcestructurechanges,thedivisionalsignalsbattalionhadtogiveupits2ndCompanytohelpformKorps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 62. In addition, noncommissioned officersand men from the 1st Company were also assigned to the newly formingbattalion. The battalion’s 2nd Company had already lost its companycommanderthepreviousApril.HauptmannBaronvonBehrwas transferred tothe Army Sports Academy in Wünsdorf. His successor from the time,OberleutnantSchulz,wastransferredtothecorpsbattalion.OberleutnantWeizremainedbehind to rebuild the2ndCompany.Evendeeper cutsweremade tothe twoarmoredregiments.Panzer-Regiment5 transferred its 6thCompany tohelpformPanzer-Regiment15;halfofthe8thCompanywastransferredtotheGunnerySchoolatPutlos.OberstNehring,whowasoneofGuderian’sclosestassociates, assumed command of the regiment.26Panzer-Regiment 6 was alsotasked with reassigning some of its elements. With the activation of theI./Panzer-Regiment10,9officersand355enlistedpersonnelweresenttodistantEastPrussia fromNeuruppin. Just a fewweeks after that, the regiment had togive up its 5th Company to help in the formation of Panzer-Regiment 31 inJägerdorf(Silesia).InNovember 1937, new recruits again arrived at all of the garrisons of the

division. The following year, 1938, also saw a number of changes in dutypositions,commands,andtransfers.Thefaceoftheofficercorpschangedonceagain.ThearrivalofOberstNehringinNovember1937hadmarkedthearrivalof the first new regimental commander in the division. Oberst Meyer, who

commandedPanzer-Regiment6,wastransferredtoMainzon1February1938tobecome its local military commander. His position was taken by OberstCrüwell.27 The two brigades also had changes of command at the same time.OberstStumpffassumedcommandofthe3.Panzer-Brigade.HehadpreviouslybeenthecommanderofSchützen-Regiment3andfollowedOberstBernardintocommandof the3.Schützen-Brigade.Oberst Gawantka assumed command ofthe 3. Schützen-Brigade.28 Oberstleutnant Kleemann assumed command ofSchützen-Regiment3 andMajor vonBernuth took over the antitank battalion,Panzerabwehr-Abteilung39.In the spring of 1938, the division finally received its engineer battalion.

MajorvonMertens’sPionier-Bataillon39heldits lastformationinWittenbergon31March1938,whereuponitmovedtoRathenow.Itmadeitsmoveintoitsnew garrison on 2 April. The division commander received the report of thebattalioncommanderonKaiser-Wilhelm-Platzinthetown.The summer months were marked by even more intensive training and a

completeimmersionintoaknowledgeofweapons,equipment,andterrain.ThearmoredbrigadespentsometimeattheBaumholderTrainingArea,followedbymore training at Bergen. During those exercise periods, the divisioncommander’s plan of seeing his forces work together with the Luftwaffe andotherelementsofthearmycametofruition.Oberst Nehring’sPanzer-Regiment 5, with its two battalions (underMajor

SchäferandMajorvonWilcke),wasacenterpieceof the large-scaleexercises.Infantry from Infanterie-Regiment 17 (31. Infanterie-Division) participated, asdidthedivisionartilleryofOberstWeidling.Panzer-Regiment5,alongwithitsattached elements, conducted a long road march that developed into anenvelopingattackandendedwithabreakthroughofthe“enemy”front.Duringthe exercises, which lasted several days, a gunnery competition (movingvehicles)washeld,whichwaswonbyHauptmannWendenburg’s4thCompany.After the fieldshadbeen cleared and theharvest brought induring the fall,

large-scale marches and exercises commenced, just as they did every year inarmiesthroughouttheworld.Thedivisionleftitsgarrisons.Itsmarchestookitsouth. The division troops and formations assembled at the KönigsbrückTrainingArea,onlytomovefarthersouthandintoSilesia.GermanarmedforcesoccupiedtheSudetenlandinaccordancewithaschedule

that had been approved by four European powers (Germany, France, GreatBritain,andItaly).Zone5wasthelasttobeoccupied.Itencompassedtheareas

bounded by Ratibor (present-day Racibórz in southern Poland) and Olmütz(present-day Olomouc in the Czech Republic), including the Hultschiner andKuhländchen regions (the present-day Hluˇcín and Kravaˇrsko regions in theCzechRepublic).Thedivisionwasplacedontheextremeleftwingofthearmyforces prepared to march into the area. Its lead elements arrived on 24September.TheformationswerequarteredintheareawestofRatibor.Arathercarefreebivouacandrear-areaatmosphereprevaileduntilorderswerereceivedtocontinue toward thedesignatedborder.Thedivisionmovedadministratively(as opposed to assuming tactically based march formations and serials). Thereservists were not called up, with the exception of the two maintenancecompanies,whichwereestablishedbetween9and11SeptemberinNiemegkandusedtosupplementtherear-areaservices.On8October, thedivisioncrossed thebordernearCosel rightatnoonwith

Panzer-Regiment 6 in the lead.Oberstleutnant Rothenburg was in commandsinceOberstCrüwellhadassumedactingcommandofthearmoredbrigadeforOberst Stumpff, who had taken ill. The regimental musicians, under thedirectionofStabsmusikmeisterQuader,29setupatthebordermarkerandplayedmarches.Thedivision’sformationsrattledintotheprettycountryside.Theywereheartily greeted by the German-speaking population and presented with wineand flowers. The first quarters for the armored regiment were in Kuchelna,where a close relationship was established with the local populace. Theremainingformationsandelementsofthedivisionsalsoreachedtheirobjectivesin accordance with the time schedule. As a result, the Wehrmacht HighCommandannouncedontheradioat1900hours:“Germanforceshavereachedtheirday’sobjectivesfor8October.”The march continued the next morning. They were joined by the other

formations of Generaloberst von Rundstedt—the 3. Panzer-Division wasattached to his command—andmoved south from a line defined byGrulich–Moravian Schönberg–Braunseifen–south of Tropau. The areas and localitieswereoccupiedwithoutanyresistanceonthatdayaswell.ThetenthofOctobermarkedthelastdayofthemovement,whichcametoaclosearound1900hours.Pionier-Bataillon 39 had had a great deal to do during the three days. TheengineershadtoremovetheroadobstaclesthathadbeenerectedbytheCzechs,as well as the mines emplaced along the former frontier. The battalion’s 1stCompanywasemployedaroundTropauandthe2ndCompanyaroundOdrau.The divisionwas located in theNeutitschein–Stramberg–Wagstadt areas. In

someinstances,thedetachmentsandbattalionswerequarteredinopenbarracks-likearrangements.Thesoldierswerewell takencareofwherever theywent.ItwasonlyintheplaceswheretherewasapurelyCzechelement,suchasaroundVresina-Pist, that the relationswere cool.Small acts of sabotagewerequicklyidentifiedandthedamagesfixed.Thebivouaclifewasnotoflongduration.Thedivisionstartedmovingback

by 20 October. The division transferred its sector to Silesian elements of theVIII.Armee-Korps.Thewaybackhome lead throughTropau andBreslau andthenalongtheAutobahntoBerlin.Thetroopelementsandformationsreturnedtotheirgarrisonsbetween23and27Octoberandweregreetedenthusiastically.Thedivisionthenhadtogiveupmoreexperiencedcommandersandofficers

andreceivedintheirplacehithertounknownmen,whowerenonethelessabletorapidly integrate themselves into the structure of the division. In the divisionheadquarters,Majori.G.GrafvonSponeckwasreplacedbyMajori.G.vondemBorneasoperationsofficer.Inadditiontohismanydutyrequirements,GrafvonSponeckhadalsodesignedthespecial-purposeover-garment thatwaswornbymilitary motorcyclists. Hauptmann i.G. Krasà,30 an officer originally hailingfromAustria,becamethedivisionlogisticsofficer,apositioninwhichhegainedthe complete trust of the division in the coming years.Major Materne, thedivisionintelligenceofficer,wasreplacedbyHauptmannBarth.RittmeistervonWietersheim became the division adjutant. Oberst von Angern assumedcommandof the3.Schützen-Brigade.31OberstForster,whohad transferred tothearmyfrombeingapoliceofficerthreeyearspreviously,assumedcommandofthedivisionalartillery.OberstWeidling,whohadcommandedthedivisionalartillerysince its formation, left thedivision toassumecommandofArtillerie-Regiment 56, the divisional artillery of the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.).Battalioncommandalsochangedwithin theartilleryregiment’s twobattalions,withMajor Lorenz andMajor Wimmer assuming command.Within the riflebattalions of Schützen-Regiment 3, Major Meese (1st Battalion) andOberstleutnant Dr. Ehlermann (2nd Battalion) assumed command. MajorFreiherr von Wechmar replaced Oberstleutnant Schroetter in command ofAufklärungs-Abteilung3.OberstleutnantNegendanckassumedcommandofthedivision’ssignalsbattalion.

Garrisonsofthe3.Panzer-DivisionintheMarkBrandenburg(asof1January1939).

Nomajorchangesoccurredamongthepersonnelduringthefirstfewmonthsof 1939. Of course, there were transfers, temporary duty assignments, andreassignmentswithinthedivision,butroutinewasthedailynorm.Itwasthereforequitebysurprise that thedivisionwasalertedon12March.

ElementsofthedivisionwereimmediatelyloadedbyrailanddispatchedtotheKönigsbrückTrainingArea.Notallof thedivisionwassent.For instance,onebattalion from each of the armored regiments remained in garrison. Thedivisionalartilleryonlyrailloadedfourbatteries.Reservistswerenotcalledupforthat“exercise.”Nonetheless,thepowerfulKampfgruppe(battlegroup)ofthe3.Panzer-Division that left the trainingarea instormyweatherwassent to theareaaroundZittau.ThetanksthatwereloadedinNeuruppinhadthedestinationofZittauaswell.ThedivisionalelementsheadedtowardtheCzechborderduringthenightof

14–15March.Itwasadifficultmarch.Bitingcold,astormyeasternwind,andwild snow squallsmade a rapid advance by themotorized elements along theice-coveredroadsimpossible.Engineersandconstructionbattalionsfirsthadtoclear themeter-high snow.As a result, themarch of the armored brigadewasdelayedforseveralhours.

The riflemen, reconnaissance elements, engineers, signalers, motorcycleinfantry,andcannoneershadalreadycrossedtheborderatfirstlight;itwasnotreachedbythetanksuntil1405hours.Themarchcontinuedthroughheavysnowandblack ice throughJung-Bunzlau,Neu-Benatek,Alt-Bunzlau,andBrandeis.It was there that the commander of the Czech Armor School reported toGeneralleutnant von Schweppenburg. Initially, theCzechmilitary and civilianpopulaceactedinaveryreservedmanner.Butforthetimebeing,therewerenomajorsourcesoffriction,actsofsabotage,orevenresistance.Exertingaspecialeffort,theleadplatoonofAufklärungs-Abteilung3reached

the high ground outside the Czech capital by 0820 hours. The commandinggeneraloftheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.),GeneraloberstHoepner,arriveda fewminuteslaterandassumedcommandoverallGermanforcesinthegreaterareaofPrague.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3andPanzerabwehr-Abteilung39followedclosebehindand immediatelyoccupied thePragueCastle,whose firstmilitaryadministrator becameMajorMeese.Generalleutnant von Schweppenburgwasabletoestablishhiscommandpostthereat0930hours.ThecombatformationsofthedivisionslowlyenteredPrague.OberstleutnantRothenburgreportedatthecastle at 1700 hours that his armor regiment had arrived, entering Praguedemonstrating exemplary march discipline. Elements of the 24. Infanterie-Division,aSilesianformation,andthe4.leichteDivision,comingfromAustria,reachedthe“GoldenCity”at1900hours.Togetherwiththe3.Panzer-Division,theysecuredthearea.Forthetimebeing,thedivisionremainedinthecity.The division passed in review in front of the division commander on the

WenceslasSquareon17March.Itthenleftthecityandoccupiedlocalitiestothenorth in the area around Alt-Bunzlau–Brandeis–Podebrady. The divisioncommandpostwaslocatedinthelattertown.Schützen-Regiment3wasbilletedin the Czech training area atMilowice, where it disarmed the Czechmilitarystationedthere.OnlythetankbattalionsremainedinPrague.On18March,theytook part in the final parade held in front of Generaloberst Blaskowitz, thecommanderinchiefoftheGermanforcesinvolvedwiththeoccupation.Oberst Crüwell left the division after its return to its garrisons. He was

transferred into the Army High Command to become a department head.Oberstleutnant Rothenburg assumed command of Panzer-Regiment 6, whileMajorvonBoltensternassumedcommandofthe1stBattalion.Inthesummerof1939,thePanzerwaffewasfurtherincreasedinsizebytheactivationofthe10.Panzer-DivisioninPrague.The3.Panzer-Divisionwasagaintaskedtoprovide

personnelandmaterieltoassistintheactivationprocess.Amongotherofficers,Oberleutnant Poretschkin left the signals battalion, from which HauptmannBrinkmannhadalsobeentransferredonlyashorttimepreviously.Thenext senior commandover thedivision remainedwith theXVI. Armee-

Korps(mot.)ofGeneralleutnantHoepner.Obersti.G.Pauluswasthecorpschiefofstaff;Oberstleutnanti.G.Heimwasthecorpsoperationsofficer.ThosethreemenwouldindeliblyleavetheirmarkonthePanzertruppe in thecourseof thenextfewyears.

__________________1.MotorizedInstructionalCommand.ThiswasthegenesisofthefuturePanzer-Regiment5.2.Thecitieslistedarethegarrisonsforthedivisionheadquarters.Thedivisiontroopsandthemajorsubordinatesupportandcombatcommandswereusuallyinothergarrisoncities.TherewasnogarrisoninGermanylargeenoughtohouseanentiredivision.3.Freiherr=Count.4.i.G.=imGeneralstab=GeneralStaff(thetraditionalsuffixappliedtoranktodenotemembershipintheGeneralStaff).TheodorGrafvonSponeckrosetotherankofGeneralleutnantduringthewar.HealsocommandedadivisioninNorthAfrica (90. leichteAfrika-Division),where he received theKnight’sCross (12September1941).HewastakenprisonerbytheBritishuponcapitulationoftheGermanforcesinNorthAfricainMay1943.Hesurvivedthewaranddiedon13June1982.5. Hans-Horst von Necker became a General Staff officer following hisassignment to the 3. Panzer-Division. He served in a variety of armored andmechanized divisions during the early war years, primarily as an operationsofficer, andhe eventually served as theoperationsofficer of a field army (16.Armee). He was transferred to the Luftwaffe in 1944, being assigned toFallschirm-Panzer-Division “Hermann Göring,” which he eventuallycommanded(October1944–February1945).HereceivedtheKnight’sCrosson24June1944,whileservingasthecommanderofFallschirm-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 2 “HermannGöring.”He survived thewar and passed away on 27

February1979.6.AKriegsgerichtsratwastheseniorjudicialofficeronadivisionstaff,witharank roughlyequivalent to thatofMajor.To receive the lifelongappointment,the individualhad tobequalified tobea judgeunderGermanlaw.Thiswasauniformedcivilianposition.7. An Intendanturrat was a senior armed forces civilian official whose rankcorrespondedroughlytothatofaMajor.8.MedicalrankequivalenttoOberst.9.Followinghisassignmenttothe3.Panzer-Division(October1940),FriedrichKühn assumed divisional command three times (33. Infanterie-Division, 15.Panzer-Division,and14.Panzer-Division).Toward theendof thewar,hewasplacedinchargeofthearmy’smotorizationdepartment,butwaskilledinanairraid on Berlin in February 1944. He reached the rank of General derPanzertruppenandalsoreceivedtheKnight’sCross(3July1940).10. Schützen generally equals rifle in translation; however, its use within theGerman Army of this period is for motorized formations, as opposed toInfanterie (infantry), Jäger (light infantry),Gebirgsjäger (mountain or alpineinfantry),orKradschützen(motorcycleinfantry).11.TheactualPanzer-Regiment1wasassignedtothe1.Panzer-Division.12.KarlZuckertortwentontoassumeavarietyofstaffpositions,primarilyinweaponsdesignandprocurement,aftergivingupcommandoftheregimenton1October 1937.He left themilitary for unknown reasons on 31 July 1941.Hesurvivedthewar,passingawayin1982.13.Panzer-Regiment5waslaterreassignedfromthedivisiontohelpformthe5.leichteDivisionforserviceinNorthAfrica.Theregiment’shistoryiscoveredindepth in the two volumes of Bernd Hartmann, Panzers in the Sand(Mechanicsburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,2010,2011).14. Hubert Lendle went on to regiment and division command after hisassignmentasbattalioncommanderendedinJanuary1938,butthiswastobehislast assignment within thePanzertruppe. He advanced toGeneralleutnant bywar’sendandpassedawayinStuttgartin1970.15.HorstStumpff left thedivision in late1940,assumingcommandof the20.Panzer-Division.While in command, hewas awarded theKnight’s Cross. Hegave up command in the fall of 1941 and assumed staff positions for theremainderofthewar,culminatinginhisappointmentastheInspectorGeneralofArmored Forces for the ReplacementArmy in July 1944.He passed away in

Hamburgin1958.Hisyoungerbrother,Hans-Jürgen,wasaGeneraloberstintheLuftwaffeandoneofthesignatoriesoftheunconditionalsurrenderinBerlininMay1945.16.Reiterisgenerallytranslatedas“rider”;however,inGermanArmyusageofthisperiod,itmeansahorse-mountedelement(cavalry).17. Paul von Felbert rose to Generalmajor by war’s end. He transferred tocommand of Kavallerie-Schützen-Regiment 9 of the 3. leichte Division inNovember1938andagainservedwiththe8.Panzer-Divisionasthecommanderof itsSchützen-Regiment8.Hewas capturedby theBritish in late1944whileserving as a local area commander in occupied France. He passed away inWiesbadenin1973.18.ThisisGünthervonManteuffel,notthemorefamousHassovonManteuffel,towhomhewasrelated.HeleftthedivisioninJanuary1942asanOberst.Hewentontobrigadecommand(skiforces)andshort-termactingcommandofthe16. Panzergrenadier-Division (January to April 1944). He then led variousdefensedistrictsinnorthernGermanyandDenmarkuntiltheendofthewar.Hepassedawayin1962.19. The same Paulus of Stalingrad fame. Following his assignment ascommander, Paulus was transferred to the position of chief of staff of theArmoredForcesasGuderian’ssuccessor.20.WendvonWietersheimleftthedivisioninMarch1940toassumecommandof Kradschützen-Bataillon 1 (1. Panzer-Division). He later successfully ledSchützen-Regiment113(1.Panzer-Division).ByAugust1943,hehadassumedactingcommandof the11.Panzer-DivisionandwasdesignatedcommanderofthedivisioninNovember1943,afterpromotiontoGeneralmajor.Heheldthatposition untilMay 1945,when his division surrendered toU.S. forces, but hewasnottakenprisoner.HeultimatelyreceivedtheSwordstotheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCross.Hepassedawayin1975.21.HelmuthWeidling ismentioned in a variety of sourceswith regard to hisfinalassignmentastheLocalAreaCommanderforBerlin.22. The regiment’s 2nd Battalionwas not formed until nearly a year later, inSeptember1936,andwillbecoveredatthatpointinthenarrative.23.Lexikon der Wehrmacht gives a somewhat different history for these twobattalions.Pionier-Bataillon39 is listedashavingbeenactivatedon6October1939 and stationed in Rathenow inMilitary District III. It was formed usingcadrefromPionier-Bataillon9(9.Infanterie-Division)andPionier-Bataillon44

(corps asset). Pionier-Bataillon 37 is listed as having been activated on 12October1937andgarrisonedinWittenberg.AccordingtoLexikon,thebattalionreceivedcadrefromPionier-Bataillon39 initsformation.Pionier-Bataillon37became the divisional engineers for the 1. Panzer-Division. Lexikon lists noOberstleutnant Müller. (www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/PionierBat/PiBat39-R.htm and www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/PionierBat/PiBat37.htm).24. German tankers were often referred to as being “black” because of thespecial-purposeblacktankeruniformstheywore.Modeledonskifashionsofthetime, the color black was used in order tominimize the appearance of stainsfrompetroleumproductsandworkingontrackedvehicles.25. Republican forces, generally left-wing and anti-monarchist in politicalorientation,butdemocraticratherthanCommunist.26.WalterK.Nehringwouldcommand the regiment fornearlyoneandahalfyearsbeforebeingtransferredtoGuderian’sXIX.Armee-Korps(mot.).Hewenton to division command (18. Panzer-Division), several corps commands(including theDeutsches Afrika-Korps), and field army command (1. Panzer-Armee). Hewas a recipient of the Swords to theOak Leaves to theKnight’sCross of the Iron Cross. He survived the war, became a prolific writer onmilitarysubjects,anddiedinDüsseldorfinApril1983.27.LudwigCrüwellwouldcommandforslightlymorethanayearbeforebeingreassigned. He went on to division (11. Panzer-Division), corps (DeutschesAfrika-Korps), and field army (Panzerarmee Afrika) command. WhileconductingaerialreconnaissanceinNorthAfricainMay1942,hisaircraftwasshotdown.HesurvivedbutwascapturedbytheBritish.HewasarecipientoftheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCross(1September1941).Hewasreleasedfromcaptivityin1947andpassedawayinSeptember1958.28. Georg Gawantka had previously commanded Schützen-Regiment 2 (2.Panzer-Division) before assuming this command. It was relatively short-lived(February toAugust 1938).Upon promotion toGeneralmajor, Gawantkawastransferredtothe2.Schützen-Brigadetoassumecommand.Aftercommandingitin Vienna for around six months, he was given command of the 10. Panzer-Divisionon1May.HediedofnaturalcausesinPragueinthemiddleofJulyofthesameyear.29.Stabsmusikmeisteristhemusician’sequivalentofHauptmann.30. Krasà apparently went on to become at least anOberstleutnant i.G. and

recipient of the relatively rare German Cross in Silver (for supportachievements)while serving as the quartermaster for theXXIV. Panzer-Korps.Thedateoftheawardislistedas23October1942.31.GünthervonAngernisperhapsmorefamousforsubsequentassignmentsandhisultimatefate.Aftersuccessfullycommandingthe3.Schützen-Brigadeduringthe campaign in Poland, he was reassigned to command the 11. Schützen-Brigade, a separatemotorized infantrybrigade that laterbecameknown in thecampaign in France as the “Ghost Division” for its exploits. It formed thenucleus of the 11. Panzer-Division. Angern assumed acting command of thedivision in Russia, only to be badly wounded. His recovery lasted untilSeptember1942,whenhewassentbacktotheEasternFrontasthecommanderofthe16.Panzer-Division.HecommittedsuicideratherthanbeingtakencaptivebytheSoviets.HereceivedtheKnight’sCrosson5August1940.

Thetwooldestgarrisonsinthedivisionarea.NeuruppinwasthehomeofPanzer-Regiment6andtheI./Artillerie-Regiment5.(Copperplateengravingfrom1650byMerian.)

RathenowwashometoPionier-Bataillon39.(Copperplateengravingfrom1650byMerian.)

GeneralleutnantFessmann,thefirstcommanderofthedivision(1935–37).

GeneralleutnantFreiherrGeyrvonSchweppenburg,thedivisioncommanderfrom1937to1940.SchweppenburgwentontocommandtheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.),towhichthedivisionhadalong-time

association.

GeneralLudwigCrüwellservedastheregimentalcommanderofPanzer-Regiment6from1February1938to15March1939.Crüwellwentontocommandthe11.Panzer-DivisionandthentheDeutschesAfrika-Korps.HebecamethecommanderinchiefofPanzer-ArmeeAfrikabutwasshotdowninaFieselerStorch

overBritishlinesandcapturedinMay1942.

GeneralWaltherK.NehringservedastheregimentalcommanderofPanzer-Regiment5from1October1937until30June1939.Hewentontoservewithdistinction,eventuallyassumingfieldarmycommandby

theendofthewar.

OberstFritzKühnservedasthecommanderofthe3.Panzer-Brigadein1940.Hewentontoserveasadivisioncommanderthreetimes(33.Infanterie-Division,15.Panzer-Division,and14.Panzer-Division).

HewaskilledinabombingraidinFebruary1944whileservinginBerlin.

GeneralderArtillerieWeidlingservedasthecommanderofArtillerie-Regiment75fromitsactivationuntilNovember1938.Hewentontocorpscommand,butismostfamousasthelastcommanderoftheBerlinmilitarydistrict,surrenderingtotheSovietsandremainingimprisonedbythemuntil1955,whenhediedin

KGBcustody.

OberstRothenburgservedasthecommanderofPanzer-Regiment6foroneyear,fromMarch1939untilMarch1940.HelatercommandedPanzer-Regiment25(7.Panzer-Division)andwaskilledinactionshortly

afterthestartofOperation“Barbarossa”on28June1941.

Panzer-Regiment6entersNeuruppinin1936.

EntrancetothegarrisonofKradschützen-Bataillon3inBadFreienwalde,withaviewtowardthe5thCompany.

ThecommanderofKradschützen-Bataillon3andhisadjutant:OberstleutnantvonManteuffelandOberleutnantPape.

TheofficersandcivilianofficialsofNachrichten-Abteilung39in1937–38.Fromlefttoright:InspekteurSylvester,ZahlmeisterBauck,OberzahlmeisterKahle,LeutnantPolack,HauptmannBrinkmann,Leutnant

vonBorries,Regierungs-BauratWeil,MajorKempf,LeutnantPorestchkin,HauptmannLackner,WaffenmeisterRohwerder,OberleutnantWeiz,LeutnantderReserveLohrmann,LeutnantvonArnim,and

LeutnantMangelsdorf.

EmployedwiththeLegionCondor:LeutnantBuchterkirch(viewer’sleft),wholaterbecamethefirstOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossrecipientofthedivision,andUnteroffizierBlaich(secondfromtheright),

anotherfutureKnight’sCrossrecipient.

TrainingpersonnelfromPanzer-Regiment6inSpain.

APanzerIatthelocationoftheGermanmaintenancefacilitiesatKubas(Spain).

ThebarracksofSchützen-Regiment3attheGroß-BornTrainingAreainAugust1939.

PanzerI’softhedivisionduringtheso-called“MussoliniManeuvers”in1937.

3.Panzer-Division,1September1939.

CHAPTER2

FromtheSpreetotheBug:TheCampaigninPoland,1939

August1939approached.Theweatherwaswarmandsunny.Therewasalotofactivity in the fields and pastures; the harvest needed to be brought in.Whoknewwhen the next badweatherwould come?But the sun still smiled downfromtheclearblueskies.Theheadquartersandstaffsectionswerefilledwithsecretiveandfast-paced

work.Theadjutantsandliaisonofficersranaroundwithseriousfaces,andeventheclerksandstaffnoncommissionedofficersbecameunapproachable.ThefirstbatchofreserveofficersarrivedinthegarrisonsatthebeginningofAugust.Thesoldiers,whohadbeencalledup for eightweeks,hadgivenuphopeofbeingreleased.Itwasthesamepictureeveryyear.Theannualmaneuverswerearoundthe corner.But this time, therewasno real anticipation; the reports coming infromeastoftheReichfrontierweretooserious.In July, at the Bergen-Belsen Training Area, the division had activated the

logistical units that belonged to it in accordance with its mobilization plans.They received the designation Divisions-Nachschubtruppen 83 (DivisionSupportElement83).BythebeginningofAugust,tentruckcolumns1hadbeenestablished.Thatwasfollowedbythedivisionrationssectionunderthedirectionof Stabszahlmeister Flitner.2 The division bakery company was under thecommandofHauptmannNagel.Therewasalso thedivision’smeat-processingplatoon, the field post office (Feldpostinspektor Mollweide), and the twomaintenancecompanies.On17August,thewhistlesofthenoncommissionedofficersinchargepierced

throughthehallwaysofthebarracksandthelivingareas:“Loadup!”Lateron,the company commanders revealed themarch objective of themovement thathadbeenordered: the trainingareaatGroß-Born.Theelementsof thedivisiongraduallymovedoutoftheirvariousgarrisons.TheadvancepartiesoftherifleregimentleftEberswaldethenextday,withelementsofthemotorcyclebattalionfollowingon19Augustandthearmoredregimentsthedayafterthat.Thatwas

followedbytheartillery.Everyonethoughttohimself:Werewereallyjustgoingto Groß-Born? Only a few actually knew that the ArmyHigh Command hadalready taken thepreliminarymeasures foramobilization.Thatmeant that theformationscapableof“movingoutexpeditiously”weretobepreparedtomove.Thatincludedallmotorizeddivisions.Astheforcesmarchedout,thefamilymembersofthesoldiersgatheredtobid

farewell,asdid thecivilianemployeesof themesshalls, thecanteens,and theadministrativeelements.Many career officers and noncommissioned officers had to depart from the

divisionalelementsduringthatperiod.Theyweretransferredtonewcommands,activating formations and schools. It was not easy taking leave of their units.Nowthatthetimehadcometoprovethemselves,theircommonexperiencesandcommon efforts had to be given up. Reserve officers and noncommissionedofficers took their places. Some of them were from the times of previousexercises and the march into the Sudetenland, thus allowing them to find abridgetofostertrustandunderstanding.The commanders of the 4th and 5th Batteries changed within the 2nd

Battalionofthedivisionartillery.MajorWöhlermannandHauptmannHellmersgave up their commands to Hauptmann Haselbach and Oberleutnant Nebel(promotedtoHauptmannon27August).MajorBurmeisterassumedcommandofthe2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6.The march route of the individual elements of the division took them past

Stettin, across the Oder, and through Pomeranian Switzerland (pommerscheSchweiz, the hill country of lower Pomerania, now Poland). On 22August, arumor spread through the march serials of a non-aggression pact betweenGermany and Russia. That evening, the rumor was confirmed. By then, allelementsofthedivisionwereatthetrainingarea.Thenextfewdayswerespentwith the daily duty routine and passed quickly.Weapons and equipmentweremaintained; classroom instruction alternated with drill. Engineers instructedother formationswith regard to electrically detonated obstacles and disarmingthem.Noonethoughtthatamilitaryconfrontationwaspossible.Suddenly, on 25 August, marching orders arrived. The code word was

“Tannenberg.”At1800hours,theformationsassembledinthecampsforafinalformation.Thecommandersdiscovered from thedivision that thesurreptitiousmobilizationwastotakeplace,withD-Daybeing26August.Thediehadbeencast.

Themarcheaststarted.Theborderwastobereachedthatsameevening.ThemotorcyclebattaliontooktheleadasfarasBarkenbrügge.Thearmoredbrigadewastopassthroughatthatpoint.Theleadelementsreachedthebordereastofand to both sides of Preußisch Friedland around 2300 hours. Themotorcyclebattalionstagedintheforestsalongtheborder.Its1stCompanyscreenedalongtherailwaylinetoKönigsberg.At2345hours,orderstohaltarrived.Theleadelementswerepromptlypulledbacktenkilometers;theartilleryset

upinthethickwoodsfortykilometerswestoftheborder.Nooneknewexactlywhat was going on. The rumor started to circulate slowly that the attack hadbeen called off. It was said that the government had made new proposals toPolandwith regard to regulating theDanzig and corridor problems and that itwaswaitingforthePolishresponse.In an order thatmust be considered amasterpiece of planning, theGerman

ArmyintheEast—aroundhalfamillionstrongatthispoint—hadtobehaltedatandovertheborder.ThedivisionsetupabivouacsiteintheFriedlandarea.Thedays spent in the campwere certainly a test of nerves for the forces, but theyalso represented a bit of a breather after the feverish preparations.Hardly anytracesofnormaldutyactivitiescouldbeseen.Theonlythingwaspullingguard.On27August,anorderprohibitingthesendingofmailwasimposedforthenextfewdays.Portionsofthecompaniesweredetailedtoassistintheharvestinthesurroundingfarmlands.Somecolorfuleveningcelebrationstookplace,withtheonehostedbythe2ndBattalionofthedivisionalartilleryontheeveningof28AugustinPeterswaldecountingamongthemostimpressive.Thehighlightoftheeveningwasasingingcompetition,which thechoir fromthe5thBatterywon.GefreiterSalchowwasanentertainingmasterofceremonieswhowasnotafraidtoinjectsomepoliticalhumor.The2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6alsoheldasingingcompetition,withthe6thCompanytakingtheprize.Ontheeveningof26August,themotorcyclebattalionreturnedtotheborder

area again to secure the staging area of the division. The 3rd Company ofOberleutnant Adler advanced as far as a line running from the Grünkirchcustoms building to Grunau. Within the company, the platoon of LeutnantArent,3whowastheReichsbühnenbildnerincivilianlife,waspositionedontheright. Leutnant Stadie’s platoon was in the middle and Leutnant Schmidt’splatoonon the left.Across fromthemwere thePolishvillageofWilkowoandHill162,whichfeaturedatallwoodenwatchtower.

Contrary toexpectations,everythingremainedquieton thePolishside,eventhoughsomemovementcouldbeidentified.Oneantitankgunandonemachine-gunpositioncouldbeidentified.Therewaslittletobeseenofcivilians.OntheGerman side, all trafficwas forbidden between 2200 and 0500 hours. Duringthat time, thepatrolsandengineerswereactive,cutting tank lanes through thebarbedwire.Allofasudden,around0100hourson29August,advanceparties fromthe

III./Infanterie-Regiment25ofthe2.Infanterie-Division(mot.)showedup.Itwaspartofadeception,whereby thearmoreddivisionwasbeingpulledbackfromthe front.Themotorcycle battalionmoved to the forestryoffice atLinde.Thenextdaypassedquietly.Itrained.Therewasnochangeinactivityon31August,either. In the midst of all the quiet, orders arrived around 1600 hours: “Bepreparedtomove!”As it started to turn dark on that rainy day, the columns began to move

forwardagain.ThetanksmovedintotheareaonbothsidesofGrunau,followedbytherifleregiment.Justaftermidnight,anattackorderarrived.Thewarwason!Tothatend,the4.ArmeehadmoveduptotheborderinEasternPomerania.

ThecommanderinchiefwasGeneralderArtillerievonKluge. ItwasdirectedforthefieldarmytoforceacrossingovertheBraha,rapidlyreachthewestbankoftheVistulaintheKulm–Graudenzarea,andeliminatethePolishforcesinthecorridor. Themain effort of that aspect of the operationwas theXIX. Armee-Korps(mot.).Thecommandinggeneral,GeneralderPanzertruppen Guderian,was thecreatorof theGermanarmored force.Oberst i.G.Nehring, a longtimeassistanttoGuderianinthecreationofthePanzertruppeandprewarcommanderofPanzer-Regiment5,washischiefofstaff.The corps consisted of the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) ofGeneralleutnant

Bader and the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) ofGeneralleutnant Wiktorin, inaddition to the 3. Panzer-Division of Generalleutnant Freiherr Geyr vonSchweppenburg.Also attached to the corpswas the23. Infanterie-Division ofGeneralmajorGrafvonBrockdorff-Ahlefeldt,whichwasitsoperationalreserve.As the formation with the most combat power of the corps, it was to be

employed as its main effort. That aspect had already been determined at aconference at the headquarters of the 4. Armee in Kolberg. According to thedecision made there, the division would advance up to and into the TuchelHeath,with its armoredbrigade in the lead. Itwas intended for the reinforced

reconnaissancebattalionofthedivisiontoadvanceasfarastheVistulaafterthebridgeovertheBrahahadbeentaken.Thelong,openflanksweretobescreenedbythemotorizedrifledivisions.Thefirstmissiongiventothedivision:“Reachthe Braha east of Prust in the vicinity of Hammermühle and continue theadvancetotheVistulainthevicinityofSchwetz!”To execute that mission, the division received the following assets in

attachment:Panzer-Lehr-Abteilung(MajorvonLewinski),4Flak-Regiment101,5andaflightofarmyutilityaircraft.Atthestartofhostilities,thearmoredbrigadehad324PanzerI’sandPanzerII’satitsdisposal.Bycontrast,thePanzer-Lehr-AbteilungwasalreadyfieldingsomeofthefirstPanzerIII’sandPanzerIV’s.WhatdidthingslooklikefromthePolishside?Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthe

PolishgovernmentwaspreparedfortheGermanattackandhadalreadyinitiatedmobilizationof itsownforces forsome time.Starting in thespringof1939, ithadstartedtosystematically“ripenup”itsmilitaryandpopulaceforthepossibleconfrontationwithGermany.ThePomeranianArmyofGeneralBortnowskihadcompleteditsmovementintothecorridorbytheendofAugust.Thefieldarmywasorganized intowesternandeasterngroups.TheEasternGroupofGeneralBoltuchadthemissionofprotectingthewesternflankoftheModlinArmywithits4thand16thInfantryDivisions.Inaddition,itwasdirectedtodefendalongaline running Straßburg–Graudenz in the event of a German offensive. TheWesternGroupofGeneralSkotnickiwasdirectedtoholdthecorridor,includingthe flanking position of Bromberg–Nakel, with its 9th and 15th InfantryDivisions, as well as the Pomeranian Cavalry Brigade. The 27th InfantryDivisionwasthefieldarmy’soperationalreserve.Itsordersweretoeventuallymarch onDanzigwith the 13th InfantryDivision,whichwould be brought infromThorn.Themorningof1September1939dawned...Anearly-morningfogappearedeerilyinthewoods;itwasalreadyperceptibly

cold. There was an unearthly disquiet everywhere. The rattle of engines thatquicklydiedoff...thealmostsilentmarchingofcolumns...whisperingandcursing, the lightclinkingofweapons . . . thedivisionwasready.Theofficerscontinuouslylookedattheirwatches.Thehandsseemedtomoveimperceptiblyslowly. Then: 0445 hours! There was a wailing from somewhere, but ourartillerywasstillsilent.

CampaigninPoland,1939.

Allofasudden,thetankengineshowled,trackedrattled,motorcyclesroared.Itwasasifallunrestandalldoubtshadbeenliftedallatonceandwipedaway.The3.Panzer-DivisionofBerlinandBrandenburgwasmarchingintowarastheleaddivisionofthe4.Armee.The small tanks were the first ones to make their way through the lanes

created in thewire obstacles by the engineers. It was the light platoon of theI./Panzer-Regiment 6 of Oberleutnant Buchterkirch. The mission: “Conductreconnaissance in theattackzoneof theregimentandpress throughacross thePrusttosecuretherailwaycrossing!”Tank after tank followed, with the Panzer-Lehr-Abteilung in the lead.

Following close behind, dispersed across awide frontage, was the rest of thearmored brigade. Interspersedwere a few squads of riflemen,mounted in thefewSPW’s6 thatwere available.The rifle brigade followed closely behind thearmored elements in two groups.Oberst Angern, the brigade commander, ledone group, while Oberst Kleemann was in charge of the second one. Theriflemen crossed the border on foot. Themotorcycle battalion startedmovingthroughthebarbedwireat0500hoursandwascommittedbehind thearmoredregiments.

Panzer-Regiment5 rolled forward on the righthand side of the attack zone,followed closely by the motorcycles of the 2./Kradschützen-Bataillon 3. Thebattalion’s3rdCompanyfollowedit,leadingaFlakbattery,the1stCompanyofthemotorcyclebattalion,andthe4thand5thBatteriesofthedivisionalartilleryintosector.Panzer-Regiment6wasemployedontheleft-handsideoftheattackzone;its1stCompanywasontheright,the2ndCompanyontheleft,andthe4thCompany following. The remaining motorcycle elements, the 2nd and 3rdCompanies of the divisional engineers, and a light Flak battery followed thetanks.GuderianrodeatthefrontinanSPWamongtheregiment’stanks.Fogcascadedovertheterrain.Despitethat,thetanksrolledforwardacrossthe

potato and stubble fields. There wasn’t a Polish soldier to be seen anywhere.Onlythecivilianpopulacecouldbeseeninindividualfarmsteadsalongtheway,some raising their arms in greeting, others glancing fearfully out from behindwindows.Oberleutnant Buchterkirch’s tanks had already advanced fifteen kilometers

whenacolumnofhorse-drawncartssuddenlyappearedinfrontoftheentrancetoZahn.Itwasguardedbyafewhorse-mountedsoldiers.ThefirstPoles!TheOberleutnant immediately opened fire. The tanks that were following closebehinddidlikewise.Therewasconfusionamongtheranksoftheenemy,withafewhorsesboltingandtossingtheirriders.Trainsvehiclesflippedover.Afterafew minutes, the enemy column scattered. The tanks rolled on. Behind themwerethefirstPolishdead.Themorningfogslowlygrewdenser.Hardlyanythingcouldbeseen.Butthat

alsomeanttheenemycouldnotseethetanks.OberleutnantBuchterkirchhadhistanksformupincolumn.Thetankengineshowledandthemarchcontinuedatmaximum speed. Klein Klonia was passed and the Prut reached withoutencountering any trace of Polish resistance. At 0915 hours, the tanks werepositionedalongtherailwaylineeastofPrust.Allofasudden,afewvehiclesappearedinthefog.Theyweretheleadvehiclesofthedivisionalreconnaissancebattalion. Nothing had as yet been seen of the enemy. A single motorcycleapproachedalongtheroadway.Machinegunsbellowed;themotorcyclestopped,with two men jumping off and raising their hands, flabbergasted. They werePolishofficers,thefirstprisoners.Farther to the rear,Panzer-Regiment 6 had also encountered enemy forces.

Around 0600 hours, its tankswere outside of Zahn.Visibilitywas poor, eventhoughthesunwasstartingtopeekthrough.Acreekwascrossed,followedbya

largetractofmarshland,whichcausedthefirstlosses.Aheavytankgotboggeddownandchurneditselfeverdeeperintothemarshlandwithitsrunninggear.Afewminuteslater,thesamefatebefelltwoothervehicles.Theothertankspassedthem,unconcerned.Themaintenancecontactteamsweresummonedforwardbyradio.The artillery liaison officer,OberleutnantWeymann, also had bad luck.WhenhemovedontotheZahn–Großlossburgwithhisarmoredvehicle,thereartrackcameofftherunninggear.ThedisabledvehiclewasdiscoveredbyaPolishbicyclepatrol,whichapproachedthevehicle’screw,whichhaddismountedandwas working on the track. But before the Poles could become dangerous,Germantanksappearedandshotthepatroltopieces.The clocks showed 1000 hours, when the fog lifted all at once. The 7th

Company ofPanzer-Regiment 6 (Hauptmann Friedrichs), moving on the left,suddenlyencounteredstrongdefensivefirescomingapatchofwoodsjuttingoutnearGrossKlonia.7ThePoleshadduginandbecomeinvisibleinthewoodsandwerefiringantitankgunsatpointblankrangeatthetanks.Twovehicleswerehitand immobilized immediately, while the others went into cover behind in therolling terrain.Thecompanyattempted tobypass thepatchofwoods,butwasforcedtohaltagainbytheenemy’sfires.TheriflemenbringinguptherearalsoranintoPolishinfantryfire,withtheresultthatitwasimpossibletoadvanceinthatsector.Theregimentorderedageneralhaltinordertowaitfortheotherformationsto

closeup.The2ndBattalionof thedivision,whichwas following the armoredregiment,was ordered forward. Likewise, the 1stCompany of themotorcyclebattalion, under the command ofOberleutnant von Cochenhausen, which hadheretoforenothadanyenemycontact,wasorderedtoattack.Thingsweregettingurgent.The7thCompanyhadalready lostanumberof

vehicles.Thefirstsoldiersofthedivisionkilledinthewarwerelostduringthatengagement: Leutnant Nienaber, Gefreiter Fromm, Gefreiter Hopp, and fourPanzerschützen (Meyer, Litmann, Godenschweig, and Kirschke). The 5thBatteryofArtillerie-Regiment75(HauptmannHaselbach)went intopositioninapotatofieldandtookthepatchofwoodsunderfirefrom800meters.Theshellsexploded in the crowns of the trees, and soon there were smoke and flamesabovethewoodline.Someof thePolesfledtheirpositions,othersapproachedtheGermanswithraisedhands.Aftertheartilleryobserverssawthattwoenemyantitankgunshadbeendestroyed,theyorderedastoptotheartilleryfires.The 2nd Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 6 made only slow progress. Every

Polish pocket of resistance had to be eliminated individually. FeldwebelWolschinaofthe6thCompanydistinguishedhimselfinthatroundoffightingbyhisaggressiveadvances.Asaresult,hebecamethefirstsoldieroftheregimenttoreceivetheIronCross,SecondClass.Bythen,themotorcycleinfantryhadarrived.OberleutnantvonCochenhausen

hadhiscompanydeployandenterthethickwoods.Itwasdifficulttoadvance.Theunderbrushwasthickandlargetreesandbranches,knockedoveroroffbygunfireorfelled,blockedtheway.TherewerestillPolishriflemeneverywhereputtingup adefense.While clearing thewoods, the company suffered its firstsoldier killed in action; Leutnant Hiltmann and a junior noncommissionedofficerwerewounded.At that point, the armored regiment was able to continue its march in the

direction of the Brahe. All of the motorcycle battalion had closed up aroundWillkowo in the meantime. A motorcycle patrol under Unteroffizier Petreinsfromthe3rdCompanywasdispatchedinthedirectionofGrossKlonia.Asolorider,KradschützeLöwenstein,broughtthenewsthattheroutewasclearoftheenemy.Atthatpoint,thebattalionheadedoutinthedirectionofBagnitz.Panzer-Regiment5madefasterprogress.Moving throughPrust,Hauptmann

Edler8 von der Planitz’s tank company reached the Brahe shortly after 1100hours. By then, Buchterkirch’s platoon had advanced along the railway line,where it was promptly taken under fire from the elevated embankment bynumericallysuperiorPolishforces.Theregiment’stanksarrivedintimetoassist.Leutnant Rommel’s platoonwas directed by Buchterkirch in an attack on theembankmentandtheenemyantitankguns.Thetanksoverraneverythingthatgotintheirway,buttheywerefinallystoppedbyafieldpositionprotectedbywire.Theywerewedgedbetweenthecreekandthemarshland,andtheyhadtotakeupfire from exposed positions. All ammunitionwas expended after tenminutes.Fortunately,theregiment’s1stCompany(HauptmannNedtwig),whichhadbeencalledforward,arrivedbythen.Theothertankswereabletopullbackunderitscoveringfires.Schützen-Regiment 3 hadmoved out in themorningwith the tanks, but its

mainbodyremainedbehindtheadvancingfightingvehicles.Insearingheat,theriflemenmarchedandrodeacrossthebroad,flatterrain.Inthevillagesthatwerepredisposed to the Germans, the soldiers were greeted heartily. The greetingswere especially heartfelt inLossberg.Men,women, and children stoodon thestreets,waving flags.Whoknewhow longandwhere theymighthavehidden

them?The two armored regiments, which had worked their way forward to the

Brahe,haltedalongitswesternbanks.Thevehiclesandmenweresomewhattheworseforwearandwaitedfortherestofthedivisionalelementstocloseup.Bythat afternoon, theywere thirtykilometersdeep in enemy territory, alongwiththe elements of the reconnaissance battalion that had been attached.They haddrivenawedgeintothePolishArmy.Buttotherightandtheleftofthatwedge,therewerepowerfulelementsofthe

Polish 9th InfantryDivision thatwere threatening the flanks.An actual threatmaterialized from the north from the Tuchel Heath. A Polish cavalry brigadeattackedtheleftwingofthedivision.The troops charged with drawn sabers. It was a scene straight out of the

openingdaysofWorldWarI.Unfortunately,thePolishcavalrymandidnotwanttobelieveorwerenotallowedtobelievethattheGermantanksweremadeoutof steel and not wood and cardboard. The machine-gun fire from the tankswreakedhavocamongtheranksoftheenemyriders.Buttheydidnotgiveup.Therodeback,reorganized,andattackedagain.In themeantime, friendly artillery had gone into position in the open fields

between Bagnitz and Prust. Its fires completely destroyed the Polish cavalrycharge.Elementsoftherifleregimentwerealsothere.Theheavymachine-gunsectionoftheregiment’s1stCompanywasabletothintheenemy’srankswithwell-aimed fire.Hauptmann vonBosse’s 1st Battalion assumed a flank guardmissionnorthofGrossKlonia.By early afternoon, the division had reached its day’s objective. The

commander went to the corps headquarters to make his report. Everythingseemedtobegoingaccordingtoplan.Thecommandinggeneralwasnotsatisfied.Guderianorderedthecrossingof

theBrahathatveryafternoon.Hewantedtoremainontheenemy’sheels—justashehadalwayspreached.ItwasdirectedthatthemotorcyclebattalionmovefirstacrosstheBrahewith

allofitsavailablecompanies.The2ndCompany,togetherwithsupportfromtheengineers,succeededincrossingtheriveronrubberboatsandfloatsaboutthreekilometers south of the railway line. The 3rd Company followed shortlythereafter. That same night, the 1st Company established a bridgehead on theeastbankoftheKamionka.Thebridgeheadwashelduntilthearrivaloftherifleplatoons.

The reconnaissance battalion forced the river in a surprise attack directlyoutsideofHammermühle.Thebridgewastaken.ThetanksthatfollowedtookaPolishbicyclecompanythatwashastilyarrivingtodefendthebridgeprisoner.Bythen,ithadturnedmidnight.Hammermühleandthefarmsteadsallaround

itwereblazingliketorches.Tobothsidesandtherear,pyrotechnicflareswerebeingshotskyward,asuresignthatthedivisionwaswellaheadoftheremainingforcesof thecorps.OberleutnantvonManteuffeldidnotallowhismotorcycleinfantryany rest.Hismenwere able to reachSwiekatowo.Thatwas as far astheygot;thebattalionsetupanall-rounddefenseinthewoods.Thatsamenight,therewasawildfirefight.AlargeMercedessuddenlyshowedupwithheadlightson,drivingrightintotheencampmentofthe1stCompany.TheGermanguardswere just as surprised as the twoPolish officers in the car. The Poles enteredcaptivitywithglowering faces.A fewminutes later, they receivedcompany intheformofamountedpatrolthatalsorodeintothebivouacsitewithoutaclue.Major Freiherr von Wechmar’s reconnaissance battalion received orders

duringthenighttocontinueadvancingeast,alongwiththeattached2ndBatteryof the artillery regiment and some tanks from thePanzer-Lehr-Abteilung. ThenextobjectiveforthenewlyformedadvanceguardwastheVistula.As it started to dawnon the seconddayof thewar, the reconnaissance and

motorcyclebattalionscontinuedtheiradvanceeast.Theyknewthatthearmoredbrigade and the rifle regimentwould close up behind them. The division hadcreatedastrongsecondwaveintheformofaKampfgruppeunderGeneralmajorStumpff. It consisted of the II./Panzer-Regiment 5, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6,the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the remaining elements of Kradschützen-Bataillon 3. The elements of the rifle regiment that remained behind inKamionka moved out and into the Tuchel Heath around 0800 hours. Thegigantic expanses of woods had an eerie quality to them.No one knewwhatcouldbehidinginthem.The Poles then upset the apple cart a bit with regard to theGerman plans.

StrongelementsfromthePolish9thand27thInfantryDivisions,aswellasthePomeranian Cavalry Brigade, conducted a surprise attack on the Germanbridgehead atHammermühle early in themorning and established themselvesalong the road to Swiekatowo. Thatmeant that the advanced elements of thedivisionwerethreatenedwithbeingcutoff.Evenworse,alossofthebridgeheadwouldhavenegativeeffectsonthecontinuedattackoftheentirecorps.That morning, only Hauptmann Beigel’s 1st Company of the engineer

battalion was arrayed along the Hammermühle. The division commander,unawareofwhatwashappening,continuedtowardthefrontinordertoreceivethereportsfromtheformationcommanders.Allofasudden,heavymachine-gunfireflaredupfromthenearbywoods.Theenemyfiresincreasedinintensitybythe minute. Generalleutnant von Schweppenburg; his adjutant, Major vonWietersheim; and an assistant operations officer,Oberleutnant von Levetzow,had to take cover immediately. The headquarters of the division and of thedivisionalartillery,whicharrivedashortwhilelater,alsogotcaughtinthefire.The division’s command-and-control abilitywas lost for a shortwhile on thatday. The two headquarters and the accompanying radio operators from thedivisional signals battalion suffered their first casualties. The officers had nochoicebuttoboundbackacrossthe100metersofopenmeadowlandtogettoasteep downward slope to the rear. They were received there by the combatoutpostsoftherifleregiment.That did not accomplishmuch, since Polish fires started to impact there as

well and stymied every attempt to pull back and occupy better positions.Although the engineers attempted an immediate counterattack into the thickwoods,theywereunabletodislodgethewell-entrenchedenemy.The division commander had theKampfgruppe ofOberst Kleemann,which

was still relatively far back, brought forward to relieve the beleaguered force.Unfortunately, that battle group had changed its direction ofmarch just a fewminutespreviouslyandhadnotturneditsradiosbackontoreceive.Asaresult,hours passed. The division commander had no idea at that point where hisindividualbattalionsandregimentswere.Finally,Germansoldiers appeared from thewest.Theywerenot formations

fromthe3.Panzer-Division,however. Instead, itwas thereconnaissance troopofRittmeistervonGötzfromthedivisional reconnaissancebattalionof the23.Infanterie-Division,whichwasinthesecondwave.ThePolishattacknotonlycutoff thecommand-and-controlelementsof the

division thatmorning, it also hit the elements of the division that had alreadyrangedwelltotheeast.Duringthenight,the2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6had assumed the mission of screening the bottleneck between the lakes atSwiekatowo.Theenemythrustearlythatmorningslammedrightintothatareawithfullforce.The5thand6thCompanieswereabletoturnbackthefirstattackeffort until 0900 hours. Two platoons from the 6th Company particularlydistinguishedthemselvesintheengagement.TheyweretheplatoonsofLeutnant

GrafvonKageneckandLeutnantvonDiest-Koerber.AlsoworthyofnoteweretheachievementsofUnteroffizierWehrmeisterandGefreiterDeuter,whowerein the thick of things with their fighting vehicles. Nonetheless, that companysuffered its first five dead in that fighting: Feldwebel Fiedler, UnteroffizierFleher,GefreiterSchreiber,OberschützeFeldhahn,andPanzerschützeBischoff.Bynoon,theenemyhadpulledbacktohisoriginallineofdeparture.Duetoa

lack of fuel, the friendly vehicles were not able to attack him. When thecommanderofPanzer-Regiment6 brought up reinforcements in the afternoon,the2ndBattalionattackedtothenorthandwasabletodrivetheenemyback.Atthesametime,the5thand8thCompaniesscreenedtheflanktotheeast.The6thCompanyattackedidentifiedenemyantitank-gunpositionsandputthegunsoutofcommission.The5thCompanywasalsoabletoeliminatesomeantitankguns—threeinall.Intheprocess,itrescuedaplatoonfromthe4thCompany,whichhadadvancedthefarthestnorthbuthadalsoshotoffallof itsammunition.Bylate afternoon, all threats had been eliminated and the battalionmoved out tocontinueeastafterrearming.The1stCompanyofthemotorcyclebattalionwasimmediatelyorderedback

toHammermühle,aswasthe1stCompanyoftherifleregiment.The2ndBatteryof the divisional artillery turned its guns around 180 degrees and fired witheverythingitwascapableof.Hauptmann Boehm’s riflemen moved as quickly as they could to

Hammermühle. Along the way were ammunition vehicles and baggage trainsthathadbeenoverrunbythetanks,aswellasthecorpsesofhorsesandofPoleskilledinaction.GeneralGuderianappearedandencouragedthesoldiers,wavingthem on. After moving four kilometers through woods, a halt was ordered.Polish artillery held up any further movement and was raking the road withheavy fire. The company’s vehicles were brought forward, and the marchcontinuedthroughJohannisbergandStansilawatoKoritowo.All of a sudden,General von Schweppenburg was standing in front of the

men.Hepersonallydirectedthe3rdPlatoonofFeldwebelHillingeragainsttheenemybattery.Panzer-Regiment5 thenmovedout toattackGrossLonk.On thefarsideof

Koritow, the fighting vehicles ran into the artillery positions of the enemy.Disregarding the intense fires and brave resistance, the tanks plunged into thePolish lines and individually took out the guns. That did not occur withoutperceptiblelosses,however.

The 1st Company of Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 assumed the mission ofprotecting the division commandpostwith oneof its platoons.The remainingtwo platoons advanced into the woods north of Hammermühle. Two Polishinfantrycompanieswerewipedoutintoughfighting.Thetwoplatoonslosttwodeadandfourwoundedin thatengagementandonlyhad thirtymenaltogetherby the end of the evening.The batteries thatwere brought forward fired overopensights.The3rdBatterylostHauptwachtmeister9Hippeintheprocess,thefirst Spieß10 of the division to be killed, an indicator of the toughness of thefighting and also the bravery of the enemy. By evening, the division hadmasteredthedangeroussituationwithitsownforces.ItwasthenabletorapidlymoveitselementstotheeastacrosstheBrahe.In the meantime, the motorcycle battalion had taken Klonowo with its

remaining two companies and a few tanks from the Panzer-Lehr-Abteilung.Unconcernedaboutthesoundsoffightingtotheirrear,themotorcycleinfantryand reconnaissance troopers continued their advance east. The sun blazedmercilesslythatday,withrainfollowingintheafternoon.Thetanksandriflemenmoved,marched,andadvanced.Theroadswerepoorandfrequentlyonlyhadasinglelane.Allofthetraffichadtoworkitswayaroundthat.Theroadsbecamecloggedand therewereunpleasant stops.The reconnaissancebattalionwas farahead of the division and moved right through the middle of enemydetachments, which were equally shocked and surprised and incapable ofofferingadefense.MajorvonWechmarintendedtoreachtheVistulabeforetheonsetofdarkness.Butintertwinedenemycolumnsorvehiclesandtreesthathadfallen victim to Stukas blocked the way. The enemy was not falling backuniformly.ResistancearoundRozanawasespeciallyhard.Thereconnaissancebattalionwasunabletoadvanceanyfarther.Thearmored

car crews, supported by the 1st Battery of the artillery regiment (LeutnantHoffmann), had a hard fight on their hands at the Poledno Estate,whichwasbeing defended by Polish cavalry. The advance guard suffered its first officercasualties. The commander of the 2./Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3,Rittmeister vonPrittwitzundGaffron, the formeradjutant toGeneraloberstvonFritsch,11waswoundedinthestomach.Thebraveofficerrefusedtobeoperatedonatthemainclearing station, insisting that the surgeons operate on the more severelywounded first. Leutnant Adam died on the battlefield at the head of hisreconnaissanceplatoon.Once stopped, thebattalion “circled thewagons”withitsvehicles,thevillageofRozana,setalightbyairattacksandartillery,forming

abackdrop.The motorcycle battalion pivoted from its movement east to head south in

ordertohelpthereconnaissancebattalion.Butthemotorcycleinfantrywerenotable to get beyond the line reached by the armored cars. In contrast, thedivisional engineers hadmore success in the effort to takeRozana. They hadbeen directed there by the division commander.Major von Mertens led hisengineersintheassaultontheshot-upandburningtownandtookpossessionofitthatnight.The 2nd Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 6 also moved out in the evening

(around2000hours).HauptmannBernewitz’s8thCompanyadvancedasfarasPolskie-Lakie.Atthatpoint,thetanksencounteredasurprisinglystrongantitankdefense.Threefriendlytankswereknockedout.Thebattalionthenpulledback1,000meters,setthevillagealight,andthensetupanall-rounddefenseforthenight.Thedivisioncouldbesatisfiedwithitsachievementsthatday.Itsformations

hadnotonlystymiedtheeffortsofthePolestobreakthrough,buttheyhadalsobrokenintothefrontoftheCorridorArmy.Thecorpsbroughtthe23.Infanterie-DivisionacrosstheBraheandemployedittotheleftofthedivision.The1stBattalionoftherifleregimentassumedtheflankguardmissionforthe

divisionduringthenight.Thepluckyriflemensucceededinorientingthemselvesin the darkwoods and fields and taking up good positions. They throttled allattemptsbythePolestofindagapintheGermanlines.ThedivisiondiscoveredwithcertaintythatitstankshadadvancedsofarintothecorridorthatelementsofthePolishforceshadbeenbypassed.The night was very cool. That was especially noticeable after a humid

summer’sday,asthepastonehadbeen.Somethingelsehadanegativeimpactonthesoldiersaswell:hungerandthirst.Thesupplyelementswerestillfartothe rear as a resultof the rapidadvanceand thepoor roadnetwork.Theyhadbarely gotten beyond Hammermühle. Some of the men found the courage tosneak across the fields in an effort to milk some cows that had gone astray.Amongartillerycircleswithinthedivision,thatnightwasalwaysreferredtoas“thehouroftheOrtsbauernführer.”12

Theadvancestartedalloveragainat0400hoursacrosstheentirefrontageofthe division. The march route ran parallel to the Vistula along the Poledno–Drozdoworoad.Thereconnaissanceandmotorcyclebattalionswerethefirsttomoveout,followedbythearmoredbrigade(atleastthoseelementsthathadbeen

refueled).The2ndCompanyofthemotorcyclebattalion,whichwasinthelead,receivedheavyfirefromDrozdowoshortlyaftermovingoutandboggeddown.The battalion commander quickly brought his 3rd Company forward andemployed it north of the road, along with the 1st Company, which was stillexhausted from the previous day. The 1st Company approached the railwayembankmentbehindBelno.OberleutnantvonCochenhausenintendedtolethismen rest after that. It remained an intent. A transport train steamed in. Themotorcycleinfantryforcedittohalt;4officersand128enlistedpersonnelweretakenprisoner.All of the remaining elements of the division also advanced against

numerically superior Polish forces. The enemy field army command hadrecognizedthesituationitwasin—therapidlygrowingthreatofencirclement—andwasdoingeverythinginitspowertopullitsdivisionacrosstheVistulaontheroadleadingtoKulm.ThearmoredbrigadeattackedatfirstlightfromSwiekatowointhedirection

ofHeinrichsdorfandBiechowokotowardthenorthwestinanefforttointerdictthe retreat routes. Both of the division’s armored regiments and the attachedPanzer-Lehr-Abteilungmovedat“fullspeedahead.”ButitwassoondiscoveredthatthePoleshadplacedverystrongantitankdefensesattheentrancetoeveryvillage.Asaresult,therewashardfightingthatwasnotwithoutcasualties.

CampaigninPoland:AdvanceRoutesoftheArmyCorps.

Panzer-Regiment6,moving on the right, crossed the Terespol–Tuchel road,withHauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s 2ndCompany eliminating three Polishmachine-gun tanks in the process. Defiles then held up further advance. Theregiment pivoted to the left and ran into elements of the advancing Panzer-Regiment 5. Enemy infantry continued defending everywhere after beingbypassedbythetanksandmadelifedifficultfortheriflemenfollowing.ThetanksreachedtheTerespol–Oslowoareaandthenpressedontotheeast,

butthefollowingformationsranintostrongenemyforces.Onlythe4thBatteryoftheartilleryregimentwasabletosuccessfullystayontheheelsoftheenemy.The remaining battery received considerable fire from the village ofHeinrichsdorf.Hauptmann Haselbach assumed command of the forces in thearea and had the 5th and 6thBatteries unlimber in a depression. Patrolsweresent out in all directions. Sections under Wachtmeister Rademacher andUnteroffizierHimmelsearchedthenearbyfarmsteads,whileLeutnantGrotewaldoccupiedtheindustrialareaofHeinrichsdorfwiththeammunitionsectionofthe4thBattery,whichhadbeenleftbehind.The Poles tried to open the road to Terespol with all the means at their

disposal. But it was already too late at noon on that hot summer day toaccomplish that, even though elements of the Polish 9th Infantry Division—especiallyelementsofthe16thCavalryRegiment,aswellasthe25thand35thInfantryRegiments—foughtbravely.Bythen,therifleregimentwasabletojointhedevelopingfraybymovingviaPolednoandDrozdowo.At1240hours,theartillerytookthePolesattemptingtobreakoutunderheavy

fire.Theeffectalongtheroadwashorrific.Horsesbolted,soldiersranheadoverheels into the fields, and limbers and trains vehicles flipped over. They werefollowed by fires from Hauptmann Haselbach’s 5th Battery and LeutnantJaschke’s 6th Battery (Jaschke was acting battery commander).Hauptwachtmeister Reinig of the 6thBattery identified a Polish battery goinginto position along the northern edge of Heinrichsdorf. He brought up thespottinggunofthebattery.Thegunner,Wenzel,hadthetargetinrangewithhissecond shell. A few minutes later, the enemy battery was silenced. For hisefforts,HauptwachtmeisterReinig laterbecame the first soldierof theartilleryregimenttoreceivetheIronCross,SecondClass.Therifleregimentattackedatjusttherighttimetointerdictthehard-fighting

enemy.Heavyfightingensued;itwasconductedbythePoleswiththecourage

ofdesperation.The1stand3rdRifleCompaniesassaultedalongtheroadinthedirectionofPolskie.HauptmannvonLany,thecommanderofthe3rdCompany,andLeutnantvonHeydebreck,hisplatoonleader,werekilled.The1stCompanylostitsfirstmanwithSchützeKrämer.Bythen,thePoleshadhadenough.Therewasnowaytogetout.Inaddition

to twenty artillery pieces and six antitank guns being destroyed, there werevehicles,ammunitionwagons,machineguns,horses,andarticlesofequipmentscatteredeverywhere.Therifleregimenttook36officersand800menprisonerthatafternoon;fifteenartillerypieceswereamongthespoilsofwar.The division did not allow itself to be distracted from its objective by the

fighting to encircle the enemy forces. The reconnaissance battalion receivedorderstotakeSchwetz,whilethemotorcyclebattalionwassentinthedirectionofLiepo–Biala–Taszarko.Fortunately,theadvanceofInfanterie-Regiment96ofthe32.Infanterie-Divisionontherightsideofthedivisionwasstartingtomakeitspresencefelt.Despitethat,Polishcavalrysectionscontinuedtosurfaceacrossthe front and created temporary disruptions here and there. There no longerappearedtobeunifiedcommandamongthePoles;operationsseemedtobeleftuptotheindividualunitandformationcommanders.Around 1000 hours, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 crossed the Czerna-Woda at

F.W.Dedienke.Theleadtanksidentifiedtherapidmovementoftrains,oneaftertheother, fourkilometersaway.OberstleutnantRothenburg,whowasup frontwith his tanks, orderedHauptmann Schneider-Kostalski to block the reportedrail trafficalongthestretchbetweenDerispol–Oslowo.Thetanksmovedalongthe sandy road as far as the rail linewithout encountering any resistance.Therailway crossing guard shack was locked up and the gate crossing lowered.Schneider-Kostalski was undeterred. He ordered: “Panzermarsch!” The gateflew in the air with a crash. A cloud of smoke could be seen to the south.Schneider-Kostalskihadhiscompanytakeupfiringpositionsonthefarsideofthe line.The train’sengineermusthavenoticed themovement,however,sincethe train slowed and finally stopped.The company commander opened fire at250 meters. With the first round, the locomotive’s boiler exploded with amonstrouscloudofsmoke.Thedoorstothepassengercarsopenedeverywhere.Polish soldiers jumped out and attempted to flee into the nearby woods. Thetanksofthe4thand7thCompaniesshowedupatthatmomentandjoinedintheengagement. Sixty Polish soldierswere sent back as prisoners. Theywere thelastmenofabattalionthathadboardedthetrain.

ThethreetankcompaniesimmediatelytookuptheadvanceonLakowicz.AtKrapjewitce, theywere able to scatter horse-drawn trains elements.Once pastPolskie-Lakie, theyencounteredPolishcavalryandantitankelements.The2ndCompanyencountereditsfirstenemytankontheRozana–Blednoroadat1100hours;itwasknockedoutat300meterswithtworounds.ThearmoredbrigadereachedthetrainingareaatSchwetzintheafternoonand

continued its advance north. Toward 1800 hours, the tanks tookOslowo. TheforcesreorganizedfortheattackontheGrupaTrainingArea.Therearareasalsohadtobesecured,sincetherewerestillstrongPolishforcesintheareaaroundTerespol. Those forces did not remain quiet; they continued to fight to breakfree.LeutnantLange,theadjutantoftheartillery’s2ndBattalion,wascapturedbytheenemyduringapatrol.Hewasstabbed,buthelivedtotellthetale.Major vonWechmar’s reconnaissance battalion pressed past Schwetz at the

onset of darkness without regard for the scattered enemy groups. HeimmediatelypressedalongtheVistulatothenorthwithallofhistroops.Tohelpkeepthemovementfluid,thedivisionsenttheengineercompaniesofMajorvonMertens,whichhadjustbecomeavailable,andHauptmannReinke’s3rdBattery,after the reconnaissance battalion.The engineers and the artillerymade it intoSchwetz,butthePolesthenstartedastubborndefensethere.Therewasadangerthattheengineerbattalionmightbeencircled.Theengineershadtodefendfromall directions and lost contact with the remaining elements of the division.Despite that, itwasable toprevail. In theend, thebattalionoccupiedandheldSchwetz.The3rdBatterycapturedawarchestinthecityhall.ThePolishcommandknewwhatwasatstake.Energeticofficersralliedtheir

menagainandagaintobravelydefend.Asaresult,theGermanriflecompaniesdid not advance any farther that night. As a result, Generalleutnant vonSchweppenburg ordered the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment pulled back toPoledno. The division operations officer,Major von der Borne, expressed acontraryopinion.Hebelievedtheriflemenshouldremainwheretheywere.Butthedivisioncommanderwantedtoleadhisforcesinatraditionalcavalrystyle:pull the forces back tonight so that they could be used to conduct a “fencer’sleap” the following morning. As a result, he ordered the battalion back anddirected it to holdPoledno “to the last bullet,” as thepivot point of the entiredivision.OnlyPanzer-Regiment5wasable toscoreasuccess thatevening. Itdidnot

remaininOslowo; instead, itpusheditscompaniesalongsandyroutes through

thedarkwoodsasfarasDubielno,whichwasreachedaround0200hours.Thatmeantthattheencirclementoftheenemyforcesfightinginthecorridor

wasjustaroundthecorner.Thedivisioncouldseetheblazingfiresandhearthesoundsof fighting in thenearby fortressofGraudenz,whichhad fallen to theEastPrussian21.Infanterie-Divisionthatday.TheXIX.Armee-Korps(mot.)wasonlyafewkilometersfromthebordersofEastPrussia.ThePolishPomeranianArmyhadbeensplitintwointhreedaysoffighting.

The field army headquarters was located in Thorn at that point and wasattempting to establish contact with the Modlin or Posen Armies with itsremainingregiments.General Guderian went to the division headquarters during the night and

orderedtheadvancetocontinue,irrespectiveoftheconditionofthebeleagueredmen andvehicles.ThePoles could not be given any time to cross theVistulawest of Graudenz. Correspondingly, orders were sent to all elements of thedivisiontomoveoutatfirstlightagain.The reconnaissance battalion started its movement along the Vistula in the

directionofGraudenzat0400hours.Thearmoredcarsandmotorcyclesmovedwithout regard for the scattered enemy elements, which were still offering adefense fromout of individual farmsteads and barns.Themen of the divisionhadonlyoneobjective:toestablishcontactwiththeirEastPrussiancomradesassoon as possible. Whoever fell back had to fend for himself. The disabledvehicleshadtoberepairedwithonlythemeansavailable.Fortunately,thePoleswere no longer in a position to offer energetic resistance. Most of themautomaticallyraisedtheirhandsintheairasthevehiclesracedpastthem.Onlyaburstofmachine-gunfirewasnecessarytofishthemoutoftheirhidingplaces—trenches,haystacks,houses,andgardens—wheretheyhadspentthecoldnightinorder to try to find a place thatmorning to get over the river somewhere andheadsouth.Themovementsofthereconnaissancebattaliontookplaceontherightwing

of the division; the main effort of the day’s efforts was to be in the center,however.The armoredbrigade, reinforcedby themotorcyclebattalion and the2ndand4thBatteriesofthedivisionalartillerywhileitstagedduringthenight,receivedorderstocrosstheMatavequicklyandattacktheGrupaTrainingAreafrom the west along a broad front. The enemy was to be driven east to theVistula, where Oberst Angern, with elements of the rifle brigade and thereconnaissancebattalion,hadbeendirectedtointerdicthim.OberstRothenberg

wasentrustedwiththescreeningofthedivisionnorthofSchwetz.InadditiontoPanzer-Regiment6,hehadtheI./Schützen-Regiment3, the1./Pionier-Bataillon39,theI./Artillerie-Regiment75,andthe6./MG-Bataillon59athisdisposal.Ofthose forces, the 2nd Battalion of the armored regiment (Major Burmeister)wouldfaceafewdangeroussituationsoverthecourseofthenextfewhours.Theelementsofthedivisionthatwerestillhangingbackwerecollectedintoa

Kampfgruppe under the command of Oberst Kleemann. It was directed forKleemann’selementstomoveasexpeditiouslyaspossibletofollowthearmoredbrigade,ferretingoutthePolishforcesstillhidinginthewoodsandfieldsintheprocess.Sincethemovementoftheentireforcewasdelayed,HauptmannBeezdecided to race forward with a hastily assembled advance party. That smallelement, to which Leutnant Behrend, Leutnant Franzke, and Inspektor Trieswere also a party, collected almost 300 prisoners in a short period. LeutnantBehrendensured theprisonerswereproperly transported to the rear,while therestcontinuedmoving toward the increasingly loudsoundsof fightingcomingfromGrupa.Thearmoredbrigademovedoutaround0400hoursandportionscrossedthe

creek in their first attempt. The Poles did not open fire until the followingelementsarrived.Thebrigadesufferedconsiderablecasualties,particularlyinthestreetsofGrupaproper,wheretheenemyhadbarricadedhimselfinhousesandsetupstrongantitank-gunpositions.OberstleutnantWimmerassumedcommandofthemotorcycle,antitank,andartilleryelementsleftbehind.Despitethemoreunifiedcommandofthoseforces,thePolesstillthwartedeveryattempttocrossthecreekbymeansofwell-placedartilleryfire.ItwasnotuntilfourlighttanksofthearmoredbrigadeturnedaroundandrolledupthePolishpositionsfromtherearthatitwaspossibletocrossthewaterobstacle.Hauptmann Hinniger’s 2nd Battery was the first unit that could be guided

through.Itwashightime,sincethetanksandriflementhatwereattackingGrupahadrunintoabind.ThePolishforces—later,itwasdiscoveredthattherewerenearly 20,000 men there—were attacking with the courage of desperation inordertobreakoutoftheencirclement.OberstAngernledtheforcesofthedivisionthatwerearrayedaroundGrupa.

Thetankattackonthetrainingareawasnotmakinganyprogressduetoheavyandwell-aimed antitank-gun fire.The friendly companies needed to be pulledback. The 1st Company of themotorcycle battalion also bogged down in thePolish fires. The company commander,Oberleutnant von Cochenhausen, was

badlywounded.The 3rd Company of the motorcycle battalion (Oberleutnant Adler) pulled

backfromthecrossroadseastofGrupaandworkeditswaybackinthewoodstothe south as far asHill 87.The companywas subjected to an intense infantryattack. The numerically superior enemy approached the company, which wasfixedinplace,byleapsandbounds.If thepositionwerebrokenthroughthere,thentheenemywouldcreateagapfromwhichtoescape.Oberst Angern gave responsibility for the southern portion of the sector to

OberstleutnantWimmer,whoarrivedinGrupa-Dolaat0745hours.Atthetime,the 3rd Company of the rifle regiment, the 3rd Company of the motorcyclebattalion and elements of two tank and one machine-gun company werepositioned there. Wimmer brought the heaviest firepower with him—his 2ndBattery. To the right of the road leading fromGrupa to the training area, thebattle group had contact with the 2nd Battalion of the rifle regiment(Oberstleutnant Dr. Ehlermann). That battalion’s 7th Company was widelydispersed in the vicinity of the observation posts of the 2nd Battery and wasexchangingfirewithPolishsnipers.The 2ndBattery then openedwell-aimed fire on identifiedPolish positions.

ThatenabledOberleutnantAdlerandhismentodisengagefromtheenemy.Hiscompany left behind three dead (Unteroffizier Bruns, Unteroffizier Fiss, andUnteroffizier Petreins), as well as four men missing (two Gefreite and twoSchützen). Wimmer employed the freed-up motorcycle infantry on the right,wherethePolesalsoattacked.The battery fired off all but twenty of its rounds. In the broken terrain, the

machinegunnershadnofieldsoffireandhadtoallowtheenemytoapproachtopointblankrange.Fortunately,elementsofthetwotankcompaniesarrivedatthatpoint. But they also had little ammunition left. The enemy recognized hisadvantageandpressedevermoreenergeticallybytheminuteagainsttheGermanpositions.Bothof thebrigadecommanders,GeneralmajorStumpff andOberstAngern, had to employ their messengers in the defense of Grupa. The timemovedinexorablyforward...ifamiracledidnothappensoon.Andmiraclesdohappen.The4thBatteryoftheartilleryregimentarrivedfromtheMatavejustintime

andunlimberedattheedgeofthewoods.Itsfiresforcedtheenemytocalloffhisattacksforthetimebeing.Fortunately,theammunitionsectionofInspektorTriesalso arrived. The guns once more had ammunition and started to fire with

everything they had.Hauptmann Lorenz, the commander of the 1stBattalion,thenarrivedwiththe1stBattery.Atthatpoint,thePolesgaveupontheirintentofbreakingoutinthedirection

ofGraudenz.ThePolesonlyconductedlimitedattacks,buttheywereallturnedback,sincelargeportionsoftherifleregimenthadalsoarrivedandstartedtogetcommitted to the fighting.On that afternoonof 4September, the division hadalsopasseditsbaptismoffireinthedefense.GeneralmajorStumpffwasabletoreport that to the commanding general, who arrived late in the afternoon.Because Stumpff became ill, however, he had to give up command of thearmoredbrigadetemporarily.OberstRothenburgassumedactingcommand,withMajor von Lewinski taking over Panzer-Regiment 6. The commander of thelatterregiment’s1stBattalion,MajorvonBoltenstern,alsotookillandhadtoberelievedbyMajorSchmidt-Ott.

Fightinginthecorridor,1–3September1939:BreaththroughtoGrupa.

The motorized elements were gradually withdrawn from the encirclementoverthenextfewhoursandreplacedbyinfantry,sincetheotherdivisionsofthecorps had closed up to the division by then and established contact. Theyassumed responsibility for finishing the encirclement of the Polish CorridorArmy.

The ethnic German villages between Graudenz and Schwetz served as thequartering area for the division. The cannoneers and riflemenwere especiallywarmly welcomed in Wiag. The rear-area services, supply elements, andmaintenance companies were brought forward through Swiekatowo toStanislawie. The tanks, trucks, and motorcycles were in desperate need ofmaintenance, but it could only be conducted hastily, since the fighting in thecorridorwasnotyetover.The majority of the division did not see action on 5 September. The

neighboring infantry divisions did not allow the Poles to break through andforced them to give up the fight that day. The first battle of encirclement ofWorldWarIIwasover.Despite the “peaceful” hours of that day, the division was not idle. The

artilleryoccupiedpositionstoassistinfendingoffanypotentialenemyattacks.Themaintenancecompanieswerebroughtupcloser to themotorizedelementsandquartered in the formerPolishmilitary facilities inSchwetz.Theengineerbattalion,whichwasnever employedas a complete entityup to that point—ithadbeenparceledouttoallofthebattlegroupsofthedivision—builtabridgeovertheVistulaatWeisshof.Themotorcyclebattalioncombedthebottomlandsof the river for scatteredPolishelements. Its3rdCompanyscreenedalong theembankment, while a reinforced platoon under Leutnant Schmidt became thefirstelementofthedivisiontocrosstheVistulatoGraudenz.On 6 September, the first German formations were moved to the eastern

portions ofEast Prussia. Theywere to conduct a new assault from there.TheXXI.Armee-KorpstookGraudenz.Inthenexttwodays,theXIX.Armee-Korps(mot.)was to follow, crossing thebridges atKäsemark (northofDirschau), atMewe,andatTopolno.The corps situationon the eveningof 6Septemberwas as follows.The20.

Infanterie-Division(mot.)wasalreadymarchingacross thebridgeatKäsemarkin the direction of Elbing and had already reached Bartenstein with its leadelements. The 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was preparing to cross at Mewe,while the 3. Panzer-Division remained west of Graudenz behind the lattermotorizedinfantrydivision.Thedivisionmovedouton7Septemberwithitsleadelements.Thecolumns

once again experienced the “beauty” of the Polish road system under theirwheels.ItseemedtothesoldiersthateversincethatareahadcomeunderPolishcontrol,notasinglespadehadbeenturnedtomaintaintheroads.Thedeepsand

andthebroadcratersmadethemarchdifficult.Manyvehiclesbecamedisabled,because the gas lines or the suspension springs broke. The men of themaintenancecompanieswerenotidle.Themovementlednorth.IntheshadowoftheOrdensburg13atMewe,allof

thedivisionalelementscrossedonapontoonbridgeconstructedbytheengineersover the broad, calm waters of the Vistula. At Kurzebrack, to the west ofMarienwerder,mostofthemsawforthefirsttimeintheirlivesthefour-meter-wideaccesstotheVistulaprovidedtotheGermans.14Atthatpoint,themenofthedivisionwereinEastPrussia,abeautifulprovincewithlargetractsofwoods,broadhills,vastfields,andquietlakes.Themovementtookplaceundermagnificentsunshinethroughtheresplendent

cities of Marienwerder, Rosenberg, Auerswald, Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode, theTannenbergMemorial,Allenstein,Guttstadt,Lötzen, andArys.The long routeof380kilometerswascoveredinthreedays.Butnoonefeltthehardships.Theweather put on a sunny face. The reception in the individual localities wasindescribable.Allpeople,especiallytheyouth,couldnotcontainthemselvesindecoratingthevehicleswithflowersandcheeringthesoldiers.Guderianrequestedthathiscorpsbedirectlyallocatedtothefieldarmygroup.

Heintendedtorangefartotheeastontheleftwingofthe3.Armee, reach theBug at Brest, and encircle the Polish field armies in Eastern Poland.Generaloberst von Bock picked up on the idea; in the end, the Army HighCommandapprovedtheoperation.When the Polish front in front of the 3. Armee started to waver, the XIX.

Armee-Korps (mot.) was employed on the left wing to conduct a boundingpursuit.Guderiangavehisdivisionsthefollowingintermediateobjectives:

20. Infanterie-Division(mot.)—throughZambrow to theBug crossing atNur10.Panzer-Division—toBielskviaBransk3.Panzer-Division—totheareanorthofBielsk2.Infanterie-Division(mot.)—tobebroughtforwardintotheareaaroundZambrow–Bielsk

The long-range objective for all of the formations remained the fortress ofBrest-Litowsk.Sunday,10September,wasadayofrestforthedivisionatthelargetraining

areaatArys.Thesunsmiledwarmlyonthesoldiers.Asitstartedtodisappear

behindthehillsandwoods,marchingordersarrived.Theindividualformationsleftthetrainingareaoneaftertheotheruntilaboutmidnightandheadedtothesoutheast to the border. That same night, Polish territory was entered for thesecond time by the forward elements of the division. The main body of thedivisioncrossedtheborderatSzczuczyn.Panzer-Regiment6followedthenextday.Ithadmovedoutwiththefollowingvehicles:55PanzerI’s,55PanzerII’s,3PanzerIII’s,6PanzerIV’s,132trucks,60staffcars,and114motorcycles.15

Thatmeantthatthetimeforcursinghadstartedalloveragainforthedriversof the tanks, staff cars, trucks, prime movers, and especially the motorcycleriders.“Roads”wasnottherightword,andtheentitiesthatweresomarkedonthemapswouldnotevenhavequalifiedasroutesoftheworstorderbackinthehomeland.But therewas tobeno rest.Therewasonlyoneobjective andonemission:Forward!WasoszandPrzytulywereafewoftheplacesontheroutebeforethecolumns

reached the broad bottomlands of the Narew. The terrain came across asmonotonous and bleak; there was something of the unearthly quality of thesteppesoftheFarEastaboutit.Thewhitewashedwoodenhousesofthevillagescameacrossassimplestructuresandthepeoplethereaspoorandraggedy.Forthefirsttime,thesoldierssawfacesthatexpressedneitherjoynorsorrow,justaresignationtofate.The engineers had already constructed a pontoon bridge over theNarew at

Wizna, since the largebridge therehadbeenblownup, and its remnantswerelyinginthewater.Thecrossingwentveryslowly,sincetheheavyprimemovershad to be guided individually. The planks were only as wide as the heavyvehicles,anditcostalotofsweatonthepartofthosedriverstomakeitacrossinonepiece.Theleadelements—thereconnaissancebattalionandthemotorcyclebattalion

—crossedtheriverinthecourseoftheday,whiletheartillerycrossedduringthenight.Thesupplyelementswerestillfartotherear.MovingfromSchwetz,theydidnotfollowupuntil13September,whenthefightingelementswerealreadydeepinPoland.Theyquicklyclosedupwiththefightingelements,however.The division did not remain in the Wizna area; it ordered the immediate

continuationof themarch in thedirectionof Jedzewo, the large transportationhubsouthoftheriver.Therewasnothingtobeseenoftheenemyyet.Onlythedestroyed bunkers, thewire entanglements, the foxholes, and the artillery andbombcratersgavewitnesstothefactthatthe10.Panzer-Division,movingahead

ofthe3.Panzer-Division,hadtotakethisareainafight.Once again, the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion,

reinforcedbyengineersandartillery,hadtakenthepoint.TheobjectiveforbothbattalionswasSokoly.Butsoonafterithadmovedout,themotorcyclebattalionwaspivotedsharplytothewest.“PolishforcesareattackingthecorpsheadquartersinthevicinityofWysokie-

Masowieki!”The motorcycle infantry did their utmost to come to the aid of Guderian.

When they reached Zambrow late in the afternoon, their efforts had beenovercomebyevents.Thecommandinggeneralwasunharmedandwashappytoseetheenthusiasmofhissoldiers.Despitethat,thebattaliondidnotgetanyrest,eventhoughthenightbrought

rainwithit.ThebattalionwasemployedbyGuderianagainstWysokie,whereitwastothrowdownthegauntletandcutofftheenemyfleeingfromthedirectionof Lomscha. When Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel and his men entered thecompletelydestroyedvillageofWysokie,theyweretoolate.Thebattalionthenreturnedtothecommandandcontrolofthedivision.The 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had thrown back the enemy south of

Zambrowandpushedhimrightintothearmsofthe21.Infanterie-Divisionandthe 206. Infanterie-Division, which were advancing from the west onAndrzejewo.ThePolish18thInfantryDivisionmetitsendthere.Thegeneral situation for theXIX.Armee-Korps(mot.) on the eveningof11

September was as follows: the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was south ofZambrowandfighting; the10.Panzer-DivisionwasadvancingfromBransk inthedirectionofBielsk; the3.Panzer-Divisionwasstill right to thenorthof it;andthe2.Infanterie-Division(mot.)wasrollinginthedirectionofBielskfromthenorth.In order to protect its open flank, the division formed a Kampfgruppe

composedofengineersandtheplatoonofWachtmeisterRademacherofthe5thBattery of the artillery regiment and employed it at Jedzewo. The terrainwascompletely open and flat. The remaining elements assaulted in generallysoutherlydirection.Thereconnaissancebattalion,supportedbythe6thBattery,advanced as far as the area southeast of Sokoly. The advancing armored carsweresuddenlyattackedfromsomewoodsbyPolishcavalryandhadtohalt.ThebatterywentintopositioninsomevegetatedterraininthenickoftimeandshottheattackingPoles topiecesat2,500meters.Whensnipersappearsduring the

continuedadvancesinsomewoods,firewasopenedfor thesecondtimeunderthe direction of Oberleutnant Kersten and Leutnant Krause, allowing thebattalion to continue its march. During its move through Sokoly, the rifleregiment was fired upon by civilians in ambush positions. The riflemenimmediatelysearchedthepoverty-strickenhouses.Bielskwasreachedon12Septemberandtakeninthefaceofweakresistance

onthepartofthePolish35thInfantryDivision.ThetanksmovedtotheBrest–Bialystockraillineandblockedalltraffic.Elementsofotherformationstookupthemissionofguardingtheeastflankofthedivision,whichwasgrowingeverlonger.TheprimevalforestsofBialowiezaspreadoutonthefarsideoftherailline.Theczarlocatedhishuntinglodgethereonce,andthelastbisonofEuropelivedinitsthickets.Themotorcyclebattalionsent twopatrols intothatarea.UnteroffizierVoutta

moved into the thick woods with his men, andGefreiter Steffen was sent toHainowka.Steffen’sgroupwasluredintoanambush,butitwasabletofightitswayoutandestablishcontactwiththe1stCompanyoftherifleregiment,whichwasscreeningtheroadeastofBielsk.HauptmannvonBosse,thecommanderofthe rifle regiment’s 1st Battalion, immediately initiated a reprisal operationagainstHainowka.The4thBatteryof the artillery regimentwent intopositionagainst Hainowka with one of its platoons, under the direction of the batterycommander,HauptmannNebel.ItreturnedtoHalodytowardnoon.The advance over the next few days headed toward Brest-Litowsk. The

motorcyclebattalionwasonceagaininthelead,withits3rdCompanythetipofthe spear.Themotorcycle infantry rattled carefree into thevillageofZabinka,onlytofindthemselvesconfrontedbyanarmoredtrainattherailstation.BeforeLeutnantSchmidtcouldissueorders,thearmoredtrainsstartedspewingfire.Atthesamemoment,thingsturnedlivelyinthetown.Machinegunsandcarbinesstartedhammeringawayfromthehouses.Themotorcycleinfantryhadnootherchoice but to turn and pull back as quickly as possible. The accompanyingartilleryforwardobserver,LeutnantJaschke,andhismenwerealsofiredupon.Vehicles exploded,woundedmoaned, and the radio equipment ripped apart. Itwasadevilishsituation.ThesituationwentfrombadtoworsewhenfourPolishtanksappearedoutofnowhereandenemyantitankgunsalsostartedfiring.The6thBatterythenracedinandtookthetownunderfire.LeutnantJaschke,

Unteroffizier Killat, andGefreiter Mieritz directed the fires of the battery bymeansofaradiosetthathadbeenbroughtquicklyforward.Thearmoredtrains

steamedaway.Whenthefirstshellsdestroyedtheenemy’spocketsofresistance,hegaveup.ThemotorcycleinfantrywereabletotakeZabinkaby1400hours.Onceagain,thetownappearedtobedead.Onlythefourdisabledtanksandtheburning houses indicated the severity of the fighting. The 7th Company ofPanzer-Regiment 6 arrived in time to fend off an immediate counterattack byPolishcavalry.Theentire2ndBattalionthenclearedthebattlearea.The motorcycle battalion assumed the mission of securing the town and

formed a bridgehead over the Muchawiec. The forward observers from theartillery,Leutnant Meyer andOberwachtmeister Berlin, appeared there. TheydirectedthefiresofthefriendlybatteriesagainstaPolishbatteryatZamoszany,whichwasprotectingtherailline.Thedivisiondidnotallowitselftobedistractedfromitsobjective,thefortress

of Brest. By the afternoon of 14 September, Panzer-Regiment 5, thereconnaissancebattalion,andthe3rdBatteryoftheartilleryregimentwereeastofthecity, inaneffort tocut itofffromthatside.(Fatewouldhaveit that thedivisionwouldonceagainmoveoutfromthesamespoton22June1941.)Guderian’s intentwas toattackBrestwithhisdivisionon15September.He

ledhisfourmajorformationsuptothefortressinanightmarch,leavingonlythe2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) to protect the broad flank of the corps in thedirection of the Bialowies Forest. The lead elements of both the 10. Panzer-Division and the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) made it to the fortress on 14September.The division moved out to attack from the east. To that end, it formed a

Kampfgruppe consisting of elements of Panzer-Regiment 6, the motorcyclebattalion, the engineer battalion, the 6thBattery of the artillery (OberleutnantKersten),andaplatoonfromthe4thBattery(LeutnantStiller).The battle group moved out around 0345 hours in its attack on Brest. Its

missionwas to takeFort III.The citywas reachedwithout a shotbeing fired.ThePolesdidnotdefendFort III,either.The2ndCompanyof themotorcyclebattalion(HauptmannPape)restedinthefort.Theforcescontinuedunscathedasfarasthecentraltrainstationandoccupiedthehighrailoverpass.Fromtheoverpass,theenemywasnowheretobeseenintheimmediatearea;

however,thegunsatthecitadelwerefiringwitheverythingtheyhadandtherewasalivelyexchangeoffireattherailyards.Themotorcycleinfantryscreenedthesouthernpartofthecity,wheretheywerealsounderconstantfirefromthecitadel.

Contact was established with the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.), which wasattacking from the north. The III./Infanterie-Regiment 86 of that divisionmaintainedthecontact.Thebatteriesofthe3.Panzer-DivisionwereattachedtoOberst Weidling—former commander of Artillerie-Regiment 75 and currentcommanderof thedivisionalartilleryof themotorizedinfantrydivision—inanefforttoprovideunityofcommandforfiresupport.The first attack of the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) around 1430 hours

against the citadel did not succeed.A bit later, the III./Infanterie-Regiment 86andPionier-Bataillon39attemptedanattackwithalimitedobjectiveagainsttheeasternedgeof thefortress.ThePolishdefensivefiresalsoforced theGermanattackerstogroundthereaswell.SmallgroupsfromSchützen-Regiment3—forexample, the 2nd Platoon of the 1st Company—attempted to conductreconnaissance-in-forceeffortsagainstthesouthernpartofthefortress,buttheywere also turned back. The 2nd Battalion ofPanzer-Regiment 6 attacked thecitadel,whichwasbeingplacedunderheavyGermanartilleryfire,fromtheeast.The 2nd Company (Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski) and the 4th Company(Hauptmann Weiß) approached the fortress from the southeast. Around 2200hours, the armored regiment received orders to call off the attack. Bothbattalionsdisengagedfromtheenemyduringthenight.Themotorcyclebattalionremainedinthecitythatnighttoscreenitssouthern

sector.The1stPlatoonofthe3rdCompany(LeutnantvonBrauchitsch)screenedthe prison, where civilian andmilitary prisoners taken the previous day werebeing housed. The battalion was pulled out of Brest on the morning of 16Septemberandquicklyreturnedtodirectdivisionalcontrol.ThedivisionproperwasmovinginthedirectionofWlodawa.Asaresult,onlytwobatteriesofthedivisionalartilleryremainedbehind.Theycontinuedtosupporttheattackofthemotorizedinfantrydivisiononthecitadel.TheirfiresweredirectedbyLeutnantMeyer, assisted by his radio operators, Unteroffizier Göhler and KanonierElsholz. The fires were so effective that all threemen later received the IronCross,SecondClass.The 3. Panzer-Division no longer took part in the fighting for the fortress.

Instead, it went around the city with the majority of its forces to then thrustsouth.ItsnewobjectivewasWlodawa.Thistime,thereconnaissancebattalion,Panzer-Regiment5,andthe3rdBatterywereintheadvanceguard.Theterrainappearedmonotonousandgraytothemenoftheadvanceguard.Therainofthelastfewdayshadsofteneduptheroadsandthepastures.Therewashardlyatree

tobeseen;onlysandysoilandmoresandysoil,withsmall,dirtylocalitieshereand there.Therewere fewpeople tobe seen,and those thatwereencounteredwere shy and uncommunicative. They were quite different from the WhiteRussians,whohadbeenencounteredatBialystokandHainowka.The division moved in Kampfgruppen on Tomaszowka. The armored cars

encounteredanenergeticdefensewhen theyarrived there towardsnoonon16September.Thetankswerecalledupbyradio.ThecommanderoftheI./Panzer-Regiment 5, Major Wendenburg, ordered the 2nd Company forward. Thenineteentankscaughtupwiththe leadelementsat thePrzaboroworailstation.Thecommanderoftheleadelementreportedthatitwasimpossibletoadvanceanyfarther,becausetheterrain,withmanywoodsandlakes,wasfullofPoles.Prisoner statements indicated that the organizational staff directing theretrogrademovementsoftheentirePolishArmywaslocatedthere.Hauptmann Schmidt, the tank company commander, assumed command of

theavailablemotorcycleinfantryandturnedtotheeastonthepathleadingfrombehindtherailstation.LeutnantNitschketookovertheleadwithhis tanks.Tohis rightwasLakeSielachy.ThenPercszpacame intoview.The smallvillagewasablaze.Theriflemendiscoveredenemysoldiersandsmokedthemout.TheLeutnantleftafewmenwiththeirmotorcyclesbackattheentrancetothevillageandgavethemorderstoreconnoiterthesouthwestinthedirectionoftherailwayembankment.Thetanksracedthroughthevillageandreachedthewoodsto itssouth.By then, itwasalready fairlydark, so theLeutnant andhismenhad towaituntiltherestofthecompanyclosedup.Just outside of the crossroads at Tomaszowka, movement was identified.

Nitschke sent a short burst in that direction, which immediately caused theactivities to cease. The 2./Panzer-Regiment 5 turned onto the road leading toTomaszowka. Therewas no break in the action. The battery, following to therear,wasunabletomaintaincontactinthedarknessandwentintopositionalongthe railway embankment.The engineersmounted up on the tanks,which thenmovedintothewoods.Whenanenemyarmoredcar turnedupona trailbysurprise, itwasshot to

bitsinshortorder.Butthereweremoreandmoremovementsalongtheroadbythe minute.Hauptmann Schmidt had his vehicle pivot sharply right and takeanythingthatblockedtherouteunderfire.Trucks,horse-drawnwagons,pontoonequipment,andmanyothermajor itemsofequipmentandmaterielwentup inflames.ThePolishdriversfledintotheprotectionofthewoodsonbothsidesof

the road as quickly as they could. The speedometers on the tanks registeredforty-fivekilometersanhour,andthepacepickedupfromthere.TheWlodawa–Kowel telegraph line was disrupted by knocking over the poles; horse-drawncolumnswerescatteredandvehiclesdestroyed.Just as the darkness of the night made further progress impossible, the

companyreachedTomaszowka.Asingleantitankgun,whichwaspositionednotfar from the rail station and took theGerman tanksunder fire,wasput out ofcommission.The tankershadonlybeenable to identify thegunby itsmuzzleflashes.Somebatterieswerefiringfromsomewhereintotheburningvillage,butthetankshadmovedthroughitby1945hours.Hauptmann Schmidt and Leutnant Nitschke fired white signal flares. The

signalsweremadeoutbyWachtmeisterGaebler,theforwardobserverfromthe3rd Battery, and understood: Shift the fires forward! On that day, the batteryfiredsome350rounds.Hauptmann Schmidt’s 2nd Company was not satisfied with what it had

achieved. There was still fuel in the tanks, so it continued south. The routeturned increasingly worse by the minute. The motorcycle infantry were nolongerabletokeeppaceandfellback.Thetanksrattledonbythemselves.Itwasdifficult to stay oriented in the darkness. The movement grew slower, sincewoodsandmarshlandbecamethenextobstacles.During the night,MajorWendenburg assembled his tanks as best he could.

The 4th Company took over the lead. The officers moving out front had toilluminatetheirwaywithflashlights.Atsomeplaces,Polishtrainsvehicleswerepassed. As it started to turn first light around 0300 hours, the battalion wasoutside of Opalin. The village was swarming with Polish soldiers. Since thebattalion was almost out of fuel—the 2nd Company was already stranded—MajorWendenburghadhis forces turneightkilometers to thewest.Hehadhisbattalionsetupanall-rounddefenseonasmallrise.Patrolsweresentoutinalldirectionstomaintainsecurity.The motorcycle battalion left Kampfgruppe Wendenburg and turned west

towardtheBug.ThePolesexpectedanattackthere,however,andhadblownupthebridgeovertheBugintime.Thatmeantthatthemenofthedivisionhadtoremainon theeastbankof the river inorder towait for theengineerscomingforward.Thenextdaywasoneofdecision.Themotorcycleinfantrycrossedtheriver

oninflatablecraftandfloatsandenteredthecityofWlodawafromthenortheast.

The 2nd Battalion of the divisional artillery had already been firing on thenorthern portion of the city since the morning, concentrating on the militaryfacilities. The enemy resistance had been weakened by the well-placed fires,withtheresultthatitdidnotprovetoodifficultforthemotorcyclebattalionandelementsoftherifleregiment,whichhadbeenbroughtforward,totakethecityin its entirety that morning. Major Burmeister’s 2nd Battalion of Panzer-Regiment6,whichalsoclosedupon thecity,wasnotneeded toenter the fray.Twoplatoons fromthe6thCompanyof thearmor regiment, thoseofLeutnantGraf von Kageneck and Leutnant von Diest-Koerber, were sent west toreconnoiter around 1500 hours. After both platoons had forded the broad butshallowriverbedandmovedoutofWlodawaaftermovingthroughit,theywereimmediately engaged by heavy enemy artillery fire and had to pull back tobehindtheforwardcombatoutpostsoftheriflemen.Itwasnotuntiltheafternoonof17SeptemberthatthePoleshadreorganized

theirforces.Theyattackedfromthewoodedterrainwestofthecitytoretakeit.Astormthatbrokeoutat thesametimeprevented theGermandefendersfromofferingaproperdefense.Theartillerywasunabletojoindirectlyintothefray.Instead,itwaslimitedtofiringontargetsthathadbeenpreviouslyidentifiedbythe forward observers. The companies of the rifle regiment finally gatheredthemselves,andtheirrifleandmachine-gunfiretorebiggapsintheranksofthePoles. The 3rd Company of the motorcycle battalion was committed to aflankingeffortoutsideof thecity,and the6thCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6(Hauptmann von Winterfeld), which was quickly called forward, was finallyable to bring the enemy attack to a complete standstill.According to prisonerstatements,ninecompanieshadbeeninvolvedintheenemy’seffort.Theenemy thengaveuponWlodawaandpulledback into the thickwoods

southofthecity.After Tomaszokwa was occupied, the 1st Company of the rifle regiment

advancedfartheralongtherailwayline.ThefinalmetersleadinguptotheBugwere a race against death. Itwas certain that thePoles hadprepared the largebridge for demolition.The riflemenand engineers took long strides across therailway ties, and the risky venture succeeded. They got across the bridge,reached the railway guardhouse on the south bank of the river, and formed asmallbridgehead.Itwas0030hours.The engineers immediately set about searching for charges. Despite the

darkness,theyfoundsomeandstartedthelaborioustaskofremovingthem.

Atfirstlight,the3rdPlatoonofthe1stCompanyattackedOrchowek,whichwasburning.ObergefreiterJanikwaskilled.Becausethevillagehadcompletelyburned down, the riflemen dug bunkers and dugouts next to the rail line.AlthoughthePolesattemptedtoreducethesmallbridgeheadafewtimesduringthedaywithinfantryandcavalry,theirattackswerealwaysturnedback.Fromtheareawhereithadencamped,the1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment5

had observed enemy groups attempting to flee since early morning, byswimming across the Bug. The tanks were unable to prevent those attempts,however,sincetheywerestrandedduetoalackoffuel.MajorWendenburg had sent out two patrols during the night that had been

directed toblowupthebridgesover theBug.Thenumericallystrongestpatrolmade good progress. Feldwebel Hass took the lead with his medium tank.Followingbehindhimwasthecommander’stankofthe4thCompany.LeutnantBrandtandanengineerUnteroffizierhadalsomountedit.LeutnantZornbroughtuptherearwiththetworemaininglighttanksandtherestoftheengineersquad.The movement of the patrol took it through Huszcza and Rowno in the

directionofWilzcy–Przewo.Alongtheroute,afewvehiclecolumnswereshotup. The crews of the two light tankswatched over the prisoners.After a fewminutes,however, they simply let thePoles flee, after theirweaponshadbeentaken away.The prisonerswould only have been a burden for the patrol. TheenemyreceivedthepatrolinPrzewowithheavysmall-armsfires.ButLeutnantZorn,LeutnantBrandt,andtheengineersfoughttheirwaythroughthemiddleoftheenemytothewoodenbridge,whichtheysetonfire.ThetwolighttankshelddownthePolesonthefarsidewithwell-aimedfires.ThetankersevenmanagedtocaptureaPolish7.5-centimeterfieldpiecefrom

1917.LeutnantZornlimberedthepiecetohistankandstartedtobringitback.Unfortunately,hisfightingvehiclebecameimmobilizedafterafewminuteswithrunninggearproblems.Theheavycommander’stankwiththeengineerofficerwentforwardasfaras

therailline.JustasLeutnantBrandwasstartingtoplaceademolitionchargeonthetracks,atransporttrainstartedtoapproach.Fortunately,itslocomotivewasknockedoutbythetank,thusblockingtheline.Asaresult,thismissionwasalsoaccomplished.LeutnantWisniewski,wholedthesecondpatrol,returnedaround1000hours

andreportedthattherailwaybridgehadbeensuccessfullyblownup.Asaresult,theimmobilizedtankbattalionshadatleastcutofftheretreatrouteovertheBug

tothePoles.Itwasnot until 1600hours that the regimental logistics officer,Hauptmann

Hackermann,arrivedandreportedthatfuelwasonitsway.Ittookanotherhourbeforethefuelarrived.MajorWendenburg immediatelyhadhisbattalionformup.ItapproachedthevillageofPrzewoasitstartedtoturndark.Thetanksdidnot

allowthemselvestobeheldupbyeitherthehastilyemplacedroadobstaclesorby the heavy flanking fires coming from thewoods. The 1st Company thrustthrough the burning village, while the 2nd Company took down the Polishresistanceinthewoods.Thesoleheavytankofthebattalionoverraneverythingandreachedtherailline.Itencounteredanenemybatterythere,whichforcedthetank to pull back. The tankers saw that the train that had been engaged thatmorningbythepatrolwasstillthere,makingalltrafficimpossible.MajorWendenburghadhiscompaniesassemblebetweenPrzewoandRowno.

In the process, the tank companies encountered the lead company of the rifleregiment.Itwasthe8thCompany,alongwithMajorZimmermann.Theriflemenwere immediately employed screening in the direction of Przewo. The tankbattalionsetupanall-rounddefense.On17September,thereconnaissancebattalionreceivedthemissiontoblown

up the Kowel–Chelm rail line at Luboml. The 2nd Battery of the artilleryregimentandsomeengineerswereattachedinsupport.Themovementofthoseelements took place on sandy, softened and seemingly endless roads to thesoutheast.Therewerestillindividualoccurrencesofenemyresistance,buttheywerequicklyeliminatedbya fewburstsof fire from themachinegunson thearmoredcars.Therewasn’tatrueengagementuntilitstartedtoturndark,whenthebattalion approachedScack.ThePoles haddug in there in the houses andgardens.Major Freiherr von Wechmar had his companies halt and wait until the

batteryhadclosedup.Thegunsunlimberedinanopenfieldandtookthelocalityand individualpocketsof resistanceunderdirect fire.Aftera fewminutes, theenemy was silenced, and the companies were able to take the locality in anenvelopment.Thebattalionsetupdefensesforthenight,puttingoutsecurityinalldirections.TheKampfgruppewasorderedtobreakcampatfirst lighton18September.

Themarchcontinuedrelentlessly,andLubomlwasreachedthatsamemorning.Thereconnaissancebattalionencounteredalargegroupingofenemyforces.The

armoredcarsmovedintopositionbehindhillsandditches.Theriflementookuptheinfantryfightandtheartillerybatteryfired.Buttheenemynolongerhadanydesire to become engaged in protracted and casualty-intensive fighting. Firstindividuallyandthen inever-largergroups, theenemysurrendered.In theend,the400menofKampfgruppeWechmarcountedalmost3,000Polishprisoners.The reconnaissance battalion had accomplished its mission, transitioning to ascreeningmission.Thetanksofthedivisioncontinuedtheirownadvanceabout0700hoursthat

morning.But theenemyhadpulledhis forcesacross theBugduring thenightandonlyputupminimal resistance.Przewo, the railwayembankment,and therailwaybridgeweretakenpracticallywithoutafight.Thetanksadvancedacrosstheriverandestablishedasmallbridgehead.The6thBatteryofartilleryarrivedand assumed the direct-support mission. ThreeUnteroffiziere—Killat, Grothe,andSchröder—discoveredthegunthathadbeencapturedthepreviousdayandincludeditinthefirefight.At1357hours,thedivisionorderedthebridgetobeblownup.Atthatpoint,

the battalionmoved back across the riverwithout any enemy interference.Atthat point, the enemy started to get continual reinforcements. Starting at 1530hours,strongartilleryfirestarted tofallon thefriendlypositions.ThedivisionwasconcernedaboutitsKampfgruppe,whichhadrangedfarforward,andsentout the following radio message in the afternoon: “If the tactical situationrequiresit,pullbacktoAufklärungs-Abteilung3inLuboml,sincelargerregular-army formations aremoving fromwest to east. Report your decision.”MajorWendenburgreportedbackshortly:“Positionwillbeheld!”Far ahead of the other major formations, the 3. Panzer-Division was the

southernmostdivisionofthefieldarmygroupatthatpoint.Correspondingly,ithadcoveredmoregroundthananyotherGermandivisionduringthecampaign.Thedivisionwasclosertotheelementsofthe10.Armeeapproachingfromthesouththanitwastoitssisterdivisionswithinthecorps.Thedivisioncommanderorderedthe2ndBattalionof therifleregiment(OberstleutnantDr.Ehlermann)tobreakthroughtoHeeresgruppeSüd.Attached toEhlermann’sbattalionwerethe 6./Panzer-Regiment 6, the 1./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the1./Panzerabwehr-Abteilung 39. The lead elements of the southern field armygroupweretryingtotakeChelmfromthreesideswiththe4.Infanterie-Division,the4.leichteDivision,andthe2.Panzer-Division.The reinforced rifle battalionmoved out right on time. Forwardmovement

was made difficult by the clogged roads, blown-up bridges, and recurringresistance form Polish formations that were led by especially brave officers.Theyhadestablishedthemselvesskillfullyalongwoodlinesandtheoutskirtsofvillages.ThefightsforOsowaandMalinowkawereespeciallyhardfortheriflecompanies. Leading the way in an exemplary fashion,Hauptmann Wellmannstormed the last village with his 6th Company. The battalion worked its wayforward slowly and had to bring down new enemy strongpoints in sacrificialfighting.During that fighting, the2ndBattalionsuffered theheaviest lossesoftheentiredivisionforthecampaign.Sincenighthadfalleninthemeantime,theideaofacontinuedadvancewasdiscarded.AmotorcycleinfantrypatrolunderthecommandofUnteroffizierPanzlaffwas

sent farther south, however, reaching the area just outside of Chelm. Theexpectedforcesof the10.Armeeattackingfromthesouthwerenot there.TheWehrmacht High Command reported a linkup between the two field armygroups,butnoneevertookplaceinthecampaign.ThedivisioninstructedtheEhlermann’sbattalionnottocontinueitsoperation

andtopullbackslowlyonthedirectionofWlodawa.Thedivisionpulledbackthe rest of its battle groups toWlodawa aswell. Theywerewidely dispersedover a large area. It wanted to protect the force and not cause unnecessarycasualties, since the Polish Army was already in a state of dissolution.EhlermannevacuatedthepositionshisreinforcedbattalionhadtakennearChelmand pulled back under sharp pressure from individual Polish formations.HauptmannvonWinterfeld’stankcompanyprovidedtheKampfgruppewiththerequisite covering fires. Four German fighting vehicles were lost that day.Around1000hours,MajorWendenburgreceivedsimilarorders:Hewastopullback to Luboml and link up with the reconnaissance battalion. Around 1600hours,thetwoadvanceguardsofthedivisionlinkedup.AllforcesofthedivisionthatwereeastoftheBuglefttheirforwardpositions

andpulledbackacrosstheriver,asordered.Therehadbeennoencounterswiththe Red Army anywhere, but the senior commanders took precautionarymeasurestoensurethattheencounterstookplacewithoutanyfriction.16

Inorder tomark theGerman lines forRussianaircraft, thedivisionorderedrecognitionpanelssetout.The fighting slowly abated. That meant that there was some movement

between andwithin the fronts. The Polish soldiers no longer knewwhat theyshould do.Unarmed, they gave up by the hundreds, so as not to fall into the

hands of the Red Army. For example, Hauptmann Eikmann’s maintenancecompany took in some1,500prisoners in thePuchaczewoarea from19 to21September.LeutnantMüller ofPanzer-Regiment 6, whowent deer hunting insomewoods, wound up bringing in 165 prisoners. The civilian populacewasalsoontherun.TheelementsofthedivisionassembledinWlodawa.Formanyofthesoldiers,

thevillagebecameaplacetorecover.Theysawanactualcityforthefirsttime,whichstoodoutconsiderably in itsappearancefromthedirtyvillages thathadbeen crossed through and fought for up to that point. Its two churches, theBaroqueRomanCatholiconeandtheOrthodoxonewithitscharacteristiconiondome,dominatedthelandscapeofthecity.ItspopulacewascomposedofPoles,WhiteRussians,andalargenumberofJews.Aftertheforceshadrestedabitandthemencouldwashoffthedirtandgrime

fromthemanydaysofdustandrain,theyhadapleasantsurprise.Thefirstfieldmailarrived.Thereturnmarchfor thedivisionwasset for21September.The individuals

left their quartering areas aroundWlodawa at first light andmoved along theroadbacktoBrest.Thelargecityhadalreadybeendecoratedwithredflagswiththehammerandsickleandblack-white-redflags.ThefirstRussiansoldiershadarrived;theywereassignedtoatankbrigade.The march then continued twenty-five kilometers to the demarcation line,

moving throughWidomla–Giechanowiec–Zambrowandon toLomscha,wherethe divisional formations arrived on 22 September. For the fourth time in amonth, the German border was crossed just south of Johannisburg. The menforgotabout thehardshipsof thecampaignthatwasbehindthem.Thefriendlyand tidyEast Prussian villages, the nice people, and the thoughts of reunitingwithlovedonesbackhomeputwindinthesailsofallthesoldiers.The division quartered in the area around Bartenstein. The individual

companies and detachments were quartered privately in the surroundinglocalities. Everyone felt as though theywere onmaneuvers. TheXIX. Armee-Korps(mot.)wasdisbandedon26September,17andthelastgeneralorderfromthe fieldarmygroupwas issueda fewdays later.That signaled theendof thecampaigninPoland.

__________________1. Kolonne is literally translated as “column,” but organizationally, it wasroughly equivalent to a company. Generally,Kolonnen were organized by liftcapacity,withakleineKolonne capableof transporting thirty tonsandagroßeKolonnecapableofsixtytons.2.AuniformedcivilianofficialwitharankequivalenttoHauptmann.3.BennovonArentwasaprominentmemberoftheNationalSocialistParty.Inaddition tohis titleas theReichStageDesigner,hewasalsodesignatedas theReichAgentforFashion.HehadclosetiestoHimmlerandeventuallyjoinedtheWaffen-SSin1944andwasgiventherankofSS-Oberführer.4.TheArmoredInstructionalBattalionwascomposedofcadrefromthearmorschool. The intent was tomake sure that school personnel had valid wartimeexperience in order to teach in themilitary schooling system. Throughout thewar,variouselementsfromtheschoolwouldbesent tothefront tofamiliarizecadrepersonnelwith the trendsdeveloping inarmored tacticsandfighting.Bytheendof thewar,anentiredivisionwouldbe formedfromschoolpersonnel.Ratherthanreturntothe“schoolhouse,”itremainedcommittedinfightingintheWestuntiltheendofthewar.Itwasusuallyequippedwiththelatestequipmentinordertokeepitonthe“cuttingedge”ofarmordoctrine.5. This was a Luftwaffe formation, primarily a command-and-controlheadquarters,withdifferingFlakformationsattachedtoit.6.Schützenpanzerwagen= armoredpersonnel carrier.Thesewereundoubtedlythe Sonderkraftfahrzeug (Sd.Kfz.) 251, which was the standard German half-track of World War II. The original German refers to these asMannschaftstransportwagen(personnelcarriers),butitisobviousincontextthattheSd.Kfz.251 ismeanthere.Thesevehicleswerealways inshortsupply,andformuchofthewar,onlyonecompanywithinamotorized/mechanizedinfantryregimentwassoequipped.The lighthalf-trackwas theSd.Kfz.250,but itwasprimarilyusedasaspecial-purposevehicleandforreconnaissanceduties.Itwaslikewiseinshortsupplyfortheentirewar.7. In German, this was Groß Klonia, the equivalent of Large Klonia. Since“large” seems awkward inEnglish, theGroßwas retainedbutAnglicized intoGross.Thesamewillbedoneforvillagesprefacedwithklein(small).Thereadershouldbearinmindthattheseextendedvillageswereoftenbrokenintosections,usuallyseparatedbyanaturalobstacle,resultingindifferentiationonmapsinto“large”and“small”sections.

8.Atitleofnobility,whichisnormallytranslatedas“noble.”Edlerwasbelowaknight(Ritter),butaboveuntitlednobilityinrank.9.Hauptfeldwebel was specific to artillery and cavalry units and indicated aunit’sfirstsergeant.Thiswasadutyposition,notarank,asthepositioncouldbefilledbyanOberfeldwebeloraFeldwebel.10.Spieß=pike.Thiswasthecommonsoldierjargonforthefirstsergeantofaunit.11.This,ofcourse,wasthefamousWernervonFritschoftheBlomberg-FritschAffairandprewarintrigue.12. The Ortsbauernführer (Village Farmer Leader) was the lowest-rankingorganization leader for food production of a village as part of theReichsnährstand(usuallynottranslated,butsometimesrenderedasReichFoodCorporation).13. The Ordensburgen were fortresses constructed in the Middle Ages bymilitaryorderssuchastheTeutonicKnightstodefendChristianGermaniclandsfrompagans.14. As part of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was guaranteed access to theVistula, but only through this small channel. It was a bone of contention forGermansofthatera,andtheauthorsobviouslyfelttherewasnofurtherneedforexplanation.15.ItisobviousfromthislisthowfewoftheheavierPanzerswereavailableatthat time.ThePanzerI—intendedonlyasa training,notacombat, tank—waspressedintoservicebecauseofashortageofarmoredvehicles.16.InaccordancewiththeTreatyofNon-AggressionbetweenGermanyandtheSovietUnion (23August 1939), Poland had been divided into two spheres ofinfluence between Germany and the Soviet Union. On 17 September, SovietforcesenteredPolandfromtheeast,thushasteningtheendtotheshortwar.17. The corpswas not truly disbanded. In actuality, the command-and-controlrelationship of the corps over the division was rescinded and the divisionrevertedtoitspeacetimecommand-and-controlstructure.Until1944,therewereno fixed major subordinate commands (divisions and brigades) assigned tocorps;theywereonlyattached.

1September1939.ThefirstPolishprisonersinapathinthewoodsbetweenPrucszandZepolna.

GeneralGuderianisbriefedbythecommanderofPanzer-Brigade3,GeneralmajorStumpff,outsideofGrupa.

AfieldmessfromthedivisionsupportcommanddistributesfoodtoPolishcivilians.

The1./Kradschützen-Bataillon3inBrest-Litowsk.

MotorcyclesfromKradschützen-Bataillon3infrontofthepoliceheadquartersinBrest-Litowsk.Thecrewswereinside,searchingthebuilding.

APolishlighttank,alicensedversionoftheFrenchRenault,knockedoutbyforcesofthedivisionatZabrinka,eastofBrest-Litowsk,on15September.

Motorcyclescrossingalight-dutypontoonbridgeovertheBugatWlodawa.

Polishprisonersbeingledbackacrossthesamefootbridgeseeninthepreviousimage.

ThetanksareloadedonshipatPilaufortransportbacktotheirhomegarrison.

ReturnmarchofKradschützen-Bataillon3onanengineerbridgeovertheVistulaatNeuenburg.

CHAPTER3

FromEastPrussiatoWestphalia:BetweentheCampaigns,1939–40

The division left its quarters inEast Prussia on 1October 1939.Many of theofficersandenlistedpersonnelreceivedtheawardstheyhadearnedjustbeforedepartureandwereproudtobewearingtheIronCross.Atthesametimeasthefirst wartime awards were presented, many members of the division alsoreceived themedalcommemorating themarch into theSudetenland.1Thathadhappenedayearpreviouslyandhadbeenforgotteninthefaceofthemostrecentevents.The long columns of the division started their trek westward. The local

populacewavedafinalfarewelltotheminallthevillagesandtowns.Themarchroutewent throughHeilsberg,Osterode, andDeutsch-Eylau.The soldiers thenreachedtheVistula.ThetanksandothertrackedvehicleswereloadedonshipsatPillau.Theyweresenthomethatwaytoavoidwearandtearontheequipment.ThewheeledelementsofthedivisioncrossedtheVistulaonthesamebridges

as ithadarrived.Themovementcontinued throughTuchel,and thebordersoftheReichwerecrossedatKonitz,sometwentykilometersnorthofwhereithadoriginallycrossed.ThefirstsignspointingtoBerlincouldbeseen.Thevehicleswerewashed,theuniformscleanedup,andtheweaponsgleamed

likenew.Thefacesofthesoldierswerebeamingwithjoy:theywerehome.Theclosertheygottotheirhomegarrisons,themoreexcitedtheybecame.Ineverylocality they passed through, the people stood on the streets and waved. Justbeforeenteringthegarrisons,therewasashorthalt.Afinalformationwasheld.. .and then theywere really there.Thepeople lining thewaywere familiar tothem. The local citizenry formed a cordon and tossed flowers. The commandrungout:“Eyes...right!”The commanderwas standing therewith his staff and received the pass-in-

review by the returning victors. It was the same picture in all of the garrisoncitiesofthedivisiononthat5October.That’sthewayitwasinWünsdorfwiththetankers,inEberswaldewiththeriflemen,inNeuruppinwiththecannoneers

and the tankers, in Bad Freienwalde with the motorcycle infantry, andeverywhereelsethatthesoldiersofthedivisioncalledhome.The division commander, Generalleutnant von Schweppenburg, who had

taken ill prior to the start of the campaign andwho had undergone all of thehardships, had to relinquish command of the division he had formed due tohealthreasons.GeneralmajorStumpff, thecommanderof thearmoredbrigade,wasentrustedwithactingcommandofthedivisionuntilfurthernotice.Thecomingmonthssawotherchangesinvariouscommandpositions.Oberst

Angern left the rifle brigade at the end of the year, with Oberst Kleemannassuming command. Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel became the newcommanderoftherifleregiment.OberstleutnantTröger2assumedcommandofthe motorcycle battalion from him on 1 December. Tröger had arrived at thedivisionfromthestaffoftheseniorcavalryofficerattheArmyHighCommand.OberstleutnantConze,whohadassumedactingcommandofPanzer-Regiment5during the campaign in Poland, relinquished that command on 15 October toOberstFreiherrvonFunck,whohadpreviouslyservedasthemilitaryattachétoLisbon.3OberstleutnantNegendank,whohadcommanded thesignalsbattalionbefore thewarand in thecampaign inPoland, turnedovercommandtoMajorBaronvonBehron20April1940.OberstleutnantDr.EhlermannturnedoverhisII./Schützen-Regiment3 toMajor vonOlszewski.By the followingMarch, thecommand again changed hands, withMajor Zimmermann coming on board.OberstleutnantWimmer, thecommanderof the2ndBattalionof thedivisionalartillery, returned from thecampaigndesperately ill, dyingof thehardshipshehad endured there on 12 December 1939. He was followed in command byMajorWöhlermann.The division underwent a decisive change during that period, as did many

otherlargeformationsofthearmedforces,whichaffecteditsorganization.Thecampaign inPolandhadbroughtwith itmany lessons learned,withonebeingthe fact that themotorized divisions with their three rifle regiments were toounwieldyforthecommandandcontrolofrapidmovements.Consequently,eachmotorized infantry division had to give up one regiment, which were thenreassignedtothearmoreddivisionsbybattalion.Asaresult, theI./Infanterie-Regiment69wasassigned to thedivision in the

middle ofOctober. The battalion had formerly belonged to the20. Infanterie-Division (mot.), which the division had shared some common fightingexperience with at Brest. The new officers, noncommissioned officers, and

enlisted personnel came primarily from the North German area, mostlyHamburg.TheysoongrewaccustomedtotheBerlindialectandaccent,andaftera fewweeks, no one noticed the differences anymore. The commander of thebattalion,OberstleutnantHoernlein,was transferredouta shortwhile later.Hewould later work with the division again as the commander of Infanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland”(Tula)and,later,asthecommanderofthemechanized infantry division with the same honorific (Kursk). MajorKratzenbergassumedcommandofthebattalion,whichwasredesignatedasthe3rdBattalionofSchützen-Regiment3.On29November1939,movementordersarrived.Thedivisional troopsand

the formations left the garrisons that afternoon. This time, the division washeadedtotheWest.Everyone,whetherenlistedmanorofficer,breathedasighof relief. The perpetual waiting for something to happen, which was alwaysbeingpostponed,gotonone’snervesovertime.The division split up among various villages in the TeutoburgWoods. The

quarteringareaforthedivisionextendedacrossanareaboundedbyOsnabrück–Glandorf–Warendorf.Theunitswereputupinfarmsteads,wheretheyalsotooktheir vehicles. Tanks, trucks, andmotorcycleswere camouflaged in barns andcourtyards. But when a few of the vehicles were discovered being used forprivate “joy rides,” orders were issued to park the vehicles in barns oroutbuildingsbyplatoonandtoguardthem.Duty during that periodwas easy and simple, and good contactswere soon

made with the locals. Not a few marriages resulted from the friendlyrelationships.Lifewasthereforenotsobad,evenifguardshadtobepostedhereandthere.Sincethetimeofyearwasnotexactlypleasantandbroughtice,snow,andrainwithit,pullingguardwasnotalwaysapleasure.Christmasapproached.Marriedpersonnelwereallowedhomeonleave;singlepersonnelremainedandwaited.Then,oneday,moremovementordersarrived,atatimewhennoonethought

thesituationwouldeverchange.Thedivision’selementsleftthehospitableareaamongtheheartfeltgoodwishesofthelocalpopulation—afewtearsweretobeseen—andarmedwithdecentlysized“foodpackages.”Throughnightandfog,snowandice,therouteledfartherwestthroughMünsterandHammasfarasthevicinityofDortmundandSoest.February1940broughtwithitsnowstormsandgruesomecold.Thedivisionwasonthemove.ItsformationscrossedtheRhineatDuisberg, thusreaching theoperationalzoneof theWesternFront.Thenew

quarteringareaforthedivisionwasaroundKrefeldandViersen.Generalleutnant Schweppenburg was given command of the XXIV. Armee-

Korps (mot.) on 15 February. He took his leave of the officer corps of thedivisionwhere itwas located in the field.He said goodbye to themen of hisheadquarterswith a firm handshake. For the first two years of thewar in theSoviet Union, the general officer would have the division under his corpscommand.StartinginJuly1944,hewouldbecomethelastInspectorGeneralofthePanzertruppe.Effectivethatsame15February,GeneralmajorStumpffwasdesignatedasthe

divisioncommander.OberstKühn, theformercommanderof thearmorschoolwhowasknowntohisfriendsas“BrotherCellarer,”assumedcommandofthe3.Panzer-Brigade. The commander of Panzer-Regiment 6, OberstleutnantRothenburg,alsoleft thedivisionat theendof themonth,withOberstleutnantvon Lewinski taking his place. Two other officers left the division, who laterwent on to be noted armor commanders. Major von Wietersheim assumedcommandofKradschützen-Bataillon1(1.Panzer-Division)on1March1940;asthedivisioncommanderofthe11.Panzer-Division,hewouldreceivetheSwordstotheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossinMarch1944.Thearmoredbrigade’sadjutant, the tall-as-a-treeHauptmann Ziegler, was transferred to the GeneralStaff.HelaterfellinthefinalfightinginBerlinasaGeneralmajorderWaffen-SS and the division commander of the 11. SS-Freiwilligen-Panzer-Grenadier-Division“Nordland.”4

3.Panzer-Division,10May1940.

At the beginning of March, orders arrived detaching the 3rd and 6thCompanies fromPanzer-Regiment 6 for a special operation. The officers andmentookleaveoftheirregimentalcommanderinVierseninaparade;theythenoccupied new quarters inDabendorf, nearBerlin. Those companies later tookpartintheoccupationofNorway.5

Krefeld!Thatwasacitynoonewouldforgetwhospent timethereuntil thestart of new operations. Although the troops received instructions on dealingwiththelocalcivilianpopulation...ahitfromthetimeisperhapstelling:“DieNacht ist nicht allein zum Schlafen da!”6 Quite a few tippling tankers andriflemen followed that adviceandnotonly in thevarious restaurantsandpubs

with names like Seidenfaden, Bosi, Parkstübchen, Dortmunder Hof, andNachtlokalBarth,but theyalsodid itatprivatequartersaswell.OnewondershowmanyreturnedtoKrefeldafterthewarinordertolivetherepermanently.And somanyhoped that springmight finally arrive. . . .But then thenews

arrived about the occupation of Norway and Denmark.7 Over the next fewnights,columnsfromnondivisionalformationsmovedthroughthecityandthesoldiers began to get the feeling that it would soon be time for them to startmarchingagainaswell.By the end of April 1940, the division had received its first Panzer III’s

(thirteen)andPanzerIV’s(twenty),whichweredistributedtothetworegiments.

__________________1.TheSudetenlandCommemorativeMedal(MedaillezurErinnerunganden1.Oktober1938)waspresentedtoallwhoparticipatedintheactualmarchintotheethnic German region of Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938. Since it was amedal,itwasgenerallyrepresentedasaribbononaribbonbarafterthefirstdayofpresentation.2.HansTrögerhadadistinguishedcareerasacavalryofficerbeforejoiningthe3.Panzer-Division. Followinghis assignment to the division in June 1941, hewent on to command in the14. Panzer-Division (Kradschützen-Bataillon 64).He went on to regimental command within that division and after anadministrative assignment was given acting command of the 27. Panzer-Division.Hecommandedthreemorearmoreddivisionsbywar’send(25th,17th,and 13th). He ended the war as aGeneralleutnant andwas also awarded theKnight’s Cross to the Iron Cross. Hewas held by the Soviets until 1955 andpassedawayinSchwangauin1982.3. Hans Emil Richard Freiherr von Funck had held various positions ofresponsibilityinSpainduringtheCivilWar.Followinghisassignmenttothe3.Panzer-Division, he went on to command the 7. Panzer-Division and theXXXXVII.Panzer-Korps.HeendedthewarasaGeneralderPanzertruppenandrecipientof theOakLeaves to theKnight’sCross.Hedied inVersen in1979,afterremainingaprisoneroftheSovietsuntil1955.4.JoachimZieglerservedwiththeGermancontingentintheSpanishCivilWar,

where he received theSpanishCross.He servedwith distinction as aGeneralStaff officer after his transfer out of the division.On the staff of theXXXXII.Armee-Korps,hewasawardedtheGermanCrossinGold.HewasdetailedtotheWaffen-SSinJune1943,servingas thechiefofstaffof the III. (germanisches)SS-Panzer-Korps.Heeventuallyassumedcommandofthe“Nordland”division.Asmentionedinthetext,hediedinthefinalfightingaroundBerlin,butitwasafterhehadbeenrelievedofcommandfordisputedandunclearreasons.Hewasmortallywoundedwhileattemptingtobreakoutoftheencirclementanddiedon2May1945.5. Lexikon der Wehrmacht makes no mention of the detachment of the 1stCompany for thispurpose.The6thCompany,however,wasdefinitelyused toform cadre for the formation of Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V. 40, which was usedduring the operations in Norway and, later, Finland. z.b.V. = zur besonderenVerwendung=specialpurpose.Anextensivediscussionof thebattalioncanbefound at www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Panzerregimenter/PR6.htm.6.“TheNight’sNotJustThereforSleeping!”7.UnternehmenWeserübungcommencedon9April1940.

CHAPTER4

FromtheRhinetotheSomme

TheGermanArmywasreadyforthecampaignintheWest.It tossedasidetheoldand traditional strategicconceptsand introducedanewepoch in theartofwar.AfterGermany’senemieshad latercopied thosemethods, itwasdefeatedbyitsowninvention.TheArmyHighCommanddecidedtoripopentheenemyfront by having a single point of main effort. The plan originated withGeneralleutnantvonManstein,whohadsoughtGuderian’sadviceasanarmorexpert. As a result, most of the armored divisions were concentrated in themiddleofthefront.TheyweretoadvancethroughLuxembourg,movethroughandnearSedan,andadvanceonSt.QuentinandAmiensasfarasthemouthofthe Somme.By doing so, theywould hit themainAllied forces in their deepflankorevenintheirrear.Eversincethestartofthewar,theenemyhadassumedtherewouldbearepeat

of positional warfare and expanded the Maginot Line as far as the EnglishChannelby theconstructionofbunkernetworks. Itwas intendedthat themainfront would be protected by the two Dutch and two Belgian lines offortifications. It was also assumed that the Germans would reuse the oldSchlieffenPlananddescendonBelgiumwithastrongwing.ThatGermanthrustwastobeinterdictedbytheAlliedfieldarmiesintheDyleLine(Meuse–Wavre–Löwen).Themotorized forces stationed innorthernFrancewere tomove intoBelgiumimmediatelyandholduptheGermanattackontheDyleLine.TheGermanfieldarmieswentintobattlewellarmed.Theynotonlyhadafull

complementofpersonnel,weapons,vehicles,andequipment,buttheyhadalsotrainedtheoreticallyandlearnedonapracticalbasisfortoconductthisfight.The divisions were given tactical insignia to place on their vehicles to

differentiate the formations, identifying them quickly on the battlefield or incongestedmovements on roads. The symbol for the divisionwas similar to asidewaysE.1

The3.Panzer-DivisionwasattachedforoperationstotheXVI.Armee-Korps

(mot.) ofGeneral derKavallerie ErichHoepner.Hoepner’s chief of staffwasOberstleutnant i.G. Chales de Beaulieu. The corps’ mission was to advancerapidly to the Albert Canal and blaze a path to Brussels for the 6. Armee ofGeneraloberstvonReichenau.VonReichenau’schiefofstaffwasGeneralmajorPaulus,whohadonceheldcommandofAufklärungs-Abteilung3.At the startof thecampaign, thedivision receivedwelcome reinforcements:

MG-Bataillon 72 (with a headquarters, signals platoon, motorcycle infantryplatoon, threemachine-guncompanies,andanantitankcompany); theII./Flak-Lehr-Regiment;andtheII./Artillerie-Regiment49.3

At this point, the formations of the division were resting and in quartersaround the Krefeld area.Many of the officers andmarried enlisted personnelwere on leave for Pentecost. The remainder spent their days with the usualPrussiandutyroutineandtheeveningsseekingentertainment.At2103hourson9May1940,thecodeword“Danzig”arrivedatthedivision

headquarters. The code word meant: “Immediately start preparations formovement and be prepared tomove out no later than 0700 hours on 10May1940!”

Tacticalinsigniaofthedivision.ThefirstwasusedinPolandandFrancein1939and1940andthesecondinRussiain1941.ThethirdisalatervariantalsousedinRussia.

That same hour, the telephones rang, the Morse code keys tapped, themotorcyclemessengers roared off and the duty personnel blew theirwhistles:“Alert!” The messengers raced through the streets of Krefeld and thesurroundinglocalitiestoalerttheofficersandpersonnelthathadbeenputupinprivate quarters. Telegrams cancelled leaves. A hasty farewell was saideverywhere.Somethought itwas justapracticealert. It turnedout tobeabigsurprisewheneveryonediscoveredtheywerereallymovingout.Thenightwasshortandwhenthesoldierssteppedoutoftheirquartersatfirst

light, they already heard a rushing sound high in the heavens. Squadron aftersquadronofbombersandfighterswereheadedwest.Atthatpoint,therewasnolongeranydoubtthatthehourofattackwascloseathand.ThedivisionstarteddepartingKrefeldaround1000hours.Thedivisionmovedintwolargemarchserialstothesouth.Initially,everyone

thought they were headed straight towards Holland. When the march turnedalongthemajorroadtoNeuß,eventhe“know-it-alls”hadsecondthoughts.ThatwasbecausethatrouteledtowardsAachenand,byextension,toBelgium.The righthand march serial under Oberst Kühn marched in the following

order:Panzerjäger-Abteilung39; division headquarters;Nachrichten-Abteilung39; headquarters, 3. Panzer-Brigade; the two tank regiments; the 3./Pionier-Bataillon39; one battery from the II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment; and one and a halffuel sections. The lefthand march serial was under the command of OberstKleemann. Its order of march was as follows: Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3; onebattery from the II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment; headquarters, Schützen-Brigade;Kradschützen-Bataillon 3; headquarters and I./Artillerie-Regiment 75;headquarters, Schützen-Regiment 3; Schützen-Regiment 3; the II./Artillerie-Regiment75;andonefuelsection.The division headquarters established its command post in Linnich. The

division’s elements hadmoved past Neuß through Titz and as far as the areaaround Jülich. The armored brigade had moved via Mönchen-Gladbach andoccupied that afternoon in the villages along the Erkelenz–Linnich road. Therifle regiment bivouacked with all of its elements around Jülich, with itsheadquartersinitiallytakingquartersinJackerath,followedbyPattern.The3rdBattalionoftherifleregimenthaditsheadquartersand12thand15thCompaniesinKoslar,its11thand14thCompaniesinFreialdenhoven,andits13thCompanyinEngelsdorf.ThemotorcyclebattalionalsotookupquartersinJülich,whilethereconnaissance battalion provided security in Linnich. The antitank battalionremained in Gereonsweiler. The divisional artillery bivouacked in the areabetweenTitzundAmeln,withits6thBattery,forinstance,spendingthenightintheMündtFarmstead.Thedivisional troopswerespreadallover theassemblyarea.Theelementsof thedivision support commandwerequarteredall acrosstheareainassortedvillages.Thistime,asopposedtothecampaigninPoland,thedivisionwasnotinthe

first attackwave. Instead, itwas in the secondwave, following the4. Panzer-Division. The latter division was directed to reach the Albert Canal in thevicinityofMaastrichtinitsfirstthrust,whereitwastorelievetheairborneandspecialforcesprotectingthebridges.Hauptmann Barth, the division’s intelligence officer, visited the 4. Panzer-

Divisiononthemorningof10May.ItsheadquarterswasalreadyinMaastricht.He made his way back with some difficulty in the face of the advancing

columns. That evening, he reported back to Generalmajor Stumpff. Barthreported on the capture of Maastricht, the demolition of the bridges by theDutch,thecaptureofEben-Emael,andthetakingofthebridgesovertheAlbertand JulianaCanals.LeutnantOelrich of theHeadquartersCompany of the 1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6, served as the route reconnaissance officer forthearmoredbrigadeandalsowentforward.Thesoldiersofthedivisionwereupearlyonthemorningof11May.Manyof

themwereenteringcombatforthefirsttimeandcorrespondinglynervous.Thosewho slept out in the openwere awakened by the cold. Themoralewas goodeverywhere and the soldiers were confident of victory. They heard about theinitial fighting along the border from the radios they had brought along,messengerspassingthroughandthelocalpopulace.Thedivision started itsmovement toward theborderwith its lead elements,

includingtheheadquartersandthereconnaissancebattalion,around1000hours.Themovementwashinderedbythecongestionontheroads.ThecongestionwascausedbythedemolitionofthebridgesovertheMeuse.Despitesupremeefforts,it was not possible to guide the jammed-up formations over the provisionalbridges quickly. TheXVI. Armee-Korps (mot.) was delayed in its advance byexactlytwenty-fourhours.Theleadingformationsofthedivision,whichstartedrollingforwardatnoon,

reached theDutch border around 1500 hours. The countrysidewas pretty andtidy;thesoldiershadtheirfirstglimpseintoHollandfromthesmall,squathills.Thefruittreeswereinbloom;itwouldhavebeenapeacetimepicturehaditnotbeenforthecloudsofsmokethatdarkenedtheskiestothenorthandwest.

Themotorcycleinfantry,reconnaissanceelements,andfirsttankscrossedtheborderatLocht.ThemovecontinuedinfitsandspurtsviaSimpelveld–Schin-op-Geul–Valkenburg. The motorcycle battalion was then outside the gates ofMaastricht. It was shortly after 1500 hours. Long columns—tanks, engineers,Flak,medicalvehicles—closeduponthebroad,attractivestreetsofthecityandwaited for a crossingover thenewly erectedpontoonbridge.All of a sudden,Flak on both sides of the street went into position. Before the motorcycleinfantrygraspedwhatwasgoingon, the first roundswerebeing fired.TwelveBritish Blenheims raced in and dropped their loads on the bridges.4 Thefireworkswere soon over, however, and themotorcycle battalionwas able tocrossthebridge.LeutnantSchmidtandhisplatoonfromthe3rdCompanywere

thefirsttoreachthefarside.By then, the division headquarters had moved forward. The corps chief of

staffhelda situationbriefingat1640hours.Heannounced that the4.Panzer-DivisionhadalreadytakenTongernandhadbeendirectedtoreachGrandeville.The 3. Panzer-Division received orders to move quickly in the direction ofBilsen–Tongern after crossing theMeuse and advance north of the4. Panzer-Division.ItwasalsotoconductreconnaissancethroughTongerninthedirectionofSt.Trond.Correspondingly, the motorcycle and reconnaissance battalions received

missionsaround1800hourstocrosstheBelgianborderatVeldvezeltandscreentheareaforthedivisionsthatwerefollowing.By2200hours,thereconnaissancebattalionwasengagedwithBelgianfranctireursandscatteredBelgianelementsinBilsen,whilethemotorcyclebattalionreachedtheborderatthesametime.MostofthedivisionwasstilleastoftheMeuseandonGermansoilduringthe

night of 11–12May. The rifle regiment had continued its march with marchserialsDandEatnoon,butthereweredelaysagain,sinceitprovedimpossiblefortheindividualcolumnstoinfiltratethemarchroutesatthedesignatedtimes.The regimental headquarters had the individual companies pass it atAhlsdorf.The border was crossed around 0200 hours at Simpelveld. The commander,Oberstleutnant vonManteuffel, went ahead toMaastricht in his staff car. Hereported in to the bridge commander,Oberst Kleemann, to receive additionalorders.At0415hours, the regimentalheadquartersand the2ndBattalionwerethefirstelementsoftheregimentovertheengineerbridge.The elements of the division support command did not leave their original

quartersuntilaroundeveningof11May.Theynotonlybroughtthesuppliesthedivision needed forward, but also the men returning from leave who did notarriveuntilthatday.StartinginAhlsdorf,thesupplyroutesofthedivisionweremarkedbysigns,whichshowedthedivision’stacticalinsignia,anarrowandtheletter N (for Nachschub). The marking of the supply route was done by amessengersectiononmotorcyclesthatwasunderthedirectionofLeutnantSeibt.The system proved itself, and many vehicles were able to find the divisionwithoutknowingthelocationoftheassemblyareaaheadoftime.The leading elements of the division reached the Albert Canal during the

eveningandrapidlygotacross.Thebridgeshadbeentaken intact thepreviousday by airborne and air-landed forces. The lead elements of the corps hadencounteredtoughresistanceinthefirstBelgianvillagesentered.Thatcouldbe

seen by the soldiers of the 3. Panzer-Division in the destroyed and burnedfarmsteads,thescatteredmaterielofwar,andthemanydeadhorses.Elements of the reconnaissance battalion and the 1st Battalion of the

divisionalartillerywent intopositionduring thenightnorthofTongern,wheretheyscreenedandwaitedfortherestofthedivision,whichwasslowlyclosingup.Noenemycouldbedetermined.Sincehewasexpectedatanytime,however,securitywasestablishedinalldirections.Itwascompletelydark,andtheeyesofthe soldiers on outpost duty strained as they gazed into the darkness.The 3rdBatteryorienteditsgunsnorth,whilethe1stand2ndBatteriesaimedwest.TheenemyhadbeenpreparedfortheGermanattackacrosstheMeuse.Allof

his plans hinged on preventing a repetition of the envelopment attempt of theGermanfieldarmiesashadhappenedinWorldWarI.TheFrenchfieldarmiesmoved into Belgium immediately after the start of the offensive in order topositionthemselvesalongtheDyleLine.TothenorthofGembloux, therewasstillagapinthefortifiedpositions,whichtheFrenchintendedtoclose.Tothatend,theFrenchHighCommandpushedacavalrycorpsforward,whichincludedthe2ndand3rdMechanizedDivisions.Since the XVI. Armee-Korps (mot.) ordered the 4. Panzer-Division to also

advanceonGembloux, the twoenemycorpswereapproachingoneanotheronthe evening of 11 May. In terms of personnel, equipment, mobility, andfirepower,theywereequals.Around 0150 hours, orders arrived at the division command post from the

corps that stated that the enemy had been forced back to the west by the 4.Panzer-Division.Thecorpsintendedtocontinueitsadvancetothesouthweston12Mayanddirected the3.Panzer-Division to advancenext to the4.Panzer-Divisionontheright.Theobjective:theareaonbothsidesofHannut.OnthattwelfthofMay,PentecostSunday,thedivisionattemptedtomoveits

elementsthatwerestillinReichterritoryforwardasquicklyaspossible.Despitethat, there was no rapid move forward, since British aircraft were constantlybombingtheengineerbridgesacrosstheMeuse,expandingtheirattacksasfarasLinnich.Thedivisionssufferednocasualties,but the1stCompanyof the rifleregimenthad todive intoposition“headoverheels”while itwascrossing theriverandatruckfromthebakerycompanyreceivedminordamage.TheII./Flak-Lehr-Regiment,attachedtothedivision,reporteditsfirst“kills.”

For example, the 8th Battery shot down four bombers and three fighters(Spitfires)on12Mayalone.5

OberstleutnantvonManteuffelwasput inchargeof trafficcontrolalongtheMeusetofacilitatethesmoothcrossingofthedifferentformations.OberleutnantStein, the commander of the 5th Company of the rifle regiment, was madetemporarybridge-sitecommander.TherifleregimenthadallofitselementsonDutchsoilandcrossedtheengineerbridgeat1620hourswithits1stBattalion.The 3rd Battalion followed at 1845 hours. The artillery regiment was inBelgium,aswastheantitankbattalion.ThelaterformationsuffereditsfirstthreewoundedafteranattackbyBritishWellingtonbombers.TheantitankelementscontinuedforwardandmovedthroughMopertingen,whichhadbeencompletelydestroyed by Stukas. Elements of the division support command crossed theMeusearound2100hours.Bydoingso,thedivisionfounditselfcompletelyinenemyterritory...Whatwasthesituationatthefront?The 4. Panzer-Division had moved out from its staging area around

Grandvilleat0600hourson12May.Oneandahalfhourslater, its5.Panzer-Brigade reachedHannut after crossing rolling countryside that was populatedwith numerous villages. At 0950 hours, the division submitted the followingreporttothecorps:“5.Panzer-BrigadehasbrokentheresistancebetweenLens–St.Remy!”Then,allofasudden,Frenchtanksapproachingfromthenorthwestmoved against theGermans.A tough tank engagement developed that did notturninfavorofthe5.Panzer-Brigadeuntilnoon.TheGermanfightingvehicleswereunable topursue thewithdrawingenemyforces, since theywere runningoutoffuel.Ju-52transporteraircraftflewinthefuelintheearlyafternoonandenabled the tanks to continue theattack.Thebrigade’s forcesboggeddownatThisnesinthefaceofstrongdefensivefires.TheFrenchemployedtheirheavySomua6 tanks, against which the main guns of the German fighting vehicleswerepowerless.The commander in chief of the 6. Armee, Generaloberst von Reichenau,

arrivedatthedivisioncommandpostat1215hours,alongwithhischiefofstaff,GeneralmajorPaulus.Afewminuteslater, thecommanderinchiefofthefieldarmygroup,GeneraloberstvonBock,alsoarrived.Thetwoseniorcommanderswereadamant in insisting that the3.Panzer-Division enter the frayas soonaspossiblewithallofitscombatelements.The forwardmost elements—such as the motorcycle and reconnaissance

battalion,aswellasthetwoarmoredregiments,whichwererapidlyclosingup,andthe1stBattalionofthedivisionalartillery—hadalreadyestablishedcontact

with the enemy. The first prisoners, mostly from the Belgian 4th InfantryDivision, had been brought in. The cannoneers of the 1st Battalion had evensucceededincapturingthe9thBatteryoftheArdennesLightInfantryRegiment.The motorcycle battalion arrived at the battlefield around Hannut late in theafternoon, soon joined by the reconnaissance battalion.The antitank battalion,which had assembled in theMopertingen area in themeantime,was also sentforward as soon as possible. Its 1st and 3rd Companies were attached to thearmored brigade, its 2nd Company to the reconnaissance battalion. Panzer-Regiment 6 followed the reconnaissance battalion through Heers and reachedHannutwithitsfirstbattalionaround1800hours.Thedivisionreceivedordersduringthenight:“AdvanceonGembloux!”The

division commander thereupon ordered an attackwith the armored brigade infrontwiththemaineffortontheright.TheattackwastocrossthelineHoutain–l’Eveque–Avernes–le Baudoin with the objective of taking the crossroadssouthwest of Jodoigne. Major von Wechmar’s reconnaissance battalion wasgiventheguardmissionontheopenrightflankduringtheadvance.ItmadeitsfirstenemycontactagainstreconnaissanceelementsatHemitiennearound1000hours.Theriflebattalionsformedupbehindthearmoredregiments,withthe3rdBattalionheldinreserve.In the meantime, the tactical reconnaissance established contact with the

enemy.Around0800hours,itbroughtinitsfirstprisonersaroundHannut.Theywere two officers and three dragoons of the Dragoon Regiment (motorcycleinfantryregiment);fourprisonersweretakenatRacourtfromthe12thCuirassierRegiment (motorized rifle regiment).Thatallowed identificationof theenemy.The French 33rd Mechanized Division from Paris was facing the 3. Panzer-DivisionfromBerlin.ThedivisionprepareditselfforitsbaptismoffireinthecampaignintheWest.

ThisactionwouldalsoprovetobethefirstmajortankengagementofWorldWarII.The division completed its preparations by 1230 hours. The two armored

regiments were in front. Panzer-Regiment 5 was at Trognée, with the 1stBattalion of the rifle regiment behind it. Panzer-Regiment 6 was atMontenaeken, with the 2nd Battalion of the rifle regiment behind it. Theartillery, reinforced by the II./Artillerie-Regiment 49, was arrayed across theentirefront.The1stCompanyof theantitankbattalionwassupportingPanzer-Regiment6,while the 3rdCompany of the battalionwas supporting the other

armoredregiment.ThedivisioncommandpostwaslocatedonekilometersouthofMontenaeken.Right at 1230 hours, Stukas raced through the air and dove on identified

enemypositions.Fountainsofsmokeandfireashighasahouseroseskywardandmovedslowly through theprettycountryside, fromwhichsomanychurchtowers were jutting. The engines of the tanks starting up didn’t allow for apeacefulmood,however.Thesteel-graymonsterswiththewhitecrossesrolledalong a wide front through the depressions and across the green hills, whichwere being bathed in the hot midday sun streaming down. The division wasattacking.

ArmoredengagementalongtheGette,13May1940.

By 1300 hours, the armored brigade had already reached the high groundalong the Gette. From there, the hills descended sharply to the creek, whichsnakeditswaythroughwoods,vegetationandvillages,onefollowingthenext.Thetankdrivershadnotimetotakeintheidyllicpicture.Allofasudden,therewasa rumblingsoundapproachingand theearthpitchedskywardbetween thefightingvehicles.Theenemyartilleryhad identified theGermanposition.Thetankshaltedbriefly and sought out the enemy.They took aimand fired.Thentherewasacracklingsoundintheheadphones:“Panzermarsch!”

OberstleutnantvonLewinski’sPanzer-Regiment6advancedonOrp-le-Grandwithits1stBattalionandGenvillewithits2nd.Theterrainwasrollingandopenand well suited for an attack, since the riflemenwere still able to follow thetanks without problems. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s 2nd CompanyenteredOrp-le-Grand first. Itwas supported by two heavy tanks from the 4thCompany(LeutnantScheweandUnterfeldwebelKrajewski)andtheregimentallight platoon of Oberleutnant Buchterkirch. The enemy had set up obstaclesalong streets, so that itwas not possible to advance quickly.Despite that, theadvancecontinuedandthenmovedontoOrp-le-Petit.MajorSchmidt-Ott’s1stBattalion attacked with all of its resources. Once again, it was Schneider-Kostalski’s and Buchterkirch’s men, who blazed a path. The tanks of the 1stCompanyfollowedashortwhile later.Anartillerydirecthitkilledonesoldierandwoundedsevenmore, includingLeutnantvonKriegsheim,whowasbadlywounded. It proved further unfortunate that the company commander,HauptmannvonZedlitzundLeipe,becameillandhadtoturnoverhiscommandto Leutnant Fechner. By then, the 4th Company of Hauptmann Weiß hadadvanced. Itdestroyed twoantitankguns in its first assault and thenadvancedinto the village, where therewas intense house-to-house fighting. The Frenchdefended stubbornly and fired from thehouses after the tankshad rolledpast.Thecrewsofthefightingvehicleshadtodismountmorethanonceandresorttopistols and carbines to clear a path. Leutnant Schewe suddenly discovered asmall emergency bridge over the Gette. What would have been consideredimpossibleinpeacetimehappenedthere:Theheavytrackedvehiclesrolledoverthewoodenbeamsandmadeittothefarside.Oberst Freiherr von Funck’s Panzer-Regiment 5 also had to fight its way

throughtoughenemyresistance.The4.7-centimeterantitankgunsturnedouttobedangerous.Theyhadtobeoutmaneuveredandengagedindividually.Despitethat, the regimentwasable to locateacrossingpoint towards1430hours.Theengineersfromthe1stCompanyoftheengineerbattalionerectedaprovisionalbridge through their aggressive actions while under French machine-gun fire.Thetanksthenrolledacrossit.Around1515hours,Panzer-Regiment6crossed theGettewith its tanksand

continueditsattack.ThetanksadvancedonJandrain.Beltsofantitankgunsheldupthetanksthere.Fortunately,thefiresofHauptmannHinninger’s2ndBatterywereplacedsowellthattwogunswereknockedoutalmostimmediately.Atthatpoint, the companies rolled forward. Leutnant Schewe encountered two moreantitank guns at the western outskirts of the village, which he was able to

eliminate.Allofasudden,aFrenchtankappeared,butitwasalsoknockedout.Whilemovingon,Schewe’sfightingvehiclereceivedahitatHill110,butitwasstill able to move. The young officer was wounded in the left arm.UnterfeldwebelKrajewski,followingbehindinhisPanzerIII,waskilledintheenemyfire.LeutnantvonKrausewasabletomountthetankinthemiddleoftheengagementandbringitbackinonepiece.AdditionalFrenchtanksappearedfromthesouthandslammedintothewide-

open flank of Panzer-Regiment 6. Even before the antitank elements weresummonedforwardby radio, thatbattalionwasclosing in.Major vonBernuthimmediately employed his 1st Company under Oberleutnant Polentz. Theantitankcrewsstartedunlimberingtheirgunswhilestillmovingandtookupthefightat800meters.Twenty-fiveSomuaandHotchkisstankswereapproaching.Theydidnotturnawayuntilthreeoftheirnumberhadgoneupinflames.Thelefthand platoon of the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 (Leutnant Rehberg)contributedsignificantlytothatsuccess.OberleutnantSchacht’s4./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39hadalsoclosedupinthemeantime.Itwascalledaway,however,toassistPanzer-Regiment5.The enemy had not used up his offensive combat power by a long shot.

Indeed, he committed additional fighting vehicles into the fight. The armoredbrigade’scommander,OberstKühn,correspondinglyorderedthe1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment5tosupportitssisterarmoredregiment.The2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment 6 was having an especially hard time of it. After it wasdetermined that the light tanks with their machine guns and light automaticcannon could not accomplish anything against the heavily armored enemyfightingvehicles,thePanzerI’sandPanzerII’swerecalledbacktoarear-slopepositionandgivenaflank-guardmission.ThePanzerIII’sandPanzerIV’s,ontheotherhand,firedwitheverythingtheyhad.Theenemycounterattackwas takingplacewith forty fightingvehicles from

theareaaroundJauche–Genville.TheI./Panzer-Regiment6hadtoexertitselftodeflect that dangerous thrust to the flanks. The regimental light platoon wasdirectedtoreconnoiter inthedirectionofGenville.OberleutnantLevin led thewayinhistank.Whilehewassearchingtheterrainwithhisbinoculars,hewasfireduponbyaFrenchsniper.Theyoungofficerbecamethefirstofficeroftheregimenttobekilledinthecampaign.The 2nd Company of Panzer-Regiment 6 had moved up and encountered

enemytanksaroundJauche.By1700hours,thecompanywasabletoknockout

another Hotchkiss, eliminate two antitank guns, and take 3 officers and 120enlistedpersonnelprisoner.Shortlyafterthat,HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski’stankwasknockedout.Thefightingcontinued.OberleutnantGrafzuDohnaandhisgunner,UnteroffizierEisel,wereabletotakeoutanotherthreeantitankgunsandbringin150Frenchprisoners.UnteroffizierSandbergandhiscrewsetatankalight,beforeheandhisdriver,GefreiterDiesener,werekilledbyenemyfires.Feldwebel Wolf and his platoon destroyed an enemy tank at Jandrain andcaptured fivemachine guns and tenmotorcycles in a surprise attack.The 2ndBattalionoftheregiment,underthecommandofOberstleutnantBurmeister,didnotremainidleeither.Inhisheavytank,OberleutnantBaronvonNolteandhiscrewknockedoutfiveenemyfightingvehiclesallbythemselves.The 2nd Battalion ofOberst Freiherr von Funck’sPanzer-Regiment 5 was

attackedfromthenorthwestbyenemytanksatOrp-le-Grand.TheywereholdingthehighgroundtothenorthofJauche.Thefightwastakenupandsoonallthevehicleswerefiringandcurvingaroundoneanother.TheGermantanksslowlystarted to gain the advantage, since their cohesiveness and coordination werevastlysuperiortothoseoftheenemy.Ourtanksremainedintactasplatoonsorevencompanies,while theFrenchmovedindividuallyor inverysmallgroups.Correspondingly,theydissipatedtheireffectiveness.SincetherateoffirefortheGermanswasalsoconsiderablyhigher,theenemysoonpulledback.Therifleregimenthadbeenfollowingthetankssincenoon.Theriflemenran

alongbetweenthefightingvehiclessoastoeliminateinfantrythreatsinatimelymanner.MajorZimmermann’s2ndBattalionreachedOrp-le-GrandshortlyafterPanzer-Regiment6did.At1530hours,itforcedacrossingoverthecreek.Thebattalionremainedontheheelsofthetanksandprovidedeffectiveprotectiontotheflanks.MajorvonBosse’s1stBattalionmovedforwardwithequalélan.Hauptmann

von Plato’s 1st Company eliminated a hard-fighting machine-gun position,before the battalionmade it toOrp-le-Petit. The riflemenwound up in a tankattackthere,andhadtotemporarilymovebacktotheGettetosetupdefensivepositionsthere,alongwiththeantitankbattalion.Panzer-Regiment5 succeededindrivingtheenemybacktothesouthwestbyitself,however.Theriflebattalionjoinedinthepursuit,withits5thCompanyparticularlydistinguishingitself.Thebattalion took inmore than400prisoners.Major vonBosse, leading from thefront, was badly wounded, however. Hauptmann Haspel assumed temporarycommandofthebattalion.Whenthe1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment5arrived

around1600hours,theengagementwasfinallydecidedinfavoroftheGermanforces.The1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment5andPanzer-Regiment6didnothalt;

instead, theycontinuedadvancingfartherwest. In theprocess,bothformationsencountered immediate counterattacks by the French, but theywere unable tostoptheGermanadvance.LeutnantRentsch’splatoonfromthe1stCompanyofthe antitank battalion was employed in a screening mission oriented towardJauche.TheantitankgunnersshotaFrenchbaggagetraintopiecesandtooktwoofficers and eighty-five men prisoner in Jauche after sending an assaultdetachment in. The 4thCompany of the battalion screened in the direction ofEnien. Since the platoon leader of the lead platoon, Leutnant Schenk, wasreconnoitering new positionswhen enemy tanks started rolling forward again,StabsfeldwebelGerickeassumedcommand.OnlythemiddlegunofUnteroffizierWestricht (the gunner wasObergefreiter Günther) was able to take the tanksunder direct fire, since the lefthand gun ofUnteroffizierBehringwas firing atidentifiedmachine-gunnestsandtherighthandgunofUnteroffizierGroßkreutzwaspreventedfromopeningfirebygrazingcows.Despitethosedifficulties,theplatoonwasable toknockout twoenemytanks,causingtheenemytogiveuphisattack.Thewell-placedfiresofthedivisionalartilleryandtheattachedII./Artillerie-

Regiment 49 played no small role in the success of the aforementionedoperations. The fires from theGerman batteries enabled the tanks to continueadvancingwest.Panzer-Regiment6movedpastJauchetothenorth—intheleadwere the platoons ofOberleutnant Buchterkirch andOberleutnant Baron vonNolde—andbypassed a small patchofwoods, all thewhile still continuing toengage individual enemy tanks. The 1st Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 5screenedinthedirectionoftheJandrain–Jaucheroad,whiletheregiment’s2ndBattalionorientedalongtheJauche–Orprailline.Thelatterregimentreachedtheraillineat2020hoursandmoveditsfightingvehiclesforwardthroughJauche.Around2100hours,asaresultoftheonsetofdarkness,theadvancecametoacloseforthedayalongalinerunningJauche–Marilles–Jodoignerailline–GeestGerompont–two kilometers south of Huppays. The rifle regiment followedcloselybehindthe tanks,with its1stBattalionreachingtheJodoigne–Hedengerail line at 2230 hours. In the course of itsmovements, it had brought in 200prisoners and knocked out five tanks and thirty-four trucks. At the onset ofdarkness, the reconnaissance battalion was in Libertange, where it hadestablished contact with the neighboring 18. Infanterie-Division. The division

commandpostwasmoved forward toGrand-Hallet.The rifle regimentand itsheadquartersmovedtoOrp-le-Petit.TheFrench3rdMechanizedDivisionpulledfartherbacktothewest.Onthat

day, it had lost thirty Somuas and almost seventy Hotchkiss. The personnellosses were likewise grave, with the three battalions of the dragoon regimentforcedtoconsolidateintoonebattalion.For 14May, the6.Armee intended “to continue the attack along the entire

front,maintaining themaineffort in thegeneraldirectionofNivelles.”For itspart, the XVI. Armee-Korps (mot.) issued the following order: “eject themechanized enemy force to the front and advance via Perwez in the generaldirection of Gembloux.” The division moved out at 0900 with its armoredbrigadeinthelead.Panzer-Regiment5movedonthe left,onceagainfollowedbythe1stBattalionof therifleregiment.FollowingPanzer-Regiment6on therightwasthe2ndBattalionoftherifleregiment.Asbefore,thereconnaissancebattalion remained on the right wing, advancing via Pomel and the bridge atWalhain-St. Pol as far as Thorembais-les-Beguines. The 2nd Battalion ofPanzer-Regiment6tookthepointinitssectorandadvancedinexorablyforward.Theenemystartedpullingbackassoonas the tanksapproached.Thedelayingactions of the French appeared to no longer have any decisiveness. Thedivision’s advance proceeded rapidly. The Löwen–Eghezée road was crossedand,ashortwhilelater,theWawre–Perwezroad.Arecentlyinstalledsteel-beamfencesouthofRoux–MiroirewasintendedtoholduptheGermantanks,buttheywereabletosimplyoverrunit.Panzer-Regiment6 reachedWalhain–St.Pol inasinglebound.Oberleutnant

BaronvonNolde’s8thCompanyshottopiecesthefirstSomuasthatappeared.Togetherwithhisplatoon,hewasabletoknockoutsevenmorefightingvehiclesin the ensuing engagement.That cleared the path for the companies thatwerefollowing.Theactionwasmentioned in theArmedForcesDailyReporton20May,whereitwasstatedthat“Duringthetankengagementsofthelastfewdaysin Belgium, Nolde, an Oberleutnant in an armored regiment, distinguishedhimselfthroughhiscold-bloodedactions.”Theenemyresistancethenbecamenoticeablystronger.Theleadelementsof

the divisionwere approaching theDyle Position,whichwas heavily fortified.Thedefensive effort increasedconsiderably in theErnagearea,with the resultthat the armor brigade had to pull back about 600 meters from the localityaround1830hoursinordertofindbettercover.Fivevehicleswerelosttoenemy

antitank and artillery fires. The rifle regiment, which had received orders toattack theDylePosition,dug in along the limitsof its advanceat2130hours,afterits1stBattalionhadtakenaboutfiftyprisonersrightoutsideofthevillage.

BreakingthroughtheDylePosition.

Atthatpoint,thecorpsformedthemaineffortoftheoffensivewithinthefieldarmygroup.Itintendedtobreakthroughtheenemyfront.Around1400hourson14 May, Generalobersten von Bock and von Reichenau visited the divisioncommandpostinMont-St.André.Bothofthememphasizedtheimportanceofarelentlesslymovingadvance.Thefieldarmycommanderinchiefplacedspecialemphasisonboundingleapsforwardsoastoalwayshavetherequisiteamountofartilleryavailable.Bytheeveningof14May,thefieldarmygroup,thefieldarmy,andthecorps

all came to the conclusion that the fighting morale of the enemy, which hadalready sunk considerably, and the previously demonstrated offensivemomentum allowed a thrust against the Dyle Position on 15 May. Hoepnerissuedhisorders:“XVI.Armee-Korps(mot.) attacksat0900hourson15May,withthe3.Panzer-Divisionandthe4.Panzer-Divisioninfrontandsupportedbyallavailableartillery,tobreakthroughtheDylePositiononbothsidesofErnage.The following enemy forces had been identified as facing the division:

elements of the French 3rd Mechanized Division; the French 1st InfantryDivision; and elements of the Belgian 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions. Byemploying thoseactive-duty forces, theenemydemonstratedhis intent toholdtheDylePositionunderallcircumstances.TheenginesoftheStukashowledthroughtheairshortlybefore0900hourson

15May.TheywereheadedtobothsidesofErnagetodroptheirbombloadsonthe enemy positions. Unfortunately, the bombs did not land exactly in thedesignatedtargetareas.Instead,theyexplodedrightinfrontoftheGermanlines.The fires from theGermanartillery alsodid little damage to the enemy, sincetheywerefiringfromthemap.Theforwardobservershadnotbeenabletomakeitupfront.Itwasintendedforthedivision’sattacktostartat0900hourswiththeriflebrigade,but thewholeoperation seemed tobeunder abad sign thatday.Unnoticedby theenemy, the2ndBattalionof the rifle regimenthadadvancedduringthenightandoccupiedHills161and165.Bydoingso,thebattalionwasunintentionally farther forward on the right than planned. As a result of theenemy’scontinuousandwell-aimedrollingartillerybarrages,itwasimpossibleto reorganize at daylight.The neighboring 1stBattalionwas able to be pulledbackandredirected,however,whentheGermanartilleryfiresstarted.Asaresultofthereorganization,theattackofbothbattalionswasdelayedhalf

anhour.Onhisowninitiative,MajorZimmermannhadhis2ndBattalionmoveout, even though he knew his companies were well ahead of the rest of thedivision.Toprotectthecompletelyopenrightflank,Zimmermannemployedthemachine-gunplatoonofhis9thCompanythere.LeutnantGrafvonArnim, theplatoonleader,waskilledshortlyafterthebattalionmovedout.Thecompaniesin themiddle—OberleutnantMüller-Röhlich’s7th,Oberleutnant vonKayser’s8th,andHauptmannZabel’s10th—descendedthefrontslopemorequicklyandwere thus spared receiving fires from theGermanartillery,whichwas landingmuch too short on that day of all days. Fortunately, a forward observer, whoshowedupintime,wasabletostopthefiresandshiftthemforward.Theenemyhad turned lively and mercilessly hammered the battalion. A total of elevenbatteries had been identified. As the riflemen slowly approached the Perbais–Ernage road, French machine guns began rattling away on all sides. Thedefensivefireswereterriblyeffectiveandforcedthe2ndBattaliontogiveupitsadvanceabout200meterswestof theroad, justsouthofPerbais,around1030hours. The company commander of the 9th,Oberleutnant Seidler, was badlywoundedwitharoundtotheheart.Inthe8thCompany,UnteroffizierZimmer,one of the “old hands” of the rifle regiment,was killed, amongothers. Itwasclear that the 2nd Battalion was not going to get any farther. The men hadreachedalongandwidedepression.Theywereunabletogetoutofitasaresultof the horrific flanking fires to make the final 100 meters to the railwayembankment.Hauptmann Haspel’s 1st Battalion also did not enjoy any success that

morning. It moved out along both sides of theWalhain–St. Pol–Perbais road,minusits2ndCompany,whichwasscreeningtowardErnage.The1stCompanyofMG-Bataillon 7 was attached to the battalion and enabledHauptmann vonPlato’s1stCompanytomakegoodprogressasaresultof itswell-placedfires.Theriflemenweretakingconsiderablecasualties.Alloftheofficercandidatesofthebattalionwerekilledthatday.Despitealltheirefforts,HauptmannHaspel’smenwereunabletogetacrossthePerbais–Ernageroad.Thetwobattalioncommandersconferredonhowtocontinuetheadvance.By

then, however, the regiment had ordered Major Kratzenberg’s 3rd Battalionforward, to help get the bogged-down attack flowing again. Kratzenberg wasbriefedatthecommandpostofthe2ndBattalion,beforehecontinuedontothebrigadecommandpost.Hereceivedthemissiontheretoclosethegapbetweenthedivisionandthe4.Panzer-Division,stagingonHill169westofBaudeset.Itwas intended for thebattalion to attackErnage from there and then swing leftaftercrossingtherailwayline.The other elements of the regiment did not remain idle. The 7th and 8th

Companies reached the Wavre–Gembloux railway line just south of Perbais.Major Zimmermann then employed Oberleutnant Engelen’s 6th Company,whichhadbeenheldinreserveuptothatpoint,totakethevillage.By then,MajorWöhlermann’s 2ndBattalion of artillery had ranged on the

road and was supporting the continued advance of the riflemen. The forwardobserverfromthe6thBattery,LeutnantLeese,movedforwardtothelocationofthe3rdCompanyoftherifleregimentontheroadwithhistworadiooperators,GefreiterMieritz andGefreiter Szagunn. From there, he directed the guns ofLeutnantKersten’sbatteryonthefieldpositionsoftheMoroccanforcesarrayedalongtheoutskirtsofPerbais.The 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment then moved out. The companies,

exploitingtheartilleryfireandaStukaattackfarthertothefront,succeededingetting to and then into thevillage.Hauptmann vonPlato’s1stCompanywasable to clear the rest of the village through aggressive employment of hisplatoons,whereby the1stPlatoonofLeutnantZitzewitzwasable to take fiftyprisonersallbyitself.Thecompanysecuredthevillagebutcontinuedtoreceivecasualties from enemy artillery fire.By contrast, squads fromMG-Bataillon 7wereabletoproceedbeyondPerbaisandtakeHill154.Major Lorenz’s 1st Battalion of artillery, as well as the II./Flak-Lehr-

Regiment, joined the fray and supported the advance of the riflemen. The

battalion’s forward observers were all up front with the attacking riflemen.Leutnant Guthke, forward observer of the 2nd Battery, was killed, the firstofficerlostbytheartilleryregimentinthewar.Bythen,elementsof the2ndCompanyof therifleregimentand the2./MG-

Bataillon 7 had entered Ernage. The companies became embroiled in heavystreetfighting,madeallthemoredifficultbythefactthatfriendlyartillerywasalsocausingcasualties.Ittooksometimeforradiocontacttobeestablishedwiththebatteries.Theriflemendisengagedfromtheenemyanddidnot takeuptheattack again until the German guns fell silent. The enemy’s defensive effortstarted increasing in the afternoon. The well-placed enemy artillery fires torelargegapsintheranksoftheattackers.Around 1400 hours, the rifle brigade ordered the 3rd Battalion of the rifle

regiment to attack left of the 2ndBattalion to close the gap between the twodivisionsthatstillexisted.ThebattalionmarchedbyfootasfarastheBaudesetFarm.Thestagingwascompletedby1600hours.Theattackwasscheduledfor1630hours.Theforceswerearrayedasfollows:ontheright,the11thCompany,reinforced by one heavymachine-gun platoon, one heavymortar section, oneinfantrygun,oneantitankgun, andoneplatoon from thedivisional engineers;and on the left, the 12th Company, reinforced by one heavy machine-gunplatoon,oneheavymortarsection,oneinfantrygun,oneantitankgun,andtwosectionsfromthedivisionalengineers.The13thCompanywasheldinreserve.Withthebattalionheadquarterswasafire-supportcoordinationofficerfromthe1stBattalionofartillery,buthisradioequipmentwasnotfunctioningproperly.Itwasonlypossibletocommunicatewiththebrigadevialandline.Justbeforetheattackstarted,the1stCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6arrived.The 3rd Battalion moved out punctually and, despite heavy enemy fire,

reachedits intermediateobjective, theroadeastofErnage,by1715hours.Theenemy’s fires increased by the minute, and the engineers were continuouslyclearingminesinordertomaketheattackonthevillageeasierfortheriflemen.Machine-gunroundspeltedagainsttheattackersfromallofthehouses,butthemenwereeventuallyabletorunthroughthevillage.The11thCompanywasthefirst one to reach the railway embankment behind the village and, after hardfighting,tookthehighground900meterswestofErnage.Theattackofthe12thCompany,ontheotherhand,stalledattheembankment,sincefriendlyartilleryfireonceagainmadeitimpossibletomoveforward.Theradiosetoftheforwardobserverhadbeenshottopieces,andthegreensignalflareswerenotseeninthe

rear. Thatmeant thatmessengers had to be sent back. They reachedLeutnantJaeger from the 12th Company, who had become separated. He immediatelyrallied his platoon. Moving through friendly artillery fire, it assaulted theMoroccanpositions.Since the rifle battalion was fighting with an open flank, the two platoons

from the 1st Company of Panzer-Regiment 6 were employed there.OberfeldwebelMeyrhofer’splatoon,movingontheright,encounteredsixenemyantitankgunsattheembankment.Allofthemwereshottopiecesbythefightingvehiclesandthenoverrun.FeldwebelBurusiak’splatoonsupportedtheadvanceofthe12thCompanythroughfiresfromhisvehicles.Theriflemenwerefinallyable to cross the railway embankment. Oberleutnant von Werthern’s 11thCompanyfollowedthetanksandreachedtheroadleadingtoNoirmontaround1900 hours.Once there, the company received heavy fire from antitank guns.Twofightingvehiclesbringinguptherear,aPanzerIandaPanzerII,werelosttoantitank-gunhits.GefreiterMaylach,whowaswounded,dismounted.Onhiswaybacktotheclearingstation,hetookinsomethirtyFrenchasprisoners.Inthemeantime,OberfeldwebelMayrhoferhadmovedon the antitankgunswithhis vehicles. Two were knocked out in the space of a fewminutes. LeutnantFechner set a third gun alight at the edge of the village. The enemy finallyweakenedandapproachedtheGermanlineswithraisedhands.Allofasudden,however,machinegunsandantitankgunsrangout to therear.TheMoroccansthrew themselves on the ground and then continued fighting. The enemy’sresistance became especially tough on the right flank, where the enemy hadbarricadedhimselfinthevillageofChastre.AfewindividualFrenchtanksalsoappeared. They were engaged by the German fighting vehicles. LeutnantFechnerreorganizedhistankcompanyandemployedhis3rdPlatoon,aswellasthebattalion’slightplatoon,whichwasattached,toprotecttheopenflank.Since the12thCompanywas still hangingback,MajorKratzenbergpushed

theengineerplatoon into thegaponahilleastofCortil–Noirmont.Anenemyimmediatecounterattack,comprisedof300soldiersandsupportedbytanks,hittheflanksandrearof thebattaliona fewminutes later.Receivingashock, theengineerspulledbackinthefaceofthesuperiornumbers.But the fighting vehicles arrived in the nick of time. Oberleutnant

Buchterkirch had received orders at 1930 hours to support the 1./Panzer-Regiment6up front.Whenhewasat thewesternoutskirtsofErnagewithhislighttanks,hesaweightenemytanksapproach.Heimmediatelyhadhisvehicles

deployintofiringorderandstartedthefight.Buchterkirch’splatoonknockedoutfiveenemytanksandforcedtheaccompanyinginfantrytoturnback200metersfrom the positions of the6./MG-Bataillon7. TheGerman tanks then resumedadvancing, bringing the machine-gun company with them. OberleutnantBuchterkirch and hismen then eliminated an antitank-gun positionwith threeguns. He wanted to report his actions to the company commander of themachine-gun company and dismounted his vehicle.At that point, enemy firesstartedhowlinginfromtheotherside.Histankflewintotheair,andtwootherfightingvehiclesalsowentup in flames.Under the leadershipofUnteroffizierReinicke, the remaining tankscontinued theattack,knockingoutanadditionalthreeantitankguns.ThenReinicke’stankreceivedadirecthit.Reinickelostanarm; the remaining two members of his crew were killed. TheUnteroffizierchangedtanksinthemiddleofthefightandbroughttheremainingtanksafelyback.HauptmannDr.Sturm’s13thCompanyhadalsomovedoutagainwithsupport

fromLeutnant Arnold’s platoon from the 1./Panzer-Regiment 6. The riflemenandtankerswereabletoeliminatetwomachine-guncarriersandcapturealotofequipment and weapons in their attack. TheMoroccan soldiers evacuated thebattlefieldandpulledback.HauptmannWeiss’s4./Panzer-Regiment6wasthendirectedtoadvance.The

companycrossedaminefieldnorthwestofErnage,withUnteroffizier Korbelladistinguishing himself through a combination of circumspection and temerity.The company then rattled throughNoirmont and positioned itself on the rightwing of the1./Panzer-Regiment 6. The tanks moved forward and approachedVilleroix.APanzerIwaslostduringtheadvance.FeldwebelKrauseshotupamachine-gunpositionwithhistank,whichhadbeencausingtheriflemenalotofproblemsuptothen.LeutnantAndersen’splatoonfromthe4thCompanydroveanenemybaggagetraintoflight.Bythen,theriflecompanieshadcloseduptothefront.OberleutnantFreiherr

von Werthern’s 11th Company started attacking Cortil-Noirmont.HauptmannOrts’s12thCompanyattackedintothevillageatthesametimeandoccupiedthehigh ground to its east. At 2045 hours, regimental orders arrived: “Stop theattack;holdthelinesreached!”Theenemywasplacingwell-aimedfiresintothepositionsofthe3rdBattalion

of the rifle regiment.When orders came to pull backMG-Bataillon 7,MajorKratzenbergdecidedtopullbacktheleftwingofhisbattaliontoeliminate the

threat to his wide flank.Oberleutnant von Brodowski andFeldwebel Thévozarrivedtherewiththeirheavyvehiclesfromthe4./Panzer-Regiment6andwereabletoeffectivelysupportthepullingbackofthe12thCompanywiththeirfires.Since the tankshad radioequipment, itwaspossible toestablish radiocontactwiththebrigadeforthefirsttime.Uptothen,onlyLeutnantSchnitzler,aliaisonofficerfromthebrigade,hadmaintainedanycontact.In themeantime, the situation in the sector of the2ndBattalionof the rifle

regiment had changed so much that the commander of the 8th Company,OberleutnantvonKayser,broughthimselftothedecisiontosupporttheadvanceoftheneighboringbattalion.Heplacedthe7thCompanyunderhiscommandaswell.With the twocompanies,he then reached the firstattackobjectiveof thedivision:Hills152and155,westofNoirmont.Thecompaniesbrokethroughtheweak resistance and crossed the creek outside of Noirmont at 2130 hours.OberleutnantvonKayserestablishedcontactwiththe11thCompany,whichwasinpositionthere,andreportedtoMajorKratzenberg.Aretrogradeorderfromthebrigadeforced thosebravementoslowlymove

backbehindthecreek.Theregimentsetupfordefense.The1stBattalionwasontheright,the2ndinthemiddle,andthe3rdontheleftinagenerallinerunning:railwaycrossingatPerbais–Hills164and165–1,000meterswestoftherailwaycrossingatErnage.Tosupporttheregiment,thedivisionbroughtacompanyofMG-Bataillon7forward,aswellaselementsofthedivisionalengineersandtheantitank battalion. The II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment also dispatched a platoon with8.8-centimeterFlak.ItwasclearthattherifleregimenthadforcedabreakthroughthroughtheDyle

Position, thusopeningupthepathfor thecontinuedadvanceof thedivisiontoBelgium.Friendlylosseswerenotinconsiderable,however.Inadditiontofortynoncommissionedofficers andenlistedpersonnelkilled, the rifle regimenthadalso lostLeutnant Lemke, Leutnant Amede, Leutnant Koch, Leutnant Strauß,Leutnant Hessler, and LeutnantGraf von Arnim. The wounded included 144noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, as well as 9 officers(Hauptmann Peschke, Oberleutnant von den Heyden-Rynsch, OberleutnantSeidel,OberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthern,LeutnantBusch,LeutnantBüschen,LeutnantBusack,LeutnantJenoquel,andLeutnantRosemeyer).The35.Infanterie-Division,whichhadbeenmarchingbehindthe3.Panzer-

Division on 15 May, moved its lead elements forward during the night andrelievedthe1stand2ndBattalionsoftherifleregiment,whichhadnoteatenin

thirty-six hours. MG-Bataillon 7 was inserted into the line next to the 3rdBattalionoftherifleregiment,bothofwhichweretoremaininthefrontlinesforthetimebeing.AsspecialrecognitionforthedifficultfightinginBelgium,twoofficersofthe

3.Panzer-DivisionwouldlaterreceivetheKnight’sCrosstotheIronCrossforthe actions just described. One was Oberleutnant Buchterkirch, the platoonleaderof theLightPlatoonof the1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6.HehadalreadybeenarecipientoftheSpanishCrossinGold.7Therecommendationforthe award stated that “through his brave and decisive actions had favorablyinfluenced the conduct of the attack in his sector.His fighting vehicle,whichlater burned out as the result of a direct hit, was responsible for putting sixenemy tanksoutofbattle andhisplatoondestroyeda totalof eighteenenemyfightingvehicles.”Thecommanderofthe3rdBattalionoftherifleregiment,MajorKratzenberg,

also received the high-level award for the actions of his capable formation inbreakingthroughtheDylePosition.8

The sixteenth of May passed with reorganizing the forces, improving thepositions that hadbeenwonand even some rest.The reconnaissancebattalionand the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 reconnoitered far to the front. Late in theafternoon, theareaaroundTillywasreached,and the townwascrossedby thetroopsof thereconnaissancebattalionaround2200hours.Thebattalion,whichhadbeenreinforcedwithriflemenandtanks, tookMarbaisaround2300hours,whereitscreenedforthenight.The corps issued orders to the division at midnight that the pursuit was to

continue with all available forces at daybreak and that the crossings over theBrussels Canal were to be taken. The division formed an advance guardconsisting of rifle, armored, and antitank elements. It was alreadymoving by0100hours.The route led throughTillyandMarbais, to thesouthofNivelles,andontothecanal.Theleadtroopsofthereconnaissancebattalionwerealreadyoutside of Arquennes at 0535 hours, where they were engaged by tanks thatappearedthere.Elementsofthe2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6assistedthereconnaissanceelementsinthatengagementandrolledonasfarasArquennes.The8thCompanyofthetankregimentencounteredtheFrenchfightingvehiclesoutside ofGrenfaux.Oberleutnant Baron von Nolde knocked out five enemytanksinthefirstexchangeoffire.At 0850 hours, the corps directed that a bridgehead be established over the

canal.Thatmissioncouldnotbeexecuted.Thevillagewasoccupiedwithstrongforces and the bridges had been blown up. The bridge at Chaumont, twokilometers north ofRonquieres,was also in thewater,where enemy elementswerealsoidentifiedalongthebanksofthecanal.TheLightPlatoonofPanzer-Regiment6, under the leadership ofLeutnant vonDiest-Koerber, knocked outtwo fighting vehicles during his reconnaissance-in-force.The7thCompanyofthearmored regimentwasdirected to take thebridges inArquennes.The leadplatoon of the company entered the village, but it was forced to halt due tointense enemy antitank fire. The platoon leader’s vehicle was set alight, withOberleutnant Schoen and his crew all being killed. It was impossible to getclosertothebridges.The5thCompany,whichhadbeenfollowing,alsoboggeddowninthefaceoftheenemy’santitankgunbelt.Sinceartilleryfirethenstartedto hamper the approach of the remaining companies, the regiment decided toprotecttheflanksoftheadvanceguardtobothsidesofArquennesforthetimebeing.While the lead elementswere still fighting it outwith the enemy, themain

bodywasstillfartotherearandmovinginthreemarchserials.Themajorityofthe forces were under Oberst Kühn and consisted of major elements of thearmoredbrigade,includingPanzer-Regiment5,andtheheadquartersoftherifleregiment and its 3rd Battalion. The secondmarch serial, under the control ofMajorvonBernuth,hadthe1stBattalionoftherifleregimentandtheantitankbattalion as its combat elements. The third serial, under OberstleutnantFuhrmann,consistedoftherestofthedivision.Theartillerywassplitamongalloftheserials.The corps headquarters issued orders at 1400 hours. The division was to

advance in the general direction of Soignes and Ath, while the rifle brigadecrossed the canal with elements and established a bridgehead. The 12thCompany of the rifle regiment and platoons from the divisional engineerbattalionweredirectedtocrossthecanalinArquennes,whilethe3rdCompanyof themotorcycle battalionwas to look for a crossing point atRenissart. Theremaining companies of themotorcycle battalion and the 3rdBattalion of therifleregimentweregivenChâteaudelaRocqastheircrossingpoint.Theriflebrigadethenorderedthattheformationofthebridgeheadswastobe

delayed. While the motorcycle battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the rifleregiment could be stopped in time, Hauptmann Orts 12th Company enteredArquennes.Theriflemenwereallbythemselves.Nonetheless,theycrossedthe

canal.Itturnedoutthattheenemyhadpulledbackduringtheeveningandhadevacuated the village. The attached engineers did not cross over with theriflemen.Theyhadalreadybeencalledback.Thus,Orts’scompanyremainedonthewestsideofthecanaltheentirenight.Itwasonlyafterexpressorderswerereceived from the brigade the next morning that it pulled back from thebridgeheadithadwon.The3rdCompanyofthemotorcyclebattalionwasfinallygiventhegreenlight

to attempt a crossing at Renissart. While approaching, Oberleutnant Beck’scompany received heavy enemy machine-gun fire. The motorcycle infantryhalted.Unteroffizier Lowawas sent forward to reconnoiter.His squad enteredthe village and called the neighboring squad ofUnteroffizier Liebich forward.ButbothsquadswereunabletocounterthefirefromtheMoroccans,whowereable to take every movement in the village and in the open under fire fromimproved positions. Fortunately, light tanks arrived along with the rest ofFeldwebel Hauff’s platoon. The fighting vehicles were called back a fewminutes later, after one tank flew into the air. Thatmeant that themotorcycleinfantry also had to pull back. Five deadmenwere left behind in the village(UnteroffizierSteinmetz,GefreiterMüller,GefreiterMaciejewskie,KradschützeFeige, and Kradschütze Wauer). The company set up to defend outside ofRenissart.Itdidnotadvanceagainuntilthatnight.Bythen,HauptmannPape’s2ndCompanyhadalsoarrived.Bothcompaniessucceededinmakingitthroughthecompletelydestroyedvillageandcrossingthecanal.ThevisibleconclusiontothefirstphaseofthecampaignintheWestwasthe

orders received from thecorpson18Maywhichstated thatall furtherattacksweretobeputonholdforthetimebeing.Thedivisionsweretodisengagefromtheenemy.Thecorpswas relieved in sectorby theXXVII.Armee-Korps,withthe division being relieved by the 35. Infanterie-Division of GeneralleutnantReinhard.TheArmyHighCommanddirectedareorganizationof themotorizedforces

thatday.Twostrongarmoredgroupswereformed.Itwasintendedtocutofftheenemy forces withdrawing to the Channel with them. One groupwas formedunderGeneral der InfanterieHoth, comprisedof the3.,4.,5., and7. Panzer-Divisionen,the20.Infanterie-Division(mot.),theSS-Totenkopf-Division,andthe11. Schützen-Brigade. Hoth’s forces were to reinforce the 4. Armee, pivotingnorth,alongwiththeinfantrydivisions,inthedirectionofFlandersandArtois.General der Kavallerie von Kleist commanded the second group of forces,

consistingofthe1.,2.,6.,8.,and10.Panzer-Divisionenandthe2.,13.,and20.Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.), which was to advance directly for the Channel.Two days later, the 2. Panzer-Division of Generalleutnant Veiel and the 8.Panzer-DivisionofGeneralleutnantKuntzenreachedthecoastatAbbévilleandMontreuil-sur-Mer. That started the encirclement of themain body of French,Belgian,andBritishforces.The3.Panzer-Divisionrestedthenexttwodays,ifthat’swhatonewantedto

call it.Weaponswere cleaned, formations held.The first replacements arrivedandwereassigned.Themovewasscheduledtobeginat0800hourson20May.The division command staff crossed the French border at Cousolre, east ofMaubeuge,around0800hours.Thedivisionfollowedintwolargemarchserials.Theriflebrigademovedto the leftof thearmoredbrigadeontworoads to theborder,whichwasnotreacheduntil2200hours in theareabetweenGrandrieuand Hestrud. The march serial of the rifle brigade was structured as follows:GroupA(MajorKratzenberg),consistingoftheIII./Schützen-Regiment3,the6.and10./Flak-Regiment26,andPanzerjäger-Abteilung39;andGroupB(MajorZimmermann), consistingof the II./Schützen-Regiment3, the7./Flak-Regiment26,thelightengineersection,andamedicalcompany.Thelargemarchserialonthe right consisted of the two armored regiments, the motorcycle infantrybattalion,andthedivisionalartillery.TheadvanceguardofthedivisionwasunderthecommandofMajorMeese,

the commander of the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment. In addition to hisbattalion,thereconnaissancebattalion,elementsofthemotorcyclebattalion,andbatteries from the divisional artillery were also attached. The advance guardencounteredenemyfightingvehiclesat1140hoursatthenortheastportionoftheMormalWoods.Thecorpsorderedthebroadexpanseofwoodlandtobecleared.Theriflebattalionandthemotorcycleinfantryelementswereemployedtothatend, but were soon called back when aerial reconnaissance revealed that thewoodswerestillfullofenemyforces.Thedivisionbypassed thewoods to thenorthandmoved in thedirectionof

Denain,whilethe4.Panzer-Divisionwentaround thewoods to thesouth.Themotorcycle infantry battalion established a bridgehead over the Sambre atBoussières at 1300 hours. Around 2100 hours, the corps orderedGeneralleutnant Koch-Erpach’s 8. Infanterie-Division to comb the MormalWoodsfromthenorth,whilecorpsforcescutoffthewoodsfromtheeast,south,andwest.For that operation, the3.Panzer-Divisionwas directed to guard the

northern flankof thecorps in thedirectionofValenciennesand toadvanceonDenain.Theadvanceguardwaspivoted in thedirectionof theSambre toscreen.To

thatend,the1stBattalionoftherifleregimentestablishedpositionsinthebendof the Sambre fromHargnies to Pont-sur-Sambre. The engineer battalionwasattachedtotheriflemeninsupport.Themotorcycleinfantrybattalionremainedbehind to screen in the direction of the woods, along with the artillery andantitank elements. Soldiers took thirty prisoners from the French 101st and143rd InfantryDivisions there. The antitank elements shot up five trucks in aconvoy,whichwasattemptingtoescapefromthewoods.Thedivision,whosecommandpostwaslocatedinSt.Remy-du-Nord,formed

astrongKampfgruppeat0100hoursandgaveitthemissionofbreakingthroughthelineofenemybunkersnorthandwestofAmfroipretonthenorthwesttipoftheMormalWoods and throw back the enemy forces west and southwest ofBavai.OberstFreiherrvonFunckassumedcommandofthebattlegroup,whichconsisted of Panzer-Regiment 5,Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, the III./Schützen-Regiment 3, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 8./Flak-Lehr-Regiment, the3.Pionier-Bataillon39,andthe1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39.The armored regiment moved out at 0630 hours and made enemy contact

startingat0744hoursatthewesternoutskirtsofMecquignies.Theenemywasejected there.Twohours later, the line of bunkers atAmfroipretwas reached.The armor was then unable to proceed any further. The armored brigadecommander,OberstKühn,directedPanzer-Regiment6forward,whichwasabletotakeouttwobunkersinitsfirsteffort.The2ndBattalionofthatregimentborethe brunt of the fighting, in which Oberleutnant Rohrbeck and FeldwebelZippliesdistinguishedthemselves.At1800hours,thesamebattalionstormedthevillageofWargnies-le-Grand.Afterthetankshadpassedthroughthevillage,thetrains vehicles that were following received heavy fire. Leutnant Hildebrandracedbacktosupportthetrainselements,buthisfightingvehiclewasknockedout. The I./Panzer-Regiment 6 then arrived on the battlefield. Together withLeutnant Oelrich and his assault detachment,Hauptmann Schneider-KostalskiandFeldwebel Thiele from the 2nd Company eliminated four enemy bunkerseastofJenlain.The armored brigade concluded that the elimination of individual bunkers

along the line of fortifications was not enough. It was directed that riflemen,antitank elements and Flak cannoneers clear the line. The two armored

regimentswerepulledback.Afterminorskirmishes,Panzer-Regiment5madeittoPreux-au-Sart.TheantitankbattaliontookOrsinval,wherethereconnaissancebattalion was engaged. The armored brigade was located just southwest ofJenlain that evening and continuing to advance west. In the process,ValenciennesandtheheavilyfortifiedFortCurgiesontherightwereleftalone.The12thCompanyoftherifleregiment,reinforcedbyengineerelements,was

thenemployed to engage thebunker complex.After a surprise attack failed, astruggle commenced that lasted for hours. By 1800 hours, one platoon ofriflemenandtwosectionsofassaultengineerswerestillattemptingtoputoneoftheconcreteblocksoutofcommission.Thedefenderswereputtingupa toughfightandinflictedheavylossesontheattackers.Germanmedicswereconstantlyonthego.Twomedics,ObergefreiterCorssenandOberschützeMeyer,werecutdownintheperformanceoftheirduties.Whenaplatoonfromthe11thCompanyarrivedtoassistitssistercompany,thebunkerswerefinallytakendown.During the fighting, the 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment was ordered to

follow right behind Panzer-Regiment 6, which was spreading out into battleformation. The rifle brigade reached the area around Villers-Pol toward 2200hours with its formations, securing the area, along with the armored brigade,which was also there. The 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment was employedagainst the high ground at Mareches, while the regiment’s 2nd Battalionscreened to the west andMG-Bataillon 7 to the north. The 6. and 9./Flak-Regiment26wereentrustedwithprotectingtheflanks.Behindthoseformations,the 1st Battalion of the artillery regiment oriented to the right, while the 2ndBattalion trained its guns to the left. The front lines of the rifle brigadewerereinforcedwithLeutnant Fechner’s1./Panzer-Regiment6 andHauptmann vonVersen’s 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39. The badly battered 12th Companyremainedinreserve.ThearmoredbrigadehadestablishedablockingpositioninfrontofthedivisionalongthecreeknorthofArtes.OberstleutnantBurmeister,thecommanderoftheII./Panzer-Regiment6wasinchargeoftheforcesarrayedthere,whichconsistedof the13./Schützen-Regiment3, the7./Panzer-Regiment6, and one platoon each from the 8./Panzer-Regiment 6 and Panzerjäger-Abteilung39.Themissionforthenextdayhadthecorpsbreakingtheenemy’sresistancein

andaroundtheMormalWoodsandthencontinuingtoadvanceonthedel’EcautCanal. The 3. Panzer-Division had to take the canal running along the lineMarly–Denain.Tothatend,thedivisionformedanadvanceguardat0920hours

under the command ofOberstFreiherr von Funck, towhom the II./Schützen-Regiment3wasstillattached.But by 1145 hours, the corps sent out a directive that all of it was to start

marching to the southwest. The Leibstandarte SS “Adolf Hitler” (mot.) wasdirected to assume the division’s sector. SS-Obergruppenführer Dietrich, thereinforced regiment’s commander, arrived at thedivision commandpost a fewminutesafterreceiptoftheorderinordertobebriefed.Thedivisionstageditsformationsforthenewoperation.Mostofthearmored

brigade, along with the 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment, the motorcycleinfantry battalion, and elements of the divisional artillery screened thereorganization and assembly in the Préseau–Guérenaing–Sommaing area. Theadvanceguardcontinuedtoremainincontactwiththeenemy.Towardnoon,thereconnaissancebattalion took the enemy’s bunkers andpositions in thewoodseastofPréseau.Around1600hours,LeutnantvonViebahnofthe2ndTroopofthe reconnaissance battalion advanced as far as the center of the city ofValencienneswithadismountedpatrol,bringingbackvaluableinformation.Bythen,Panzer-Regiment5hadmadeittothecanalandwasabletotakethebridgeatThiantintactafterhardfighting.Inthatroundoffighting,the2ndBattalionoftherifle regiment lost fourdeadand thirteenwounded, includingOberleutnantvonKayserandLeutnantDittmer.At 1630 hours, Oberstleutnant i.G. von dem Borne brought the corps

movement order. The division was directed to advance to the area aroundCambrai. To that end, two march serials were formed, which were to moveindependentlyofoneanother.Theywere tobeprepared tomoveno later than1830 hours. The division deliberated whether the bridge that had just beencapturedatThiantshouldbeblownup.Thatmeasureprovedunnecessary,astheLeibstandarte elements showed up in time and assumed control of thebridgehead.Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel led March Group I. The order of march:

Kradschützen-Bataillon 3; headquarters, Schützen-Regiment 3; 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39; 8./Flak-Lehr-Regiment; II./Artillerie-Regiment 75 (minus its 4thBattery);II./Flak-Regiment26 (minus its 8th and 9thBatteries); III./Schützen-Regiment 3; I./Artillerie-Regiment 75 (minus its 1st Battery); Panzerjäger-Abteilung39;andPanzer-Regiment5.Therouteofthemarchgroup:Ruesnes–Beaudignies–Neuville–Vendegies–Ovillers and on as far as Beugny, east ofBapaume.Thesixty-kilometer routewascoveredwithout regard to theenemy.

Contact was frequently lost between the units and formations; there were toomany destroyed bridges and other obstacles. Since the route led through thebattlefieldsofWorldWarI,individualmilitarycemeteriescouldoccasionallybeseen along the sides of the road.The tank companies had an especially toughtimeofitduringthenightmarch,whichplacedaterrificstrainonbothpersonnelandmateriel.Panzer-Regiment6 suffered themechanical lossof the followingvehicles that night: fourPanzerI’s, twoPanzerII’s, one command tank, threemotorcycles,andthreetrucks.Thefieldarmyheadquartersissuedthefollowingordertelephonicallyat2100

hours:“GruppeHothadvancestotherightofthelineHesdin–Lillers–Merville.It is sufficient if the line Arras–Vimy Hills–Aire–St. Omer–Gravelines isreached.”Onthatday,GeneralderInfanterieHothcommandedtwoarmoredcorps:the

XXXIX Armee-Korps (mot.), with the 5. and 7. Panzer-Divisionen, the SS-Totenkopf-Division, and the 11. Schützen-Brigade; and the XVI. Armee-Korps(mot.), with the 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen and the 20. Infanterie-Division(mot.).Thedivisionintelligenceofficer,HauptmannBarth,wentforwardthenextday

around 1700 hours to establish contact with the SS-Totenkopf-Division. Thedivision also startedmarching again with its twomarch groups. Shortly aftermovingout,reportscameinabouttheappearanceofenemyarmoredforcesthatwere approaching on both sides of the Arras–Bapaume road. The antitankbattalion, the 8./Flak-Lehr-Regiment, and the 1st Company of engineers wereimmediatelyemployedaroundErvilles indefensivepositions.Theenemy tankattackdidnotrunintothe3.Panzer-Division,however,andthemarchcontinuedunimpeded. Themen of the divisions saw their first capturedBritish soldiers.Aroundmidnight,thedivisionwasinitsnewrestarea.Thetwenty-fourthofMaywasanotherdayofintenseactivity.Fromwithinthe

sectorofGruppeHoth,the12.Infanterie-DivisionwasalreadyatArras.The11.Schützen-Brigade and the 5. Panzer-Division were fighting. The 4. Panzer-DivisionwassentforwardthroughBéthune,whiletheSS-Verfügungs-Division9establishedabridgeheadalongthed’Aire–LaBasséeCanalandwasadvancingonSt.Vènant.At0900hours,thecorpsorderedthe3.Panzer-DivisiontohaveareinforcedmotorizedKampfgruppe standing by. Two hours later, it was givenorderstotakethebridgesatRobecqandBusnes.

TheBattleofFlanders:DevelopmentoftheSituationon27May1940.

Thedivisiongavethemissiontotheriflebrigadeat1415hourstotakethosebridges and then force a crossing over the Lys canal at Merville. The rifleregiment attacked in thedirectionof thecanalwith its1st and2ndBattalions,reinforced by the antitank battalion and the 1st Battalion of the divisionalartillery.The forwardobserver from the6thBattery enjoyedgreat observationover the entire attack sector from the church tower in Busnes. The battalionsreachedthecanalnorthofBusnes,afterstubbornfightingagainstformationsoftheBritish2ndInfantryDivision.Theengineers immediatelystartederectingabridge,soonallowingtheriflemenandantitankelementstocrossandadvanceasfar as thenorthernoutskirtsofRobecq.English snipers causedagreatdealof

disruption.Generalmajor Stumpff then summoned all of his senior commanders to

Busnestoexplaintothemasbesthecould—hereallydidnotknowthereason,asdidnoneoftheothermajorcommanders—whyHitlerhadhaltedhisarmoreddivisions,allowing theEnglishandFrench fieldarmies time towithdraw theirforces and to evacuate Dunkirk. It was assumed by all of the officers of thedivision—atleastthatwaswhatwasrecordedinthedailylogsoftheintelligenceofficer—thattheenemywouldattempttobreakouttothesouth.TheLaBasséeCanal provided the best natural line of defense for interdicting that attempt.Furthermore, it was assumed that the broken-up terrain of Flanders posed anobstacle to tanks, thus preventing the fullmobility and firepower of an armordivisionfrombeingbroughttobear.Butevenconsideringthat,giventheenemysituation,onlyarapidpursuitoftheenemycouldledtovictoryovertheenemy—thatmuchwasalsorecordedinthedailylogs.At 1825 hours, the rifle brigadewas surprised to receive the order that the

mission to take Merville had been rescinded. The brigade was directed toimmediatelyceaseworkontheengineerbridgeandpullbacktheelementsthathad already crossed the canal. Shaking their heads, the officers and enlistedpersonnel followed those directives. The engineers were allowed to mine theterrainon the far side, however.Once theyweredone, they also crossedbackundercoveringfirefromanantitankplatoon.Under thecommandofOberstKleemann, the1st and2ndBattalionsof the

rifleregiment,alongwithMG-Bataillon7,occupiedadeepdefensivezonealongthecanal.Allformationswerebroughtbackacross;onlyafewcombatoutpostswere left on the far side along a line running Carvin–Les Amusoises. Theirmissionwastoturnbackenemyreconnaissanceelementsbuttopullbackintheface of superior enemy forces. The divisional engineers prepared all otherbridgesover thecanal fordemolition incaseof theenemy’sapproach, after ithadtakendownitssixteen-tonbridgeatRobecq.Allboatsandwatercraftalongthecanalweredestroyed.Theengineerplatoonsofthetworiflebattalionsbuiltfootbridges for the combat outposts. A forward observer from the artillerycontinuedtobepostedintheRobecqchurchtower.Theimposingtowerwasalsoprepared for demolition. The artillery regiment went into position. All of thevehiclesof thedivisionwere sentback to theRieux–Lillers–Cauchyarea.Themotorcycle infantrybattalion, the8./Flak-Lehr-Regiment and the3rdBattalionoftherifleregimentwerequarteredintheFloringhem–Pernesareaandheldasa

reserve.TheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)remainedonlinewithitsthreedivisionsinthe

areabetweenBéthuneandLillers.TheSS-Totenkopf-Divisionwasinsertedinthefront between the two armored divisions, thus become the righthand of the3.Panzer-Division.ThelefthandneighborwastheSS-Verfügungs-Division,whichwaspartoftheXXXXI.Armee-Korps(mot.)ofPanzergruppeKleist.ElementsoftheBritish2ndInfantryDivisionwerereportedinfrontofthedivision’ssector.In general, 26Maywas quiet. The division had only a strong battle group

from the rifle brigade in position. The weather was poor, with rainy stormssweeping over the fields of Flanders. Fortunately, the first mail arrived fromhomethatdayandallowedthesoldierstoforgetthewindandtherain.Major Meese’s 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment crossed the canal the

previous night and encircled Robecq from the east and north. The brigadeprovided the battalion with additional elements of the 1st Battalion of theartillery regiment, the antitank battalion and the engineer battalion. At 0900hours, theKampfgruppe attacked the village straight on. TheBritish defendeddoggedly.Afightdevelopedforeveryintersectionandeveryhouse.Theenemymachinegunsfiredfrombasementwindows,roofaccessdoorsandeveryholeina wall. The riflemen had no other choice but to smoke out each houseindividually. The 5th Company of the rifle regiment, the engineers and twoheavytanks,whichhadbeenbroughtforward,reportedthemostsuccess.Itwasnotuntil1600hours,whoever,thatRobecqwasfirmlyinGermanhands.Two officers and thirty-six enlisted started their journey to Germany as

prisoners. They had been assigned to the following formations: The DurhamLight Infantry Regiment, the Royal Berkshire Regiment and the RoyalWelshFusilierregiment(allfromthe6thInfantryBrigade).Withtheexceptionoftheofficers,alloftheprisonersthoughttheyweregoingtobesummarilyexecuted.Thatwasthereasonwhytheyhadfoughtsostubbornly.Inaddition,thespoilsofwar for theday included twoantitankguns and twomortars.Thedifficulty intakingRobecqcouldbemeasuredinthehighnumberoffriendlycasualties.The1stBattalionoftherifleregimenthadsufferedoneofficer(LeutnantKayser)andsixteen noncommissioned officers and enlisted dead. Hauptmann Haspel,OberleutnantWüst,Leutnant Schmittchen,Leutnant Dziewas, and twenty-fiveenlistedpersonnelwerewounded.The battalion improved its positions within the newly won bridgehead and

held itagainst the immediatecounterattacks launchedby theBritish.Someten

heavytanks,approachingfromEstaires,wereidentifiedbytheriflemen.Oneofthefightingvehicleswasimmobilizedbyminesinfrontofthepositionsandwasfinallyputoutofcommissionbywell-placedartilleryfire.The division was attached to Generalleutnant Reinhart’s XXXXI. Armee-

Korps (mot.). Reinhart’s chief of staff was Oberstleutnant i.G. Röttiger. Acommander’s conferencewas held at the division command post around 2200hours.ItwasdirectedforthedivisiontomoveoutfromthevicinityofitscombatoutpostsinthedirectionofMerville–Bailleulat0800hourson27May.Tohelpaccomplish that mission, SS-Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) “Deutschland”10 wasattached,aswasalightartillerybattalion,anengineercompany,acompanyfromHeeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 (with nine 4.7-centimeter self-propelledantitankguns),andaheavyFlakbatteryfromFlak-Regiment101.Thedivisionformedtwostrongattackgroups.TheKampfgruppeontheright

was commanded by Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel and consisted of theIII./Schützen-Regiment 3, the I./Panzer-Regiment 6, the I./Artillerie-Regiment75, and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 (minus the 3rd Company). KampfgruppeKleemannontheleftconsistedofMG-Bataillon7,theII./Schützen-Regiment3,the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the I./Panzer-Regiment 5. Oberst Kühn’sarmorbrigadewaspositionedinthesouthernportionsofLillersandMensecqtobreak through once the rifle attack succeeded. The 1st Battalion of the rifleregimentwasheldatthedivision’sdisposalinRobecq.The rifle battalions that formed the main effort of the attack were staged

duringthenightandearlyinthemorning.MajorKratzenberg’s3rdBattalionhadhis 11th Company on the right, his 13th Company on the left, and the 12thCompanyandanengineerplatooninreserve.HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski’s2nd Company of Panzer-Regiment 6 was attached to the rifle battalion.Oberleutnant vonBrodowski’sandFeldwebelHöhe’s platoonsprovideddirectsupport to the 11th Company, while Oberleutnant Graf zu Dohna’s platoonassisted the 13th Company. Leutnant Schneider, Leutnant Falkenthal, andWachtmeisterFritz,allfromthe1stBattalionofartillery,arrivedasfire-supportofficers.LeutnantKrammofthe2ndCompanyoftheengineerbattalionreportedinastheleaderofanengineerreconnaissanceparty,whosemissionitwastofindthebestplacetoerectasixteen-tonbridgeatMerville.Major Zimmermann’s 2nd Battalion, which had been directed to take St.

Vénant, positioned its 7thCompanyon the right and the 8thCompanyon theleft.The 9thCompanywas inserted into themiddle,while the 10thCompany

washeldback.The2ndCompanyofPanzer-Regiment5 (MajorSchmidt’s1stBattalion) was attached in support and provided each rifle company with aplatoonoftanks.The division command post moved to the high ground 1.5 kilometers

southeastofBurbureat0730hours.TheStukaattack,whichhadbeenrequestedto start at 0745 hours against the woods at Amont and Moyen, as well asMervilleproper,wascalledoffduetotheheavygroundfog.Afewbombersflewoverthefriendlylines,buttheirtargetswereunknown.After a short artillery preparation, which provided Oberst Kleemann’s

Kampfgruppewiththebruntofitsfires,thedivision’sattackstartedpromptlyat0800hours.Theriflecompanies,whichmovedoutimmediately,madeonlyslowprogress in the completely flat terrain. The sparse vegetation provided littleconcealmentandmade iteasier for theenemysnipers to takeaim.TheBritishsoldiersstubbornlydefendedtheoutskirtsofSt.Vénant.The8thCompanywasbeingledbyOberleutnantvonWallenberg,whohadonlytakencommandoftheorphaned company two hours previously.Despite the enemy’s defensive fires,his riflemen entered the village and fought their way forward along themainstreet between the individual farmsteads in the direction of the railwayembankment.TheBritishcontinuedtoholdoutamongtheruins,however,andtook everymovement under fire.VonWallenbergwas cut downby a burst ofmachine-gunfire.OberleutnantMüller-Röhrbach’s7thCompanyhadmovedoutfromBusnesinthedirectionofthewatertowerinthemeantime,butitwasonlyable togaingroundslowlyasaresultof theenemy’sdefensivefires.LeutnantvonBismarckwasbadlywoundedinthatadvanceanddiedashortwhilelaterofhiswounds.The 8thCompany,whichwas then being led byLeutnantEnglisch, did not

succeed in reaching the bridge over the canal until around noon. Its elementswere joined by elements from the neighboring SS-Verfügungs-Division.MajorZimmermann immediately employed his 6th Company and advanced throughthevillagewithitinordertoformabridgehead.TheBritishelementsfightinginthe houses along the road leading to Haverskerque were overcome and threeofficers were taken prisoner. By then, the tanks of Major Schmidt and theantitankelementsofthe10thCompany(HauptmannZabel)hadcomeforward.Enemyarmoredcarsandfightingvehiclesattemptedagainandagaintoreducethebridgehead,whichhadbeenreinforcedbythe7thCompany.ItwasnotuntilUnteroffiziervonderHorstandGefreiterStöckerandtheirsmallantitankguns

knocked out four tanks and two armored cars that the British gave up theiroffensive efforts. The battalion had an easier time holding on to its positionsafterthebatteriesofthe2ndBattalionofthedivisionalartillerymovedforwardtothesouthernapproachestoSt.Vénantintheafternoon.TherighthandKampfgruppeofOberstleutnantvonManteuffelwascommitted

directlyagainstMerville,whereitnotonlyencountereddeepwaterditchesbutalso strong resistance. Despite that, the riflemen were in Calonne forty-fiveminutesaftertheattackhadstarted.Themanydrainageditchesthatcrisscrossedthecountrysideweredifficulttocross.Forthecrewsoftheheavymachineguns,the infantry guns, and themortars, the heavy clay soil presented a significantobstacle.ThefightingvehiclesoftheI./Panzer-Regiment6arrivedinCalonnestarting

at 0900 hours. They attempted to get as far as Merville in a coup de main.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski, the commander of the 2nd Company, had afewmen from the 11thCompany of the rifle regimentmount his tanks. Theythen thrust into thevillage.Approaching fromthesouthwestwere themediumtanks of Oberleutnant von Brodowski and Oberleutnant Graf zu Dohna’splatoon.One platoon, under the command ofFeldwebel Biesicke, approachedtheBritishairstrip.Actingquickly,itsetthreemachinesalight,aswellasseveraltrucksandtwoantitankguns.FeldwebelWolf’splatooneliminatedtwoantitankguns and a fighting vehicle. At that point, the lead elements of the companyreached the railway crossing, where it started receiving murderous defensivefires.LeutnantvonWinterfeld’stankreceivedadirecthit.Thetank’sturretflewhighintotheairandlandedontheroadwithacrash.Noneofthecrewsurvived.TherewereroadobstacleseverywhereinMervillethatmadeforwardmovementimpossible. Inaddition,Englishmachinegunswerehammeringaway fromalldirections: from the roofs, cellar windows, and house windows. InterspersedwerethesoundsofBritishfieldhowitzersthathadcamouflagedthemselveswellafter going into position off the side of the road and in front of the largememorial. The 2./Panzer-Regiment 6 had a total loss of one more tank inadditiontotheplatoonleader’svehicle.Twoothertanksreceivedbattledamage.Nonetheless,thecompanywasabletosilencesixguns.Friendlylosseswerenotinconsiderable. Oberarzt Dr. Koch, the battalion surgeon, who had comeforward, had his hands full in recovering the wounded. Since the fightingcontinued to increase in intensity,Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski decided topull back. The maneuver was successfully supported by fires from the 1stCompany,whichhadreachedtheMervillebattlefieldinthemeantime.

Ithadturnednoonbythen.Thesunburneddownfromtheskiesinbetweenrain showers. The 1st Battalion of the divisional artillery tookMerville underconcentric fire, after the tank companies had returned to the outskirts of thetown.The3rdBattalionof therifle regiment thenattacked.The leadcompany—OberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthern’s11th—crossedtherailwayembankmentsouthofthelocalityat1130hoursandenteredthetownforthesecondtime.Theenemy,whocouldbarelybemadeout,firedontheriflemenlikehehadbefore.Onceagain,thereweredeadandwounded.Thetirelesssurgeonsandmedicshadnorestthatday.The regiment ordered the bridge to be taken immediately. It had been

identified by aerial reconnaissance as being intact. But the British resistancegrewfromstreetcornertostreetcornerandfromhousetohouse.Althoughthebrave men of the 11th Company made it as far as the northern canal, thedrawbridgehadbeen raised there andwas apparently riggedwithdemolitions.The company had to take cover. Likewise, the 13th Company was unable tomakeanyfurtherprogress.Thecompanycommander,HauptmannderReserveDr.Sturm,wasbadlywoundedanddiedashortwhilelater.EvenOberleutnantGraf zuDohna’s tankswereunable tohelp inanysignificant fashion.Contactwas lost between the two forward companies. The 12thCompany,whichwassent forward, was finally able to establish a cohesive front after some time.OberstleutnantvonManteuffeldecided tocalloff theattackuntil such timeastheneighboringSS-Totenkopf-Division andKradschützen-Bataillon3 had gonearoundMervilleandencircledit.MG-Bataillon 7 had been able to establish a small bridgehead north of St.

Florisatnoon.ThereconnaissancebattalionreachedKorbisandadvancedwithpatrols intothed’AmontandMoyenWoods.TheattackbytheSS-Verfügungs-Division was starting to have a positive effect in the sector of the 3. Panzer-Division around 1500 hours. The III./SS-Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Deutschland” was inMeurilon and pressing on La Brianna. The rest of thebattalionsofthatregimentwerescreeninginthedirectionofEstaires.Thedivision issuedorders toerectasixteen-tonbridgeacross theLyscanal

southofLeSart.The1stCompanyoftherifleregiment(HauptmannvonPlato)succeededinestablishingabridgeheadafterasharpskirmishinthevillageandthenholdingitagainstallattacks.Duringtheoperation,thecompanytookfortyprisoners and captured or destroyed five trucks, threeCardon-Lloyd tankettes,threeinfantryguns,andonearmoredcar.

Thearmoredbrigademovedacrossthebridgeinordertobreaktheremainingresistance in Merville.Oberst von Funck andOberstleutnant von Manteuffelbrought their regiments forward to attack. The II./Panzer-Regiment 6 wasattached to Panzer-Regiment 5 for the attack. Oberstleutnant Tröger’smotorcycle infantry battalion reinforced the armored regiments. LeutnantPanzlaffandhisleadplatoonfromthe3rdCompanyofthemotorcycleinfantryestablished contact with the 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment around 1845hoursandreachedtherailwayembankment.Buttheadvanceofthemotorcycleinfantryandthetanksthenboggeddown.Themediumtankswerepulledoutofthefiringlinesoastotakethevillageunderfirewiththeir7.5-centimetermainguns. The senselessness of continuing the attack in that pitch-black and rainynightbecameincreasinglyclear.Correspondingly,thedivisionordereditsforcestopullbackfromMervillearound2240hours.The division pulled its forces out of the town and established a combat-

outpost line along the railway embankment south of Merville–Calonnebridgehead–eastern outskirts of Cornet-Male. It remained in contact with theforcesofSS-Infanterie-Regiment“Deutschland”alongthatline.Occupyingtheforward positionswere the 3./Schützen-Regiment 3,Kradschützen-Bataillon 3,the 1./Schützen-Regiment 3, the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39, and Heeres-Panzerjäger-Kompanie 527. The total number of prisoners taken that dayamountedto310Britishand20Frenchsoldiers.TheBritishbelongedtoactive-duty formations, includingguards regiments,of the ICorps.Losseswithin therifle regiment in dead amounted to 3 officers and 15 enlisted personnel; inwounded,thenumberstotaled5officersand66enlistedpersonnel.The corps issued orders that night to repeat the attack the next day. The

division’s objectivewas the area aroundBailleul.By 0430 hours, the divisionhadestablisheditsobjectiveasthehighgroundsouthwestofBailleul.ItwastoleaveMervillealone.The divisionmovedout at 1000hours in stormy and rainyweather. Patrols

from the 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment could no longer find any enemyforcesinMerville,withtheexceptionoftheareaaroundthechurch,whereafewprisonersweretaken.Correspondingly,thebattalionmovedimmediatelyintothetown,supportedbythe4thCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6(HauptmannWeiß).ItmovedthroughthetownandthenestablishedcontactwithMG-Bataillon7andSS-Infanterie-Regiment“Deutschland” justeastandnorthofMerville.Panzer-Regiment 6 then screened from the northern portion of the town with its 1st

Battalionandthewesternportionwithits2ndBattalion.Thereconnaissanceandmotorcycle infantry battalionsmarched forward on foot due to the intractablemudand the continuouslymisting rains.Themotorcycle infantrywere able toestablishabridgeheadatSt.Tournantat1200hours,while the reconnaissanceelementsmadeittothenorthernedgeoftheHamontWoods.At 1330 hours, the corps ordered the division to transition to the defense,

sinceitwasfearedtheBritishweregoingtolaunchanimmediatecounterattack.Thatdidnotmaterialize,andthreehourslater,anewattackwasorderedfor1800hours. The enemywas still holding out in the Lestrem–Estaires area andwasmaking life difficult for the SS-Verfügungs-Division. That also did notmaterialize,sincethedivisionwasreattachedtotheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)at1900 hours, after the attack had been postponed for an hour. A commanders’conferencewas held twohours later at theGeneralmajor Stumpff’s commandpost.Thedivisioncommanderannounced theplans for thenextday.After the1stCompanyofthedivisionengineersbuiltasixteen-tonbridgeatMerville,thedivisionwouldattackwithallofitsforces.The Britishwere very activewith their artillery that night. The harassment

fires caused unwelcome unrest among the companies thatwere screening andalsocausedafewcasualties.Adirecthitslammedintothepositionsof the5thBattery of artillery. The British fires were intended to cover the retrogrademovements of their own forces.When patrols entered Neuf-Berquin the nextmorning,theyfoundittobeclearoftheenemy.The division then started its advance at 1100 hours.General Hoepner had

visited thecommandpost justprior to thatand indicated for the first time thatthecorpsmightbepulledoutoftheattackfrontage.Thereinforcedriflebrigadeborethebruntoftheattackthatday,whilemostofthearmorbrigadewasheldinthe previously reached area awaiting the opportunity to follow up once theriflemenhadgainedsufficientground.TheobjectiveofKampfgruppeKleemannwas the lineLaDoulieu–LaCouranne; that of the armored regimentswas thehighgroundsouthofMeteren.Theriflebrigadeemployedthe3rdBattalionoftherifleregimentontheright

andMG-Bataillon 7 on the left. The 2nd Battalion of the rifle regiment waspositioned behind the machine-gun battalion, with the motorcycle infantrybattalion echeloned to the left rear. Both of the lead battalions received acompany of light tanks from Panzer-Regiment 6 and a company of antitankelements.The1stBattalionofthedivisionalartillerywasdirectedtosupportthe

advance of the first assault group. Leutnant Fechner’s 1st Company of thearmored regimentwas attached to the righthand group,withLeutnant Hilpert,Leutnant Falkenthal, Leutnant Buhrmann, Leutnant von Stosch,WachtmeisterSchwarz, andWachtmeister Tschechamowski functioning as forward observersfortheartillery.The3rdBattalion advanced throughNeuf-Berquinwithout encountering the

enemy and moved as far as north and east of Le Doulieu. The machine-gunbattalioncrossedtherailwayembankmenttothenorthofVieux-Berquin,andthereconnaissancebattalionmovedbeyondthatasfarasBailleul.Thesectorsofthecompanies employed kept getting narrower. The continuing reduction of thepocketaroundtheEnglishandFrenchforceswasunmistakablynoticeable.At1645hours,thecorpsheadquartersissuedordersnottocrosstheBailleul–

Meteren road any longer. The lead elements of the 6. Armee had alreadyadvanced past the lead elements of the XVI. Armee-Korps (mot.), advancingfromthesouth.Correspondingly,theriflebrigadesetupascreeninglinealongaline running two kilometers outside of Bailleul–Outersteene–Meteren. Themachine-gunbattalionremainedon the leftwing, followedby the2ndand3rdBattalions of the rifle regiment and then the reconnaissance battalion. The 1stBattalion of the rifle regiment was positioned behind the reconnaissancebattalionasabackstop,anditwasalsosenttotheareaaroundPacaut,southofMerville, to conduct clearingoperations.The rear-area servicesof thedivisionwere allowed to close up at that point. Hauptmann Graf Plauen’s 2ndMaintenanceCompanysetupshopinLillersand,alongwithotherelementsofthe division support command, confiscated a shoe factorywith 3,000 pairs ofshoes,asugarfactorywith100tonsofready-to-consumesugarandalargefueldepotattherailstation.On theeveningof29May, thedivisionhad its forwardcombatoutpostssix

kilometers from the French-Belgian border and fifteen kilometers outside ofYpern.ThatwasthehotlycontestedbattlefieldofWorldWarI,dominatedinthedistancebyKemmelMountain.Anotherphaseofthecampaignwasoverforthedivision.Itthenmovedsouth

fromthepositions ithad takenandoccupiedrestareas in thevicinityofAire–Pernes–Busnes.Mostof thebrigades remained inquarters, but themotorcycleinfantrybattalion,thereconnaissancebattalion,andthe1stBattalionoftherifleregimentwereemployedclearingtheareaoftheenemybetweentheLys,Aire,and La Bassée Canals. The division command was moved from the mill in

CalonnetoIsbergues.The next few days passed without any serious incidents, although the

maintenanceandrepaircompaniesandfacilitiescouldnotcomplainaboutalackof work. The riflemen, cannoneers, engineers, and radio operators got theiruniformscleanedup.Thetwodivisionchaplains,HeidlandandLaub,heldfieldservices and set upmemorials for the fallen. The division’smusical elementsperformed at village squares andhelped raise the spirits of themany refugeeswhohadtakenupprovisionalquartersinbarnsandoutbuildings.Generalmajor Stumpff held a commanders’ conference on 2 June, inwhich

themovementofthedivisiontothesouthandalongtheSommewasdiscussed.Theordersforthatmovementhadarrivedfromthecorpsthepreviousday.Thedivision intelligence officer,Hauptmann Barth, went with Leutnant von demKnesebeck and Sonderführer (translator) Winkin to the headquarters ofPanzergruppeKleist.Fromthere,theywentontothe33.Infanterie-DivisionofGeneralmajorSintzenich, inwhosesector the futureoperationsof thedivisionwere to take place. The infantry division was positioned in a bridgehead atPéronne, facing the French 19th Infantry Division. The French division washoldingthelocalitiessouthoftheSommewithstrongforces.Startingat2100hours,thedivisionmovedsouthfromitspreviousquartering

area along to march routes. The movement led through St. Pol, Arras, andBapaume and the broad and open terrain with its young stands of woods,ripeningwheat fields, andmanymilitary cemeteries fromWorldWar I in theareanorthof theSomme.Thedivisionheadquarterssetup inLeTransloyandthe armored and rifle brigades in the area around Péronne. The leader of thedivision support command,MajorHaker—promoted to that rank on 2 June—broughtuphissectionsbehindthecombatformationsassoonaspossible.Allofthe ammunition for the light howitzers was unloaded at Maurepas.Oberfeuerwerker11 Kaulfers looked for ammunition distribution points, whilethesupplycolumnsunderLeutnantGrafAsseburgcontinuedontoSt.Quentintopickupmoreammunition.Panzer-Regiment6sentadetailtoMonstopickupthe followingnewvehicles for the regiment: thirteenPanzerI’s, sevenPanzerIII’s, and one Panzer IV. The maintenance and repair companies workedceaselesslytomaintainweaponsandequipmentinacombat-readystatus.

__________________1.Theauthorisnotentirelycorrect.ThetacticalinsigniawereintroducedforthePolishcampaignandretainedinusagethroughthecampaignintheWest.Theyweremodified several times again during the course of thewar. The insigniawerepaintedonthehullfront,rear,andsidesinasubduedyellow.2.ThebattalionwasraisedinSaxonyin1935asaseparateformation.Itservedasareserveforthe10.ArmeeduringthecampaigninPoland.InAugust1940,itbecamethenucleusofKradschützen-Bataillon64ofthe14.Panzer-Division.3. The regiment was intended as a separate formation with a command-and-control headquarters and two battalions. The 2ndBattalionwas outfittedwithheavyfieldhowitzers(15centimeters).AfterthecampaigninFrance,itbecamethe3rdBattalionofthedivisionalartilleryofthe3.Panzer-Division.4.Probably from15SquadronRAF.SixBlenheimswere shotdownand threeheavilydamaged.5.TherewerenoRAFSpitfiresoperationalinFranceorBelgium;theseaircraftwereprobablyHawkerHurricanes.6.TheSomuaS-35mounteda4.7-cmmaingunandhadrelativelyheavyfrontalturretarmorof55millimeters.7.TheSpanishCrossinGoldwaspresentedtomembersoftheLegionCondorwhohadproventhemselveswellincombatinSpain.Some1,126ofthesewereawarded.8.Ernst-GeorgBuchterkirchreceivedhisawardon29June1940,althoughVeitScherzer,DieRitterkreuzträger,1sted.(Ranis/Jena:ScherzersMilitaire-Verlag,2005),226,listsBuchterkirchashavingbeenassignedtothe2./Panzer-Regiment6atthetimeofhisaward.Buchterkirchlaterwentontobecometheforty-fourthrecipientoftheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrosson21December1941,whileserving as the commander of the same company. He ended the war as anOberstleutnanti.G.andpassedawayon17July1969.Kratzenbergreceivedhisaward on 15 August, ending the war as anOberst and passing away on 24January1976.9.TheSS-Verfügungs-Division, the first division ofwhatwas to later becomeknown as theWaffen-SS,was itself later redesignated numerous times, endingthewarmorefamouslyasthe2.SS-Panzer-Division“DasReich.”10.TheregimentcamefromtheSS-Verfügungs-Division.11.AnordnancespecialistequivalentinranktoFeldwebel.

AnengineerbridgeovertheMeuseatMaastricht.The3.Panzer-Divisionuseditinitsmarchwest.

ThefirstcapturedBelgiansareledback.

AttackontheGetteon13May1940.

OrpleGrandhasbeentaken.

Shot-upFrenchfightingvehiclesonthestreetsofJaucheafterthefighting.

FormingupfortheattackontheDylePositionon14May1940.

AlongtheedgeofthewoodsinfrontoftheDylePosition.

Theadvancecontinues—themenofthe5./Schützen-Regiment3areproudoftheirachievements.

Discussingthesituationon27May1940.Fromlefttoright:MajorKratzenberg,OberstleutnantvonManteuffel,andAssistenzarztDr.Türk.

Thefinalminutesbeforetheattack.Fromlefttoright:HauptmannOrts,MajorSchmidt-Ott,MajorKratzenberg,andOberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthern.

AttackonMerville:MajorKratzenbergleadshisIII./Schützen-Regiment3.NexttohimisLeutnantLange.IntheblackPanzeruniformisHauptmannSchneider-KostalskiofPanzer-Regiment6.

EnteringMervilleacrosstheblown-upbridge.

AntitankelementsinRobecq.

CapturedBritishsoldiersinMerville.

ThearmoredbrigadestagesaroundPéronne.

CHAPTER5

FromtheSommetotheSouthofFrance

ThesecondpartofthecampaignintheWeststartedforthe3.Panzer-Divisionon 4 June 1940. On that day, the division reached its staging area west andnorthwestofPéronnewithallofitselements.Onceagain,itwasattachedtotheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.),alongwith the4.Panzer-Division. Incontrast to theattack on 10May, however, itwould be employed in the firstwave this time,whilethesisterdivisionwouldremainbehindtothenortheastofPéronne.Thedivisioncommander,GeneralmajorStumpff, andhisoperationsofficer,

Major i.G. vondemBorne,werebusypreparing theiroperationsorder for thenextday.The logisticssituationwasdiscussedby thedivision logisticsofficer,Hauptmann i.G. Krasá; the division support commander, Major Haker; thedivisionarmamentsofficer,HauptmannHein;andOberleutnantGesenger.Thecommandersofthetwobrigadesandthedivisionaltroopsestablishedcontacton4 June with the elements already at the front, in order to be briefed on thesituationandterrain.At1700hours,thedivisionissuedordersfortheoccupationoftheassembly

area,whichwouldbeconductedthenextnight.Accordingtotheorder,themainbodyofthedivisionwouldmoveacrosstheSommeintothebridgehead,whileweakelementsandthemajorityofthevehicleswouldremainnorthoftheriver.The division inserted itself into a narrow area between the 33. Infanterie-Division on the left and the 44. Infanterie-Division on the right. Previouslyoccupying the new divisional sector was Oberst Fuchs’s Infanterie-Regiment104 of the former infantry division. Its sector ran a line running Dompierre–Assevillers–northofBelloy.Thefollowingformationswereattachedtothedivisioninsupportforthenew

offensive: the II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment, the 9.(H)/Lehrgeschwader 2,1 schwerePanzerjäger-Abteilung 605,2 Nebel-Abteilung 1,3 MG-Bataillon 7, and anadditionalheavyFlakbattalion.Thedivisionstartedorganizingfortheoperationat1900hoursandestablished

twoKampfgruppen.Therighthandgroup,intheDompierre–Becquincourtarea,consisted of Infanterie-Regiment 104 (with two battalions), the 1./Pionier-Bataillon39,andtheheavyFlakbattalion.Thesecondgroup,intheAssevillersarea, was comprised of the III./Schützen-Regiment 3, MG-Bataillon 7,Panzerjäger-Abteilung605,theII./Infanterie-Regiment104,andreconnaissanceparties from the2.Pionier-Bataillon39. The divisional artillery sent all of itsbatteries across the Somme. The armored brigade was also represented therewithPanzer-Regiment 5 on the right andPanzer-Regiment 6 on the left. Thedivision’santitankbattalionwasbroughtforwardtothevicinityofthevillageofHerbécourt, as was the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment. The II./Flak-Lehr-Regimentandelementsofthesignalsbattalioncrossedtheriver,whilealloftheremaining elements of the division remained north of the river. The divisioncommandpostwasmovedforwardacrosstherivertoBuscourtby0400hours.TheoperationsplanoftheGermanArmyHighCommandforthesecondpart

ofthecampaignenvisionedHeeresgruppeBmovingoutfortheoffensivefromitspositionsonthelowercourseoftheSommeon5June,withtheobjectiveofoccupyingnorthernandnorthwestFrance.ItwasintendedforHeeresgruppeAtoadvancetothesoutheast in thedirectionof theSwissAlpson9June,withtheobjective of encircling the French field armies in the Vosges Mountains andalong the Maginot Line. Depending on how the situation developed,Heeresgruppe C was to break through the Maginot Line frontally at anappropriatetime.Thearmoreddivisionswereonceagaintobeemployedasthemaineffortof

theoffensive.GeneralvonKleist’sarmoredgroupwastosupport theattackofHeeresgruppeB,with the5. and7.Panzer-Divisionen west ofAmiens, the9.and10.Panzer-Divisionen to both sides ofAmiens, and the3. and4.Panzer-Divisionen in the area around Péronne. General Guderian’s armored group,consistingofthe1.,2.,6.,and8.Panzer-Divisionen,wastoinitiallystandbyontheAisneaspartofHeeresgruppeA.The night of 4–5 June passed relatively quickly.As the new day started to

dawn, it promised to be sunny and warm. Around 0300 hours, the Frenchsuddenly fired several artillery missions on Assevillers. The lead combatoutposts had fired green signal flares on orders of the division in an effort todraw out enemy fire. That was intended to give the forward observersopportunity to identify the enemy batteries. The hands of the clock movedslowlyforward...

Rightat0500hours,384gunsofallcaliberssenttheirfierygreetingsacrosstotheFrenchpositions,villagesandroadnetworkfromalongafrontageoftenkilometers.Atthesametime,thesquadronsandgroupsofbombersandStukasrushed through the air to drop their deadly loads on Estrées-Deniecourt,Ablaincourt,andChaulnes.Thebattlehadstarted.When the artillery fires started, the riflemen, infantry, engineers, and tanks

movedouttoexploitthosefiresandgetascloseaspossibletotheenemylines.Thefightingvehiclesofthetwoarmoredregimentssoonpassedtheriflemenandmovedwithoutstoppinginandovertheinitialenemytrenches.The lead elements of the armored brigade had already crossed the Villers–

Estrées road west of Villers at 0540 hours. They went around the village ofEstrées and, twenty minutes later, were rolling along the “Roman road” atEstrées-Deniecourt. The 4th Company of Panzer-Regiment 6, leading thecolumns, received heavy artillery fire, causing it to stop for the first time andalsocausingsome losses.TheFrenchbatterieswere identifiedasbeingon thenorthern edge of the woods at Chaulnes and at the southwest outskirts ofAblaincourt. It appeared that the friendly fires thathadbeen fired thereearlierhadhadnovisibleeffect.Thecrewsofthefightingvehicleswereimbuedwiththe“spiritoftheattack”

andcontinuedtorollon,disregardingtheenemy’sfires.Justbefore0630hours,Panzer-Regiment6 reachedDémécourt. Itwasgreeted therebyheavyartilleryfire,whichcausedthecompaniestoscatter.Theenemy’sbatterieswerefiringatthetanksfromunidentifiedpositionsatBerny-en-Santerre.Bothofthearmoredregiments continued their advance through the French lines. By 0850 hours,Panzer-Regiment5 had crossed theChilly–Hallu road, soon reaching the highgroundsouthofHalluandnorthofFransart.Theenemybatteries recognized thedanger theywere in and startedplacing

well-aimed interdiction fires on the tanks. The attack of the armored brigadeincreasinglydissolved into individualengagementsby thecompanies.The2ndCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6 turnedon thefirstenemybatterynorthwestofBerny and silenced the 7.5-centimeter guns. Feldwebel Kannenberg’s 3rdPlatoonwasespeciallysuccessful,knockingoutthreegunsonitsown.Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Funck’sPanzer-Regiment 5 was able to break

through all of the enemy positions and advance directly towards Chaulnesthroughthewoods.OberstleutnantvonLewinski’sPanzer-Regiment6,movingontheleft,advancedpastAblaincourtwithits2ndBattalioninthelead.Another

threeenemybatterieswereeliminated.TheheaviestresistancewasencounterednorthofPressoir.TheenemyartilleryfireforcedPanzer-Regiment6 tosplitupandsidesteptothesouth.Inthe4thCompanyoftheregiment,GefreiterMoritz’slight tankwasknockedout.Thecrewwasable todismountandmake itswaybacktoadefile,wherewoundedfromdifferingcompanieshadassembled.Theysetupanall-rounddefenseandheldouttheretheentireday.The 4./Panzer-Regiment 6 approached Chaulnes. The 1st Company of the

regiment cleared thewooded terrain and eliminated two enemy antitank guns.Thetwocompaniesthenattackedwestofthelocality.The4thCompanyoverrananenemybatterywith itsheavytanks. In thecourseof thefighting there, fourfriendly fighting vehicles were lost, with ten tankers being wounded.OberleutnantGraf zuDohnawas among them; one of his armswas shot off.Twohoursafterthestartoftheattack,thetankswerefartotheenemy’srearandbetweenhisartillerypositions.Butwhereweretheriflemen?Initially,thosetwobattlegroupshadbeenabletofollowthetanksrapidly.But

when they got to the first built-up areas, they started receiving murderousdefensive fires,which caused the attack to bog down. TheWeygandLine didhave its strengths. The French forces had established positions south of theSommethatplacedtheirmaineffortsonthevillagesandtowns.Theywerewellfortified and interconnectedwith theother villagesbymeansof trenches, thuscreating a small system of fortifications. The defense was organized along anarrowfrontageandindepth.ItsmissionwastoallowtheGermantankstopassandtakeonthefollowinginfantry.MajorKratzenberg’s3rdBattalionoftherifleregimentreceivedantitankand

machine-gun fires from Estrées. The attackers had to go to ground. OnlyLeutnant Alter and his 13thCompanywere able to swing out to the east andenter the first fewhousesof thevillage.But thenAlter’smenalsogotboggeddownintheruinsandcouldbarelylifttheirheads.TheFrenchwerefiringattheslightestmovement.HauptmannOrts’s12thCompanygotboggeddownonthewesternoutskirtsof thevillageandwasunable tomoveasinglemeter farther.Thebattalionwasbeinghitby intense fires fromthe flanksandrear thatwerecomingfromFayandthewoodstoitssouth.Thebattalion’sfrontagewasmorethan 1,800meters at that point. The two companies lost all contact with oneanother.Finally,the11thCompanyofOberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthernwasabletoplugthegapbetweenthetwoinaprovisionalway.Bythen,theriflemenhad run out of steam. Neither of the two engineer platoons of Leutnant

ZiegenbalgandLeutnantWeigelwasabletoproviderelief.Theonlyperceptiblerelief came from the fires of the 4th Battery of the divisional artillery, whichweredirectedbythetwoforwardobservers,LeutnantGrafandLeutnantBraun,andcausedsomedamagetotheenemy.TheII./Infanterie-Regiment104wasabletoclosetowithin600metersoftheoutskirtsofEstrées,butitwasalsoforcedtoground.Theattackoftheotherbattalionsoftheriflebrigadealsogotheldupbythe

strongenemyresistance.Forinstance,HauptmannHansen’sbraveMG-Bataillon7 was employed against Belloy. Although the companies reached the initialhouses, they soon became decisively engaged in casualty-intensive streetfighting.Infanterie-Regiment104,whichwasadvancingon the right,worked itsway

withsomedifficultytoFayandenteredthevillageshortlyafter0700hourswithits lead elements. The French also defended there with doggedness anddetermination and an unflappable will to fight. Hard-fought close combatdeveloped,whicheventuallyejectedtheGermaninfantryfromthevillage.Theantitankelementsthatwerefollowingwerelikewiseunabletoaccomplishmuchofanything.AlthoughthetwoassaultgroupsofLeutnantPrauseandFeldwebelWiemer brought some relief, they also suffered heavy casualties. All ofWiemer’smenwerecutdownbymachine-gunfire.The armored regiments reached their attack objectives by 1100 hours and

continued to advance. The 1st Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 6 turned to thesouthwestandmovedonHattencourt,receivingheavyfirefromthere.Ithadtotakeupadefensiveposture,orientedtothesouth.Wheninformationarrivedthata few scattered fighting vehicles and wounded were holding out east ofChaulnes, the regiment ordered their relief. The regimental liaison officer,OberleutnantSuhr,movedtherewiththelasttwotanksofthelightplatoon,buthisvehiclewasknockedout.Despitethat,thestrandedcrewwasabletoassaultaFrenchmachine-gunpositionalongtheeasternoutskirtsofChaulnesandthenuse thecapturedweapon to stopaFrench truck.The resourcefulOberleutnantthen used the truck to get to the encircled comrades.Oberleutnant Schaary’stank,whichwasalsoheadedthere,waslikewiseknockedout.OberleutnantvonKiekebuschsufferedthesamefateanhourlater.Despitethefactthatthetankersweresurroundedbysuperiorenemynumbers,theydidnotgiveup.Instead,theyconducted energetic immediate counterattacks andwere even able to take 120Frenchprisoners,beforetheyfinallyboxedtheirwaythroughtotheneighboring

4.Panzer-Division.Bynoononthatfirstdayoftheoffensive,thearmoredbrigadewasfarahead

ofthedivisionandinthemidstoftheenemy.Contacthadlongsincebeenlostwiththeriflemen.Fuelandammunitionwererunningout.OberstKühnorderedhis forces to set up security on both sides ofHallu.Although a few rifle andmotorizedelementsattemptedtoforcetheirwayforwardtothetanks,theywerealways turned back by the French fires from the fortified villages. Only theadjutantofPanzer-Regiment6,OberleutnantMarkowski,succeededinreachinghis regiment after several attempts through enemy fire coming fromChaulnesandOmiécourt.The commander of the I./Panzer-Regiment6,Major Schmidt-Ott, attempted

to rejoin his companies in Hattencourt. In the process, his tank come off theroadway and landed in a tank ditch. But the tank did not land on earth andstones; instead, it slammed against steel walls. There was another Germanfighting vehicle in the ditch, which was anywhere from three to four metersdeep.UnfortunatelyforSchmidt-Ott,thetankcommanderoftheothertankwashisownadjutant,LeutnantvonTwardowski.FeldwebelThévoz,whohadbeenfollowing behind, recognized the unfortunate situation his commander hadgotteninto.Hemovedforwardinhisheavytanktoassistthetwoofficers.Theenemyartilleryalsoseemedtohaveidentifiedtheunfortunatesituation.JustastheFeldwebelwasstartingtorecoverhiscommander,theroundslanded.Thévozwaswounded.Intheend,however,alltheeffortswerecrownedwithsuccess.Asecond heavy tankwas able to recover the two tanks of the officers and theircrews.As it started to turn evening that fifth of June, the armored brigade from

Berlin had turnedopen theFrench front andbroken through.Thevictory costdearly. Eleven noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel of Panzer-Regiment 6 were killed; another three officers and twenty-seven enlistedpersonnelwerewounded.TanklossestotaledelevenPanzerI’s,thirteenPanzerII’s,fivePanzerIII’s,onePanzerIV,andonesmallcommandtank.The commander of the armored brigade, Oberst Kühn—promoted to

GeneralmajorafterthecampaignintheWest—laterreceivedtheKnight’sCrosstotheIronCrossfortheactionsofhistworegimentsthatday.Partoftheawardrecommendation read: “on 5 June, the brigade penetrated the stubbornlydefendedWeygandLine southwestofPéronne toadepthof fifteenkilometersand destroyed fourteen French batteries, including three heavy ones, thus

eliminating their fires.Thatbrought aboutdecisive relief for the further attackandbreakthrough.”ThecommandinggeneraloftheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.),GeneralHoepner,

arrivedatthedivisioncommandposttwohoursafterthestartoftheattackon5June, wanting to be briefed on the status of the advance. The commandinggeneral ordered that the divisionwas to reconnoiter as far as the area aroundRoyethatsameday.Sothatthedivisionwouldnothavetobearthebruntofthefighting,Hoepnerdeclaredheintendedtobringupthe4.Panzer-Divisionaheadoftimeandinsertitintothefightingtotheleftofthe3.Panzer-Division.The employment of the5.Panzer-Brigade of the4. Panzer-Division on the

highgroundnorthwestofEtalonbegantobefeltinthedivision’ssectorstartingat1100hours.Theregimentsofthe4.Panzer-DivisionwereemployedsouthofFlauciourtandeastofAblaincourtagainst thehighgroundaroundChaulnes inanefforttoexploitthesuccessofthe3.Panzer-Brigadeandtorallyforwardthe33.and44.Infanterie-Divisionen,whoseoffensiveeffortshadstalemated.Whatwasthedivision’sriflebrigadedoingatnoon?The sun was burning hot from the almost cloudless skies andmade things

evenmoredifficultfortheriflemenhunchedoverinthecornfields,meadowlanddepressions and blown-up walls of houses. The enemy resistance had notslackened in the least and had brought the attack between the villages to astandstill. A few officers and noncommissioned officers attempted to lead theforcesforward,buttheFrenchfireskeptpinningtheassaultingforces.Thebravecommander of the 13th Company of the rifle regiment, Leutnant Alter, waskilled while undertaking just such an effort. Leutnants Wördemann andWietbrockof the regimentwere likewisekilled thatday.The3rdCompanyofthedivisionalengineersalsosufferedheavycasualties.The battalion surgeons and medics had no shortage of work. The division

surgeon,OberstarztDr.Böhm,establishedhismainclearingstationwithoneofhismedicalcompaniesatthewesternoutskirtsofBuscourt.Thetwoambulanceplatoonsofthedivisionwereconstantlyonthegotopickupwoundedfromtheforwardclearingstations.Thebattalionsurgeonofthe3rdBattalionoftherifleregiment, Stabsarzt Dr. Marr, had already dressed 100 wounded from hisbattalionbynoon.OberstabsarztDr.Grünewaldandhismedicalcompanyalsoworkedceaselessly.Earlyintheafternoon,MG-Bataillon7achievedthesolevisiblesuccessofthe

riflebrigade thatday.HauptmannHansenandhis smallbandof soldierswere

hardpressedforsometimeand,indeed,someofhiselementswereencircled,buttheSaxonswerefinallyabletorallyandoccupyBelloyaround1430alongwithafewattachedlighttanksfromPanzer-Regiment5.TheprisonerstakenfromtheFrench117thInfantryRegimentnumbered450.The artillery was called to help the hard-pressed rifle formations. Oberst

Forster used all available batteries to support the rifle brigade. LeutnantHoffmann’s 1st Battery andOberleutnant Kersten’s 6th Battery were pushedforward as close as possible to Estrées-Deniecourt and fired over open sightsintothetwinvillages,settingthemalight.LeutnantLeese,theforwardobserver,was wounded; he was immediately replaced by Leutnant Schröder to ensuretherewasnolullinthefiring.Toward 1600 hours, the batteries all placed concentrated fires on Estrées.

Major Kratzenberg’s 3rd Battalion stormed into the village while the roundswere still impacting. It was finally taken in close combat.Major Meese’s 1stBattalion, which had been brought forward after noon, supported its sisterbattalioninitsefforts.The2ndCompanyattackedEstréesfromthefront,whileLeutnantHilliger’s3rdCompanyscreenedinthedirectionofFay.Kratzenbergandhistirelessmencontinuedtheirassaultandoccupiedthehighgroundsouthofthevillage.Onlythe12thCompanyremainedbehindinthedestroyedvillage,eliminatingthefinalenemyresistancebytheonsetofdarkness.Inthatroundoffighting,700prisonersweretaken.MajorZimmermann’s2ndBattalionwastheninsertedintothelinetotheleft

of the 3rd Battalion so as to reinforce the position that had been taken.Infanterie-Regiment104alsofoughtitswayslowlyforwardinthefaceofheavyenemyfireinthedirectionofFay.OberstFuchs,whowasashiningexampletohismen,wouldbekilledincombattwoweekslater.Around1830hours, thedivisionorderedthatcontactbeestablishedwiththe

armored brigade far to the front, which was defending against strong enemyforces. The battalions that had previously been held in reserve—thereconnaissance battalion, the motorcycle infantry battalion, and Panzerjäger-Abteilung605—werebroughtforwardtosurgepastPressoirandChaulnes.ThearmoredbrigadewasorderedtopullbacktoChaulnes,sincethe44.Infanterie-Divisiontotherighthadhadtopullbackfromterrainithadtakeninthefaceofenemyforcesthathadproventobetoostrong.Asaresult,agaphaddevelopedbetweenthetwodivisions.Since the situationwasgrowing increasinglycritical, thedivision reinforced

theKampfgruppethatwasbeingsentforwardwiththe1stBattalionoftherifleregimentandthe2ndBattalionofthedivisionalartillery(MajorWöhlermann).All of the formationswere then placed under the command ofOberstleutnantvonManteuffel.ThereinforcedKampfgruppemovedoutat2100hours.Shortlyaftermovingout, the lead elements, composedof the reconnaissancebattalionand the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment, encountered heavy infantry andartilleryfirecomingfromAblaincourt.Elementsofthe1stBattalionfoughttheirwayintothevillageunderextremelydifficultcircumstancesby2230hours.Buttheenemyresistancewastoogreat,andOberstleutnantvonManteuffeldecidedtopullhisentireforcebacktoHill105andscreenfromtherefortherestofthenight.ThearmoredbrigadefounditselfaloneintheareaithadtakenaroundHallu,

where it set up an all-round defense. Since the fuel had run out and theammunitionhadbeenpracticallyshotup,themenofthetwoarmoredregimentshad to rely on their small arms and hold their positions until the rifle brigadecouldcloseupthenextday.ThetroopsofMajorFreiherrvonWechmar’sreconnaissancebattalionstarted

moving out against at 0500 hours.Oberstleutnant vonManteuffel followed ashortwhilelaterwiththerestoftheKampfgruppe.TheriflemenencounteredtheFrench positions at Ablaincourt and Pressoir. The 1st Battalion of the rifleregimentsucceededintakingbothvillagesby0615hours.Intheprocess,ittook295 prisoners and captured two antitank guns and a few trucks. The advancethencontinuedrelentlessly.Thearmoredbrigadewasawareoftherapidadvanceandputtogetherallofits

vehiclesthatcouldstillmoveandenteredthefray.Thefightwasespeciallyhardaround Chaulnes, which had been reduced to rubble by artillery and Stukaattacks.Thearmoredbrigadewasable to takeseveralhundredprisonerson itsown,beforeKampfgruppeManteuffelarrivedthere.LeutnantvonQuastandhisreconnaissance platoon from the 2nd Battalion ofPanzer-Regiment 6 was thefirstonethroughtotheencircledtankers.Whentheyoungofficerlater triedtobringupthecombattrains,hewaskilledatOmiécourt.The eastern part of Chaulnes was still being stubbornly defended by the

enemy. The riflemen did not give up; they started attacking the Frenchstrongpointsat0900hours.Thefiercefightinginthevillagelastedthreehours,beforetheenemywasfinallyclearedoutofit.Theenemylost5officersand150men as prisoners.Four antitankguns, four 7.5-centimeter guns, eightmachine

guns, twenty trucks, and twelve staff cars were the spoils of war. All bythemselves,LeutnantDoerner,UnteroffizierUlrich, andGefreiter Borgmann—all from the headquarters of the rifle regiment—were able to take an enemybattalion staff with four officers and forty enlisted prisoners at the southernoutskirtsofChaulnes.The streetsof thevillagewere litteredwithmilitary equipmentof all types.

Among themanygunswere shot-upvehicles,cratesandboxeswithuniforms,equipment,radiosetsandammunitionanddeadhorsesandsoldiers.Worthyofnotewere themanydefensivemeasures. In the second floor of a house, therewasaheavymachinegunonthesidethatwasonthemainstreetandfacedtheattacker’sdirection.IthadexcellentfieldsoffirebetweenthetwohousesacrossthestreetandintotheopengroundoutsideofChaulnes.Therewasanantitankgunatanintersection.Itwaswellprotectedbysandbagsandwoodenbeams.Ithadbeenemplacedinaslightlyraisedgatewayandhadgoodfieldsoffiretoallsides.Inthevicinityofthedestroyedrailstationandinthemanygardens,thereweredugoutsfortheriflemen.Itwasnotonlytheactionsoftheenemy,butalsothedefensivesystemthathehadestablishedthatshowedthattheFrenchwantedtostemtheGermansattheWeygandLine.Thereconnaissancebattaliondidnotallowitselftobeheldupinitsadvance

bythefightinginChaulnes.Around0930hours,itreachedtheleadelementsofthearmoredbrigade.MajorFreiherrvonWechmarreported to thecommanderof the 2nd Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 5. Physical contact had beenreestablishedwiththearmoredbrigadeforthefirsttimeintwenty-fourhours.Whilethearmoredregimentsrefueledandrearmed,KampfgruppeManteuffel

kept advancing. The reconnaissance battalion was sent in the direction ofHattencourt. The remaining elements of the battle groupwere south of a linerunningChilly–Halluearly in theafternoonof6June.OberstleutnantTröger’smotorcycle infantry battalion screened to the south and southwest outside ofHattencourt, while the II./Infanterie-Regiment 104 screened west from thewestern outskirts of Chaulnes. Both battalions of the divisional artillery werepushedforwardandemployedintheareaaroundChaulnes.The field army inserted the SS-Verfügungs-Division next to the 3. Panzer-

Division,sincethe44. Infanterie-Divisionwashangingbackand thedivision’srightflankwas“hangingintheair.”Uptothatpoint,thatareahadbeenscreenedagainst the strong enemy strongpoints by Infanterie-Regiment104 and the 3rdBattalionoftherifleregiment.

The division could not give the battered enemy any chance to recover if itwantedtoexploitthebreakthroughithadachieved.Correspondingly,allcombat-capable elements of the division moved out in blazing heat that afternoon toinitiatethepursuitinthedirectionofAvre.Thearmoredbrigadewasintheleadagain,withPanzer-Regiment5on therightandPanzer-Regiment6on the left.FollowingitwasKampfgruppeManteuffelwiththemotorcycleinfantrybattalionon the right and both the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment andPanzerjäger-Abteilung605ontheleft.Theartilleryregimentcoveredtheadvancefromnewpositions around Chaulnes. On the left wing, the 1st Company of the rifleregiment tookFransart from theeast.The regiment’s2ndCompany, supportedbyattachedantitank-gunplatoons,attackedatthesametimefromthenorth.Thefightingfortheheavilydefendedvillagewasnotdecided,however,untilthe3rdCompany entered the fray. Two hundred thirty-five French soldiers werecaptured.

BreakingthroughtheWeygandPosition,5June1940.

Panzer-Regiment5movedthroughFransartaround1800hoursandcontinuedadvancing south. It reached Fresnoy and a line running Roye–Goyencourt.Oberleutnant Buchterkirch from Panzer-Regiment 6 conducted combatreconnaissanceasfarasAvregrund,nearSt.Mard.Thereconnaissancebattalion,racingahead,wasabletoreachthebanksoftheAvrewithmostofitstroopsjustafter2000hoursandtaketheundamagedbridgeatSt.Aurin.The enemy had recognized the danger posed by the breakthrough and

employedhisair force toprevent thearmoredbrigade fromcrossing the river.Some painful casualties were taken. The 2nd and 5th Companies of the rifleregimentlostthreedeadandfifteenwounded.Butitwasnolongerpossiblefor

theenemyaircrafttoholduptheattack.At 2020 hours, Panzer-Regiment 5 crossed the Avre at Villers-les-Roys;

Panzer-Regiment6 crossedatSt.Mard.Themotorcycle infantrybattalionwassent forward as rapidly as possible to support the armored regiments.OberleutnantBeck’s3rdCompany,alongwith theheavy-machine-gunplatoonofthe4thCompany,wasabletocrosstheriveratL’Echelle.MajorMeese’s1stBattalionof the rifle regiment reached the highground south ofSt.Mard andstarted screening south. Panzer-Regiment 5, Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, andAufklärungs-Abteilung 3 (mot.) rapidly formed a bridgehead in a line runningL’Echelle–St. Aurin. The rifle regiment, which closed up later, assumed thescreening mission in that area, with the riflemen continuing to improve thepositionsuntilmidnight.Themotorcycle infantrybattalionwaspositioned in therighthandportionof

the sector; the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment was on the left. The 2ndBattalionoftherifleregimentwaspushedforwardduringthefirstfewhoursofdarknessfromParvillerstoVillers-les-Roys,whereitwasemployedtotherightofthe1stBattalion.AllofthebattalionssentoutpatrolstothenearbyvillagesofMarquivillers,DancourtandLancourt.Itwasdeterminedthatallwereoccupiedbytheenemy.Thedailyreportofthedivisioncontainedthefollowing:“3.Panzer-Division

tookChaulnes,Hattencourt,andFresnoyon6June,crossingtheAvreandthenscreening with its lead elements in the direction of the line formed by thevillagesofMarquivillers,DancourtandLancourt.ThelocalitiesareoccupiedbytheenemyandmostlikelyimprovedtostrongpointslikethepreviouslocalitiesintheWeygandLine.Itisanticipatedthatadditionalenemyartillerywillappear...”Thespoilsofwarforthatday,capturedordestroyed,numberedeighttonine

batteries, four thirty-two-ton tanks, and five aircraft. The number of prisonerswasintheneighborhoodof3,000menfromtheFrench19thand29thInfantryDivisions.Thatsuccesswouldneverhavebeenpossiblehaditnotbeenforthelogistics

personnel,whoperformed theirduties inaquietandmodestbutconscientiousfashion. Their story is rarely told. The daily logs of the division supportcommandrecordedtheeventsof6Juneasfollows:

Basedonadiscussionwiththedivisionlogisticsofficer,theheadquarters

and the supply company will be moved to Ham-Monacu. Movementorders were issued to the units. Departure at 1000 hours. As aconsequenceof the rapidadvance, it is anticipated the1stMaintenanceCompanymaymove.The1stMaintenanceCompany reported itwouldneedthirty-sixhourstoclearitsworkload.At1130hours,messagetrafficarrived, according to which two sections of ammunition needed to besent to Chaulnes immediately. To that end, the 2nd and 3rd TruckSections (Light) were dispatched. . . . At 1200 hours, radioed ordersarrived for two fuel sections to be pushed forward to Ablaincourtimmediately.The8thand9thTruckSections(Heavy),aswellasthe7thTruck Section (Light), continued their march. The units reached theirmarch objectives in a seamless movement, with only the 2nd TruckSection (Light)winding up in heavy ensnarled traffic. The 10th TruckSection(Heavy),whichhaddistributeditsfuelinFeuilléres,wassenttoHenencourt,tothewestofSt.Albert,torefuel....The2ndMaintenanceCompanywaspushedforwardtoHerbecourt....Someelementsofthe7thTruckSection(Light)andthe8thand9thTruckSections(Heavy)inAblaincourt came under artillery fire and air attack. . . . From theammunitionsections, the4thand6thSectionsare tobesentforwardtoHallu.The1stTruckSection(Light)is togotoAblaincourt. . . .Radiomessage:“Bringforwardinfantryammunitionandthe6thTrucksection(Light) with a platoon from the supply company. Ammunition to bedroppedoffatMaurepas.ThesectionwillbesenttoSt.Quentintopickuplighthowitzerammunition.”

Nowherealongthefrontageofthedivisionwasitquietduringthenightof6–7June.Patrolswere sentouteverywhereandmachine-gun firehissed throughthe air.Both friend and foe fired harassing fires. For instance, the 6thBatteryfired on Marquivillers shortly after midnight. During that time, the divisionformedtwonewKampfgruppenforthecontinuedattack.Therighthandgroup,underOberstleutnantFreiherrvonFunck,consistedof

Panzer-Regiment5,Kradschützen-Bataillon3, the II./Schützen-Regiment3, theHeadquartersofSchützen-Regiment3,andtheI./Artillerie-Regiment75.On theleft, under Oberstleutnant von Lewinski, were Panzer-Regiment 6, theI./Schützen-Regiment 3, and the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75. The initiation ofoperationswas originally scheduled for the division at 1230 hours, but itwaspostponed to 1430 hours. In the meantime, the reconnaissance battalion

reconnoiteredtothefrontandreportedenemyantitankpositionsatLaBoissièreand artillery batteries at Guerbigny and south of Popincourt. Those were thecombatoutpostsoftheFrench47thInfantryDivision,whichhadbeenbroughtinfromtheAlsaceregion.OberstleutnantvonLewinskiorderedthe1stBattalionoftherifleregimentto

takeDancourt themorning of 7 June in order to open up terrain for the laterattack by the tanks. Mortars, infantry guns, and heavy tanks opened theoperation with a short artillery preparation. Leutnant Hilliger’s 3rd Companyassaulted fromitsposition inadefilewith theGermanbattlecryof“Hurrah!”Hilliger reached the edgeof thevillagewithout taking any casualtieswith thesquadsofUnteroffiziereRöske,Gertner,andSchöning.FourmachinegunswerecapturedandfiftyFrenchtakenprisoner,butheavyanddevastatingflankingfirestarted in from Popincourt. Using the infantry guns of his 5th Company,Oberleutnant Stein covered the enemy positions in such a way that the 3rdCompanywasabletocontinueitsassault.Buttheenemyappearedtocomealiveeverywhere at the same time. There was a racket from all directions—frombasements and rooftops, from behind hedges and trees. Gefreiter Sust andUnteroffizierSchröderwerekilled;ashortwhilelater,thecompanyheadquarterssection leader, Feldwebel Kügler, was also killed. Major Meese andOberleutnantWüstwerealsoforwardwiththemen,whoweresmokingoutthehouses inhand-grenadeduels.OberleutnantBuchterkirchmoved forwardwithfive light tanks of the 1stBattalion ofPanzer-Regiment6. The tanks directedtheir fireson identifiedmachine-gunnests; theydestroyedanantitankgunandwereabletotakesixtyprisoners.Thatonlyreducedtheintensityofthefightingalittlebit.Thecompanycommanderofthe4th,OberleutnantWüst,waskilledbyaroundtothehead.HisfatherhadbeenkilledinLothringenin1914asanofficer.The riflemencontinued toattack.Theywere finallyable tomake itallthewaythroughDancourt.FeldwebelRuhland’splatoonwasabletomakeitasfarasPopincourt. Inall, seventy-sevenprisonerswere taken,and thespoilsofwar numbered one antitank gun, four heavy machine guns, and eleven lightmachineguns.The main attack of the division was initiated by the assault against

Armancourt.Ithadbeenidentifiedthepreviousnightasbeingaheavilyfortifiedstrongpoint.Hauptmann Pape’s 2ndCompany ofmotorcycle infantry attackedthe locality after an artillery preparation. The enemy defended stubbornly andinflictedheavycasualtiesonthemotorcycleinfantrybeforehesuddenlyfledthevillageat1400hours.Thecompanylostsevenmendeadduringthatoperation,

as well as many wounded. Among the wounded was the dashing LeutnantErdmann.Aroundthattime,GeneralmajorStumpffarrivedatthecommandpostofthe

armoredbrigade.Hehaltedthetanks,whichhadbeenintheprocessofmovingout.Ordershadbeenreceivedfromhigherheadquartersthattheattackwasnottobecontinueduntil8June.Thedivisionstartedscreening.ThearmoredbrigadeleftonlyweakforcessouthoftheAvreandmovedintotheareaaroundHallu–Fransart–Hattencourt along with all of the non-essential vehicles of the riflebrigade. Remaining up front under the command of Oberstleutnant vonManteuffelwere the1stBattalionof therifleregiment,alongwithelementsofPanzer-Regiment6andPanzerjäger-Abteilung605,ontheleftwingandthe2ndBattalionoftherifleregiment,alongwithelementsofPanzer-Regiment5,ontheright wing. On the left, contact was maintained with the 4. Panzer-Division,while it was with the SS-Verfügungs-Division on the right. The motorcycleinfantry battalion occupied positions in the defile south of Hill 99 and fromArmancourtasfarastheSt.Aurin–Dancourtroad.Therifleregimentordereditsforwardbattalionstoreconnoitertothewestand

southwest in their sectors during the night. In doing so, the 6th Companyconducted a reconnaissance-in-force against Marquivillers. The enemy wasinitially driven from the northern and western edges of the village, but thecompanyhadtopullbackinthefaceofgrowingresistance,whichincreasedbythe minute. Another patrol determined there were a large number of enemyforcesinCrivillers.At 0500 hours on 8 June, the division ordered the attack continued at 1100

hours.Tothatend, thedivisionwasreinforcedby theLeibstandarteSS“AdolfHitler.”TheSSregimentwascommittedupfrontwiththe2ndBattalionoftherifleregiment.Echelonedbehindthoseforceswerethe1stBattalionoftherifleregiment,Panzerjäger-Abteilung605andMG-Bataillon7.Thearmoredbrigadereceivedorders to follow immediately as soon as theLeibstandarte SS“AdolfHitler”hadovercomethefirstenemyposition.Then, by surprise, orders arrived from the6. Armee at 0900 hours that the

attackwastobepostponedindefinitely.Startingat1200hours, thedivisionsetupfor thedefensesouthof theAvre.

The2ndBattalionoftherifleregimentremainedatLaucourtontherightwing,withthe1stBattaliontoitsleft.TheSSregimentwasheldbackeastofSt.Aurinas reserve. One heavy platoon each from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 605 was

attachedtotheforwardbattalions.Fromtheranksofthearmoredbrigade,onlythe1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment5wasforward,beingpositionedsouthoftheriver line.Allof theremainingelementsof thedivisionpulledbackacrosstheAvretothenorth.Generaloberst von Reichenau arrived for a short visit to the division

commandpostat1300hours.Atthesametime,thecommandinggeneraloftheI. Flak-Korps,General der Flakartillerie Weise, also appeared. The divisionoperationsofficer,Majori.G.vondemBorne,wenttothecorpscommandpostandbroughtback the information that the3.Panzer-Divisionwas tobepulledout of the line. It was directed for the 33. Infanterie-Division to assume thedivision’ssectorandcontinuetheattack.The combat outposts continued to patrol to clarify the enemy situation and

keepthewithdrawingdivisionfrombeingunpleasantlysurprised.Attheonsetofdarkness, theLeibstandarte SS“AdolfHitler” was pulled out of its positions,being relievedbyMG-Bataillon7.The33. Infanterie-Divisionmoved into theformerpositionsofthedivision.Infanterie-Regiment104tookoverthepositionsof the 2nd Battalion of the rifle regiment, while Infanterie-Regiment 115assumed those of the 1stBattalion. The rifle battalions then pulled back fromtheirtrenches.Generalmajor Sintzenich, the commander of the relieving infantry division,

arrivedwithhisheadquartersstaffatFresnoyduringthemorningof9Juneandformallyassumed the sectorof the3.Panzer-Division. The division commandpostmovedbacktoPéronneviaLiancourtandOmiécourt.BothofthebrigadesandthedivisionaltroopsweretakenbackacrosstheSommeon9and10June,where theywere quartered betweenPéronne andHam.The formations rested,cleanedweaponsandvehicles,andtookcareofpersonalhygiene,all thewhilealso enduring formations.A fuel dump for the divisionwas established at therailway fuel stop at Roisel, to the east of Péronne. Replacements arrived. Forinstance,therifleregimentreceived200newofficers,noncommissionedofficersand enlisted personnel from the replacement battalion in Eberswalde, whereHauptmannWellmannhadbeenconductingcoursesforofficercandidates.Thedivision’s supply elements received forty-sixmen, ofwhich twenty-seven hadbeentrainedasdrivers.Oberstleutnant i.G. von dem Borne andHauptmann Barth reported to the

commandpostoftheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.) inGauchyat1100hourson10June to be briefed on the future operations of the division. The corps was

assemblingintheSt.Quentin–Soissonareaandwasstagedbehindtherightwingofthe9.Armee,whosecommander inchiefwasGeneralder InfanterieStraußandwhosechiefof staffwasGeneralleutnantHollidt.Thecorps’missionwasshortandtothepoint:“PanzergruppeKleist,withtheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)ontherightwingofthe9.Armee,isdirectedtocrossthebridgeheadestablishedbytheXVIII.Armee-KorpseastofChâteau-ThierryandadvanceinthedirectionofMontmirailassoonaspossible.”TheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)was insertedbetween theXVIII.Armee-Korps

of Generalleutnant Ritter von Speck4 and the XXXXIV. Armee-Korps ofGeneralleutnantKoch.The two divisions of theXVIII.Armee-Korps—the81.Infanterie-Divisionontherightandthe25.Infanterie-Divisionontheleft—hadestablishedasmallbridgeheadovertheMarne.Duringthecourseofthedayon11June,itwasexpandedenoughsothatPionier-Bataillon725wasabletoerectthefirstsixteen-tonbridgeovertheriveron12June.Startingon10June,thedivisionsetupitsquarteringareasintheareaaround

Villers–Cotterets.Itmovedthereontwomarchroutes:Roupy–Flavy–Houvron–Coevre and St. Sulpice–Berlancourt–Coevre. The division headquartersestablisheditselfinChâteauLaPoterie.Theoperationsofficer,returningfromacorpsmeeting,returnedwithordersdirectingthedivisiontocrosstheMarneon12 June.The intermediateobjectiveof its attackwas the line runningViffort–Mont Levon; the day’s objective wasMontmirail. The enemy in front of thedivision belonged to the French 6th Army and consisted of the 27th InfantryDivision,aswellaselementsof the7thand8th InfantryDivisions.Up to thatpoint, those enemy forces had offered the XVIII. Armee-Korps stubbornresistance.Hauptmann Barth, the division intelligence officer, went forward on the

morning of 12 June to reconnoiter a location for erecting a bridge. Since theapproachroutetothecrossingpointwasblockedbytheruinsofshot-uphouses,Barth commandeered some nearby prisoners and had them clear the route.Advancepartiesfrombothofthebrigadesfoundtheroutesinorderbynoonandhadthedivisioncomeforward.Whentheengineerbridgewasfinishedat1345hours,thedivision’selementspreparedtomoveacross.Oberst Kühn’s armored brigade was in the lead with both of its armored

regiments, themotorcycle infantry battalion, and the reconnaissance battalion.The first elements crossed the river at 1415 hours. The rain misted from theheavensandplaceda thinveilover thebeautifulMarneValley,whichfeatured

hills filled with deciduous trees on both sides. The reconnaissance andmotorcycleinfantrybattalionspassedthroughthepositionsofthe81.Infanterie-Division—theSilesiandivisionwascommandedbyGeneralmajorvonLoeper—andadvancedintotheenemyforces,whichhadbeenpullingbacksincenoonastheresultofheavyartilleryfire.The 3rd Company of the motorcycle infantry sent a large patrol in the

direction ofHill 222. The patrol, under the command ofFeldwebelO.A. vonPlessen,6movedrapidlyasfarastheRaillerWoodsnortheastofSoudan.Thereit encountered surprisingly strong resistance and did not have time to turnaround.Themotorcycleinfantrysetupadesperatedefense.Butwhentherestofthe company arrived a few minutes later, it only found dead.Feldwebel vonLessen, Unteroffizier Schörnborn, Obergefreiter Kurz, Gefreiter Müller, andGefreiterZimmermannwerethefirstdeadofthedivisioninitsnewsector.At thesametime, thetroopsof thereconnaissancebattalionwerepositioned

inthewoodssouthofFontanelle.Thevillageproperwasfullofenemyforces.Thebattalionhadtoholdupuntilthetankshadclosedup.Withtheirsupport,thevillagewastakenindifficulthouse-to-housefightingby2000hours.Elementsofthearmoredbrigadehadgonearoundthevillagebythenandsetupinthehighgroundtothesouth.OberstFreiherrvonFunck’sPanzer-Regiment5wasin thelead.Neither the

onset of night or the enemy machine guns and antitank guns prevented thebattalions from continuing their advance.At 2130 hours, the fighting vehiclesapproachedMarchais.Inaboldmove,theregimentsucceededintakingthetwobridges south andwest of the city over the next hour. Kühn then ordered hisregimenttocontinueadvancingtoopenupthecrossingsatMontmirailfromthesouth.Generalmajor Stever’s 4. Panzer-Division, employed to the left of the 3.

Panzer-Division, crossed the high ground west of Mont Levon, encounteringlittle French resistance. On the division’s right, the 1. Gebirgs-Division7 ofGeneralleutnantKüblerwasstillhangingfarbackinthevicinityofEssières.Bytheendofthefirstdayoftheattack,thecorpshadpressedadeepwedgeintotheenemy’sfront.Correspondingly,duringthenight,thecorpsdirectedaceaselesspursuit.Asitturneddark,theriflebrigadereachedtheMarneandcrossedtheriverin

twoseries,startingwiththe2ndBattalionoftherifleregimentat2100hours.Allof the remaining battalions were immediately brought across. The movement

wasnot so simple, since the roadswereensnarledwith traffic and themistingrain had softened them as well. The brigade bivouacked for the night in theFontanelle–Marchaisarea.The armored brigade had established itself in the vicinity of La Saulsette–

Courtoux–Villegeruis–St. Martin–Foucheries during the night, with securitybeing posted in all directions. It started its advance again the nextmorning at0800hours.Themotorcycleinfantrybattaliontooktheleadandgotinvolvedinengagements in the small woods and individual farmsteads two kilometersnorthwestofMarchais.Theywereabletobreakallresistance,however,andhadreachedLaHauteEpínéanhouraftertheyhadmovedout.Thearmoredregimentsmovedintwogroupstothesouth.Theenemywasby

no means defeated. The fighting vehicles frequently had to halt and let theirmaingunsdothetalking.Panzer-Regiment5wasabletoforceLeVezier,whichwasfullofenemyforces,afterasharpfight.Theregimentimmediatelymovedon the Grand Morin, after the 4. Panzer-Division succeeded in takingMontmirail.The division orderedOberst Kleemann and his rifle brigade to exploit the

situationandestablishabridgeheadovertheGrandMorin.Inthemeantime,thearmoredbrigadehadencounteredheavyresistanceoutsideofVilleneuve,andtheenemydemonstratedheknewhowtoemployartillery.Panzer-Regiment5wasable tocross theroadsouthofReveillon,andit tookthebridgeatLaFosséat1400hours,whilePanzer-Regiment6overrantheenemypositionsinandaroundTréfols.Thedivisionorderedthecontinuationofthepursuitofthebatteredenemyat

1400 hours. Two battle groups were formed under the respective brigadecommanders.BothreceivedorderstoestablishbridgeheadsovertheSeine.Kampfgruppe Kühn was employed in the direction of Nogent. The

reconnaissancebattaliontookthelead,followedcloselybyPanzer-Regiment5.The2ndBattalionof the rifle regimentwasattached to the tankers.Followingbehindwas theheadquartersof therifle regimentand its3rdBattalionand themotorcycle infantrybattalion.The3rdBattalionwas initiallydesignatedas thedivision reserve.KampfgruppeKleemann consisted ofPanzer-Regiment 6, the1stBattalionoftherifleregiment,andthe2ndBattalionofartillery.Engineers,signalers, and antitank elements were split out among the two battle groups.Kleemannalsoformedanadvanceguardforhisbattlegroup.ItconsistedoftheII./Panzer-Regiment6,elementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung605,theII./Artillerie-

Regiment 75, and the 10./Flak-Lehr-Regiment. In addition to the separatecompaniesanddetachments,theremainingformations—theI./Panzer-Regiment6, the main body of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 605, and MG-Bataillon 7—constituted the main body of Kleemann’s forces. Oberleutnant Buchterkirchonce again took the lead with his light tanks. By then, the bold officer hadreinforced his platoon with five captured French fighting vehicles, enemypersonnel carriers and English ammunition carriers. Oberleutnant vonBrodowskiwas attached to the advance guardwith his twoPanzerIV’s and aplatoonofmotorcycleinfantry.Kleemann’s advance guard reached the high ground south of Rieux shortly

after1000hoursandadvancedonstrongenemyforcesatTréfolsanhourlater.Thebatteriesofthe2ndBattalionhadtogointopositionforthefirsttimethere.At1250hours,theleadtankelementsenteredthevillageandhaditfirmlyunderGermancontrolby1320hours.Theadvanceguard took350menprisonerandcapturedone15-centimetergunandoneantitankgun.Themarchcontinued.Whentheleadelementsofthedivisionreachedthethree-roadintersectionat

Neuvyat1545hours,ahaltwasordered,withsecuritypostedinalldirections,even though there was no serious enemy resistance far and wide. ThecommandinggeneralarrivedafewminuteslaterandorderedOberstleutnantvonLewinskitocontinuethepursuitimmediately.The tanks and reconnaissance elements encountered a few French

strongpoints, but the resistance was quickly broken. It was only outside ofVilleneuve that enemy artillery fires became particularly noticeable. Onearmoredcarandonetankreceiveddirecthitsbeforetheenemybatterycouldbeidentified.Thefightingvehiclesthenrolledforwardandeliminatedonegunaftertheother.Thestockpiledartilleryroundscaughtfireandwentupintheairwithaloud bang. In the process of that engagement, Panzer-Regiment 6 took 600Frenchfromdifferingformationsprisoner.The advanceguardofOberstKühn’s battle groupwas outside ofReveillon

around 1900 hours, after crossing rough terrain and practically impenetrablewoods. It entered St. Genest. The lead elements of Oberst Kleemann’sKampfgruppe rightneared theSeineas it turneddark.Onceagain, theyhad tocontendwithheavyartilleryandantitank-gunfire.Infantryfirefromthewoodsalso hampered friendly movements. Despite the uncertain situation,OberleutnantBuchterkirchorderedanimmediateattackonthebridgesovertheSeine.

Buchterkirch’s men moved out immediately with two heavy and two lighttanks. They raced through the enemy fire towards the first bridge. LeutnantBusseandhisplatoonofengineerssprungtowardstheobstaclethereandmadealaneforthefightingvehicles.Buchterkirchwasthefirstonetomoveacrossthebridge,rippingoutthedemolitionchargesonthefarside.Thesame“game”wasplayed at the second bridge, although the engineers had to remove threeobstacles there. In front of the third bridge,Feldwebel Thiele shot up a 7.5-centimeter fieldpieceand twoantitankguns.The thirdbridgewas then taken.Thenitwastheturnoftheriflemenofthe1stBattalion.LeutnantWeissstormedaheadwithhismen.Underthecoveringfiresprovidedbythetanks,theycrossedthe fourth bridge. By 2040 hours, the fighting vehicles, riflemen, motorcycleinfantry and engineers had established the first bridgehead over the Seine atPont-sur-Seine.OberstKühn’sKampfgruppehadnotbeenidle,either.Hisadvanceguardwas

at thehighgroundaroundCourtnouxby theeveningof13June.Asunnyday,filledwith success,was behind the tankers and riflemen.The spoils ofwar intermsofartillery,vehiclesofalltypes,smallarms,andequipmentcouldneitherbe counted nor used. Frequently, it was not even reported—the pursuit hadmoved so fast. On that day, the division took some 3,000 prisoners from theFrench20th,53rd,and59thInfantryDivisionsandthe27thMountainDivision.Bythen,thesilverribbonoftheSeinepresenteditselftothesoldiersofOberstFreiherr von Funck andMajor Zimmermann. It snaked and curved its waythroughthecountryside.Kühnorderedhiscommanderstogetheraround2200hours.Heissuedorders

toMajorEdlerRittervonPetertotakethebridgeovertheseineatNogent-sur-Seine in acoupdemainwith his tank battalion, the 6thCompanyof the rifleregiment and a platoon of divisional engineers.The riflemen sent out a patrolunderUnteroffizierHeinrich,which already started encountering enemy forcessixkilometersfromthebridge.Thatmeantthatsurprisewasoutofthequestion.Makinga snapdecision,Peterhadhis tanks closeup, followedcloselyby theriflemenandtheengineers.Unfortunately,theleadfightingvehiclesencounteredanobstacleinfrontofaneight-meter-widecreek.Themaingunssetthebeamsalight.Leadingtheriflemen,MajorZimmermannandhisadjutant,OberleutnantSiegelmann,hadalreadyclimbedoverthebeamsandreachedthefarside.Thereweretwentyabandonedbusestoeithersideoftheroad;theyhadprobablybeentransportingFrenchforcesjustafewhoursearlier.

OberleutnantEngelien’s6thCompanymovedforwardsilently.Totheleftwasarailwayembankment;ontheright,a largegasworks.Amachine-gunsectionwas posted at the road leading to Paris. The riflemen then sprang across therailwaybridgeinlongstrides.Thesilenceofthenightwasbrokenbymachine-gunandantitank-gunfire.Thatwascomingfromthebridge’sguarddetail.Theengineers with the company tossed hand grenades. Unteroffizier Schrankbrought the first machine gun into position, Unteroffizier Reschke andUnteroffizierKlemuschtheirmortars.Reschkewasabletoeliminatetheantitankgun.Thenthewordscame:“Getup!Move!Move!”The bridge over the Seine had been taken. In the course of clearing the

demolitions, the engineers suffered two dead and fourwounded.The riflemenkeptmovingforward.LeutnantTankandhisplatoonassaultedandwereabletotakea secondbridgeovera tributary.TheFrenchhadalreadyabandoned theirpositionsthere.ThefirstGermanfightingvehiclesstartedtoarrive.Itwas0330hours.By0400hours,Engelien’s6thCompanyhadassembled inNogent.Thesquads ofUnteroffizier Heinrich andUnteroffizier Franz, which had been leftbehind,wereabletobringtwelveofficerandthirtyenlistedprisonerswiththemwhen they came forward. The town proper was not defended by the enemy.Large numbers of refugees were dwelling in the streets. Feldwebel Gablercombed the townandbrought back a fewmoreprisoners, as didUnteroffizierSchmidt,whotookin4officersand140enlistedwhilescreeninginthedirectionofFerreux.The bridgehead was expanded until noon and combat outposts sent out to

Sorigny–AvantleMarcilly–Ferreux.Theneighboringdivisionontheleft,the4.Panzer-Division,hadalsoestablishedabridgeheadatMarcillywithitsPanzer-Regiment35.The1.Gebirgs-DivisionontherightcontinuedtohangbackinthevicinityofPetitMorin.TheforcesofthecorpswerearrayedfartotherearoftheFrenchfront.Theordersforthenextday:“Pursuetotheutmostandpreventanyenemybreakthroughsfromtheeast!”Thedivisionstartedmovingoutagainwith twoKampfgruppenaround1400

hours.KampfgruppeKühn—Panzer-Regiment5,Kradschützen-Bataillon3, theII./Schützen-Regiment 3, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 1./Pionier-Bataillon39, and the II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment—movedout fromNogent.The route led itpast seemingly endless columns of refugees through Marcilly, where weakenemy resistance was eliminated. The pursuit continued via Planty–Vulaines–Rigny–Bérulles–Boeurs.

One episode from the pursuit may shed some light on the conduct of thefighting as the French field armies started to disintegrate, which was moreevidentwith each passing day.Unteroffizier Ulrich of the headquarters of therifle regiment took a wrong turn on his motorcycle and found himself on asecondary road.Hewas surprised toencounter amotorizedcolumn.Makingasnap decision, he raised his carbine,which had only three rounds loaded, andhadtheeightvehicleshalt.Hetookthreeofficersandfortymenprisoner.KampfgruppeKleemann—Panzer-Regiment6,theI./Schützen-Regiment3,the

II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and division troops—pursued the enemy through lePeje–Palis–Villemaur.HauptmannvonPlato’s1stCompanyoftherifleregimentwasabletopushbackenemyforcesthatunexpectedlyappearedandcontinuedthe advance at the head of the column. Elements of the armored regimentstopped a French transport train at the Villemaur rail station and forced thepersonnelonboardtosurrender.Thedivisionintelligenceofficermadethefollowingnotationinthedailylogs

thatevening:

Enemy pulling back in complete dissolution. Formations aboveregimental level no longer identifiable as entities. The appearance ofnumerousmedicalpersonnelmakeitapparentthatthebreakthroughisfarintherear-areaservicesarea.Whilemovingthedivisioncommandpostforward to St. Mard, there were long columns of prisoners withoutGermanguardsonandnext to theavenueofadvance to thenorth.Thenumberofprisonersforthedayisestimatedat10,000.

Panzer-Regiment 5 and the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 were only fifteenkilometers north of St. Florentin when it turned dark. Major Zimmermannreceivedorders:“takethecrossingsovertheArmance,thedeBourgogneCanaland theArmançonandenter thecityofSt.Florentin!”MajorHohmann’s tankbattalionwastosupporthiminthateffort.That started thememorable operation of Zimmermann’smen, supported by

Leutnant Bonacker’s tank platoon and Leutnant Weigel’s engineers. The twomachine-guntanksand the lightcannontankrattledonahead,followedby theengineersand then the6thand10thCompaniesof riflemen.The raidingpartypassed long columns of refugees and a French bicycle company.UnteroffizierLandgräber, a patrol leader from the6thCompany, returnedwithhismen andreported thatSt.Florentinwasfullof theenemybut that thebridgeswerestill

intact.Major Zimmermann ordered the tank platoon to head for the city.Without

regardforthedispositionsandresistanceoftheenemy,the6thCompanyandtheengineers were to follow right behind. They were to take the bridges andestablish a bridgehead.The first houses of the city soon appeared.The streetswere full of refugees, mixed in among them were innumerable French armytrucks.Upto thatpoint,notasingleshothadbeenfired.TheFrenchprobablythoughttheGermanforcesweretheirEnglishAlliesuntilsomeone,somewhere,shoutedout:“LesAllemands!”But by then, themain guns andmachine gunswere doing the talking. The

riflemencharged thenonplussedenemywithcoldsteel.Noneof them thoughtaboutdefending.Intheblinkofaneye,30...50...100menwerecaptured.The tanks reached the first bridge, but were unable to proceed in theentanglement of vehicles and horse-drawn conveyances.Major ZimmermannandOberleutnantEngelienchargedforwardwiththeirmen.Theygotontoandthenacrossthebridge.Thebattalioncommanderwasbadlywoundedbyaroundtothechest.UnteroffiziereModerandBöhm,alongwithStabsgefreiter Jordan,took their commander back toStabsarztDr. Schreck.Despite the setback, theattack did not falter.Oberleutnant Siegelmann, the battalion adjutant, made asnapdecisionandassumedcommandofallGermanforcesinSt.Florentin.FeldwebelSchieblonchargedonwithhisplatoon,withUnteroffizierModerin

thelead.Theriflemenclearedapathbymeansofclosecombatandsoonbrokeall resistance. Despite the Gordian knot of vehicles, the men continuedadvancing.SleepingFrenchmenwerepulledfromtheirvehiclesandsimplysentback through the city without guards. Unteroffizier Klemusch and GefreiterBorsdorffwerekilledinthefighting.UnteroffizierModerwasthefirsttoreachtherailwaybridge.Hewasabletocutofftheretreatrouteofavehiclecolumn,andheforcedtwofightingvehiclestostop.By then, Leutnant Bonacker was able to blaze a trail with his tanks and

occupythebridge.Hearrivedatjusttherighttime;alongtransporttrainwantedtodepart.ThefewGermanfightingvehiclesimmediatelyattackedthearmoredtrainandstoppedit.HundredsofFrenchleftthefreightcarswithraisedhands.Itwasslowlyturninglight.Therewereenemytruckcolumns,gunsandtanks

everywhereinthestreets;amongthemwasanimmensecrowdofprisoners.The6th Company had taken five bridges and set up to secure the bridgehead.FeldwebelFranke’splatoonfromthe8thCompanyoftherifleregiment,which

wasrushedforward,wasabletoturnbackthefirstandonlyFrenchimmediatecounterattacktorelieveSt.Florentin.OberleutnantSiegelmannarrangedthecompaniesinsuchafashionthatthey

couldturnbackanyattemptedenemyattacks.HauptmannRiedlbroughtuphis9thCompanyandassumedactingcommandof thebattalion fromSiegelmann.OberleutnantMüller-Röhlich’s7thCompanywaspositionedalongthenorthernoutskirts of the city. Later on, the 9th and 10th Companies reinforced thosepositions. The 6th Company screened in front of the railway facilities to thesouthofthecity,andthe8thCompanyclearedthecityandengagementareasoftheenemy.Intheprocessofclearing,UnteroffizierKnollwasabletoroundup20officers

and105enlistedandsecuretheminabuilding.UnteroffizierDickfeld,GefreiterTamm, and Gefreiter Leuendorf captured an additional 250 French.OberfeldwebelArndtandaplatoonformthe9thCompanyforcedthreecolumnsoftruckswith400soldiersbackintothecity,whileSchützeWegenerofthe6thCompanypersonallyheld50Frenchcaptive.AlloftheprisonerswereplacedinacollectionpointinthecitysquarethathadbeensetupbyHauptmannZabel’s10thCompany.Two French companies attacked the outposts of the 7thCompany from the

north.Afterashortfirefight,theywereforcedtosurrender.SixhundredFrench,includingmanycoloreds,putdowntheirarms.GefreiterNoack,armedonlywithhis pistol in his had, succeeded in bringing in 25 prisoners. When MajorHohmannarrived inSt.Florentinaroundnoon, thefightingwasover.The2ndBattalionreportedanoverwhelmingsuccessthatday:

Prisoners: 112 officers and 2,360 noncommissioned officers and enlistedpersonnel

Spoilsofwar:Morethan500vehiclesofalltypes;4tanks;4armoredcars;4antitankguns;6antiaircraftguns;11artillerypieces;17ambulances;andafueldepotwith6millionlitersoffuel

TheGerman losses consisted of three dead and threewounded.Thevictorywas reported in theArmedForcesDailyReport of 18 June as follows: “As aresultofhisdecisivepersonalactions,thecommanderofariflebattalion,MajorZimmermann...preventedthedemolitionofimportantbridgesbytheenemyatthelastminute.”

Later,ZimmermannreceivedtheKnight’sCrossforthisoperation.ThesameawardwaspresentedtoWillyModer,whowasalsopromotedtoFeldwebel.Hisaward recommendation read, in part: “. . . entered St. Florentin with hismotorcycleinfantrysquad,movingthroughFrenchcolumnsduringthenightof14–15 June. In two hours of close combat, he eliminated numerous Frenchsoldiers with cold steel and blocked the retreat route for an enemy column,forcingittosurrender.”Atthatpoint,theFrenchArmynolongerofferedacohesivedefensivefront.

Nonetheless, individual strong points and troop elements offered stubbornresistance, and the enemy conducted immediate counterattacks here and there.Forinstance,theantitankelementshadtoturnbackaFrenchcavalryattackfromoutofthewoodseastofVillemoiron.Anothercavalrythruststrucktherestareaofthe6thBatteryofthedivisionartilleryatAix-en-Othe.UnteroffizierArndt,inanoutpostwithamachinegunontherightsideoftheperimeter,wasabletoseethehorsemenfleeing,however.Theenemylosttensoldiers.Thedivisioncontinueditspursuitstartingat1400hourson15June.Theday’s

objectivewasAuxerre/Yonne.Thecorpshad issued itsorders in that regardat1120hours.Onceagain,thearmoredbrigadetookthelead.Areinforcedadvanceguard under the command of Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel followed. Itconsistedof theIII./Schützen-Regiment3, the3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39, the3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, the 8./Flak-Lehr-Regiment, the 5./Artillerie-Regiment60, and the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75. Manteuffel’s men marched via St.Florentin–Brienon–Moneteau without enemy contact. During the movementsthatday,the1stand2ndCompaniesofPanzer-Regiment6 seta transport trainloadedwithhigh-explosiveammunitionalight.Thereconnaissancebattalionwasahead of all the other battalions and encountered the enemy at the easternoutskirts ofAuxerre around 2000 hours. The battalion immediatelymoved ontheenemyandwasabletotakeanairfieldwithfifteenoperationalaircraft.The division continued its movements without pausing and advanced via

Cravant–Vermenton–Arcy toAvallonwith both of its battle groups. The latterlocality was reached during the night of 15–16 June around 0200 hours. Thereconnaissance battalionwas only able to enter andmove through the villagewith the help of the 11th Company of the rifle regiment, which was quicklybroughtforward.Intheprocess,severalhundredprisonerswereagaintaken.The Frenchwere surprised by the sudden appearance of theGerman tanks.

Situations developed that bordered on the farcical. For example, the lead

armoredcarsofthereconnaissancebattalionapproachedtheLaCôtedeChauxMountain, south of Arcy. The tunnel through the mountain was completelyilluminated. The French guards posted there greeted the waving armoredreconnaissance soldiers in a friendly manner and seemed happy to encountertheirBritishAllies.Theyweremightilydisappointedwhentheylookeddownthebarrel of a pistol after the tunnel was firmly in the hands of the fewreconnaissancetroopers.The 1st Company of the rifle regiment, part ofOberst Kleemann’s march

group,wasabletobookanothersuccessthatnight.OberleutnantBuchterkirch’slightplatoonhad the riflemenmountup and then conduct a reconnaissance inforce in the direction of Chabois. The nighttime march was successful andbroughtgood reconnaissance information for thecommand.Butwith thegreatdistances that were being covered during the day, there were also a fewdifficulties thathadnotbeenanticipated.Forexample, the forcesdidnothaveanygoodmilitarymapsforsouthernFrance.Commercialroadmapswithascaleof 1:300,000 or travel guides had to be used. The number of prisoners wasanother issuethathadnotbeentakenintoaccount in theoperationsplans.Themass of prisoners grew by the day. The division could barely spare anymoremen toguard them.GeneralmajorStumpff requested thecorpssendforwardaguardregimentthatwouldacceptresponsibilityfortheFrench.The fuel situation presented the greatest problem.The supply sectionswere

barelyabletokeepupwiththepaceoftheadvance,sincetherewerenosupplydumps.Evenwhensomewerereported,aswasthecaseon14JuneinCrisolles,theyeitherdidnotexistortheirexistingstockshadalreadybeendistributed.Itwas a daily worry for the division logistics officer and the division supportcommander: How was the division going to get fuel? The division had notreceivedasinglecubicmeteroffuelfortwodays.Whenareportarrivedon15JunethatJu-52’s8werelandingattheairfieldatBethonwithfuel,MajorHakerimmediatelystoppedthemovementsofallofhissectionsandorderedthemtheretopickupfuel.ButwhenOberleutnantGesengerandLeutnantBömckearrivedinBethon,therewasnothingthere.Theofficersfromtheotherdivisionsthathadshown up for the same purpose also had to leave with unfinished business.OberleutnantGesenger flewinaFieselerStorch9 to fourneighboringairstrips,includingonethatwasstillunderFrenchartilleryfire,buthewasunabletofindfuelanywhere.Inthemeantime,PanzergruppeKleistannouncedthatfuelwouldbecomingtoCrisolles“sometime.”OberleutnantGünther’s10thTruckSection

(Heavy)wasordered there immediately; but that effortwas also invain.OnlyLeutnantGrafDouglas’s8thTruckSection(Heavy)hadsuccess;itbroughtfiftycubicmetersoffuelfromRoiseltoNogent.The3.Panzer-DivisionthusbecametheonlydivisionofallofPanzergruppeKleistthatreceivedanyfuelthatday.ItwasnotuntilthelargedumpinSt.Florentinwasdiscoveredthatallworriesweretemporarilygone.Hauptmann i.G.Krasáconfiscatedallof thestockpiles thereforthedivision.Despitethat,thefuelsituationcontinuedtoremainstrained.Panzer-Regiment

5sentareportbackwithLeutnantMüller-Hauffon16Junethatitwasstrandedwithoutfuel.GuidedbyLeutnantBömckeandLeutnantHaug,corpsassetswerethen sent forward as soon as possible with twenty-five cubic meters (6,600gallons) of fuel. A few hours later, the armored brigade adjutant,HauptmannFriedrichs,arrivedatthedivisionsupportcommandandreportedthatthebrigadewasoutoffuel.The7thand9thTruckSectionsweresentforwardwithLeutnantGrafAsseburgwithanothertwenty-fivecubicmetersofgasolineandthreecubicmeters (790 gallons) of diesel. Since the brigade’s fuel situation was really acause forconcern, thedivisionorderedmore fuel tobebrought forward to theQuarré–lesTombesareaimmediately.Fortunately,LeutnantThorhauerofthe9thTruckSection(Heavy)hadbeenabletolocatesomefuelinParis10andbringitforwardtothedivisionon17June.Duringthenightof15–16June,thedivisionreorganizeditsforcesinsucha

manner that the two battle groups under the brigade commanders marchedbehindthereinforcedadvanceguard,whichhadalreadyreachedAvallonaround0230 hourswithout encountering any enemy resistance.Outside of that town,however,wereFrenchforces.Theywerecompletelysurprisedbythearrivalofthe Germans. After the 3rd Battalion of the rifle regiment had closed up, theattack started.Oberleutnant Freiherr von Werthern’s 11th Company made itthroughthetowninitsfirstattemptinanefforttocutofftheroadsleadingtothenorth, northeast and east. TheFrenchwere quickly overrun. Some 52 officersand2,500enlistedpersonnel, includingmanymen from theAlsace regionandNegroes, surrendered, resigned to their fate. Among other things, thereconnaissance battalion captured the war chest of the garrison, which held14,000Francs.Italsodestroyedthetelephonelinesbymeansofaspecialdetail.The corps radioed orders at 0800 hours: “The main body of the division

movesonArnay-le-Duc;theadvanceguardtoBeaune!”The armored brigade was already approaching Saulieu and was four

kilometers northwest of the city around 1700 hours. The 2nd Battalion ofPanzer-Regiment6,using triedand truemethods,wentaround thecity togainsomeopenground.Allofasudden,Hotchkisstanksrolledagainstthebattalion’sleft flank from somewoods.They belonged to formations that had previouslybeen positioned in theMaginotLine andwere pulling back in the face of thefrontalattackbythe1.Armeetothewest.Thesurprisewasequallygreatonbothsides.Theenemywasfirst tofire,however,andunfortunatelyknockedoutthecommand tank of the regimental commander. The regimental liaison officer,Oberleutnant Rohrbeck, was badly wounded. One of the crew was killed.Fearlessly,Obergefreiter Jahrmoved forward to the road in hisPanzerII andblockedit.Thebravesoldierpaidfortheboldmovewithhislife.Nonetheless,hehelduptheenemytemporarily.OberstleutnantvonLewinskisentmotorcyclemessengersforwardtothetanksthatwerealreadyfarahead.Ashortwhilelater,the first ones returned. ItwasOberleutnantBaron vonNolde and his platoonfromthe8thCompany.Asharp tankengagementensued.After thesmokehadcleared, there were twelve knocked-out enemy tanks littering the landscapebetween the woods and the road. At the same moment, the regiment’s 1stBattalion rolled up, which immediately started pursuing the French. Theirfighting vehicles were able to knock out another tank and destroyed anothereightyvehiclesofalltypesanddescriptions.Oberstleutnant von Lewinski assembled his regiment. One battle group

attacked the woods in an enveloping maneuver, while a second one turneddirectly on Saulieu. The tanks that advanced against the woods only foundinfantryforces.Forthemostpart,theywereMoroccans,whoputupadefense.Theyallowedthemselvestobeoverrun,onlytofireonthefollowingriflemenorthedismountedtankers.Finally,thelastresistanceinthewoodswasovercome,and 780men started theirmarch into captivity.Major von Bernuth’s antitankbattalionalsoarrived.Thefiresfromthesmall3.7-centimeterantitankgunswerejustabletoreachthefleeingenemyfightingvehicles.Fiveenemytanksweresetalight by the antitank elements. A short while later, the motorcycle infantrybattalionalsoappeared; itscompaniesbroughtabout thedecisive turningpointinthefightforSaulieu.Afterthelastinfantryresistanceinthewoodshadbeeneliminated, themotorcycle infantry attacked the city frontally.Themotorcycleinfantry,supportedbythe1stCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6,wereabletopushthroughthecityrapidlyandtake450prisoners.Withthataction,thedivisionfounditselftotherearoftheFrench2ndand4th

Armies.The troopelements thatputup a fightbelonged to formations froma

large number of divisions. There was no more unified command among theenemy forces, and every officer foughtwith his element at the spot he foundhimselfinwhentheGermantanksappeared.Tothesoldiersofthedivision,itseemedtheyonlymovedintheirvehiclesand

marched.Thecountrysidegrewprettierbytheday.Thedivisionfounditselfinthe fruitful and rich Burgundy region. Small rivers snaked through the hillycountryside, which reminded the men of the wheat fields and bloomingmeadowsoftheRhineland.Thevineyardsstretchedforkilometersontheslopesofthewoodedhills.Theroadsweregoodandstraightasanarrow.ThereconnaissancebattalionmadeittotheoutskirtsofArnay.Nothingtobe

seenoftheenemyfarandwide.But,allofasudden,therewasacrack!Theleadarmoredcarwashit.ThereweretwoFrenchtanksinfrontofit.Anantitankgunfromthebattalionwasimmediatelybroughtforwardandwasabletoknockoutone of the two fighting vehicles. The other vehicle cleared the route.MajorFreiherr von Wechmar sent a motorcycle infantry platoon in pursuit. It wasunable to enter the village, because itwas halted outside bymachinegun andantitankfire.Thebattalionstoppeditsmovementsandwaitedfortherestoftheadvance guard to catch up. Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel ordered the 3rdBattalionof the rifle regiment toattackaround1600hours.Valuable timewaslost, since thebattaliondismounted toearlyand tried toenvelop too far to thewest. The 1st Battalion of artillery supported the attack with its 1st and 3rdBatteries, as well as the attached 5./Artillerie-Regiment 49. Leutnant Grafdirectedtheshortartillerypreparationasaforwardobserver.At1915hours,therifle battalion finally launched its attack. The 12thCompanywas on the rightand the13thCompanyon the left.Bothof thecompanieshadbeen reinforcedwith infantry guns, antitank guns and heavy mortars. The 11th and 14thCompanieswereemployedagainstthehighgroundnorthoftheroad.Initially, the battalion made good progress. But five enemy tanks appeared

rightoutsideofArnay,whichcausedthemomentumoftheattacktopeterout.Itwasnot until the friendly antitankguns fired that theFrench fightingvehiclespulledback.HauptmannOrts’s 12thCompany then entered the city.The13thCompanyfollowed,somewhatmoreslowly.House-to-housefightingensuedthatlastedtwohoursandcausedmanycasualties.ItwasmadeallthemoredifficultbytheappearanceagainandagainofFrenchtanks.Thefightingwasespeciallyintensearoundthecemetery,whichchangedhandsseveraltimes.Itwasnotuntil2100hoursthatArnaywasfirmlyunderGermancontrol.

The advance guard moved to the high ground west of the city to screen,leavingbehindthe11thCompanyoftherifleregiment,whichwasreinforcedbythe 4./Panzer-Regiment 6, two platoons from the antitank battalion and theengineer platoon of the regiment’s 15th Company. The nightwas fitful, sincegroupsofenemyriflementriedtotakebackArnayinimmediatecounterattacks.While defending against one such attack, the 3rdBattery of artillery set eightenemytrucksalight.Thepersonnelonboardsurrendered.Theentiredivisionwentovertoascreeningposture.The1stBattalionofthe

rifleregimentwasassignedtoguardthearmoredbrigade,whichhadassembledatSaulieu.Theriflebattalioncommander,MajorMeese,waswoundedduringanenemy reconnaissance-in-force. In addition, three other officers from theregimentwerewoundedthatday:HauptmannHaspelandLeutnantDeckertandLeutnant von Pfuhlstein. The French were hiding out in the woods aroundSaulieuandattemptingtobreakthroughtheGermanlinestoreestablishcontactwith their own forces. A large fuel column under Hauptmann Schütte wasengagedseveraltimesbyonesuchgroup.Theconstantrainhinderedtheconductofcombatoperations.Itdidn’tbother

the riflemen, who were resting in the vineyards on the high ground aroundArnay,atall.Without warning, a French first lieutenant arrived at the German positions

with awhite flag.MajorKratzenberg andMajorFreiherr vonWechmarwereamazedwhentheemissaryofferedthemthesurrenderoftheDijonFortress!TheFrenchofficerwas takenback to thedivisioncommandpost. Insteadof the3.Panzer-Division, however, the corpsdirected the4.Panzer-Division to initiatethe capitulationof the fortress.Dijonwas in the latter division’s attack sector.Starting at 1700 hours on 17 June, the Reich war flag was waving from thefortresswalls.Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel reorganized his advance guard. Instead of

placingthereconnaissancebattalioninfront,heinsertedatankcompany,whichwould enable him to break any potentially significant enemy resistance faster.The battalionmoved out right at noon.HauptmannWeiss ledwith his battle-tested 4th Company of Panzer-Regiment 6. The 12th Company of the rifleregimentandoneplatoonfromthe3rdCompanyoftheantitankbattalionwereattachedtohiminsupport.Themainbodyoftheadvance,underthecommandofOberstleutnant von Lewinski, followed behind in this order: Headquarters,III./Schützen-Regiment 3; Headquarters, Schützen-Regiment 3; Headquarters,

Panzer-Regiment 6; Headquarters, I./Artillerie-Regiment 75; 1./Artillerie-Regiment75;III./Schützen-Regiment3;3./Pionier-Bataillon39;andoneplatoonfromthe3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39.Therestof thedivisionfollowed in twobattlegroups.Theleadelementsoftheadvanceguardreceivedriflefirefromboththeleft

andrightoutsideofBligny.Thetankcompanywasabletobreaktheresistancerapidly,however,withtheresultthattheadvancecouldbecontinuedunimpededat 1330 hours. The first batch of prisoners for the day numbered forty. ThereconnaissancebattalionwassentinthedirectionoftheraillinethatturnedofftoDijon.Inthecourseofitsreconnaissance,itdestroyedfivelocomotivesandatransporttrain.When the lead armored elements reached the high ground northwest of

Beaune,theyencountereddefendingenemymotorizedcolumns.Theyhadbeendirectedtocoverthewithdrawalofthegarrisontothewest.OberstleutnantvonManteuffel immediately brought the 14th Company of the rifle regimentforward,aswellasthe1stand3rdBatteriesofartillery.Theytookthevalleyandtherailwaystationunderfire.Unfortunately,theydidnotsucceedinstoppingthetrains thatwere just pulling out.Later on, however,LeutnantHiltmann of themotorcycle infantry battalion was later able to capture them. By then,MajorSchmidt-Ott’s1stBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6 had closedup.HeadvanceddownonBeaunewithhisbattalionandenteredthecity.Intheprocess,theleadtankswereabletoknockoutaFrenchtankandthenworktheenemyoverwithmachinegunsandmainguns.TherewasagreatnumberofIndochineseamongthem.Mountedup,the11thCompanyoftheriflebattalionfollowedbehindthe1./Panzer-Regiment6.Theriflemenwereabletoovercomethefrequentlytoughresistanceinthehousesandthenestablishadefensivepositionalongthecreeknortheastofthecity.Afterclearingthecity,the12thand13thCompaniesoftherifleregimentweresenteastofthecitytoreinforce.The12thCompanyblockedtherailwaylinetoChagny.Theadvanceguardwasthenallowedtorest.TheHeadquartersandI./Panzer-

Regiment 6 stayed in Beaune; the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, along with the12./Schützen-Regiment 3, the 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, and a platoon from the3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39 inAlexe-Corton; the III./Schützen-Regiment3andtherestofthe3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung39aroundSerrigny;andtheI./Artillerie-Regiment 75 and the II./Flak-Lehr-Regiment in Vignolles. Screening elementsweresentoutinalldirectionsandcombatoutpostsestablished.

Rumorsstartedcirculatingfrommouthtomouththatwereconfirmedashortwhilelaterbythosewhocouldlistentoaradio:MarshalPétainwasaskingforaceasefire.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthetroopswereoverjoyedthateveningandnight.Thepatrolsthathadbeensentforwardreportedbythemorningof18Junethat

thebridgeatSeurrehadhadaspanoffifteenmetersblownoutofitonitswestside.Theenemywasnowheretobeseenalongtheriver.Thedivisionmovedoutimmediatelywith its forward elements around 0700 hours. The leaders of thebattlegroupshadbeen issuedordersbeforehand: “ReachVerdun sur leDoubsimmediatelyandestablishabridgeheadovertheSaone,screeningtothesouth!”ThatwastobefollowedbyalatercrossingovertheDoubsatChaussin,withanattendantadvanceonMouchardandtheSwissborder.Thedivisionhadreorganizedthatdayaswell.Thetwostrongbattlegroupsof

OberstKühnandOberstKleemanntookoverthelead,whiletheformeradvanceguard was sent to the righthandmarch group.KampfgruppeKühn placed thereconnaissancebattalioninthelead;itwasabletotakethebridgeinVerdunsurleDoubsat0732hoursaftera shortengagement.The troopsmovedoutagainimmediately, and the bridge north ofPagny laVille, eight kilometers north ofSeurre, fell to them a short while later. That bridge was negotiable for allvehicles.At that point,Kampfgruppe vonManteuffel moved out with themission to

guard the advance of the two battle groups to the east and north. His forcesconsistedoftheHeadquarters,Schützen-Regiment3; the III./Schützen-Regiment3; the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75; the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39; and theI./Flak-Regiment 51. The aviators from the attached Luftwaffe short-rangereconnaissancesquadronhadbeenintheaireversincethemorninginanefforttomonitortheentiredivisionalsector.KampfgruppeKühn reached theSaonearoundnoonwithmostofhis forces,

crossingtheriver.Thereconnaissancebattalioncontinuedtoadvanceandturnedin thedirectionofMontVaudery.OberstKleemannwaswithhis forcesat thesame time outside of Aumont, while Kampfgruppe von Manteuffel formed abridgeheadatAllery.Theenemywasgenerallyfallingbackeverywhere.Incaseswhereadefense

was being offered, there were strong officers in charge. There were frequentinstanceswheremachinegunandcarbinefiresuddenlybrokeoutfarbehindtheleadelements.Inonecase,KradschützenPohl,Gerbsch,andKiebitzofthe3rd

CompanyofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionnoticedthatthevillageofChagnywasstillfullofFrenchsoldiers.UnderthedirectionofLeutnantHiltmann,whowas bringing up the rear because he was wounded, the three motorcycleinfantrymenconvinced thegarrison there to surrender.Eightofficersand threehundredfiftymensurrendered.Inaddition,theyalsocapturedthreeintactfreighttrainsandonehospitaltrain.Major Freiherr vonWechmar’s reconnaissance battalion was turned in the

directionofChampagnole.His troopsdidnot encounter any serious resistanceanywhere.Thereconnaissanceelementsdidrunintocolumnsofrefugeesagainand again, however. Some soldiers tried to hide themselves among them,whowerehopingtoescapeundetected.Therewasnofightingatallon19JunealongtheentireWesternFront.OberstKleemannandhisbattlegroupreachedtheareaaroundMouchard–Arbei without practically any enemy contact.Oberst Kühnand his forces advanced into the area around Chaussin, after the brigade hadcrossedtheDoubsat1715hours.Over the last fewdays,MajorBeigel’s engineerbattalionhad seenconstant

employment. The engineers practically needed to be everywhere at the sametime in an area that was dotted with rivers in order to scout bridges or erectthem.Forexample,thebattaliondeterminedatnoonon18JunethatthebridgeatPt.Noirwas tooweak for tanks.Correspondingly, it prepared the bridge atLays for tank crossing. The destroyed bridge at Peseuxwas likewise repairedaround 1800 hours and, within the same hour, the bridge at Orrain, west ofChaussin, was checked for its load-bearing capacity. The 3rd Company ofengineerscompletelyrepairedthelargebridgeinSeurrebymidnight.Liketherestoftheforcesofthedivision,KampfgruppevonManteuffelstarted

itsnighttimerestaround2000hoursthatday.ThequarteringareaspreadacrossAllery,Bragny,Chauvort,St.Pussey,LaParre,Verdun,andSt.Jean.Elementsof the3rdBattalionof the rifle regimentand the3rdCompanyof theantitankbattalion guarded the bridge over the Saone at Chauvort, as well as themostimportant roadsandbridgeof theentiresector.The13thCompanyof the rifleregiment established a large prisoner collection point atVerdun.Bymidnight,some600prisonersfromthefollowingregimentshadbeencounted:34,49,134,168, 305, and 402. There were also soldiers assigned to territorial training,replacement and work detachments. That evening, the 12th Company of theregimentfoundaburningfueldepotattheGergyrailstation.Aplatoonfromthesupply company that was sent there by the division support command was

undeterred and put out the fire.Feldwebel Röhl’smenwere able to save onemillionlitersofgasolineforthedivision.ThenineteenthofJunewasadayofrest for thedivision. It remained in the

positionsithadpreviouslyreached.Thetroopsfoundthenecessarytimetobringweapons, uniforms and vehicles back into order and enjoy the well-deservedrest. More replacements arrived from the homeland. Only the reconnaissancebattalion enjoyed no rest. It attacked Champagnole and occupied the villagewithout encounteringmajor resistance. By doing so, the lead elements of thedivisionwereonlyfifteenkilometersfromtheSwissborderthatevening.Thatdayhadbeenblessedwithgreatweather.Thesunshonefromclearskies,

invitingthesoldierstobatheintheSaoneorsimplytakeiteasyinthesoftgreenmeadowlandsalongtheriverandintheprettyvillagesofBurgundy.Vineyardson ridgelines stretched all the way around. Old palaces and ruins greeted thesoldiersfromthepeaksof thehillsandmountains.Richvillasand tidyhousesinvitedthesoldierstospendsometimeinthesmalltownswiththeirgardensandparks. The roadswere smooth andwellmaintained andwound in serpentinesdownintotherivervalley.Unfortunately, there was hardly any rest time for the officers of the

headquarters.AfterMarshalPétainhadexhortedhisarmytofulfillitsdutiestothelastman,weknewthat thewarwasnotquiteoveryet.Oberstleutnanti.G.vondemBornewenttothecorpsheadquartersandbroughtbacknewdirectivesfor the division. According to them, the corps was to fall in behind theXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) and advance in the direction ofMarseille or the Spanishborder.Thenewdirectionofmarchwas causedby the fact thatPanzergruppeGuderianhadreachedtheSwissborder,encirclingtheFrenchfieldarmiesintheAlsace region.PanzergruppeKleistwas tomove down theRhone. The armorgroup consisted of theXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.), with the 9. and 10. Panzer-Divisionen, Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) “Großdeutschland,” the LeibstandarteSS “Adolf Hitler,” and the SS-Totenkopf-Division, and the XVI. Armee-Korps(mot.),withthe3.and4.Panzer-Divisionen, the13. Infanterie-Division(mot.),andtheSS-Verfügungs-Division.Inasupplementtoitsdirectiveof14June,theArmy High Command had designated the long-range objectives of Germanoperationstobea linerunningfromtheareasouthofLyonintheeastandtheareaaroundBordeauxinthewest.TheXVI. Armee-Korps (mot.) followed theXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.) in the

direction of Lyon on 20 June. On that day, the 10. Panzer-Division and

Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland” took thatmajor city.The corpswasdirectedtoadvanceintotheareasoutheastofLyon,wherebythe3.Panzer-Division had a flank guard mission, protecting the left flank in the generaldirection of Grenoble–Chambéry. The division continued its march in thedirection of Lyon from its bivouac sites late in the afternoon of 20 June. Byevening,themetropolisstillhadnotbeenreached.OnlyHauptmannBarth, thedivisionintelligenceofficer,madeittoLyontoestablishcontactforthepurposesof quartering and traffic regulation. (Hauptmann Barth received notice at thetime that he had been accepted as a General Staff officer.) The divisioncommand post set up operations in Château Boullars, six kilometers west ofBourg.The enemy no longer seemed capable of putting up organized resistance. It

wasonly thereconnaissanceandcombatpatrols thatoccasionallyhad itout insmallskirmisheswithenemyrearguards.Forexample,UnteroffizierLiebichofthe3rdCompanyofthemotorcycleinfantrywasabletodestroysixaircraftanda tank at an airstripwhile conducting a patrol. The noncommissioned officer,whoreceivedtheIronCross,FirstClass,forhisefforts,hadcrossedtheRhoneinapneumaticcraftwithhissquad.Mostof thedivisiongot to see abit ofLyonon21 June.The tankers from

Berlin and Brandenburg finally got to see a large French city that had notsufferedanything from thewar.Thecolumnshaltedbeforeentering theSaoneValley.Therewerebaronialvillaswithhugegardens,whichstretchedallthewayupthehills.Theoutskirtsweresoonreachedandthemovementcontinuedintothe city center. The streets were full of people. There was movementeverywhere.Thestreetcarsmovedpast,ringingtheirbells.Frenchpolicestoodat the intersections and regulated the enormous traffic. Businesses had theirwareson tables in frontof their stores.Manypassers-by stoodmotionlessandgapedatthefield-graycolumnsmovingby.ThecolumnsthenmovedacrosstheRhone and into themain business district. It should be noted that there wereugly, black house facadeswith dark rowsofwindows along the riverbanks. Itwas a picture of proletarian poverty, which the tall spires of the mightycathedralsthatdominatedtheskylineofthecitycouldnothide.ThemovementcontinuedwithoutstoppingpasttheairfieldsatBronandBourgouin.TheeffectofStukaattackscouldeasilybeseenthere.ThedivisionrestedontheperipheryofLyonin themanysmallhamletsand

localities.Panzer-Regiment6 guarded the rest area around Janneyrias. For the

soldiers,itwasawelcomechangeofpacetobeabletobuyfreshfruit,suchasbananasandapricots,orsilkgoods,suchassilkstockings,orsmokingproductswhile they bivouacked in theRhoneValley. Somewere happy just to see thepeaksofthewesternAlpsgleamingoverfromafar.Generalmajor Stumpff summoned his commanders to a conference on 22

JuneattheHotelCarlton.Hebriefedtheofficersonrecentlyreceiveddirectivesconcerning thesituation.According to them, theXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)wastobetheonlyGermancorps tocross thedemarcationlineestablishedbetweenGermanyandItaly.ThepurposewastounhingetheFrenchfrontalongtheAlpsfromthewesttomakeiteasierfortheItalianstoattackintotheRhoneValley.The corps had issued orders to its divisions. On 23 June, the 3. Panzer-

Division was to form the first wave and move on Grenoble from its formerassembly areas. Itwas to block the retreat routes leading to the city from thenortheast,eastandsouth.Ifpossible,itwastoestablishcontactwiththeItalianArmy.Itwasdirectedforthe4.Panzer-DivisiontoguardthatadvancealongtherightflankbyattackingonbothsidesoftheRhoneinthedirectionofValence.The13.Infanterie-Division(mot.),reinforcedbytheII./Panzer-Regiment6,wastoadvancetoalinerunningMontmélian–Annecytoblocktheegressroutesforthe enemy out of the Isere and Arc Valleys. There were still eight enemydivisions in the fortified area between theMediterranean andMontblanc: theMoroccan2ndand3rdInfantryDivisions,the30thMountainDivision,andthe40th, 54th, 67th, 69th, and 72nd Infantry Divisions. There were also threefortressbrigades employed there.Sincemostof those forceshadnotyet doneanyfighting,itwasanticipatedthattherewouldbeanenergeticresistance.Thataspectwastobetakenunderconsiderationintheformationofbattlegroups.Thedivisionmoveditsforcesforwardon22JunesothatKampfgruppeKühn

was in the Bourgoin area,Kampfgruppe Kleemann in the Crémieu area, andKampfruppevonManteuffelaroundBron.Therewasonlynominalfightingthatday in the division sector, with the 3rd Company of motorcycle infantryencountering slight resistance from Negroes at Crémieu. WhenObergefreiterKrautwurst and Gefreiter Lewerenz captured two French officers while onpatrol, theywerenotsatisfiedwith their“catch.”Theycontinuedscouting,butwhen they reached some trees, shots rang out. Undeterred, the two juniornoncommissionedofficersattackedcourageouslyandbroughtbackanadditional2officersand200Negroes.The twenty-third of June started with dreary and rainy weather. The

reconnaissance battalion, reinforced by a battery from the 1st Battalion ofartillery,movedoutpunctually.ThetroopsmovedthroughRuyandChampierein the direction ofLesAbrets. The division followedwith its two large battlegroups. On that day, Oberst Kühn commanded Panzer-Regiment 5, theII./Schützen-Regiment 3, MG-Bataillon 7, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, theII./Artillerie-Regiment 49, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39, the 3. Pionier-Bataillon39, theengineersectionandbridgingsectionfromthedivisionalengineers,theII./Flak-Lehr-Regiment,andacompanyfromPanzerjäger-Abteilung605.OberstKleemann’s force,marching to the left, consistedof the I./Panzer-Regiment 6,theI./Schützen-Regiment3,Kradschützen-Bataillon3,theI./Artillerie-Regiment75,Panzerjäger-Abteilung 605, the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 39, and the 10./Flak-Lehr-Regiment.TheadvanceguardofKampfgruppeKühn ran into a large tree abatis at the

entranceofthevalleyleadingtoGrenoble,notfarfromMoirans.Itwasguardedbyenemyantitankguns.Thetankstookupthefightwiththeenemyshortlyafter0900 hours andwere able to breach the obstacle in the end. But the fightingvehicles were unable to advance any further that day. The terrain was toodifficult, themountainroadstoosteepandrockyandthemeadowstothesidestoomarshy.Moreover,theFrenchhadpostedmachinegunsandantitankgunsatalmost every bend in the road.Artillery andmortars fired from high atop themountains on the march routes and inflicted the first casualties on the battlegroup.OberstKühn reported to the division that itwould only be possible toadvanceiffriendlyartillerywerebroughtforward.The advance guard of Kampfgruppe Kleemann encountered stubborn

resistancearound1100hoursatPontdeBeauvoisin.Theroadbridgehadbeenblownupbytheenemy,andtherailbridgetothesouthwasbutamountainofrubble.Withoutartillery support, itproved impossible tocrosswithpneumaticcraft,sincetheenemyoccupiedthefarbank.Correspondingly,onlythewesternportionofthelocalitycouldbetaken.Fightingvehiclesfromthe2ndCompanyofPanzer-Regiment 6, which had been sent forward, hadmore success. TheywereabletocaptureanintactbridgesixkilometersfarthersouthatSt.Albin.Major Meese’s 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment started crossing the

demolishedrailwaybridgenearBeauvoisinbysquadsaround1400hours.Theyapproached the locality from that side. Nonetheless, the attacking riflemenreceivedheavyriflefirefromthehouses,frombehindvegetationandfromtrees.Ahardstrugglelastingseveralhoursdevelopedforthelocality.Thebatteriesof

the2ndBattalionofartillery,platoonsfromtheantitankbattalionandengineershad to be brought forward. There was a crashing and booming, the likes ofwhichhadnotbeenheardsince the fighting for theDylePosition.Thevillagewas ablaze, but the enemy did not admit defeat. Oberstleutnant Tröger’smotorcycle infantry approached. By then, it was the afternoon. The mendismountedfromtheirbikesandpressedintothebadlybatteredvillage,whosepopulace, almostwithout exception,had fled.Pocketsof resistancecouldonlybetakenoutinclosecombat.Thecasualtiesmounted.Inthe3rdCompanyofthemotorcycleinfantry,FahnenjunkerMertz11waskilled,thefourteenthsoldierofthecompanykilledinthecampaign.The enemy finally started pulling back around 1800 hours. Themotorcycle

infantrybattalionthenturnednorthandscoutedinthedirectionofSt.Albin.The1st Battalion of the rifle regiment pivoted to the south in the direction of St.Beron. Sections left behind inBeauvoisin needed the entire night to eliminatethelastremainingmachine-gunpositionsthere.OberstKühn’sforcestothesouthhadbeenabletoworktheirwayforwardto

the Voreppe after difficult fighting and movement. When the lead tanks ofPanzer-Regiment5worked theirway through the broken terrain of the valley,whichwasfullofdensevegetation,ditches,andstandsoftrees,andapproachedtheIsèreCanal,theysuddenlyreceivedartilleryfireofallcalibers.Itwasnearlypossible togetoutof theway, since largeobstacles in the roadpreventedanyforwardmovement.Thetwoleadfightingvehiclesflewintotheairasaresultofdirecthits.OberstKühnorderedthe7thand8thCompaniesoftherifleregimentforward

to clear the obstacles.OberleutnantMüller-Röhrbach’s 7thCompany attackedalong the road, whileOberleutnant Engisch’s 8th Company moved along therailwayline.Theterrain,whichformedtheentrancetoanarrowvalleyflankedon both sides by 800-meter mountains, was completely open and could beobservedfromthehighground.Whilethecompaniesdeployed,strongartilleryandmachine-gun fire impacted among their ranks. The French batteries wereterrificallycamouflagedandcouldbarelybeidentified.Theriflemenfoughttheirwayforward,meterbymeter,alongthesteepslopes,throughdefilesandacrosscreeks. They advanced into La Crue deMoirans, which was occupied by theenemy.Adirecthitimpactedatthelocationofthecompanyheadquarterssectionof the 8th Company, killing two senior noncommissioned officers and badlywounding Oberleutnant Engisch and many noncommissioned officers and

enlistedpersonnel.Theenemyfirescontinuedunabatedandstoppedanyfurtherefforts at attacking.Oberleutnant Engisch, who remained up front, pulled hisriflemenback to theoutskirtsofMoirans.Elevendead remainedon thevalleyfloor;thirty-ninewoundeddraggedthemselvesback.Thedivisionordered theattack tobecalledoff at1900hours.Atmidnight,

Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel received orders from the division, whoseheadquarters was located in Château Rives that day, to cross the river at St.Quentin-sur-le-Isère and attackVeury from thewest. The 3rdBattalion of therifleregimentwasdirectedtoattempttoeliminatetheartilleryfromthere,thusallowingthetwobogged-downbattlegroupsoutsideofVoreppeandBeauvoisintoadvanceagain.MajorKratzenberg’s 3rdBattalionwas already leaving its former screening

area aroundEtieeneat 0100hours andmovingviaRives andRebage toFure.OberstleutnantvonManteuffelpersonallybriefedtheBattalionCommanderonthe special situation. To assist the battalion, Hauptmann von Viereck’s3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 and Hauptmann Stern’s 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39were attached in support. The two forward observers from the 4th and 6thBatterieshadnoradiocontactwiththeirbatteries,sotheentireoperationhadtobeconductedwithoutartillerypreparation.Thebattaliondismountedfromitsvehiclesandadvancedthroughthedarkness

ofthenight.The13thCompanyreachedVertandwasdirectedtotakeacrossingpointover the Isèrebymeansofacoupdemain.Theengineers reconnoiteredanddeterminedthatacrossingwasnotpossiblebecauseoftherapidcurrent—threemetersasecond.Theriverwas250meterswide,andthepneumaticcraftwouldmost likely by taken 1,000meters downstream. Further reconnaissancewasconductedatthebridgeeastofTullins.ThepatrolreceivedfirefromseveralmachinegunsfromthedirectionofSt.Quentin.Itwasalsodeterminedthatthebridge had been blown up. The third spanwas in thewater and could not berepaired quickly by the engineers. After that report reached the division,GeneralmajorStumpfforderedtheoperationcalledoff.TheattackbyOberstKühn’s forces on24 Junedidnotmake anyprogress,

despiteseveralattemptson thepartof theriflemen topenetrate into thevalleywestofVoreppe.EnemyfiresfromtheoutersectorsofthefortressofGrenoblewerepreventingthedivisionfrompenetratingintothewesternFrenchAlps.KampfgruppeKleemannwasgiventhemissiononthemorningof24Juneto

establishcontactwithGeneralmajorvonRothkirchundPanthen’s13.Infanterie-

Division(mot.)on the left.Thatwasachieved late in theafternoon in theareaone kilometer north ofBeauvoisin.Kleemann’s forces then advancedwith therightwingof themotorized infantrydivision in thedirectionof theCol-de-la-Crusière.ThesecondobjectiveofthebattlegroupwastoattackGrenoblefromthenorth.ThemotorcycleinfantrybattalionwasemployedagainstLaBridoiretoprotect

theleftflank.ThebattalionattackedintwogroupsunderHauptmannPapeandOberleutnantBecktothenorth.Afterovercominglargeobstaclesandmachine-gun nests, it succeeded in getting to Gunin outside of la Bridoire. Two tankplatoonsundertheoverallcommandofLeutnantNeumann-Holstesupportedthemotorcycleinfantry.Thatevening,thefightingvehiclestookthevillageofLépinonbeautifulAiguebeletteLake.Hauptmann Hansen’sMG-Bataillon 7 eliminated the French heavy infantry

weaponsonthehighgroundnorthofVoreppe,thusbringingsomerelieftothe2ndBattalion of the rifle regiment,whichwas in position aroundLaCrue deMoirans.By that afternoon, themachine-gunbattalion fromSaxonyhad takenLe Grand Bois, taking 150 prisoners in the process. Its advance then boggeddowninthefaceoffiresfromenemyguns.Themain body ofKampfgruppeKleemann then advanced on Les Echelles.

The small village spread out at the foot of theGrandSom in a narrowvalleypocket. The slopes all around the village were filled with vineyards,meadowlands and isolated farmsteads. The terrain presented a peacefulappearance. Major Meese’s 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment, MajorWöhlermann’s 2nd Battalion of artillery and Leutnant Fechner’s 1./Panzer-Regiment6wereearmarkedfor theattackon thevillage.Thefightingvehiclesadvanced along the road, which was full of curves and tunnels, while theriflemenadvancedtobothsides.Theenemyresistanceappearedtogrowweakerwith each meter advanced. At that point, the riflemen were right outside thevillage.One platoon from the tank company was sent against the village. After

passing the first obstacle in the road, the fighting vehicles ofLeutnantMüllerknocked out an antiaircraft gun. The French placed well-aimed antitank firesalongtheroadandforcedthetankstopullback.In contrast, Hauptmann von Plato’s 1st Company of the rifle regiment,

supported byOberfeldwebel Meyrhofer’s platoon, had more success that day.The tankers and riflemen advanced across boulder-strewn fields, through

vegetation, across narrow creek beds and along serpentines against St. Franc,located at 1,200 meters. The Germans were almost able to enter the villageunnoticed. They took 100 Negroes from Senegal prisoner; the men were sosurprisedtheyhadnotimetoofferadefense.Theriflemendidnotrest.Instead,theyadvancedthroughAttignattoLaBauche,whichtheyreachedbeforethesunsetonthebeautifulcountryside.Heavy rainfall made the individual engagements that flared up around les

Echelles in the afternoon more difficult. The riflemen up front had beenreinforced by heavy antitank guns and four howitzers from the 6thBattery ofartillery,whentheattackwasrepeated.Thecannoneersbroughttheirpiecesrightuptotheedgeofthevillage.ThegunsfiredoveropensightsagainsttheFrenchpocketsofresistance.Everygunhadanofficer incommand:LeutnantSchaaleonGunNo.1,LeutnantKrauseon2,LeutnantSchröderon3,andOberleutnantKerstenon4.Asaresultoftheconcentricfires,theenemy’sresistanceweakened.The2nd

Company of the rifle regiment entered the first few houses of Les Echelles,which the enemy had abandoned. The enemywas simply trying to avoid theGerman artillery fire, however, and had reestablished himself further in thevillage. Based on theweapons and equipment previously captured—includingfivecasesofdum-dumrounds—itwasapparentthatthe1stBattalionoftherifleregimentwasfacingafairlysubstantialfoe.Aftertheonsetofdarkness,thefiringabatedonbothsides.Thedivisionhad

passedonto thebattalionthat itwas tocalloffanyattacksfor the timebeing,sinceitwasexpectedthataceasefirewouldgointoeffectshortlyandtherewasno need for unnecessary casualties. The watches of the men in the combatoutpostsshowed1900hours,whenawhiteflagstartedtobewaved.ThemayorofLesEchellesappeared.Heworeablackfrockcoat,overwhich

hehadplacedablue,whiteand red sash.He soonappeared in frontofMajorMeeseandrequestedthathisvillagebespared.Thecommanderrepliedthathecouldonlyacceptanunconditionalsurrender.Hisriflemenwouldotherwisebecompelledtofighttotheceasefire,whichwasexpectedshortly.ThemayorleftwithaheavyheartanddisappearedthroughthefirstFrenchlines.AnofficerpatrolwassentinthedirectionofLesEchelles.Allofasudden,the

Frenchshowednomoreinterestinfighting.Notashotwasfiredanywhere.TheGermansmoveddownthestreetswithoutbeingstopped,followedbyhundredsofpairsofeyesfromarmedNegroes.Thentherewasatrumpetcall.TwoFrench

officers and the mayor approached the Germans. The battalion adjutant,OberleutnantMölln,greetedthemandtookthemtothecommandpost.Duringanothermeetingat thebattalioncommandpost, theGermancommanderagaindemanded unconditional surrender. The French Capitaine declined, statingproudly, “A Frenchman never surrenders!” Both sides came to terms with amutualceasefireuntil2215hours,however.Thecorpsinformedthedivisionat2130hoursthattheofficialceasefirewould

gointoeffectat0135hours.Hardly anyone slept that night. Keyed up, everyone kept looking at their

watches.Thehandsmoved slowly across the faces, but the time finally came.Theoutpostsupfrontfiredsignalflaresintothedarkskies;therewasahissingandbanginglikesomejoyousfireworks.Fromadistance,outofthevillagesofIsèreValley,came thesoundofchurchbells.Thena faintsoundmixed in thatstartedtorise.Itwasatrumpetsignal:“DasGanzehalt!”12

German state radio played the hymn “We Gather Together.”13 Wistfulness,joy, contemplation, and a feeling of triumph had not just a few rough-hewnwarriorsfoldingtheirhands.The division remained in contact with the enemy with its outposts on that

memorableday,aswellassecuringallimportantareasinitssector.Asalways,emphasiswasplacedonpassiveairdefensemeasures, since therewasstill thesoundofindividualexplosionsinthemountains.Mostoftheformationsrested.After positioning the necessary outposts, the rifle regiment placed its 1stBattalion inLesEchelles, its2ndBattalion inMoiransand its3rdBattalion inTullins.The2ndBattalionofPanzer-Regiment6,whichhadbeenattachedtothe13.Infanterie-Division(mot.),returnedtothedivisionfold.Thedivisionheadquarters issuedpassestoFrenchphysiciansandemployees

ofpublicutilitiesallowing thosemen tocross the linesandmaintaineverydaylifeforthecivilians.Theforcesquarteredinthecitiesandvillagesalsotookthatunder theirwing.Not a few soldiers and officers passed up on food from thefieldkitcheninordertoeatwithMadame,whosefoodtastedawholelotbetter.The businessmen did not have toworry about a loss of sales for their goods,sincetherewerethingsintheirshopsthatthetankershadlearnedtogowithoutforalongtime.An officer from the division went to see the commander of the opposing

forces.TheFrenchcommanderallowedthedivisiontorecoverandevacuatethedeadandwoundedfromtheheavyfightingof theprevious threedays incases

wheretheyhadnotbeenaccessible.ThelastdeadfromthedivisionwereplacedtoeternalrestonthepalacegroundsatMoirans.Thecommanderinchiefofthearmy,GeneraloberstvonBrauchitsch,arrived

atthedivisioncommandposton29June,andGeneralmajorStumpffreportedtohim.ThecommanderinchiefthenwenttoMoirans,wherehevisitedtheforcespositioned there.At a formation of the 6thCompany of the rifle regiment, hementionedforthefirsttimethatthedivisionwouldbeheadedforthehomelandsoon.Thosewordssooncirculatedthroughallofthedugouts,quartersandoutposts.

All of the needs and the worries of the previous six weeks were quicklyforgotten.A few thought about the comradeswithwhom they had shared the4,950kilometersthedivisionhadcoveredinthecampaignandwhohadpaidtheultimateprice.Thedivisionhadbeenat the front fromtheverybeginningandhadparticipated inallof thedecisivebattles. Ithadalsopaidahighcost.ThenumbersofdeadsufferedduringthecampaignintheWestshouldbeconsideredillustrative of all of the dead the division suffered and serve as amemorial tothem: inPanzer-Regiment 6, 5 officers and 65 noncommissioned officers andenlisted personnel; in Schützen-Regiment 3, 20 officers and 134noncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnel.The successes of the division in the campaign were not due solely to the

leadership skills and tactical proficiency of the officers or to the courage andcommitmentofthetankers,riflemenandcannoneerswhowereinthefrontlines,but also to those that anArmed ForcesDailyReport nevermentioned. Thosewere the innumerable radio operators, telephone operators, convoy drivers,medics,cooks,firstsergeants,maintenancepersonnelandmechanics,bakersandbutchers.Theirachievementscanneverbemeasured.IntheperiodfromMaythroughJune,thedivision’sfieldpostoffice,manned

by fifteen soldiers and under the supervision ofFeldpostinspektorMollweide,processed the following amounts of mail: 2,851 sacks of received mail, 637sacks of outgoing mail, 6,792 outgoing postal money transfers (389,341Reichsmark),and1,425incomingpostalmoneytransfers(38,314Reichsmark).On29June,thecorpspassedthefollowingordertelephonically:“Effective1

July,the3.Panzer-DivisionmovesinthedirectionofGermany.”ThatofficiallyendedtheemploymentofthedivisioninthecampaignintheWest.

__________________1. This was a Luftwaffe short-range reconnaissance squadron: 9th Squadron(Army)ofthe2ndInstructionalWing.2.Thiswasaseparateheavyantitankbattalion.Atthetimeofthecampaign,ithadthreebatteriesoffour8.8-centimeterantitankgunseach.3.Lexikon lists the battalion’s designation asNebelwerfer-Abteilung 1 by thistime.ItwasinitiallyequippedwiththeNebelwerfer35,a10-centimetermortar,designedprimarilytodeliversmokeandchemicalmunitions,butalsocapableoffiringhigh-explosiverounds.Itwasinthelattercapacitythattheweaponsystemwas used most often. Later on, the German Army had multiple-barrel rocketlauncher systems developed, which were used to the end of the war to goodeffect.4.Speckbecame the first commandinggeneralof theGermanArmy to fall incombat.Hewaskilledinactionon15June.5.Thatengineerbattalionwasassignedtothe72.Infanterie-Division.6.O.A.=Offizier-Anwärter=officer-candidate.7.1stMountainDivision.8. The Junkers Ju-52, a trimotor aircraft, was the standard transporter of theLuftwaffefortheentirewar.Itwasasturdyandreliableaircraft,buttherewereneverenoughonhandtoaddresssupplyissuessuchastheoneunderdiscussion.9.TheFieslerStorch(“Stork”)wasalightutilityaircraftusedinawidevarietyofroles.Ithadasingleengineandwasnotedforitsabilitytotakeoffandlandatunimprovedairfields.10. Paris was declared on “open city” on 13 June and occupied by Germanforceson15June.11.AFahnenjunkerwasanofficercandidate.12.Itroughlymeans“Everyonestop!”or,inmoremodernterms,“Standdown!”13. This is known in German as the niederländisches Dankgebiet—literally,“DutchPrayerofThanks”—andintheoriginalDutchasWillthedennutreden.Itwaswritten tocelebrate theDutchvictoryoverSpanish forcesat theBattleofTurnhoutin1597.

CommandpostatAssevillers:Thecompanycommanderswaitfortheattackorders.Fromlefttoright:OberleutnantvonBaumbach,HauptmannvonPlato,OberleutnantStein,andotherunidentifiedofficers.

OberstForster,thecommanderofArtillerie-Regiment75.

MajorZimmermann,thecommanderoftheII./Schützen-Regiment3.HewaslaterawardedtheKnight’sCrossforhisroleinthefightingforSt.Florentin.

UnteroffizierModerledtheleadsquadthattookthebridges.

Justbeforeafiringmission:A10.5-cmfieldgunofthe6./Artillerie-Regiment75atPéronne.

ThebridgesatSt.Florentin.

Themainclearingstationofthe3.Panzer-Division.

Takingabreatherafteranengagement.Fromlefttoright:LeutnantHellinger,OberleutnantStein,HauptmannHaspel,andLeutnantvonPfuhlstein.

SketchmapofthefightingaroundSt.Florentin.

Asoldier’sgravesitealongtheroadinfrontofArnayleDuc.ThirdfromtheleftisLeutnantFreiherrvonWerthern.

TheII./Schützen-Regiment3advancesonMoirans.

ThebridgeovertheSt.AlbinatLaBridoire.

OberleutnantMöll,theadjutantoftheI./Schützen-Regiment3,receivesaFrenchemissaryatLesEchelles.ThewarinFrancewasover.

Panzer-Regiment6returnstoitshomegarrisonofNeuruppin.PanzerII’softheregimentpassinreviewinfrontoftheregimentalcommander.

Aparadeinvolvingthe3.Panzer-DivisioninMainz.OnthetribunalareGeneralderInfanterieSteppuhn,thecommanderofMilitaryDistrictXII;GeneralmajorStumpff;andGeneralmajorMeyer,thelocal

commanderforMainzandthefirstcommanderofPanzer-Regiment6.

Schützen-Regiment3entersitshomegarrisonofEberswalde.

Pionier-Bataillon39returnshometoRathenow.InthePanzerIIisLeutnantZiegenbalg.Ofinterestisthefactthattheorderofbattleforthebattalionin1940doesnotindicatetheissuanceofanytanks.

TheIII./Schützen-Regiment3entersthevonEstorffBarracksinHamburg-Wandsbek.

OberstKleemann(seenhereasaGeneralmajor),thecommanderofthe3.Schützen-Brigade.

OberstLinnarz(seenhereasaGeneralleutnant),thecommanderofthe5.Panzer-Brigade.

OberleutnantBuchterkirchwasnotonlythefirstrecipientoftheKnight’sCrossinthedivision(29June1940,asaplatoonleaderinthe2./Panzer-Regiment6),buthewasalsothedivision’sfirstOakLeaves

recipient(31December1941,asthecommanderofthe2./Panzer-Regiment6).

MajorKratzenberg,thecommanderoftheIII./Schützen-Regiment3.HeisgivencreditforthetakingoftheDylePosition.

CHAPTER6

TheReturnHome

ThefirstofJulysawthestartofthedepartureofthedivisionforGermany.ItwasdirectedtotakethetrackedvehiclestothevicinityofLangres,wheretheywouldberail-loadedhome.Allwheeledvehicleswere to roadmarchdirectly to theirgarrisons.Thedivisionstartedmovingoutofitsquarteringareasat0700hours.Itwasabrightandclearmorning.Themountains juttedoutof the fogwith

their peaks and presented their final greetings to the departing soldiers. TheforcesrolledalongfamiliarroutestotheRhône.ThetanksrattledinthedirectionoftherailheadatLesAbrets.Thedivisionformedthreemarchserialsandmovedvia Lyon to the area around Bourg and to the north. The division located itscommandpostinBranges.Hauptmanni.G.BarthremainedwiththeintelligencesectioninPaladruastherearparty.The road march the next day proceeded via Châlons-sur-Sâone, Beaune,

Dijon,Langres,andChaumont.The transport trainswith the tanksand trackedvehicles caught upwith themarch serials on 3 July,which had a day of rest.OberleutnantvonBrauchitsch,whohadbeensenttothe12.Armeeasaliaisonofficer, returned on 3 Julywith the information that a reconstitution had beenorderedforthedivisioninitspeacetimegarrisons.TheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)remained the division’s immediate superior command until the borders of theReich,atwhichpointthedivisionreportedtotheReplacementArmy.Thedivisionassembledallofitselementson4Julyandcontinueditsmarch.

TherewasagoodbitoftrafficinNancy.Allofthebusinesseswerejammedwithsoldiers of the occupation forces and the first brown-uniformed partyfunctionaries.Oncebeyondthecity,thereweretracesofthewar:Bombcraters,graves,destroyedhouses, tossed-asideweaponsandvastquantitiesofmateriel.Theroutethenledthroughkilometersofpeaceful,unspoiledcountryside.ItwasnotuntilthevicinityoftheMaginotLinewasreachedthatdestroyedlocalities,blown-upbridgesandshot-upbunkersandgunswereseenagain.ThedivisionmovedthroughSaargemünd.Around1700hours, leadelementsof thedivisionenteredReich territory.Themovement continuedpast bunkers, improved fieldfortifications,wireobstaclesandtanktrapsandintoundamaged,butdepopulated

Saarbrücken.ThefirstcommandpostofthedivisiononGermansoilwasinLandstuhl.The

rifle regiment tookupquarters inMünchweiler,while thearmoredbrigadedidnot cross the border until the next day. The next forty-eight hourswere spentwithsleep,leisureandmaintenance.TheseventhofJulywasabrilliantSunday.ThedivisionmarchedfromSaarbrückenviaKaiserslauternandarrivedinMainzthatmorning.Thecitywasdecoratedwithflowersandflags.Theresidentsstoodalongthestreets, lookedoutof theirwindowsandwavedfromtheirbalconies.Accompanied by the sounds of parade music, the regiments and battalionsmarched past the commanding general of the homefront command of theXII.Armee-Korps,1GeneralderInfanterieSteppuhn,whowasalsothelocalmilitarycommander for Mainz, as well as Generalmajor Meyer, the first peacetimecommanderofPanzer-Regiment6andGeneralmajorStumpff.Advancepartiesfromthedivisionalelementshadalreadyheadedbacktotheir

garrisons.Thetrackedvehicleswereloadedontrainsagainon7JulyandsentinthedirectionofBerlin.The III./Schützen-Regiment3 left themainbodyof thedivisionthesamedayandmovedviatheAutobahnandGiessen,Göttingen,andLüneburg to Hamburg. There, the battalion paraded in front of the cheers ofthousands of people and pastGeneralleutnant Schwandtner, the commandinggeneralofthehomefrontcommandoftheXII.Armee-Korps.ThemainbodyofthedivisionmarchthroughThuringiaoverthenexttwodaystowardBerlinandits other home garrisons. The local populations greeted the forces everywherewithloudcheers,flowers,cakesandcigarettes.Onceintheirhomegarrisons,thevariousformationspassedinreviewbeforetheircommanders.

DetachmentsforAfrica

The fall of 1940 was a decisive time in the history of the division. AfterUnternehmen “Seelöwe” (Operation Sea Lion), the invasion of England, wascalled off, the German leadership attempted to force England to its knees byothermeans.For the immediate future, ithad tohelp its Italianallies inNorthAfrica.TheArmyHighCommandorderedthedivisiontobethefirstmajorformation

trained and equipped for the new theater ofwar. Specialist committees startedvisiting the troop units at the end of September and beginning of October todeterminewhethersoldierswerefitfordutyintropicalclimates.Startinginthemiddle of October, those soldiers, who could not be employed there due to

health issues, were swapped with soldiers from other elements or from thereplacement detachments. At the beginning of November, the division startedexchangingequipmentandvehiclesandreceivingspecialammunition.Mussolini protested against the sending of a German armored division,

however.Hitleracceded tohisdesiresand the transferof theentire3. Panzer-DivisiontoAfricawashalted.The refitting of the division for tropical duty continued, however, since the

German leadershipentertained thoughtsofusing it forUnternehmenFelix, theproposed invasionofMorocco.Consequently,all regimentalofficersweresentto themilitarymedicalacademyinBerlin toattendcoursesontropicalmattersrelating to the military. The division’s training in garrison and local trainingareas continuedunabated, even after orderswere receivedon12November toprepare the entire division once again for tropical duty. That idea wasabandoned,however.At thatpoint, theBritishstartedtheirmajoroffensiveonCyrenaica.General

Wavell’s8thArmymovedouton8DecemberagainstMarshalGraziani’s10thArmy.Justoneweeklater,Wavell’sforceshadpushedtheItaliansbackacrosstheEgyptianborder.Atthatpoint,MussoliniturnedtotheGermangovernmentandaskedforexpeditedmilitarysupport.That caused theArmyHighCommand to form amotorized blocking force

that could accomplish just such a mission. Oberst Freiherr von Funck, thecommanderofPanzer-Regiment5,waspromotedtoGeneralmajorandgiventhetaskof forming theunit.Freiherr vonFunck arrived as the first officer of thefutureDeutschesAfrika-KorpsinTripolion15January1941.Heremainedtherefour weeks before returning to Germany and assuming command of the 7.Panzer-Division fromGeneralleutnant Erwin Rommel, who was then sent toAfrica. The division was ordered to provide combat-capable elements andestablishthemainpartsoftheblockingforce.EventsinNorthAfricaalsotooktheir own course. That forced the Army High Command to raise a lightdivision,2insteadoftheoriginallyenvisionedbrigadeequivalent.Consequently, the 3. Panzer-Division lost not only combat-experienced

regimentsandbrigades.Withintheoverallschemeofthings,italsolostofficers,noncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnel,whohadbeeninthedivisionfor years, training and growing professionally there. The loss of Panzer-Regiment5wasthebiggestblowtothedivision.Theregimentwasnotonlytheoldestarmor regimentof thePanzertruppe, ithadalsogone through thickand

thin with the division and had participated with distinction in the fighting inPoland andFrance.AlthoughPanzer-Regiment6 had initially been earmarkedfortropicalduty,ithadtransferredallofitstropicalequipmentandvehiclestoitssister regiment after the fall of 1940.The regiment received considerable newequipment,includingseventyPanzerIII’swith the5-centimetermaingun.ThefirsttwobattalionsoftheregimentpreparedforthetransporttoAfrica.The3rdBattalion of Panzer-Regiment 28, which had been intended for the newlyactivated18.Panzer-Division,was reassigned toPanzer-Regiment6 as its 3rdBattalioninMarch.The divisional artillery had to give up its 1st Battalion.3 Panzerjäger-

Abteilung39andAufklärungs-Abteilung3werealsoreassignedtothenewlightdivision.4 Those five good formations formed the nucleus of the firstGermandivision to be employed in Africa. In addition, the division gave up the3./Nachrichten-Abteilung39andthe2./Pionier-Bataillon39,with the laterunitbecoming the 5th Company of MG-Bataillon 2. The signals platoon of thearmored brigade had to turn in its signals equipment. Panzerjäger-Abteilung605,whichhadsupportedthedivisionthroughoutthecampaignintheWest,wasalsotransferredtothe5.leichteDivision.Oberstleutnanti.G.vondemBorne,whohadprovenhimselfforyearsasthe

divisionoperationsofficerandwhohadcontributedgreatlytoitssuccesses,gaveup his duties to prove his abilities as the chief of staff of the newly formingDeutsches Afrika-Korps. The 3. Panzer-Brigade was dissolved to provide theheadquarterscadreforthe5.leichteDivision.Generalleutnant Rommel reported to his immediate supervisor, General

Gariboldi,thecommanderinchiefoftheItalianforces,inLibyaatthebeginningofFebruary.The seamovement of theGerman forces toTripoli started on 11February1941.OberstleutnantFreiherrvonWechmar’sAufklärungs-Abteilung3 became the firstGermanground force to landonAfrican soil.The armoredcars and motorcycle infantry immediately headed to the front and took theBritish fort at El Agheila on 24 March. That started the operations of theDeutschesAfrika-Korps,whosefirstmajorattack tookplaceon the lastdayofMarch betweenMarsa-el-Brega and the salt marshes ofMarada. The fightingvehiclesofPanzer-Regiment5,underthecommandofOberstOlbrich,initiatedoneofthemostglamorouschaptersofthewarwiththeirthrustintotheLibyanDesert.After a series of great victories and heroic defensive efforts, those former

troopelementsofthe3.Panzer-Divisionfoundtheirlamentablebutgloriousendin1943aspartofHeeresgruppeTunisintherockyandsandywastesofTunisia.

__________________1.Germanywas divided into districts, each ofwhichwas the home base to acorps. Upon mobilization, homefront commands for the districts were alsoactivated to takecareofmilitaryadministrativeandtrainingmatterswithin therespective districts. These were referred to as the “representative”(stellvertretend) commands, which have translated as “homefront” commandshere.2. This became the 5. leichte Division, which was later reorganized andredesignatedasthe21.Panzer-Division.3. This was replaced by schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 714, which had been aseparate artillery battalion with three batteries of 10-centimeter cannon. InMarch1941,itwasreorganizedandreissuedwithlighthowitzersandattachedtothe3.Panzer-Divisionasits1stBattalionofartillery,althoughitmaintainedthenumericaldesignationof714until relatively late (at least1943,perhapsnevergiven up). For simplicity’s sake, it will be referred to as the regiment’s 1stBattalion.SeediscussioninLexikon.4.Panzerjäger-Abteilung543,aseparateantitankbattalion,wasassignedtothedivision to replace the transferred Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39. The divisionreceived Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 to replace Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3 on 29January 1941, but that battalion was forced to give up its 2nd Troop on 29January to help form Aufklärungs-Abteilung (mot.) 18 (18. Panzer-Division).The battalion was redesignated as Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 in April1941.SeediscussioninLexikon.

CHAPTER7

FromtheSpreetotheBug,Part2:TheEveofOperationBarbarossa

TheFaceoftheDivisionChanges

All of the formationsof thedivisionwereback at their homegarrisonsby10July 1940. The barracks were frequently occupied by replacement elements,however,with the result that rooms and offices had to be shared. In addition,someoftheactivecompanieswerequarteredprivatelynearby—withnoneoftheriflemen, radio operators, cannoneers and tankers complaining one bit. Forinstance,thedivisionalsignalsbattalionleftitsgarrisoninStahnsdorfafterafewweeks to take up residence in the Michendorf–Caputh area in farmer’s andcivilian’shouses.It goes without saying that many officers, noncommissioned officers, and

enlistedpersonnel the fourteendaysof leave thatwasduehadbeenearned. Intheprocess,additionaltrainingandnormaldutieswerestillcarriedout.Vehicles,equipmentandweaponshadtobecleaned,repairedandmaintained.Onecouldaskanyoneassignedtothemaintenancecompanieswhatallthatentailed.Once the first period of block leavewas over, the quiet timeswere again a

thing of the past. Thewarwas still going on and new assignmentswere alsogiventothedivisionsthatwerebackintheirpeacetimegarrisons.TheGermancommandhadplannedfirstUnternehmenSeelöweandthenUnternehmenFelix.The3.Panzer-Divisionwasunderactiveconsiderationforbothoperations.Forinstance, a detachment of Panzer-Regiment 5 under the command of MajorRitter Edler von Peter was sent to the North Sea and the Baltic to receivetraining on submergible tanks.1 Most of the elements of the division wereaffected by reorganizations, issuances of new equipment, special duties, orcoursesofinstruction.The armor regiments were not the only major formations affected by

reorganizations within the division. For instance, the 1./Schützen-Regiment 3,which had previously been a motorcycle infantry company, received armoredpersonnel carriers. The rifle squads were organized into two machine-gun

sections.Even with the changes, the focus of daily duty continued to remain on

maintainingweapons,equipmentandvehicles.InthemonthofAugust,officersand enlisted personnel, who had been wounded during the Campaign in theWest,returnedtotheirunits.Thedivisionreturnedtofullstrengthinpersonnelassignments.MajorMeese,thecommanderoftheI./Schützen-Regiment3,was transferred

totheunassignedofficermanpowerpoolofMilitaryDistrictIIIon25July.Hewas later assigned to the Ceasefire Commission.Major von Bosse, who hadbeenwoundedatOrp-le-Petit, returned to reassumehis former command.Thecommanderof theregiment’s1stCompany,HauptmannvonPlato,wassent tothewaracademyforgeneral-staff-officertraining.The training for thenewer soldiers and theprofessional developmentof the

troops intensified over time. On 16 August, the division released its trainingplan. Among many other things, emphasis was placed on the cultivation ofdiscipline, march exercises, poison gas defensive training, professionaldevelopment of junior leaders, weekly company exercises, and biweeklybattalionexercises.Theyoungandnewofficerswereconstantlyinvolvedinmapexercises.Forinstance,amapexercisewasconductedon30Augustthatfocusedonthebreachingofafortifiedpositionbyabattalionreinforcedwithtanks.Inthefallof1940,theGermanArmywasinthemidstofbothreorganization

and organizational changes. Those changes especially effected the armordivisions.Thedirecteffectsonthe3.Panzer-Divisionwereasfollows:2

TheHeadquarters,3.Panzer-Brigade,was used to form the headquarters ofthe5. leichteDivision. In its place, the division received theHeadquarters, 5.Panzer-Brigade. The latter command-and-control entity was formed out ofassetsofMilitaryDistrictIII.SincePanzer-Regiment5wastobeshippedinitsentirety to North Africa, the division only hadPanzer-Regiment 6 remaining.Eventually, the previously reassigned personnel used to form the submergibletank battalion (Panzer-Abteilung C), returned to the division in a rathercircuitous fashion as the III./Panzer-Regiment 6.3With the addition of a thirdbattalion, Panzer-Regiment 6 was one of the first armored regiments soorganized.The division also received a second rifle regiment. It was designated as

Schützen-Regiment 394. The headquarters came from the former Infanterie-Regiment394ofthe209.Infanterie-Division.TheIII./Schützen-Regiment3was

used to form the regiment’s 1st Battalion. The regiment’s 2nd Battalion wasformedfromtheII./Infanterie-Regiment243,whichhadoriginallybeenformedfrom Landespolizei-Regiment 1 in Danzig.4 In addition, the 13./Infanterie-Regiment 325 (228. Infanterie-Division) was used to form the regiments 13thCompany.Theregiment’sactivationtookplaceintheEberswaldearea.Thedivisionalartillerydidnotremainunaffected.Its1stbattalionwassentto

Africa.SchwereArtillerie-Abteilung714,ahorse-drawnartillerybattalionfromSwabia,wasreceivedinitsplace.Thebattalionwasmotorizedandreceivedtheleichte Feldhaubitze 18 and considered the regiment’s 1st Battalion.5 Thedivisional artillery was reorganized to have a 3rd Battalion. This was formedfromtheII./Artillerie-Regiment49.6Flash-rangingsupport for theartillerywasprovidedbytheadditionofBeobachtungs-Batterie325.7

Since the original antitank and reconnaissance battalions of the division—Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 and Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3—were also sent toAfrica,thedivisionalsoreceivedreplacementsforthem.Aufklärungs-Abteilung(mot.) 1,8 from East Prussia, became the divisional reconnaissance battalion;Panzerjäger-Abteilung543,fromtheRhineland,itsantitankasset.Theantitankbattalionwasmoved toTeupitz,nearBerlin.The reorganization for thosemenwas difficult, inasmuch as it had been a battalion composed of reservists andoldervehiclesandequipment.Theyhadtogetusedtothedemandsandpaceofanactive-dutyarmordivision,whichwasoutfittedwithmodernequipment.Thebattalionconsistedofaheadquarterselementwithsignalplatoonandthreelineantitank companies having two platoons each of 3.7-centimeter antitank gunsandoneplatoonof5-centimeterantitankguns.Inaddition,thebattalionalsohadantiaircraftassets,consistingofonecompanywithtwoplatoonsof2-centimetersingle-barreledFlakandoneplatoonwith2-centimeterfour-barreledFlak.Sincetheengineerandsignalsbattalionseachhadtogiveupacompanyfor

the5.leichteDivision,thebattalionswerereorganizedtoaccommodatethat.Forinstance, the4thCompanyofengineersbecamethe2ndCompany.Bothofthesignalscompaniesweremodernizedandreorganized,sothatbothhadthesameweaponryandvehicularequipment.The new additions and assignments to the division from previously non-

organic elements, as well as the permanent and temporary reassignments ofpersonnel, also changed the face of the division froma personnel perspective.The officers and enlisted personnel had come from all areas of theReich andonly the number remindedone that itwas aBerlin andBrandenburg division.

Thedivisionhadbeen“remodeled,”asthesoldiersstartedtosay.Thatexpressionwasderivedfromthenameofthenewdivisioncommander,

GeneralleutnantModel.On13November,amanwithboundlesszeal took thehelmofthedivision,amanwhobentittohiswill,histoughnessandhisvision.Generalmajor Stumpff, who had been with the division since it had been

formed, was transferred to the newly formed 20. Panzer-Division to takecommandthere.The operations officer for the new division commander was Major i.G.

Pomtow.The twootherGeneralStaffpositionswere filledbyHauptmann i.G.Barth, the new division logistics officer, andOberleutnant vonSchubert,whotookBarth’spositionasdivisionintelligenceofficer.CommandofthearmoredbrigadewasassumedbyGeneralmajorBreith,who

camefromthe4.Panzer-Division.HegaveupthatcommandinMaytoOberstLinnarz.9 The rifle brigade continued to be commanded byOberst Kleemann.ThetwocommandersofPanzer-Regiment6andSchützen-Regiment3remainedincommandaswell,whilethenewcommanderofSchützen-Regiment394wasOberst Erhard, who was replaced on 26 August 1940 by OberstleutnantAudörsch.MajorvonCorvin-Wiersbitzkiassumedcommandofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalion,whileMajorWellmanntookthehelmofthe1stBattalionofSchützen-Regiment 3. Major Freiherr von Türckheim zu Altdorf assumedcommandofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,andHauptmannZiervogelbecamethecommanderofAufklärungs-Abteilung1. In January1941,Oberst Ries becamethedivisionalartillerycommander.Theyearof1941wasalsomarkedonceagainbytoughtraining.Battledrills

werethefocalpointofthemilitaryexercises.StartinginJanuary,thedivisionwasuniformlyequippedwithvehiclesofthe

sametype,andthepreviouslyissuedtrucksandstaffcarsturnedin.InFebruary,allenlistedpersonnelwhowereborn in1909orearlierwere transferred to thereplacement detachments, with the gaps in the formations being immediatelyfilledwithtrainedpersonnel.InMarch,thetankcrewsreceivedsteelhelmetsforthe first time in their history; theirmarchingbootswere replacedbyhigh-top,lace-uphalf-boots.10

A large-scale exercisewas held on 17May 1941 in front ofGeneraloberstGuderianatMarienwerder(nearEberswalde).AcrossingovertheFinowRiverandtheHohenzollernCanalwasexercisedusingallavailablemeans,including

the employment of close air support. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s 3rdBattalion of the armor regiment crossed the Hohenzollern Canal usingsubmergible tanks, while Major Wellmann’s I./Schützen-Regiment 3 crossedusingpneumaticcraft.Inthemeantime,thehighercommandlevelshadalreadyreceivedmovement

directives in preparation for the campaign against the Soviet Union. Theheadquartersconductedthenecessarymapexerciseswithinarestrictedcircleofcommanders and staff officers.For instance, the commander in chiefof the4.Armee,Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, conducted a map exercise with hiscorpsanddivisioncommandersinPosen,whichfocusedontheapproachmarchandemploymentofthefieldarmy.GeneralleutnantModel,accompaniedbyhisaide,LeutnantLiebrich,attendedtheexercise.The division was filled to its authorized levels of personnel, weapons,

equipment,andammunition.In themonthofMay,allof thecompanieshadtoprovide work details that were involved in producing bundled fascines forattachingtothesidesofthevehiclestoaidinthenegotiationofsoftgroundorsmallobstacles.Thedivisionalsoreceivedanewtacticalinsignia.Itconsistedoffanupside-

down“Y”withtwoverticalshortbarstotherightsideofthetopportionofthe“Y.”11

AttheendofMay,thedivisionwasorderedtobepreparedtomove,withitselementsremainingintheirgarrisonsandtemporaryquarters.Theexceptionwasthe I./Schützen-Regiment394, 280 kilometers from the division’s areas,whichwasmovedbyrailfromHamburgtoAngermünde.Rail-loadingexerciseswereconducted,andofficersandenlistedpersonnelonleaveweresummonedback.GeneralleutnantModelcalledhiscommanders together forameetingon25

MayatthedivisionheadquartersinBuckow.Theofficersreceivedthedirectivetolookforquarteringareasfortheirforcesfortheupcomingoperation.Tothatend,thebrigadeandregimentalcommandersmovedviaWarsawtoNiedzyrzectotheheadquartersofthe1.Kavallerie-Division,wheretheywerebriefedonthegeneralsituationbytheforcespositionedalongtheBug.ThedivisionpublisheditsmovementorderfortheEaston31May(OrderNo.

0044/41, SECRET COMMAND MATTER). According to it, the wheeledelementsofthedivisionweretostartmovingouton6June,reachingRadzyninfour day and two nightmarches. The3. Panzer-Division was granted right ofway along allmarch routes, with the exception of Posen forward, whichwas

sharedwiththe4.Panzer-Division.Therailmovements,whichdepartedatarateofforty-eighttrainsaday,hadabsolutepriority,however.Therewereadditionaldirectives for the tracked vehicles from the transport commands.The advanceparties of the regiments and battalions left their quarters on 1 June under thecommandofofficers.Twodays later,specificmovementorderswere issued toeachofthetroopelements.When the division startedmoving out on 6 June, it was greeted by radiant

sunshine over Berlin and the surrounding areas. People were standing on thestreets everywhere,waving ina friendlymanner to thedeparting soldiers.Theregimental bands played continuous marches in front of the garrisons, as thedivisionleftitshomebaseinthreemarchserialsforthethirdtimesincethewarstarted. The clocks showed 0900 hours, as the lead elements entered theAutobahn at Finowfurt. The I./Schützen-Regiment 394 had arrived fromAngermünde, as did the wheeled elements of the armored regiment. Theelements of the rifle brigadewere in the lead, followedby the armor brigade.Bringinguptherearwasthedivisionalheadquartersandtroopunits.Themovementcontinuedwithout stopping.Themarchwasused toconduct

small-scale exercises and training. For instance, the vehicles were to take upconcealedpositionsundertreeswhentheyhalted,andmealsweretakenfromthefieldkitchens,whichalsomovedwith the troopelements.As it started to turndark,thedivisionhadreacheditsday’smarchobjectiveof225kilometers.ThewheeledvehiclesofthearmorregimentbivouackedinReppen,whileSchützen-Regiment3setupinDrossen,tonamebuttwolocations.Theseconddayofmovementdidnotproceedassmoothly,oncetheright-of-

way for the railroads became felt. There were hour-long delays at railwaycrossings.ThedivisionmovedviaSchwiebusintotheareaaroundTierschtiegelalong the former Polish border. The movement forward from there wasreminiscentofthecampaigninPoland,asthevehiclesstruggledalongthedustyroadsunderahot sun.Themove through thecityofPosenwasdoneata fastclip.TheGerman-Russianborderof1914wasreachedandthesoldiersspentthenightinthevillagesandruralestates.RidinginhisOpel(licenseplate:WH-512-244) along with Leutnant Pauckstadt, Obergefreiter Kohlwey, and GefreiterPape,GeneralleutnantModelmingledwithhis soldiers.He frequentlyscoldedthemarchdiscipline,sinceconvoymovementshadbeenpracticedfartoolittleinthepreviousmonths.TheninthofJunewasanotherwarmandcloudlessday.Themovementdidnot

startuntiltheafternoon;itmovedviaKutnotoLowice.Thereweresomedelays,sincemarchgroupsfromthe4.Panzer-Divisionhadtobeallowedtopass.Asaresult, the troop elements did not reach their march objectives until between0200 and 0500 hours. Since the weather was warm and dry, the battalionsbivouackedintheopen.Thedivisionremainedrestingduringtheday;itstarteditsmovementsupagainthatnight.Around2200hours,thedivisionwasoutsideof Warsaw. The forces moved straight through the city, which was lit up asbrightly as day and featured civilian and military personnel of both sexespromenading,andheadedforthewoodedareaaroundMinsk–Mazowiecki.Theforcesbivouackedthere,whilethevehicleswereconcealedfromaerialview.Due to the night marches, all sorts of rumors surfaced. Many thought the

divisionwassimplygoingtobeemployedinborder-protectionduty.Intheend,however,everyonenoticed that therewerea lotof forceson themove tobothsides of theirmarch route.Eventually,most thought theywere going tomovethroughRussiatogettoPersia.Anyandallavailablenewspaperswerescouredforanycluestothateffect.The divisional formations continued their night march in a pouring rain.

Sometimes, themovewas at awalking pace, only to be followed by a crazytempo,so thatcontactwith thevehicle in frontwouldnotbe lost.Siedlcewascrossed and, around midnight, the wooded area at Radzyn was reached. Thedivisionfinallyhalted.Schützen-Regiment 394 remained in the Radzyn area. The battalions were

spreadoutalong theedgesof thecity,with someelements staying inbarnsorunder canvas. Oberstleutnant Audörsch set up his headquarters in the newschool.Thecityconsistedofpeasanthuts;onlythedistrictgovernmentresidedin thepalace.The sister rifle regimentbivouacked inandaroundPluty. Itwasterribleinthewoods,however.Theinnumerablemassesofmosquitoesweretheenemy.The soldiers cleared the thickunderbrush and set it alight.Despite thewarm nights, everyone ran aroundwith thick padding. Everyone tried to findmosquitonetting.Thearmor regiment setupabivouacsite in theareaaroundZabickow.ItsfightingvehiclesarrivedbytrainandwereunloadedatLukowon12June.AllofthedivisionwasinthewoodswestoftheBug,notfarfromthebattlefieldsofthecampaigninPoland,whereithadfoughttwoyearspreviously.The commanding general of theXXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.), towhich the3.

Panzer-Division reported, was Generalleutnant Freiherr Geyr vonSchweppenburg.Thecommandinggeneralvisited thedivision in itsquartering

areason14June.Hewassatisfiedwiththebivouacsitesandthepreparationsforoperations.Thedivisionhadissuedordersthatdayforreconnoiteringitsstagingareas; on 15 June, it issued a second order detailing themovement into thosepositions.Thedivision’s chaplainswere constantlyon thego, to conduct fieldservices.TheCatholicpriest,FatherLaub,providedgeneralabsolutioninBialaPodlaska.On 16 June, the division moved into its staging areas along the Bug. The

advancepartiesofthebattalionstookoffearlyintheday.Theyhadthetaskoffindingquartersfor thecompanies thatwouldfollowand, ifnecessary,assumethe border securitymission from the regiments of the 34. Infanterie-Division,whichwas stationed there. Toward evening, the lead elements of the divisionwerealongtheBug.MajorWellmann’sI./Schützen-Regiment3occupiedanareaaroundKoden.Its

2ndand3rdCompaniessetupoutpostsalongtheriver thatwererunbyjuniornoncommissionedofficers.Theywerechargedwithobservingallmovementsonthe far bank and to pay especially close attention to unusual noises or lightsignals.Thesectorwiththefriendlyforcesontheright,the4.Panzer-Division,ranfromOlszankitoPoint151.8,fourkilometerseastofStradecz.MajorDr.Müller’sII./Schützen-Regiment394wasinsertedintothelinetothe

leftofWellmann’sbattalion.Hisobservationpostswerealso locatedalong thewirefencethatranthelengthoftheriver.Thefriendlyforcesontheleftwasthe45. Infanterie-Division.On the far sideof the river, thedarkness of nightwasspreading,thedarknessofaforeignworld.The division had occupied its designated sector. The two rifle battalions

occupied a narrow frontage up front along the river. The main body of thedivision to the rear began to prepare for its upcoming missions by means ofcontinuous reconnaissance, small-scaleexercises,maintenanceofvehicles, andissuance of ammunition. On 16 June, Generalleutnant Model signed theoperationsplanfortheattackofhisdivisionacrosstheBugonD-Day.OnlytheofficersoftheimmediatebattlestaffknewthatthatdaywouldbenextSunday.

__________________1.AccordingtoLexikon,bothofthearmoredregimentsprovidedpersonnelfora

battalionformedundervonPeter’scommand,withPanzer-Regiment6providingitsentire2ndCompany.Thebattalionwasformedon24JulyanddesignatedasPanzer-AbteilungC. InDecember, itwas consolidatedwith the newly formedPanzer-Regiment 28 (intended for the 18. Panzer-Division) and designated asthat regiment’s 1st Battalion. Just threemonths later, inMarch 1941,Panzer-Regiment 28 was disbanded and the 1st Battalion was reassigned to Panzer-Regiment6asits3rdBattalion.2.Seealsothepreviouschapter,wheresomeofthismaterialoverlaps.3.Seefootnote1above.4. That regiment was part of the 60. Infanterie-Division, which was latermotorizedandendthewarasPanzergrenadier-Division“Feldherrnhalle.”Theregiment was inactivated as a part of the division’s reorganization(motorization).Thisreduceditsoriginal three infantryregiments to two.Cadrefrom Infanterie-Regiment 243 was also used in forming the Headquarters ofSchützen-Regiment114 (6.Panzer-Division)and the II./Schützen-Regiment304(2.Panzer-Division).5. See the previous chapter for additional information on the numericaldesignationofthisformation.6. Artillerie-Regiment 49 had been a separate artillery regiment, but itsheadquarters and two line battalions had been used to support differingcommandsaftermobilization.7. The author may be in error with regard to the additional artillery asset,inasmuch as neitherLexikon nor Schmitzmention this battery in this context.LexikonindicatesthatBeobachtungs-Abteilung10(10. Infanterie-Division)wasinactivatedinDecember1940anditspersonnelusedtoformthreeflash-rangingbatteries(324,325,and326)whichwereassignedtothreearmoreddivisions(4,7,and15),withBeobachtungs-Batteriegoingtothe7.Panzer-Division.SeealsoPeter Schmitz, et al., Die deutschen Divisionen 1939–1945, Band 1, DieDivisionen1–5(Osnabrück:Biblio-Verlag,1993),215ff.8.NottobeconfusedwithAufklärungs-Abteilung1ofthe1.Infanterie-Division,whichwasalsogarrisoned inKönigsberg(Kaliningrad).Aufklärungs-Abteilung(mot.)1wasformedfromcavalryassetsofthe3.Kavallerie-Divisionandusedasaseparatereconnaissancebattalion.9.Othersourcesindicate3Juneforthechangeofcommand,whenBreithwenttothestaffoftheMobileForcesattheArmyHighCommand.HeworkedthereuntilOctoberofthatyear,whenhewouldreturntothe3.Panzer-Divisionasits

commander.SeeDieRitterkreuzerträgerderDeutschenWehrmachtundWaffen-SS(www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de).10.Althoughthehelmetswereissued,theywererarelyworn,exceptforparadesor field award formations. Despite the danger on the battlefield, the tankerscontinued to prefer cloth headgear. The iconic beret and crash helmetcombinationseenbeingwornthroughthecampaignintheWestwasalsoturnedin,sinceitwasalsogenerallyheldindisdainbythetankers.11.Theinsigniawaspaintedinyellowandgenerallyappearedonthehullfront,rear,andsides.

3.Panzer-Division,22June1941.

CHAPTER8

FromtheBugtotheDnjepr:FightingalongtheRoutesofAdvance,1941

The3.Berlin-BrandenburgischePanzer-DivisionwasattachedtoPanzergruppe2 (GeneraloberstGuderian) foremployment inRussia.ThePanzergruppewaspartofthe4.ArmeeofHeeresgruppeMitte.Fortheinitialpartoftheoperation,thePanzergruppehadreceivedthemissionofcrossingtheBugonbothsidesofBrest-Litowsk and reaching the area bounded by Roslawl–Jelnja–Smolensk.From there, itwas to turn in the direction of eitherMoscow or Leningrad, inconjunctionwithPanzergruppe3.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)marchedoverthecourseofthenextfewdays

withthe255.Infanterie-DivisionintheareaaroundWlodawa,withtheintentofmarching onMaloryta from there. The 1. Kavallerie-Division adjoined it andwas to turn in thedirectionofPinsk fromSlawatycze lateron.The3.Panzer-Division and 4. Panzer-Division had the mission of breaking out of the areaaroundKodenandreachingtheBrest–Kobrynroad.The10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)remainedbehindthearmoreddivisionsasthereserve.The division organized itself into the following battle groups forOperation

Barbarossa:Headquarters, 3. Panzer-Division (Generalleutnant Model, with Majori.G. Pomtow as the division operations officer), with Nachrichten-Abteilung39,Straßenbau-Bataillon97,1 and the9.(H)/Lehr-Geschwader22atKaty.GruppeAudörsch, consisting of his Schützen-Regiment 394,SS-Pionier-Bataillon “Das Reich” (only for the crossing),3 the2./Pionier-Bataillon39, the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, the engineer platoon ofKradschützen-Bataillon3,and the1.Radfahr-Bau-Bataillon503.4 Theseformations and elements were located in the northern portion of thedivisionsector,betweenKopytowandtheBug.Gruppe Kleemann assembled in the south in the area around Koden.

Belonging to Oberst Kleemann’s forces were Schützen-Regiment 3,Pionier-Bataillon 10,5 the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39, the 2. and3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, the headquarters and 2./Radfahr-Bau-Bataillon 503, a reinforced company from the III./Panzer-Regiment 6,Brücko 606 with the 2./403,6 and an assault detachment from the3./Pionier-Bataillon39.Gruppe Linnarz was located around Zcuprov with Panzer-Regiment 6,Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,7leichteFlak-Abteilung91,8oneheavybatteryof the I./Flak-Regiment11,9 and the3./Pionier-Bataillon 39. It followedthedivision.Gruppe von Corvin-Wierbitzki, with Kradschützen-Bataillon 3,Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, and the 6./Flak-Bataillon 59.10 ThisKampfgruppewaslocatedintheKatyandZcuprovarea.

Alloftheartillerywasplacedunderthedirectionofthecorpsartilleryofficer,OberstForster,andhisArko143.11Hedividedhisassetsintothreelargegroups.GruppeNord,underOberstRies,consistedoftheI.andIII./Artillerie-Regiment75,theIII./Artillerie-Regiment10,12andtheI./Artillerie-Regiment53.13GruppeSüd was commanded by the division artillery officer of the 10. Infanterie-Division(mot.)andconsistedofthe11./Artillerie-Regiment75,theII./Artillerie-Regiment10,theII./Artillerie-Regiment42,14andMörser-Abteilung604.15Theartillery group in the middle was employed against long-range targets andconsisted of the I./Artillerie-Regiment 10, the II./Artillerie-Regiment 69,16 andthe 7./Artillerie-Regiment 75. Command and control of themiddle groupwasprovided by the Headquarters, Artillerie-Regiment 623.17 Supporting OberstForsteratthecorpslevelwasPanzer-Beobachtungs-Batterie327.18

The logistics support elements of the division—ten supply (truck) sections,threemaintenance companies, one supply company, one bakery company, onebutchercompany,thedivisionrationspoint,themilitarypolicesection,thefieldpost office, and vehicle sections—were positioned far to the rear, while themedical companyand the threeambulanceplatoonswereattached to the threegroups.

CampaignintheEast,22June1941toMay1945:MarchRoutesoftheDivision.

Itwas intended for thedivision to form theSchwerpunkt (spearhead) of the

corpsintheupcomingattack.TheordersgiventotheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)statedthatthetwoarmoreddivisionsweretoadvancetothenortheastoncenorthofMiedna,afterhavingbrokenthroughtheenemyborderpositionsonbothsidesof the lakearea.Theywere to take the roadbetweenKobrynand thecrossingovertheMuchawiecatBulkowoandthenadvanceinthedirectionofSluzk.The4.Panzer-Divisionwasdirectedtoadvancealong“TankRoute1,”whilethe3.Panzer-Division attacked to its north. The fortress atBrest-Litowskwas to bebypassedtotherightandtakendownbyinfantrydivisions.Themaineffortwithin theattackswould liewith thearmored regiments. In

the case of the 3. Panzer-Division, that would be Panzer-Regiment 6. Theregiment had a full complement of 209 fighting vehicles: 58Panzer II’s, 108PanzerIII’s,32PanzerIV’s,8mediumcommand-and-controltanks,and3lightcommand-and-control tanks.19 The 3rd Battalion of the regiment had tanksoutfittedfordeep-waterwading.Aswithalloftheothervehiclesofthedivision,thetanksalsoborethetacticalsignofGeneraloberstGuderian’sPanzergruppe,awhite“G”(aboutthirtycentimetershigh).Startingon19June,allofthedivisionalelementsstartedmovingforwardinto

their staging areas along the Bug. The engineers and bridging sections weredividedamongtheindividualbattalions.Therewasnolongeranydoubtthattheattack would take place soon. The combat outposts along the river notedincreasingmovements on the far sideover theprevious fewdays.ThatmeantthattheRedArmywaspreparingforaGermanattack.ThedefenseoftheborderalongtheBugwastheresponsibilityoftheWestern

Military District of the Soviet Union. Commander in Chief Pavlov had thefollowingforcesathisdisposal: the3rdArmy(LieutenantGeneralKusnezow)with twomotorized corps, one cavalry corps, and three rifledivisions; the4thArmy (Major General Korobkow) with one motorized corps and four rifledivisions; and the 10th Army (Major General Golubev) with one motorizedcorps.Thetwenty-firstofJuneconfirmedeverything.Divisionordersformovements

that night arrived.A fewminutes later, an appeal by the commanding generalreached the forces in the field, which ended in Geyr von Schweppenburg’sfamous saying: “Through and forward!” The artillery liaison officers placedtargetreferencepointsontheirmaps.Thedivision’sarmorregiment,stillabout100kilometerstotherear,headedoutonthemoreorlessbadroadstothefront.In thewoods to the left and right of the roadwere theprepared and, inmany

cases,occupiedairstripsoftheLuftwaffe.Justbeforemidnight,thedivisionwasinitsdesignatedstagingareas.Itwas0300hours.20Therewasstillawallofgroundfogonthesmallislandin

theBug,onwhichasectionofengineersandriflemenwerepositioned.Nottoofar away, on the righthand side, was the bridge. Leutnant Möllhoff andUnteroffizier Hahnfeld of the 3rd Company of the divisional engineers hadpositionedthemselvesthereeversince0100hours.Anassaultdetachmentwithanassaultcrafthaddisappearedintotheunderbrushtwentymetersdownstream.Twofloatswerehiddenontheisland.Therestoftheengineerplatoonwas100meterstotherearalongtheoutskirtsofKoden.Themenwaitedandwaitedandcounted theminutes.Then,allofasudden,

therewasthesoundofenginesintheair.Germanbomberswereapproachingtheborder.Damnit!Theywerefiveminutestooearly.Theenemycouldbealertedtoosoon.Makinga snapdecision,LeutnantMöllhoffdrewuphis submachinegunandfiredaburst.TheywerethefirstshotsonthegroundofthecampaignintheEast.Itwastheattacksignalforthedivisionalassaultforces.

Stagingofthe3.Panzer-Division,21June1941.

Möllhoff and Hahnfeld raced across the bridge. At the same time, theengineers placed their assault craft and floats in the water and crossed over.From the direction ofKoden,motorcycle infantry started racing forward. The“SpanishRiders”21werequicklypushedaside,andthefirstfourSovietsoldiersoverwhelmed.Theengineerscontinuedtheirassault.Theyhastenedanotherfiftymetersalongtheroad.Therewasatankditchdugacrosstheroad.Beamswerebroughtupquicklyandtossedoverit.FeldwebelHaslersearchedthebridgefordemolitioncharges.Thecoupdemainthathadinitiatedthecampaignhadsucceeded,evenbefore

thecampaignhadofficiallystarted.

Itwas0315hours.Atthatmoment,thousandsofgunsopenedfireontheSovietborderpositions

from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Operation Barbarossa had started. Thedivisionalartilleryfiredalongwithallofthebatteriesattachedtoitontheeastbanks of the Bug. The fires were especially concentrated around the smallvillageofStradecz,whosechurchtowerwasalreadyjuttingoutofthemorningfog. The village was familiar to some of the men of the division from thecampaigninPoland.Itwasgoingupinfireandflamesatthatpoint.Theleadelementsofthetworiflebattalionsupfrontcrossedtheriverat0345

hours in pneumatic craft, while the vehicles of the motorcycle infantry andreconnaissance battalions rolled across the undamaged bridge. The sounds ofindividualenemymachinegunscouldbeheard;theyalsocausedthefirstlosses.OberleutnantJopp,thecompanycommanderofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,waswoundedwhilesittinginapneumaticcraft.Thefarbanksoftheriverweretakenrapidly. In the lead, Oberleutnant von Becker’s 8th Company of Schützen-Regiment 3 raced across the bridge and reached themeadowlands behind theBug. The soldiers worked their way towards Stradecz by squad. Schützen-Regiment394wentafterthenorthernpartofthevillageandencountereditsfirst,albeit slight, resistance. The enemy bunkers were rapidly eliminated, and theattackcontinuedintothevegetatedterrainnorthofthevillage.By contrast, Schützen-Regiment 3, attacking the southern part, had a more

difficulttimeofit.Therailwaystationforthevillagewasprotectedbybunkersandthecrewsmanningthemputupadefense.Enemyartillerystartedfiringatthe forces at the same time from the village’s industrial area. OberleutnantSiegelmann’s2ndCompanyenvelopedthesouthernpartofthelocalityandtooktheRussiansundercrossfire.ThatcausedtheSovietresistancetocollapse.Theriflebrigade’sfirstobjectivewasinGermanhandsthreehoursafterthestartoftheoffensive.The2ndCompanylosttwodeadandsixteenwounded.Thevillageitselfwaspracticallydestroyed.ThefirsttwentySovietsweretakenprisonerbytheriflemen.TheRussianswerecompletelyflustered.GeneralleutnantModelfollowedhisattackingsoldierswithhisbattlestaff.By

0430hours,hehadhiscommandpostestablishedonawoodedhillnorthofthebridgeatKoden.Fivehourslater,itmovedtoStradecz.The rifle regiments fought against the fleeing Russians, who offered slight

resistance,inthesandyandmarshyareas.Themotorcyclesgotstuckmorethanonce.Sincenoheavyvehicleshadcrossedoverby thatpoint, theantitankand

infantry gun crews helped themselves by hooking horses up to their guns.Oberleutnant Freiherr von Werthern’s 3rd Company of Schützen-Regiment 3wasthefirstunittoreachthehighgroundnorthofStradecz.Buttheriflemen’sattack then bogged down in front of themoor and its damned-up creeks. Thevehiclesbottomedout,andnotafewsoldiershadtopulltheirbootsoutofthemarshes.The motorized elements of the division followed one another across the

undamagedbridge.Themovementforwardproceededslowly;therewerealotoftraffic jams.Inaddition, themovementcausedenormousquantitiesofairbornedust. The vehicle sections of all of the battalions—Panzer-Regiment 6 startedcrossing theBugat1220hourswith its fightingvehicles—weremovingalongthe edges of the marshland. The armored cars, motorcycles, and SPW’s wereblazingatrailwithsomedifficulty.Thedivision’sadvanceguard,towhichthe2ndCompanyofthearmorregimentbelonged,wasattemptingtofindapassagepoint.Fivekilometershadbeencovered;itwassupposedtohavebeen80bythatpoint.ThedivisioncommandermovedforwardtoOberstleutnantAudörschandhis

Schützen-Regiment394 inorder toseeforhimself thatallof thevehiclesweregetting stuck in the marshland. (The division commander’s vehicle also gotstuck.)Anadvancealongthedesignatedroutewasimpossible.Afterconferringwith thecommandinggeneral,Modelordered thedifferentelementsoutof themarshlandat1530hours,pivotingthemtothenorth.The division formed a new advance guard out of the 3rd Battalion of the

armor regiment, a company of motorcycle infantry and elements of thedivisional engineers.The advanceguardmovedout ofStradecz at 1642hoursand encountered heavy resistance a fewminutes later at Przyluki, which wasbeingdefendedbytheenemy.The12thCompanyofthearmoredregimenteliminatedthoseforces,whilethe

motorcycleinfantryhelddowntheelementsthatwerelocatedinthewoodsandmarshlandbetweentheavenueofadvanceandtheriver.Thecontinuedadvanceofthetankswasnotheldup.Around1845hours,theextremesouthernportionofBrest-Litowskwasreached.Thefightingvehiclesstartedreceivingenemyfireagain. That was also eliminated, and the companies turned to the northeast,reaching themain road toKobryn, “TankRoute 1.”All of a sudden, Russiantanks appeared from the west. They were trying to get out of Brest-Litowsk,which was being attacked by the 45. Infanterie-Division. A short tank

engagementdeveloped,inwhichthestrongerGermantanksemergedthevictor.ThefirstSoviettankshadbeenknockedoutbythe3.Panzer-Division.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 did not stop.

Around2100hours,itwasinfrontofthehighwoodenbridgeonatributaryofthe Muchawiec. While the German fighting vehicles rattled across the span,motorizedcolumnsoftheenemy,includinglighttanks,attemptedtogetpasttheGerman vehicles and escape to the east. They were shot to pieces. BurningSoviet trucks and fighting vehicles lined the advance route of Schneider-Kostalski’sbattalion.Bythen,allofthearmoredregimenthadclosedup.Thedarknesshinderedthe

advance,andtheregimenthadtoorderahaltwhentheMuchawiecwasreached.Thebridgehadbeenburneddownbytheenemy.Thetankspulledoffoftheroadand set up an all-round defense. Theywere eighteen kilometers east ofBrest.Theriflebrigadewasfartotherear.Becauseofthemarshland,theadvancewasonlypossiblealongthatoneroadthatranparalleltotheBug.SincethepontoonbridgethathadbeenerectedbytheengineerbattalionatOkczynhadbeentakendown, the trains could only cross over the bridge at Koden. As a result, thecolumnsgotjammedupeverywhere.GeneralleutnantModelandhisbattlestafffollowedtheforwardelementsof

Panzer-Regiment6.Heorderedthattherestofthedivisioncloseupassoonaspossible.The trailcolumns,movingforwardatnight,werefiredatbyRussianforcespositionedalongthesouthernoutskirtsofBrest.ThedivisionalengineershadgoneallthewayforwardandstartederectingabridgeatBulkowo,southofthelargeroadbridgeatChaby,justbeforemidnight.Hauptmann Kalkbrenner’s 1st Company of engineers erected the bridge in

twosixteen-tonsections,usingfloatingsupports.Theengineersreceivednorestthatnight.Whenthemorningfogofthenewdayliftedoutofthelowlands,thebridgewasfinished.Divisionalvehicles—armoredcars,personnelcarriers,andmotorcycles—started rolling across it at 0500 hours. Leutnant Burgheim’sengineersguardedthestructure.Panzer-Regiment6wasawakenedat0430hours,sincethetrainshadarrived

with thevaluable fuel. Immediatelyafter refueling, the tanks rumbledoff.The3rd Battalion took the lead. The advance proceeded terribly slowly. The roadwas very sandy, and the combat vehicles could only churn through slowly.Despitethat,thelightervehiclesoftheadvanceguardmovedforwardandweresoonoutsideofKobryn,whichtheRussiansweredefending.

Shortlyafter1100hours, the3rdBattalionarrived. Jabbinghard, theenemypocketsofresistanceonthewesternsideofthelocalitywereeliminated.Whenenteringthecity,Russianlighttanksappeared,allofwhichwereshottopieces.Likewise, high-explosive rounds crashed into the houses from which Russianmachine-gun fire had flared up. After a quarter of an hour, the battalion hadquashedallresistance.Themotorcycle infantryhad advanced into the city center andwere able to

takethebridgeovertheBug-DnjeprCanalthroughrapidaction.Unfortunately,thebattalionsuffereditsfirsttotallossesinvehicles.KilledonthisdaywerefournoncommissionedofficersandoneObergefreiterof the12thCompanyand theHeadquartersCompanyofthe3rdBattalion.The regimentmoved through thecityquicklyand reached the roads leading

east with all of its elements. Up front were the lead elements ofHauptmannZiervogel’s reconnaissance battalion and Major von Corvin-Wiersbitzki’smotorcycle infantry battalion. That was the start of a journey that would becharacteristicofthis23June1941.Thosevehiclesofthe3.Panzer-Divisionceaselesslyadvancedalongthebroad

road.Therewasnowaytodetour,sinceuntrafficablemoorlandstretchedtotherightand leftof the road.TheRussianshadbeendriven from the road. Itwasonly the vehicles, guns, tossed away weapons and abandoned equipment thatremindedone that theenemyhadpulledback in flight.The tanksoccasionallyhad difficulty in maneuvering past the enemy vehicles, which were oftenperpendicular to the road.TheSoviet riflemenhad fled into the tall cornfieldsandfiredfromthereontheGermancolumnsthatfollowedintheiropencross-countryvehicles.Theforceshadtodismountandexpel theRussianswithcoldsteel.TheI./Panzer-Regiment6madeasurprisecontactwithRussiantanksat1540

hours at Buchowiecze. The enemy combat vehicles had broken out of nearbywoods and taken the German columns under fire. Major Schmid-Ott22immediatelyemployedhiscompanies inanenvelopingmaneuverandknockedout thirty-six T-26’s in the counterthrust. In the process, OberleutnantBuchterkirch’s 2nd Company was able to finish off twelve tanks all by itselfwithin the space of a few minutes. Polish peasants alerted the German tankcrews passing by of hidden Russian defensive positions. The light platoon ofPanzer-Regiment6 (Leutnant Jacobs)wasdirected toward the small villageofPodberje off of the avenue of advance. The combat vehicles encountered six

heavygunsandtractorsthere.TheRussiancannoneersweresosurprisedbytheappearanceofGermantanksthattheysurrendered.The7thCompany,whichhadbeenreinforcedwithmediumtanks,wasorderedforwardtothe3rdBattaliontosupportitinitsvariousskirmisheswithfleeingSovietcolumns.The advance guard reached the regional capital of Bereza-Kartuska on the

railway line toMinsk. It was able to break the initial resistancewith its ownforces,beforePanzer-Regiment6closedup.Germanprisoners—theycamefromthe4.Panzer-Division—werefreedfromthehandsoftheRussians.Theadvanceguardandthe tankregimentwerefar to thefront.Theriflebrigadecouldonlyfollowslowly,sincethesolitaryroadwasjammed.Asleadregiment,Schützen-Regiment 394 encountered no resistance. The intensity of the fighting by thedivisional elements to the front could be gauged by the wrecks of enemyvehiclesalongtheedgeoftheroad,however.ThedivisioncommandpostwasmovedthroughZabinkatoKobrynthatday.

The battle staff established itself in a church east of the bridge. The localpopulace was overwhelmingly friendly to the Germans and fed the rearwardtrainsandsupplieselements.ValuablematerialconcerningtheSoviet4thArmyfell into the hands of the division intelligence officer; the headquarters of thefieldarmyhadbeen inKobryn.That fieldarmy,under thecommandofMajorGeneral Korobkow, opposedPanzergruppe 2 with its four rifle divisions; the6th, the 42nd, the 49th, and the 75th.TheXIVCorps (Mechanized) ofMajorGeneralOborinformedthesecondlineofdefenseinthePruzana–Kobrynarea;itslineshadbeenbrokenthroughbythe3.Panzer-Divisionon23June.Despitethesuccess,GeneralleutnantModeldidn’tallowhissoldiersanyrest.

HepersonallywenttoBereza-Kartuskaandorderedtheceaselesspursuitofthefleeing enemy.MajorBeigel, the commander ofPionier-Bataillon 39, quicklyreorganized the advance guard and immediately continued the advance. Thecombat vehicles andmotorcycles advancedwithout regard to thewithdrawingenemy elements along the road. Villages and woods were negotiated, bridgesover themany smallwaterwayswere crossed and the resistance that flaredupalong the flankswas swiftly engaged.TheRussiandefenses along the railwaycrossing southwest ofByrtenwere stronger.The light armored cars firedwitheverythingtheyhad.Thewoodenfreightterminalsoonwentupinflames.Thefirsttanksarrivedsoonthereafter.Allofasudden,well-aimedartilleryfirewasplacedontheroad.Therewasno

gettingaround it,however.The tanks, followedby themotorcycles, rattledon.

The forcesmoved three kilometers further into the night—throughwoods andSoviet artillery fire. The lead platoon of the 7./Panzer-Regiment 6 (LeutnantRühl)was in front of thebridge at the first crossingover theSzczara at 2200hours. The tanks rolled across thewooden bridgewithout incident. They thenadvanced a few more kilometers. The motorcycle infantry and the engineerssecuredthesmallbridgehead.Thetanksthenreturnedinthedarknessandrested.On that second day of thewar, the division had broken through the enemy

frontandadvanced150kilometers.OnehundredsevenRussiancombatvehiclesweredestroyedandseveralhundredartillerypiecesofallcaliberswerecapturedordestroyed.The leaderof the advanceguard,MajorBeigel,became the firstofficerofthedivisiontoreceivetheKnight’sCrossintheEastfortheseactions.Theofficial recommendation read, inpart: “Bymeansof lightning-fast action,[he] tookthe importantbridgeover theSzczara,whichcreated theprerequisitefortherapidadvanceofanarmoredcorps.”Theleadelementsofthedivisionwerealreadydeepinenemyterritorybythe

second night of the campaign.At the same time, the rear-area services of thedivisionwerestillontheoppositeoftheborder,notstartingtocrossituntilthemorningof24June.Theformations,whichwerestillatKodenontheeastbankoftheBugwerebroughtforwardonthemajorsupplyroute.23

OberstleutnantMinzel’s II./Panzer-Regiment6, reinforced by a company ofmotorcycleinfantry,acompanyofengineers,abatteryofartilleryandabatteryofFlak, formed thenewadvanceguard.The fightingvehiclesmovedout at arapidpace.Therewereshot-uptanksandtrucksalongtheedgesoftheroadway,which the forcesout fronthadpassedanddestroyed.Allofasudden, the leadtankelementsencounteredstrongenemyresistancenot toofar fromMilowidy.Theenemy’sartilleryalsojoinedthefray.ItwaseasyfortheRussianbatteriestohittargets,sincetheyonlyhadtofireontheroad.Theterrainonbothsideswascompletemarshlandandnot trafficablefor tanks.For thetimebeing,Munzel’sadvance guard bogged down. Reconnaissance aircraft reported that Sovietrearguardshadsetupdefensivepositionstoprotecttheretrogrademovementsofthe main body of forces. Toward noon, the first few companies of Schützen-Regiment 394 arrived to support the tanks, whose ammunition was slowlyrunning out.Oberstleutnant von Lewinski ordered the 1st Battalion forward,whichwasabletocloseupquickly.Bythen, thearmorbattalionhadtakenthehighgroundatMarynowo.Intheprocess,OberleutnantJaroschvonSchweder’s5thCompany,withattachedelementsof the8thCompany,haddestroyednine

Russiantanks, twobatteries,andfifteenantitankguns.LeutnantDehnkeofthe4thCompanywaskilledduringthatoperationandOberleutnantMarkowskiofthe 8th Company was wounded. The divisional engineers had two officerswoundedthatday:HauptmannArnoldandLeutnantZiegenbalg.Allofasudden,theRedAirForcemadeanappearance.Nooneanticipatedits

employment,sincenothinghadbeenseenofRussianaircraftthefirsttwodays.The enemy fighters and bombers attacked the road in waves starting at 1345hours and caused the advance to falter. Even the battle staff of the division,whichhadfollowedthearmoredbrigadeasfarasNiedzwiedziewa,wasattackedseveraltimes.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6continuedtheattackshortlyafter1500hoursasthe

advanceguard.Again,thetanksdidnotgetveryfar.ThesecondcrossingpointoftheSzczarawasinfrontofthem.Althoughtheriverwasonly15meterswide,itsfloodplainextendedformorethan800metersand,withitsascendingedges,itformedanaturalbasin,whichwasdifficulttocross.Thebridge,whosefreshlycut pilings practically shone to the tank drivers, had been blown up in themiddle. There were no routes around at that location, since everything wasmarshland with the exception of the road. The remaining elements of thedivision slowly pushed their way forward. Russian artillery fire and renewedattacksfromtheairbroughtcontinualdelaystothatapproachmarchandcausedcasualties.TwoFlakwerecompletelydestroyed.GeneralleutnantModelwas unable to stand by in the rear.He had the 2nd

Companyof thesignalsbattaliongivehimaneight-wheeledradioarmoredcarandrodeit tothefront.Whenthegeneralwasunabletomakefurtherprogressdue to the congestion on the road, he dismounted to create room. At thatmoment, a direct hit from an artillery round tore apart the radio vehicle. Thefour-mancrewwaskilledinstantly;GeneralleutnantModelwasunscathed.Thehourspassed,slowly.Companiesfromthemotorcycle infantrybattalion

and the1stCompanyofSchützen-Regiment394 attempted topress forward inthe flood plain. The riflemen had to remain close to the road, however, sinceeverystep in thebloomingmeadowlandswasastep intomud.TheBolsheviksdefended stubbornly in the formerPolish bunkers,which had been built yearsagoasprotectionagainsttheSovietUnion.The tanks took the individual bunkers under fire again in order to make it

easier for the motorcycle infantry to work its way forward. Finally, a smallsectionwasabletomakeittothebridge.Itwasplasteredbyenemyartilleryand

cutoff.Twelvemenwereat thebridgeandcouldnotgetback.Themenwerenotfreedfromtheirpredicamentuntilfriendlyfightingvehiclespressedforward,ignoringtheenemy’sdefensivefires.Fighting had also broken out to the rear of the lead tank elements. Strong

elementsof thescatteredReddetachmentshadfledinto thewoodsto therightand left of the road and disrupted the columns that were closing up withambushes. As a result, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 had to clear the woods atPostolowo in the afternoon. Its 3rd Company (Hauptmann Peschke) broughtbackthirty-eightprisonersandoneantiaircraftgun.Toward2000hours,GeneralleutnantModelordered the1stBattalionof the

armor regiment to move forward and form a bridgehead. OberleutnantBuchterkirch’s2ndCompanywasreinforcedbytheregimentallightplatoonanda platoon from the 4thCompany.The tanks, followed bymotorcycle infantry,worked their way forward to the burning bridge by means of aggressiveoperations.OberleutnantBuchterkirchhadhismenhaltthere.Hejumpeddownfromhis

fighting vehicle and ran towards the bridge with a few riflemen, while theremainingtanksattemptedtobreaktheenemyresistanceonthefarbankthroughcontinuousfire.Afewriflemensucceededinclamberingovertheburningplanksandestablishingafootholdonthefarside.Anassaultdetachmentofmotorcycleinfantry—using pneumatic boats from the engineer platoon of the II./Panzer-Regiment6—likewisecrossedtheriver.Thebridgeheadwasformed.Oberleutnant Buchterkirch’s actions were praised as follows in the Armed

ForcesDailyReportof6July1941:“distinguishedhimself throughexemplarybravery!Asaresultofthefiresofthe2./Panzer-Regiment6,theRussianslost2lightarmoredcars,6tanks,9antitankguns,and25artillerypiecesatthesecondSzczaracrossing!”Thebridgingcolumnoftheengineerbattalionwasorderedforwardthatnight.

Its vehicles encountered an enemy ambush at Milowidy, and one man waswounded. The column reached the Szczara at Minicze intact, however. Thatplaced the engineers one kilometer south of the burning bridge and thebridgehead formed by the motorcycle infantry. Two bridge-laying tanks werebroughtuptotheriverattheoriginallocation.Theplacementofthebridgetooktenminutes.Intheprocess,aportionoftheoriginalbridgewasusedassupport.Thesecondtankdroveontothebridgeandplacedthesecondpartdowntotheotherbank.

Inthemeantime,morninghaddawned.Batteriesfromthedivisionalartilleryhadmoved forward—some of them in open fields near Nibiszcze—and werefiring with everything they had. Russian artillery rounds landed among theelementsof thedivision thatwerewaitingalong the road.Moreeffective thanthe artillery were the continuous attacks by Soviet bombers. The armoredcommandvehicleof thedivisioncommanderwas set alight.The firecouldbeput out quickly, butModel’s driver,Obergefreiter Kohlwey, died a few hourslaterastheresultofaheadwound.Toward1100hours,thedivisionorderedthecontinuationoftheattackacross

thebridge thathadbeenbuiltby theengineers.MarchGroup1consistedof areinforcedadvanceguardunder thecommandofOberstleutnantvonLewinski.Theadvancehadtobepostponedanddidnotstartuntilafteratwo-hourdelay.Some of the heavy tanks had to make stops on the bridge, since it was verynarrow.Oberleutnant Buchterkirch rode point again with his company. Behind him

were the 3./Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, the 5./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the1./Schützen-Regiment 394, the I./Panzer-Regiment 6, the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543,theheadquartersofPanzer-Regiment6andPanzer-Brigade5,the1./Pionier-Bataillon39, the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, a platoon fromMörser-Abteilung604, the1./Flak-Regiment91,and the6./Flak-Regiment59.The tworemainingmarchgroupsofthedivisionwereledbyOberstleutnantMunzelandOberstleutnantAudörsch.Thevehicles rolled through themeadowlands and reached themain road in

thevicinityofthebridge.Theruinsofthepositions,whichhadbeenshotupbythe Buchterkirch’s company the previous evening, could be seen everywhere.There was no stopping his tanks. The armored vehicles churned their waythroughthedirtoftheroadwiththeirheavytracks.Contacthadlongbeenlostwiththemainbodythatwasfollowing.Thecompanycommanderleftbehindatank at each of the bridges to provide security, as he continued east with hisfighting vehicles. Buchterkirch’s men were able to reach Filipowicze. Thehousesofthelocalitywentupinsmokeandflames.Themarchgroupfollowingbehindhadbeenheldupbyenemyresistanceat

Siniawka. Although the fighting vehicles were able to enter the woods, theunarmoredvehiclesoftheriflemenandcannoneerswereunabletoproceed.TheRussians launched an immediate counterattack and hit the 1st Company ofSchützen-Regiment394.The1stCompanyofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,under

the command ofOberleutnant Michels, moved forward immediately and wasabletoturnbacktheSovietassaultwithitsself-propelledantitankguns.Itwasabletoeliminatetwofightingvehiclesandsevenarmoredvehiclesoftheenemy.OberstleutnantvonLewinski,whonolongerhadanyradiocontacttohislead

company,decidedtoreestablishcontact.Hemovedforwardwiththeregimentallightplatoonandafewmotorcyclemessengersintothewoodsandreachedhislead company around 0100 hours outside of Filipowicze. The remainingelementsofthemarchgroupfoughttheirwayslowlyforward.The7thCompanyandthelightplatoonoftheII./Panzer-Regiment6werethefirstonestoenterthewooded area. They positioned themselves along the side of the road andprotected the columns passing them by. The fighting vehicles fired into thewoodswiththeirmaingunsandmachinegunsandheldtheRussiansdown.Asaresult,thefuelandammunitioncolumnsreachedtheleadtankelementsatfirstlightandtheregimentcouldcompletelyrefuel.Around0525hourson26June,orderscamefromthebrigadetocontinuethe

march. The objective was Sluzk. The advance guard moved out in the sameorder as the previous day. The 2./Panzer-Regiment 6 moved along the roadwithoutstopping.TothenorthofthevillageofGulicze,aRussianantitankgunpositioncausedatemporaryhalt.Buttheresistancewasquicklybrokenandthemarch continued. Oberleutnant Buchterkirch rattled east with his fightingvehicles. The turrets of the city of Sluzk appeared on the horizon. The tanksweretwokilometersfromthelocalityatthatpoint.Allofasudden,therewasahowlingfromallsides.TheSovietsintendedto

defendSluzk.OnordersfromtheHeadquartersof theWesternFront, theyhadbroughtartilleryandantitankguns intoposition inorder to forcea stop to theGermanadvanceatallcosts.Buchterkirch’scompanywasunable tomakeanyfurtheradvance.OberleutnantBuchterkirchdismountedandralliedtheriflemenforward across an embankment. Fortunately, the 1st Battalion, which wasfollowing, soon closed up. Since the terrain on both sides of the road waspassabletoarmor,MajorSchmidt-Otthadhisbattalionapproachacrossabroadfront.ThefightingvehiclestooktheidentifiedRussianpositionsunderfireandheld down the defenders until Oberleutnant Grigo’s 5th Battery of artilleryarrived and took out the enemybatteries.A shortwhile later, the1./Schützen-Regiment394 arrivedwith its armoredpersonnel carriers.Toward1100hours,orderswereissuedforanattack.The 1./Panzer-Regiment 6 (Oberleutnant Vopel) advanced into the city

without delay. Although the Russians offered resistance at several spots, theyweresurprisedbytheenergeticattackoftheleadarmorelements.Thewoodenhousesburnedandcollapsed likeblazing torches.Onmore thanoneoccasion,thefightingvehicleshadtofindawayaroundorovertherubble.Theymovedrapidlythroughthesmallmarketplace,wheretheLeninmemorialroseupinthemiddleoftheseaoffire.Sovietvehicleswereontheoppositesideoftheplaza,thecrewsandhorsesshreddedbyrounds.But the tankdriversdidn’thaveanytime to take that in; they continued the assault on and past the new militaryfacilitiesontheoutskirtsofthecity.Suddenly,thefightingvehicleshadtohalt.ThewoodenbridgeoverthesmallSslutschatWiesiekjahadbeenblownup.Thevehicles with the engineers immediately rolled forward. Enemy antitank gunsopenedfireonandnearthebridgeanddidnotallowtheengineerstoapproach.The fighting vehicles moved upstream and downstream in an effort to find aford.Intheprocess,LeutnantvonKiekebusch(1./Panzer-Regiment6)wasfelledbyaRussiansniperonthefarbank.The I./Schützen-Regiment 394 (Major Kratzenberg) hadmoved up to Sluzk

and cleared the burning city of the remaining Soviet forces with all of hiscompanies. Sluzkwas a giganticmass of flames. Theywere fed by thewindwhich,inturn,hadresultedfromthelargefires.ThelastRussiansoldierswerefetched from their hiding places by noon. The few civilians hastened throughtheirburningcity,shyandagitated,andattemptedtoplunderthefewbusinesses.The soldiers of Schützen-Regiment 394 were able to capture the equipmentstoresinthemilitaryfacilitiesanddistributedfooditems,bread,flourandbutterto the residents,who had beenwithout food for two days. The battalion thenmovedeastofthecityandsecured.Uptothatpoint,thedivisionhadonlyassaultedalongoneroad.Asaresult,

there was an immense length to the entire column. The lead elements borethemselveslikeanarrowintotheenemyfront.ButtheSovietsweresittinginthewoods and marshland to the left and the right and did not even consider theprospectofsurrendering.Theyattackedthesupplyconvoysthatfollowedagainand again and inflicted considerable casualties. Correspondingly, Schützen-Regiment 3 (Oberst von Manteuffel) was given the mission of screening theroute of advance. His 1st Battalion screened in the area of Kantonowicz–Janowiczeon26June.Totheleft,intheareaaroundSiniawka,wasthedivisionfieldreplacementbattalion.ThereconnaissancebattalionwasaroundKleck.Theoutpostsremainedwheretheywereuntillateintheafternoon.Atthatpoint,theleadelementsofthe4.Panzer-Divisionhadarrived.Theregimenttookoffafter

thedivision,whichhadhurriedfarahead.Theleadelementswerealreadysome300kilometersfromthebordersofthe

ReichandhadcoveredafifthoftheentiredistancetoMoscow.Thatstretchhadleft itsmarkonmenandmateriel.Thevehiclesrattledfromtoptobottom, theweaponswerecoveredindustandthesoldiersoverlytired.Generalleutnant Model arrived in Sluzk shortly after noon and called his

commanderstogetherat theformerairstrip.Hescoldedthemarchdisciplineoftheforces.Thatnotonlycauseddelaysintheadvance,butitalsoofferedenemyaircraftgoodtargets.“We have to move on! The Beresina is our next objective . . . and then

Moscowisinfrontofus!”Therewas nomore advance that day. The Russians continued to block the

riverbanks. It was not until the friendly artillery could be brought forward toprovidecoveringfirethatanewbridgecouldbebuilt.Atleast theforceswereable touse the transition to screening toclean someof thedirt and sand fromtheirweapons and attend to thedamageon thevehicles.Thedivision surgeonestablished a main clearing station in the orphanage in Slulz with Sanitäts-Kompanie522.The division ordered the continuation of the advance at 0730 hours on 27

June. The advance guard formed two march serials to that end: one underOberstleutnant vonLewinski and the other underOberstleutnantMunzel.Thetankregimentassembledattheoutskirtsofthecity.Thereconnaissanceaircrafthad noted hardly any enemy movement along the road to Brobruisk. It wasassumedthatrapidprogresswouldbemadethatday.Atleastthat’swhatthemenofthedivisionthoughtthatmorning.

FromtheBugtotheBeresina(SümpfePripjet=PripetMarshes).

While taking itsmiddayrest, the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543wasattackedbyscatteredSovietforces.The1stPlatoonimmediatelytookupfiringpositions,while Oberleutnant Michels and ten volunteers advanced against theapproaching tanks. In a short engagement, the antitank men were able toeliminate five enemy fighting vehicles.Afterwards, itwas determined that thetanks in question were command tanks with valuable materiel on board,including papers, documents, 5,000meters of film,women’s silk clothing (!),andotheritems.The 5./Panzer-Regiment 6 (Oberleutnant Jarosch von Schweder) took the

lead,aftertheSslutschhadbeencrossed.Thetanksmadegoodprogressontheroad,but theyreceivedfireaftera fewkilometers fromsomehighground thatran perpendicular to the road. The Russians had dug in artillery and antitankgunsthere.Thetankcompanydeployednorthoftheroadintoattackformationand broke the enemy resistance after a short period. Two cannons fell intoGermanhands.Thearmoredregimentmovedoutagaintocontinuethemarchat1200hours.Themarchjammedupagainafterashortwhile,however.TheleadelementshadrunintoaRussianpositioninthewoodsaroundStary-Hutok.Thatresistancewasalsobrokenrapidly,andthetankscontinuedtorollonthroughthe

woodsandisolation.Afterthefightingvehicleshadpassedthedangerousspot,itsuddenlyturned

livelyinthewoodsaroundKalista,whentheriflemen,engineers,Flakgunners,and cannoneers followed. As if on command, heavy, rapid fire frommachineguns and automatic weapons broke out of the impenetrable thickets from allsides.Theriflemenquicklythrewthemselvesonthegroundfromtheirvehicles,seekingcover.Minutespassedthatseemedeternallylong.Friendlytanksrolledforward from the rear. It was the lead elements of the armor regiment’s 1stBattalion. The fighting vehicles moved their way carefully along the woodedroad.Theywerealsoshoweredwithahailof fire,but thoseroundsricochetedoff.GeneralleutnantModelwasinthemiddleofthatgroup.Hestooduprightinhisopenstaffcarandattemptedtoorganizeadefensefromthere.Hesummonedthe commander of the I./Schützen-Regiment 394. When Major Kratzenbergapproachedthegeneral,hesanktotheground,badlywounded.HauptmannOrtsthen assumed command.But he also collapsed, hit twice in the legs.He diedsoon afterwards at the main clearing station. Oberleutnant Freiherr vonWerthernthenassumedcommandofthebattalion.Nothingcouldbeseenoftheenemy,butheavyfirewascomingfromthewoods.OberleutnantvonWerthernissuedorders:“Fixbayonets!Getup...go...go!”The fight with the well-camouflaged opponent was conducted with

determination on both sides. Every individual mound of earth that marked aRussian dug-out had to be stormed. The enemy defended strongly and couldonlybeeliminated inclosecombatorbymeansofhandgrenades.Finally, thewoodsaroundKalistawereinthehandsofthevonWerthern’sbattalion.Itwasamajorsuccess.Unfortunately,ithadbeenboughtwithheavycasualties.LeutnantBerg,Leutnant Nebel, andLeutnant Bley fell leading their platoons. LeutnantRougemont received a severe stomach wound; he died a few hours later.StabsarztDr.Marrhadhishandsfull.TheyoungUnterarzt,Kalten,waswiththeriflemen,whowereslowlyclearingoutonepocketofresistanceaftertheother.The medic,Unteroffizier Sprössing, was wounded.Unterarzt Kalten went tohelpdresshimandwasmortallywounded.Generalleutnant Model had witnessed the fighting of his soldiers while

standingontheroadandhadpersonallyissueddirectivesandorders.Whenthefightingcametoaconclusion,thegeneralwasabletothankthebadlywoundedMajor Kratzenberg one more time for the accomplishments of his bravebattalion. Hauptmann Pape of the motorcycle infantry battalion assumed

commandofthe1stBattalion.Forhisbraveactions,OberleutnantvonWerthernwaslaterawardedtheKnight’sCross.24

ThedivisioncommanderthenhadaconvoyformedfromthefightingvehiclesoftheI./Panzer-Regiment6.Theyescortedtheunarmoredvehicles throughthewoods.Thelightplatoonofthetankregimenttooktheleadinordertoestablishcontact with the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, which had ranged far ahead. Theremaining tankswere positioned at 100-meter-intervals to the left and right ofthe road to allow the vehicles through. This unique type of advance startedaround1600hours.In thewoods aroundKalista, however, theworkof thedoctors,medics and

chaplains continued. Fresh graves were dug. Forty-three officers,noncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnelweregivenovertoeternalrestunderthetreesandbrush.Intheevening,alargewoodencrosswaserected.Thetwodivisionalchaplains,LaubandDr.Heiland,heldthefuneralremarks,alongwiththeregimentalcommander,OberstleutnantAudörsch.In the meantime, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 (Oberstleutnant Munzel) had

continueditsadvance,despitethefightingthathadbrewedupbehindit.Rightinfront of the bridge over the Oressa, the enemy had set up an obstacle withdestroyed armored vehicles.When friendly fighting vehicles showed up, theyreceivedahailofwell-aimedartilleryfire.The5thCompany,movinginfront,stoppedbriefly.FeldwebelNoeltemoved up to the obstaclewith his tank andcollapseditwiththeweightofhissteelcolossus.OberstLinnarzpersonallytooktheleadinthecommandvehicleofhisbrigade

headquarters. They were closely followed by the 7th and 5th Companies ofPanzer-Regiment 6. Kilometer after kilometer, the tanks churned their wayforwardthroughtheroads,whichhadbeensoftenedbycloudburstsearlyintheafternoon.ThentheywereinfrontofthePtitsch,asmalltributaryofthePripjet.TherewasalongwoodenbridgeoverthewateratGluscha.OberstLinnarzdidnothesitatelong.Heorderedanimmediatecrossing.The

beams on the bridge started to burn.The fighting vehiclesmoved through thetonguesofflameto thefarbank.Theplanksonthebridgesoonwentup;onlythe beams remained. The three command vehicles and the five tanks werealreadyacross.Rightbehindthem,thefourarmoredpersonnelcarrierswiththeriflemenattemptedtogetacross.Theysucceeded.Then,withamightycrack,thebridgecollapsed.Bythen, the tanksof the7thCompanywereat theriver.LeutnantRühlsaw

movement on the bridge and thought he had Russians in front of him. Thevehicleofthebrigadecommanderwasinadvertentlyknockedout,intheprocessof which Oberst Linnarz lost his right arm. Oberstleutnant von Lewinskiassumedactingcommandofthearmoredbrigade.The following elements of the tank regiment closed up. But there was no

gettingovertheriverinthedarknight.GeneralleutnantModel,whohadorderedthe attack on Brobruisk at 2100 hours, immediately ordered Aufklärungs-Abteilung1toreconnoitersouthforadetour.Thearmoredcarsfinallylocatedabadlyworn-outroad.Thecolumnsthenchurnedtheirwayforwardthroughtheknee-deepsand.Theroutewasmarshyinspots;asaresult,someofthewheeledvehiclesbecamestuck.Theycouldonlybepulledoutofthemuckbymeansofprimemoversandtanks.Asmallbridgebrokeundertheweightofthetrucks,butitwasabletoberepairedforthetimebeing.Banksoffogcontinuedto layover thecountryside,whentheenginesof the

tankssprangtolifethenextmorning.Theyslowlypushedforwardintothefirstoutlying settlementsofBrobruisk.Nothing stirred;only individual flames shotout of some of the huts. Friendly artillery had sent out its fiery greetings thepreviousevening.The lightplatoonofPanzer-Regiment6, the lightplatoonofthe I./Panzer-Regiment 6 and the armored personnel company of Schützen-Regiment394tookthelead.Thefightingvehiclesrattledatspeedovertheroads.The squalidwooden houses and edifices of the party remained behind. Therewashardlyanyresistance.Itwasonlyattheoldcitadelthattheenemyputupadefense.Theresistancewasbrokenwhenalloftheweaponsintheleadelementwere brought to bear. At 0450 hours, the men of the light platoon of theI./Panzer-Regiment 6 raised the Reich war flag on the turret of the citadel.Brobruiskhadbeentaken.Generalleutnant Model found himself at the edge of Brobruisk; the

commanderofSchützen-Regiment394(OberstleutnantAudörsch)arrivedatthedivisioncommander’slocation,whilethebattalionsoftheregimentapproachedBrobruiskbymeansofdetours(allofthebridgesalongthemainroadhadbeenblownup).ReportsconcerningcounterattacksoftheRussiansagainstthecitadelarrived at the commander’s location. Model issued the following order toAudörschatthatcriticalmoment:“Assumecommandofallforcesinthecitadel.Allelementsofthedivisionthatarriveareattachedtoyou.Holdthecitadelandthen clear Brobruisk.” That order could be executed in its entirety; all of thecounterattacksagainstthecitadelwereturnedback,meaningthatthecitycould

thenstarttobecleared.TheforcesofSchützen-Regiment394,whichhadarrivedinthemeantime,werecommittedbycompanyinthevariouscityblockstoclearthem.Small skirmishesensued.But resistancewassoonbrokenandBrobruiskwascompletelyclearoftheenemy.Theleadelementsoftherifleregimentwerealong the banks of theBeresina.Unfortunately, the big bridgewas blown up.Since theRussians held the riverbanks under continuous fire, a hasty crossingwasnotpossible.OberstleutnantAudörschandhis commandpostwere in thebastionrightalongtheBeresina.Theartilleryhadalsosentitsobserversforwardto the river. They dug in behind the walls of the citadel, which were fifteenmetershighrightonwater’sedge.Thedivisionalengineersweremovedintothecitadel to occupy it. The armored regiment arrived at the western portion ofBrobruisk,andthetankswererefueledandrearmed.TheSovietswantedtoholduptheGermansattheBeresinaatallcosts.They

broughtupseveralbatteries to theeastbankandcontinuouslyshelled thecity.TheSovietfirekeptuptheentireday,focusingonthecitadel.ThefirstofficerfromArtillerie-Regiment75tobekilledinthiscampaign—OberleutnantWeihe,thebatterycommanderofthe9thBattery—losthislifeearlyintheafternoon.Allofasudden, theskiesdarkened.Astormwith flashing lightning, rolling

thunder and cloudbursts let loose on the river flood plain. Despite that, theRussian firecontinuedacross theBeresina.Enemyforcesused thehazeof thestorm to climb across the planks of the blown-up bridge. The Soviets evensucceededinreachingtheGermanside.TheywerethencaughtbythemachinegunsoftheII./Schützen-Regiment394andhadtopullbackrapidly.The division, which also moved its command post to Brobruisk in the

afternoon, ordered the II./Schützen-Regiment 394 to form a bridgehead on theeastbankoftheBeresinathatevening.Friendlybatteriesinitiatedtheoperationswithapreparatoryfire.Theriflemenmadeitacrosstheriverininflatablecraft;afew took the route over the destroyed bridge. The Russians put up a bitterdefense.Despitethat,thebattalionsucceededinestablishingasmallbridgeheadbymorning.Major Dr.Müllerwas able to enter the small village of Titowkawithhiscompanies.The2ndCompanyofthedivisionalengineers,insupportoftheriflemenandledbyOberleutnantRoever,was thefirst toenter thevillage.Hardfightingdeveloped,duringwhichtheengineercompanylostfourdeadandfifteenwounded.The1stCompanyofengineersthenimmediatelystartedtoworkonapontoon

bridgeandlaboredtheentirenight.AlthoughRussianfiresdisruptedthework,it

continued to make progress. For the construction of this bridge and others,Pionier-Bataillon7925wasattachedtothedivision.Buttheriverwastoowidetorapidlycross largeportionsof thedivision.Thedivisionextended itspositionson the west bank of the river. In the course of those movements, the airstripsouthofBrobruiskwasalsooccupied,wherebyafewmachinesfellundamagedintoGermanhands.TheII./Schützen-Regiment394wasallbyitselfonthefarsideoftheBeresina

andcouldonlybesupportedbyartillery,whichsentitsfierygreetingsacrosstheriver.Thebraveriflemenurgentlyneededthathelp,sincetheywereexposedtoongoing Russian immediate counterattacks, which concentrated on Titowka.Despiteeverything,MajorDr.Müllerwasable tobeatbackallof theRussianattacksthroughhisownpersonalandbraveexample.ThedivisionwasheldupfortwodaysontheBeresina.Itwasimpossibleto

get across the river with larger forces. Although the engineers were workingconstantly on the construction of both the field-expedient and the pontoonbridges, Russian aircraft attacked continuously, causing casualties and addingnewdamage to thework inprogress.Thehighest command levels of theRedArmy had identified the danger associated with the German offensive in thecentralsectorofthefrontandattemptedtopreventanotherbreakthroughwithallmeansavailable.ThecommanderinchiefoftheWesternFrontwasrelievedandGeneral Jeremenko replaced him. Jeremenko would prove to be the mainantagonisttoGeneraloberstGuderian.ThefriendlyFlakelementsgaveittheirbest,buttheyweretooweaktoturn

backalloftheenemyairattacks.On29June,thebatteriesshotdownmorethantwenty Soviet aircraft; on the next day, itwas thirty-five. The employment ofOberstleutnantMölders’swing26 brought the riflemen considerable relief. ThewingshotdownsomanyRussianmachinesthatsoonbarelyanySovietaircraftdaredtoshowthemselvesonthehorizon.Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadbeenbehindthedivisioninthesecondwave

uptothispoint,movedintoBrobruiskon29June.Attheordersconference,thedivisioncommanderordered the I./Schützen-Regiment3 tosendapatrol to theeastbankoftheBeresinathatverynight.LeutnantVormannofthe3rdCompanyconducted the mission and was able to determine that the Russians hadapparentlyvoluntarilyevacuatedtheirpositions.Working feverishly, Major Beigel’s engineers were able to complete the

pontoon bridge over the river during the night of 29–30 June. The division

thereuponorderedthattheadvancewastocontinuethefollowingmorning.Thebivouackingforceswerealertedat0600hoursandwereinformedtobereadytomoveoutfifteenminuteslater.ButtheRussiansalongtheriverdidnotgiveupand continued to place well-aimed fire on the bridge construction sites. TheMajorDr.Müller’s2ndBattalionwasstillallby itselfon theeastbankof theBeresina,anditsriflemenhadbeenconstantlydefendingdayandnightthelasttwo days. During the morning of 30 June, the battalion finally succeeded inclearing the locality of Titowka of the enemy, thus establishing a point ofdepartureforthecontinuedadvance.The1./Schützen-Regiment394,whichwastheonlycompanyoftheregiment

equippedwitharmoredpersonnelcarriersatthetime,wasthefirstunittocrossthefinishedbridgetotheeastbankoftheriver.Theremainingcompaniesofthe1st Battalion followed. The battalion immediately inserted itself into themarshlands next to its sister battalion, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, andexpandedthebridgeheadinalldirections,onehouratatime.Oberst von Manteuffel’s Schützen-Regiment 3 was brought forward to the

westbankof the river fromKemenkaat1000hours. Its2ndBattalioncrossedtheBeresinafromthenorthernportionofBrobruisk.The1stBattalioncrossedthewaterobstacleonthepontoonbridge.Crossingtheriversouthofthecityininflatable craft was the 3rd Company of the regiment. That companyencountered heavy defensive fire in front of the railway embankment andsufferedthreedeadandseveralwounded.Bothofthemiddleregimentswereonthe east back and drove wedges into the enemy front. Finally, the Russianresistanceweakenedandtheirforcespulledbackthroughthemarshyfloodplainto theeast.Theonly thing that continued tobeactivewas theRedAirForce,whichattackedthecrossingpointinwaves.The continuing bomber attacks were also the reason why the armored

regimentdidnotcrosstheriverthatday.Towardnoon,thetwobattalionsmovedback to their bivouac areas west of Brobruisk, although their orders to beprepared tomovecontinued tobe ineffect.Anexceptionwasaplatoonof the2nd Company under Leutnant von Wedel, which was attached to thereconnaissance battalion to form an advance guard.Around 1600 hours in theafternoon, thebrigadeprovidedthefollowingsituationreport:“Movementeaststopped.For the restof theday, rest andmaintenance.”A fewhours later, thearmoredbrigadeheadquarterswasdissolved.Thatmeantthatthearmorbrigadeof the 3. Panzer-Division had ceased to exist. The command vehicles of the

headquarterswere issued toOberstleutnant von Lewinski’s armored regiment,andhewasplacedunderthedirectcommandandcontrolofthedivision.During theday, the two rifle regiments expanded their bridgeheads.Toward

1900 hours, Schützen-Regiment 3 reachedBabin, seven kilometers east of theBeresina. At that point, the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 and the II./Schützen-Regiment394were north of themain avenue of advance,while the twootherbattalionsweretothesouthofit.ForwardofBabin,theI./Schützen-Regiment3screenedtothesoutheast.TheSovietscontinuedtotrytoturnbacktheregimentsbymeansofairattacks,buttheireffortswerefruitless.The division moved across the military bridges to the east bank of the

Beresina with its remaining elements. Starting at 0600 hours, the armoredregiment formed up to move through Brobruisk. It started crossing the riverthreequartersofanhourlaterwithitsleadelements.Sincethefloodbridgeshadbeenblownuponthefarside,longstretchesofdetourhadtobedriventhroughdeepsand.Thewheeledvehiclescouldonlymakeithookeduptotanksinfrontof them.AftermovingthroughbadlydamagedTotowka, thearmoredregimentbivouackedinthewoodsnearBabin.Thedivisionhadordered itsattack in thedirectionofRogatschew.Astrong

advanceguardunderOberstKleemannwasestablishedforthatpurpose.Panzer-Regiment6detached its3rdBattalion(HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski),whileSchützen-Regiment 3 detached a mixed company under the command ofOberleutnantvonBaumbach.Thefirstmissionfortheadvanceguard:locatetheenemyanddeterminehisstrength;determinewhichbridgesaredestroyed;takeintactbridges.Theadvanceguardmovedout at1030hours.The tanks, armoredpersonnel

carriers,andmotorcyclesmadegoodprogressuntiltheyreachedOlaCreek,anda destroyed bridge there prevented their further movement. Leutnant Bodig’stank platoon was given the mission of reconnoitering for a detour as part ofOberleutnantBaumbach’smixedcompany.Intheprocess,thefightingvehiclesdiscoveredanenemyairfield.Bothsideswereequallysurprised.GermantanksandRussian antiaircraftweapons opened fire at the same time.Three friendlytanksandonearmoredpersonnelcarrierwereknockedoutandsetalight.Intheend,however, theenemyresistancewasbroken.Three“Rata” fightersand tenbombers were destroyed on the ground.Leutnant Haugwas sent back by thecommanderoftheadvanceguardtorenderareport.Helinkedupwiththeriflebrigade5.5kilometerseastofBabin,whereablown-upbridgewasholdingup

itsadvance.Ashortwhile later,OberleutnantvonBaumbachreturnedwithhiscompanyaftersuccessfullycompletinghismission.GeneralleutnantModelpersonallymovedforwardtobreathsomelifeintothe

advance, which had bogged down. In the meantime,Hauptmann Ziervogel’sreconnaissancebattalionhaddiscoveredanintactbridgeatPawlowitschi.Atthatpoint, Generalleutnant Model issued new orders. According to them,OberstleutnantvonLewinskiwastoswingoutwithhis2ndBattaliontotheleftonce across thebridge and reach the roadagain to the rearof the enemy.TheriflebrigadewastoadvanceonbothsidesoftheroadintwoassaultgroupsandgoaroundtheRussianpositionatthedestroyedbridge.A cloudburst commenced at the same time that the tanks and the riflemen

started out. For the most part, the wheeled vehicles got stuck in the mud.OberstleutnantMunzelthereuponhadtheriflemenoftheII./Schützen-Regiment3mount his tanks,while the 1stBattalion had to fight itswaywith difficultythroughthemarshandmolder.The5./Panzer-Regiment6advanceddirectlyeast,whiletheremainingelementsoftheregimentpressedsouthfromthefarbankoftheOla.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3(MajorWellmann),supportedbyelementsfromthedivisionalengineers,crossedinrafts,anddrovetheRussiansinfrontofit away. The riflemen linked up with the tankers of Panzer-Regiment 6 atBortniki. Toward 2300 hours, Schützen-Regiment 3 transitioned to screeningaroundBortniki. Its2ndBattalion (MajorZimmermann)was to the left of theroad,the1stBattaliontotheright.Themorningof2Julypromisedanotherwarmdayofweather.Thearmored

regimentwasawakenedshortlyafter0500hours.OberstleutnantvonLewinskionlyhadtheII./Panzer-Regiment6athisdisposalatthetime,sincethecombattrainsofthe1stBattalionhadnotmadeitforwardyetandthebattalionneededtoberefueledandrearmed.The2ndBattalionmovedoutat0805hours.Thepointwas formed this timeby its 8thCompany.The companymade rapidprogress,butitwasunabletocrosstheDubysna,sincethebridgehadbeenblownupbytheenemyatLiskowskaja.Thefightingvehicleswereabletodiscoverabridgecapable of taking tanks to the north at Filipkowitschi.Oberstleutnant Munzelmovedhisentirebattalionthere,crossingthesmallriver.The remaining elements of the battalion followed slowly. Russian aircraft

repeatedly attacked the columns in the morning. A short while later, fifteenclose-support aircraft came in, followed by eight fighters. The aircraft flew atlow levelover thebattalionsandstrafed,causingcasualtiesanddamage to the

vehicles.Most of the division was still bogged down in front of the Dubysna. The

bridgingcolumnsofthedivisionalengineerswereemployedandbuiltasixteen-tonbridge.Theconstructiondidnotproceedasquicklyasexpected,sinceenemyaircraftcontinuouslyforcedtheengineerstoseekcover.Itwasnotuntilaround1900 hours that the work was completed; at that point, the vehicles startedrollingagain. In themeantime, thedivisionhad issuedorders for thenextday.TheadvanceguardofOberstleutnantMunzelhadadvancedasfarastheraillineinfrontofRogatschewwithitsleadelementstowards1100hours.Onehalfhourlater, itreportedbyradio:“BridgeovertheDrutinfrontofRogatschewblownup.Correspondinglyimpossibletoadvanceatthistime.Enemyartilleryfire.”Atthat point, Generalleutnant Model issued orders for a halt. The armoredregimentpulledoffof the roadandsetupsecurity in theareaaroundTrotzky.SmallerelementsremainedscreeningalongtheDrut.Thedivisionhadreachedthelargestnaturalobstaclesofarinitsadvance.The

fifty-meter-wide Drut separated the regiments from the enemy. That wasfollowedbythemarshyfloodplainsoftheDnjepr.ThecityofRogatschewwaslocatedinthesharpcorneroftheconfluenceofthetworiversanddominatedtheentireregion.Thecitywasalreadyburning.MajorZimmermann’sII./Schützen-Regiment 3, reinforced by engineers and a platoon of antitank guns, attackedRogatschew in a coup demain. The riflemen, some of themmounted on theantitank vehicles, assaulted along the narrow road. The resistance offered byindividualmachine-gunnestswasrapidlybroken.Theyreachedthehighgroundwestofthecity,wheretheysawtheenemyblowupthebridges.Thatmeantthattheobjectivecouldnolongerbeobtained.MajorZimmermannissuedorderstosetupahedgehogdefenseonthehighground.Fortunately,themilkprocessingplant—afairlymoderninstallation—remainedinthehandsoftheriflemen,whowereabletoindulgeinmilkandcheese,beforenightfalldescended.

AreaofOperations:Bobruisk–Rogatschew.

Thedivisioncloseduptotheriverintheeveningandduringthenight.Enemyartilleryfirerepeatedlydisruptedfriendlymovements.Threelargebombcraterstemporarily rendered the main road useless. Patrols and route reconnaissanceelements that were sent out determined that the Liskowskaja–Bartschiza–Tschgirink road, which was needed for an advance on Star-Bychow, wascompletely impassable to wheeled vehicles. That meant that an attack to thenortheastwasoutofthequestionforthetimebeing.The division command therefore decided to attackRogatschew frontally, in

ordertoeliminatethis“fire-spewing”Russiancityandstrongpointandcreateabridgeheadto theeastbankof theDnjepr.TheII./Schützen-Regiment3 (MajorZimmermann), the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 (Hauptmann Pape), and theIII./Panzer-Regiment6(HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski)wereemployedtothatend. In addition, therewere elements fromPanzerjäger-Abteilung543 (MajorFreiherr von Türckheim), Pionier-Bataillon 39 (Major Beigel), and theII./Schützen-Regiment394(MajorDr.Müller).OberstRies’sArtillerie-Regiment75,whichhadclosedup, startedpreparatory firesonburningRogatschewandRussianpositionsonboth sidesof the river at1800hourson thatThursday,3July.TheRussianartillerydidnotremainsilent,either.Itplacedharassingfiresallacrossthesector,especiallyalongthebridgeontherailwayembankment.The III./Panzer-Regiment 6, together with the I./Schützen-Regiment 394,

approachedtheDrutthroughitsgreeningvegetatedfloodplains,windingitswaythroughthemarshymeadows.Numerouswoodenraftswereinthewater,whichwasnotdeep.HauptmannStreger’sPanzer-Regiment6 initiallyapproachedtheriver.Thetanksbuttonedup.Thefightingvehiclesrattledintotheshallowandmarshy waters. The remaining companies waited a few minutes to see whathappenedtothefordingcompany.WhenthefirsttankclimbedoutoftheDrutonthefarbank,HauptmannSchneider-Kostalskiissuedorders:“Panzermarsch!”The entire battalion was able to get through the river without incident. Theriflemenfollowedcloselybehindand,insomeinstances,usedthewoodenraftsto cross. Despite stubborn defensive fires, the tanks and the riflemenwere infront of the burningwoodenhuts on the northern edgeofRogatschewa shortwhilelater.Atthesametime,theII./Schützen-Regiment3,theII./Schützen-Regiment394,

andthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39movedouttoattackthecity.Thetwobattalionsmoved intoRogatschewfairly rapidly.Theriflemenandengineers fought theirwayin,meterbymeter.Murderousfirewasreceivedfromallofthehouses.TheRussiansdefendeddesperately.Theantitankguncrewspushedandpulledtheirgunsbyhandandindividuallytookthepocketsofresistanceunderfire.The houses and the roads were burning everywhere. The battalions slowly

chewed theirway into the city. The platoon ofLeutnantMöllhoff (3./Pionier-Bataillon39)reachedthechurchinthecenterofthecity.ThentheriflemenwereattheDnjepr.Extremelyheavymachinegunandartilleryfirewasreceivedfromthe far bank, forcing the riflemen to take cover. Oberstleutnant Audörsch(commander ofSchützen-Regiment394) andMajor Zimmermann (commanderof the II./Schützen-Regiment 3) were both in the city and discussed how toconductthefightthereaswellasapossiblecrossingoftheDnjepr.Duringthenight,duringwhichtheenemyartilleryfirehadnotsloweddownatall,oneofthedivisionchaplains,Dr.Heiland,madeasurprisevisittothecommandpostofSchützen-Regiment 394. As he had done so frequently before, he had comeforwardtotheforwardlinestocareforthewounded.Forhisconstantpresenceamongtheleadelementsandhisunflappability,hewasawardedtheIronCross,FirstClass,thatday.ItwasonlyoutsideofRogatschewthatafewbattlegroups—the7thand8th

CompaniesofSchützen-Regiment3—wereabletogetacrosstheriver.Fromtheregiment’s6thCompany,onlyLeutnantSaathoffmade itacross thewater.Theengineers made another crossing attempt, until they were torn apart in the

maelstromofthehardfightingalongthebanks.The fighting to establish a bridgehead at Rogatschew started. Since the

Sovietswere still defending in the city proper, our soldiers quickly got into adifficult situation. The losses mounted from hour to hour. OberleutnantSpillmann,thecompanycommanderofthe6./Schützen-Regiment394,fellalongwith many of his soldiers. Major Zimmermann, the commander of theII./Schützen-Regiment3,waswoundedfor the third time.HauptmannEngelienassumed acting commandof the battalion.The8./Schützen-Regiment3, whichhadbeenemployedasaflankguardinthedirectionofSalutje,tooktheheaviestcasualties.Thecompanycommander,OberleutnantBecker,wasbadlywounded;Leutnant Fritze was killed. Leutnant Gleitz, the leader of an engineer assaultdetachment, was mortally wounded, along with three other enlisted engineerpersonnel.At that point, the acting commander of the3./Pionier-Bataillon 39,LeutnantSchultze,assumedcommandofallsurvivingforcesinthebridgeheadandorderedawithdrawalacrosstheriver.While the fightingvehiclesof the III./Panzer-Regiment6 pulledback to the

city’sedgeduringthenight,theriflemenremainedincontactwiththeenemy.Hewasputtingupparticularlystiffresistanceinthesouthernpartofthecity.Forthetimebeing, therewasnomakingprogress.The riflebrigade issuedorders thatthe I./Schützen-Regiment 3, which had not yet been committed, reinforce theoutposts in that area with some of its elements. The 1st Company ofOberleutnantvonZitzewitzwasreinforcedwithplatoonsfromthe2nd,4thand5thCompanies,aswellasaplatoonfromPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,andgiventhatmission.Thereinforcedcompanyreceiveditsdesignatedsectorshortlyafter2100 hours and dug in among the vegetated terrain southwest of the railwaybridge.The morning of 4 July saw no change to the situation. The fighting was

primarilymarkedonbothsidesbytheartilleryfight.TheSovietshadthirty-sixheavybatteriesontheeastbankof theDnjeprsoutheastofRogatschew,whichtheyusedtoshowertheGermanmovementsinandaroundthecitywithheavyfire(15centimeter).Despitethefactthatforwardobservershadbeenbroughtasfar forward as the river, the artillerywas unable to successfully engage thoseenemybatteries.The numbers ofwounded climbed day by day, hour by hour.Thewounded

whocouldnotbecaredforattheforwardclearingstationhadtobetransportedby ambulance to the field hospital at Brobruisk, forty-two kilometers away.

LeutnantSchickerling,theplatoonleaderofthe1stAmbulancePlatoon,savedawounded man by swimming across the Dnjepr. For his actions, he was laterawardedtheIronCross,FirstClass.Toward noon, the rifle brigade ordered an attack on Lutschkin by the

I./Schützen-Regiment 3, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and two antitankcompanies. Major Wellmann moved out ahead with the tanks and the2./Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadclimbedaboard,andoccupiedit.Oncethere,the riflemen linkedupwithLeutnant Stegmann andhis demolitionparty fromthe5./Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadblownup therailwayfacilitiessouthofthevillage.ThedivisionstartedtoformitsfirstbridgeheadontheDnjeprat1800hours.

AStukaattackonenemypositionshadalreadytakenplaceat1500hours,butitdid not succeed in silencing the enemy artillery. The II./Schützen-Regiment 3attacked directly from Rogatschew, in order to establish a bridgehead. It wasdirected for the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, supported by elements of theIII./Panzer-Regiment6, toformabridgeheadto thenorth,soas to thenhit theenemy in the rear, while the reinforced 3./Schützen-Regiment 3 tied downSovietsfromthefrontattheJedolincollectivefarm.Unfortunately,theoperationstoodunderanunluckystar.Theattackof the II./Schützen-Regiment3 boggeddownatthecity’sedges.Onhisowninitiative,HauptmannEngeliencalledofftheattackofhisbattalion.Inthelastfewdays,thebattalionhadlostallofits8thCompanyandanadditional146menoftheotherfourcompanies!Likewise,theattack of the 3./Schützen-Regiment 3 (Hauptmann Peschke) was delayed. Thecompanywasunabletoattackuntil2000hours,becausetheinflatableraftswerebroughtforwardtoolate.Thecompany’seffortsthenboggeddowninthefaceoftheRussianartillery.ThecompanythereuponduginalongtheDnjeprandhadtodefend against the enemy’s immediate counterattacks, which were directed atLutschkin.The II./Schützen-Regiment 394 (Major Dr. Müller) had more success. The

battalion, reinforced by antitank elements,was actually able to cross the 100-meter-wide river. The three submergible tanks of the 12./Panzer-Regiment 6(underOberfeldwebel Blaich) provided powerful support to the riflemen. Thetankscrossedtheriverunderthewatersurfaceandgottothefarshore.Althoughone of the fighting vehicles was knocked out by Russian antitank guns, theremaining two tanks held down the Russian defenses long enough for theriflementocross.The6./Schützen-Regiment394(LeutnantGappel)attackedand

reachedtheridgeline100meterseastofSborowo.Atthatpoint,MajorDr.MüllerwasatSborowoontheeastbankofthebroad

river with his battalion and the 1. and 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543(Oberleutnant Michels and Oberleutnant Held). That signaled the heroicstruggleofthoseforces,whichweresooncutofffromtheremainingelementsofthedivision.TheSovietsplacedsuchheavyartilleryfireontheriverbanksandthe destroyed bridges that not a single additional man was able to cross theDnjepr.At the same time,Russian infantry charged the positions of the smallbridgehead.CasualtiesmountedbythehourontheGermanside,andrationsandammunitionwereslowlyrunningout.Butthefewcompaniesheldfirmagainstall attacks.The riflemen and antitank gunners knewneither sleep nor rest norreliefoverthenextfewdays.MajorDr.Müllercompelledhismentoholdoutthroughhispersonalbravery.Lateron,heandOberfeldwebelBlaichreceivedtheKnight’sCrossfortheirboldactions.TheXXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.) radioed orders during the morning that the

divisionwasnottomoveanymoreforcesintothebridgeheadforthetimebeing.In the meantime, the Drut flood plains had been made trafficable by theconstruction of a 1.8-kilometer-long corduroy road by the 1st and 2ndCompanies of the divisional engineers under the direction of HauptmannWinkler. The elements of the rifle regiments that had been employedwere toremaininplace,whilePanzer-Regiment6was tobepreparedtosupport the4.Panzer-Division. But even those orderswere changed. Themovements of thearmorregiment,whichhadalreadybeeninitiated,werestopped.Its1stBattalionwas attached to the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Bortniki toward noon.MajorSchmidt-OttimmediatelyheadedinthatdirectionandsetupinKaschary.The II./Panzer-Regiment 6 remained on alert, since strong enemymovementswere detected along the southern flank of the division, where the motorcycleinfantrybattalionwasscreening.Aplatoonfromthe8./Panzer-Regiment6wassent towards Schlobin to reconnoiter and reported motorized Russian forces.Leutnant Jacobs and his light platoon from the regimental headquartersreconnoiteredtheareabetweentheDrutandtheDnjepr.The overall situation that day remained unchanged. The morning was

strangely quiet; it was not until the afternoon that the enemy’s artillery firesincreased.Thedivisionfeared large-scaleenemyattacksandpulledbacksomeof the rifle companies thathadbeenemployed to screenas reserves.Only theII./Schützen-Regiment394 remained inplace, involved inheavy fighting in its

bridgeheadposition.Theriflementherehadbeenfightingfortwodayswithoutletup.Itwasnotuntil6JulythattheI./Schützen-Regiment394wasabletocrosstheDnjepr—after its companies had crossed theDrut on floating beams—andsupport its hard-pressed sister battalion. The casualties continued to increase,however. Stabsarzt Dr. Marr died after being hit in the chest, as he helpedtransport wounded to the rear along with Feldwebel Feldebert. The forwardobserverof the7thBatteryofartillery,LeutnantSchwedendieck,wasmortallywounded at his observation post. The acting commander of the 6./Schützen-Regiment 394, Leutnant Gappel, had to turn over his company toHauptfeldwebel Holst, after being wounded by shrapnel. Holst himself wasbadly wounded a short while later. Leutnant Rosemeyer and LeutnantSteinmüllerwere likewisebadlywounded.Despiteall thecasualties,Schützen-Regiment394continuedtohold.Theartillery,whichwasbeingdirectedbythewoundedLeutnantGrafStudnitz,providedvaluablesupport.After the intoxicating successes of the first few days of war, no one had

thoughtthattheRussianswouldbeabletopullthemselvestogethertooffersuchhardresistance,eventhoughtheDnjeprwasontheso-calledStalinLine.Itwascertain, however, that the division could not force a crossing over theDnjepr.The corps considered sending the 4. Panzer-Division and the 10. Infanterie-Division(mot.)northtoattack,inordertolandtotherearoftheenemy,whowasbeinghelddownalongthefrontbythe3.Panzer-Division.At that point, theRussians seized the initiative.Unnoticed, theyheadedout

duringthedarkandrawnightof5–6JulyfromSchlobintoapointhalfwaytothemainroad.TheSoviet117thInfantryDivisionhadthemissiontocutoffthe3. Panzer-Division from its logistics lines of communication at the DubysnaBridge,overwhichsome250vehiclesrolleddaily.Thethrustlandedrightinthemiddle of the formations of the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.),27 which werestagingfortheirownattackthenextmorning.TheSovietswereabletopenetrateintoPobolowobysurpriseandwipeout theelementsof thedivision thatwerethere.At0545hours, thedivisionalerted the II./Panzer-Regiment6 for immediate

employment in support of the neighboringdivision.Since the downpours of 5Julyhadmadetheunimprovedroadsalmostimpassable,thebattalionhadtofirstmove back five kilometers to get toPobolowoon secondary roads.All of thewheeled vehicles got stuck in the mud. The regimental headquarters likewiseboggeddown.OberstleutnantvonLewinskihadhiscommandvehicletowedby

afightingvehicle,soastobeabletoatleastfollowtheattack,evenifhehadnoway to lead the entire regiment by that means. A simultaneous advance bycomplete tank battalions in that terrain was barely conceivable. The terrainbetween the Dnjepr and the Dubysna formed an acute triangle leading toSchlobinAcreekdividedthisareaonemoretimeintotwoparts.Embankmentsfurtherrestrictedtheterrain,whichofferednoextendedvisibilityduetothehighcorninthefields.Without checking with the 3. Panzer-Division, the command of the 10.

Infanterie-Division (mot.) immediately employed the I./Panzer-Regiment 6before the 2nd Battalion had arrived.Major Schmidt-Ott advanced with hiscompaniesandimmediatelyencounteredstrongenemyforces.The1stCompanysupported the advance of the II./Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) 41 on the extremeright wing. Oberleutnant Buchterkirch’s 2nd Company encountered enemyartillery and antitank-gun positions on the high ground southeast of Luki.Feldwebel Reinicke, who had lost an arm during the campaign in the West,attacked the batteries, despite their superiority.All by himself, hewas able toshoot an entire battery and two additional guns to pieces. The Panzer III ofFeldwebelMachens(driver:GefreiterKullrich)washitinthedrivesprocketandimmobilized.Thecrewhadtoholdoutinthetankduringthedayandwasunabletobailoutuntilitturneddark.Thetankwasrecoveredduringthenight.Oberleutnant von Brodowski’s 4th Company moved at high speed along a

road that was not on themap directly towards Schlobin. All of the companybrokethroughablockingpositionwithantitankguns,sinceitwasimpossibletoleavetheroad.Asaresult,onetankfollowedtheothertowardsSchlobinandtheincreasingly heavy enemy defensive fires. The Russian guns could barely beidentified.Inaddition,theyhadcamouflagedfightingvehiclesinthehighcornso well that they were not noticed until their fire broke into the company atpointblank range.The firstGerman tankboggeddownand thesecondone ranover amine.The next threewere shot to pieces byRussian fighting vehicles.Theinfantryhadlaggedbehindandwaspreventedfromclosingwiththetanksdue to the long-range artillery fire of the Russians. The Soviets concentratedtheirfiresonthefightingvehiclesofthe4thCompany.Whenithadmovedoutthatmorning, ithad thirteen tanks.Oneafter theotherwasgoingup insmokeandflame.LeutnantvonWedelwaskilled;ashortwhile later,Leutnant Bussefellaswell.OberleutnantvonBrodowskidiedafewdayslaterfromtheburnshereceived. Along with him, twenty-two noncommissioned officers and enlistedpersonnelwere killed. Some of the thirty-six remainingwere badlywounded.

Onlythreetanksreturnedfromthedeathmarchofthe4thCompany.Major Schmidt-Ott ordered his 1st Company forward, which also suffered

severallosses.The1stCompanyprovidedcoveringfiresothattheremnantsofthe4thCompanycoulddisengagefromtheenemy.Individual tanksof the2ndCompanywere also there and took theirwounded comrades onboard, despitethe enemy fire. Once again, it was Feldwebel Reinicke who distinguishedhimself.Hewasthelast to leavethebattlefield.Forhisaggressiveactionsandhis already demonstrated performance, the Feldwebel received the Knight’sCross.28

Bynoonon that “black” day, the I./Panzer-Regiment6 had lost twenty-twofighting vehicles, half of its inventory. The loss could not be balanced by thedestruction of nineteen Russian fighting vehicles, twenty-one guns, twoantiaircraft guns, and thirteen antitank guns. For the self-sacrificing actions ofhisbattalion,MajorSchmidt-OttwouldlaterreceivementionintheArmyHonorRoll.The2ndBattalionof thearmoredregimentheardthecriesforhelpfromthe

1stBattalionon theradio.OberstleutnantMunzeldecided toattackeastof theembankment, since he could not provide direct support. The 5th Company(OberleutnantJaroschvonSchweder)tookthelead,followedcloselybythe7thand 8thCompanies.BetweenTertesch and the railway line, the lead companywas able toknockout four enemybatteries, one tank and three antitankguns.The 5th and 7th Companies then covered the advance of the 8th Company(LeutnantDr.Köhler)byleapfrogging.The8thCompanyenteredthecityfromthe flank and advanced by surprise all theway to the bridge over theDnjepr.Nonetheless, theenemywasabletoblowitupinthenickoftime.Thatmeantthat a lot of Russians were also still in the city. With his six Panzer IV’s,LeutnantDr.Köhlerwasabletodestroyatotaloftwenty-twoRussiantanks,twoantitankguns,andonearmoredtrain.ThatmeantthatthedangerofanadvancebystrongforcesfromSchlobinwasthwartedforthetimebeing.At 0300 hours during the night, the armored regiment sent its recovery

platoon out onto the battlefield, covered by the regimental light platoon, toevacuate its shot-up fightingvehicles.Thework lasted through the entire nextday.Themenof themaintenancefacilityand themaintenancesectionsdidnotgetanyrest.LeutnantJacobs,whocoveredtherecoveryoperationswithhislightplatoon,shotupanadditionalfourenemyantitankguns.On7July,thedivisiontransitionedtoascreeningmissionalongtheriver.The

divisioncommandpostwasmovedfromStrenkibacktotheschoolinBronnoje.Sinceitwasanticipatedtheenemywouldcontinuehisefforts tobreakthroughandtheeventsofthelastfewdayshadproventhedangerposedbytheenemy—theleadelementsoftheSovietforceshadapproachedveryclosetothequartersofthedivision’squartermastersection(Hauptmanni.G.Barth)—securityaroundthecommandpostwasboastedby two securitygroupsunder thecommandofUnteroffizier Luft andUnteroffizier Junick. That was in addition to the rifleplatoonandantitankplatoonalreadythere.The armored regiment was designated the division’s reserve; it located its

commandpostinthevillageofOsseniki.HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski’s3rdBattalion was positioned forward in the area between the Drut and Dnjepr,however, and kept in a state of readiness. Schützen-Regiment 3 assumedresponsibilityforguardingalongtheriver.Thenextnight,duringthatmission,the 3rd Companywas able to eliminate an officer patrol of tenmen that hadinfiltrated.The2ndCompanyofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionreconnoiteredsouthinthedirectionofSchlobin.Thenorthernportionofthatlocalitywasclearoftheenemy,butthesouthernhalfwasheldbytheRussians.Oberstleutnant Audörsch’s Schützen-Regiment 394 remained in the

bridgeheadatSborowo,alongwithitsattachedantitankelements,engineersandforward observers. As it started to turn dark, the first squads started crossingbackovertheriverinpneumaticcraft.Theregimentgraduallydisengagedformthe enemy, starting with its 1st Battalion. The heroic days of fighting inSborowo,whichhadseentheregimenttakemanycasualties,wasacknowledgedby the inclusionofMajorDr.Müller in theArmyHonorRollon9September1941,followedbyFeldwebelReiss(3rdCompany)on29September1941.Theregiment continued its retrograde movements out of the bridgehead. The 1stBattalion was employed screening north of Rogatschew along the river. TheRussianartillerytookthemovementsunderfire,withthecompaniestakingsomelosses.On9Julyalone,therewereeightdead.Thedailyeventsof theotherdivisionalelementsdidnotchangemuch.The

outpost lines were reinforced, wherever that appeared necessary, and eitherpushed forward or pulled back, as deemed appropriate. The II./Schützen-Regiment 3 was positioned northwest of Schlobin. Since the Russians werefeeling their way forward against the battalion’s lines with fairly strongelements, thebattalionwas reinforced in theafternoonbya reinforcedplatoon(heavymachinegunsandmortars) fromthe1stBattalion’s2ndCompany.The

platoon leaderwasLeutnantSchuppius.Thosereinforcementswerefollowedashortwhilelaterbyaplatoonfromthe2ndCompanyofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543. On that day, the 2nd Battalion suffered two dead and five wounded,includingOberleutnantvonBismarck,thecommanderofthe10thCompany.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3hadbeeninitsscreeningpositionsfordays.They

were constantly being covered by enemy artillery fire. Unteroffizier Elven’ssquadfromthe2ndCompany,whichwaspostedfartothefront,wasstuckinapathofthickwoodsforforty-eighthourswithoutrelief.During themorning hours of 9 July, awarning orderwas received that the

divisionwouldbepulledoutofthatsectorofthefront,withitspositionsbeingassumedbythe1.Kavallerie-Division.Itwasextremelyhotthatday.Asitturnednight,thenon-essentialvehiclesandequipmentoftheregiments

was sentback to the rear area.Oneafter theother, thecompaniespulledbackfrom their positions when the advance parties of the 1. Kavallerie-Divisionarrived. Strong security forces from Schützen-Regiment 394, the divisionalartilleryandthe3rdBattalionofthearmoredregimentremainedinandaroundRogatschew. The relief-in-place continued the next day. The I./Schützen-Regiment3andtheII./Panzer-Regiment6weredesignatedasthecorpsreserve.TheyturnedhardtothenortheasteastofBrobruiskandmarchedinthedirectionofSbyschin.On the previous day, Generalmajor Freiherr von Langermann und

Erlenkamp’s4.Panzer-DivisionhadattackedtheRussianfortificationsnortheastofBrobruisk.Theenemy’s resistance therewas in theprocessof fallingapart.Thecorpsidentifiedaweakspotintheenemy’sfrontageandearmarkedthe3.Panzer-Division to break through.Thatwas the reason for the relief by the1.Kavallerie-Division aroundRogatschew.The3. Panzer-Division assembled itsforces in the fields east ofBrobruisk, and the divisional engineers took downtheirbridgeovertheDubysna.Thatsameday,MajorHaas,anewtransferintothedivision,wasgivencommandoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394.Hereplacedthe acting commander, Hauptmann Pape, who had earned the trust andconfidenceofthebattalion’smenduringtheshorttimehehadbeenincommand.For the 3. Panzer-Division, this signaled the end of the first phase of its

employment in the East. In an incomparable advance, the division hadconqueredboththeenemyandtheterrain.TheSovietsoldierhadprovenhimselftobeanextraordinarily tough, cleaverandcraftyopponent.Thebloody lossessustainedwere painful; themateriel losses considerable. For instance,Panzer-

Regiment 6, which had started the campaign with 210 operational tanks, hadonly153operationalon9July.

__________________1.97thEngineerBattalion(RoadConstruction).2.ThiswasthesameLuftwaffeassetthathadsupportedthedivisioninFrance.3.Atthetime,theofficialdesignationofthebattalionwasPionier-BataillonSS-DivisionReich.4.1stCompanyofthe503rdEngineerBattalion(Bicycle),anothercorpsasset.Thisformationusedbicyclesasitsmeansoftransport.5. The 10th Engineer Battalion was the combat engineer battalion of the 10.Infanterie-Division(mot.),whichwasbeingheldbackasthecorpsreadyreserve.For a forced river-crossing operation, the engineer battalions of the forces notimmediately committed to the forced crossingwere usually attached in directsupportoftheleadforces.6.Thesearecorpsbridgingassets.7. A separate antitank battalion equipped with three companies of nine 4.7-centimeterself-propelledCzech-builtantitankguns.8.ThiswasaLuftwaffe formation. Itwasoriginallyanantiaircraftbattalion inthe Austrian military before its assimilation into the Wehrmacht after theAnschlußin1938.9. Flak-Regiment 11 was also the Luftwaffe antiaircraft formation in directsupportofthedivision.10.Aseparateantiaircraftbattalion.11.Artillerie-Kommando=ArtilleryCommand.12.Fromthedivisionalartilleryofthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.).13. Part of a separate regiment whose battalions effectively acted as separatebattalions. Apparently, the battalion had three horse-drawn heavy howitzerbatteriesatthestartofthecampaign.14. Part of a separate regiment,whose battalions effectively acted as separatebattalions. Apparently, the battalion had three heavy howitzer batteries at the

startofthecampaign15. The official designation of the battalion was schwere Artillerie-Abteilung604.Itconsistedofthreebatteriesof21-centimetercannon.16. Part of a separate regiment whose battalions effectively acted as separatebattalions.Apparently, thebattalionhad threemotorized10-centimeter cannonbatteriesatthestartofthecampaign.17. This was strictly a command-and-control entity and had no organic linebattalionsassignedtoit.18. InApril 1942, this flash-and sound-ranging batterywas consolidatedwiththe divisional artillery of the 3. Panzer-Division and redesignated asBeobachtungs-Batterie(Panzer)75.ThePanzerinthedesignationindicatesthatthe battery was issued SPW’s to help accomplish its mission when observerswentupfront.19.ThemediumvehiclewasbasedonthePanzerIIIchassis.Itsturretwasfixedin place and main gun removed to accommodate more radio equipment. AdummygunwasplacedonthemantlettosimulateanormalPanzerIII.Theonlyclose-in defensive weapons a Panzerbefehlswagen III had were the on-boardmachine guns. The light vehicle was based on the Panzer I chassis with theturretremovedandfixedsuperstructureadded.Thelattervehiclewasonlyusedforfront-linedutiesduringtheinitialstagesofthecampaign.20. Times given in the narrative are official German military time(correspondingtothetimeinBerlin)andthustwohoursearlierthanlocalSoviettime.21.Temporarybarricadesusuallyconstructedfromwoodandstrungwithbarbedwire.22. GustavAlbrecht Schmidt-Ott was one of the first recipients of the newlycreatedGermanCross inGoldon18October1941.Hewenton toreceive theKnight’sCrossof the IronCrosson3October1942as anOberstleutnantandacting commander of the regiment.Although this narrative spells his name asSchmid,mostaccountsgiveitasSchmidt.23.Thisisalso“TankRoute1.”TheoriginalGermanusesRollbahn,whichcanoftenhaveavarietyofmeanings,eveninthesamecontext,suchasroad,routeofadvance,andmainsupplyroute.24.VonWerthernreceivedtheKnight’sCrosson8September1941.HeendedthewarasanOberstleutnantandwentontoserveintheBundeswehr,whereheretired as an Oberstleutnant. He passed away on 10 January 2001 in

Großhansdorf(Hamburg).25.Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 79 was the engineer battalion of the 4. Panzer-Division.26.ThiswasJagdgeschwader(JG)51.27.ThedivisionhadjustcompleteditstransitiontoamotorizedformationpriortothestartofBarbarossa.Aswastypicalwiththeearly-warmotorizedinfantrydivisions, itdidnothaveanorganic tankformation.At the timeof theactionsdescribedhere,thedivisionhadtwomotorizedrifleregiments(20thand41st),amotorcycle battalion (40th), a motorized reconnaissance battalion (10th), amotorized artillery regiment (10th), an antitank battalion (10th), a motorizedengineerbattalion(10th),andthenormaldivisionaltroops.28.GerhardReinickewassubmittedfortheawardon3Julyandreceivediton9July.Bytheendofthewar,hewasaLeutnant.HepassedawayinViersenon4July1997.

AmarchhaltalongaPolishcountryroad.Thevehiclesaremaintainingathirty-meterintervalandparkedundertreesasconcealmentagainstaerialobservation.

CamplifewithinSchützen-Regiment394atRadzyn.Fromlefttoright:OberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthern,OberstleutnantAudörsch,MajorKratzenberg,LeutnantHildebrand,andHauptmannSchmidt.

ThefirstvehiclesofthedivisionarriveatKoden,alongtheBug.Theborderhasbeenreached.

ThefirstcapturedSovietsmovebackoverthebridgeovertheBugatKoden,whichwascapturedintactbytheengineersinacoupdemain.

Ontheveryfirstdayofthecampaign,motorcyclesweregettingstuckalongthesandymarchroutesofthedivisioneastoftheBug.

Marsh,marsh,andmoremarsh—by22June,alreadythemostdangerous“opponent”ofthe3.Panzer-Division.

Theadvancewasinitiatedon23June:ontheroadtoKobryn.

Theknocked-outSd.Kfz.263armoredradiocarofthedivisioncommanderinfrontofthebridgeatSzczara.GeneralleutnantModelwasnotinjured.

ObservationpostonthehighbanksoftheSzczara.AtthescissorsscopeisMajorKratzenberg;tohisrightisMajorDr.Weißenbruch,thecommanderoftheIII./Artillerie-Regiment75.

AprovisionalspanhasbeenputinplaceovertheSzczarabyPionier-Bataillon39.

Thecommanderinchiefofthearmoredgroup,GeneraloberstGuderian,visitsthedivisionandisbriefedbyGeneralleutnantModel.

GeneralleutnantModeltalkstothecommanderoftheleadtankcompany,OberleutnantBuchterkirch.NexttoModelareMajorBeigelandLeutnantvondemKnesebeck.

AshorthaltamongtheleadelementsduringtheadvanceonSluzk.

MajorSchmidt-Ott,thecommanderoftheI./Panzer-Regiment6,withOberleutnantBuchterkirch.

TheI./Schützen-Regiment394attacksSluzk.

Themainclearingstationofthe1stMedicalCompanyinSluzk.

InthewoodsnearKalita.GeneralleutnantModeldiscussesthesituationwithMajorSchmidt-Ott.

TheBeresinaisreached.Hereistheblown-upbridgeatBrobruisk.

The1./Schützen-Regiment394crossesthepontoonbridgeovertheBeresina.

MajorBeigel,thecommanderofPionier-Bataillon39(seenhereasanOberst).ForhispartinthecaptureofthebridgesovertheSzczara,hewasawardedtheKnight’sCross.

FeldwebelGerhardReinicke,aplatoonleaderinthe2./Panzer-Regiment6,receivestheKnight’sCrossfromGeneralleutnantModelandhiscompanycommander,OberleutnantBuchterkirch(9July1941).

OberfeldwebelBlaichofthe12./Panzer-Regiment6wasawardedtheKnight’sCrossforhisactionsalongtheDrutatRogatschew.Fromlefttoright:FeldwebelGroß,LeutnantHeuer,OberfeldwebelBlaich,

OberleutnantHirschmann,andOberfeldwebelHass.

CHAPTER9

FromtheDnjeprtotheDessna:BreakingthroughtheStalinLine

The3.Panzer-DivisionhaddisengagedfromitsDnjeprpositionsatRogatschewwithitslastelementsby11July1941.ItwaslocatedinastagingareasouthofMogilew.Therewasn’tmuch time to rest,however.Thefree timewasused tocatch“fortywinks,”as longas theswarmsofmosquitoswerenotbuzzing toowildlyorRussiansthathadbeenflushedoutcamerunningby.At 1645 hours, the division formed a battle group from elements of both

brigadesunderthecommandofOberstvonManteuffel,whoreceivedorderstoattackMogilew.Thedesignatedbattalionsanddetachmentsmovedfarthernorthand behindKradschützen-Bataillon 40 (10. Infanterie-Division [mot.]), whichwasinpositionthere.TheRussianswereveryactiveandwereintheprocessofconducting an immediate counterattack against Nowaja Leschnewka. The1./Schützen-Regiment 3 (Oberleutnant von Zitzewitz) was immediatelyemployed against it. The riflemen advanced several kilometers to the north intheirarmoredersonnelcarriersandwereabletotakeSsolanowkaat1930hours.At 1800 hours, Generalleutnant Model discussed the attack on Mogilew

(population:99,000)withhiscommanders.Kampfgruppe vonManteuffel moved into its designated staging areas. The

Oberst placed his command post on the road 400 meters southwest ofMashissjadki. The commanders of the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 (OberstleutnantMunzel)andPanzerjäger-Abteilung521(MajorFrank)reportedinthere,aswellasthecommandersofthe7thand8thCompaniesofPanzer-Regiment6andthecommander of the headquarters company of Schützen-Regiment 3, whosecompany formed the reserve of the Kampfgruppe. The 6./Flak-Regiment 59assumed area defense on both sides of Mashissjadki. The 1./Nachrichten-Abteilung39establishedradiocommunicationswiththeforwardelementsofthedivision. During the day,Pionier-Bataillon 39 employed all of its companiesclearing the heavily mined terrain and completed its construction of a bridgeover theLechwa.Themainclearingstationwassetupbybothof themedical

companiesinGluchaja-Seliba.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) had themissionof forcing a crossingof the

Dnjepr by using all of its forces. The attached divisionswere given the samemissioninthesectorsassignedtothem.Aspartofthat, the3.Panzer-Divisionwastheleft-wingdivisionanditreceivedadualmission:Protecttheflankofthecorps and take a good and armor-capable crossing point over the Dnjepr atMogilewbyrapidlytakingitanditsbridges.During the night, Artillerie-Regiment 75 brought its batteries into position,

which initiated a short but intense preparation on the Soviet positions right at0300 hours on the morning of 12 July. Shortly afterward, the men ofKampfgruppe von Manteuffel moved out. The initial enemy resistance wasbroken,but then thedifficultyof the terrainand thedefensivepreparednessofthestrongenemyforcesmadeitselffelt.The righthand group under Major Wellmann advanced northeast of

Mashissjadki between the road and the railway line with the 2nd and 3rdCompaniesofSchützen-Regiment3.Againstexpectations,bothcompanieswereabletoquicklytaketherailwaystoppingpointatKrassnitzaandthenmoveoutonSselez.The3rdCompanytookthemeadowlandsbetweenthelocalityandtherailwayline,while the2ndCompanystormedthevillage.Upto thatpoint, the7./Panzer-Regiment6andthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39hadfollowedtheriflemen.Thetanksthentookthelead,swungeastandreachedaroadrunningparalleltotheriver.TheythenboundedfivekilometersnorthtoBunitschiinasinglemove.TheRussians stubbornlydefended thevillageandhademployed theirantitankguns in anespecially skillfulmanner.Despite that, the fightingvehicles rolledthrough,destroyingeightantitankgunsandfivetanksthatcrossedtheirpaths.Atthatpoint, theattackboggeddown.Fortunately,riflemenfromthe2./Schützen-Regiment3showedup.Theyfoughttheirwayintoandthroughthevillagemeterbymeter.Incontrast,the3rdCompanyoftherifleregimenthungfarback,sinceitwasunabletoeliminateenemypocketsofresistancethathadbeenestablishedon the railwaynortheast ofSselez. In fact, theSoviets launchedan immediatecounterattack there, which was turned back with the assistance of the1./Schützen-Regiment3,whichwassentforward.Afternoon,KampfgruppeWellmannmadenoprogressanywhere.Theenemy

atBunitschiturnedactiveagainandputalotofpressureonhis2ndCompany,sinceRussianforcescomingfromtheDnjeprattackedthecompanyintheflank.OberleutnantvonBaumbachwasbadlywoundedanddiedafewhours laterat

themain clearing station. The 3rdCompany lostLeutnant Jobst andLeutnantHaugthroughwounds.Thebattalionradioedtheregimentthatitwasunabletoadvance any more with its own forces and requested tanks and artilleryimmediately.The lefthandKampfgruppeunderHauptmann vonCochenhausen, consisting

of hisKradschützen-Bataillon3, the1./Schützen-Regiment 394, the5./Panzer-Regiment6,the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,andthe11./Schützen-Regiment3,was also initially successfully thatmorning. The tanks, riflemen, and antitankelementsquicklygainedgroundwestoftherailwayline,eventhoughtheyhadhardlyany improvedroadsat theirdisposal.Tscheinowkawas taken.The tankcompany advanced on its own in the open terrain west of the railwayembankment.Thefirsttankthenflewintotheair;asecondonewasalsoquicklyimmobilized.Athirdtanklostatrack,withafourthonesharingthesamefate:mines.Nomatterwhere thefightingvehicles turnedandmoved, theyranoverminesagainandagainandbecameimmobilized.Thecrewswereforcedtobailout, since the enemywas placingwell-aimed antitank-gun fire on the fightingvehicles. TheRussianmachine-gun and antitank-gun fire caused the companyconsiderable casualties. Oberleutnant Jarosch von Schweder and GefreiterSchnellwerekilled;manywerewounded. Inall,elevenfightingvehicleswerelost.Althoughtheremainingtanksprovidedcoveringfire,theyhadtodisengagefrom the enemy. The crew of a knocked-out tank brought back LeutnantHinzpeter, the new acting company commander. Thanks to its timelyappearance,the8./Panzer-Regiment6,whichhadbeencalledforward,wasabletogivepowerfulsupporttothedisengagement.Italsolostafewvehiclesintheminefield,includingthecommander’stank.Bynoon,the2ndBattalionhadlosteighteentanks,withoutmakinganyfurtherprogress.Ashadbeenthecasewiththe1stBattalionatSchlobin,thiswasthisbattalion’s“blackday.”Onlythelightplatoon of the 2nd Battalion was able to make progress, advancing as far asGolynez,fivekilometerswestofMogilew.Atthatpoint,thedivisioncalledofftheunpromisingattackonMogilew.The

1st Battalion of the armor regiment was pushed forward into the area aroundTumanowka,whereitsetupascreeningpositionbyevening.Thatallowedtheregiment’s2ndBattaliontobepulledoutoftheline.Thebattalion’slightplatoonmovedforwardonemoretimetopickupsurvivorsfromthe5thCompanyandtorecover tanks. The remaining elements of Kampfgruppe von Manteuffel alsopulled back. The I./Schützen-Regiment 3 reached a line running from t herailway embankment to the southern edge of Sselez to the northern edge of

Ssoltanowkaby1800hours.ThemotorcycleinfantrybattalionjoinedthetankersatTumanowkainscreening.The harshness of the fighting can be demonstrated in the experience of

Assistenzarzt Dr. Türk (Schützen-Regiment 394). That evening, he wanted torecover fourwounded from the 1st Company,whowere lying in front of thepositions.Togetherwithtenvolunteers,hemovedforwardinanSPWasitturneddark.TheRussiansgotwindofthemovement,buttheywereunabletodetertheGoodSamaritans.Themedics found their comradesdead.Theywere lyingontheground,disfigured,strippedandplundered.Theyhadbeenfinishedoffwitharoundtothebackofthehead.The twelfth of July endedwith a setback for the division. Itwas only after

severaldaysoffightingthatanentirecorpswasfinallyabletotakeMogilew.Bycontrast, however, the neighboring division hadmore success. The4. Panzer-Division succeeded in taking an intact wooden bridge over the river at Star-Bychow and forming a bridgehead over the Dnjepr. The engineers thenconstructeda120-meter-longbridgesothattheattackingforcescouldremainontheheelsoftheenemy.The division was directed to hold a screening line along the Lechwa until

relieved, while sending some of its forces into the sector of the 4. Panzer-Divisionthatsamenight.The3rdBattalionofthearmorregimentarrivedeastofStar-Bychowandwasdesignatedasthecorpsreserve.Thebattlestaffofthe3.Panzer-Division marched south and bivouacked at Poplawschtschina around0330hours.Atthesametime,OberstleutnantLewinskireceivedorderstohavehisarmorregiment,supportedbyelementsofartilleryandFlak, tobepreparedto move out for operations. Those orders were delayed until 0415 hours.Lewinski’sforcesthenwaitedfortwohoursontheroadtoBrobruisk,beforetheapproach march southeast to Star-Bychow commenced along the deep, sandyroads.Theriflebrigaderemainedincontactwiththeenemythatnight,buttherewas

nofighting.Atnoon,theRussiansfelttheirwayforwardatSsoltanowkawithalarge assault detachment, but it did not allow itself to be decisively engaged.Elements fromthe1.Kavallerie-Division startedarrivingafter1500hours andrelieved the last remaining elements of the3.Panzer-Division by 1945 hours,whichmovedoutimmediatelytocatchupwiththedivision.ItwasSunday,13July1941.Thedaywashotandsunny.Thedivisionmoved

through the completely burned-down Star-Bychow—only the chimneys were

left,inmostinstances—andacrosstheDnjeprwithmostofitsvehicles.Theeastbank of the river, sandy in places and marshy in others, had extensive wireobstacles, tree abatis, wooden bunkers and machine-gun positions extendingseveralkilometersinland.Thedivisionwasinthemiddleoftheso-calledStalinLine,whichhadbeenforcedbythe4.Panzer-Division.That presented the option of takingMogilew,which had been turned into a

fortress, from the east. Itwas directed that the division, togetherwith the10.Infanterie-Division (mot.), attempt that, while Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland”andSS-Division“DasReich”attemptedtoenvelopthecityfrom the north. But those orders were rescinded. Leaving behind screeningelementsorientedonMogilew,theadvancecontinuedeast.Onthat13July, thedivisiondirectedSchützen-Regiment394 toattacknorth

alongtheGomel–Mogilewroad,while thearmorregimentcrossedthatroadtothe east. It bivouacked for the night in theKusskowitschi area,minus its 2ndBattalion,whichwassentforwardtosupportthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.).Therifleregimentinitiateditsattacknorthrightaftercrossingtheriverwithoutalotofpreparation.Its1stBattalionmovedoutonfootinscorchingheat.Itsfirstmissionwasto

relieveInfanterie-Regiment(mot.)41ofthemotorizedinfantrydivisionandthenimmediately advance on Studenka. The riflemen churned their way along thesandypathways—completely exhausted.The enemydidnotgiveupwithout afight.Hisartilleryfiredontheadvancingcompanies.Itwasn’tuntilitstartedtoturn dark that that Soviet fires abated, only to be replaced by hundreds ofswarmsofmosquitoesthatplaguedthemen.The regiment’s 2nd Battalion was inserted into the line next to its sister

battalion. Later on, it provided flank guard along the left at Lykowo. Theriflemen occupied makeshift foxholes and dugouts and defended against theincreasingnumberofattacksbyRussianforcesoverthenextfewdays.Superiornumbersofenemy forcesattackedLykowo thenextmorningandwereable todrivethebattalionoutofthevillageinhardclosecombat.Thebattalionsufferedbloodylosses.The1stBattalionofthearmorregiment,whichwasthelastformationofthe

divisiontoberelievedintheareaaroundMogilew,returnedtotheregiment.Itbroughta reportof successwith it.Acompany from thebattalionhad takenaSoviet armor garrison at Klin, ten kilometers southwest of Mogilew. In theprocess,itwasabletosecureninety-eightlightfightingvehicles.

Thedivisionwasdirected to remainon theenemy’sheels,despite the flankthreat from Mogilew. Since not all of the division’s forces were across theDnjeprtotheeast,thedivisionattackedwiththebattalionsithadatitsdisposal.Continuing in the leadwasOberstleutnantAudörsch’sSchützen-Regiment394.Early on 14 July, there was an orders conference in the woods east ofSsidorowitschi.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 wasattached to Major Haas’s I./Schützen-Regiment 394. Also in support wereelementsofMajorFrank’sPanzerjäger-Abteilung521.Theorder:Attack!Theriflemenmountedthefightingvehiclesandmovedout.OberstKleemann

was in charge of the battle group, which was churning its way through thepracticallyprimevalandforestedterrain.Kostinkawastaken.Intheprocess,thetankscompaniessucceededinshootingaSovietartillerypositiontobits.Whenthe column then turned toward the Mogilew–Tschaussy road, the enemyresistancesuddenlygrewstronger.TheSovietswerepositionedindeepdugouts.Theyletthetanksandmotorizedelementspass,beforetheyruthlesslyambushedindividual vehicles. During one of those attacks, the commander of the 3rdCompanyoftheantitankbattalion,OberleutnantHeld,waskilled.The casualties increased by the hour. Major Dr. Müller’s II./Schützen-

Regiment 394 had an especially tough time of it, while enduring the hardfighting in theLykowoarea as a flankguard.The7thCompany lost all of itsofficers.Despitebeingwounded,UnteroffizierBeckerassumedcommandofthecompanyandralliedthemenforwardinanimmediatecounterattack.Bydoingso, itwaspossible tosealoff theenemypenetrationanddrive theSovietsout.The regiment sent up the 3rd Company as reinforcements. During theemployment of Oberleutnant Freiherr von Werthern’s company, he waswoundedagain, this time in theshoulder.LeutnantSchulz,whohadbeenwiththebattaliononeday,waskilled.VonWerthern’smensavedthesituation.Lateron, Becker1 was awarded the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross. Therecommendationread,inpart:“Onhisowninitiativeandafterbeingwoundedinthe head, he took charge of themechanized infantry, who had been renderedleaderlessbythelossofalloftheofficers,inanengagementinthewoodssouthof Mogilew. By means of an immediate counterattack, he prevented thepenetrationof theenemyand theencirclementofhisowncompanyaswellastheattachedunits.”Theattackeastrolledon.GeneralleutnantModelwentforwardwithhisbattle

staff at 1100 hours and had his command post established in Amchowaja, a

“street” village.2 The armor regiment followed the attack spearhead. Theadvance did not proceed smoothly, since enemy-occupiedMogilew forced theuseof secondary roads far to theeastof thecity.By then,however, allof thedivisionalelementshadclosedup.ThedivisionstillneededtoprotectitsflankinthedirectionofMogilew.The

Sovietsattemptedseveralattacksfromthatdirectionduringtheday.Individualvehicles and bogged down vehicles were the targets of enemy assaultdetachments.Intheafternoon,theRussiansattackedfromthedirectionofLipez.ThearmorregimentprovidedtwoPanzerIV’sandonePanzerII toprotect themoving columns. At the cemetery to the south of the village, the fightingvehicleswereable to turnback twoSoviet rifle companies, aswell asdestroytwogunsanda fewmortars.Thearmor regiment itselfwasambushedat1730hours.Thetankshadtopivotonnarrowpaths.Thatledtostoppagesalongtheroute, since other columns were rolling forward. Several Russian fighter-bombers joined in the fray, bombing and strafing, but they only causedminorcasualties.Schützen-Regiment 3 was brought forward as soon as possible. It screened

north and west in the area around Kostinka. The regiment’s 1st Battalion, inconjunction with the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, was finally able to retakeLykowoinanimmediatecounterattack.Thateliminatedthethreattotheflanksforthetimebeing.Thenalloftheformationsofthedivisionturnedeast.Theyhad to cross a long stretch ofmarshland.Sections of corduroy roadhad to bebuilt, which delayed rapid movement. Correspondingly, the riflemen did notarrive in Amchowaja until midnight, where the division set up an all-rounddefensetoprotectitselfagainstanyenemyattack.Inthemorning,at0500hours,aconferencewasheldtodiscussthecontinued

advance.ThedivisionformedabattlegroupunderOberstleutnantvonLewinski.ItconsistedoftheI.and9./Panzer-Regiment6andthe2ndBattalionofeachoftherifle regiments.MajorHaas’s I./Schützen-Regiment394movedoutat0800hourstoattackKutjna,whichwastakensurprisinglyrapidly.Thecasualtieswereslight,butthemenwereexhaustedafterreachingtheobjective.Thebattalion’s3rdCompanywasemployedtoscreentotherear,inthedirectionofMogilew.Kampfgruppe Lewinski started its attack at 0940 after a short artillery

preparation by the batteries. The 2nd and 4th Companies of the armoredregimentmoveddirectlyalongtheroad,whilethe1stand9thCompaniesmovedto the right.The riflemenweremountedupon the fightingvehicles located to

therear.TheRussiansknewwhatwasatstakeanddefendedwithallthemeansat their disposal, especially along the flank exposed to Mogilew. Despite theenemy’s defensive efforts, the German forces reached the Dubrowka–Kutjnaroad twohours later.Up to thatpoint, the I./Panzer-Regiment6 haddestroyedfour T-26’s,3 two guns, and ten antitank guns. Oberstleutnant von Lewinskidecidedtocontinue theadvance toWolkowitshi toensure that thesuccesswasnottemporary.Afteranhourofmovingandfighting,thatvillagewastakenandcontactwasestablishedwiththe4.Panzer-Division,whichwasattackingfromthesouth.Atthesametime,the9./Panzer-Regiment6wasabletoadvanceasfarasthepositionsofthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.),whereitscreenedfromthehigh ground. During a reconnaissance-in-force, the armor regiment’s lightplatooneliminatedtwoenemy15-centimetergunsinthethickwoods.The rifle brigade had moved out directly to the east from the area around

Mogilew to attack in the direction of Tschaussy. The armored cars andmotorcyclesof the reconnaissancebattalion took the lead, followedcloselybytheSPW’softhe1./Schützen-Regiment3.Therestoftherifleregimentfollowed,along with the attached engineers, antitank elements and artillery. The 2ndCompany of the divisional engineers improved roads and trails in the areaaroundGarbowitschi.To support it in its efforts, the1stBridgingSectionwaspushed forward to Amchowaja and employed by Oberleutnant Weyler.Seljonaja-Roschtschawastakenaswell,butthentherapidattackboggeddown.Enemyresistancehadgrownstrongerandwasexertingpressure,especiallyonthe flanks, where the motorcycle infantry battalion and the II./Schützen-Regiment394werescreening.Bothbattalionsregisteredconsiderablecasualties.Oberst Ries’s divisional artillery fired an artillery preparation onTschaussy

andidentifiedenemypositionsat0430hoursthatmadeupforitsshortnessbyitsintensity.Theenemyseemedtobecompletelysurprisedbytheonsetofsuddenartilleryfireduringthatearlymorningareaandrepliedwithonlyafewrounds.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3attackedthevillagewhilestillbeingcoveredbytheartilleryandwasabletoreportitscapturetothedivisionby0500hours.Theriflemenadvancedthroughthestreetsandontowardsthebridgeoverthe

Bassja, but it was blown up just before it could be reached. The companiesboggeddown,sincetheenemy’sdefensivefiresfromthefarbankincreasedinintensity as it grew lighter. A few tanks from the 3rd Battalion were pushedforward and reconnoitered a ford through the watercourse. The riflemenimmediatelymountedup,andtwotanksrolledintothewater.Thefirstoneran

overamine,andthesecondonewassoimpededbyheavymachine-gunfirethatanyfurtheradvancewasprevented.Acrossingtherehadtobeabandoned.Thedivisionwantedtogetacrossthatriver,however.Tothatend,thearmor

regimentformedabattlegroupunderOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ottaround1100hours.Itconsistedofthe2ndCompany,halfofthe4thandtheengineerandlightplatoons of the 1st Battalion. It was directed to take the railway bridge sixkilometers south of Tschaussy and establish a bridgehead there. TheRussiansputupanunexpectedlystrongdefenseagainsttheapproachingtanks,whichwasespeciallytougharoundtheTschaussyrailstation.Thefightingvehicleshadtofighttheirwayforward,meter-by-meter.Whenthetanksfinallyoccupiedtherailstation,theyhadknockedoutatotaloffourteenguns,sevenantitankguns,andthreeT-26’s.Whiletheleadelementsofthedivisionthatwerepointedeastwereconstantly

gettinginvolvedinengagements,theelementsthatwerescreeningtothenorth,west and south were not being spared enemy attacks and breakout attemptseither. All of Schützen-Regiment 394 was employed along the road in ascreeningmission,aswas the2ndBattalionof thearmor regiment,whichwasscreening west at Petrowitschi. The division’s columns rolled slowly in thedirection of Tschaussy under the protection of those two formations. ThedivisioncommandpostwasmovedintotheparkinTschaussythatafternoon.The fighting had entered a new phase by then. Reconnaissance reported at

1400hoursthattheenemywasstartingtoevacuatethefarsideoftheriver.Thedivision immediately ordered Schützen-Regiment 3 to pursue. Two engineerSPW’s arrivedwith ditchingbeams; the regiment’s 2ndCompany immediatelystarted crossing over them, while the other companies of the 1st BattalionmountedupontheirvehiclesandfordedtheBassja.Theythenreachedasecondbridgeandestablishedasmallbridgehead.Thedivisionexploiteditschanceandimmediately ordered an expansion of the position that had been won.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 and elements of themotorcycle infantrybattalionunderHauptmann Pape crossed over andmovedout immediately. The two battalions got as far as Putjki, which was reachedaround1900hours.In themeantime,Kampfgruppe Schmidt-Ott had also made progress to the

south.Itwasabletooccupytherailwaybridgearound1800hours.Theengineerand light platoons, as well as an additional light platoon from one of thecompanies, formed a bridgehead there. The enemy, who was slow to launch

immediate counterattacks, was turned back everywhere he appeared. At 2130hours, orders arrived to evacuate the position, since the division no longerneededthebridgeforitscontinuedadvance.On the other hand,Major Beigel’s divisional engineers erected a bridge at

Tschaussy.Thebridgewasstartedat1300hours,butitwasnotcompleteduntilaroundmidnight.Twospanswereputdown,one19.2meterslong,theother14.4meters. The construction was delayed by the need to construct a provisionalmiddlesupportoutofbeams.The division ordered a continuation of the advancewhile itwas still night.

Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, and the III./Panzer-Regiment 6 formed the advance guard. They moved out from Putjki at 0730hours.Thehotsummerweatherofthepreviousdayhadturnedtoalightrainfall.Despitethat,theadvancemovedrapidly,withonlyenemyartilleryfirecausingoccasional delays. The enemy’s resistance did not stiffen until just outside ofMoljatitschi.Themotorcycleinfantryandreconnaissancebattalionspreparedtoattackfrom

thenorth.The riflebrigadepushed the I./Schützen-Regiment3 forward,whichwasdirectedtoassault thevillagefromthesouth.Inthefaceof thosesuperiornumbers, the Soviets soon vacated the area. The motorcycle infantry andreconnaissanceforcespursuedandoccupiedthevillage.Fiveantiaircraftandoneantitankgunwerecapturedinfiringorder.Theriflemenmountedupagainandadvanced to the south. At the railway facilities at Kritschew, the enemy hadestablished field fortifications. His well-aimed artillery fire forced the riflebattaliontoturnofftothenorth.Asitstartedtoturndark,bothofthebattalionsoftheregimentwereabletomakeittotheareaaroundKalninsky.Theadvanceguardofthedivision—stillcomprisedofthemotorcycleinfantry

andreconnaissancebattalionsand the3rdBattalionof thearmoredregiment—did not allow itself to be held up by considerable terrain difficulties, rainshowers and enemy resistance. It reached Starosselje in complete darknessaround 2030 hours. The Ssosh formed a natural barrier there and, since therewerenobridges,theadvanceforthedaycametoahalt.On17July,thedivisiondisengageditslastelementsfromtheencirclementof

Mogilew.Thedivisiongraduallyreassembleditsformations,whichhadmadeitasfarasPutjkiinthePolnaValley.Sincethebridgewouldonlysupportwheeledvehicles, the trackedvehiclesforded theriver.Themarchwashaltedforhourson end, since the route led through marshes and dense woods. Most of the

motorized elements moved into the broad meadow lowlands without beingdisruptedby enemyair activity.Themenused thehalt tobathe in the river, apleasure that they had not enjoyed for some time. The east bank of the riverprovedtobeatankobstacle;itrosesharplyverticallyoutofthewater.At2100hours, the division command post moved forward to Moljatitschi. TheI./Schützen-Regiment 394 rested east of Tschaussy for the night, after itsscreening positions had been assumed by the 2nd Battalion. The II./Panzer-Regiment 6 went to Sabolotje, to the northwest of Tschaussy, leaving its 5thCompanyinPetrowitschitocovertherear.Duringthenight,thearmorregimentwassentforwardtosupporttheadvanceguard.TheeighteenthofJulybroughtdrearyweatherwithit.Everyoneenjoyedthe

coolness, however, compared to the extended heat of the last few days.Unfortunately, the rain turned the roadways into seas of mud andmuck. TheGermansoldiers remarked thatnotonlywere theRussianpeopleagainst thembutthelanditself.At 0230hours, the III./Panzer-Regiment6 was suddenly attacked by strong

Sovietforcesthathadbeenabletoapproachundetectedtowithin150metersofthe battalion in its assembly area at Starosselje.A night fight lasting one andone-halfhoursdeveloped,beforetheenemywasdrivenoff.Inadditiontotwentyinfantrygunsandmachinegunsbeingcaptured,350prisonersweretaken.Duringthecourseoftheday,thedivisionmoveditsforcesuptotheSsosh.In

the area aroundLobkowitschi, it screened along the river.Thatmeant that thevehiclesreceivedashortbreak.Theyhadallbeeninoperationwithoutabreakfor fourweeks and had driven routes and crossed terrain that had never beenintendedforthem.Onlytherear-areaservices,whichwereinKritschew,atownwithproperbrickhousesandfactories,usedtheirtruckstoanyextentthatday.The riflebrigade screened to thenorthandeast,witha few rifle companies

remaining in contactwith the tanks along the fertile banks of the river,whichformedthefrontforthetimebeing.Thereweremanyappletreesinthegardens,alongwithbloominghollyhocksandfirelilies.Inthemeadows,cattle,pigsandsheepcouldbeseen.Thearmoredregimentwasdistributedthroughoutthedivisionsector.The1st

Battalion rested in the Moljatitschi area. The 2nd Battalion had companiesbetween Krotki and Petrowitschi, some eighty kilometers apart. The 9thCompany forded the Ssosh and established a bridgehead at Dubrowka. Thedivisional engineers erected a bridge during the day.Two spanswith supports

andpontoonsweresetupforacombinedtotalof60.8metersandacapacityofsixteentons.Theenemywasunexpectedlyactiveon19Julyandattackedthepositionsof

the4. Panzer-Division at Propoisk, fifty kilometers south of Kritschew, withfighter-bombersandmotorizedformations.TheSovietssucceededinencirclingsomeelements.Thatdivisionhadtouseallofitsforcestoejecttheenemy.The3.Panzer-DivisionreceivedorderstoassumeresponsibilityforthebridgeheadatKritschewfromthe4.Panzer-Division.Intheprocess,advanceguardsfromthereconnaissanceandmotorcycleinfantrybattalionswereabletoestablishanotherbridgeheadeastoftheriveratStarosselje.Lateintheafternoon,theII./Panzer-Regiment6wassentovertheSsoshtoreinforce.Most of the formations of the division remained where they were. The

I./Schützen-Regiment 3 was directed to occupy the bridgehead position, but itwas instead turned off in the direction of Sui, to the north of Kritschew, toscreen. The I./Schützen-Regiment 394, as well as its 11th Company, and theII./Artillerie-Regiment75wereattachedtothe4.Panzer-Division.Togetherwiththose formations, the 4. Panzer-Division formed a strong battle group underOberstEberbach,whichalsohadPanzer-Regiment35,theII./Schützen-Regiment12, and the I./Artillerie-Regiment 103 at its disposal. Eberbachwas given themissionofeliminatingtheenemyforcesthathadbrokenthroughandtoclearthewoods to thenorth.Forall those involved, itwasanuneasynight.Theenemyexploited thedarknessand the rain tosuddenlyappearatplaceswherehewasnot expected.Duringoneof thosenighttime engagements, thedivision liaisonofficer to theXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.),HauptmannBernewitz (fromPanzer-Regiment6),waskilledsouthwestofTscherikoff.That same night, a chapter in the history of the I./Schützen-Regiment 394

started that has to be characterized as “sacrificial.” Just moving somewhereduringthatpitch-blacknightwasanythingotherthanpleasant.Theroutetakento link up with the 4. Panzer-Division led across extremely narrow paths,throughmarshes,overhillsandfieldsandintoextremelydensewoods.OnceatKritschew,themainsupplyroutewasreached,headingwest.TheRussianshadidentifiedthosemovementsandplacedartilleryfireonthebridgeatTscherikoff.Avehiclefromthe5thCompanyreceivedadirecthit.ThebattalionthenfounditselfatthebridgeovertheLobtschanka.Itwastherethatliaisonofficersfromthe4.Panzer-Divisionbrought thefirstspecific reports: thedivisionhad takenPropoisk and was advancing. The 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.), which was

followingbehindthe4.Panzer-Division,wasejectedfromthecity,however.Intheprocess,theSovietsalsosucceededincuttingoffelementsofthe4.Panzer-Divisionfromthemainadvanceroute.KampfgruppeAudörsch’smissionwastorelieve those forces. Once Audörsch arrived at the command post of the 4.Panzer-Division, he was personally briefed by the division commander,Generalleutnant Freiherr von Langermann, and received orders to clear theadvancerouteandthewoodstoitsnorth.The movement to the high forest took place without significant enemy

interference. It that point, the resistance increased. Audörsch issued orders toattack. The enemy defended stubbornly. The 2nd Company reported its firstlosses.Whenthebattalionmedicalvehicleheadedthere,itwasattackedbytheRussians.The driver,Obergefreiter Petersen,was killed;Unterarzt Söntkerathwas badly wounded. Assistenzarzt Dr. Türk, who was in the vicinity,immediately attacked the Soviets, alongwith his driver,ObergefreiterCordes.TheywereabletopushtheSovietsback.The battalion combed through thewoodswith its thick underbrush. Enemy

firewasreceivedfromalldirections.Thesnipersinthetreesmadetheadvanceespeciallydifficult.Despitethat,thewoodswerecleared.Atthatpoint,thebattlegroupwaspositioned in frontofabroadmeadowland thatofferednocoverorconcealment. Ithad tobecrossed,however, since theadvance routehad tobereached before it turned dark. The SPW’s were employed up front. Enemymachine-gunandantitank-gunfirelashedoutattheadvancingcolumnsfromallsides.AnUnteroffizierwasstruckdown.Eventhoughhehimselfwaswounded,Dr.Türksprangforwardwithtwovolunteersandamputatedaleginthemiddleofenemyfire.LeutnantPeterscoveredtheGoodSamaritanworkwithfirefromhismachinegun.OberleutnantBachmann’s11thCompanyespeciallydistinguisheditself.Asa

resultofwell-aimedmachine-gunfire,itwasabletoeliminateanenemybatteryandcausetheSovietpositionstowaver.TheSPW’sandtheriflemenpickedupthetempooftheattackandtooktheRussianposition,whichmeantthatthelastenemy resistance before the advance route had been shattered. Just before itturned dark, the roadwas reached.A company fromPanzer-Regiment 35 wasscreening there. The situation was anything but clear. Everyone was asking:“Who’sencirclingwhom?”A night followed that any living veteran once assigned to the I./Schützen-

Regiment394rememberswithdread.Justbeforefirstlight,therewasaRussian

attackfromthenorth,thatis,fromtheareathattheKampfgruppehadclearedtheprevious afternoon. It seemed focused on the battalion headquarters location.TheRussianswereattemptingtobreakthoughtothesouthtoescapetheirownencirclement.Despite a stiff defense on the part of the battalion, theRussianssucceededinbreakingthrough.Inaddition,thebattalionsufferedalargenumberofdeadandwounded.While the fighting continued during the day both north and south of the

advance route—half of the attached artillery was employed to the north, theotherhalfsouth—itturnedquiettowardtheevening.IncoordinationwithOberstEberbach, the advance routewas evacuatedover thenext fewnights andonlyscreened during the day. When a large Russian column attempted to breakthroughfromthenorthtothesouthduringtheday,itwasshottopiecesbytheartilleryandtheinfantryguns.Numerousprisonersweretakenintheprocess.Duringthetimethebattlegroupwasattachedtothe4.Panzer-Division,itlost

a total of 109 officers and enlisted personnel in dead andwounded.LeutnantJäger, Leutnant Thonneger, Feldwebel Lange, and 37 additionalnoncommissioned officers and men found their last resting place at theregimental cemetery along the Lobtschanka. Oberleutnant Freiherr vonWerthern, Leutnant Steinmüller, and Leutnant Heinz were among the badlywounded.AssistenzarztDr.Türk,whowasonlyslightlywounded,wasable toreturn soon to his battalion, where Sanitätsunteroffizier Dr. Rakowski hadstepped in for him. Dr. Türk, Stabsfeldwebel Voss, andOberfeldwebel EversbecamethefirstmenofthebattaliontobeawardedtheIronCross,FirstClass,intheEast.Thehighcasualtiessufferedcouldnotbeoffsetbythelargenumberofprisonersreportedduringthatoperation(6,000).Even though themain body of the 3. Panzer-Division had remained in the

positionsandbridgeheadsithadwon,ithadnotrested.Ithadtodefendagainstseveral enemy attacks. For instance, Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’sIII./Panzer-Regiment6 beatbacka strongSoviet advanceatSokoljanka in themorning.Theattacksforthedivision,whichhadmoveditscommandpostbacktoGorbatka, to temporarilygoover to thedefense.The II./Panzer-Regiment 6movedforwardfromKrotkitoBereschisstaja,bringingalongthe8thCompany,whichhadbeenleftinTschaussy.Thatevening,theI./Panzer-Regiment6hadtobe employed in an immediate counterattack southwest of Kritschew. TheRussianshadreachedtherearofthe4.Panzer-Divisionthereandwereattackingthatdivision’scommandpost.The1stBattalionwasabletorestorethesituation

bymidnight.The division then issued orders to Hauptmann Engelien’s II./Schützen-

Regiment 3 to advance on Alexandrowka via Rogalnja on the morning of 21July.Thebattalion advancedwith its 6th and8thCompanies to the left of theadvanceroute. ItadvancedpastRogalnjawithpracticallynoenemyresistance.OberleutnantMente’s7thCompanyformedastrongpoint.Theriflemensmokedout several Russians from holes and dugouts, but they also found thirteenGermandeadandthreeburned-outtanks.Afterthetwoleadcompaniesmovedout again, strong enemy forces, reinforced by three fighting vehicles, attackedthe7thCompany.Thecompanyslowlypulledbacktotheroad.Fortunately,theyencounteredtheleadplatoonsofLeutnantTank’s6thCompany,whichhadbeencalledbackbyradio.TheywereabletotaketheRussians,whohadapproachedtowithin150meters,underdevastatingfire.TheSovietsrepeated theirattacksagainst thecrossroadsseveral times.Whentheydidthat,however, theywoundup in flanking fires from the battalion. At that point, the enemy gave up hisefforts.They left the followingbehindon thebattlefield: 108panje carts, 139horses, 13 machine guns, 11 antitank guns, and 250 prisoners. The friendlylosses were ten dead and ten wounded, including Oberfeldwebel Herbst andFeldwebelEdler.The general situation did not clear up the next day, either. The Russians

appeared to be everywhere at once.While ourmotorized columns could onlymovealongroadsandtrails, theenemyunderstoodhowtoestablishhimself inthe woods and disrupt German movements from there. For that reason, thedivisionemployedamassiveeffort toclear thewoodswestofSswadkowitschiin the morning. Under the command of Oberstleutnant von Lewinski,OberstleutnantMunzel’sII./Panzer-Regiment6,MajorWellmann’s I./Schützen-Regiment3,andacompanyfromPanzerjäger-Abteilung521werecommittedtothe undertaking. The tanks set up on the east side of the woods, while theantitankelementspositioned themselveson thewest side.The rifle companiesenteredthewoodsfromthenorthandgraduallyclearedseveralenemyoutpostsandpositions.Itwasatiresomeoperation,sincethewoodswerefairlydenseanda short rain shower made forward progress difficult. By 1800 hours, theoperationwassuccessfullyconcluded.Thespoilsofwarincludedfivegunsandonearmoredcar;250prisonersweretaken.ForMunzel’sbattalionandthe3rdCompanyoftherifleregiment,therewas

no time to rest on laurels. They were employed in a line running

Kusstjokowitschi–Bowankowk, screening to thenorth.Prisoner statementshadindicatedthattheenemyintendedtoconductanattacksouthfromtheareawestofKritschew.Noneof theriflemenor tankersemployed thatnighthad time toreflect that they had prepared to cross the border along the Bug exactly fourweekspreviously.Perhaps thatwaswhat the enemywas thinking of.All of a sudden, around

0200hours,heavyartilleryfirewasplacedonthebridgeheadatKritschewandinthecityproper.Atfirstlight,theRussianriflemenstormedaheadwithaloudbattlecry—Urraah!TheywereunitsfromaRussianairbornebrigade,andtheyfoughtdoggedly.Theformationsofthe4.Panzer-Division,whichwereholdinga bridgehead four kilometers deep and one kilometerwide,were only able toturnbackthedangerousattackwithdifficulty.The3.Panzer-Divisionreceivedarequest for tank support. Since its tank companieswere distributed across theentire front, it was not until 1900 hours that the 7th Company of the armorregimentcouldbesentintotheeasternportionofthebridgehead.The advance stalemated. The divisions of the XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.),

which had ranged far ahead, were now facing an enemy who did not allowhimselftobeintimidatedbytanksanymore.Asaresult,theforwardforceshadto wait for the infantry divisions to close up, so that the rear areas could beclearedoftheenemy,whichwouldthenallowthemotorizeddivisionscompletefreedomtomaneuveragain.ThedivisionreinforceditsoutpostsalongtheSsosh,whilethearmoredbattalionsconductednecessarymaintenance.ThebridgeheadatKritschewcontinued tobeunder enemyartillery fire and

subject to infantry attacks.The7./Panzer-Regiment6 conducted an immediatecounterattackon24July,whichbroughtwithitvaluableenemyinformation.The1./Schützen-Regiment 3 was moved into the bridgehead in the evening toreinforce.General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, who had not had anydirectcontactwith thedivisionover the last fewdays,visitedGeneralleutnantModelforthefirsttimeinthenewpositions.GeneraloberstGuderianarrivedatthedivisioncommandposton26July.By

then,ithadbeenmovedtoLobkowitschi.Thecommanderinchiefexpressedhisgratitude toModel for the performance of the division and congratulated himand Feldwebel Reinicke on receipt of the Knight’s Cross.4 The divisionintelligence officer, Oberleutnant von Schubert, was transferred to thereconnaissancebattalionduring thisperiod tobecomea troopcommander.Hisposition was assumed by the assistant intelligence officer of many years,

OberleutnantvondemKnesebeck,whoseassistant thenbecameLeutnantGrafzuDohna.ThedarknesswasstilloverthewoodswhentheRussianssuddenlylaunched

anattackinbattalionstrengthagainsttheKritschewbridgeheadat0200hourson29July.TheenemysucceededincompletelysurprisingtheGermanoutpostsatSui, crossing the Ssosh and appearing at the outskirts of Kritschew by 0330hours.Thedivisionissuedageneralalert.TheSovietsfocusedtheiradvanceontheareaaround the rail stationand the rail line to itsnorth.Unfortunately, theprisoner collectionpoint for both the3. and4. Panzer-Divisionen was locatedthere.Atthetime,thereweresome10,000prisonersonhand.Thefirstbatchesof prisoners started trying to force their way through to their own attackingforces,whichwereonly400metersawayontheriverbanks.The II./Schützen-Regiment 394 had to pull back from its positions, but the

I./Panzer-Regiment6soonarrivedinsupportandwasabletostabilizethefrontaround Bel-Perwaje. The 2nd Battalion of the armor regiment establishedoutpostseastofGorbatka.Thefightingvehiclesadvancedonlinesoastobettertake the terrain to the front under fire. By then, fighting had also broken outalongtheeastsideofKritschew.Acolorfulmixofdifferentdivisionalelementstookuppositions:antitankelements,Flakgunners,menofthemaintenanceandbakerycompanies, aswell aspersonnel from the fieldpostofficeandprintingsection.TheyfiredwitheverythingtheyhadagainsttheattackingSoviets.When the enemy started to cross the railway embankment to the west, the

lightplatoonof the I./Panzer-Regiment6wasemployedagainsthis flank.Thearmored battalion, minus its 1st Company, then launched an immediatecounterattack towards the railway station at 0420 hours. The 2nd CompanyattackedSui and the4thCompany to itsnorth.The1stCompanyattacked theenemyfromthenorth.TheSovietswereunabletowithstandthepowerfulblow.They had been told before their attack that the division did not have anyammunition or fuel. They fled back to and across the Ssosh. Two hundred ofthemwerecaptured.Thesituation settleddown,and the II./Schützen-Regiment394reoccupiedthepositionsithadlost.The1./Panzer-Regiment6remainedinsupport.Thedivisionhad the rear area searched for scattered enemy elementsand ordered intensive reconnaissance efforts. The 1st Battalions of both rifleregiments combed through the areas in front of their outposts. UnteroffizierElvenandhis seven-manpatrol from the2./Schützen-Regiment3 were able totakeninetyprisonersinthevillageofKurolitschkion30July.Inaddition,they

capturedfourmortarsandthreemachineguns.The finaldaysof Julypassedby“withoutmajor incident” in theoppressive

heatof the summerof1941.Rumors started tocirculate slowly that thepausewouldsoonbeover.Since22June,thedivisionhadtakenthefollowingnumbersof casualties: 148 officers and 2,409 noncommissioned officers and enlistedpersonnel. During the afternoon of 30 July, the division command post wasmovedtoDubrowka.Bythen,thedivisionalengineersandbridgingsectionshaderected a permanent bridge at Starosselje. Gradually, all of the divisionalelements crossed over it, with the exception of the I./Schützen-Regiment 3,which remained behind on the west bank after it had taken over the combat-outpostlineofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalion.Duringtheeveningof31July,theMorsecodeswitcheshammeredaway,the

telephonesrang,andthemotorcyclemessengersofthedivisiondeliveredattackordersfor thenextday.According to thedivisionorder,allofPanzergruppe2was to continue its advance on 1 August. The objective for the corps wasRosslawl. Both armored divisions were being employed against it. The 10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)andthe7.Infanterie-Divisionwereemployedasflankguards.Thedivision’smissionrequiredacrossingovertheOsterandanadvancealongtheKritschew–Rosslawlroad.TherighthandattackgroupwastobeledbyOberstleutnantvonManteuffel,anditconsistedofSchützen-Regiment3andtheIII./Panzer-Regiment 6. The lefthand group was formed from the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 and the I./Panzer-Regiment 6 and was led by OberstleutnantAudörsch.Since thebroadrivervalleyof theSsoshenkaseparated thedivisionfrom the neighboring division to the north, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, theII./Schützen-Regiment 394, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, and Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 positioned behind von Manteuffel’s forces to guard the northernflank.The first of August 1941 promised to be another sunny and warm day.

Punctually, starting at 0345 hours, the divisional artillery fired with all of itstubes on the enemy positions. The German attack was underway. Tanks andpersonnel carriers rattled through meadows, blooming canola fields, and theburning, squalid villages. The entire division was advancing after theI./Schützen-Regiment 3, which was screening from its old positions until themorning, was relieved by Schützen-Regiment 33 (4. Panzer-Division). Onceagain, Generalleutnant Model found himself in the midst of his advancingsoldiers. He ordered his command post in Goljejewka, which was still under

enemyartilleryfire,topreparetomoveat0645hours.Themorning sun streamed over the wide land. The enemy put up a tough

fight. His defense focused around the small village of Bednja, which was ondominant high ground. After a short artillery preparation, OberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott’s I./Panzer-Regiment6 attacked thevillage from thewest and thesouthat the same time, capturing it.Thedivisioncommander arrivedwith thefirst riflemenandhad themen immediatelymountupon thefightingvehicles.Heorderedacontinuationoftheattack.The mood improved by the hour. The men were advancing again.Panzer-

Regiment6startedthenewoffensivewith103fightingvehicles:37PanzerII’s,42PanzerIII’s,16PanzerIV’s,and8commandtanks.Thatwasexactlyhalftheamount of tanks that had crossed the frontier on 22 June. The leading attackcolumnsofthetwobattlegroupslinkedupshortlyafter0800hoursatthebridgeovertheSsoshenkainWabitschewka.Bydoingso,thefirstattackobjectivehadbeen reached.Oberstleutnant Audörsch then took over the lead elements andpressed on to the northeast against StudenezwithSchützen-Regiment 394 andthe I./Panzer-Regiment 6. The enemy defended there; he knew that thestrongpoint prevented the crossing of the German formations over the Oster.Major vonCorvin-Witzbitzki’smotorcycle infantrydetermined that thevillagewas occupied, but that did not deter them from advancing. He pivoted hiscompanies to the southeast. Major Wellmann’s I./Schützen-Regiment 3 wasemployed against thevillage.By1200hours, his 2ndCompanyhad taken thevillage,establishingoutpostsorientedtotheeast.Bythen,themainbodyofthedivisionhadadvancedalongtheroadsleading

southeastfromStudenezandpressedintothewoodedterraininfrontoftheriver.GeneralleutnantModeldirected theattack fromStudenez;Major i.G.Pomtowandthebattlestaffhadfollowedhimthere.ThenextobjectiveforthedivisionwasMikulitschi.Bothofthebattlegroups

formed advance guards, whichwere then set inmarch in the direction of theriver along the two roads. The first units to reach the citywereOberleutnantVopel’s1./Panzer-Regiment6 andLeutnant Schultze’s 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39.The fighting vehicles disregarded the enemy outposts and advanced right intoMikulitschi.Theysoonpositionedthemselvesinfrontofthefirstbridge,whichtheytook.TheRussianshadbrought twolong-barreledcannonintopositionatthesecondbridge,buttheyweresosurprisedbythelightning-fastappearanceofthe tanks that theywereunable togetoffa round.Machine-gunfireandhigh-

explosive rounds kept the crews low.While the fightingvehicles continued toroll,OberstleutnantAudörschappearedwiththe1./Schützen-Regiment394andelements of the engineer battalion. The riflemen and engineers jumped to theground and drove off the bridge guards, who hadwanted to pour fuel on thestructure.Theycapturedthebridge.Ashortwhilelater,anotherdefendedbridgewastakenbyOberleutnantVopel’stankcompanyandtheriflemenofSchützen-Regiment394.LeutnantMöllhoff,acompanyofficerofthe2./Pionier-Bataillon39, contributed magnificently to the operation and later received a by-namemention in the Army Honor Roll. The first bridgehead over the Oster wasformed in the shortest time imaginable by the assaults of all of the forcesemployedinthatarea.Generaloberst Guderian andGeneralleutnantModel arrived up front at the

sametimeatMikulitschi.Theymovedforwardintothebridgeheadandpraisedthe participating tankers and riflemen. As a result of the rapid taking of thebridgehead,anewsituationhaddeveloped,causingtheentire3.Panzer-Divisionto be brought forward into the bridgehead, even though enemy forces stillexisted in thewoods north of the river. According to prisoner statements, forexample, there were strong forces in the woods between Chawrotowka andMikulitschi, including a corps headquarters. Based on that, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, and the 9./Panzer-Regiment 6surroundedthewoodsinordertoclearouttheSovietsinthemorning.At the same time, the 1./Panzer-Regiment 6 received orders to pursue an

enemy column that was pulling back in the direction of Schumjatschi. Thecompanyreachedthecolumn,whichhadbeenreportedbyaerialreconnaissanceandconsistedofseveralbatteries,around1945hoursandshotittopieces.Thefighting vehicles continued to advance and reached the Kritschew–Rosslawlroad,where they established contactwith the lead company of the4. Panzer-Division,whichhadmovedoutfarthertothesouth.Thetankcompanyreturnedtothedivisionaroundmidnight.As it turned dusk, Oberstleutnant von Lewinski ordered Oberstleutnant

Munzel’s II./Panzer-Regiment 6 and elements ofMajor Frank’s Panzerjäger-Abteilung521 tomovefromWabitschewkadirectlysouthwiththeobjectiveoftakingtheKritschew–Rosslawlroad,thusprotectingtherightflankoftheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.).By then, the4.Panzer-Divisionhadbeendirectedeast toattack Rosslawl, which it took later that night in conjunction with the 23.Infanterie-Division.

The first day of attack had brought with it the anticipated results. The 3.Panzer-Divisionwas east of theOster. The7. Infanterie-Division had inserteditselfintothelinetotheright,whilethe4.Panzer-Divisionhadadvancedfarthereast south of the river. The Russian front started to waver, with the enemypulling back to the south. The German command was aware of the enemysituation,withtheresultthatorderswereissuedthatsamenightthathadthe3.Panzer-Divisionstopitseastwardmovementandturndirectlysouth.Tothatend,thedivision engineersweredirected to establish additional provisional bridgesacrosstheriver.On 2 August, the division again formed two battle groups. It continued its

attack at first light from the positions it had taken the previous day.KampfgruppevonManteuffelwascomprisedofSchützen-Regiment3,elementsof the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543.Oberstleutnant Audörsch had command over the I./Schützen-Regiment 394, the I./Panzer-Regiment 6, and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543.Oberstleutnant von Lewinski led a third group, which was composed ofelements of the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, andAufklärungs-Abteilung1.Theremainingdivisionelementsweredividedamongthebattlegroups.Themorningwasverycool,andtheriflemenhadtoputontheirovercoatsfor

the first time.KampfgruppeAudörschmovedout first,withKampfgruppevonManteuffelfollowingassoonastheelementsthathadbeenleftbehindtoclearthewoodsatMikulitschihad rejoinedhis forces.Theobjective forbothbattlegroupswastheKritschew–Rosslawlroad.Thethirdgroupbrokecampat0700hoursandcrossedtheOsteraround1100hours.Towardnoon,thetwobattlegroupsreachedtheroadwiththeirleadelements

andoccupiedsemicirclescreeningpositionsforwardoftheroad.Reconnaissanceefforts directed to the south and southwest encountered strong resistance inplacesandwerecalledoff.Inthecourseofoneofthosepatrols,thelightplatoonofthearmorregimenteliminatedoneenemyartillerypiece.Despiteanenergeticdefense, the III./Panzer-Regiment 6 assaulted Kowaljowka, shortly after the1./Schützen-Regiment3had taken theSovietmortarpositionalong the railwayembankment.Theremainingcompaniesoftherifleregimentscreenedinsupportofthoseoperations,orientingonthedensewoods.Anattackonthosewoodsinthe afternoonhad to be calledoff,when the fightingvehicles got stuck in themarsh.Nonetheless, both battalions ofSchützen-Regiment3 were later able to

combthewoodsandadvanceasfarasalinerunningPotapowka–Jakimowitschi,inconjunctionwith themotorcycle infantrybattalion.The2ndBattalionof therifle regiment encountered the105thCossackRegiment atPodgassan andwasabletotake100Sovietsprisoner.KampfgruppeAudörsch attackedMiloslawitschi,whichhadbeen set on fire

by the withdrawing Russians. Elements of Audörsch’s armored and rifleformations took the village and set up to defend. Any further advance thatafternoonwouldhavebeensenseless,sincecontinuousrainfellstartingat1600hours,whichimmediatelytransformedtheroadsandbywaysintomuck,chokinganymovement.Althoughthenextdaybroughtwithitsunnybutwindyweather,theadvance

was not continued. The division used the time to reinforce its outposts andreorganizeitsforces.Contactwasestablishedwiththeneighboringforces.Intheprocess,Infanterie-Regiment19(7.Infanterie-Division)relievedelementsofthearmor regiment.The2ndBattalionof thearmored regimentwasdesignatedasthe sector reserve, with only its 7th Company remaining in contact with theenemyatSklimin.Earlyinthemorning, therewereengagementswithRussianriflemen in front of the sector of the 7. Infanterie-Division (halfway toKritschew).The armored regiment’s light platoonwas sent to the area aroundChotowisch,GanowkaandJegorowskajainsupport.The10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)wasinsertedintothelinetotheleftofthe

3.Panzer-Division,withtheresultthatthecorpswasabletoestablishafronttothesouthoftheOsterbytheeveningof3August.Themostdangerousspotwason the right wing, since the German forces were jutting far into the enemypositions,whichwerestilltothewestalongtheSsosh.TheXII.andXIII.Armee-Korps were gradually closing up there with their infantry divisions. Thecommandpostofthe3.Panzer-DivisionwasinSwentschatka.Withtheapproachoftheinfantrycorps,therightflankofthearmoredgroup

started tostabilize.Thedivision’s riflebrigadewaspulledoutof the lineon4August.Byevening,both regimentshadcrossedbackover theOster,with theexception of their rearguards. They set up camp on both sides of theMiloslawitschi–Mikulitschiroad.Therestofthedivisionpulledbackacrosson5August.Ofcourse,thewithdrawalsdidnotalltakeplacewithoutahitch.Oberleutnant

Klöber’s 7./Panzer-Regiment 6 attacked Titowka on themorning of 4 Augustand took in eighty prisoners. During that action, Oberleutnant Freiherr von

Bernewitzwaskilled.HehadbeenassignedtotheregimentfromtheoperationssectionoftheArmyHighCommandjusttwoweekspreviouslyforsomefront-line experience. During the withdrawals, Panzer-Regiment 6, along withPanzerjäger-Abteilung521andthedivisionalreconnaissancebattalion,screenedforthewithdrawingriflemen.Thenextday,5August,theIII./Panzer-Regiment6wasattachedtothe7.Infanterie-Division,since itwasfearedtheenemywasgoingtoattackinthatsector.On6August,thearmorregimentleftitsscreeningpositions and pulled back across the Oster by noon. Only OberstleutnantMunzel’s2ndBattalionwas turnedaroundshortlybeforecrossing; itwaskeptonthefarsideoftheriverasacorsetstayfortheinfantrystillthere.Bythen,theriflemenwere resting in the assignedbilleting areas.During that period, some700menshowedupforthedivisionasreplacements.TheirtrainshaddepartedGroß-Borntendayspreviously.Duringtheeveningof6August,theRussianslaunchedafairlystrongattack

againsttheroadatJanowskaja-Buda.Thedivisionalerteditsforcesimmediately.Therestingforcesdidnotneedtorespond,however.The8./Panzer-Regiment6,alongwith a reserve company from the7. Infanterie-Division, had interdictedtheenemyadvanceonthesouthbankoftheriverandrestoredthesituation.Exactly twenty-four hours later, the enemy repeated the same attack. This

time, he was able to break through the infantry lines. He encountered theII./Panzer-Regiment6atSchesterowka.Afterhoursoffighting,theenemygaveup,leavingbehind110prisoners.OberleutnantKlöber’stankcompanypursuedthewithdrawingenemyintheearlymorninghours,occupyingHill203.8,whereInfanterie-Regiment61 thenduginagainfor thesecondtimeinasmanydays.The 3. Panzer-Division, the 4. Panzer-Division, the 10. Infanterie-Division(mot.),andthe7.Infanterie-Divisionwereallpositionedsouthof theriverandhad driven a wedge into his front. The corps decided to capitalize on itsadvantagebylaunchingauniformattacktothewest.ItwasintendedtotearopentheSoviet front and cause it to collapse.On7August, the3.Panzer-DivisioncommittedaraidingpartyunderMajorFrank,whichthrustthroughwoodsandmarshlandalmost100kilometers into the enemy’s rear area,where it blewupthe rail line at Kletnja. The elements employed—Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, acompanyofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521,asectionofartillery,andaplatoonfromthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39—allreturnedtothedivisionalareafivedayslater.GeneralleutnantModelsummonedhiscommanderstogetheron8Augustand

briefed them on the corps order: “On 9August 1941, theXXIV. Armee-Korps

(mot.) attacks by surprise with the 3. Panzer-Division on the right and the 4.Panzer-DivisionontheleftfromtheareaaroundMiloslawitschitothesouthwestagainsttheenemyinfrontofthe7.Infanterie-Division.ItthenmovesfromtheOsterthroughKlimowitschitoencircletheenemyforcespositionedacrossfromKritschewasfarastheSsosh.”That meant the days of rest for the division were over. The rifle brigade

startedmoving out of its quarters that afternoon andmoved across theOster,startingat1600hours.Thearmorregimentfollowedatnightinrainyandstormyweather.Thestormsandtheright-of-wayexertedbythecrossingcolumnsfromthe4.Panzer-Divisioncausedstoppagesalongtheroadthatlastedforhours.Theforceswerestillmovingwhenitstartedtoturnlightat0300hours.Theattack,whichhadbeenplannedfor0600hours,hadtobepostponed.OntherightwasOberstvonManteuffel’sbattlegroup,consistingofSchützen-Regiment3andtheIII./Panzer-Regiment6.OberstleutnantAudörschwasontheleftwithSchützen-Regiment 394 and the I./Panzer-Regiment 6. The II./Panzer-Regiment 6 andKradschützen-Bataillon3wereheldbackalongtheroadasreserves.ThedivisionarrivedintheMiloslawitschiareaoverthenextthreehours.The

movementsdidnotproceedwithoutahitch,sincetheenemyhadidentifiedtheconcentrationsandfiredintothemwithartillery.Thefirstcasualtiesweretakenbeforetheattackhadevenstarted.Finally,itwastimetomoveout.Theclocksshowed0900hours,whentheartillerybatteriesofthedivisionalartilleryopenedfireontheRussianpositions.Ashortwhilelater,bothbattlegroupsmovedout.Sincetheattacksectorwassomewhatnarrowandwasimpededbywoodedandmarshyterrain,thedivisioncouldnotbecommittedallatonce.OberstleutnantAudörsch’s forces entered the enemy positions first, followed later by thebattalionsofSchützen-Regiment3invonManteuffel’sbattlegroup.The Soviets did not voluntarily give up one meter of ground and fought

stubbornly. The enemy artillery fired without a break, and the casualtiesincreasedshortlyaftermovingout.ThecommanderoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394,Major Haas, and his adjutant, Leutnant Meister, were wounded. WhenRussian bombers and fighter-bombers also joined the fray, the casualtiesincreasedbythehour.Friendlyfightersappearedonlyinfrequently.Theattackmovedthroughthewoodstothesouthwestinaslowbutconsistent

manner. The hardest enemy resistance was being offered in front ofKampfgruppeAudörsch.Heavytanks,weightingfifty-twotons,wereemployed;the tanks of the 1st Battalion could only knock them out at close range. The

riflemen then reached the point, where a German assault party had beenbutcheredinabestialmannerbysuperiorSovietforcesthepreviousday.Theterrainwassodifficultthatthemotorizedriflemenwereforcedtomove

on foot in spots. Moving through Starij Stom, the attacked continued onTitowka.TheattackcolumnswerehitseveraltimesbyRussianbombers.Sevenmen from the5./Schützen-Regiment 394 were killed, includingOberfeldwebelUllmann.The2ndCompanyoftheregimentlostFeldwebelNepp.AfterTitowkahadbeentaken,HauptmannSchneider-Kostalski’sIII./Panzer-

Regiment6wasturnedinthedirectionofNesnanysoastohittheenemyinfrontof the 7. Infanterie-Division in the rear and eliminate his heavy artillery.OberstleutnantMunzel’sII./Panzer-Regiment6waspushedforward tosupporttheattackofSchützen-Regiment394,whichwasadvancingthroughandbeyondOstroff and Pawlowitschi. By the onset of darkness,Oberstleutnant Audörschand his men were able to block the road leading from Klimowitschi to thesoutheastinthevicinityofGaigowka.MajorWellmann’sI./Schützen-Regiment3screened to the north, while Hauptmann Engelien’s 2nd Battalion orienteddirectly west. Major von Corvin-Wiersbitzki’s motorcycle infantry battalionpassed through the lines of riflemen starting at 2000 hours to get closer toKlimowitschi.That night, the division ordered the city to be attacked.Oberst Kleemann

directedtheadvancetomovethroughSimniza.Butbytheearlymorninghours,the reconnaissance battalion had determined that the enemy had abandonedKlimowitschi. Oberstleutnant von Lewinski thereupon decided to attack thelocalitywithhisbattlegroup.AftervonLewinski’splanhadbeenapproved,therest of the division moved out as well. It turned into a classic attack by anarmoreddivision.At0500hours, twolargebattlegroupsassaultedat thesametimefromtheeastandsouth.Thesunwasbeamingfromapartlycloudysummersky, as the difficult terrainwas crossed and the forces entered the undefendedcitytwohourslater.ItwasSunday,10August1941.Thetankcompaniesmovedonaheadtoscreenthemovementforwardofthe

rifleregiments.OberleutnantKlöber’s7thCompanypressedthroughthefleeingRussiancolumnsandestablishedcontactwiththeGermanforcesdefendingtheKritschewbridgehead.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6protectedtheadvanceofthedivisionagainstenemyforces to itsnorth thatwereholdingout. Itdrovethoseforcesback into thewoods.The9thCompany turnedbackabreakout attemptfromTitowka, eliminating three fighting vehicles and several antitank guns in

theprocess.Anenemybatterypressingaheadranintothedefensivefiresofthe1stCompanyofengineers.Thecombatengineerscapturedthree10.5-centimetergunsand threemortars.During thenight, thedivisionsecuredallaroundfromtheKritschewarea.Schützen-Regiment394wasresponsibleforguardingthecityproper.At first light the next day, patrol and assault detachments were sent in all

directions inorder togetabetterpictureof theenemysituation.Therewasnodoubt,however,thatstrongRussianforceswereencirclednorthofthecity.Whatwasn’tknownwaswhattheyintendedtodo.Thepatrolsreturnedwithmoreorless good results. Riflemen from the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 brought backeight guns, a few machine guns, and twenty prisoners for their efforts; theI./Schützen-Regiment3 took thirty-five prisoners.The battery of the divisionalartillery,which had closedup aroundKlimowitschi, fired irregular harassmentfireon theenemyforces in thepocket. In thepast fewdays, the regimenthadsuffered thedeaths ofOberleutnantDorsch,LeutnantDr.Engel, andLeutnantMilisch.By then, the armored regiment had returned to an assembly area, where it

performed maintenance and it refueled and rearmed. The regiment’s 3rdBattalion was temporarily attached to the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.). InKlimowitschi,a typicalsmallRussiantownconsistingofwoodenhutsanddirtroads,Schützen-Regiment394 andPanzerjäger-Abteilung 543 set up all-rounddefenses.Asthesunbegantosetthatevening,themenofthe3./Schützen-Regiment394

noticed all at once that several horse-mounted riders were moving from thewoodstowardsKlimowitschi.Beforethealertcouldbesounded,thefewridersturnedintoanentiretroopridingagainstthepositionsatagallopandwithdrawnsabers. The men could only grab their carbines and machine guns in haste.Before they new it, thewild “hunting party” had descended into and betweentheirlines.Fortunately,thegunsoftheantitankbattalionwerereadytofire,andtheir3.7-centimeterroundstorethefirstholesintotheSovietranks.Bythen,theforward observers had also issued firemissions to their batteries. The roundsstarted howling in. In the hail of German fire, the Russian mounted attackvanished into thin air as quickly as it had arrived. Nonetheless, a few SovietcavalrymenfoundtheirwayintothetownunderthecoverofdarknessandmadeitasfarasthecommandpostoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394.Themettheirendthere.

Thatepisodewasquicklyforgotten,butthenightwouldturnouttobealongone.FireworkssuddenlystartedintheneighboringInfanterie-Regiment68ofthe23. Infanterie-Division.TheSovietswereattempting tobreak through there aswell,aftertheinfantryregimenthadpulledbackitsoutpostswhenitturneddark.Schützen-Regiment394wasalerted.Itwasn’tnecessaryfortherifleregimenttointervene; instead, itwasonlycalledupon toassist inchasingdownRussians,whohadbrokenthroughandwerewanderingaround.Afteranhour,itwasquietagainintheKlimowitschiarea.Themorningsunof12Augusthadjustclimbedoverthehorizonintheeast

whentheoutpostsofthe2./Schützen-Regiment394atSswireljiidentifiedenemycavalryagain.Thistime,itwasbetween150and200riders,whoweregallopingeastabout500metersawaydown theslopeatSswitschewo.The riflemenandthe antitank gun of the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, which was positionedthere, immediatelyopened fire.The roar that arose set off the alarm in all theremainingpositions.Themenof therifleregimentdidnothavetosearchlongfortheenemy.Allofthemcouldseeafirstwaveofridersfollowedbyasecondand then, soon thereafter, a third.Among those columnswere trains vehicles.Bringing up the rear were strong infantry forces. Rounds from the divisionalartillerysoonstartedhowlingin.Soonthereafter,afour-barreledFlakattheedgeof the village started hammering away. The first approaching troop wasscattered.Thehorsesbolted,andtheridersflewoffandattemptedtogetawayonfoot. In theprocess, they intermingledwith thehordesofoncoming troops,which moved out of Selzonyj–Klin in dispersed order and headed for theKlimowitschi–Sswireljroad.ThemainbodyofLeutnantDr.Lotze’s2./Schützen-Regiment394washolding

there. Itopenedupwith itsmachineguns into themassed rider elements.Theleaden crack ofOberleutnant Michels’s guns of the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543 bellowed. The wave of approximately 600 cavalrymen turned away andheadedinthedirectionofthe3rdCompanyoftherifleregiment.Thatcompanywas ready.Roundafter roundwhipped into thegallopingcavalry.They troopsswungawayandturnednorth.The1stCompanyoftherifleregimenthadmovedup. Behind it were the light tanks of the reconnaissance platoon of Panzer-Regiment6.Themachine-gun fires from the riflecompanyand the light tankscompletelyshatteredtheenemyattack.Theriderswhosurvivedscatteredinalldirections.Afewsucceededingettingtotheartillerypositions,wheretheyalsofoundtheirend.

Agroupofabout100cavalrymenunderthecommandofalieutenantcolonelmade itas farasKlimowitschibymoving throughadepression thatwas thickwith vegetation. That put them to the rear of the 2nd Company of the rifleregiment. The riflemen quickly reversed positions, andLeutnant Peters’smenlaunched an immediate counterattack. None of the Russians escaped. ThefightingforKlimowitschidieddown.The1stand4thCompaniesofPanzer-Regiment6,whichhadbeenalertedat

0435hours,didn’tneed to join the immediatefighting. Ithadbeendecidedbytheriflemen,antitankelements,andcannoneers.Thetwotankcompaniesweresentoffinpursuitoftheenemy,however.Theycaughtupwiththefleeingtrainsandabattery,whichtheywereabletoshoottopieces.Therifleregimentsentoutplatoonsandsquadstocollectthewoundedlayingonthebattlefieldandbringinprisoners. In doing so, the regiment suffered an additional sixteen casualties,including Hauptfeldwebel Stachowiak of the 5th Company, who was badlywounded. The casualties stemmed from the fact that the wounded Russiansallowed the riflemen to approach close—they played dead—only to then firetreacherouslyontheGermansfromtherear.Based on that bad experience, the division had the II./Panzer-Regiment 6

assist in the clearing of the woods northwest of Klimowitschi early in theafternoon.The3rdBattalionof thearmoredregimentwasorderedtocombthewoodedterraintobothsidesof theTitowka–Nesnanjroad.ItwassupportedinthatbytheI./Infanterie-Regiment41(mot.)ofthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.).Thatoperationswas calledoff around1600hours, since an alertwas receivedfrom the4. Panzer-Division that the Soviet 50th TankDivisionwas attackingfromthesouthwest.OberstKleemannwasgiventhemissionofformingascreeningfrontinthat

direction.HeusedSchützen-Regiment3,whichhadbeenearmarkedforanotheroperation, and the III./Panzer-Regiment 6. The riflemen reached thewoods atPutimeljby0300hours,whilethetanksdidnotreachtheirdesignatedassemblyarea around Iwanowa–Sloboda until the morning. Orders arrived that thedivision did not need to intervene, since the Soviets had not continued theirattack. Nonetheless, route reconnaissance and contact was established withneighboringunitsinthecourseoftheday.The division had assembled most of its combat-capable forces around

Miloslawitschi; only Schützen-Regiment 394 and the antitank and artilleryelementsattachedinsupportremainedaroundKlimowitschi.On13August,the

enemyattemptedtobreakthroughafewtimesatthelattervillage,buttheeffortswereno longer in the same strengthas thepreviousdayand, correspondingly,could be turned back more easily. Toward evening, the rifle regiment alsoreceivedorderstopullbackfromKlimowitschi.Whilemostofthedivisionwasable to enjoy a day of rest, Schützen-Regiment 394 had to undergo a fewskirmisheswiththeenemywhileitwasmovingback.The armored regiment sent out a tank patrol in the morning to establish

contactwithGeneralleutnantGallenkamp’s78. Infanterie-Division,whichwastwenty kilometers away. The patrol encountered the outposts of theIII./Infanterie-Regiment 283 to the east of Bessedka around 1400 hours,completingitsmission.Atnoonon15August,thedivisionissuedawarningorderfortheresumption

of the advance. The commanders were summoned for conferences, the mapswere issued and the new march routes marked on the maps. Everyone wasamazed—thistime,theywereheadedsouth.Thewarningorderwasshortandtothepoint:“TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)movesouttothesouthon16Augustwiththe4.Panzer-Divisionontheright,the3.Panzer-Divisionontheleft,andthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)following,inordertocutofftheretreatrouteofthewithdrawingenemyinfrontoftheattackofthe2.Armeetotheeast.”Theelementsofthe3.Panzer-Divisionwere tobeready tomovestartingat

1600hours.At1700hours,theactualorderwasissued.The nighttime approachmarch in the newdirection could only be executed

withagreatdealofeffortanddelay.Themanynarrowroutesweresofullfromthemanycolumnsthatthevehiclescouldonlyadvanceatawalkingpace.Theleadelementsof thedivisionbarelymade itpastGabitschi; itwasonlyMajorvon Corvin-Wiersbitzki’s motorcycle infantry battalion that was able to reachChotimskby first light.But thebridgeshad tobe reinforced there, so that theheavy vehicles could continue. Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 was able to crossaround 0800 hours, reaching Warwarowka, five kilometers away, in a rapidmove.Themotorcycle infantryandreconnaissancesoldiersdidnotspend timethere;theymovedon.Bythen,themenofthetwoengineercompaniesthatweremoving toward the front clearedmines so as to enable the continuationof themovepastChotimsk.Becauseofthemines,theII./Panzer-Regiment6wasalsohaltedinWarwarowka,soastoavoidunnecessarylosses.The leadgroupunderOberstvonManteuffelmade it toDegtjarewkaon the

Iputj.Enemy resistancewasbroken, and the firstbridgeheadwas formedafter

crossing in inflatable craft. Hauptmann Ziervogel and Major von Corvin-Wiersbitzki immediatelypressedonwiththeircompanies.TheengineersunderHauptmann Winkler and Oberleutnant Brandt started to erect a bridge. Thebridgingsectionwasorderedtomoveusasquicklyaspossible.By1700hours,ithadcompleteda100-meter-longengineerbridgebyconstructinga9.6-meterendsection.After a crossing point was created for the heavy vehicles—the terrain

otherwise consisted of sandy forest soil—Oberstleutnant Munzel’s II./Panzer-Regiment6continueditsmarchfromWarwarowkastartingat1315hours.Twohours later, the entire regiment received orders to move out and reachDegtjarewkaassoonaspossible.Onceagain,the3.Panzer-Divisionhadspreadoutoverthedistanceofmanykilometers.TheleadgroupwasalreadyadvancingthroughZynkaalongthegood,improvedroadfromRoslawltoMglin,whilethe1stand3rdBattalionsofthearmoredregimentwerechurningthroughdeepsandandmarshyspots.Allthewhile,thesunwasburninghot,withthethermometerregistering more than 30 degrees Celsius (86 Fahrenheit). The 2nd and 3rdCompaniesofSchützen-Regiment3wereemployedscreeningafifteen-kilomterstretchofroadbetweenChotimskandDegtjarewka.KampfgruppevonManteuffelwasontheroadleadingtoMglin.Acompetition

to see who couldmove the fastest started among the tankers, the motorcycleinfantry,thereconnaissancesoldiers,thecannoneers,andtheengineers.Enemyresistanceontheroadwasquicklybroken.TheRussiansfrequentlydidn’thavetimetodefendandhadtoraceheadoverheelsintotheclosestpatchofwoods.EnemyforcesgrewinsizeoutsideofMglin.Thebattlegrouphaltedbrieflyandprepared to attack, while the batteries ofOberstleutnant Wellmann sent theirfiery greetings intoMglin. The II./Panzer-Regiment6,Kradschützen-Bataillon3, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, and the more slowly following II./Schützen-Regiment3movedout,enteredthecityquickly,andimmediatelytransitionedtoanall-rounddefense.Themainbodyofthedivisionwasmorethantwentykilometersfarthertothe

rear and secured the bridgehead over the Iputj from the high ground atDegtjarewka.Thewheeledvehicle columnsofKampfgruppeKleemann closedup there during the night. Kampfgruppe Audörsch found itself an additionaltwenty kilometers further back. The great distances of course could not becompletely screened. As a result, Soviet partisans succeeded in attacking thevillageofChotimskduringthenightandburningitcompletelytotheground.

Afterthecoolnightstartedtoyieldtothefirstfaintraysonthehorizon,whichindicatedanotherhotday,KampfgruppevonManteuffelimmediatelymovedout.The 7./Panzer-Regiment 6 arrived in Mglin at 0500 hours. By then, theremainingtwobattalionsofthetankregimentlefttheirbivouacareasalongtheIputj, after almost all the engineer companies had improved the roads throughceaseless effort. Since the bridges over the river were still incapable ofsupporting tanks, the fighting vehicles forded the river and advanced withoutstoppingtoMglin,whichtheyreachedat1000hours.At the same time, Oberstleutnant Munzel was advancing south with his

companiesandthemotorcycleinfantryandreconnaissanceelementsattachedtohim.Theadvanceguardwasabletogetasfarasthesouthernedgeofthelargeforested tract outside of Unetscha without enemy contact. At that point, aRussianantiaircraftbatterypreventedafurtheradvancethroughwell-aimedfire.Thefightingvehiclesof thebattalionformeduptoconductaconcentricattackagainst thebattery.At that point,Russian aircraft attacked the columns at lowlevel; they were unable to defend themselves. Leutnant Bertram, GefreiterGrund,andGefreiterSobeckwerekilledinthefighting.Oberleutnant von Zitzewitz’s 1./Schützen-Regiment 3 was moved forward,

and the last resistance was finally broken with its assistance. The tanksimmediately entered the city of Unetscha and moved to the far end withoutregard for any other pockets of resistance that were still holding out.Unfortunately,theywereafewminutestoolate.Along,fullyloadfreighttrainlefttherailwaystationinfrontoftheireyesandsnortedaway.In thenext twohours, the enemy remaining inUnetschawas eliminated. In

the process, a portion of the city burned down. Toward 1630 hours,OberstleutnantvonLewinskiarrivedwith theother twobattalionsand,ashortwhilelater,MajorWellmannandhisriflemenalsoarrived.TheRussiansdidnotwanttogiveupUnetschasoeasily.Sovietfighter-bombersattackedthealreadyburningcityandtheenteringGermancolumnsrepeatedlyuntilitturneddark.At1930 hours, Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 movedoutwith the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 as the advance guard in the direction ofStarodub.ThequickonsetofnightforcedtheadvancetobehaltedinthevicinityofRjuchoffaround2300hours.Theadvanceguardsetupfordefenseandwaitedformorning.The advance of the XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.) turned fluid again on 17

August.Intheprocess,the3.Panzer-Divisionhadgainedasurprisingamountof

groundto thesouthandwas just to theeastofGomel.The4.Panzer-Divisionwasable to takeGelynkowitschiand followed the3.Panzer-Division.The10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)wasinsertedintothelinetotherightofthe3.Panzer-Division in order to establish contact with the infantry divisions, which werehangingbackfartothenorthwest.Generalleutnant Model issued orders at 0115 hours for the further pursuit

south. The supplemental order issued by Panzer-Regiment 6 started with thesoberstatement:“GruppevonLewinskireachestheareaaroundStarodubon18August,startingoutat0530hours.”At that precise moment,Oberstleutnant von Lewinski moved out with his

strong force from the area south ofUnetscha. In the leadwere the companiesfromtheI./Panzer-Regiment6,followedbythevehiclesofthe1./Flak-Regiment94andthetwoantitankbattalions.ThecompaniesoftheI./Schützen-Regiment3followed that group, with the batteries of the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the2./Pionier-Bataillon39,andthe1./Kradschützen-Bataillon3bringinguptherearofthecolumn.MajorFreiherrvonTürckheim,thecommanderofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,tookupthesecurityoftheavenueofadvancewithhisgunsandthe attached3./Schützen-Regiment3. In the process of executing thatmission,hisgunnersknockedoutsevenlightRussianfightingvehicles.TheadvanceguardofHauptmannSchneider-Kostalskimovedoutsouthfrom

Rjuchoff at 0630 hours. His 9th Company took the lead. The lead fightingvehicles arrived outside of Starodub, the large transportation hub halfwaybetweenGomelandBrjansk,around0900hours.TheRussianshadquicklysetupdefensesat theoutskirtsandwereprepared todefend thecity.TheGermantanksdidnotallowtheenemyanytimeandheadedimmediatelyinthedirectionof Starodub. The Soviet resistancewas very tough in some places, especiallywhere a formation of Komsomol, a youth group of the Communist Party,defended.Theenemycouldbeejectedeverywhere,however.At0915hours,thecity was in German hands. The Russians were so surprised by the suddenappearance of the German tanks that they thought they were dealing withairborneforces.KampfgruppevonLewinskireachedthecitythreehourslater.Whilethetank

companies screened and established bivouac sites in the southern andwesternportionsofStarodub, the riflemensetup for thedefense to theeastandnorth.Theforwardgroupsofthedivisionsetuphedgehogdefenses.Theywereallbythemselves, since the advance routeof thedivision stretchedall theway from

Starodub toMglin. The 4. Panzer-Division was unable to advance as quicklythat day. For that reason, elements of Schützen-Regiment 394 had to remainbehindandonlyslowlymadetheirwayforward.KampfgruppeAudörsch reachedMglinandreceivedorders there tocontinue

on toUnetscha, a large railway transportation hub on theMoscow line.Uponreaching Unetscha, the division commander issued orders to OberstleutnantAudörsch to hold the town, although the II./Schützen-Regiment 394 was tocontinuemarching in the direction of Starodub to support the elements of thedivisionemployedthere.At the same time, Soviet bombs were falling on Starodub, where

Kampfgruppe von Manteuffel,Kampfgruppe von Lewinski, and KampfgruppeKleemann had either arrivedorwere arriving.The enemy aerial attacks lastedtheentirenightanddidnotabateuntilfirstlighton19August.OberleutnantHeysing,anofficerassignedtoapropagandacompany,wrotea

veryinterestingarticleaboutthefightingforStarodublateron.ItappearedintheVölkischerBeobachter(issue199),dated18July1942.Thefirstportionofthearticleisreprintedhere:

The Celebrated Soviet Marshal and the Black Bears: HowTimoschenkoEscapedacrosstheDontotheEastOberleutnantGüntherHeysing,propagandacompany,July1942.There’sa “connection” between a certainGerman armored division,which hasthesymbolofitshometown,ablackbear,aspartofitstacticalsymbol,andtheBolshevikMarshalTimoschenko.Backthen,thebeardivision,whichwasthebatteringramofthefield

army, was moving as the spearhead. It happened that this relativelyunusual event took place as it reached the rural Ukrainian town ofStarodub. Today, the story can be told: Telephone conversations withTimoschenko.The advance guard of the bear division had taken Starodub in its

possession. The Bolsheviks did not even have time to set everythingalightpriortotheirretreat,aswastheircustom.ThearmoredforcesinStarodubsoonfeltateaseinStarodubafterthe

localpopulacehadovercome its timidity regarding theGermans.For afewdays, thetownbecameasmallgarrisonfortheleadelements,untilmostof thecolumnshadchurned theirwaythroughthesanddesertsof

Rosslawlandtheadvancecouldcontinue.When the leadelementsof theGerman forceshad enteredStarodub,

the signalers immediately started looking for any telephone lines thatwerestillintactinordertodestroyanycontactthatstillexistedwiththeenemy.AGefreiter,whowascuttinglineshighuponapole,happenedtooverheartelephonetrafficbeingconductedbytheBolsheviksoveroneofthe lines.A translatorwasquicklysummoned.Healsohad toclimbuponthepole.Whileeavesdropping,hedeterminedthat theconversationswerewithout a doubt of amilitary nature.At the local post office, thecorresponding line and switch was soon found. The leadership of theGermanforceswasabletoinformitselfinthebestwaypossibleofwhatitscounterpartswereplanning.SincethepostofficeinStarodubproperwasalsobeingcalledfromall

sortsofstations,thetranslatorfinallypickedup.Heinitiallygotanearfulfromanunknownhigh-rankingSovietofficer,whowantedtoknowwhyhehadbeensilentforsolong.Butthetranslatordidnothesitatewithananswer. He explained to the top-level Bolshevik that he was Sub-lieutenantMirowandhe had just finished clearing theGermansout ofStarodub.His forces consisted of 250men and a battery.The oppositenumberbelievedhim,aswasdemonstrated thateveningwhen listeningto theBolshevik armed forces report: Starodub had beenwrested fromtheGermans by brave friendly forces. That also gave us some insightintothereliabilityoftheSovietArmyreports.Thedirect linetotheSovietswasexploitedofcoursebytheGerman

brigade staff located in Starodub. Despite all efforts at maintainingsecrecy and using code names, itwas possible to determinewhere thehigher-levelBolshevikheadquarterswerelocated,especiallyahigh-levelBolshevik senior command and the artillery headquarters of theTimoschenko Front. Since the telephone connection functionedmagnificentlyontheGermanside,itwaspossibletoexperiencethevisitofGermandive-bombers in the respectiveSovietBolshevik commandsthefollowingday.Inaddition,itwaspossibletoeavesdroponnumerousTimoschenkoordersandkept theenemypilotsawayfromournecks inStarodubfordaysonend,sinceourcounterpartsstillassumedthattheirownforceswerestillthere.Whenever the translator was asked something he could not

immediately answer, he noticed “interference” on the lines, using thetimetoaskhiscommanderwhatheshouldanswer.Hethencalledback,and itdidnotbotherhim thathewassuddenly referred toasa“fascistpig” and a “Nazi spy.”By eavesdropping on the rest of theBolsheviklandlinecommunications,heknewthatsuchsuspicionsandaccusationsappearedtobequitecommon.Hewouldprotesthisowninnocenceandthenmake similar accusations,whereuponTimoschenko’s general staffwouldbeonlytoohappytoprovideinformation.Itwasn’tuntiltwodayslaterthatthelightapparentlyfinallywentonthere.TheycutthelineandthefrontheadquartersoftheSovietmarshalcouldnolongerbereached.Timoschenkohadbeenabletosavehimselfintimefromtheaffectionatehugsoftheblackbears.

The Soviet command knew all too well that the breakthrough of Germanarmor forces to the south constituted a great danger to their own front,whichwas still oriented to the west. For that reason, everythingwas then geared todefeatingoratleastholdinguptheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.).After Generalleutnant Model had taken off in the direction of Starodub,

reports filtered in toOberstleutnant Audörsch from the reconnaissance effortsthat had been dispatched that the woods in the vicinity of Unetscha and theroadway to the rear had been occupied by Russians. At that moment, thecommanding general, Generalleutnant Geyr von Schweppenburg, arrived atAudörsch’scommandpostandAudörschfilledhiminonthelatestreports.VonSchweppenburg ordered that the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, which wasmarchingthroughUnetschaat thetime,wastoremainthere.ThecommandinggeneraldecidedtoremainatAudörsch’scommandpost,sincealloftheroadstothecorpscommandpostwereoccupiedbytheenemy.SinceitwasexpectedthattheRussianswouldattackUnetschathenextmorning,allnecessarymeasuresforthedefenseofthetownweretaken.Atfirstlighton19August,thepositionsofSchützen-Regiment394wereplacedunderheavyRussianartilleryfire;anattackby fifteen Russian fighting vehicles attempted to break through the positions.The attack hitLeutnant Dr. Lotze’s2./Schützen-Regiment 394 especially hard,but it did not allow itself to be shaken and bravely conducted its defense.Oberstleutnant Audörsch employed the three tanks that had remained inUnetscha, some of which were immobilized. Leutnant Büschen conducted asuccessfuldefensiveengagementwithhistwoPanzerIII’sandsinglePanzerIV.After three T-34’s5 had been knocked out, the Soviets turned away. Some of

themboggeddowninthemarshland,wheretheyremainedstuck.A Russian infantry attack then started against the command post of the

Kampfgruppe. The commanding general was also there. It was supported byheavy artillery fire. All available forces, including clerks and liaison officers,wereused in thedefense.Thecommandinggeneralpersonallygot involved inthe fighting, armed with a submachine gun. The general’s liaison officer,standing next to the commanding general andOberstleutnant Audörsch, wasbadlywounded.Theenemyattackwasabletobeturnedback.Thefightingthencontinuedwithunrelentingharshness.Theresponsiblebattle

group leader,Oberstleutnant Audörsch, received constant reports of renewedenemyattacksorsmallpenetrationsintothepositions.It was almost miraculous that the corps landline leading forward to the 3.

Panzer-Division had not been discovered by the Russians. The commandinggeneral was thus able to speak withGeneralleutnant Model and ordered theimmediate sending of two tank battalions to Unetscha, since that importantrailwayhubcouldnotbelostunderanycircumstances.Afterthatconversation,Model spokewithAudörsch and asked him the following question: “Are yougoing to holdUnetscha or not?”AfterAudörsch answered the question in theaffirmative,Model decided not to send the second tank battalion toUnetscha.OnlyOberstleutnantMunzelandtheII./Panzer-Regiment6weresent.The difficult defensive fighting of Schützen-Regiment 394 continued. The

disquietinginformationreachedthecommandpost thatafifty-two-tonfightingvehicle had just succeeded in crossing a bridge into Unetscha, after it hadeliminated theGermanguard forceon thebridgewith itsmaingun.Audörschgave Leutnant Störck of the regimental engineer platoon the mission ofdestroyingthetank.Theheavytankwaslumberingaroundthestreetsofthecity,firingwildly.Previousefforts to takecareof the tankwithsatchelchargeshadfailed.Leutnant Störck jumped onto the rear deck of the tank with a satchelcharge.GefreiterBaldes likewise jumpeduponto the rolling tankandblockedthe vision ports of the turret with his hands. Störck threw open an enginecompartment access grate and tossed the satchel charge inside. Both of theengineers jumped off and went into cover behind the corner of a house. Thechargedetonatedanddestroyedthetank;theRussiancrewwasabletodismountwithout any serious wounds. Störck laconically reported to the commandinggeneral:“Tankdestroyed;IbroughttheRussiancrew.”ThegeneralremovedhisownIronCross,FirstClass,andpinnedittothechestofLeutnantStörckforhis

bravedeed.The attacks of the Russians did not let up, but they were turned back

everywherebythebraveriflemen.Thedifficultfightingcostalotofcasualties.HauptmannSchmidt, thecommanderof the4./Schützen-Regiment394,and thebattalionphysicianoftheII./Schützen-Regiment394,AssistenzarztBosien,werekilled. Sanitäts-Feldwebel6 Holler took his place. Assistenzarzt Dr. Türk waspracticallyhelplessinthefaceofallthewounded,buthewasabletomasterthesituation,ashesofrequentlydid,with theassistanceofhismedicalpersonnel.Towards noon, the heavy fighting abated somewhat,with only smaller attacksbeing conducted by the Russians, which were effortlessly turned back by theriflemen.OberstleutnantMunzel’sII./Panzer-Regiment6,whicharrivedaroundnoon, turned back the last Russian attacks. The riflemen, who had been inextremely difficult but ultimately successful defensive fighting since the earlymorning,were happy that the tanks had arrived to provide some relief for thesituation.At 0945 hours,Oberstleutnant von Lewinski pulled his battle group a few

kilometersbackfromStarodubinordertosetupascreeningpositionfurthertothe north at Janjkowa, so that contact was not lost between the two cities.Unfortunately, theenemywassostrongand thesupplysituationwith fuelandammunitionsoweak,thattheSovietscouldnolongerbedrivenfromtheroad.AfterthearmoredbattlegrouphadpulledoutofitsscreeningpositionbetweenUnetschaandStarodub,thedivisionmovedanotherbattlegroupintotheareatopreventtheenemyforcesbatteredatUnetschafromalsoattemptingtoseparatethose two cities. Oberstleutnant Dr. Weissenbruch, the commander of theI./Artillerie-Regiment75,wasgiventhemissionofformingthescreeningbattlegroup.The1.and2./Schützen-Regiment3,aswellaselementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521andWeissenbruch’sownbattalion,movedoutofStarodubatnoonand occupied positions at Asskoli, ten kilometers north of the city.GeneralleutnantModelwasalsoatthatlocation.ThemenofPionier-Bataillon39minedtherailwaylineandthe2ndCompanyoftheengineerbattalionbuiltasixteen-tonbridgeinRjuchoff.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6andelementsof themotorcycle infantry battalion and the reconnaissance battalion remained inStarodub,wheretheyconductedpatrolsinalldirectionsinthecourseofthedayin an effort to keep the southern wing of the division from being surprised.Kampfgruppe Frank—consisting of Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,abatteryfromArtillerie-Regiment75,andthe4thPlatoonofthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39—capturedthreeartillerypiecesandtook

fiftyprisoners,amongotherspoilsofwar.The enemy movements continued through the night and hit the widely

extendeddivision,whichwasfightinginalldirections,withfullforceearlyonthe morning of 20 August. Strong Soviet forces rolled across the crossroadsnorth ofShetscha at 0400hours, heading from the northwest to the southeast.Additional columns followed those initial forces in the area around Rjuchoff.ComingfromKampfgruppeWeissenbruch,elementsofdifferingbattalionsunderMajorWellmannimmediatelywentintopositionsouthofRjuchoffandengagedthe enemy. The 1./Schützen-Regiment 3 encountered an enemy antiaircraftbattery in theprocessofattempting tobreak through.ObergefreiterSchrader’srifle squad took up the fight. The soldiers approached the enemy withaggressiveness,eliminatedthebatteryandtook192menprisoner.TheengineersinpositionatRjuchoffhadaworsetimeof it.Theyhadbeen

surprised by a lightning-like attack by the Russians and lost four dead, fivemissingandonewounded.Atthelastmoment,UnteroffizierMünchowwasabletoescapeencirclementwithfourvehiclesandreestablishcontactwithBridgingSection 1. Major Beigel immediately employed a motorized patrol underLeutnant Seefeld (3./Pionier-Bataillon 39) to see what had happened.Unfortunately, the engineerswere unable tomake it through to their encircledcomradesandhadtoreturnwithoutanytangibleresults.Generalleutnant Model directed friendly tanks to intervene as soon as

possible. The I./Panzer-Regiment 6 rolled in the direction of Shetscha. Fromthere,the1stCompanywasemployedinanenvelopingmaneuvertothelefttwohourslater,whiletheremainingcompaniesattackedRjuchofffromthenorthandfelttheirwayforwardalongtheroadheadingsouththatbypassedthecitytothewest.TwoRussianfightingvehicles—T-26’s—aswellasanartillerypieceweredestroyedduring the reconnaissance-in-force.The leadvehicles then linkedupwiththefirstcoupleoftanksfromtheIII./Panzer-Regiment6,whichhadmovedoutfromStarodubtothenorth.Asaresult,contactwithinthedivideddivisionwasreestablishedat1315hours.Around1400hours,thesituationaroundRjuchoffclearedupsomewhat.The

Soviets had disappeared from the road. They had pulled back into the thickwoodsbetweenRjuchoffandShetscha.Fromthere,theycontinuedtopresentadanger to the columns advancing along the road.At that point, the I./Panzer-Regiment6onlyhadsevenPanzerII’s,threePanzerIII’s,andasinglePanzerIVat its disposal. Itwas impossible for it to attack the enemy.The forceshad to

transitiontothedefenseeverywhere.KampfgruppeAudörsch leftUnetschaaround1400hourson20Augustwith

the II./Panzer-Regiment6 in the lead after elements of the4. Panzer-Divisionhadassumedthescreeningmissionthere.TheleadcompanyencountereditsfirstRussianformationsfourkilometerssouthofthecity;theyhadadvancedasfarasthe road again. The enemy had even brought artillery into position and tookeveryvehicleunderfire.Thetankssucceededinbreakingthrough.Schützen-Regiment 394 followed the tank battalion and, protected by it,

continueditsmarchsouth.Allofasudden,aircraftwiththeRedStarappearedabovethecolumn.Thefirstbombsfellsoonafterwardand,ashortwhilelater,enemy artillery again fired into the ranks of the regiment. Exploiting thesituation, theenemycameoutof thewoodswith tanksand riflemen, scatteredtheI./Schützen-Regiment394,andpressedonfarthertotheeast.The next halt was at Shetscha. A camouflaged fifty-two-ton tank was

positioned under trees near the roadway. It took every vehicle that rolled pastunder fire from pointblank rangewith itsmain gun. The first vehiclewas setalight;thesecondoneranintoit;thethirdonetippedover.Everythingcametoastandstill, and there was total confusion. The friendly infantry weapons werepowerlessagainstthesteelmonster.Oberstleutnant Schlutius, the commander of the III./Artillerie-Regiment 75,

immediately ordered a 15-centimeter battery forward. Unfortunately, the gunscould not be brought into position to destroy the tankwith direct fire.MajorHaasemployedthebatteryonbothsidesoftheroad.Theriflemenwereunableto advance, since the Soviets were constantly bringing up reinforcements andappearedtohaveappreciableamountsofammunition.TheSovietsattackedtheGermanoutpostsat1900hoursinanefforttoforcea

breakthrough to the east. The III./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 4./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the 6./Flak-Regiment 59 fired with everything they had. Inaddition,therewasthebarkofinfantrygunsandmortars.Itwasahellishconcertin those gloomy woods, over which Northern Lights played that night in thebloody-redheavens.Theenemyonlypressedforwardwithriflemen.Thateffortcouldbeturnedback,withsomeoftheenemyrunningintominesthathadbeenlaidby the5./Schützen-Regiment394.TheRussians did not employ any tanksthattime.Towardevening,thefightingsloweddownsomewhat.TheSovietshadsuffered heavy casualties, but the friendly losses also weighed heavily. TheI./Schützen-Regiment 394 lost eight dead, including Leutnant Schellong, who

hadonlybeengivenactingcommandofthe3rdCompanyafewdaysearlier.Thatevening,OberstleutnantAudörschreceivedorders to immediatelyclear

thewoodsof theenemybetweenRjuchoffandStietscha.Audörschreportedtothedivisionthattheorderscouldnotbecarriedoutinthedarknessandthattheattackwouldtakeplaceinthemorning.ThedivisionplacedextremeimportanceondrivingtheenemyfromtheroadandfirmingupthefriendlyfrontenoughsothatnomoreRussiansgotthrough.Audörsch,whohadtwotankbattalions(theI.andII./Panzer-Regiment6),as

wellasartillery,attachedtohimfortheoperation,scheduledtheattackfor0500hours.Theplannedattackhadtobepostponedindefinitely,however,sinceheavyfogtookawayallvisibilityinthebottomlandsandinthewoods.ThebatteriesofArtillerie-Regiment 75 did fire heavily into the huge woods, however, and itstartedtoburnbrilliantlyinplaces.Panzer-Regiment6hadsetupitsscreeningpositionsasfollows:theI./Panzer-

Regiment6alongtheUnetscha–Starodubrailwayline,blockingthewoodsfromthewest;theII./Panzer-Regiment6screenedalongtheeasternsideofthewoods.Oberleutnant Klöber, the brave commander of the 7th Company, was killedwithina fewminutesbyashot to the throat fromshort rangebyasniper.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6 continued to remain inStarodub thatday toprotect thedivisiontothesouthandtotheeast(fromMerinowka).Duringthatlullinthefighting,ModelappearedatAudörsch’scommandpost

and was initially highly annoyed that the attack had not yet started. AfterAudörschhadrenderedhisreportonthesituation,however,Modelleftituptohimtodeterminethetimeoftheattack.Modelwaitedfortheattacktobegin.Itstartedat1100hoursinbrutalheatafterthefoghadcleared.Schützen-Regiment394advancedonabroadfrontfromtheeastalongallforesttrailsandroadwaysinto the large expanse of vegetation and trees. The tanks of the II./Panzer-Regimentrattledcloselybehind.TheRussianshadcamouflagedthemselvesandduginmagnificently.Heavyfightingdevelopedinsomesectionsofwoods.Theenemyslowly turnedweakandwanted toflee to thewest. Itwas there thatheran into the deployed I./Panzer-Regiment 6, whose concentrated fires causedevenmorecasualtiesamongtheRussiansattemptingtobreakout.Elevenguns,including eight of 15-centimeter caliber, were destroyed by German rounds.Afterfourhoursofbitterfighting,theleadelementsofSchützen-Regiment394wereat thewesternedgeof thewoods.The lastenemyresistancecollapsedat1800hours.FortyRussianartillerypiecesandtanks—mostofwhichhadgotten

stuckinthemarshes—werecaptured.Morethan900prisonersstartedtheirwaytotherear.Under sunny andwarm skies, the next day promised to be somewhatmore

“peaceful.” The division informed all of its elements telephonically at 0900hoursthatafairlylongbreakwasintheworks.Theenemy,however,continuedtoattempt tofinda“hole”somewherealongthefrontof thedivision.Early inthemorning,aRussiancolumnattempted tobreak throughin thesectorof the3./Schützen-Regiment 3. The attack collapsed in the defensive fires of theriflemen.Oneartillerypiece,fourtrucks,onequadantiaircraftgun,andoneunitflagremainedinGermanhands.Along the road to Rjuchoff, Schützen-Regiment 394 combed through the

woodsonemoretime.Intheprocess,therewereadditionalskirmishes.Over thenext fewdays, theSovietsgaveup theirattempts tobreak through

outof theareaaroundGomeland intended toescapeGermanencirclementbygoingacrosstheDessnafarthersouth.The 2. Armee had crossed the Ssosh on a broad front to the southwith its

infantry divisions, whereby the 1. Kavallerie-Division on the right wing wasalreadynottoofarfromGomel.The10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)continuedtomaintain contactwith the forward elements of theXXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.).The 3. Panzer-Division screened from the areas it had reached and pulled itsown forces closer to Starodub, since the 4. Panzer-Division had assumed theprotection of Unetscha. Behind it was the 17. Panzer-Division, which wasmarchingdownfromthenorthernsectorofthearmorgroup,reachingMglin.Inthe course of the individual screening engagements, patrolling activities andcombatraids,theI./Schützen-Regiment3, togetherwithKradschützen-Bataillon3,wasabletobringin200moreprisoners.The9./Panzer-Regiment6occupiedMischkowa and Dochnowitschi to the southeast of Starodub, capturing tenRussianhowitzersintheprocess.HeeresgruppeMitte issuedorderson22August that its fieldarmieswere to

move out to the south from the line running Gomel–Starodub, wherebyPanzergruppe2was to envelopeast toprevent the enemy fromescaping.Thedivisionissueditsattackorderat0500hourson28August:“AdvancesouthoftheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)with the10. Infanterie-Division(mot.) rightandthe 3. Panzer-Division left crossing the line running Cholmy–Nowgorod–SewersktocutofftheenemystillholdingouttothesouthwestofGomel.The4.Panzer-Divisionfollowsthe3.Panzer-Division.Friendlyeastflankopen;tobe

guardedthroughoffensiveactionsandtheenemypushedback.”A Russian leaflet was scattered over the German lines during the period,

whichexhorted solders todesert.Amongother things, the soldierscould read:“Just in the last threeweeksalone,our forceshavewipedout:The3.Panzer-Division . . . asa resultof that fighting, there isnothing leftofmanyof thosedivisionsexcepttheirnumber.”Thesoldierswerereadingthatjustastheywereabouttostartoutontheirboldestraid.The division established three battle groups for the continuation of its

advance.ThemaineffortwasunderOberstleutnantvonLewinskiandconsistedof the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, the II./Schützen-Regiment 3, the III./Artillerie-Regiment75,Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,Aufklärungs-Abteilung1,andPionier-Bataillon 39. That battle group received the mission of breaking through toNowgorod–Sewersk.OberstKleemann’sbattlegroup followedbehind.HehadtheI./Panzer-Regiment6,Schützen-Regiment394,theII./Artillerie-Regiment75,elements ofPanzerjäger-Abteilung 543, and divisional troops at his disposal.OberstvonManteuffelhadthethirdbattlegroup.ItformedtherearguardfortheadvanceandconsistedoftheIII./Panzer-Regiment6,theI./Schützen-Regiment3,anddivisional troops. It alsohad themissionofguarding theeast flankof theattackingdivision.

BetweentheDnjeprandtheDessna.

The7./Panzer-Regiment6 left itsassemblyareaat0500hoursandadvancedacross its line of departure at “Windmill Hill” south of Starodub as the leadelementofthebattlegroup.Atthesametime,theIII./Panzer-Regiment6movedoff in thedirectionofDedoff to screen thosemovements.Theadvancemovedrapidlyundersunnyandwarmweather.Theslightenemyresistancewasquicklybroken.Byaround1100hours,thetankcompanieshadcoveredfortykilometers.Thereconnaissanceelementsintheleadreportedthatthedirectroutewasverybadfromthatpointforward.OberstleutnantMunzelthereforeorderedhisforcestoturnofftotherightatKostobobr.Thefightingvehicles,SPW’s,andartilleryprimemovers thenchurned theirwayalongdeeply sandy roads throughdensewoods.Therewasasmall,dirtysigntherewithCyrillicletteringindicatingtheSoviet

Union.TheUkrainehadbeen reached.Strangelyenough, the terrain started tolook completely different. The villages appeared to be cleaner and the peoplefriendlier. The woman stood along the side of the road and offered milk andeggs,whilethemenliftedtheircaps.Whilethefirstbattlegroupworkeditswaythroughthesandandthedustof

the Ukraine, the second battle group left the area around Starodub–Rjuchoffaround 1020 hours and followed von Lewinski’s men. The forces that wereemployed in the flank guardmission turned back repeated attacks pressing infrom the east. For instance, the2./Schützen-Regiment394 was suddenly hit inthe flank by 200 assaultingRussian yellingUrräh! The companywas able toturn back the attack, however. The screening forces followed the advancingcolumnsandreachedKostobobrintheafternoon.Theleadcompaniesofthe4.Panzer-Division arrived in Starodub in the course of the day and relieved thedivisionrearguards.The3.Panzer-DivisionbecamethefirstformationofPanzergruppe2toenter

Ukrainian territory, and its armored spearhead was approaching the Dessna.Kampfgruppe von Lewinski held up around 1300 hours towards the north ofPetschenjugi. The supply vehicles were brought forward and the vehiclesrefueled.Russian fighter-bombers attacked theGerman tanks,droppingbombsandstrafing,but theywereonlyable tocause insignificantdamage.Thebattlegroupmovedoutagaintwohourslater.The 7./Panzer-Regiment 6 was the lead company again. Outside

Forostowitschi, it ran into the long stretch of ascending, barren high groundbefore the Dessna. The enemy had established defensive positions there.

Initially,thetankcompanyandtheriflemengotboggeddown.Thentherestofthe 2nd Battalion closed up. Oberstleutnant von Lewinski summoned hiscommanders for a conference; the division commander was already there. ARussian gun had identified the gathering and fired. Leutnant Sellschopp waskilled;OberleutnantDarsowandGrothbadlywounded;OberstleutnantMunzelandLeutnantKippwereslightlywounded.Far behind the tanks, the vehicles of the riflemen and artillery of the battle

group continued rolling forward. Unfortunately, the columnswere not able tomovefastenoughalongthebadroadsandtheattack,scheduledfor1900hours,had to be postponed. By then, it had turned dark and it would have beensenseless to advance against an enemy, whose situation was uncertain, andacrossterrain,whichwasunfamiliar.Theriflemensetupsecurityforthebattlegroupinthepositionsithadreached.Anall-rounddefensewasestablished.Thetanks pulled back to Forostowitschi, which was located in a deep defile. TheSovietshadcontinuouslyobservedtheapproachingGermanforcesbymeansofobservationaircraft;theformationswerebombedseveraltimesduringthenight.Thehighcommandof theSoviet21stArmy,whichwas responsible for this

sector,realizedthedangerposedtotheentirefrontiftheGermanssucceededincrossing the Dessna and advancing deep into the Ukraine. The division waspositioned only a few kilometers from that river that night, thus closing outanotherchapterofitsoperationsintheeast,achapterthatbelongedtooneofitsmostsuccessfulfortheentirewar.Sincethestartofthecampaign,thedivisionhad covered and fought through 2,000 kilometers of Russia and had brokenthroughstrongenemydefensivepositions.

__________________1. As of 2012, Becker was still alive. He ended the war as a Leutnant derReserve.HechangedhislastnameafterthewartoBecker-Neetz.2. Thesewere villages that extended along a single road and had no depth tothem.3.ASoviet light tank based on theBritish six-tonVickers tank chassis.Morethanfiftyvariantswerestudiedandmorethantwentyenteredseriesproduction.Inall,morethan11,000weremanufacturedbytheSovietUnion,althoughitwas

basicallyconsideredobsolescentbythetimeoftheGermaninvasion.4.ModelwasofficiallyawardedtheKnight’sCrosson9July.5.Nearly1,000early-modelT-34’shadbeendeliveredtothefrontbythestartofBarbarossa.Theywere employedpoorly by the inexperienced crews and fieldcommanders, besides having some mechanical problems in the early models,with the result that many of the were lost in the initial wave of Germanadvances.Nonetheless,thetankwasaformidableopponentandvastlysuperiorinbotharmorandarmamenttoanythingtheGermanswerefieldingatthetime.Itwasfastandmaneuverable,andfeaturedahigh-velocity7.62-centimetermaingun (later upgunned to 8.5-centimeter). It became the standard Soviet mainbattletankandnearly100,000wereproducedbywar’send.6.Enlistedmedicalpersonnelgenerallyhadtheirspecialty(medical=Sanitäts-)placedinfrontoftheirrank.

FourdaysaftercrossingtheDessnaon30August,FeldwebelSchröder’sSPWfromthe1./Schützen-Regiment394wasresponsibleforknockingoutninetanks,onegun,andtwotrucks.Heandhisgunner,

GefreiterEmden(seenhere),werebothawardedtheIronCross,FirstClass.

Schützen-Regiment394crossedtheSeimon7September1941andestablishedabridgehead.Thegunsoftheheavyinfantrygunplatoonofthe11thCompanyprovidedartillerysupport.

Theinteriorofaplatoonleader’svehicle.

Theobservationpostofthe6./Artillerie-Regiment75inthewatertoweratRogatschew.HauptmannKerstenobservesthroughthescissorscope.

TanksandantitankelementspushforwardtowardRogatschewon7July.

The2./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543inanassemblyareaoutsideofRogatschew.

ThechurchinStaryBychow.

Kradschützen-Bataillon3crossestheDnjepratStaryBychow.

PortraitofOberfeldwebelAlbertBlaich,Knight’sCrossrecipientinthe12./Panzer-Regiment6.

UnteroffizierBecker-Neetzwasasquadleaderinthe7./Schützen-Regiment394.HedistinguishedhimselfduringthefightingforLykowoandwasawardedtheKnight’sCrosson25August1941.

MajorDr.HerbertMüller,thecommanderoftheII./Schützen-Regiment394.HereceivedtheKnight’sCrosson8September1941,whileservinginthatcapacity.

OberleutnantFreiherrvonWerthernwasthecompanycommanderofthe3./Schützen-Regiment394whenhereceivedhisKnight’sCrosson8September1941.HeeventuallywentontobattalionandbrigadecommandandservedforsometimeinPanzer-Grenadier-Division“Großdeutschland”intheformercapacity.Hesurvivedthewar,reenteredtheGermanmilitaryin1956,andretiredasanOberstleutnant,

passingawayon10January2004.

CHAPTER10

FromtheDessnatotheSsula:TheBattleforKiev

On24August,thefieldarmygrouporderedtheattackofPanzergruppe2tothesouthandintotherearoftheSoviet5thArmy,whichwasholdingoutinfrontofKiev.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)wastobethesteelypointofthefieldarmyonce the Dessna was crossed. The corps directed the 10. Infanterie-Division(mot.) toadvanceonCholmy–Awdejwkaand the3.Panzer-Division to forceacrossingovertheDessna,whilethe4.Panzer-Divisionwastoinitiallyclearthewestbankoftheriverandfollowthe3.Panzer-Division.The3.Panzer-Divisionwasabout600 to1,000meters in frontof thebroad

valleyoftheDessna.ThecityofNowgorod-Sewerskseparatedthedivisionfromtheriver.Thedivisioncloseduptotheriverduringthenight.OberstKleemannarrivedwith his headquarters, as did the I./Panzer-Regiment 6,Kradschützen-Bataillon3,andAufklärungs-Abteilung1.Ittooklongerforthebatteriestomaketheirwaythroughthesandyroadsandthedeepwoodsinthedefilesinfrontofthecity.Thecommandersdiscussedtheattackinthehoursthatfollowed.Itwasscheduled for 0500 hours the following morning. Since the bridge over theDessnawasmarkedonthebadmapsavailableasbeingatthenorthernentranceofNowgorod,itwasdirectedthatareinforcedtankcompanyunderOberleutnantVopel (commander of the1./Panzer-Regiment 6) take the bridge in a coup demain. The remaining companies of the I./Panzer-Regiment 6 were to givecoveringfirefromthehighgroundinfrontofthecitywhilethatwasbeingdone.Kampfgruppe Kleemann would advance against the southern entrance toNowgorod-Sewersk,whileKampfgruppevonLewinskiwouldcomeinfromthewest.The advance guard ofOberleutnant Vopel—reinforced by the 1./Schützen-

Regiment 394, the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, and the engineer platoon ofSchützen-Regiment 394—left its staging area at 0345 hours. The tanks andpersonnelcarrierswerehitbyartilleryandmortarfireastheyapproached.Theydid not allow themselves to be deterred. The Rome Bridge was crossed and,

aboutonekilometertothesoutheast,thefirstSovietroadblockbrokenthrough.The advance guard then moved two kilometers through a defile, which wasdominated by enemy infantry-gun fire. The fighting vehicles approached theenemygunsatfullspeedandoverranthem.The enemy’s resistance stiffened a bit later at the fork in the road 3.5

kilometersnorthwestofthecity.Thefightingvehicleshadtohaltthere,andtheriflemenhad todismount to force theRussians topullback inahand-grenadeduel.LeutnantAye,aplatoonleaderinthe1./Schützen-Regiment394,waskilled,while hewas negotiatingwith Soviet emissaries.A shortwhile later, the leadfightingvehicleswereatthenorthernoutskirtsofNowgorod-Sewersk.Althoughtherewereafewmachine-gunnests,theywereoverruninshortorder.Butwherewasthebridge?Bythen,OberstleutnantSchmidt-Otthadworkedhiswayforwardtothehigh

groundwithhisother companies.Themenwereofferedamagnificentpicturefromthere.TotheleftwasthebroadbedoftheDessna,withitstwoarms.Ontherightsidewastheprettycity,extendedalongthesteephighground.Behindthat—aboutfourkilometersaway—wasthehighbridge,overwhichanunendingstreamoftrucksandpanjecartswascrossing.Theartilleryliaisonofficersaidhewasnotcapableofengagingthebridge,sincethebatteriesweresofarback.Atthatpoint,Schmidt-OtthadKampfgruppeVopel informedbyradioof theexactlocationofthebridgeandissuedordersthatitwastobetakenimmediately.The tanks, personnel carriers, andmotorcyclesmoved out again. This time,

theywerehitbyRussianfighter-bombers,butlittledamagewasdone.KompanieVopel,followedbytheantitankelementsandtheriflemen,rattledinthedirectionof the bridge.Wherever resistancewas offered, it was answered in the steelylanguage of themain guns andmachine guns.ARussian truckwas destroyedrightinfrontofthebridge.Thetankswereinfrontofthehighbridge,some700meterslong.Theclocksshowed1000hours.While the forwardmost elementsofKampfgruppeKleemann arrivedquickly

at their objective, Kampfgruppe von Lewinski had approached the southernoutskirtscityfromthewest.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6,alongwithitsattachedelements, had departed Forostowitschi around 0700 hours. Artillery firedescendedontheroadsanddefiles.Thebattlegroupreachedthestubblefields,whichwerefullofmachinegunsandguardoutposts.Whilethetankscontinuedtheirway east uninterrupted, themenof the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 swarmedoutacrossthefieldsandsmokedouttheindividualenemygroups,oneafterthe

other.ThebattalionwasonceagainbeingledbyMajorZimmermann,whohadbeenreleasedfromthehospital.Hispredecessor,HauptmannEngelien,wassenttoEberswalde,tocompleteGeneralStaffofficertraining.(HeendedthewarasaregimentalcommanderinKurland.)Oberstleutnant vonLewinski conducteda commanders’ conferencewith the

commandersofhisbattlegrouparound0900hoursinoneofthemanydefiles.Coordination with the batteries was emphasized, since they could only moveforward in the local terrain with difficulty. Soviet fire fell on the group ofofficers. The commander of Artillerie-Regiment 75,Oberst Ries, was killed.Withhimdiedanothermemberofthedivisionalartillery,LeutnantWöhlermannof the regiment’s 1st Battery. Unteroffizier Lipschitz, who later became thesenatorforinternalaffairsinpostwarWestBerlin,wasbadlywoundedandlostanarm.WithinKampfgruppe vonLewinski, the 7./Panzer-Regiment 6 took up point

again. Itcrosseda railwayembankment justbefore thefirsthousesof thecity.As the tanks crossed the tracks, they ran into the positions of a Russian 15-centimeterbattery.TheSovietswereintheprocessoflimberingthegunstothetall, ungainly tractors with the wide tracks that served as prime movers. Themain-gun rounds crashed into the guns and the vehicles and left behind onlysteelskeletonsandacloudofburningoilandfuel.A short time later—1030 hours—Kampfgruppe von Lewinski advanced into

Nowgorod-Sewersk. Generalleutnant Model had moved to the head of thecolumninhisopenstaffcarandorderedcontactbeestablishedbetweenthetwobattlegroups.The II./Panzer-Regiment6wasable toclear theareaaround therailwaystation.Thedivisionthensentthetankbattalionfarthertothesouth,inthedirectionofJuchnowa,totakethebridgethere.Oberleutnant Vopel’s reinforced advance-guard company of the northern

battle group was at the river. The terrain sloped steeply downward and roseequally steeply on the other side. The bridge stood there as the connectionbetweenthetwopoints,juttinghighintotheskyonfourlargepilings.Allofasudden,therewereburstsofmachine-gunfirefromthebridgeguards.Thetwotanksinfronttookupthefightandshreddedthemachine-gunpositions.TwentytothirtyRussiansfledtothebaseofthebridge.LeutnantStörckoftheengineerplatoonofSchützen-Regiment394turnedout

tobequicker,however.Hemaneuveredhiswaythroughthefrontlineoffightingvehicles and raced towards the bridge. Soviet artillery, mortars, and machine

gunsfiredfromtheoppositebanks.OberleutnantVopelhadhistanksspreadouttolendsupport,andthetinnyreportsofthemaingunsandmachinegunscouldbeheard firingagainst identifiedenemypositions.Theengineervehiclehaltedsixtymetersinfrontoftheapproachramptothegiganticbridge,whosefarsidecouldbarelybeseen.Störck jumpeddownfromhisvehicle.FollowingbehindhimwereFeldwebel Heyeres,Unteroffizier Strucken,Obergefreiter Fuhn, andGefreiterBeyle.Themenhurriedtowardthebridge,racingbentoveralongthewoodenplanks,whiletheroundsofthetankskepttheenemydown.StörckandBeylepaidnoattention to them.Their eyeswere looking fordemolitions and,indeed,theyfoundthem.TheLeutnantdiscoveredthefirstchargeononeoftheverticalpilingsonthebox-likesuperstructureofthebridge.Theengineersdoveonit,tearingthelinesoutandthrowingtheboxintothewater.Störckhastenedon,foundthesecondcharge...thenthethird...thenthefourth.The rounds of individual Russian machine guns headed towards them and

forcedtheengineerstotakecover.AfewRussiansoldiersattemptedtofleefromthebridgeandreach thesafetyof thefarshore.The tankgunners tookupaimandfired.Störckwas thenable tocontinue.Anotherchargewasflunginto thewater, followed by another.Valuable time ticked by; no one knew howmanychargeswerestillonthebridge.Thentheydidit.OberleutnantVopeldecidedtoexploit the confusion among the enemy and not wait until the engineers hadcompletedtheirdangerouswork.Thebridgecouldhavegoneupatanyminute.. . the Oberleutnant recognized the opportunity that was being offered. Heordered:“Panzer—Marsch!”Thevehiclesrolledout.Theyrattledtowardsthebridge,movedpastLeutnant

Störck,whowas still in the process of removing charges, and reached the farside.Unteroffizier Borowczek of the 4./Panzer-Regiment 6 led the first tank.With him was Leutnant Hiltmann, the liaison officer from the rifle brigade.Vopel followed close behind with all tanks capable of moving. Close behindwerethemenofPionier-Bataillon39underLeutnantHarzer.It was 1100 hours, when the German tanks reached the south bank of the

Dessna.The Soviets were so surprised, they fled their positions.OberleutnantVopel intended to advance farther. He advanced through the fleeing columnswith his reinforced company so as to take the high ground, some 800metersaway. While the Russian infantry fled, enemy artillery and 7.62-centimeterantitankgunsstartedfiringintotheapproachingtanks.Onefightingvehiclewaslosttoadirecthitfromanantitankgun;thevehicleoftheOberleutnantwasalso

hit. Generalleutnant Model arrived at the bridge at that moment and hadOberstleutnantAudörschbriefhim.Hecouldhardlybelievethatthelargebridgehad fallen into the division’s hands intact. He ordered that Störck berecommended for aKnight’s Cross immediately; he later received it from thehandsofModeloutsideOrel.TheSoviets thennoticedthegreatdangerthelossofthebridgeplacedthem

in.Theyplacedoneartillery firemissionafter theotheron thebridgeand theapproachroad.Itwasalreadytoolate.OberstleutnantSchmidt-Ottwasalreadytherewithhisremainingcompanies.Thebattalioncommanderwasthefirstoneto race over the 700-meter-long stretch. Behind him was Oberleutnant vonKriegsheimwiththeothertanks.Afightingvehiclewashitbyanantitankgun,butitwasabletocontinuemovingunderitsownpower.Oneofthechargeswentoffthattheengineershadoverlooked.Fortunately,itonlycausedlightdamagetothewoodenbeams.The1./Panzer-Regiment6underwentheavyartilleryfireon thehighground

800metersontheothersideofthebridge.Therestofthebattalionarrivedinatimelymanner,bringpalpablerelief.The4./Panzer-Regiment6 tookthewoodsonbothsidesoftheroadunderfire.TheRussiansquicklypulledback.Atthatpoint,thefirstriflemenarrived.The1./Schützen-Regiment394relievedthehard-fighting tank company. Over the next few hours, Oberstleutnant Audörschbroughthisentireregimentacrosstotheeastbank.Theriflemenexpandedandfortified the rapidly won bridgehead. In the process, they engaged an enemyartillery position, capturing a few guns and antiaircraft guns and takingmanyprisoners.Oberstleutnant Audörsch then received orders to immediately thrust south

with his battle group, which consisted of the I./Schützen-Regiment 394, theI./Panzer-Regiment 6, antitank elements, and elements of the reconnaissancebattalion,andinterdicttheimportantKiev–Moscowrailwayline.Thatmeanthewouldbemovingoutintothenight.Theadvancecontinuedthroughwoodsandmarshland.Theexhaustionon thepart ofhis forceswas a consequenceof thestrenuousfightingofthelastfewdays.Whenevertherewasashorthalt,whichwascausedbythepoorroutesorfirebeingreceivedfromthewoods,thedriversfellasleep.Thecommandersandcompanyleaderswentfromvehicletovehicletokeep thecrewsalertandready toattack.After thesmallbridgeat Iwotwascrossedatfirstlight,therewassuddenlyheavyfirereceivedagainsttherearwardportionofthemarchcolumn.Thecolumnwasimmediatelyturnedaround,and

thequickactionsofthetanksunderthecommandofOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ottdrove off the enemy attack. The battle group continued its advance. The leadelement of the rifle battalion, supported by four fightingvehicles and antitankelements,reachedSchostkafromthenorthat0800hours.Buttherewaslittletobeseenofthecity.Thick,yellowishorangesmokefromtheburninggunpowderfactoryspreadoutforkilometersoverthearea.Thecitywastakenagainstlittleresistance.At that point, the battle groupwas approaching theKiev–Moscow rail line.

JustastheleadtanksandSPW’sclearedthehighgroundinfrontoftherailline,a transport train rushed in.The fightingvehicles immediatelyopenedfirewiththeirmainguns,andthemachinegunsontheSPW’salsowhippedtheirroundstowardstheapproachingsteel.Thetraincametoastop,andthelocomotiveandafuelcarstartedtoburn.SoldiersfromaRussianreplacementbattalionjumpedout of the freight carswith raised hands.They had been given themission oftakingouttheGermanairborneforcesatNowgorod–Sewersk.Theraillinewasblockedbytheburningtrain;themissionwasaccomplished.OberstleutnantSchmidt-OttandOberstleutnantAudörschcouldnotbeheldin

check.Alloftherouteshadbeensoftenedandbeamsfrequentlyhadtobeusedbefore the tanks could continue their advance. Soon the soldiers of the battlegroupwereinfrontofWoronesch.TheleadvehiclesofHauptmannZiervogel’sreconnaissancebattalionwerethefirsttoentertheindustrialcity.Unfortunately,theriflecompanieswerenotbehindthem.Theyfrequentlyhadtodefendagainstenemy forces that were still hiding in the woods. Consequently, only theoutskirts of the city were occupied by the few fighting vehicles and SPW’s.Whenanenemyimmediatecounterattackwaslaunchedintheafternoon,itcouldbe turnedback.GeneralleutnantModel appearedat thatmoment.Althoughherecognizedtheachievementsofhisfightingforces,heorderedWoroneschtobeevacuated in lightof the fact thatmostof thedivisionwas far to the rear.Thebattle group left the city at 1700 hours and screened three kilometers to thenorthwest.That morning, Kampfgruppe von Lewinski was stalled at Juchnowa. The

engineershadtoimprovethebridge.Itprovedfasterforthemtosetupaferry,overwhichthefirstfourself-propelledgunsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521werecrossed at 1100 hours. Later on, the fighting vehicles were also able to becrossed, after the riflemen of the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 had expanded thebridgeheadasfarasthevillageofPirogowka.

TheRedAirForcewasveryactivethatdayandintendedtodestroythelargebridgeover theDessna,nomatter thecost.The fighter-bombersdescendedonthe bridge almost continuously, and the bombs howled down constantly. Thebiggestattackconsistedoftwenty-oneSovietbombersatthesametime.The division’s 2nd Medical Company set up a field clearing station on

Nowgorodon26August.ThebadlywoundedweretakentothefieldhospitalinStarodub,wherethe1stMedicalCompanyandthedivision’sambulanceplatoonassumedresponsibilityfortheircare.Thebadweatheron28Augustconsiderablyimpededmovement.Assoonas

improved roads were left, vehicles and even tanks sank in the muck. TheII./Panzer-Regiment 6 was moved from Pirogowka, since the bridgehead wasinsufficientforstartinglarge-scaleoperationsfromthere.ThebattalionwassentthroughNowgorod-Sewersk and across the large bridge to the location of thearmor regiment’s 1st Battalion. By then, the 3rd Battalion was already inSchostka.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6leftitsquartersaroundnoon,aftertherainhadlet

up some, and hit the enemy in the flank at Pirogowka. Despite the nearlyimpassable roads, Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s crews advanced throughtheRussianpositions,reachingtheforwardlinesoftheII./Schützen-Regiment3with the lead tanks at 1700 hours. That cleared out the bridgehead. LeutnantEngelhardtandtwojuniorenlistedmenfromthearmoredregimentwerekilledthatday.The tanksand theeight self-propelledgunsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521hadarrivedjustintime.TheriflemenhadbeenattackedbystrongRussianforces and torn apart.Oberleutnant Biegon’s 9th Company did not rejoin thebattalionuntil0200hours.WhenOberleutnantEwertwaskilled, thedivisionalartillerylostanotherbatterycommander.On orders from the division,Kampfgruppe Audörsch had left its screening

areaintherearinthemorningandenteredWoronescharound1145hours,withthereconnaissancebattalionin thelead.Theenemyattemptedto takebackthecitywiththesupportoftanks,buthewasturnedback.Thebattlegroupinitiatedreconnaissancetothesouthintheevening.Itwasdirectedthatthe2./Schützen-Regiment394occupythebottleneckbetweenthelakesatSaruskawo,supportedby three fighting vehicles. Contrary to expectations, the operations succeededrapidly. The riflemen even advanced five kilometers beyond the orderedobjective.Therailwaylinetherewasblownupbymeansofmines.The enemy then took the initiative. The Soviet high command probably

recognized that the German thrust to the south was not intended to cause anenvelopmentalongtheDessna.Instead,itwasprobablyintendedtoleadintotheUkraine.MarshalTimoschenko,whoseheadquartershadbeeninSchostkaonlyafewdayspreviously,personallydirected theoperations thatwere intended towinbacktheDessnaRiverline.There were constant Russian attacks on 29 August, which were supported

heavilybytheRedAirForceandartillery.Thedivision’svehicleswereunabletomoveduetoashortageoffuel.Thedivisionwasleftuptoitsowndevices,since the 4. Panzer-Division was still rolling towardNowgorod. The armoredregimenthadonlytwenty-twoPanzerII’s,ninePanzerIII’s,andsixPanzerIV’sthatday—thecomplementofacompany.1

TheSoviets initiated their thrustagainstSchostkaat0630hours.Theywereabletopenetrateasfarasthefirstfewhouses.TheGermanformationswereinatight squeeze, since the enemy had succeeded in crossing the main advanceroute, separating thebattle groups.All troop elements in and aroundSchostkawere called to arms. Itwas not until 0930 hours that the primary dangerwaseliminated,andtheenemypulledbackintothewoodseastofthetown.WhenWoroneschwas attacked again in the course of the sunny andwarm

day,thecitywasevacuatedforthesecondtime.Thedivisionalformationspulledback to Schostka. The Soviets vigorously pursued. From the ranks of theI./Schützen-Regiment 394, Leutnant Hecht, Oberfeldwebel Müller and fourenlisted personnel were killed; another three officers were wounded(Oberleutnant Roos, Leutnant Wurm, and Leutnant Meise). Only thereconnaissancebattalionremainedintheareaaroundWoroneschtoscreen.Thesituation around thePirogowkabridgehead easedup some. Itwaspossible forthe II./Schützen-Regiment 3 to improve its positions there.Major Beigel, thecommanderof thedivisionalengineers,screened thedivision’s frontagewithabattle group composed of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, his 1st and 3rdCompanies,andFlak-Abteilung94.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.)was forced to call off the advance of the3.

Panzer-Divisionand the10. Infanterie-Division(mot.).The4.Panzer-DivisionmovedthroughNowgorod-SewersktocleartheDessnariverline.Itthenpulledbehindthe3.Panzer-Division,which,despiteallofthesetbacks,hadtaken800prisoners.On30August, thecorpsordered that the terrain to thesidesof theroadsbe

cleared,sothatthearmordivision,whichhadracedahead,wouldnolongerface

the danger of being encircled and cut off from their rearward lines ofcommunications. Under the command ofOberst Kleemann, the large woodedtract east of Schostka was combed that through day. The mission was anessentialone for the3.Panzer-Division, since its rear-area services, trains andmaintenance companies were still sixteen kilometers away in Nowgorod-Sewerskorwerejustarrivingthere.Underallcircumstance,theconstantthreathadtobeeliminated.Oberstleutnant Audörsch’s Schützen-Regiment 394 had to defend against

intenseenemyattacksearlyinthemorning,whichwereexecutedfromthedensewoods in the direction of Lokotki and Schostka. During those operations, theenemy also employed fifty-two-ton tanks.2 The antitank elements werepowerlessagainstthem.Forthatreason,individualartillerypieceswerebroughtforward to the rifle positions. (Oberstleutnant Dr. Weissenbruch was thedivisional artillery commander at that point.) Working hard, the cannoneersattemptedtorenderthesteelgiantspowerlessbyfiringoveropensights.Since the intensity of the attacks did not let up, the armored regiment was

called forward. The 1st Battalion moved to Lokotki to reinforce the riflebattalionsthere.The2ndBattalionwasemployedtocleartheterraintotheeast.Intheprocessofexecutingthatmission,thebraveactingcommanderofthe8thCompany, Leutnant Dr. Köhler, was killed. While the German and Russianfighting vehicles had it out, fighting also erupted in the sector of Schützen-Regiment3,whichwasstillpositionedinthePirogowkaarea.ItwasdirectedtopushthefriendlypositionsforwardinanefforttoeliminateaRussianthreattothe flanks. Oberleutnant von Zitzewitz’s 1st Company was sent out toreconnoiter the enemy positions around Ssobytsch around 0900 hours. Thecompanyapproachedthevillageinawidelydispersedorderandentereditfromtheside.ThevehiclesreceivedRussianantitank-gunfire,causingthecompanyto pull back to the hills outside the village. By then,Unteroffizier Simon hadmoved on by himself and discovered a way through the marshland from thenorth, which led directly into the village. Oberleutnant von Zitzewitzimmediatelysenthisentirecompanyinthatdirection.ThoseSPW’salsoenteredthe village undetected. The Soviets were completely surprised. UnteroffizierBuggert and his squad cleared the left flank, while the 2nd Platoon underLeutnant Braun advanced as far as the southwest corner of the village. Twovehicleswere lost tomines.Leutnant Schuster, a platoon leader from the 7thCompany,alsojoinedthefraywithhismen,endingtheengagement.Theenemyforcesmanningthedefensesinthevillage—some200men—surrendered.

Thanks to the determined actions of the 1st Company, it was possible toquickly occupy the actual reconnaissance objective. The higher levels ofcommandhadnoideathathadbeendoneand,asaresult,Stukaswereheadingin tobombSsobatsch.At the same time,OberleutnantZitzewitzhadhis radiooperator,Obergefreiter Prange, report to thedivision that thevillagehadbeentaken.Finally,atthelastminute,thedivisionwasabletoholdbacktheattackbytheLuftwaffeandhavetheStukasdirectedelsewhere.Schützen-Regiment394andthearmoredregimentstartedclearingthe terrain

aroundSsobatschafternoon.TheI./Panzer-Regiment6swungtothesouthandsoutheast,while the 2ndBattalion covered themove. In the area just betweenMakoff and Woronesch alone, more than twenty-five fighting vehicles wereidentified.Sincethefriendlyforcesweretooweaktoengage,adefensivefrontwasestablishedthatorientedtothesouth.Theenemytanksdidnotgetpasttherailwayembankment,afterthefirstfewranovermines.TheI./Panzer-Regiment6 and the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 attacked Dewitschi across a practicallybarrenplain.Theenemyputupastubbornfight.Despitealloftheresistance,theGermanattacksoongainedgroundandthevillagecouldbetaken.Mostof theenemyescapedbeingencircled.TheactionsofFeldwebelSchröderandthemenof hisSPW (1st Company of the rifle regiment)were especially praiseworthyduringtheoperation.Despitebeingattackedbyenemytanks,theSPWwiththemounted 3.7-centimeter antitank gun stood its ground.3 Gefreiter Eisen, thegunner,wasabletoknockouteightenemytanksinthespaceoffifteenminuteswith the small-caliber gun. Leutnant Peter and his crew knocked out anadditionalthree.The division started screening in the area it had taken that afternoon. The

night was generally quiet, not counting small skirmishes by patrols on bothsides.Thedivisionattempted topush its supply elements farther forward.The2ndPlatoonoftheArmorMaintenanceCompanywasabletoestablishshopinNowgorod-Sewersk, althoughmostof the companywas still inUnetscha.ThearmoredregimentreceivedreplacementsthatdayfromPanzer-Ersatz-Abteilung254inErlangen.Themenreceivedcouldnotbeusedrightaway,sincetheyhadonly received trainingon thePanzerI and thePanzer38(t)5 in the homeland.Neitherofthetwovehicleswasonhandinthedivision.The divisionwas unable to advance on 31August, either, since theSoviets

suddenlystartedassaultingNowgorod-Sewerskfromthenortheast.Elementsofall of the formations had to be shifted north. At the same time, the Russians

attackedWoronesch.The3./Schützen-Regiment394andAufklärungs-Abteilung1evacuatedthecity in thefaceof thesuperiornumbers.TheSovietsoccupiedthe city with thirty tanks. Schützen-Regiment 394 cleared the woods aroundMakoff, while Schützen-Regiment 3 occupied the high ground southwest ofSchostka. A Stuka attack was conducted against Woronesch early in theafternoon, laying a portion of the industrial city to waste. The Soviets tookconsiderablelosses.Whenthemenofthereconnaissancebattalionfelttheirwaytoward the city, they no longer encountered any enemy. The reconnaissancebattalionthenoccupiedthecityforthethirdtimeinthespaceofthreedays.The division was directed to move to the south, forming its point of main

effortontheright.The4.Panzer-Divisionwastobetothedivision’sright.Thistime,theriflebrigadewasplacedupfront.Thearmoredregimentwasbehindit,withthe2ndBattalionontheright,the1stBattalionontheleftandPanzerjäger-Abteilung521inthemiddle.TheI./Schützen-Regiment394waspulledoutofthelineanddesignatedas thecorpsreserve.Theattackstartedat0700hourson1Septemberafterashortartillerypreparation.Theenemyresistanceinfrontofthebrigadewasslight.TheriflemenwereabletoadvanceasfarasthesouthernpartofWoroneschwithoutanyseriousfighting,since theenemyhadevacuated thecityafterthepreviousday’sStukaattack.Onthefarsideofthecity,theenemyhadduginagain,however,andputupenergeticresistancetoKampfgruppevonManteuffel.TothesouthofWoronesch,inthemiddleofalargewoodedarea,theenemy

was holding rail and road bridges that led across Essanj Creek. MajorZimmermann’s II./Schützen-Regiment 3 was given the mission of taking bothbridges.The7thCompanyofthebattalion,advancingontheright,reachedtherailwaybridgearound1000hours.Itboggeddowninthefaceofenemyfire.The6th Company, attacking on the right, reached the road bridge with its leadplatoon. Just as the first two vehicleswere crossing the bridge, theywere hitwithwell-aimedenemymachine-gunfire.Theplatoonleader,FeldwebelModer,aKnight’sCrossrecipient,waswounded.Oneriflemanwaskilled.TheSoviets,whowere able to observe along the sandy andwide road through thewoods,were able to stop every movement. Despite that, several men from the 10thCompanyattemptedtoclearenemymines,buttheywerealsoforcedtogiveupthateffortinthefaceoftheheavyfire.Forthetimebeing,thebattalionmadenoprogress.By then, the division had established a strong screening ring around

Woronesch.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6coveredthesouthernandwesternedgesof the city. The 1./Schützen-Regiment 3 and the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39 werecombined to form a special blocking group, to be employed wherever thingswere“hot.”TheI./Schützen-Regiment3coveredtheflankstothewestandhadtoovercomeenergeticresistance,evenafter the4.Panzer-Division,whichwasmovingfromSsobytschinthedirectionofKlimschki,hadpassedbytheenemyforcesholdingthere.SupportedbyfightingvehiclesfromPanzer-Regiment35,whichjusthappenedtorunintotheenemyintherear,theresistancewasfinallybroken and 350 prisoners taken in the process. To the east, the III./Panzer-Regiment 6 screened the left flank of the division, which was growing everlonger.Kampfgruppe von Manteuffel and Kampfgruppe von Lewinski moved out

around1300hoursfromtherailstationatSaruzkawoinanefforttofinallybreakopenthebottleneckbetweenthelakesandtakethebridge.Thedivisionhadtogetthroughthatbottleneck,sincethemarshlandonbothsidesofthelakesmadeitimpossibletomovewithmotorizedvehicles.TheSovietcommandintendedtoholdthatbottleneck,sothattheavenueofadvancetoKrolewezwasnotlost.Itwas elements of the Soviet 23rd Police Division (GPU) that were positionedthere. They did not allow themselves to be intimidated by either tanks orartillery.Usingallof their forces,OberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott’s I./Panzer-Regiment 6

andMajorFrank’sPanzerjäger-Abteilung521wereabletoforcetheirwayuptothe second bridge. Since it was already destroyed and the enemy had goodobservation of the approach routes, the formations bogged down again. Incontrast, the attack that afternoon by the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 atPissarewitschi picked up steam again, afterOberleutnant Tank’s 6thCompanyestablishedcontactwithOberleutnantMente’s7thCompany.Patrolsdiscoveredanother bridge right outside the village; it was also guarded by the enemy.Ashortwayfromthere,however,wasawoodenfootbridgeoverthecreek.Sincethewoodswentallthewaytothewater,MajorZimmermanndecidedtohavehisbattalion cross there. The lead platoon of Leutnant Scheffler (7th Company)encountered strong resistance almost immediately. The young officer andUnteroffizier Traue were mortally wounded. In the end, efforts to advancethoughthethickunderbrushwerelikewiseabandoned.Inthemiddleofallthat,thebattalioncommanderreceivedareportthataparalleltrackoftherailwaylinehadbeendiscoveredinthemiddleofthewoods.Itwasnotmarkedonanymap.MajorZimmermann immediately sent the7thCompanyandOberleutnantvon

Becker’s8thCompanyinthatdirection.Bothcompaniesreachedthemaintrack.Bydoingso,theyfoundthemselves

approximatelyonekilometerbehindtheRussians,whowereorientedtotheeast.The riflemen approached the railway bridge undetected. The battalioncommander went forward, followed closely by his liaison officer, LeutnantFreiherr vonEckardstein,Leutnant Pauckstadt (8thCompany), andFeldwebelSchneider(SignalsPlatoon).TheSovietsweresosurprised,theyneededseveralminutes before they even reacted.By then, the 8thCompany had tossed handgrenadesattheenemy.Atthesametime,thebattalionadjutant,LeutnantBrandt,hadbrought the6thCompanyforward,whichstartedattacking fromthe flank.Therailwaybridgewastaken.Itwasnolongerpossibletogettotheroadbridge,sincedarknesshaddescended.The attack in themiddle of the front had also notmade any progress. The

divisionrequestedStukas.At1815hours,nineaircrafthurtleddownwithahowlon theenemypositionsalong thebottleneckanddropped theirdeadlycargoes.Theenemydidnotwaver.Whentheriflemenandtanksfelttheirwayforward,thereceivedthesamestrongfiretheyhadreceivedpreviously.Theattackcouldnotberepeatedduringthenight.TheRedAirForceattackedWoroneschseveraltimesduringtheday,butitdidnotcauseanynoticeabledamage.Whenitturneddark,thebombingraidswerehalted,onlytobepickedupagainstinthemorningaround0500hours.Around2300hours,thecorpsorderfortheattackthenextdayarrivedatthe

divisioncommandpost,whichwaslocatednorthofWoroneschinthemiddleofacloverfield.Itrequiredacontinuationoftheattacktothesouth.Move-outforthe division was scheduled for first light on 2 September. The I./Panzer-Regiment6 pushed itsway forward in the densewoods to the location of theI./Schützen-Regiment3. In theprocess, the lead tanksof the2ndCompanyranover mines. The company was led by Oberleutnant Meyrhofer, who haddistinguished himself during the campaign in the West. His predecessor,OberleutnantBuchterkirch, had just left the division to assume a command inGermany.Thedivisionreinforcedtheforcesboggeddownatthebottleneckinthecourse

of the day. The I./Schützen-Regiment 3 was pushed forward as far as theEssmanj.Theengineersthenwentforwardwithflamethrowersandsmokepotsandattached toOberst vonManteuffel.Theattackof the reinforcedSchützen-Regiment3 finallystartedaround1400hours,afteralmostallof thedivisional

artilleryhadplacedanintensepreparationontheenemypositions.Theriflemenattackedagainstatoughandwilyopponentandagainstamarsh

thatwasalmostworse.Theenemy’spocketsofresistancehadtobesmokedoutbytheengineers.The2ndBattalionoftherifleregimentsucceededinadvancingthrough a gap in the front to the east and hitting the enemy from the rear.Fortunately,anarmorpatrolfromtheIII./Panzer-Regiment6hadheadedoutatthesametimeinthesamedirection.Theenemypulledback.Around 1845 hours, the bottleneck had been opened and a bridgehead

established across the Essmanj.Major Wellmann’s 1st Battalion immediatelyheadedsouthwithhis2ndCompanyon the rightandhis3rdCompanyon theleft.Theycombedthroughthewoodsonbothsidesoftheroadandshookhandswith the tankers of the 3rd Battalion at the whistle stop at Andronikoff. Theriflemensetupsecurity.The armored cars and the motorcycles of the reconnaissance battalion

continued to move, reaching the area five kilometers north of Krolewez byevening.Theplatoonsandcompanieshadtosetupanall-rounddefenseforthenight,sincethewoodswerefullofenemy.Duringtheday,thedivisionbroughtthe 3rd Company of engineers and the bridging section forward to create acrossingpointovertheEssmanj.Duringthenight,thedivisionreinforcedKampfgruppevonManteuffel,which

had been directed to move out against Krolewez on 3 September. The battlegroup consisted of Schützen-Regiment 3, the I./Panzer-Regiment 6, the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, the II./Flak-Regiment 94, and the 6./Flak-Regiment 11. Oberleutnant von Zitzewitz’s advance guard—consisting of aplatoon of tanks, a platoon of antitank elements, a minesweeper section, the1./Schützen-Regiment3,andtwo10.5-andone8.8-centimeterguns—movedoutrightat0700hoursintheareaaroundAndronikoff.Themainbodyofthebattlegroup followed closely behind, with Manteuffel’s forces receiving additionalreinforcementbytheadditionofOberstleutnantWöhlermann’s2ndBattalionofartillery.Withoutencounteringappreciableenemyresistance, the leadvehiclesalmost

movedinasingleboundasfarasPodoloff,justoutsideKrolewez.Onceagain,therewasacreeksnakingitswayacrosstheavenueofadvance—theRetj.MajorWellmann committed his 2ndCompany against the intact railway bridge. Theriflemen succeeded in taking the bridge, which had been prepared fordemolition, and forming a bridgehead at Podoloff. The advance then stopped

temporarily, because, unexpectedly, Russian tanks suddenly appeared on thesouthernoutskirtsofthevillage.Wellmann shifted his battalion’s forces to focus on that threat. Two of his

companies succeeded in expanding the bridgehead to the south. At the sametime,themainbodyofvonManteuffel’sbattlegrouphadswungtotheeastandturned from there in thedirectionofKrolewez.The I./Panzer-Regiment6wasturnedaroundnoonandsentviaGruskojetowardRetik.Itwasintendedforthetankcompaniestopowerfullysupporttheattackofthebattlegroupfromthere.Thebridges therewere tooweak tohandle anythingbutPanzerII’s, however.Theycrossedandsupported the riflemen.Themainbodyof the tankbattalionremainedinRetik.BothbattalionsofSchützen-Regiment3workedtheirwayslowlytoKrolewez

from two sides, pushing the enemy back into the city. Despite the onset ofdarkness, the riflemen remained in contact with the enemy, even though theadvancesloweddowncorrespondingly.Bothofthebattalionslinkeduparound2330hoursinthelocality.Totherearofthebattlegroup,the3rdCompanyofengineershadarrivedwith

the bridging section to restore the damagedbridgeover theRetj in two spots.Since the open left flank of the division kept growing longer, KampfgruppeAudörschdetachedthe9thCompanyofthearmorregiment,whichwaspushedforwardtoAndranikoff.The division was blessed with good luck that day. In its sector, General

EngineerTschistoff,arecipientoftheOrderofLenin,wascaptured.Thathighofficerhadbeendirected toestablishdefensivepositionsalongtheDessna.Hehadbeengivenwide-rangingpowersandhadamillionworkersathisdisposal.He had just arrived fromMoscow by train and had no idea that Nowgorod-SewerskhadbeeninGermanhandsforaweek.Anotherimportantprisonerthatdaywas a captain from the operations section of theRussianXXXXVCorps,whichwasfacingthedivision.The constant rainfall transformed all of the routes into a sea of muck and

demonstrated onemore time how the power of nature could be dangerous formotorizedformations.Thearmoredregimentrecommendedtothedivisionthatits threebattalionsbe consolidated into two, since its high losses in tankshadreduceditsstrengthbyhalf.

BattleforKiev.

Duringthenight, theII./Schützen-Regiment3clearedKrolewezofstragglersand units that were still holding out.Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott’s I./Panzer-Regiment6leftthecityat1200hours.IthadreceivedthemissiontoreconnoiterasfarasSspaskojeandtakethebridgesover theSeiminacoupdemain.Thebattalion was reinforced to that end by the attachment of the 1./Schützen-Regiment3,aplatoonofengineers,andtwoartillerypieces,sinceitsownforces—two Panzer II’s, one Panzer III, and two Panzer IV’s—were too weak toaccomplishthemissiononitsown.Schmidt-Ott’s forcesmadegoodprogress.Theymoved throughTscherepoff

and then encountered a patchofwoods right outsideofSspaskoje,whichwas

thickwith the enemy. Schmidt-Ott had his forces reorganize.While the tanksand the SPW’s prepared, enemy artillery rounds slammed into their assemblyarea. A direct hit slammed into the company commander’s tank of the 2ndCompany.OberleutnantMeyrhoferwaskilledinstantly.ASPWalsoburnedout.Thesmallbattlegroupthenapproachedthelocalityfromthewest,butitalso

encountered a strong defense there.A few capturedRussian civilians reportedthat there were twenty fighting vehicles in Sspaskoje. When a patrol sentforward to the Seim determined that there was no bridge there, Schmidt-Ottcalledofftheoperation.HisforcesreturnedtoKrolewezat1900hours.The division had pulled its forces together, so that it could attack in

concentrated form thenextday.Thatafternoon, the II./Panzer-Regiment6waspushed forward to the reconnaissance battalion at Matkowschtina, which hadalready been reinforced by three light fighting vehicles from the regimentalheadquarters. Oberstleutnant Munzel left the wheeled vehicles behind andpressed forward to the high ground 2.5 kilometers north of Mutino with histanks.Unfortunately,darknessfellrapidlyontheextremelycloudyday,sothattheattackplanhadtobeabandoned.GeneralleutnantModelhadhis commandpostmoved to the schoolhouse in

Krolewez that afternoon. A short while later, the Red Air Force attacked thelocality.AFlakwasabletobringdownonemachinerightovertheschoolhouse.The pilot, who had bailed out, landed by parachute not too far from thecommandpost.Leutnant vondemKnesebeck, thedivision intelligenceofficer,jumped on a motorcycle and raced out to the landing spot. The Russianattemptedtoescape,buthewasshotatbythesoldiers,whohadresponded,andkilled.Whenhispocketsweresearched,importantdocumentsconcerningtheairdefensefacilitiesforBrjanskwerediscovered,aswellasfortheaerialdefensesofMoscow.Inaddition,therewasasituationmapfortheSovietforcesrightinfrontofthedivision.ThatgoodcatchwasimmediatelyreportedtothecorpsandontoPanzergruppe2.Whileexaminingthemap,itwasdeterminedthattheleadelements of the 3. Panzer-Division were right on the boundary between theSoviet13thand21stArmies.GeneralleutnantModelheldaconferencewithhiscommandersthatevening.HeorderedthetakingofMutinothenextdayandthebridgeovertheSeimthere.OberstleutnantMunzel’s II./Panzer-Regiment 6 andHauptmann Ziervogel’s

Aufklärungs-Abteilung1,supportedbyattachedriflemen,antitankelementsandartillery,movedoutfromtheirassemblyareasupfrontrightat0600hours.They

tookthehighgroundnorthofMutinoandpushedtheenemytheredownintothevalley floor. The battle group then enteredMutino proper around 1300 hours.The II./Schützen-Regiment 3, which had been augmented with the two SPWcompanies from the two rifle regiments, attacked theRussian positionswith aloudHurra!The riflemen took244prisoners.Thebattalion lost12menkilledand50wounded.WachtmeisterKirchgeorg,wholedtheattachedgunsfromthe2ndBatteryofartilleryduringtheadvance,waskilledjustoutsideofthelocality.Butasthetanksandtheriflemenapproachedtheriver,theyhadtowatchasthebridgeflewintotheair.Theformationsdeployedalongtheriverhadtoscreenforthetimebeing.The I./Schützen-Regiment 3 had employed Hauptmann Peschke’s 3rd

Company during the operation as a flank guard. Itmoved towards Sspaskoje,alsowiththeintentofreachingtheSeim.Justoutsideofthevillage,theriflemenreceived heavy fire from artillery and tanks, including some thirty-two-tonfighting vehicles.6 It was unable to proceed. Since the Russians there evenlaunched an immediate counterattack that afternoon, the motorcycle infantrybattalionwasquicklycalledforward.MajorPapethenassumedcommandofthescreeningmissionwithhiscompanies.Since the river could not be crossed up to that point, the division ordered

Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 to attack Kamenjaround1200hours.Afteraquickpreparationalongtheedgeofadefile,Kamenjwasreachedaround1530hours.The10thCompanywasevenpushedforwardasfarasMorosowka.FromKamenj,thebattalion’stankstooktheenemypositionsalongthesouthbankoftheSeimunderfire.Thatafternoon,theenemyrepliedwithheavyartilleryandmortarfire.Themorningof6Septembersawrainonceagain.At0900hours,ordersfor

thecontinuedattackwereissued.Afternocrossingpointsover theSeimcouldbewon on the leftwing and in themiddle, themain effort shifted right. ThebridgesatMelnjaweretobetaken,whilethe4.Panzer-DivisionclosedupandattackedBaturin.Despite thesoftenedroutes, thedivisionreorganized its forces thatmorning.

Staging at the Tscherepoff whistle stop were the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, theI./Schützen-Regiment3,andKradschützen-Bataillon3.Theywereearmarkedtotake Sspaskoje. The I./Panzer-Regiment 6 and the II./Schützen-Regiment 394weretoadvanceviaAltinowkainthedirectionofMelnja.ThatbattlegroupwasfollowedinthesecondwavebytheIII./Panzer-Regiment6andtheI./Schützen-

Regiment394.The lefthandgroupreported toOberstKleemann,whoalsohadthe2ndand3rdBattalionsofthedivisionalartilleryindirectsupport.Atexactly1200 hours, the riflemen, tankers and motorcycle infantry moved out of theTscherepoffarea,afterthetwoartillerybattalionshadplacedstrongpreparatoryfiresinandaroundSspaskoje.Major Wellmann’s 1st Battalion of rifles attacked the locality through a

depressionfromthenortheast.Afterashort, sharp fight, itwasable tooccupythecemeteryandtakethefirsthouses.OberstleutnantMunzel’sfightingvehicleswerethenbroughtforward.Theypressedintothelocalityatthesametimeastheriflemen.Mostoftheenemydidnotputupadefense.Instead,hepulledbacktothesouth.Thefightingvehiclespursuedimmediately.In a short period, the tanks were able to knock out seven Russian fighting

vehicles and an armored car. The 8th Company succeeded in taking out anenemy antiaircraft battery at Ljubitoff.Major Pape’s motorcycle infantry hadguarded the flank of the attacking battalions. In this he was aided byKampfgruppePeschke,whichconsistedofoneplatoonfromthe3rdCompany,twoplatoonsfromthe4thCompany,andoneplatoonfromthe2ndCompany(allof Schützen-Regiment 3), as well as two antitank guns from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, one 8.8-centimeter Flak, and one rocket launcher. The latterforceswere then rapidly committed in the direction ofOssaritschi to take thebridgeovertheSeimthere.Justastheleadelementsofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionreachedtheriver,thebridgeflewintotheair.Inaddition,thelastthreeoperational tanksof the8thCompanywerehit.The7./Panzer-Regiment6wasabletogetfarther,reachingtheMelnjawhistlestop,whereitthensetupanall-round defense, having expending its ammunition. The operations on the leftwingofthedivisionweresuccessfullyconcludedby1845hours.Allofthedesignatedobjectiveswerealsotakenintherighthandattacksector.

KampfgruppevonLewinskihadtakenupitsassemblyareasby1300hoursintheareabetweentheroadandtherailwaylinenotfarfromtheTscherepoffwhistlestop.Shortlyafter1300hours,OberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott’sI./Panzer-Regiment6andMajorDr.Müller’sII./Schützen-Regiment394commencedtheirattack.Theleadtanksandthe6thCompanyoftherifleregimentreachedthevillage

at 1500 hours and advanced all the way through to the southern edge. TherewerealotofRussianshiddeninthehousesandthehuts;theyhadtobedrivenoutby thecompanies that followed.Afteranhour,Altinowkawasclearof theenemy.Whenmostoftheformationshadreassembled,theattackwascontinued.

The fighting vehicles in the lead encountered the first Soviet tanks shortlyafterleavingthevillage.Theywerecrossingthelineofadvancefromtheeasttothesouthwest.Theenemywasdrivenback,afteronevehiclewentupinflames.Thebattlegrouppursuedthewithdrawingenemy.Aftercoveringtwokilometers,moreSoviet tankswereencountered.Those tankshadoccupiedgoodpositionsfor defending.As theGerman companiesmoved out to attack, several enemyrifle companies attacked to the right of the road, not too far from the Rudawhistlestop.Justasthefightingturnedcritical,the12./Panzer-Regiment6arrivedsouthof

Ruda,sincethearmoredregiment’s3rdBattalionwasfollowingthe1stbattalionbythen.IttooktheRussiantanksunderfireatgreatdistance.Theenemystartedto pull back. The Russian riflemen also started to flee. The German advancecontinued.ButtheenemyhadsetupdefensivepositionsatthenorthernedgeofChrolynskyandofferedafight.WhiletheI./Panzer-Regiment6preparedtofightin the town,Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski and his tank companies pulled asurpriseandrolledpast.TheRussianspulledbackwestrapidlyatthatpoint.When it turned dark,GeneralleutnantModel appeared and issued orders to

OberstleutnantAudörsch to advance in the directionofMelnjawith his battlegroup,whichconsistedoftheII./Schützen-Regiment394,theengineerplatoonofSchützen-Regiment 394, the III./Panzer-Regiment 6, a company fromPionier-Bataillon 39, antitank elements, and divisional artillery. He was to take thebridgeovertheSeimthere.Theadvancewasimmediatelyresumedincompletedarknesswith the hope of reaching the riverwhile itwas still dark, since thedominant high ground on the far bank would make a daylight approachimpossible.The forces onlymade slowprogress, however, since every villagewas occupied by the enemy and had to be taken. Despite that, the river wasreached around 2300 hours. When Oberfeldwebel Blaich of the 12./Panzer-Regiment6enteredthevillageofMelnjaintheleadtank,hereceivedtwodirecthitsfromanantitankgun.Thevehiclewasnolongeroperational,andtheseniornoncommissionedofficerwaswounded.Nonetheless,theroutewascleartotheriver.Unfortunately,theriflemenofSchützen-Regiment394wereunabletotakethe

bridgeovertheSeiminanundamagedcondition.Thebridgeflewintotheairinfront of the eyes of the riflemen arriving from the lead company of the 2ndBattalion.OberstleutnantAudörschimmediatelymadethedecisiontocrossoverthe river to the far bank under the cover of darkness with the entire 2nd

Battalion, using the inflatable craft from the regiment’s engineer platoon(Leutnant Störck). Despite the heavy enemy fire, the action succeeded. Toexpand thebridgehead, thepositionsof theartillery, tanksandheavyweaponswere determined during the course of the night. By then, at first light, theregiment’s1stBattalionhadarrivedfromWoronesch.Toexpandthebridgehead,it also crossed over the river in inflatable craft, since the engineer companydesignatedforthecrossinghadnotyetarrived.Itwasgivenheavyfiresupportfromtheartillery,tanks,andFlak.Asaresultofthearrivalofthe1stBattalion,thebridgehead couldbe expanded somewhat.A significant expansionwasnotpossible, however, since the rifle regiment’s positions were constantly undermachine-gunfireandtheRedAirForcewascontinuouslyintheair,bombingtheGermanforces.Inordertoexpandhistoeholdandtakethehighground,whichthe Russians still possessed, Oberstleutnant Audörsch requested air supportthrough the division during the morning of 7 September. The sorties werepromised at 1300 hours. As the German aircraft were closing in,GeneralleutnantModel andOberstKleemann arrived atAudörsch’s commandpost. With astounding precision, the bombers hit the Russian positions. TheRussianswavered,andtheriflemenstormedthekeyhighground.Atthatpoint,OberstKleemannassumedcommandoftheforcesinthebridgehead.Audörschandhiscommandpostwentforwardintothebridgehead.ThedivisionpushedMajorBeigel’sengineerbattalionuptothecrossingpoint

quickly. The companies and the bridging section, which had moved forwardthrough Altinowka, immediately started erecting a bridge. They built threesections,eachwithasixteen-toncapacity.HauptmannKalkbrenner’smenofthebridgingsectionwereconstantlyonthegoandworkedhardintothenight.Thedivisionreorganizedover thenextfewhoursfor thecontinuationof the

attackon8September.KampfgruppeKleemannconsistedofSchützen-Regiment394, the 1./Schützen-Regiment 3, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, the III./Panzer-Regiment 6,Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, and the6./Flak-Regiment59.Thedivisionalartilleryplacedmostof itsbatteries in theMelnjaareaandoccupiedfiringpositionsundercoverofdarkness.KampfgruppevonManteuffelwasdirected to remain in its sectoruntil a reinforced regimentfrom the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) could relieve it. The 3./Artillerie-Regiment75andthe1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543,whichhadbeendesignatedasacorpsreserve,werereturnedtothedivision.GeneralleutnantModelhadhiscommandpostmovedtothenortheasternedgeofKsensowka.Modelpersonallywentforwardwithhis liaisonofficerstoMelnja,wherehehadasignalscenter

setup.Since only Schützen-Regiment 394 was across the river at that point, the

divisiondesignatedthefollowingorderofpriorityforthecrossingoftherestofits elements across the pontoon bridges: the III./Panzer-Regiment 6, with onecompany fromPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521; the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 and theremainder ofPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521; the 1./Schützen-Regiment 3; Panzer-Regiment 35 (4. Panzer-Division); the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75; theII./Artillerie-Regiment42;7theIII./Artillerie-Regiment103(4.Panzer-Division);the III./Artillerie-Regiment 75; and the combat vehicles of the formationsinvolved.Theengineerswereabletobringoffthecompletionofthebridgesby0400hours,atleasttotheextentthattheywereforthemostpartusable.Two hours later, the first tanks and SPW’s crossed the bridge to reinforce

KampfgruppeAudörsch.Thedayslowlydawned.Theriflemenandthevehicleshad to bunch up in the bridgehead. The terrain was very flat and consistedprimarilyofmeadowlandswithpracticallynocover.Fromthesouthernendoftheblown-uprailwaybridge,theenemyhadgoodfieldsofobservationintothesector,with the result thathe took thepontoonbridgesunderconstantartilleryandmortarfire.Atthesouthernedgeofthemeadowlands,theterrainrosetoa500-meter-long plateau that stretched to the large woods on the horizon. Thesandyridgesonthenorthernendoftheplateauofferedtheonlyconcealedareafor the assembly of theGerman forces. That spotwas also under enemy fire,causing some casualties among the artillery. Ever since first light, theobservation aircraft of the attached 9.(H)/ Lehrgeschwader 2 were in the air,radioingtheirreportstotheLuftwaffeliaisonofficersbelow.Thentherewasasuddenrushingsoundintheair—itwasexactly1030hours

—Stukaswereon theirway in.Theydoveon the enemypositions andon theedge of the village right in front of the outposts.While the first group pulledbackup,themenoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394emergedoutoftheirholesandassaulted south of the railway bridge toward the enemy. They were closelyfollowed by the fighting vehicles of the III./Panzer-Regiment 6. The armoredregiment’s 2ndBattalion and elements ofPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521 took thevillage in front of the positions and cleared it by 1100 hours of any enemyelements.Oberstleutnant vonLewinskiwentback to the cliffswithhis2ndBattalion,

theattachedantitankelementsandthemountedriflemen,wheretheythenmoveddirectly south in the direction of Werenki. They were closely followed by

Panzer-Regiment35ofthe4.Panzer-Division,whichhadalsocrossedbythen.Thecontinuedcrossingofthedivisionalelementswascompletedseamlesslyinlarge measure to the exemplary traffic regulation provided by traffic controlsectionsoftheI./Panzer-Regiment6.KampfgruppevonLewinskiwasunabletoproceedalongthedesignatedroutes

asaconsequenceofdestroyedbridges; itwas redirected to theeast.The tanksandtheirmountedriflemenrattledalongadeeplysandyroutetothesouthalongtherail line.EnemyforceswereidentifiedoutsideofWerenki.Providedstrongcovering fires, the tanks entered the village, scattered a truck convoy and ranintoabatterythatwaschangingpositions.Thebattlegroupturnedinthemiddleof the village to the southeast so as to take the high ground across from it.Unfortunately, the lead tank broke through a bridge when six heavy Russiantanks appeared on the high ground, moving perpendicular to the route of theGerman tanks. Before the enemy identified the approaching columns, the 7thCompanyhadgoneintopositionandopenedfire,knockingouttwotanks.Atthesame time, a light howitzer from Oberleutnant Weymann’s 6th Batteryunlimbered and a self-propelled gun of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 also wentinto position.They each knocked out a tank.At that point, the Soviets pulledback. The battle group was unable to immediately proceed, however, sinceenemyforcesalsoappearedtothesouthwest.Theregimentallightplatoonwasimmediatelyemployedagainst those forces, stopping that attack.Twohundredprisonersweretaken.The flank guard for the attacking battle groupswas provided by anad hoc

detachment thatwas formed for thepurpose. Itsmissionwas to reconnoiter inthedirectionoftheraillineleadingtoKonotop.Artilleryprovidedthenecessarysupport,whiletheantitankelements,motorcycleinfantryandengineersfelttheirway forward. Thanks to heavymachine-gun and antitank-gun fire, the enemyforced the detachment to take cover in a large cornfield.Leutnant Bürkner ofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543waskilled.ItwasnotuntilStukasattackedthattherewas some relief.OberleutnantMichels, the commander of the3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543,used theopportunity tohavehisantitankgunsgo intoposition.Leutnant Fischer’s platoon successfully engaged the Russian trenches. Theflank-guarddetachmentwasabletocompleteitsmissionbytheafternoon.Around1400hours,KampfgruppeAudörschcrossedtherailwayline.Anhour

later,itencounteredstrongenemyforcesinavillagethatwasnotmarkedonthemap.AhardstruggleensuedwiththeRussian777thRifleRegiment,whichwas

well equipped with antitank guns, thus preventing the German tanks frommakingafrontalassault.Finally, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394 was able to break the last resistance

with thehelpofattachedheavyweapons.Thebattalioncapturedone lightandsixheavyantiaircraftguns, fourantitankguns,and tenheavy infantryguns; inaddition,200prisonerswerebroughtin.Amongthemweresixuniformedgirlsranging in age from fifteen to eighteen. As it started to turn dusk, the battlegroupsetupanall-rounddefenseinthewoodstwokilometerssouthoftherailline.The10./Panzer-Regiment6hadtoreturntotheSeimtosupport thecrossing

ofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionoverthedestroyedrailwaybridge,startingat1700hours.ThetwobattalionsofSchützen-Regiment3andtheremainingbattlegroupsofthedivisioncrossedthepontoonbridgesinthecourseoftheafternoon,with the result that the entire division, with the exception of the rear-areaservices,wasacrosstheSeimtothesouth.After a coldnight,where itwasbarelypossible to still sleep in theopen, a

drearydaydawned.Thedivisionused the time toconcentrate its forcesbetter.Schützen-Regiment394clearedPropowka.Theremainingformationsgraduallyassembled in the area aroundWerenki.Thatmeant thatmost of the division’scombatforceshadshotpastKonotoptothewest.Thelargetownwastobeleftto the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.), which was still following.OberleutnantRoever’s2ndCompanyofengineerstooktheairfieldatKonotop,however,inacoup de main. Roever was wounded, and Leutnant Weigel assumed actingcommand.Thecompanycapturedtwoaircraftandtookseventeenprisoners.The enemy attempted to attack the division from the east several times.

KampfgruppevonManteuffel—theI./Schützen-Regiment3anddivisionaltroops—moved forward around 1200 hours. Itwas able to establish a bridgehead atSchepowalowka at 1400 hours. In the process, the 3rd Company of the rifleregimentblockedthebridgesatSzarazorkaandGurewka.Thedivision formedabattlegroupunder the commandofMajor Frank. Its

missionwas toadvanceas faraspossible. Inaddition toFrank’sPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521, the battle group heaviest combat forces consisted of the8./Panzer-Regiment6andthelightplatoonofthesamebattalion.Frankandhismenwere able to advance as far asKorabutowo rapidly and cross thebridgestherebyevening.Theenemywascompletelysurprisedandneededsometimetomount energetic countermeasures. The riflemen, tanks and antitank elements

were able to hold off the attacks, however, and hold their bridgeheads untilOberstvonManteuffel’sbattlegroupwith the II./Schützen-Regiment3 and the2nd Battalion of divisional artillery arrived towards midnight, considerablyreinforcingFrank’sforces.Duringthenight,thedivisionorderedthecontinuedattackinthedirectionof

Romnyon10September.ItwastocrosstheSsulathere.Atthatpoint,everyoneknewwhatwassoimportantabouttheadvance—linkingupwithPanzergruppe1comingfromthesouth.Around 0600 hours, the division moved out with all of its forces for the

decisive thrust. Unfortunately, the skies were leaden and rain bordering on adownpour transformed all the roads and trails into muck. Many vehicles gotstuckandhadtoberecoveredbyprimemovers.Amotorcyclewasattachedtoeach truck. Itwasn’teasy for theheavy trucks,either.Theyfrequentlysank totheiraxlesinthemud.Asaresult,themarchserialsandcolumnswereextendedseveral times theirnormal lengthandsoon theonly thing that remainedwasaconglomerate of companies, platoons, troops, and batteries all intermingled.Despitethat,theadvancecontinuedslowlyforward.The officers and men of Frank’s advance guard, as well as Aufklärungs-

Abteilung 1, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6, theII./Schützen-Regiment 3, the 1./Schützen-Regiment 394, elements of Pionier-Bataillon39,theII./Artillerie-Regiment75,andafewFlakallchurnedtheirwaythroughthemud.Towardnoon,thehousesofRomnyappearedonthenortheastedgeofaridgelinethatjuttedoutofthevalleylikeanisland.MajorFrankraced toward thefirstbridgewith the3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung

521, the 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, a company of riflemen, and a battery. TheSoviets,whohadsecuredthedeepcutoftheRomenRiverbytankditchesandwireobstacles,weresosurprisedbythesuddenappearanceoftheGermansthattheyinitiallydidnotofferadefense.Theleadvehiclesofthedivisionusedtheopportunityanddidnotgetheldupbythewhistlingrounds.TheyassaultedandtookthebridgeovertheBolschj-RomenandthenimmediatelyenteredRomneyfromthenorthwest.Theydidnotstopthere.Theycontinuedthroughthecityasfar as the bridge over the Ssula at the far end. Oberleutnant Lingk, thecommander of the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, was the first to reach thebanks. Without regard for the consequences, he drove straight through thecompletely surprised Russians and did not stop until he knew he was on theothersideofthebridge.LeutnantSchultzeandLeutnantSeefeld,bothfromthe

engineerbattalion,followedcloselybehind.Thebridgefellintactintothehandsofthebattlegroup.Itwasatthatpointthattheenemyfinallyawakenedfromhissurprise.There

were skirmishes and tough resistance throughout the city, which had whitehousesandcleancobblestonestreets.Oberstleutnant Munzel’s II./Panzer-Regiment 6, with the attached

1./Schützen-Regiment394,enteredthecityfromthewestandtookoverguardingthebridge.Afreighttrainfulloffoodstuffsandclothingwascapturedattherailfacilities. The fighting in the city continued at an unrelenting pace. The onlypalpablesignsofreliefoccurredwhenOberstKleemann’sbattlegrouparrivedinRomnyaround1700hours.Theprogressoftheclearingcouldbemeasuredbythehousesgoingup in flames.OberstKleemanncommanded theforces in thenorthern part of the city;Oberst vonManteuffel in the south. In addition, theRedAirForceconstantlyattackedtheleadelementsofthedivisionformtheair.Despite the bad weather, the fighter-bombers constantly raced in, droppingbombsorstrafingtheGermanforces.TheFlakwerebarelyabletofire,sincetheSovietsusedthecoverofferedbythecityonthehillbyflyinginlowandonlypullingupatthelastmomenttothendiveontheforcesthathadcloseduptothegardens of the northern outskirts. By evening, no less than twenty-five aerialattacks had been counted. When it turned night, Romny was burning like asingletorch.The3rdCompanyofthedivisionalengineersblewuptherailwaytrackswestof thecity.The fightingwasover.But the forces,overexertedanddrenched to thebone,wereunable to enjoy thevictory.Theywere simply tootired.It rained the entire night without stopping. The movement of the vehicles,

whichhadbeenheadedtowardRomnysincemidday,couldbarelybecontinued.Everythingwassinkinginthemud.Thedriversofthesupplyelementsweretheonestobeadmired.Withthegreatestofefforts,theymanagedtobringsuppliesforwardtothefightingforces.Theammunitionsituationwasbearable.Thefuelsituation,ontheotherhand,precarious.Thatwasalsounderstandablewhenoneconsideredtheconditionsoftheroadsandthedistancetotheclosestrailtransferpoint(400kilometers).Thecorpsneeded1,000tonsofsuppliesaday.Uptothispointinthecampaign,everytruckinthefuelsectionshadcoveredanaverageof170kilometersaday.On11September,thedivisiondidnotadvanceanyfurther.Instead,itscreened

in the area it had won around Romny. With the limited number of forces

available, thescreeningcouldonly takeplaceatkeyareasandalong theroadsleadingintothecity.Althoughtherainhadletup,theroadsweresosoftenedthatthe forces in Romny were practically cut off from their rearward lines ofcommunications. The bare minimum of fuel was brought forward on primemovers.Theoutpostswereextendedto thesouthandsouthwest.Onthehighground

south of the Ssula, there were enemy field positions with bunkers and tankditches.AsaresultoftherapidadvanceofMajorFrank’sforces,theenemyhadnot had time to occupy the positions.When the southern part of the citywasclearedinthemorning,numerousSovietstockpileswerediscovered.Fourcubicmetersoffuelweretrackeddown,aswasastoreofvodkaandbeer.Onthatdayaswellasthenext,therewasnoseriouscontactwiththeenemyin

front of the outpost lines. Therewas only patrol activity on both sides in thesectorstothefront.Aroundthecity,theforty-sevenoilrigsthatroseupwereasignoftherecentlytappedoilreservesinthisarea.Whileretreating,theSovietssetthirty-sixofthemonfire.Thecommander inchiefof the fieldarmygroup,Generalfeldmarschall von

Bock,congratulatedthedivisionbyradioonthecaptureofRomny.Theweatherdidnotimprovemuch.Theskieswereovercast,andtheclouds

only occasionally cleared away to allow the sun to shine. Since the rain hadabated, sufficient vehicleswith fuel, ammunition and rationsmade it forward,withtheresultthatthecombatpoweroftheforcesthereincreasedbythehour.By the evening of 12 September,Major Frank was placed in charge of theadvanceguard tokeepon theheels of the fleeingSoviets.The advanceguardconsistedofFrank’sheadquartersand3rdCompany,the1./Schützen-Regiment3(whichwas commanded byLeutnant Lohse at this point), the1./Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, the6./Artillerie-Regiment 6, twoPanzer II’s from the II./Panzer-Regiment6,twolightFlak,andaplatoonfromthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39.TheadvanceguardmovedoutfromRomnypriortolast light.Itoverranthe

weak Russian positions in its first attempt and bounded 45 kilometers to thesouth.At2115hours,theadvanceguardhadreachedtheintactbridgeovertheSsulaatMliny,acrossfromLochwiza.ItscapturemeanttheretreatroutefortheSovietsacrosstheSsulahadbeenblocked.Forhisdeed,OberleutnantLingk,thecommander of the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, was later inducted into thearmy’sHonorRoll.LeutnantMöllhoffadvancedasfarasthe“Stalin”railstationwithhisengineers,wherehismenshotuptentrucks.After theenemyrealized

thesituationhewasin,hedideverythinginhispowertodrivetheweakGermanforces fromthebridgehead.During thenight,heremainedrelativelyquiet,buthis efforts increased inmagnitude at daybreak.Major Frank felt compelled toradiorequestsforimmediatesupportfromthedivision.The division put together a battle group during the morning, which was

directed to relieve Frank’s forces and also advance into Lochwiza.Oberstleutnant vonLewinskiwas placed in charge of the battle group,whichconsistedoftheIII./Panzer-Regiment6(augmentedbythreePanzerII’sfromthe2ndBattalion),the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,the1./Schützen-Regiment394,the2.and3./Schützen-Regiment3,the4./Artillerie-Regiment75, the3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, and a quad Flak from the 6./Flak-Regiment 59. Around 1300hours, a reconnaissance aircraft reported that a large armored force wasapproachingtheadvanceguard.Thebattlegrouppickedupitspace.Theroadshaddriedout,soitwaspossibletoadvancerapidly.AsthevonLewinski’sleadvehicles approached Mliny, Stukas were diving on the approaching enemyarmored formations. Around 1600 hours, the tanks and the SPW’s rolled intoMliny,establishingcontactwiththeadvanceguard.Oberstleutnant von Lewinski and Major Frank met at the church in the

village.Afterashortconversation, themencameto theconclusionnot towaitfor themore slowlymoving riflemen and cannoneers. Instead, theywanted toadvance into Lochwiza as soon as possible with the forces on hand. Thecompany commanders were informed and, a short while later, the tankcompanies,theantitankelementsandthetwoSPWcompanieswerereadytoroll.WithoutregardfortheRussianfiresthatsuddenlystartedincreasing,thetankers,antitank men, and riflemen raced along the embankment that was severalhundredmeterslongandreachedallthreeofthebridgesovertheSsulasouthofMliny before the enemy recognized the threat. Themen captured the bridgesintact.At that point, the Russians took the bridgeheads under heavy fire from

Lochwiza, some1,600meters away.The fire from the heavy antiaircraft gunswasespeciallydangerous.Byincreasingintervalsandvaryingspeeds,casualtieswereavoided.Theenemygunstookeveryindividualvehicleunderfire,buttheywere unable to prevent themen from crossing the bridges over to the jaggedsouthbankoftheriver.Theterrainonthefarsideofferedconcealmentforallofthevehicles.Because

of the pace, however, the companieswere all intermingled. The officers soon

restored some order and the advance continued. The closer the force got toLochwiza, themoredefensive fire it received.TheGerman tankshalted, fired,and thenmovedon.Theyreceivedgoodcovering fires fromtheself-propelledgunsofthetwoantitankcompanies.Thecompaniesworkedtheirwaytothecitymeter by meter. The eastern portion of Lochwiza was reached around 1700hours.Theenemydidnotwaver; instead,heputuphardresistanceagainst theadvancingvehicles.Machinegunshammeredaway fromall sidesand thedullthudofmortarsfiringcouldbeheard.ButtheGermangunsrepliedinkind.Afterhalfanhour,thatportionofthecityhadbeencleared.Justastheenemystartedtopullback,theI./Schützen-Regiment3arrived.The

riflemenreceivedthemissiontoclearthehousesofenemygroups.TheRussianswereholdingoutintherestofthecityandhadalsobroughtantitank,antiaircraft,and infantry guns forward. The German forces were unable to get across theintersection in the middle of the city. The enemy was firing from pointblankrangeagainsttheapproachingtanksandSPW’s.Sinceithadturneddarkbythen,nooneknewwherethefrontorrearwasorwhatwashappeningtotherightorleft.Around1900hours,OberstleutnantvonLewinskipulledhisfightingvehicles

outofLochwizaandhad themoccupyscreeningpositions in thedefilesalongthecity’sedge.OnlyMajorWellmann’s riflemen remained incontactwith theenemy.Overthenextfewhours, theyhadtodefendagainststrongattacks,buttheywereabletoholdtheportionsofthecitytheyhadalreadytaken.Fartotherearofthosebattlegroups,thedivisionconcentrateditsforcesinthe

Romnyarea.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6wasgiventhemissionofscreeningthedivision’sstagingarea.Incarryingoutthatmission,LeutnantRühlreconnoiteredinthedirectionofGawrilonkaearlyinthemorningwiththreePanzerIII’sandthreeSPW’s. Reconnaissance aircraft had identified enemy tanks there. Therewasnoenemycontact,sothat theengineerswhohadcomealongwereabletoemplaceahastyminefieldwithoutanyinterruption,thushelpingtopreventanyunwantedsurprisesaroundRomnyfromthatdirection.Thenewday,14September,broughtaclearmorningandsunnyweather.The

banksoffogfromtheSsulawerestilloverLochwiza,whenthefightingstartedanew.MajorWellmannwasunabletogranthisriflemenawholelotoftimetosleep; he had been directed to clear the entire city on that day. Both of hiscompanies and the fighting vehicles attached to him from the III./Panzer-Regiment6movedout at first light around0500hours to attack the identified

Russian pockets of resistance. What they had been unable to accomplish theprevious day was accomplished that day. The 3./Schützen-Regiment 3 ofHauptmann Peschke assaulted surprisingly fast through the city and took thelarge northern bridge in a coup de main. To the amazement of the Germansoldiers,thereweresixheavyantiaircraftgunsinfrontofthebridge,wheel-to-wheelacrosstheentirewidthofthestreet.Theywereunmanned.TheriflemenchargedthegunswithaHurra!andpulledthecrewsthatwerestillsleepingoutfromunder theirblankets.Asquickly as that actionwascompleted,Lochwizawas also cleared thatmorning,whichhad turned into a beautifully sunnyday.The fighting vehicles of the 3rd Battalionwere able to enter the city withoutincidentaround1030hours.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3advancedacrossthebridgeandoccupiedthehigh

ground outside of Jaschniki, to the north of Lochwiza,with its 3rdCompany.The2ndCompanysetuponthehighgroundatCharjkowziwestofthecity.Theremaining elements of the advance guard spread out to all sides to hold openLochwizaforKampfgruppeKleemann,whichwasclosingonthecity.Itenteredthe locality around 1020 hours with the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 and theII./Schützen-Regiment3.At the same time, the division orderedPanzer-Regiment6 to form a strong

combat patrol, which was to immediately advance to the south to establishcontactwiththe16.Panzer-Division,whichhadtakenLubnythepreviousday.Oberleutnant Warthmann, the commander of the 9./Panzer-Regiment 6, wasgiven themission.Only a single fighting vehicle, aPanzerIII, was available.Functioningasthecommunicationscenterwastheregimentalcommander’stankandafewpersonnelcarriers.Thenecessaryfuelhadtobetakenfromwheeledvehicles, since the supply columns had not yet closed on the city. The patrolconsisted of a total of forty-five men, including the two Oberleutnants,WarthmannandMüller-Hauff(commanderofthe3./Panzer-Regiment6),andthewarcorrespondent,Heysing,whoexperiencedeverythingfromthecommander’stank.At thatpoint, a short episodestarted in thehistoryof thedivisionwhichexemplified theboldnessof theGermanarmoredarm in that summerof1941.The action that was initiated led to the closing of one of the greatest pocketbattlesinhistory.Thesmallbattlegroupstarteditsmarchatthedesignatedtime.Oberleutnant

Müller-Hauff took the lead.Theweatherwas sunny and clear; the roadswerefirmandshowedonlyafewspotsofclingingmud.Ontopofthat,itwasSunday

—perfect “riding weather” or, in this case, “tank weather.” The tanks andpersonnelcarrierssoonleftbehindtheforwardmostoutpostsofFrank’sadvanceguard at Iskowzy-Ssentschanskije and had the slightly rolling Ukrainiancountrysideinfrontof them.Theenemywassomewhere,butnooneknewhisstrengthorhisweaponry.Contactwiththedivisioncouldonlybemaintainedbyradio.Thefirstvillageappearedaftermovingforthreehours.Itwasbypassedonthe

right.ARussiantransportcolumnwasontheroad.WhentheGermanvehiclesapproached, the drivers abandoned their panje carts and fled into the nearbysunflower fields. When some high ground was crossed, enemy trucks werecrossingtheroad.Onceagain,themachinegunsdidthetalking.AndsoLützowswilde, verwegene Jagd8 continued.Once again, Soviets appeared. This time itwas a gigantic column consisting of batteries, trains elements, constructionbattalions, limbers, panje carts, tractors, two fighting vehicles, and someCossacks on horseback. The machine guns whistled again and shot a routethrough the Russian column. The tanks and other vehicles raced through thestreamofvehiclesathighspeed.OberleutnantWarthmannandhismenknewonlyonething:Getthrough!And

sothevehiclesrolledthroughdefiles,marshyfloodplains,woodsandfieldsandacross several fragile bridges.The columncrossed theSsula in thevicinity ofTitschi—thatwashalftheway.Allofasudden,radiocontactwaslostwiththedivision.Thefriendlyvehicleswereinadefile.Oncetheyworkedtheirwayoutagain, the radio contact could be reestablished. In the rear, at Romny,Generalleutnant Model andMajor i.G. Pomtow breathed an audible sigh ofreliefwhentheyheard:“AsfarasLukaat1602hours.”Thesunhadalreadygonedown,a reddishgold.Finally,however, thebattle

groupwasabletohaltonaplateauandconcealitsvehiclesunderpilesofgrain.Themengazedovertothesilhouetteofacitythoughbinoculars,whichwasstilloffsetfromtheeveningsky.Hazeandcloudsofsmokecrossedoverthehouses;in between was the whistling of machine guns and the crash of impactingartillery.Therewasnolongeranydoubt:ThepatrolwasrightbehindtheRussianfrontanda fewkilometers furtheronwere the leadelementsofHeeresgruppeSüd!OberleutnantWarthmannissuedorders:“Panzer—Marsch!”Thebattlegroup

rolledout,crossedadefile,andfiredattheRussianssuddenlyappearingoutofthe darkness, who scattered in shock. A creek blocked further progress. The

vehicles lookedforacrossingpoint.Abridgewasseen.ThePanzerIII of theOberleutnantapproached.Itwasblownup.Grayfiguressprangup.Theywereencrustedindirtandhadstubblebeards.Theywavedandwaved.Itwasmenofthe 2./Pionier-Bataillon 16 of the 16. Panzer-Division. It was exactly 1820hours.The soldiers directed the battle group to a fordable location.Oberleutnant

WarthmanncrossedinhisvehicleandturnedtowardLubny.Ashortwhilelater,he reported toGeneralmajor Hube.9 The fighting vehicles of the 3. Panzer-Divisionwiththelarge“G”(Guderian)ontheirsteelwallswerenext toatankwiththeletter“K”(vonKleist).Theleadelementsofthetwofieldarmygroupshadestablishedcontact.TheKievPocketwasclosed.The3.Panzer-DivisionbroughtmoreofitsforcesclosertoLochwizaduring

thecourseoftheday,sinceitappearedcertainthattheSovietswouldattempttobreak out of the encirclement to the east. The city was surrounded by strongenemyforcestoallsides.Inorder tocreatesomebreathingspacetothenorth,thedivisionalengineerslaunchedanattackonLukatoblowupthebridgeoverthe Ssula there. The effort had to be called off early in the face of theconsiderable enemy forces present. In contrast, the II./Panzer-Regiment 6 hadmoresuccessthatafternoonwhenitconductedareconnaissance-in-forceinthedirection of Stepali. The fighting vehicles encountered superior numbers ofRussiantanks,buttheywereabletoknockoutthree,aswellasanarmoredcar,whilelosingonlyoneoftheirown.The3./Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadbeenfollowingbehind, thenscreened the tankbattalionfromthehighground to thefront.The division continued to close up in the area around Lochwiza on 15

September.Generalleutnant Model had his command post set up in a largeprivatehouseinLochwiza.Thatday,additionalpropagandacompanypersonnelfromHeeresgruppeMittearrivedtocapturethehistoricalevent—thelinkingupoftheleadelementsoftwofieldarmies—inwordsandpictures.Includedamongthem were Bastanier, a cameraman, who filmed for the weekly newsreel;Habedank,aphotographerfromtheperiodicalDieWehrmacht;andFritzLucke,a reporter for the Berliner Lokalanzeiger. Major Baron von Behr, thecommander of Nachrichten-Abteilung 39, was designated at the local areamilitary administrative commander for Lochwiza; Fürst10 Mirski was histranslator.Inadditiontoallofhismilitaryandadministrativeduties,MajorvonBehrsetuparestaurant,wherethesoldierscouldeatforfree.Accordingtoan

extantmenu, the followingwas already being served on 15 September:whitecabbagesoupwithgoulashandslicedtomatoes,stewedfruit,andcake.MajorFrankscreenedthecitytothesoutheastwithhisantitankelementsand

additional forces of his battle group.He had established his command post inIskowzy-Ssentschanskija.Theantitankpersonnelandtheriflemenhadtobeontheirtoes,sinceRussianforcescontinuouslytriedtobreakinfromthenorthandwest.When one of those groups was caught, it contained the assistant seniormedicalofficeroftheSoviet21stArmy.Justbeforenoon,dustcloudsappearedtotheeast,whichwerebeingchurnedupbytanks.Theantitankelementswerealreadytakingaimwhenthewhitesignalflareshissedskyward.Theriflemenofthe1./Schützen-Regiment394 thatwere in position got up and ran toward theapproaching tanks.Theywere the lead vehicles ofPanzer-Regiment33 of theAustrian9.Panzer-Division(GeneralleutnantRittervonHubicki).Thatdivisionhad taken thebridgesover theSsula atSsentscha thatmorningat 0745hours.When theyoung tankOberleutnant reported toMajorFrank, itmeant that thepocketaroundKievwasclosedonceandforall.OberstvonManteuffel’sSchützen-Regiment3hadextendeditsoutpoststothe

northandeastbythen.Theregiment’s2ndCompanytookthebridgeatJaschiki.Thefriendlypositionswerethenextendedfurthernorthwest.Schützen-Regiment394closeduptoLochwiza,insertingitselfbetweendivisionalelementsandthe4.Panzer-Division,whichwasadvancingonPriluki.Hauptmann Ziervogel’s reconnaissance battalion pushed the enemy back to

theeasternedgeofTschernuchi.TheRussiansthenpulledbackandattemptedtobreakoutinthedirectionofShdany.ThedivisionsenttheavailablecompaniesofMajorPape’smotorcycleinfantrybattalionthere.Theywereabletointerdicttheenemyforces.WhenHauptmannSchneider-Kostalski’sIII./Panzer-Regiment6joinedthefrayaround1300hours,theenemypulledbacktoMelechi.Smallreconnaissanceandcombatpatrolsfromalloftheemployeddivisional

assetswere sentout toallpointsof thecompass thatday to follow theenemymovementsandprotect thedivision fromunwelcomesurprises. In theprocess,Oberfeldwebel Kretschmar, the company headquarters section leader in the1./Schützen-Regiment3, togetherwithUnteroffizierBaudein’ssquad, linkedupwithAufklärungs-Abteilung16of the16.Panzer-Division, thusestablished thethirdfirmlash-upofGermanforcesontheeasternedgeofthegiantKievPocket.Thenightremainedrelativelyquiet,eventhoughmorefirescouldbeseento

thewest.Around0500hourson16September,theSoviet169thRifleRegiment

attackedintheareaaroundRomnyandpushedbacktheoutpostsguardingthere.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski gathered his tanks andmoved out against theRussians.TheRussians fell back and the tankers pursued.Thatmorning, theywere able to occupyMelechi,with themotorcycle infantrybattalion assumingthe screening mission there. The 10./Panzer-Regiment 6 then had to be sentnorthtohelpthereconnaissancebattalion,whichwasbeingattackedbysuperiorenemyforces.Theriflebrigadeconductedareconnaissance-in-forcetothewestwithbothof

its regiments. Indoingso,Schützen-Regiment3establishedcontactwith the4.Panzer-Division, which neighbored on the right. Schützen-Regiment 394remainedintheareaeastofPirjatin.Thenumberofprisonersgrewbythehour.Many Russians voluntarily surrendered, others only after a hard fight. TheI./Panzer-Regiment6establishedaprisonercollectionpointinLochwiza.Inthemorning,ithad400prisoners;byevening,thenumberhadgrownto2,000.The countryside was beautiful. High plateaus with woods and corn and

sunflower fields were crossed. The objective on 17 September was the UdajRiver. The 2nd Battalion of the armor regiment supported the advance ofSchützen-Regiment3againstBelozerkowkaandAntonowka.Bothofthevillageswere reached in the afternoon, and outposts were established along the river.That night, the division called off any further attacks on Pirjatin. Aerialreconnaissancereportedthatstrongenemyforceswereconcentratingonthewestbanksof theUdaj.Approximately1,500vehicles couldbe counted in the cityproper.Friendlyforceswereinsufficienttoejecttheenemy.Correspondingly,theoutposts along the river reported theconstantmovementsof theSoviets.Theyonlywaytosignificantlydisruptthemwasthroughthebatteriesofthedivisionalartillery,whichhadbeenbroughtforward.Sincethedivision’sforceswerestilltooweaktoattacktheSovietsatPirjatin,

thearmorregimentwassenttoInfanterie-Regiment(mot.)11911toattackwithitfromthesouth.Bothregimentsmovedoutearlyintheafternoonwithelementsfacing to three sides.By theonset of darkness, they succeeded in clearing thewoods on both sides of Tschapatowka. In the process, numerous enemy truckcolumnsweredestroyed,includingmanyheadquartersvehicles.Duringthenightof19–20September,strongenemyelementsbroke through

the25. Infanterie-Division (mot.) and attempted to escape throughMelechi tothe northeast. The threat to the southern flank of the 3. Panzer-Division thatresulted from that breakthroughneeded to be eliminated.MajorFrank andhis

antitankbattalion,augmentedbyelementsof themotorcycle infantrybattalion,werecommitted.ThoseforcesencounteredtheenemyatWelitschkowschtschina;the enemy forces were attacking to the northeast. Oberstleutnant Munzel’sII./Panzer-Regiment6wascalledin.Histanksadvancedthroughtheenemyandestablishedcontactwithelementsfromthe9.Panzer-Divisiononekilometertothe northeast of Melechi. The Soviets were able to escape encirclement,however,andpulledbackin thedirectionofShdany.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6,alongwiththerestofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalion,advancedalongbothsidesoftheJuskowzy–MelechiroadtowardHill160.TheydrovetheSovietsoutandforcedtheminthedirectionofDrjukowschtschinaandintothewoodsanddefiles. The I./Panzer-Regiment 33 of the 9. Panzer-Division joined thedivisionalelementsintheeffort.Hauptmann von Cochenhausen’s 1./Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 and

OberleutnantLingk’s3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521attackedDrjukowschtschinafrom the front. Despite considerable resistance, it was possible to enter thevillage, eject theRussians, capture two guns and six armored cars and take anumberofprisoners.AfterthemotorcycleinfantrytookacloserlookattheRedArmymen,theyfoundoutthattheyhadcapturedtheartillerycommanderofthe5thArmy,MajorGeneralSsetinski,alongwithhisheadquarters.Mostoftheenemyforceswerehidinginthetwopatchesofwoodsandcould

not be driven out that evening. Oberstleutnant Wöhlermann’s II./Artillerie-Regiment 75 placed fires on the woods. At first light,Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’sIII./Panzer-Regiment6andMajorPape’sKradschützen-Bataillon 3attacked the woods, while Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 and the II./Panzer-Regiment6sealedoffthearea.After five hours of struggling against stubborn resistance, the Russian

defenses collapsed. The Soviets took considerable casualties. Fortunately, theGerman losseswere negligible, althoughHauptmann Schneider-Kostalskiwaswounded in the fighting. The motorcycle infantry of Hauptmann vonCochenhausenmade a spectacular catch.When the soldiers searched the finalportionsof thewoodsforsoldiers,whowerehiding,ayoungish, immaculatelydressedofficercameoutofaholeintheground.Thereweregoldstarsandtwosmallgold-coloredtintanksonhiscollartabs.ItwasthecommanderinchiefoftheSoviet5thArmy,ColonelGeneralPotapow.Bynoon on 27September, the specialmission forOberstleutnant Lewinski

andhisforceswasover.The25.Infanterie-Division(mot.)wasnolongerbeing

threatened, and the enemy had been eliminated. The captured senior officerswere immediately transported toGiljzy,where thedivisioncommandposthadbeen located since 18 September. The daily logs of the intelligence sectionrecorded the interrogations of the Russian officers in the following sequence:artillerycommanderof the5thArmy;quartermastergeneral; signals lieutenantwith his wife; two Slovakian spies; commander in chief of the 5th Army;adjutant; commander of the 10thTankDivision;RedAir Forcemajor generalwithdaughter;commanderofarifleregiment;artillerycommanderofthe193rdRifleDivision;thecommissarsofthe9thTankBrigadeandtheIITankCorps;andothers.The fighting along thewestern half of theKiev front came to an end, after

Germanforceshadthrustdeepintothepocketfromallsides.Itwasauniqueanddifficultfightthattheforceshadundergone.TheRussianshadattemptedwithallmeansattheirdisposaltoescapeencirclement.Insomeinstances,theforcesofthedivisionhadtofighttheirwayoutofa“hedgehog”positiontowithstandthepressuretheRussianswereexertingonallsides.The regimental surgeon for Schützen-Regiment 394,Assistenzarzt Dr. Türk,

recordedthefollowinginhisdiaries:“Itwasasceneofhorror.Humanandhorseremainsbetweenvehiclesandequipmentofalltypes.Therewasamaintenancevehiclewithelectric lathes,drillsetc. Ihadnever seenanything like itbefore.Medical vehicles with instruments . . . heavy antiaircraft guns, cannon,howitzers,tanks,trucks,staffcars.Somestuckinmarshland;somedrivenupinfrontofhousesandtrees,crasheddownembankments,crashedintooneanotherorburnedup.”TheRussianSouthwestFronthadceased to exist.Among thedeadwere its

commanderinchief,ColonelGeneralKirponos;amemberofthecouncilofwar,Burmistrenko;andthechiefofstaffofthe5thArmy,MajorGeneralPisarewski.The number of prisoners was immeasurable. From 18 to 22 September,Schützen-Regiment 394 counted around 9,000 men.Oberleutnant Dr. Lotze’s2nd Company alone counted 2,100. During the same period, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 registered 1,345 prisoners. In all, the 3. Panzer-Division counted18,000,while theXXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.) had 31,000. The division had toclearitsprisonercollectionpointinLochwizatomakeroomfornewarrivals.On21September,the2./Schützen-Regiment3wasdetailedtoescort8,000prisonerstoRomny.Panzergruppe2orderedthearmoredregimentstobepulledoutofthelineon

20Septembersoasnot towear themdown inwoodlandfightingand toallowthemtorestandrefit.On22September,thedivision’sarmoredregiment,alongwith the attached Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 and the 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39,leftLochwiza.Thatsameday,itreachedTalalaler,50kilometersdistant.AdetailunderthecommandofOberleutnantSchefflerwassenttoGomeltopickup35new fighting vehicles. On 22 and 23 September, Schützen-Regiment 3, thedivisionalartilleryandmostoftheremainingdivisionaltroopsdisengagedfromtheenemy.OnlySchützen-Regiment394remainedintheareaaroundLochwiza(until 24 September). The division turned around and headed back north,generallyalong thesameroutes ithad takenon itsadvancesouth.Mostof thedivision arrived in its new assembly area around Gluchow–Krolewez on 24September.ThePocketBattleofKievwasover.Itwouldgodowninthehistorybooksas

thelargestbattleofitstypeintheSecondWorldWar.ThefinalreportissuedbytheArmed ForcesHigh Command on 27 September listed 665,000 prisoners,884capturedordestroyedtanks,and3,718destroyedartillerypieces.AsaresultofitsboldraidthroughNowgorod-SewerskandontoLochwiza,

the3.Panzer-Divisioncontributedgreatly to theformationof thepocketandaproudsuccess.Thecampaignhadstartedthreemonthspreviously.Inthatperiod,the division had lost 264 officers and 4,111 noncommissioned officers andenlistedpersonnel.Thatwas27percentofitsassignedstrengthon22June1941.On 22 September, the division submitted a report on the results of its threemonths of uninterrupted combat: “Prisoners: 43,381. Captured or destroyedmateriel: 408 tanks; 56 armored cars; 738 guns; 140 antiaircraft guns; 515antitankguns;265mortars;1,137machineguns;2,825trucks;102staffcars;20motorcycles;158tractors;89destroyed,96shot-downand64capturedaircraft;1armoredtrolley;7passenger,25fueland438freightcars;18locomotives;4trains,etc.”

__________________1. The author misunderstands the combined totals, which are more like theequivalentof twocompanies,unlessonediscounts thePanzerII’s,whichwereoflimitedvalueatthisstageofthecampaign.

2. Probably the KV-1, which weighed forty-seven tons, more than twice theweight of the heaviestGerman tank at that time, thePanzerIV. The standardGerman antitank gun, the 3.7-cmPaK36, was totally ineffective against boththisvehicleandtheT-34.3.TheSd.Kfz.251/10variant,the3.7-cmPaK36,wasintendedprimarilyasininfantry-supportweaponratherthananantitankgun.4.25thTankReplacementBattalion.5. ThePanzer 38(t) was the Czech Skoda-built tank impressed into Germanserviceat thestartof thewar tomakeup for shortfalls inGermanproduction.Somearmoredbattalionswereoutfittedalmostexclusivelywiththem.6.ProbablyT-34’s.7.Aseparateartillerybattalionandregiment.8.“Lützow’swild,daringhunt,”apopularmilitarysong.LützowwasthestuffofGermanmilitarylegendinhisvariousexploitsagainstNapoleon.9.Thecommanderofthe16.Panzer-Division.10.Count.11.Oneofthemotorizedinfantryregimentsofthe25.Infanterie-Division(mot.).

Theadvancecontinueswithoutrest.Everyshorthaltwasusedtocatch“fortywinks.”

LeutnantReindersleadshisplatoonfromSchützen-Regiment394inpreparationforanimmediatecounterattackatSsidorowitschi,eastoftheDnjepr.

RiflemenmountupontanksinpreparationfortheattackalongtheOsteron1August1941.

Badlywoundedpersonnelwereairtransportedtothehomeland.

Theobservationpostofthe6./Artillerie-Regiment75alongtheOster.Theartilleryfireishelpingtosupporttheadvance.

Thedivisionstaffinthesummerof1941.Fromlefttoright:Hauptmanni.G.Barth,divisionlogisticsofficer;GeneralleutnantModel;Majori.G.Pomtow,divisionoperationsofficer;MajorvonOppen,division

adjutant(officerpersonnel);andOberleutnantvondemKnesebeck,divisionintelligenceofficer.

Thedivision’sbakerycompanyatwork.

OberstleutnantAudörsch,thecommanderofSchützen-Regiment394(seenhereasaGeneralmajor).

OberstRies,thecommanderofArtillerie-Regiment75.Hewaskilledinactionon26August1941.

The“BerlinBear,”themascotofthedivision,infrontofthedivisioncommandpostinOrel.

Theweaponsandequipmentsectionatrest.

Acowisbutcheredforrations.

CHAPTER11

FromtheSsulatotheUpa:TheAdvanceonMoscow

On26September 1941,HeeresgruppeMitte issued an operations plan for thecontinuationoftheoffensive.Itscontents,inasmuchastheyregardedtheforcesofPanzergruppe2,containedthefollowing:

Panzergruppe2advances—mostlikelytwodaysbeforethe[other]fieldarmiesmoveout—acrossalinerunningOrel–Brjansk.Therightwingistomovealong theSwopandOkaRiver lines. Its leftwingrollsup theDessna from the south and holds the enemy in the southeast Dessnabend,inconjunctionwiththe2.Armee.ThecityandindustrialareasofBrjanskaretobecutoffinitiallybyamobileforceandthentakenlaterbytheXXXV.Armee-KorpsinconjunctionwiththeLuftwaffe.

The plan established the date for the start of operations for the field armygroupas2October.GuderianrequestedhisforcesstarttwodaysearliersoastoreceivethebulkoftheinitialsupportfromtheLuftwaffe.The XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.), to which the division continued to be

attached,wasputinthemaineffortoutsideofGluchow.Theformationsofthedivision, which had pulled out of the line in the Lochwiza–Pirjatin area,occupied bivouac and battlefield reconstitution areas around Krowelez.Although there were only a few days available, they were used to rebuild asmuchaspossible.ThedivisionheadquarterswaslocatedinKrowelez.Sinceitsquartering area was constantly being subjected to Soviet air attack, the battlestaffmovedtoPogrebkion26September.Theterrainintheareawasbeautiful;less exciting, however, was the fact that there were already signs of livelypartisanactivity.Duringtheday,however,theareawassparedtheappearanceofthat attendantphenomenon.The regimental anddivisionalbandsplayed in thevillagemarketplacesand thechaplainsheldservices.Replacementscamefromthehomelandandhadtogetquicklyintegratedintotheframeworkoftheforces.It was intended to reorganize the armored regiment after its receipt of new

tanks.Once received, the regimentwouldagainhave three full linebattalions.Theregiment’sorganizationon27September:Eachbattalionhadaheadquartersand headquarters company; a light company consisting of approximatelyseventeenPanzer III’s and twoPanzer II’s; a medium company consisting ofapproximately five to seven Panzer IV’s and two to three Panzer II’s; and acompanyattachedfromPanzerjäger-Abteilung521.Thebattalionheadquartersoftheantitankbattalionremainedintacttoprocesspersonnelandadministrativematters,while the commander,Major Frank, assumed acting command of theI./Panzer-Regiment6forOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott,whowasonleave.Tobeabletoengageheavytanks,thearmoredregimenthadthe5./Artillerie-Regiment75andabatteryof8.8-centimeterFlakfromtheII./Flak-Regiment11attachedtoit, with each tank battalion receiving one light field howitzer and one 8.8-centimeter Flak. The attachment of the individual guns later proved to beineffective.Giventhepoorweatherconditionsofthefallandthefact that theywereunarmored,thegunsprovedtobemoreofahindrancethanahelp.Finally,thearmoredregimentformedacompanyunderHauptmannStaesche,whichwaschargedwithmonitoringmovementsandregulatingtraffic.The division issued orders to occupy staging areas.Generalleutnant Model

helda commander’s conferenceat1030hourson28September todiscuss theupcomingattack.Thedivisionissuedsupplementalordersaswell.Inoneoftheorders, the unitswere directed to take 3.5 basic loads of fuelwith them. Thedivision logistics officer was responsible for bringing that amount of fuelforward.Onthatday,thedivisionhad15,050menassignedtoit.Panzergruppe 2, on the right wing of Heeresgruppe Mitte, had the initial

mission during the offensive of preventing any type ofRussian impact on thewingsofthe4.ArmeeandPanzergruppe4,whichwereattackinginthedirectionofMoscowfromRosslawl.AllocatedtoPanzergruppe2on29September:

XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.), with the 3. Panzer-Division, 4. Panzer-Divisionandthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)XXXXVII.Armee-Korps(mot.),withthe17.Panzer-Division,18.Panzer-Division,andthe29.Infanterie-Division(mot.)XXXXVIII. Armee-Korps (mot.), with the 9. Panzer-Division, 16.Infanterie-Division(mot.),and25.Infanterie-Division(mot.)XXXIV.Armee-Korps,withthe95.Infanterie-Divisionand134.Infanterie-DivisionXXXV Armee-Korps, with the 262. Infanterie-Division, 293. Infanterie-

Division,and296.Infanterie-DivisionTwomotorizedcorps(theXXIVandtheXXXXVII)stagedtobreakthrough

thepositionsoftheSoviet13thArmy,whiletheothercorpswerestillclosingin.It was intended for the two infantry corps to be echeloned right and left,following the motorized corps. The main effort of Panzergruppe 2 was atGluchow.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)placedbothofitsarmoreddivisionsinthefrontlines,whilethe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.) initiallyremainedinthesecondwave.ThefirstattackobjectiveofthecorpswastheOrel–Brjanskroad.Theweatheron29Septemberwasanythingbutpromising.Ithadrainedthe

entirenightandtheroutesandroadswereasinglemassofmud.Startingon27September,Pionier-Bataillon39wasunder itsnewcommander,Major Petsch,whoreplacedMajorBeigel,whohadbeentransferredtotheEngineerSchoolatDessau-Roßlau. Together with a battalion of RAD1 personnel (5./313), theengineersweregiven themissionofconstructingcorduroy roads.Thedivisiontook up its positions south and southwest of Gluchow, six kilometers east ofJareslawez. Themain body of the divisionwas placed under the command ofOberstKleemann.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6,Kradschützen-Bataillon3,andthe3./Pionier-Bataillon39wereattachedtothe4.Panzer-Division,whichhadbeendirectedtoattacktotheleftofthedivision.Detachedtothecorps,asitsreserve,weretheII./Schützen-Regiment3,onebatteryfromArtillerie-Regiment42,andone company from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521. To screen the staging area,Kampfgruppe von Manteuffel, with the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 and theII./Artillerie-Regiment42,was employedalong theKlewenj fromWjasenka toLjachow,eightkilometerseastofGluchow.Thenightpassedquietly.Visibilitywasextremelylimited,sincetheheavens

were completely blanketed by clouds. Right at the designated minute—0530hours—all of the batteries of the divisional artillery opened the newoffensivewith a barrage on the forward Russian positions. The men of the two rifleregiments then jumped out of their trenches and worked their way in boundstowardstheenemylines,whichwerestillbeingcoveredbyfriendlyartilleryfire.Kampfgruppe vonManteuffelwas employed along the rightwing to protect

theflankofthedivisionthroughoffensiveoperationsandmaintaincontactwiththeXXVIII.Armee-Korpsontheright.Inexecutingthatmission,thebattlegroupattackedSawarkow.Intheleadweretheremainingarmoredpersonnelcarriersofthe1stCompany(LeutnantLohse),onwhichtheriflemenofthe3rdCompany(HauptmannPeschke)were riding.Theattack tookplaceacrossanopen field.

There were Russian positions in front of the village outskirts, which werequickly overrun. The riflemen were then among the wooden cottages, whichwerestubbornlydefendedbyindividualRussians.TheleadelementsoftheSPWcompanymade it to the center of the village,where they stopped at a churchwithadilapidatedcemetery.All of a sudden, a few dogs sprang out of the second line of the enemy’s

defenses, about fortymeters away.The animals ran quickly toward theSPW’sandwere not distracted by themachine-gun firing.ObergefreiterMüller criedout:“It’sgot somethingon itsback!”Hiscomrades identifiedawooden lever,about twenty-five centimeters long. It rosevertically froma rackon thedog’sbody.AfewoftheRussianshadjumpedupfromtheirpositionsinthetrenches,encouraging the dogs. Instinctively, the machine gunner on the first vehicle,Obergefreiter Ostarek, took the animals under aimed fire. The lead dogcontinued racing.Oberfeldwebel Kretschmar brought his submachine gun intofiring position and fired until the animal collapsed. At the same time,HauptmannPeschkehadfinishedoffadogwithacarbine,andthethirdanimalwas shot byFeldwebelHoffmann’smachine gun.Another four dogs followedwithattached two-kilogramcharges,but theywerealsokilled.LeutnantLohseradioedoutthenewdanger:“Minedogs!”When the Russians saw that their dogswere unable to deliver their deadly

chargesanywhere, theyevacuated theirpositionsbehind thechurchandpulledcompletelyoutofSawarkow.Butassoonasourriflemenreachedtheedgesofthe village, Soviet artillery fire slammed into the wooden houses. In betweenwereroundsofanunknowntype,whichraineddownallatoncebythedozensand had a tremendous shrapnel effect. Those were the first Stalin organs thesoldiersofthedivisionencountered.Friendly lossesmountedconsiderably.LeutnantVetter from the3./Schützen-

Regiment3wasbadlywounded.Allofasudden,thefiresstoppedaroundnoon.An immediately launched patrol under the command ofUnteroffizier Buggertbroughtinanadditionalforty-eightprisoners.Whilethe3rdCompanyremainedin Sawarkow, the 1st Company was ordered back, with the squads ofUnteroffizier Dreger and Unteroffizier Hesse then moved to screen in thedirectionofCholopkowo.Schützen-Regiment 394, which was employed as the division’s main effort,

quicklybrokethroughtheenemyresistanceandadvancedfairlyrapidly.Itwasjustthattheroadsandtrailswereaproblemthatcouldbarelybesolved.Onewas

amazedthatthearmoredpersonnelcarriersandothervehicleswereabletoholduptothedemandsplacedonthem.Sincetheterrainwasnotsuitedfortanks,thetank battalions remained behind for the time being.Oberstleutnant Audörschbelievedhewouldbeabletoaccomplishhismissionwithoutthesupportofthefightingvehicles.By 0830 hours, the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 had reached the high ground

eastofFrigoltowo,hardlyencounteringtheenemy.Theadvancewasthenhaltedduetoanextensiveandbarelyidentifiablemineobstacle.Theengineershadtogo forward to clear a lane.The situationwasmadeevenmoredifficult by thefact that the Russians had occupied Studenok to the east and were causingfurtherdelaysthroughartilleryfire.By then, the II./Schützen-Regiment394 had reached thearea twokilometers

westofKlewenj. Itwas there that thefirst fightingvehiclesof theIII./Panzer-Regiment6 arrived. Both formations joined together and continued themarchfrom Klewenj. The first obstacle appeared after four kilometers: destroyedbridges.Shortlythereaftercamethesecondobstacle:TheminefieldatStudenok.The clearing of themines took a long time, since theywere almost allwood-encased, which could not be detected by electric mine detectors. TheII./Schützen-Regiment394 lost a lot of time andwas only able to continue itsattack at the onset of darkness. It eventually established all-round defensivepositionsintheNaumowkaarea.The I./Schützen-Regiment 394 got through Studenok in the afternoon and

occupied the high ground to the east at Chinel. That meant that the day’sobjectivehadbeen reached.Apatrol advanced as far asKutscherowka,whichwas reportedasbeingclearof theenemy. Inanyevent, the railway line to thesouthwestwasnottobecrossed.Shortlyafterfirstlighton1October,allofthedivisionalelementscontinued

theirforwardadvance.KampfgruppeKleemannassembledaroundStudenokbynoon and reached Kutscherowka with Schützen-Regiment 394 and theII./Panzer-Regiment 6. The completely softened ground did not allow for anyrapid advance. The supply routes coming in from Gluchow were alreadycompletelyruined.Everyvehiclegotstuckinthemudandcouldonlybeguidedoutwithassistancefromaprimemover.PatrolsweresentoutfromKutscherowkaanddeterminedthat theroadfrom

Esmanjappearedmore-or-lesstrafficable.Bythen,theI./Panzer-Regiment6hadadvanced to the northeast and reached the village ofUlanow,moving through

Suchodol.Thetankregimentcouldadvancenofurtherthatday,sincethethirty-five new fighting vehicles had arrived and had to be distributed among thebattalions,withthe3rdBattalionreceivingtenPanzerIII’sandPanzerIV’s.KampfgruppeKleemannwasreinforcedduringthedaybyKampfgruppevon

Manteuffel. The latter battle group had remained in its old positions in themorning and had turned back severalRussian counterattacks, in the course ofwhichLeutnantThomaswaskilledandLeutnantDollwasbadlywounded(bothfrom the I./Schützen-Regiment 3). The 2./Schützen-Regiment 3 also sufferedcasualties,sincetheSovietssucceededinbreakingupBachert’splatoon.Twoofthesquadsencircledbytheenemywereabletofighttheirwaythroughandmakeit back to the battalion. Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 cleared the area aroundTschernewa.Bynoon,the3./Schützen-Regiment3hadtobedetachedtoreturntoStudenok to takeover the security there.The remainingcompanies followedafew hours later, afterMaschinen-Gewehr-Bataillon 52 had relieved the battlegroup in the positions it had taken the previous day. In Studenok, Pionier-Bataillon 39 was in the process of erecting a sixteen-ton bridge over theKlewenj. The 1st Bridging Section provided three trucks with spans and twowithsurfaceelements.By the evening of 1October, the lead elements of the division reached the

areatwentykilometersnortheastofKutscherowka.Theenemywaspullingback.Generalleutnant Model reported to his superior headquarters that a rapidadvancecouldnotbecontinuedduetothebadconditionoftheroadnetwork.Atthatpoint, thecorpsdecided topull thedivisionoutof itsprevious sector andhaveitmarchonthebetterroadstoSsewsk.Theregroupingtookplaceatnight.Thedivisionturnedtothenorthbehindthe

4.Panzer-Division.Onthemorningof2October,whichfinallybroughtwithitniceweatheragain, thedivisiondisengaged thebulkof its forcesandmarchedthroughSuchodolandPolkownitschja in thedirectionofSsewsk.On thatday,thedivisioncommandpostwasmovedfromSuchodoltoPrilepy,offthesideoftheroad.Themarchwasfrequently interrupted,since theroadwascompletelyjammedwithvehiclesof all types.For the first time,Russian aircraft droppedphosphorousbombsonthecolumns.Duringtheday,Schützen-Regiment3,elementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521,

and the1./Pionier-Bataillon39 provided security for thosemovements. In theprocess,theriflemenwereunabletocrosstherailwayline.Duringthenight,theenemyhademplacedadditionalminefields.Asaresult,onlyreconnaissanceand

combat raids could be conducted. The enemy remained on the defensive andonly disturbed friendlymovements bymeans of artillery fire. Some casualtieswere taken.For instance,LeutnantDr. Sieverling of the4./Artillerie-Regiment75waskilled.AsthesunnyseconddayofOctobercametoanend,theXXIV.Armee-Korps

(mot.)hadachieved important initial success.After the4.Panzer-Divisionhadtaken Ssewsk on 1 October, it not only penetrated the enemy front 130kilometersdeep,italsorippedtheSoviet13thArmyapart.TheSoviet21stand55thCavalryDivisions,the121stand150thTankBrigadesandthe183rdRifleDivisionwereseparatedfromtherestoftheirfieldarmyandwerepullingbacktothenorth.The3.Panzer-Division did not conduct anymajor combat activitywith the

bulk of its forces, since itwasmoving behind the4. Panzer-Division. On thesameday,thenewmajoreffortonthepartoftheGermanArmygotunderway.Atfirstlighton2October,OperationTyphoonhadstarted.ItsendobjectivewasthecaptureofMoscow.Themorningof3Octoberstartedwithahazerisingoutofthewoods.While

theforcesofthedivisionstartedmovingoutat0800hours,onebattlegroupwasattached to the 4. Panzer-Division, which had been directed to attack Orel.Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543 was ordered to join the battle group. For the firsttimesincethestartofthecampaign,MajorvonTürkheimhadcommandofhisentirebattalion.Allthreecompanies—the1stunderOberleutnantJopp,whohadjust returned a few days previously from a hospital in the homeland, the 2ndunder Oberleutnant Michels, and the 3rd under Oberleutnant Möcking—participated in theattackof theneighboringdivision to theeast.Orel,with itsfactoryfacilitiesandairfields,fellintoGermanhandsthatday.ThedivisionformedastrongbattlegroupunderOberstleutnantvonLewinski:

the III./Panzer-Regiment 6, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 39. Those forces advanced at 1100hoursfromSsewsk.Afewfightingvehiclesprovidedflankguard,buttheyfoundnoappreciableresistanceforfifteenkilometers.Theadvanceproceededslowly,sincethe18.Panzer-Divisionwasusingthesamerouteandhad“rightofway”on certain parts. The battle group crossed the Ljachoff–Brjansk rail line andreached Kamarischa-Lobatowo around 1600 hours. There was no furtheradvance for theday,andvonLewinski’s forces setupanall-rounddefense.Alargepatrolfromthetankbattalionwassenttothenorthwestalongtherailline.

East of Schadino, it encountered an enemy cavalry patrol, which was pushedback.Themotorcycle infantry battalionwas ordered back toKamarischa.Themotorcycle infantrybroughtbackprisoners fromnorthwestof thevillage,whomentioned thedetrainingofRussianelements.Theengineers thenblewup therailway facilities.Oberst Kleemann’s battle group,whichwas reinforcedwiththe II./Panzer-Regiment 6, reached the area around Dmitrowsk, where itscreened.Thenightpassedrelativelyquietly.Thedivisionpushed its forces forward in thedirectionofDmitrowskduring

theday.Bydoingso,itwasadjacenttothe4.Panzer-Divisionontheleft.ThelatterdivisionhadbeenabletotakethebridgesovertheOka,butitsregimentsthenboggeddown.Elementsof the10. Infanterie-Division(mot.) closedup tothedivision,relievingKampfgruppevonManteuffel,whichhadbeenscreening.At 1145 hours on 4October, the division advanced fromDmitrowsk to the

north with an advance guard that had been reinforced with the II./Panzer-Regiment 6. After five hours, it reached Robja in dank and chilly weather,continuouslyheldupbybadroadsandmissingbridges.Theleadelementsofthedivisionwerethen30kilometersnorthofDmitrowsk.ThethreebattlegroupsofKleemann,vonLewinski,andvonManteuffelfollowedslowly.Verypoor,sandyroutes and stretches of sand on both sides of the bridge at Nerussa causeddifficultiesfor thewheeledvehicles.Forexample, thefuelcolumnsofPanzer-Regiment6neededsixhourstocoverastretchofsevenkilometersthatday.The division used the day to pull its own forces closer to Dmitrowsk,

replenishsuppliesoffuelandammunition,erectbridgesandimproveroads.ThedivisioncommandpostinitiallymovedtoRobjaandthenontotheschoolhouseinMolodewoje.Soviet aircraftwere very active that day and disrupted friendlymovements.

Some casualties were taken. The escortingFlak batteries could not complainaboutalackofwork.JustoverDmitrowskalone,theywereabletoshootdownnine bombers. By evening, the elements of Schützen-Regiment 1 andAufklärungs-Abteilung1,whichhad transitioned tosecurityduties in thatarea,were relieved by formations of the 10. Infanterie-Division (mot.). They thenmovedontocatchupwiththedivision.TherifleregimentsclearedthevillagesofSchablikinoandMolodewojealongtheroad.On 5October, the corps again placed itsmain effort in the sector of the4.

Panzer-Division.The II./Panzer-Regiment6, the5./Artillerie-Regiment75, andthe2./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521wereattachedtothatdivision.TheyleftRobja

at 1000 hours and advanced through Schablikino as far as Bunina along theOrel–Karatschewroad.The sixth of October 1941 was an event-filled day in the history of the

GermanArmyintheEast.Rainshowerspelteddownallmorninglongfromthelowcloudcover,drivenalongbythestrongnorthwestwind.Inbetweenwerethefirst snowfalls. Those were the signs of the onset of the mud period, whichwould make further advance appreciably more difficult and cause delays. Onthat 6October,Hitler also issued instructions that the tank groupswere to beredesignatedtankarmiesfromthatpointforward.Likewise,themotorizedcorpsweretoberedesignatedastankcorps.3

The3. Panzer-Division was so held up by the rain andmushy snow on itsmarch routes thatnoneof itsdailyobjectiveswas reached.Panzer-Regiment 6was stuck in themud for three and a half hours. Schützen-Regiment 394 wasturnedoffinthedirectionofOreltoprovidesecurityfortheflankoftheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)totheeast.On that day, the 17. Panzer-Division took Brjansk, while the 18. Panzer-

DivisionreachedKaratschewandthe10.Infanterie-Division(mot.)foughtitoutwithscatteredenemyelements in theareawestofSsewsk.ItwasdirectedthattheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)screentheencirclementaroundBrjanskfromtheeast.Panzergruppe 2 crossed its first attack objective, theOrel–Brjansk road,andwasheaded for thecrossingsover theSsushaatMzensk, soas to laterbeabletoadvancefromthereinthedirectionofTulaoralongtheOka.Onthatday,the 4. Panzer-Division, with the attached II./Panzer-Regiment 6, advancednortheast of Orel in the direction of Mzensk. It was there that the fightingvehiclesencounteredT-34’sforthefirsttime.The4.Panzer-Divisionsucceededinbypassingthoseenemyformations,reachingMzenskon7Octoberandtakingit.ItwasnotpossibletoestablishabridgeheadovertheSsusha,however,sincethe Soviets held the high ground on the far side. The III./Panzer-Regiment 6,alongwithKradschützen-Bataillon 3, were able to advance as far as the areaaround Bogdanowka as the lead elements of the 3. Panzer-Division. Theattachedplatoonfromthe1./Pionier-Bataillon39wasabletoblowupasectionoftheOrel–BrjanskraillineinthevicinityofBogdanowkaduringthenight.TheengineersthenfoundthemselvessurroundedbytheRussiansashortwhilelater,but they were able to fight their way through to the motorcycle infantrybattalion.

BattleinthemudalongtheSsusha.

Right at midnight during the night of 6–7 October, a violet snowstormcommenced,whichquicklytransformedtheentireareaintoawinterlandscape.Unfortunately,thesnowdidnotremainontheground,andtheexpectedfrostdidnotarrive.Byfirstlight,thesnowhadmixedwithrain,andittransformedalloftheroadswithinashorttimeintoamorass.Drivingwasanunbelievableeffortonmenandmateriel.EverytruckhadtobetowedatthedestroyedZonBridgebyatank.AmemberofSchützen-Regiment394describedthesituationthatdayinthefollowingwords:“Wecouldadvancenofarther.Therewasnomorefuel.Nothingcame forward.The routewas longand the roadsevenworse than thelastfewdays.Thesnowhadmeltedagainand,asaresult,themessevenbigger.Rationsdidn’tcomeforward,either.Wesatinthemucktheentireday.”The3.Panzer-DivisionreachedtheareaaroundOrelandsetupsecurity.Most

of thevehicles—morethan2,000—werestuck in themudbetweenDmitrowskandKromy.Almostwithoutexception,allofthefuelandrationsvehicleswereamongthem,aswellastheentiremaintenancecompanyofPanzer-Regiment6.It could not be determined with certainty when the entire column could getmovingagain.AfteritappearedthattheoperationsaroundWjasmaandBrjanskwouldturn

outwell,Panzergruppe2receivedorderson7OctobertoadvanceonTulaand

takethecrossingsovertheOkathereforfurtheradvanceineitherthedirectionofKolomna orKashira. Since the other corpswere still hanging considerablyback,onlytheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)wasavailableforthatthrust.Forthetimebeing,mostofthedivisionwasonlybeingemployedforsecurity

missions around Orel. Only the reconnaissance and motorcycle infantrybattalionswereincontactwiththeenemy,sendingpatrolsoutinalldirections.Schützen-Regiment394assumedthemissionofguardingtheKaratschew–Orelrail line. On 11 October, it moved into the area west of Orel bounded byNaryschkinoandSwetiski.InOrel,acityof120,000,therewereenormousRedArmydepots.TheircontentsindicatedtheSovietsweregearingupforawinterwar.Fromexternalappearance,thecityleftagoodimpression.Forthefirsttimeinawhile,thesoldierssawmulti-storyhomes,openshopsandevenastreetcarline.TheII./Schützen-Regiment3tookupquartersinthebarracksoftheSovietarmorschooldemonstrationregiment. Inoneof thebuildings,a formerTsaristcadetacademy,theriflemendiscoveredatwo-meter-tallstuffedbear,whichwasagoodlikenessofourBerlinmascot.Itwassetupinfrontofthecommandpostofthedivisionandcarriedthegeneral’spennantfromthatpointforward.Starting on 8 October, the reconnaissance battalion, augmented by the 3rd

Companyoftheengineerbattalion,wasemployedinthedirectionofBolchow,whereitencounteredstrongenemyforces,supportedbyartillery,approximatelytwenty-fivekilometersnorthofOrel.Themotorcycleinfantrybattalionandthe10thCompanyof thearmor regimentwassent in thatdirection.Thenextday,the forces occupied the locality, thus creating a good start point for furtheroperations.Thedivisionorderedthatthebattlegroupsemployedupfrontbesuppliedwith

afuelsectionthathadbeenassembledbythearmorregiment.Thetruckstookoff fromOrel on themorning of 10October. Theywere given a small guardforceandwereinitiallyabletoget2,700litersoffueltoBolchow.Onthewayback, thetrucksbroughtalong800prisoners.Themainbodyof the4.Panzer-DivisionhadboggeddownoutsideofMzensk.Ju52transportersbroughtinthenecessarysuppliesduringthedayandairdroppedthecanisters,sincetherewasnoplaceforthemtoland.Therewasa lightsnowfallon12October. Itdidnoteffect thecourseof the

fighting.OberstleutnantMunzel’stankbattalion,stillattachedtothe4.Panzer-Division,wasboggeddowninthewesternpartofMzenskandunderenemyfire.Since the Soviets had turned active in the Bolchow area again, the

reconnaissancebattalionwasreinforcedthatdaywithamixedgroupcomprisedof the III./Panzer-Regiment 6, the 7./Schützen-Regiment 394, and the5./Artillerie-Regiment75.Lateron,theI./Schützen-Regiment3wasalsobroughtforward.Itrelievedthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionwithitscompanies,freeingitforemploymentintheMzenskarea.Thedivision receivedawarningorder from the corpson13October, that a

strikeforcemighthavetobesentforwardasfarastheareaaroundSchablikino,sinceelementsof theSoviet3rdArmyhadbrokenthroughin thesectorof the29. Infanterie-Division (mot.). The division was informed to have its forcesreadytomoveby0600thefollowingmorning.Thebattlegroup,underthecommandofOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott,moved

outatthattime.Onetank,oneantitank,onerifleandonebatteryheadedoffinthe direction of Schablikino in the darkness. It turned out that they were notneeded.Ontheotherhand,thedivisionhadtoreinforcethe4.Panzer-Divisionat Mzensk, pushing all of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 into the locality. TheIII./Panzer-Regiment 6 continued to screen around Bolchow with thereconnaissance battalion, while Schützen-Regiment 394 remained in the Orelarea. Later on, it extended its positions in the direction of Bolchow. Thedivision’smedicalforcessetupaforwardclearingstationfortykilometersnorthofOrelunderthedirectionofUnterarztRakowskiofthe1stMedicalCompany.On 14 October, the Army High Command issued directives for the

encirclementofMoscow.Forming themaineffortof thearmy in theEastwasthe4.ArmeeandPanzergruppe4,whichweretoattacktheRussiancapitalfromthe north and thewest, whilePanzergruppe 2 swung out far and blocked offMoscowfromthesouth,southeastandeast.TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)preparedforthatfinalpushalongthebanksof

the Ssusha. Its main effort was formed by its two armored divisions. The 3.Panzer-DivisionwasaugmentedbytheattachmentofInfanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland,”whichwascommandedbyOberstHoernlein.Theapproachmovements proceeded vey slowly as a result of the mud, however. Armoredpatrolsweresentoutinalldirectionstoscreen.One,forinstance,wassentouton 15 October from the I./Panzer-Regiment 6. It moved in the direction ofSnamenskoje,forty-fivekilometersnorthwestofOrel.Over the next few days, terrain was observed, conferences held and other

typesofreconnaissanceconducted.ItwasintendedtocausetheheavilyfortifiedSovietpositionsaroundMzensk,whichwerebeingreinforceddaily,tocollapse

by an envelopment from the north. The 4. Panzer-Division had reached astalemateandcouldnolongeradvancefrontally.Therifleregimentsconductedcombatpatrolsinfrontofthedivisionsector.Onthemorningof17October,the3./Schützen-Regiment 3 launched one such patrol, but it was hit hard by theenemy.The7thCompanyofthesameregimenthadtorelieveit.Aplatoonfromthe 6thCompanyunder the commandofLeutnantDziallas hadmore luck thefollowingday.Theriflemenwereabletocrosstheriverinpneumaticcraftandbroughtbacktwenty-nineprisonersfromthefarbank.The Ssusha was up to forty meters across and twometers deep. The river

emptiedintotheOkafiftykilometersnorthofMzensk.Thesoilbetweenthetwowatercourseswasveryfertile,butitturnedtomuckaftereventheslightesttraceofrain.Theterrainwasgenerallyopen.Therewerefewwoods,buttheytendedto be expansive.Therewere long and steep defiles everywhere—the so-calledbalkas—theyprovidedanobstacletotanks.On 18October,GeneralleutnantModel held his last conference concerning

the attack with his commanders. The XXIV. Panzer-Korps was to cross theSsushaandgenerallyadvanceonTula.The4.Panzer-Divisionwastobeontheleft,the3.Panzer-Divisionontherightformingthemaineffort.Tothatend,thedivision formed two battle groups. The southern group consisted of the riflebrigadeandwouldattack from theareaeastofGlaunowa.Thenortherngroupwouldbeunderthecontrolofthe5.Panzer-Brigade4andconsistedofPanzer-Regiment6andPanzer-Regiment18.5Thatgrouphadthemissionofadvancingin thedirectionofShaljamowaand turning thereonto themain road,where itwasassumedthattheenemywasmassinghisheavyartillery.Itwasalsogiventhemissionofguarding the flankof the riflebrigade.Since the first objectivewastwenty-fiveairkilometersfromthelineofdeparture,itwasassumedthatthetankswouldbeemptyatthatpointandneedtoberefueled.Refuelingbytruckwas not an option because of the mud. Correspondingly, each battalion wasallocatedaprimemoverwith1,500litersoffuel incanisters.Inaddition,eachregimenthadanadditionalprimemoverwithtrailerthathad6,000litersoffuel.Before the division started this new chapter in its history, it also made a

number of personnel changes. Major Baron von Behr, the Division SignalsOfficer,wastransferredtotakecommandofKorps-Nachrichten-Abteilung424.6Hauptmann Böttge took his place. Major Haas, the commander of theI./Schützen-Regiment394,hadtogiveupcommandduetoahandwound.ActingcommandwasassumedbyOberleutnantBachmann,thecommanderofthe11th

Companyofthatregiment,beforeherelinquishedcommandafewdayslatertoHauptmannFreiherrvonderHeyden-Rynsch.Duetohealthreasons,OberstvonManteuffel had to return to the homeland. Major Zimmermann assumedcommand of Schützen-Regiment 3. Hauptmann Peschke took overZimmermann’s 2nd Battalion. Oberstleutnant von Lewinski relinquishedcommandofPanzer-Regiment6toOberstleutnantMunzel,whose2ndBattalionwas taken byMajor Frank.Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott assumed command ofthe1stBattalion.Generalleutnant Model transferred command of the division, after he had

workedoutall theplansfortheattackonTula, toGeneralmajorBreith.Breithwas not an unknown factor for the division. He had been a part of thePanzertruppe fromtheverybeginning.DuringthecampaigninFrance,hehadbeen thecommanderof the5.Panzer-Brigade.At thestartof thecampaign intheEast,hewasassigned to theDirectorate forFastForcesat theArmyHighCommand.7Model,ofcourse,wentontocorps,fieldarmyandfield-armygroupcommandbytheendofthewar.8

Bytheeveningof22October,thedivisionhadreacheditsdesignatedholdingareas despite considerable difficulties with the roads. During the afternoon,Panzer-Regiment6,departingfromTolitsche,reachedtheareaaroundRoshenez.TheI./Panzer-Regiment18madeittherefromBolchow.Thedivisioncommandpost and themain clearing stationwere located inTolitsche.The II./Schützen-Regiment 394 arrived at Roshenez as well. These northern forces reported toOberstEberbachof the4.Panzer-Division.At the time, the threebattalionsofPanzer-Regiment6eachhadthreePanzerII’s,sixteenPanzerIII’s, fivePanzerIV’s, and three or four self-propelled 5-centimeter antitank guns (fromPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521). The I./Panzer-Regiment 18 had approximatelythirty tanks. Also assigned toKampfgruppe Eberbach were the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the II./Artillerie-Regiment 42, Pionier-Bataillon 39, theI./Schützen-Regiment3,the1./Schützen-Regiment394,the5./Flak-Regiment91,andthe6./Flak-Regiment11.The southern attack group established a bridgehead before the start of the

offensive.The6. and8./Schützen-Regiment3 crossed the river atmidnight onfloatsandmovedapproximately200metersinland,wheretheythendugin.Theengineers from the 1st Company of the divisional engineers assisted and, by0530 hours, had also crossed the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion. Twobattalionsofartillery,onebatteryofrocketlaunchersandthe10thCompanyof

theregiment(infantryguns)setupinpositionbehindthebattalion.All at once, the German artillery opened fire on the Russian trenches and

localities with a preparation bombardment. In the north, the I./Schützen-Regiment3alsostartedtocrosstheSsusha,asdidtherestofthe2ndBattalioninthesouth.The1stBattalionwassoonabletobreakthroughtheenemypositionsnorthwest of Bobenkowo with its 2nd and 3rd Companies. After forty-fiveminutes,theyhadcrossedthemainroadsouthofNikolskaja.Ahaltwasordered,since the riflemen had to wait for the tanks to close up. The II./Schützen-Regiment3approachedNikolskaja.Heavydefensivefires fromweaponsofallcalibers forced the riflemen to take cover.The soldierswaited for the fightingvehiclestoapproachfromthenorth,buttheycouldnotbeseen.Inaddition,theartillery frequently fired too short, causing casualties, which were notinconsiderable.Itwasn’tuntilStukasattackedaround1000hoursthattherewasthefirstpalpablerelief.Thehourspassedslowly.Theriflemenwereunabletoadvanceinthefaceof

theheavyRussianfire.Bothbattalionswerepracticallyfixedinposition.Onlyafew individuals and squads succeeded in entering the enemy positions. Forinstance, an unknownGefreiter from the 8th Company was able to clear anentiretrenchlinewithhismachinegunandtakeafewprisoners.Unfortunately,thesamesoldierwaskilledafewminuteslaterwhenhewentbackupfront.The2nd Company made some progress, working its way slowly forward andreachingtheareathreekilometerssoutheastofNikolskaja.Buttheriflemenhadtodiginthereaswell.Theweatherwascold,thegroundfrozeninsomeplacesandtherainfellwithoutstopping.Kampfgruppe Nord encountered similar difficulties in its crossing of the

Ssusha. The 8./Schützen-Regiment 394 crossed the river late the previouseveningandestablishedasmallbridgeheadon theeastbankatRoshenezwiththe help of engineers; the 6th Company of the battalion did the same atKarukenkowo.LeutnantPeterandfoursoldierswerekilledinthoseefforts,andtheSovietstookgreatpainstoreducethosepositions.By0700hours,however,theriflemensucceededinlinkingupthetwocrossingpoints.Becausefoartilleryfire,itwasonlypossibletoerectabridgeatKarukenkowo.Itprovedimpossibletoeliminatetheenemyartilleryfires.The2ndCompanyofengineershadbeenworkingduringthenighttobuilda

bridge.ItwasaSisyphuseffort.Whenevertheythoughttheyhadputinthefinalsection, Russian artillery destroyed their efforts. The engineers drug materiel

forward ceaselessly. They hammered, constructed and drilled. The nineteen-meterbridge,whichwassupposedtohavebeencompletedby0530hours,wasfour hours late. Two sixteen-ton stretches had to be put down along with afloatingsupport.At that point, the tanks of the III./Panzer-Regiment6 and the SPW’s of the

1./Schützen-Regiment3approachedandcrossedthesmallriver.Theconditionswerelessthanidealinallrespects.Thesteepfarbankhadbeentransformedintoa “grease ramp” as a result of the rain.Thebridge properwas partially underwaterandbarelyuptothejob.Itwasaskingalmosttheimpossibleofthevehicledriversand theirdrivingskills. In thecaseof theartilleryandFlak, itwasnotjust a case of getting the vehicle across, but the limbered gun aswell. In onecase, a Flak slipped off the bridge and blocked the crossing point forconsiderabletime.TheI./Schützen-Regiment394thencrossedtheriver.Itwasabletoexpandthe

bridgeheadasfarasTriozkoje.Theenemyartilleryfiresabatedsomewhat,butthecrossingoftheIII./Panzer-Regiment6lasteduntilnoon.GeneralmajorBreithorderedtheI./Panzer-Regiment6,whichwaswaitingfor

the bridge to be erected atRoshenez, tomove north and cross behind the 3rdBattalionof theregiment.Byaround1400hours, thebattalionwason theeastbank.OberstleutnantSchmidt-OttturnedinthedirectionofNikolskajawithhiscompaniesinordertoassisttheriflemen.WhenSchmidt-Ott’stanksreachedthefirstrise,theywerealreadybeingtakenunderheavyfirebyartilleryandantitankguns.Theyhad to turnbackandgoaround thehill to thenorth.Around1600hours, they established contact with Hauptmann Peschke’s II./Schützen-Regiment3.Theriflemenandtanksthenadvancedtogethertothesoutheast.Theattackboggeddowninfrontofaridgelinethatwasheavilydefended.The2ndCompany of the rifle regiment lost three dead and thirteen wounded; the 3rdCompany, two dead and five wounded. Just on that day alone, Schützen-Regiment3hadthreephysicianswounded:StabsarztDr.SchröderandStabsarztDr.SchreckandAssistenzarztHoffmann.Althoughthetankbattalionattemptedtoenvelop thehighground from the south, itwas forced togiveup its effortswhenitturneddarkandabalkawasencountered.KampfgruppeNord immediatelyadvanced to thenorthwestwithHauptmann

Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment6. It crossed the first ridgeline andthenreachedtheMzensk–Belewroad.Allofasudden,sevenT-34’srolledoutofSchaljamowa.Ashort firefightensued,duringwhich twoT-34’swereknocked

outbutthebattalionalsolosttwoPanzerIII’s.WhentheSovietspulledback,thebattalion offered an immediate pursuit and reached Schaljamowa as it turneddark. Seventy prisoners were collected; they came from the 540th RifleRegiment. The battle group set up an all-round defense. Around 1900 hours,LeutnantRühl’s7thCompanyfromtheII./Panzer-Regiment6,whichhadbeensentforward,arrivedfromthewesttoreinforcethe3rdBattalion.Despitetheenemyfire,theengineersofthe3rdCompanyattemptedtobuilda

bridgeatRoshenez in theafternoon.MajorFrank’s II./Panzer-Regiment6wasable to cross during the night, completing itsmove after 0600 hours. Frank’sbattalion moved west past its sister 1st Battalion and reached Schaljamowaaround0900hoursatthesametimeastheregimentalandbrigadeheadquarters.Eversincefirstlight,theenemyhadbeenplacingheavyfireintheareaaroundthe locality.That fire, coupledwithmines,whichdamaged two tanks, initiallypreventedafurtheradvance.The portions of the rifle brigade located to the south had suffered from the

coolnight.Inaddition,allofthelandlinetrafficwaslost,sothatcontactcouldonlybemaintainedbymeansofmessengers.The I./Panzer-Regiment6 closeduptighttotheII./Schützen-Regiment3,andtheybothmovedouttoassault.Fivetankswereinitiallyallocatedtoeachriflecompany.Thebattle group succeeded in takingMalyje-Bersinki against practically no

enemy resistance. The I./Schützen-Regiment 3 also started its attack at 1000hours.Thebattalionhadnotanksinsupport;onlytheSPW’softhe1stCompany,which had arrived from the north.Major Wellmann had his heavy weaponsconcentrate on a few positions and had his battalion attack them. Deeplyecheloned, the battalion thus overran the first Russian field positions and, bynoon,thepositionsatKrestzowoandMalyje-Bersenski.KampfgruppeEberbachwasstillatSchaljamowa.At themoment, itdidnot

appearthatanysuccesswaspossiblethere.Theresistancewastoogreat.Stukaswere requested. They did not appear, however, and the attack was launchedregardless.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6was in the firstwave,with its sister3rdBattalionrightbehindit.Thefightingvehiclespushedforwardonbothsidesofthe Schaljamowa–Malyje-Bersenki road to the high ground and reached thelattervillagearoundnoon.Theregimentsetupall-rounddefensesthere.Itwasoutoffuelandammunition.TheII./Panzer-Regiment6hadtowaitforPanzer-Regiment 18, which had not crossed the Ssusha until that morning and wascarryingfuelcansforthe2ndBattalionwithit.The6.and9./Panzer-Regiment

18arrivedaround1500hours.Just after 1200 hours, the long awaitedStukas showed up and dove on the

enemy positions. High clouds of smoke showed the tankers and riflemen theRussiantrenches.Assoonasthelastmachineturnedaway,theriflemenroseoutoftheirholesandthefightingvehiclesmovedout.TheII./Schützen-Regiment3,successfullysupportedbyLeutnantVopel’s1./Panzer-Regiment6,advancedintothedensewoods.By evening, theyoccupiedKatuschistscha and thedominanthighgroundofHill118.7.TheSoviet401stRifleRegimenthadevacuated thefieldinthefaceoftheaggressivelymountedattack.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3,to which Oberleutnant von Kriegsheim’s 4./Panzer-Regiment 6 had beenattached, advanced to the south on Szomowo. The 2nd Company of the rifleregiment cleared the enemy’s field positions. Leutnant Eckert, FeldwebelSchelinger, and Feldwebel Pfeiffer charged at the head of their men. Thecompany lost five killed and twenty-six wounded during the action. The 3rdCompanyoftherifleregiment,undertheactingcommandofLeutnantHeurich,wassenttowardsSaroschtschatoestablishabridgeheadatButyrkiandestablishcontact with Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) “Großdeutschland.” Moving formMzensk,thelatterregimenthadattackedthestronglyfortifiedRussianpositionsbetween the road and the railway and had already reached the high groundnorthwestofthecitywithits3rdBattalion.OberstleutnantMunzel’sPanzer-Regiment6wasabletotakeMeznewainthe

afternoon.Enemyfightingvehiclesfiredwithoutletupfromthewoodedterrainnorth of Gubarjowa. The Stuka sortie there hit the target with hair-splittingprecision; later on, sixteen abandonedRussian tankswere found there.OberstEberbachdecidedtocontinuetheattacktothenortheastthatnight.HewantedtoswingoutandthenblocktheMzensk–Tularoad,thuscuttingoffthewithdrawalroutefortheRussians.The III./Panzer-Regiment6was the first battalion to refuel; itmovedout at

the onset of darkness, reinforced by the 1./Schützen-Regiment 3. OberstEberbachandOberstleutnantMunzelmovedwiththebattalion.Movingslowly,the German vehicles approached the objective—a fork in the road with afarmsteadnorthwestofMzensk—despitethedarknessandtheunfamiliarroute.The 2nd Battalion was left behind to screen the Orel–Tula railway line atKudinowa.Thefightingvehiclesapproachedtheroadthroughthenight-darkenedwoods

and found themselves in themiddle of a Russian supply point. Awildmelee

ensued,whichwasilluminatedeerilybythemagicallightofinnumerablesignalflares.Tanksmovedagainstother tanks;stockpilesofammunitionexploded; itwasawildfree-for-all.UnteroffizierSplettstößeroftheSPWcompanywentafteraT-34.Themineheuseddidn’texplode,however,andthetankwithdrewinthedarkness.Bycontrast,ObergefreiterTietzofthesamecompanyhadmoreluck.Hegrabbedsomebundledstickgrenadesandleaptuponatank.Hetossedthechargeinanopenhatchandjumpeddown,rightontothebackofaRedArmysoldier.TheturretoftheKV-Iflewintotheair.Thenext“T-34”wassetalightafter the third round from a Panzer IV. Oberleutnant Möllhoff of the 3rdCompanyof engineerswent after a fifty-two-tonKV-II and blew it up. In theend,fiveSovietfightingvehicles,severalarmoredcarsandsometrainsvehicleswereonfire,theirluridflamesilluminatingthenighttimescene.Around midnight, it finally turned quiet. The Soviets had disappeared.

KampfgruppeEberbachsetupanall-rounddefensearoundthesupplypointforthe night.During the early-morning hours,UnteroffizierWorpkeunexpectedlybrought forward a fuel sectionwith thedesperatelyneeded fuel.Themenhadsearched theground for tank tracks andhad followed theirbattalion there thatway. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski promoted the young noncommissionedofficeronthespottoFeldwebel.The attack objective for the armored brigade had been reached and the

Russian front broken through in that sector! The route to Tula was clear forPanzergruppe2.OberstEberbachlaterreceivedtheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossforthisoperation.9

Duringthesamenight,theriflebrigadeemployedtothesouthlinkedupwiththe elements of Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) “Großdeutschland,” which hadmoved out from Mzensk. The brigade continued its attack the followingmorning,25October.Theenemyhadevacuatedhispositions,presumablyasaresultofthenighttimetankraid.Asaresult,thebattalionsmadegoodprogress.WhiletheI./Schützen-Regiment3advancedonChutor,the2ndBattalionoftheregiment made it through Bolschaja-Kamenka. The enemy was ejected fromthereandacrossingover theSsusha forced. In thecourseof that fighting, theregimentlostseventeendeadandeightywounded.Thesuccessoftheoperationcould be measured by the taking of 1,335 prisoners, as well as innumerablequantitiesofcapturedsmallarmsandlightguns.ThedivisionformedanadvanceguardunderHauptmannSchneider-Kostalski

on themorning of 25October. It consisted of his III./Panzer-Regiment 6, the

1./Schützen-Regiment3,elementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521,anddivisionalartillery.By1600hours,theadvanceguardreachedtheTschernrailwaystationand set up security.A large fuel depotwas discovered. Itwas not possible torefuel all of the vehicles, however, since the octane quotient differed fromGerman fuel.As a result, the advanceguardwas stranded there, sinceno fuelcouldbebroughtforwardthatday.By then, Panzer-Regiment 6 had pushed its 2nd Battalion up to the

intersection. The 1st Battalion established contact with Infanterie-Regiment(mot.) “Großdeutschland” and rearmed in Mzensk. The regimental adjutant,OberleutnantvonTwardowski,broughtordersforthebattaliontomarchtothenorth.As it hadbeendiscovered in the courseof theday that theSoviets hadcovered themajor road toTschernwithhugeminefieldsof up to1,800minesandburiedaerialbombs,itturnedoutthatamovementalongthatroadwasnotpossible.Thebattalionthereforeveeredoff theroadtotheleftandarrivedthateveninginBolschaja-Kamenka,afterhavingmovedacrosscompletelysoftenedground.Themotorizedcompaniesofthedivisiondidnotmovethenextday,withthe

exceptionofOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott’s I./Panzer-Regiment6,which left itsquarteringareaat0600hoursandreachedTschernthreehourslaterinthemidstof a downpour. The lead elements of Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland”hadalsoarrivedtherebythen.Theinfantrymounteduponthetanksand,afterashortbriefingbyOberstEberbach,movedoutimmediatelyagain. The movement took the elements past Gorbatschewo, where relativelylightenemyresistancecouldbebrokenfairlyquickly.ThebattlegroupreachedthecityofPlawskbeforetheonsetofdarkness;itwasquicklytaken.By those movements, the breakthrough of the XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.)

throughtheenemypositionsalongtheSsushawasguaranteed.Theenemyforcesthat had been employed there—the 6th Guards Infantry Division, the 41stCavalryDivision, and the4thTankBrigade—hadpulledback to thenortheastandeast.TheSovietsleftbehind2,480prisonersand19fightingvehicles.Themudthenprovedtobeworsethantheenemy.Itbroughtmovementstoa

standstill.Itinevitablycausedallofthewheeledvehiclestogetstuck;onlytheprime movers and the tanks were able to churn their way through the thickporridge. Panzer-Regiment 39 of the 17. Panzer-Division was used on 26October, for instance, to help pull the supply columns of the battalions ofPanzer-Regiment6uptothefrontfromMzensk.Afterabouttenkilometers,the

trucksgotstuckagain.Whenitstartedtorainagaintowardsmidnight,anyeffortto continue the march proved illusory. Only Oberst Cuno and his Panzer-Regiment39wereabletomakeittoTschernthatnight.The division, whose command post was in Toltschje, issued orders on the

eveningof26OctoberforthecontinuationoftheadvanceonTula.Theyread,inpart:

1)Enemyejected fromhisheavily fortified fieldpositionsnorthof theSsusha by an enveloping attack of the3. Panzer-Division after severaldays of fighting under extremely difficult circumstances. TschernoccupiedbyGruppeEberbachontheafternoonof25October.4.Panzer-DivisionestablishedcontactwithGruppeEberbachbymeansofafrontalattackfromtheMzenskbridgehead.

2)XXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)advancesalongtheroadonTulawiththe3.Panzer-Divisioninthelead.

3) 3. Panzer-Division, with the reinforced Panzer-Regiment 39 in thelead,movesoutfromMzenskon26October,advancesthroughTscherninthedirectionofTulaandtakesTula.

Forthenextphaseoftheattack,thedivisionreorganizedduringthenightandthe next day and formed the following battle groups: Kampfgruppe Cuno(Panzer-Regiment 39); Kampfgruppe Hoernlein (Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland”);Kampfgruppe Eberbach (Panzer-Regimenter 6 and 35);KampfgruppeKleemann (Schützen-Regiment 3, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394,the main body of Artillerie-Regiment 75, and Pionier-Bataillon 39); andSicherungsgruppe10vonTürckheim (Aufklärungs-Abteilung1 andPanzerjäger-Abteilung 543). For the time being, von Türckheim’s forces remained inOreland exerted command and control over all of the divisional trains elementsarrivingthere.Theadvancecouldnotbecontinuedon27October,sinceallofthecolumns

remained bogged down in themuck. Luftwaffe transport squadrons had to berequested to get the necessary fuel forward. The heavily laden Ju-52’s had tolandattheprovisionalairfieldatTscherntounloadtheircanistersanddrumsoffuel.Thentherewasthenextproblem.Theaccessroutestotheairfieldweresomuddythatonlyprimemoverscouldmakeit through.Sincetherewereonlya

limited number of them up front, the refueling of the tank battalions wasconsiderably delayed. By then, the rifle regiments had secured their assemblyareas; theywere involvedwith the improvement of the roads and trails.OnlyOberstCuno’sforceswereabletomoveoutthatmorning;Panzer-Regiment39occupiedPissarjewka.After the leadelementsof the regimenthadcrossed thebridge,itflewintotheair.ThatarmorregimenthadtocalloffthepursuitoftheenemyandsetupsecurityalongtherailwayembankmentatPissarjewka.Despiteallthat,thedivisionintendedtocontinuetheattack.Duringthenight,

the individual battle groupswere concentrated together and sent further to thefront.The followingaccountbyanofficerofSchützen-Regiment394 providesinsight:

Therubberymuckclungtoeverything.Yourockedfromonesidetotheother. Terribly difficult. It rained; themud grew higher and stickier. Itstucktoyourbootsbythepound.Weweresweating,despitethecold...ten minutes of a break and you started to freeze immediately. Keepgoing.Youthoughtyourlegscouldn’tdoanymore.Thegroundsuckedatyourboots.Itgotworse....Wefrequentlysankuptoourkneesinthemud.. . .Everyonetotteredandstaggered.Thenyouwereinthemuck,since your boot could no longer be pulled out. . . . Then there was asnowstorm. . . .Avillageafter twentykilometers. . . .But theyhouseshadbeenburneddown....Anothertenkilometers....Wegottoabuilt-up area. It consisted of tinypanje huts. Just get in at that point. Ninehoursofuninterruptedmarching.

Generaloberst Guderian arrived at Pissarjewka on 28 October. He hadsummoned his commanders there to discuss continued operations. GeneralFreiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, Generalmajor Breith, Oberst Eberbach,Oberst Cuno, Oberst Hoernlein, and Oberstleutnant Munzel attended themeeting,whichfocusedonthecontinuationoftheadvanceonTula.Bythen,thedivisionwasalreadypushingadditionalsupplyelementsforward,withtheresultthat all of thebattalions couldbepartially rearmedand refueled that day.Thearmoredelementsofthe3.Panzer-Divisionhadadvancedfarforwardandwerequartering around Lapotkowo. The I./Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland” was attached to Panzer-Regiment 6 there. On that clearevening of 29 October, the tanks conducting reconnaissance for Panzer-Regiment39wereonly twenty-sixkilometerssouthofTula. Itwas intendedto

launchtheattackonthecityon29OctoberinordertosealoffMoscowfromthesouth. Depending on the overall situation, the advancemight be continued toGorki(NischiNowgorod).Thenightof28–29Octobersawfrost,withtheresultthatalloftheroadsand

trailswere trafficable.Thearmorbrigade reorganized in the first fewhoursofthenewdayfortheupcomingattack.AnadvanceguardwasformedfromMajorFrank’s II./Panzer-Regiment 6 and the 2nd Company of “Großdeutschland.”Following closely behind was Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski’s III./Panzer-Regiment 6 with the reinforced 1st Company of “Großdeutschland.”OberstleutnantMunzel andOberstEberbach followedwith their headquarters.OberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott’sI./Panzer-Regiment6ledthesecondmarchserial,to which two batteries of the II./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 3rd Company of“Großdeutschland”,andPanzer-Regiment35alsobelonged.Theadvanceguardleftthebivouacareaat0530hours,bypassedtheblown-up

roadbridgeandadvancedacross the railwayembankmenteastofPissarjewka,only to turn towards theJastrebzowa–TrossnaroadviaRebinka lateron.Rightnear the railway station, the lead tank rolledover amine.The engineers,whowere mounted on board, also saw an obstacle. Correspondingly, the advanceguardwentaround thevillage, since theadvancing fightingvehicleswerealsoreceiving flanking fire by then. Russian aircraft observed the movements.Germanfighterswerenowheretobeseenthatday.It wasn’t until the regiment reached Kunaki that several flights of Stukas

appeared. They dove on the previously identified enemy field positions there.After theyhaddropped theirbombs, theaircraft startedstrafing in frontof thelead tank elements. By doing so, they practically cleared the battlefield bythemselves, since the tanksdiscoveredonlyemptyenemypositionswhen theyenteredKunaki.TheSovietshadwithdrawntothehutsonbothsidesoftheroadduring the aerial attacks and were very surprised by the appearance of theGermangroundelements.Aftera short firefight, theRussianscameoutof thehutsandsurrendered.Onlytwothirty-two-tontankscontinuedtoholdoutattheentrancetothevillage.Theleadcompanywasabletoeliminatethem,however.Major Frank was able to move out immediately, since the next group had

arrivedby then.Soviet artillery fire, coming from the left and thedirectionofJassnaja-Poljana,startedtoimpacttheroad.Thefightingvehiclesveeredofftheroad,whereupontheystartedtoreceiveantitank-gunfirefromthefront.Beforethe tankscouldget intoposition,someof the infantryridingon thereardecks

wereshot.OberstleutnantMunzelmovedupfrontandenteredthelargewoodswiththe

advance guard. It stretched across the front like a blocking position about tenkilometersoutsideofTula.Thecompaniessucceeded inpenetratingabout800metersonbothsidesoftheroadintothethickunderbrushwithoutencounteringenemyresistance.Then thesoundsofheavyantiaircraft roundscouldbeheardon the road. The tanks were powerless against them as well. The exposedfightingvehiclespulledofftheroadtothesidesandsoughtcover.TheRussianguns could not be identified. The infantry from the 2nd Company of“Großdeutschland” jumped off the fighting vehicles and worked their waythroughthewoodstothesuspectedenemylocation.Twoheavyantiaircraftgunswerefinallyidentifiedatextremelycloserange.Thesoldiersenvelopedfromthesidesandeliminatedthecrewsinclosecombat.HauptmannSchneider-Kostalskiclosedupwithhisbattalion.Theregimental

commander issuednew instructions.Hedirected the III./Panzer-Regiment6 tomove to the right via Skuratowka and reach Staraja-Bassowo. Those fightingvehicleswere able tomake it through to the Jassnaja-Poljana rail station in asingleboundwithoutencounteringtheenemy.Whenthetanksattemptedtocrossthetracks,however,remotelydetonatedminesweresetoff.Theydidnotcauseanydamage,butshowedthattheSovietshadidentifiedtheadvancingcolumns.AfewSoviettruckswerecapturedattherailwayfacilities.Whenthetankershadapproached the vehicles, they saw that the engineswere still running and thekeyswerestillintheignition.Apparently,thedrivershadfled“headoverheels”attheapproachofthetanks.Afterdispatching the twoheavyantiaircraft guns, the II./Panzer-Regiment6

movedoutagainandadvancedasfarasKossaja-Gora.Afterthetankslettheirmaingunsdo the talking, theRussians fled thebattlefield,pullingback to thenorthwest. The fighting vehicles gave immediate pursuit, crossed through thevillage and reached the bridge at its northern outskirts. The engineers weresummoned to search the bridge. They found mines and immediately startedremoving them. Another group was employed to the north at a railwayunderpass.Mineswerediscoveredthereaswell.Togetherwitheightmenfromthe 3rd Company of engineers, Leutnant Seefeld cleared mines from fourbridges.Thefightingvehiclesthenmovedoutagain.While this was happening, the initial vehicles that were screening the

followingformationsarrived.OberstleutnantMunzelsetupshoptemporarilyin

a large smelting plant north of Kossaja-Gora. All of a sudden, there was atremendousexplosion.Dust,debrisandfire.Bitsofthewalls,ironsupportsandwooden beams flew through the air. Large portions of the smelting plant hadbeenblownup!The regiment moved out again in the same march order. When the lead

elements reached the terrain 800 meters south of Nowoje-Bassowo, theyencounteredantiaircraft-gunfire.Incontrasttothepreviousencounter,thegunscouldbereadilyidentified.Withafewroundsfromits7.5-centimetermaingun,the lead tank was able to take out the enemy guns, with the result that thefightingvehiclesthatfollowedbarelyhadtohalt.Thebattalionmovedintothenarrow, extended village.Once again, antiaircraft-gun firewas received alongtheroad.Thefightingvehicleswereunabletoevade;theyhadtopullbehindthehouses.Afewwereabletomakeittotherailwaystation,wheretheythensoughtcover.Bythen,ithadturneddark.Byorderofthedivision,theattackwashaltedfor

theday.Thearmoredregimentestablishedsecurity.TheroadsignsindicatedthatTulawasonlyfivekilometersaway.The3rdBattalionofthearmoredregimentremained in the northern part of Staraja-Bassowo, the 2nd Battalion screenedfrom there to themiddle of thevillage and the1stBattalion to the southwest.Around 2130 hours, the report arrived that the attack was to be renewed thefollowingmorningat0530hoursinordertotakeTulainacoupdemain.Thiswascontrarytothedivision’spreviousintent.Thesupplysectionshadperformedadmirably.Althoughtheroadswererock

hardwithfrostinthemorning,theystartedtransformingbacktomuckwithinafewhours after it started raining.The roadbridge atPissarjewkacouldnotbenegotiated until the engineers placed railway tracks on it. In some cases, thetrucks did not reach the fighting elements until the morning with fuel andammunition.Thatmadeitimpossibletokeepthetimetablefortheattack.Gruppe Eberbach moved out at 0700 hours on 30 October. In the face of

heavy fire, thebattlegrouphad tocalloff its attackwithina fewminutesandmovebacktotheprotectionofthehouses.OberstleutnantMunzelarrangedforthe operation to wait until a battalion from “Großdeutschland” arrived. Incontrast,HauptmannSchneider-Kostalskiand the III./Panzer-Regiment6madebetter progress advancing fromStaraja-Bassowo, but they did notmake it toofar, either. Russian artillery, antiaircraft guns and antitank guns placeddevastating firesonallof theopen terrain.Thecompaniesheldupand looked

forpositionsthatofferedgoodcoverandconcealment.Thelackofastrongairforce was felt; the few motorized forces were unable to break though thedefensesestablishedbytheenemyoverthecourseofthelasttwoweeks.TheterrainaroundTulawascreatedbynatureforthedefense.Theexpansive

industrial and mining areas, which provided the many factories and blastfurnaces with raw materials, were overlaid with pockets of resistance of alltypes.Thehighground,whichwassparselyvegetated,allowedobservationforkilometers on end into the defiles and valleys of the rolling terrain. Deeplyecheloned field positions, covered on the far bank by artillery, antitank guns,mortarsand,mostofall,antiaircraftguns,hadbeenestablishedinawideareaallaroundTula,acityofabout300,000.TheIII./Panzer-Regiment6,reinforcedbythe1./Schützen-Regiment3,didnot

remain idle. It sentoutpatrols toall sides inaneffort todiscoveragap in theenemy’sfrontlines.Thetankcommanderswereabletoeasilyobservefromthehatches of their cupolas the vibrant rail and truck traffic along the approachroutestoTula.Duetothegreatdistance,theywereunabletoengage.That battalion, which was also joined by the 1st Company of

“Großdeutschland,”wasabletocrossatankditchwestofthelargebrickworks.The Soviets attempted to stop the advance bymeans of antiaircraft and smallarms fire. While the fighting vehicles raked the Russian positions with theirmain guns, the infantryworked theirway forward and checkmated the enemyfromtheflank.ThetanksrolledonandfoundthemselvesinaresidentialareaonthesouthernoutskirtsofTulathatwasnotmarkedonthemap.Therewasnoadvancingthere,sincetheRussianswereplacingheavyfireof

allcalibersontheterrainfromthecity,primarilythecemeteryandthemilitaryfacilities.Thetankbattalionhadtosetupanall-rounddefense.Thecommanderof the 10th Company, Oberleutnant Graf Saurma-Jeltsch, left his fightingvehicle to reconnoiter the terrain. He did not get far. An antiaircraft roundimpacted next to him and shattered both of his legs. He collapsed, dead.Unteroffizier Ludwig andGefreiterWenz from his companywere also killed.TheI./Panzer-Regiment6closedupandalso tookuppositions in theworkers’residential area. It likewise received heavy artillery fire. Oberleutnant vonKriegsheim,theactingcommanderofthe4thCompany,andGefreiterBlaschkewerekilled.By1130hours,MajorFrank’sII./Panzer-Regiment6hadbeenreinforcedby

elementsof“Großdeutschland.” Itwasdirected tocontinue theattackwestof

theroad.Theinfantrywerenotintheposition,however,ofeliminatingthetwoantiaircraftgunswhosepositionshadbeenidentified.Thatmadeitquestionablewhether the battalion would be able to move out, since heavy Russian firecontinuedtofallonthestagingarea.Thetrickysituationwasfinallymasteredbyayoungofficercandidatefromthe6./Flak-Regiment11.Despite theconstantlyimpactingrounds,hepulledhis8.8-centimetergunthroughtheresidentialarea,unlimberedandsilencedtheenemyantiaircraftgunsafterafewrounds.Finally, at 1200 hours, the fighting vehicles of the 2ndBattalion rolled out

again.Russianinfantryandmilitiastubbornlydefendedtheapproachroutesandhad to be literally overrun. The companiesmoved through the woods east ofWyschnaja-Wolochowoandreachedadefileinwhichatankditchpreventedanyfurthermovement.Infantryandengineersimmediatelymovedforwardtotrytobridgetheditchwithtreetrunksandanytypesofavailablebeams.Despitealloftheobstaclesandcasualties,thesoldiersof“Großdeutschland”

did not give up. They remained at the throats of the Russians. Smoking outposition after position, they slowly gained ground. In the lead was the 2ndCompanyof theelite regiment. Its commander,OberleutnantBrockmann,waskilled.LeutnantvonOppen,nineteenyearsold,assumedactingcommandoftheremainingsixtymen.Theyoungofficeradvancedwithhismen,reachedthefirsthousesofthecityandfromhiswayforward,fromhousetohouse.Butnoonefollowedthem.Theinfantrywereexhausted,bleedingandfreezing;intheend,theyhadtopullback.Byaround1700hours,theII./Panzer-Regiment6hadbreachedthetankditch

and cleared the high ground behind it of the enemy. It then turned night. Thecompanies had to set up all-round defenses, since fuel and ammunition hadbecome scarce. But there was no rest during the night. The Soviet artillery,includingStalinorgans,rakedtheentireforegroundtoTula.ThelastdayofOctoberdawneddrearyandrainy.Therewasnoadvancingin

frontofTula.“Großdeutschland,”with twoof its battalionswas right outsidethe southern edge of the city. Behind them were the fighting vehicles of thearmor regiment. But they were condemned to inactivity. No supply columnsmadeitforwardduringthenight.AfewJu-52transportersflewinanddroppedfuelcanisters,someonlyfivemetersofftheground.Insomecases,thecanistersburstwhenhittingtherock-hardfrozenground.Not only did the Soviets fire ceaselessly on the Germans positions with

artillery,theyalsoattackedfromoutofTulaaround1000hourswithsixheavy

tanks.Thesteelgiantstoreapartthethinlyheldinfantrylines.Theantitankgunsof “Großdeutschland” knocked out four of the Russian tanks, with an 8.8-centimeterFlak eliminating the fifthone.At that point, the sixth tank fled thebattlefield.AsimilarefforttopenetratetheGermanfrontwasmadebytwofifty-two-ton tanks, but they were eliminated by concentrated fires from theII./Panzer-Regiment6.The remaining hours of 31Octoberwere spentwith improving the friendly

positions, which continued to suffer under the enemy’s artillery fires. At theonset of darkness, the first field messes, fuel trucks and ammunition haulersmade it to the regiment after three days.Themenof the supply elements hadmadetheimpossiblepossible:theyhadconqueredthemuck.The detachments and battalions that only had wheeled vehicles at their

disposalwere stuck in themud and could neithermove forward or backward.ThelogisticschainonlyworkedasfarasMzensk.Theengineersandtherailwayforceshadrestoredthetracksthatfar,sothatthefirstfewtrainscouldbringinfreight.InOrel,itwasalmostlikepeacetime:Electriclightswereburninginthehousesandonthestreets.Amovietheaterhadbeensetupforthesoldiers.ButfromMzenskforward,nothingwasworking.Thedivision logisticsofficer,Hauptmann i.G.Barth,hadall availablepanje

carts commandeered, since only true horsepower could overcome themuck insome instances. Themotorcycle infantry battalion had been directed to movebehind the armor regiment three days previously; it was still in the city. ThedepartureofSchützen-Regiment3wasalsopostponeddaily.Inthemeantime,theriflemenwerebusywithimprovingroadsandconstructingcorduroyroads.Treeswerefelledandhalf-destroyedRussianhutsandbunkerfacilitiesweretornaparttocreatebasematerialfordrivingalongtheroads.Schützen-Regiment 394 was employed to screen the flanks, and its 1st

Battalion reached Plawsk during that period. The SPW’s and other vehiclesremainedbehindinthemarshlandtotherear.Eventhedetourrouteswerebarelypassable,sincetheSovietshaddestroyedallbridgesandfootpathsduringtheirwithdrawal.Despiteallofthedifficulties,Schützen-Regiment394slowlyclosedup toPanzer-Regiment6 and reached the area ten kilometers outside of Tula,after theriflemenhadsimplymovedandmarchedthelastfewkilometersrightalongtherailwaytracks.Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadalsobeendirectedtomove forward on 31 October, was still in its screening area. Finally, on 1November,itstwobattalionsmovedout.Italsohadtoleavebehinditsvehicles.

Baggage,weapons and ammunitionwere loaded on thepanje carts. ThemostsecureroutewasalongtherailwaytracksoftheMzensk–Tschernline.Generalmajor Breith was initially up front with the armor regiment. He

recognized the senselessness of a continued attack on Tula and, feeling theresponsibilityhehadtowardshismen,calleditoff.Heandhisbattlestaffsetuptheircommandpostintheformer“Tolstoy”MiddleSchoolinJassnaja-Poljana.Thatlocalityseemedtohaveauniquesenseofpeacefulnessinthemiddleofthewoods. The estate of Count Tolstoy consisted of two homes and a fewadministrative buildings. German soldiers took the facilities under their wingandpreventedtheirdestruction.Tolstoy’sburialplotwasnottoofaraway,anditwas guarded bymen of the division. The first soldiers killed in theTula areaweregivenover to eternal restnot too far from the famousRussianpoet.Themedicalbattalionestablishedaclearingstationtherewithits1stCompany.Therewas a large influx of wounded.Oberleutnant von Rochow’s 2nd AmbulancePlatoonwas constantly on thego, especially since somanyvehicles hadbeenlost, in taking the wounded to Tschern. Stabsarzt Dr. Koch’s 2nd MedicalCompanywassetuptheretohandlethewoundedsoldiers.ThebadlywoundedwereflownfromtheretoOrel.Asaresultofitsmanyvehicularlosses,thedivisionreorganizedthearmored

regiment on 5 November. The three battalion headquarters were retained ascommandandcadreformations.Theregimentwasreorganizedtacticallywith:aregimentalheadquarters;atanksectionwiththeheadquartersoftheIII./Panzer-Regiment 6 (Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski) and three line companies,consisting of the 1st Company (Oberleutnant Vopel), the 2nd Company(OberleutnantMarkowski),andthe3rdCompany(OberleutnantMüller-Hauff);and a tank supply section with the headquarters of the I./Panzer-Regiment 6(Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott), also with three line companies. Panzerjäger-Abteilung521wasonceagainplacedunderthecommandofMajorFrankwithitstworemainingcompaniesandremainedattachedtothearmorregiment.SincetheSovietswerenotcontentwithsimplydisruptingtheassemblyareas

withartilleryfirebutalsostartedtolaunchinfantryattacks,thearmorregimentwasemployedtoguardthenorthernflankofthedivisionon5November.Uptothatpoint,onlyoneplatoonfromthe5thCompanyof“Großdeutschland”hadbeenscreeningasectorofthreekilometers.Under extremely difficult circumstances, Hauptmann von dem Heyden-

Rynsch’s I./Schützen-Regiment 394 had forced its way forward throughmuck

andwoods—constantlyengagingSovietriflemen,tanks,andpartisans—asfarasTula,whereitwentintopositionnexttothe1stBattalionof“Großdeutschland.”Both of those elements screened in the direction of Tula. The regimentalheadquarters ofOberst Hoernlein andOberstleutnant Audörsch were locatednearoneanother.TheriflemenoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394wereexhausted,tiredanddirty.Inthefighting,especiallyintheareaaroundKitajewka,theyhadtomakemany sacrifices. The villagewas retaken by the Russians during thenightof5–6November.The3rdCompanylaunchedanimmediatecounterattackand was able to drive out the enemy in fighting that lasted for hours. In theprocess,100Russianswerecaptured.Thecompanywasonlyabletoholdoutinthe localityduring theday, since theSoviets launchedattacks fromthreesideswithnumerically superior forcesduring thenight.Thecompanyevacuated thevillage, leaving behind all of its heavy weapons. Two men were reportedmissing.Theriflemenwereabletomakeitbackacrosstherailwayembankmentandestablishcontactwiththe4thCompany.On 6 November, Schützen-Regiment 3 started its move forward to relieve

“Großdeutschland.”Footmarchingandvehicularmovementwereeasier,sinceit had turned colder and all of the routes had frozen firmly.The 1stBattalionreached Jassnaja-Poljana that same day and relieved the first elements of“Großdeutschland” during the night. The battalion was guided forward by atrafficcontrolelementsthathadbeenestablishedbythedivisionandwhichwascommandedbyHauptmannKersten,thecommanderofthe3rdBattalionofthedivisional artillery. The battalions of the divisional artillery had also made itforward to Jassnaja-Poljana with great difficulty. One battalion each wasdedicatedtosupportingtheI./Schützen-Regiment3andtheI./Schützen-Regiment394.ThetwoFlakbattalionsupfrontassumedresponsibilityforprotectingthenorth(Flak-Abteilung91)andthesouth(theII./Flak-Regiment11).The reinforcement of the riflemen had come at the right time. During the

night, the Soviets had launched a surprise attack on the Tolstoy estate andattempted to assault the clearing station that had just been established there.Oberleutnant Müller-Hauff’s 3rd Tank Company, reinforced by a battery ofartilleryandaplatoonfromPionier-Bataillon27,11movedoutagainstthebridgeovertheUpaat0815hourstoeject theenemyandblowuptherailwaybridge500metersdownstream.TheRussiansfledwhentheGermanfightingvehiclesapproached. Artillery fire then prevented further advance, however, with theresult that thebridge couldnot beblownup.The company remained engagedwiththeenemyandwasunabletoreturntotheregimentuntilithadturneddark.

At the same time that“Großdeutschland”was relieved, the armored regimentwasalsopulledoutofitssector,withOberleutnantVopel’s1stTankCompanyrelieving the2. and5./Panzer-Regiment 35. His company established outpostsorientedinthedirectionofTula.EversincethebeginningofNovember, theSovietcommandhadbeenintent

onpreventingtheadvanceoftheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.).Twocavalrycorps,five rifle divisions and a tankbrigadewere attacking the flanksofEberbach’sbrigade,inanefforttoalsogettotherearofthecorpsatthesametime.TheLIII.Armee-Korps, launching a counterattack with its main effort directed towardsTeploje, pushed the enemy back slowly. Individual elements of both Panzer-Regiment 6 and Panzer-Regiment 35 were attached to that corps for shortoperations.TheII./Schützen-Regiment394wasalsocross-attached to thecorpsand saw heavy fighting atKrutja andDworiki. The supreme command of theRedArmywasconcentratingmoreandmoreofitsforcesaroundMoscow.TheBrjansk Front was dissolved and its divisions allocated to the Western andSouthwesternFronts.FacingthesectoroftheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)wastheSoviet50thArmy.On7November,theanniversaryoftheOctoberRevolution,therewasenemy

artilleryfireallalongthecorpsfrontage.Theheavyfirewasconcentratedonthepositions of the 3rd Battalion of “Großdeutschland” during the morning.Around 1000 hours, severalwaves of enemy riflemen stormed the thinly heldGerman lines.When theenemytanksstarted toapproach, thebatteredsoldierswerenolongerabletoholdout,andtheypulledback.TheSovietscamethroughthegapin the lineandoccupiedHills216.6and232.8.Theenemyattackthenexpanded to include the sector of Schützen-Regiment 394. The outposts weredrivenoutofKitajewkaandwereonlyabletoreestablishthemselvesalongtherailway embankment. Three T-34’s were knocked out by antitank guns from“Großdeutschland.” The quickly alerted 3rd Tank Company entered the frayaround1200hoursandclearedMalejewka.Theenemyartilleryandantiaircraftfirecontinuedthroughouttheday.Fortunately,alloftheattackscouldbedrivenoff,withthefrontoutsideofTulacontinuingtohold.The enemy forces continued to be reinforced and attacked the positions of

both rifle regiments during the nightwith hiswell-camouflaged riflemen.Theenemywasable to takeMalejewkaonceagain.The1stBattalionofSchützen-Regiment 394 was especially threatened. A reconnaissance-in-force conductedbythe1stCompanydeterminedthattheRussianswerealreadyinthebattalion’s

rear.Allofthedriversandtrainspersonnelweresoonengagedwiththeenemy.Fortunately, the 2ndBattalion of the regiment arrived in time and temporarilycleared up the situation around Kossaja-Gora. The situation was not simple,since theenemyforceswerenumerically superioreverywhere. Inaddition, theenemyusedsearchlights inTula to illuminate the terrain toshowtheattackinginfantry theGermanpositions.Since therewerenoheavyweaponsonhand, itprovedimpossibletoeliminatetheantiaircraftsearchlights.ThegeneralsituationofthattimeisreflectedinthefollowinglinesGeneraloberstGuderianwroteinaletter:“Itismiseryforthetroopsandagreatshameforouroperations,sincetheenemyiswinningtime....Godonlyknowshowitwillallturnout.”Fortune smiled a bit more on Schützen-Regiment 3 that day. With the

exceptionofafewskirmishes infrontof thesectorof the1stBattalion, itwasquiet there. The 2nd Battalion, which had conducted successful immediatecounterattacks the previous day, stormed Krukowo and conductedreconnaissance-in-forceinalldirections.On8November,thatbattalionsufferedone dead and ninewounded in the 10thCompany. The battalion knocked outfourtanks,capturedfivemachineguns,andtookseventy-threeprisoners.Elementsofthearmorregimentwerealsoinvolvedinthefightinginfrontof

thepositionsofSchützen-Regiment394.The2ndTankCompanymovedoutat0700 hours. It cleared Malejewka for the second time and advanced onBolschaja-Jelaraja. The company encountered strong enemy forces in a defileand had to fight its way slowly back to the lines of the 1st Battalion of“Großdeutschland.”HauptmannSchneider-Kostalskithenbroughthis3rdTankCompany forward. He had the two companies attack and was able to setBolschaja-Jelarajaalight.Theenemyforcesholdingoutthere—the2ndSiberianRegimentofthe413thRifleDivision—pulledbacktotheeast.Whiletheenemycouldgenerallybeheldincheckalongthefronttoeastand

south against the constantly attacking Russian forces, some enemy elementssucceededininfiltratingthroughtheGermanpositionsandsurfacinginthereararea. For instance,Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 encountered an enemy force ofabout250menquitebysurprise in theareasouthwestofProgress.TheenemydetachmenthadhadthemissionoftakingKossaja-Gorafromtherear.Thatday,thedivisionwasthreatenedwithbeingcutoff.Thecorpsandthefieldarmywerealreadyconsideringwhethertopullthedivisionback,sinceInfanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland,”whichwasstillattached,couldhardlybeconsideredcombatcapableatthatstage.

TheninthofNovemberwasnodifferent than thepreviousday.TheSovietsweredictating the termsof the fightingoutsideofTulawith theirartilleryandaerial attacks. The enemy launched smaller-scale but energetically conductedimmediate counterattacks against the positions of the 3rd Battalion of“Großdeutschland” and the I./Schützen-Regiment 394. The 3rd and 4thCompaniesofthelatterbattalionwereabletoturnbackallenemyattacks.Thedivision thenordered thehills thathadbeen lost tobe recaptured.TheSovietsbeattheGermanstothepunch,however,byplacingstrongartilleryfiresonthethinlyheldGermanstrong-pointsandthenattacking.TheSovietssucceededinadvancing as far as Kischkino, ten kilometers east of Jassnaja-Poljana, wheretheyranintoforcesoftheII./Schützen-Regiment3andtheII./Schützen-Regiment394. In Kischkino proper that morning was only the 2nd Company of thedivisionalengineers.Fortunately,theenemy’srapidadvancewasidentifiedandtemporarily halted by fires from the heavy infantry guns of the 11./Schützen-Regiment3.Animmediatecounterattacklaunchedbythe6./Schützen-Regiment3 was unsuccessful.Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 then provided six guns to the2ndBattalion.Earlyintheafternoon,the2ndTankCompanyalsoarrivedfromKossaja-Gora.Around1400hours, theattackon thedefilebetweenKischkinoandLobynskojewasstarted.Thethrustdidnotadvancewellinplaces,sincetheterrain,whichwascovered

withdensewoodsandvegetation,gavetheSovietsgoodcoveredandconcealedpositions.Theenemy—itwas the827thRifleRegiment—allowed theGermansoldierstopassby,onlytofireonthemfromtherear.Therewereconsiderablecasualties,especiallyinthe6thCompany.Nonetheless,theriflemenwereabletooccupythedefilebytheonsetofdarknessandgetto“TP”Hill.Thecompaniesofthe2ndBattalionsufferedninedeadandsixteenwounded.Theyduginforthenight, while the tanks pulled back to Lutowinowa and the 1st and 2ndCompanies of the engineer battalion moved back into Kischkino. The nextmorning, the 2nd Battalion moved out shortly after 0600 hours and tookLobynskoje after an hour of fighting. Two hours later, the 8thCompany tookBrykowa,supportedbythefiresofthe1stBatteryofthedivisionalartillery.Theenemylefthispositions there,pullingbackinto thefruitorchards,whichwerecoveredinsnowandallowedlittlevisibility.Itwasimpossiblefortheriflementopenetrate into the thicket.The1stCompanyofengineers then tossedsmokegrenades, and the fighting vehicles of the 3rd Tank Company fired witheverything they had. The 1st Battery of artillery also moved forward. Thecombinationslowlyworedowntheenemy.Shortlyafter1200hours,Hauptmann

Peschke issued orders to attack again. The 8th Company assaulted. Itscommander,OberleutnantvonBecker,waskilled,alongwithfourothermenofthe company. Leutnant Pauckstadt then led the riflemen, who succeeded inejectingtheenemyhalfanhourlater.Inthecourseof thetwodaysoffightingagainst the 2ndBattalion, the Soviets lost 43machine guns, 11 infantry guns,and600rifles;377prisonersweretaken.That was the last successful operation of the division outside of Tula. The

domesofthechurchesofthecity,whichhadbeenvisibleuptothatpoint,wouldsoondisappearfromthefieldofviewoftheGermansoldiers.At1700hourson9 November, the division issued orders for a transition to the defense: “3.Panzer-DivisiontransitionstothedefensesouthofTula.ItshortensitsfrontbywithdrawingfromTulatoavoidanenvelopmentandestablishstrongreserves.”That night, the first formations started to disengage from the enemy,

principally“Großdeutschland.” They pulled back to the northern outskirts ofNowoje-Bassowo and Pirowo. The occupation of the new position wascontinuedon10Novemberand,bythatevening,thenewlineswereoccupiedbythedivision,whichhadformedthreebattlegroups.OberstKleemanncommanded the righthandgroup,whichwaspositioned in

Lobynskoje, Skuratowka, and Warwarowka. It consisted of the II./Schützen-Regiment 3, the II./Schützen-Regiment 394, Pionier-Bataillon 39, the1./Schützen-Regiment 3, the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, and the 6./Flak-Regiment59.The1st,2nd,7th,and8thBatteriesofthedivisionalartillerywerein support. The center groupwas commanded byOberstleutnant Audörsch. Itwas comprised of the I./Schützen-Regiment 3, the I./Schützen-Regiment 394,Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, the 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, Panzerjäger-Abteilung521, Artillerie-Abteilung 400 (the regimental artillery of Infanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland”),andtheremainingbatteriesofthe2ndBattalionofartillery.Audörsch’sforceswerearrayedfromWarwarowkatotheeasternedgeof thewoodlineeastofRwy.HauptmannZiervogel’sreconnaissancebattalionscreened on the left of the division. Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland”was designated the division’s ready reserve. Itwas pulledoutofthefront,leavingbehinditsheavyweaponstosupportSchützen-Regiment394.Thearmoredregimentassembled in thevicinityof thedivisioncommandpost.Panzer-Regiment35moved toTrossna,where itwasplacedat thedirectdisposalofthecorps.The disengagement from the enemy succeeded without being noticed or

disturbed.Thewesternflankofthedivisionturnedouttobeclearoftheenemy,withtheexceptionofstrongelementsoftheSoviet290thRifleDivision,whichwere in the villages northwest of the Mysa. The reconnaissance battalionestablished contact with the XXXXIII. Armee-Korps, which had reached theTula–Aleksinroadwithits31.Infanterie-Divisionand131. Infanterie-Division.Thedivisionestablisheditsdefensesinthedesignatedsector.Itformedastrongready reserve,which couldbe committedwhenever the situationdemanded it.OberstleutnantMunzel commanded the reserve forces,which consisted of the2nd and 3rd Tank Companies, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3, the 1./Schützen-Regiment394,andabatteryfromthe2ndBattalionofartillery.AllnonessentialvehiclesoftheforceswereconcentratedthatdaytobesenttotheOrelarealateron.Bythen,adeepfrosthadarrived.Thetemperaturedippedto16degreesbelow

zero(3.2degreesFahrenheit).Therewerenewandunwelcomesurprisesfortheforces in the field. The gas lines on thewheeled vehicles froze; itwasn’t toodifferentwith the fighting vehicles. The engines had to bewarmed up beforetheycouldbe turnedover.Eventhegrease in the turret traversingmechanismsfrozeup.Thetracksonthetanksslidontheiceontheroadsandinthefields.Thecrewsplacedsparetrackunderneathtogaintraction,butthatalsocausedthespare track to be bent. A tank sometimes needed a whole hour to cover akilometer. The logistics personnel only brought forward what the LuftwaffecouldflyintoTschern.Butitwasevenworseforthepersonnel.Therewerenowinter uniforms; correspondingly, the first cases of frostbite appeared. On 13November,thetemperatureregistered24below(-11.2Fahrenheit).“GeneralWinter”hadarrivedonthebattlefield.

__________________1. Reichsarbeitsdienst, or Reich Labor Service—a prewar paramilitaryorganization that was designed to reduce unemployment and provideinexpensivelaborforgovernmentprojects.Later,itworkedprimarilyinsupportofthearmedforces,withsomeunitsevenseeingcombat.2.Thiswasageneralheadquarterselementthatwasnotassignedtoanydivisionorcorps.

3. The author is in error with regard to the timeframe of the redesignations.While the tankgroups started tobe redesignated as field armycommands andeventually as tank armies at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, themotorizedarmycorpswerenotredesignatedas tankcorpsuntil thesummerof1942. Therefore, the original designations will be used until the “official”timeframeoftheredesignations.4.Thebrigadehadbeenapartofthe4.Panzer-Division.Effective26July1941,theXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)ordereditattachedtothe3.Panzer-Division.5.Thearmoredregimentofthe18.Panzer-Division.6. This was the signals battalion for the XXIV. Panzer-Korps. Effective 15October, it was redesignated as Panzerkorps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 424. Itshouldbenoted thatvonBehr ended thewar as aGeneralmajor commandingthe 90. Panzergrenadier-Division. He also received the Oak Leaves to theKnight’s Cross of the Iron Cross as the commander of Panzergrenadier-Regiment200 (90. leichteDivision).Hewas equally successful in thepostwarGermanmilitary,alsoachievingtherankofGeneralmajorandcommandingthe5.Panzer-Divisioninthelate1950s.HepassedawayinBonnin1983.7.InGerman,GeneralderschnellenTruppen.8. His immediate reassignment was as commanding general of the XXXXI.Panzer-Korps,whichwasalso involved in theassaultonMoscow,albeit fromthenorthwest.9.Eberbachwasoneofthekeypanzergeneralsofthewarandeventuallyrosetofield armycommand.Hewas the forty-secondmemberof theGermanArmedForcestobehonoredwiththeOakLeaves,whichwasofficiallyawardedtohimon31December1941.10.Roughly,“screeninggroup.”11. By that time, the battalion had been redesignated as Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon27.Itwastheengineerbattalionofthe17.Panzer-Division.

RationsaredistributedwithintheI./Schützen-Regiment394.

Awelderinamaintenancecompanyatwork.

Winter1941.AmailtrainhasarrivedoutsideofOrelandisquicklyunloadedsothatthehighlydesiredmailquicklyreachestheunitsthroughsupplychannels.

Theuniformsectionfollowedtheforcesinthefield,wherevertheywent.Itwasalso“completelymotorized,”astheelectricsewingmachineattests.

LunchispreparedfortheheadquarterscompanyoftheI./Schützen-Regiment394.

The3./Schützen-Regiment394intheattack.

FeldwebelLevermann,therationstrainsleaderofthe1stBattalion,supervisesthedistributionofpersonal-demanditemsforthe4./Schützen-Regiment394.ObergefreiterStöverandObergefreiterSeefeldareseen

passingoutitemstoFeldwebelKaiser(listinhand).

GeneralleutnantModelvisitstheauxiliaryhospitalinUnetscha.AssistenzarztDr.Türkisseenreportingtohim.

ASovietT-34knockedoutbyLeutnantStörck(engineerplatoonofSchützen-Regiment394)infrontofthecorpscommandpostinUnetscha.

MajorSchneider-Kostalski,theboldcommanderoftheIII./Panzer-Regiment6.

TheadvanceofthePanzergruppein1941.Standinginthestaffcarontheviewer’sleftisOberstleutnantAudörsch,thecommanderofSchützen-Regiment394.

Themainclearingstationofthe3.Panzer-DivisioninMeljna.

CHAPTER12

FromtheUpatotheSchat:TheBattleforTula

Generaloberst Guderian’s 2. Panzer-Armee was directed to continue theoffensivebygoingaroundTulafromthesouthandthenadvancingfartotheeasttothenpivottothenortheastinthedirectionofGorki.SinceTulacouldnotbetaken frontally, it was intended to take the important city, which blocked theroute toMoscow, by enveloping from the eastwhile simultaneously attackingfromthewest.AsofthemiddleofNovember,thefieldarmyhadthefollowingforces at its disposal (from right to left): the XXXXVII. Armee-Korps (mot.),commanded by General der Artillerie Lemelsen and consisting of the 18.Panzer-Divisionandthe10.,25.,and29.Infanterie-Divisionen(mot.); theLIII.Armee-Korps, commanded by General der Artillerie Weisenberger(Generalleutnant Fischer von Weikertsthal, effective 1 December) andconsisting of the167. and112. Infanterie-Divisionen; theXXIV. Armee-Korps(mot.), commanded byGeneral der Panzertruppen Geyr von Schweppenburgandconsistingofthe3.,4.,and17.Panzer-Divisionenand Infanterie-Regiment(mot.) “Großdeutschland”; and the XXXXIII. Armee-Korps, commanded byGeneral der Infanterie Heinrici and consisting of the31. and131. Infanterie-Divisionen.The3.Panzer-DivisionwasbyitselfintheTulaarea.On11November,the4.

Panzer-Division moved to the east wing of the corps, while the 17. Panzer-Divisionremainedwhereitwas,betweenOrelandTschern,duetoalackoffuel.Itwasn’tuntiltheonsetofthedeepfrostthatthesupplycolumnscouldusetheroadsagainandresupplybegantofunction.Manytanksandtrucksthathadbeenstuckforweeks in themudholearoundKromyfinallybegantoreturn to theirunitsagain.Thedrivershadnothaditeasyoverthepastfewweeks.Theywereboggedsolidlydowninthemuckandcouldonlyberesuppliedfromtheair.Inthe process, they were exposed to continuous attacks from the air. Somepersonnelwereunable topass that testofnerves.Whenthecommanderof the1stMaintenanceCompany,HauptmannEikmann,drovebackalongtherouteon19November,hefoundanotherseventy-onestuckandabandonedvehicles.

On13November, thedivisionorderedabattlegroupunderthecommandofOberstleutnantMunzeltoclearthebendintheUpaandblockthewesternaccessroadstoTula.Munzel’sbattlegroup,consistingofthereconnaissancebattalion,thethreeadhoctankcompanies,theSPWcompanyofSchützen-Regiment3,andthe5thBatteryof thedivisionalartillery,combed thewoodsatGorjuschino inextremely difficult circumstances. The temperature registered -25 degreesCelsius(-13Fahrenheit).ItthencrossedthehighgroundatUgrjumandclearedtheareaoftheenemy.Themissionwasalreadyaccomplishedbynoon,sothatthe battle group could be brought back to the combat outpost line, with theexception of the reconnaissance battalion, which continued to advance to thenorth and take the airstrip atMasslowowithout encountering the enemy. Thenext day, a similar operation was conducted in the direction of Michalkowo.Four Panzer IV’s under Leutnant von Arnim and twelve motorcycles underFeldwebelGradel(the3./Kradschützen-Bataillon3)startedtoenter thevillage.Itwasatthatpointthatthesmallbattlegroupencounteredsuperiornumbersofthe enemy. Two fighting vehicleswere lost tomines.Oberfeldwebel Ostwald,theforwardobserverfromthe5thBattery,requestedimmediatefiresupportsothat thebattle group couldpull back.At that point, the armored regimentwaspulledoutofthefrontandassignedtoscreenJassnaja-Poljanaagain.TheXXIV.Panzer-Korps reorganizedoverthenext twodaysforanattackto

theeast.Infanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland”wasemployedtoscreentheroadsouthofTula,whereitrelievedtheelementsofthe3.Panzer-Divisionthatwere positioned there.The corps employed the4. Panzer-Division on therightandthe3.Panzer-Divisionontheleft.Themaineffortwasdirectedtobealong the inner flanks,with theobjectofbreaking through theenemybetweenDedilowo and Tula and then, later on, advancing to the northeast across theSchatwiththeobjectiveofWenew.Thecorpshadthefollowingtankforcesatitsdisposal:Panzer-Regiment 6 with fifty-two vehicles (threePanzer II’s, thirty-seven Panzer III’s, nine Panzer IV’s, and three command tanks), Panzer-Regiment 35 with thirty-five vehicles, and Panzer-Regiment 39 with fifteenvehicles.Thefightingvehicleswerecamouflagedwithacoatofwhitewash.Theattackwasscheduledfor0500hourson18November.The division formed two battle groups. The righthand group, forming the

main effort, wasKampfgruppeKleemann, consisting of Schützen-Regiment 3,Panzer-Regiment6,the1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,the1./Schützen-Regiment394, the 2. and 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39, the 6./Flak-Regiment 59, and theI./Artillerie-Regiment75.Thelefthandbattlegroup,OberstleutnantAudörsch’s,

consisted of Schützen-Regiment 394, Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, the 2. and3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung521,the1./Pionier-Bataillon39,andtheIII./Artillerie-Regiment75.TheUpawasasmallriverthatsnakedintwistsandturnseastoftheroadto

Tula.Itwasthefirstobjectiveofthe3.Panzer-Division.Itwasstilldark,whenthe batteries of Artillerie-Regiment 75, as well as Artillerie-Regiment 69 andMörser-Abteilung818,1senttheirfierygreetingsovertothepositionsofthenewSiberian regiments opposite them.Our riflemen raised themselves out of theirtrenchesandfoxholes,assaultedinthedirectionoftheriverandhastenedacrossthe 10-centimeter-thick ice to the opposite bank. The engineers placed boardsandbeamsontheicesothatthemotorcyclesandSPW’sdidnotbreakthrough.Withtheexceptionofthelargerailwaybridge,alloftheotherbridgesalong

theUpahadbeenblownup.Itwasthedivision’sintenttotakethatbridgeintact,if possible, since itwas of great importance for the execution of the attack aswell as future supplies. The commander of Schützen-Regiment 394,OberstleutnantAudörsch,usedhisengineers,commandedbytheKnight’sCrossrecipientLeutnantStörck,forthatmission.Thebraveofficermadeuseofaruse.Störcktookoffwithfourmen—UnteroffizierStrucken,ObergefreiterBeyle,andtwoUkrainiansofethnicGermandescent inRussianuniforms.The restof theengineer platoon, fourteen men under the command of the assistant platoonleader,FeldwebelHeyeres,followedwithinearshot.The engineer platoon snuck through the thinly held Russian lines in pitch

darkness,andthemenreachedthebridgewithoutincident.Rightinfrontofit,along the embankment, themen discovered foxholes on both sides, eachwithtwomeninthem!Theguardsweresleeping!“Calmeddownwithapistolbutt,”theycontinuedtosleep.Thetwomachinegunsemplacedthereweretakenalong.WhileStörckwalkeduprightwithhisfourmenacrosstheapproximatelyeighty-meter-longbridge,theengineerplatoonmovedupandtookthe“sedated”guardsundercontrol.The men had crossed two-thirds of the bridge, when a Russian guard

approachedthem.Theyhadtothenusetherusethathadbeendiscussedearlier,sothat thingsdidnotgowrong.TheUkrainiansthenactedasthoughtheyhadprisonerswiththemandspokeRussiantooneanotheralongthelinesof:“Well,it looks like we’re in a neighboring sector, but we need to get rid of theseprisoners shortly.” The guard was deceived by the measure and was takenprisonerhimselfwithoutasoundbeinguttered.Despitethedarkness,thingsdid

notseemquiterighttoanotherguard,whowasstandingattheendofthebridge.HeranbeforeStörckcouldreachhim.Hesoundedthealarmandsoughtcoveralongtheembankment.By then, however, the rest of the platoon was across the bridge, and the

machine guns were quickly emplaced where ordered. In the blink of an eye,therewerewild fireworkswithmachine guns and hand grenades.Most of thesleep-drunkRussians of the bridge guard force,who had been rendered panicstricken by the fires, surrendered. The bridge was taken. Signal flares arcedskyward, the signal to the regimental commander, who had collocated hiscommand post with the point of departure for the engineer platoon, that theoperation had succeeded and that support needed to be sent to the engineerplatoon. As it turned light, an immediate counterattack by the enemy lastingsome thirty minutes was beaten back, since the regimental attack had alsocommencedbythen.In all, theRussians took losses of eighty-sevenmen in captured, killed and

wounded. The engineer platoon was able to capture five machine guns, twoantitankgunsand threemortars. In thecourseof that riskymission, it lostonemandeadandonewounded.A similar rusewas employedby the II./Schützen-Regiment3.As a result of

the fluent Russian ofUnteroffizier Roemer (6th Company), the guards wereoverrunandhiscompanywasabletocrosstheUpawithoutafight.Schützen-Regiment3rapidlycrossedits1stBattalionacrosstheriverandtook

Demidowka.LeutnantHeurich,theactingcommanderofthe3rdCompany,waskilled.LeutnantSchuppiustookhisplace,combedthroughthelocalitywithhisriflemen and drove the enemy from his closest trenches. The battalion wasunable to advance further, however, since the Soviets held their main fieldpositions. The 2nd Company of the battalion screened the right flank in thedirection ofMalaja Sujewa, since therewas a constant stream of fire comingfrom there.When a patrol from the company felt itsway forward toward thevillage around noon, it entered the village without any contact, only to besuddenlyengagedfromallsides.Thefriendlyriflemenhadtopullbackquickly;fourdeadandtwowoundedremainedinthehandsoftheSoviets.By early morning, the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 had taken Dubowka. In the

process,itspentitsstrength.The7thCompanyadvancedasfarasKamenka,butit was unable to move any further, despite support from the 10th and 11thCompanies. ItwasnotuntilSchützen-Regiment394hadcrossedatTruschkino

andOserkithattheover-alladvancestartedmakingprogressagain.Although a Stuka attack late in the morning had demolished considerable

portionsoftheenemyfieldfortifications,ithadnotbrokentheenemy’swilltoresist.TheriflemenweresubjectedtothefullfuryoftheRussianfiretheentiretime.Panzer-Regiment6didnotjointhefrayuntilnoon,sincetherewasstillnocrossing point for tanks atTruschkino.OberstleutnantMunzel decided to pullhis1stand3rdCompaniesbackandsendthemovertherailwaybridgethathadbeen taken by the engineer platoon ofSchützen-Regiment 394.While the twocompanies rolled north, the I./Schützen-Regiment 394 succeeded in takingTruschkinoafterheavyfighting.Fortunately,theUpainthevicinityofKamenkawasnot toodeep,with the result that the2ndCompanyofPanzer-Regiment6wasabletoimmediatelystartfordingtheice-coldwater.The friendly advance then turned fluid again. The fighting vehicles of

Oberleutnant Markowski and the men of Hauptmann Peschke attacked east.Contrarytoexpectations,heavilyfortifiedHill292.2couldbetaken.ThetanksstartedadvancingalongtheroadbetweenWjewka-StarajaandWjewka-Nowaje.The 7./Schützen-Regiment 3 had to conduct a fierce fight for the houses inWjewka-Staraja, however, since numerically superior enemy forces hadbarricadedthemselvesthere.Sinceithadturneddarkbythen,thecompanywasstuckoutsidethevillage.Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski arrived on the battlefield with his two

companies.His1stCompanywasimmediatelyinsertedintothelineontherightwingofSchützen-Regiment3,while the 3rdCompanyprepared for operationsoutsideofWjewka-Staraja.Sinceithadturnedcompletelydark,theadvancewashalted for the day. Success was great. Schützen-Regiment 3 took in 280prisoners,butitalsolost16deadand51wounded.Assoonasmorningdawned,theattackwascontinued.Theterrainwasfairly

flat; therewasonlyhighgroundat theedges.Chimneysandmineworkswereseen everywhere, a reminder of the industrial area south of Tula. The mensufferedterriblyunderthecold,sincetheystilldidnothaveanywinteruniforms.Moreover,theyofferedgoodtargetstotheenemyintheirfield-graycoatsinthesnowylandscape.Shortlyafter0700hourson19November,bothbattlegroupsmovedout.On

the right wing, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 (MajorWellmann), along with theattached 1./Panzer-Regiment 6 (Oberleutnant Vopel), succeeded in occupyingMalaja-Sujewa. By doing so, it eliminated the threat to the flank there.

OberleutnantVopelandthe2./Schützen-Regiment3advancedfarthertotheeastand established contact with the 3./Schützen-Regiment 3 (Leutnant Oesten) atSsalassowka.Anattackbythe3rdCompanytothesouthwasunabletodevelop,sincetheenemyopenedheavyfirefromtheflank.The II./Schützen-Regiment3, neighboring its sister 1stBattalion on the left,

hadalsomovedout to the southeast andadvanced just to theeastof themainroad.Whencontactwasestablishedwith the1stBattalion, theRussianspulledback. By noon, both battalions had reached Kalmyky-Mal. While MajorWellmann’sriflemenscreenedtothesouthandwest,HauptmannPeschke’smencontinuedadvancing.HiscompanieswereabletooccupyKalmyky-Bolsch.ThatbattalionthenpusheditsscreeningforceseastasfarasMarkaschowa.Themain effort of the attackwaswithSchützen-Regiment394 and the two

tank companies of Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski. The objective wasBolochowka,whichwasenteredontheRussiangeneralstaffmapwithatotaloffourhouses.ImaginehowsurprisedtheGermansoldierswerewhentheyfoughttheir way forward, kilometer after kilometer, and found out that they weredealingwithanextensiveindustrialtown.Bolochowkawasnovillage—itwasadefendedindustrialcity.Asaresult,Schützen-Regiment394wasunabletotakethelocalityinafrontal

attack.Instead,hismenpulledbackslowlytothesouthinanefforttopenetratefromthere.Althoughtheriflemensucceededingettingoverthehighgroundandliterally work their way into the town meter by meter, the regiment sufferedconsiderablelossesonthefirstday.The1stBattalionalonelosttwelvedeadandfifty-eightwounded.ThelosseswerethatlargebecausetheSiberians,whowerefacing our units there for the first time, did not open fire until practicallypointblank range. The Soviets defended stubbornly from well-concealedpositions,firingattheriflementhatappearedrightinfrontofthem.Anexampleshould suffice. The II./Schützen-Regiment 394 was bounding its way forwardinto the town. Its lead company encountered a wooden fence. The fencesuddenly collapsedupon itself.Behind itwereSiberians.Theyopened fire onthe7thCompanyatfiftymeters,cuttingitdown.Thecommander,OberleutnantMulthaupt, was killed, along with two other officers and many enlistedpersonnel.By then itwas1600hoursandnight.Thedivision transitioned toasecuritypostureatBolochowkaandjusttoitssouth.

StreetfightinginBolochowka.

After Stalin was certain that Japan would not march against Russia, hewithdrew the Siberian forces from the Far East and committed them to thefightinginfrontofMoscow.Kampfgruppe Kleemann—consisting of Schützen-Regiment 3, Panzer-

Regiment 6, the I./Schützen-Regiment 394, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the9./Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 6./Artillerie-Regiment 69, Pionier-Bataillon 39,elementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung521,andelementsofPanzerjäger-Abteilung543—was given themission of taking Bolochowka. The divisional engineers,whohadalreadystartederectingabridgeover theUpaon18NovemberusingthebridgingsectionsofHauptmannWinkler,startedreconnoitering inorder to

establishabridgeover theSchatatNowoje.OberleutnantMöllhoffof the3rdCompany of engineers conducted the reconnaissance along the Schat. Inaddition,the1stBridgingSection,undertheleadershipofLeutnantMertens,hadstartingbridgingtheUpaatTruschkinobythen.Thesixteen-tonbridgelaterhadalengthofthirty-twometersandawidthof3.5meters.ThebrigadestagedaroundUlanowkaandstarteditsattackat1000hourson

20 November. The artillery preparation proved ineffective in places, since itlandedtooshortand,asaconsequenceof themorningfogand thesmolderingminingfacilities,observationwasbarelypossible.TheI./Schützen-Regiment3movedoutwithits2ndCompanyontherightand

its3rdontheleft.The1stCompanyofLeutnantLohsewasusedtoreconnoiterandalsoscreentheflank,orientedtotheeast.TheSPWcompanyadvancedfromPagassowa, which was clear of the enemy, to the north. In doing so, itencounteredtwoRussiantanksatalargemine.TheSovietsfromthe413thRifleDivisionpulledback in thedirectionofBolochowka.TheSPW company thenswungwest toreinforce theattackof thebattalion.LeutnantBraun,moving inthe leadvehicle,wasable to effectively support the2ndCompany,whichwasstrugglingforsomeminefacilitiesontheeastedgeofBolochowka,withhis3.7-centimetercannon.TheSovietshadsetupdefensivelythereandinthewoodlinetothenorth.Theywerefiringwithmortarsandheavyantitankguns.Forthetimebeing, the battalion had to call off its attack and set up all-round security.Contactwiththe2ndBattalionoftheregimentwasmaintainedbyapatrolledbyUnteroffizierRonnebergofthe3rdCompany.The II./Schützen-Regiment 3 of Hauptmann Peschke, along with the

3./Panzer-Regiment6ofOberleutnantMüller-Hauff,advancedonBolochowkafromthesouth.The8thCompanywasabletoassaultthecollectivefarmquicklyand take the residential areas arrayed in frontof the town from there.The6thCompanymovedupalongsidethe8th.Themovementsofbothcompaniesthenboggeddown,sincetheywerereceivingheavyfirefromthenearbywoodsandthe industrial facilities.The riflebattalionbroughtup its infantrygunsand theantitankplatoonthathadbeenattachedtoit.Forthetimebeing,however,theywerestillunabletoadvance,sinceRussiantankshadrolledupinthemeantime.MajorHaas’sreinforcedI./Schützen-Regiment394hadcrossedthe800meters

ofopengroundinthesouthwestinthemeantimeandwaspositionedattheedgeof Bolochowka. Numerous houses and factories were burning in the townproper. TheSiberians put up a brave defense and could only be driven out in

tough house-to-house fighting. Since heavy Soviet tanks appeared, the riflecompanieswereunabletoadvance.Theregimentordereda8.8-centimeterFlakforward.Thegunwasabletotake

outthefirstfightingvehiclewithinafewminutes,butasecondoneapproached.Afterfourrounds, itwasalsoeliminated.ThenaT-34appearedinfrontof theI./Schützen-Regiment3.Itdroveintoaconstructionexcavationpitandgotstuckthere.ThefightingforBolochowkacontinued.Houseafterhousewastakeninclose

combat.Thefiercestresistancewasbeingofferedtotheattackingriflemenfroma two-storybrickhouse.Theheadquartersof theSiberian2ndRifleRegiment,along with about seventy Red Army men, had barricaded itself inside. Theinfantrygunsandahowitzer thathadbeenbrought forward fired sixty roundsintothebuilding.Aplatoonfromthe6./Schützen-Regiment3thenmovedouttoassault. Russian rifle rounds started whistling around the ears of the Germansoldiers.HauptmannPeschkethereuponorderedtheattackcalledoff.The I./Schützen-Regiment 394 had cleared the remaining houses of

Bolochowka,althoughafewRussiantankscontinuedtocauseunrestwithinthetown. When the 8./Schützen-Regiment 3 combed through a nearby park,OberleutnantBrandtandLeutnantPauckstadtnoticedanapparentlyabandonedKV-I.Justastheofficersapproachedit, theheavyfightingvehiclerolledawaywith a howling engine and switched-on headlights. Fortunately, the 8.8-centimeterFlakwasnearby.Thecannoneersimmediatelytookupasightpictureand, after the third round, they knocked out the tank.A fifthRussian fightingvehiclewassetalightlateronbyantitankelements.Darknesshaddescended.TheSovietscontinuedtodefendfromthehighbrick

house.LeutnantWeigel’s engineers from the 2ndCompany of engineerswerebrought forward. They penetrated into the house with 350 kilograms ofdemolitionsandblew itup.SeventeendeadRussianofficers remainedbehind;onlyasinglefirstlieutenantescapedwithhislife.ThefightingforBolochowkawasover.TheII./Schützen-Regiment3lost9deadand37wounded,includingLeutnant

Zimmermann and Leutnant Stegemann. Victory also cost the I./Schützen-Regiment394dearly.Inthelasttwodays,ithadsuffered125wounded;sincethestartoftheattack,63hadbeenkilled.LeutnantDr.Lotzeassumedcommandofthewiped-out7./Schützen-Regiment394,withLeutnantDürrholztakingovertheregiment’s2ndCompany.

The I./Schützen-Regiment 3, supported by the 3./Panzer-Regiment 6, hadcontinued to remain on the right flank. That afternoon,Oberst Kleemann haddirectedittoreconnoiterthewoodedterraintothenortheastofBolochowka.The3rd Company took Hill 243.3, initially screening to the west and then to thenorth.The2ndCompanyandthetankcompanyturnedtowardsthewoodsafterashort artillery preparation.Despite the onset of darkness, the fighting vehiclesand the riflemen entered the woods and combed through them. Around 1700hours,thenorthernandeasternsideswerereached.Theriflemenspentthenightthere, after contactwas establishedwith the 3rdCompany. The battalion tookninetyprisoners;itlosttwodeadandfifteenwounded.Thenightpassedwithoutanyseriousincident.Earlyinthemorning,Leutnant

Braunof the1stCompanyofSchützen-Regiment3wassentoutonamountedpatrol inthedirectionofHill232.1andKurakino.Bothweredeterminedtobeclearoftheenemy.AsecondpatroladvancedonNowojeabitlater.Thatlocalitywasalsoclearoftheenemy,butenemydigginginonthehighgroundnorthofthefrozenSchatwasobserved.Atthatpoint,areinforcedplatoonfromthe3rdCompanyoccupiedthevillage.GeneralderPanzertruppenGeyrvonSchweppenburgmetwithGeneralmajor

Breith and Oberst Kleemann in Bolochowka on 21 November. HauptmannPeschkereportedonthesuccessofhisbattalionthepreviousday.Thedeadwereburiedinasimpleceremonyintheafternoon,withFatherHeidlandholdingtheeulogy.TheII./Schützen-Regiment3remainedscreeninginBolochowkathatdayand in the woods to the north. The I./Schützen-Regiment 394 arrived inBolochowkaandthenmovedtothewestandnorthtothesouthernbanksoftheSchat.The4.Panzer-Division,attackingto therightof thedivision,wasstruggling

against numerically superior enemy forces at Uslowaja. For that reason, theII./Schützen-Regiment 394, the 1. and 2./Panzer-Regiment 6, and the2./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543wereattached to the4.Panzer-Division.The17.Panzer-Division,whichhadmovedforward,hadalreadycrossedtheSchatandwas advancing in the direction of Wenew. In its sector, however, the strongenemy forces,which belonged to the Soviet 10thArmy,weremaking groundgainsdifficult.On23November, thedivision reached theSchat,which ran from twenty to

thirtymeters inwidth. It started screening along the river line.OberstleutnantDr. Müller’s II./Schützen-Regiment 394 returned to the division from the 4.

Panzer-Division. Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, which had been attached toInfanterie-Regiment (mot.) “Großdeutschland,” was also released from itsattachment to that formation, but it was immediately designated as a corpsreserveintheDedilowoarea.Onthedayofitsreturn,Müller’sbattalionrelievedSchützen-Regiment 40 of the 17. Panzer-Division, which was positioned inLjachowoandPetrowka.The latter armoreddivisionmovedout toadvance tothenorth;thatsameday,itreachedtheareajustsouthofWenew.It was planned to continue the attack on 24 November. To that end, the

division received the followingmission: “Movingout on24November, the3.Panzer-Divisionejectstheenemyalongthewestflankofthecorpsatleastasfaras a line running Panowa–Kutschina by attacking to thewest and envelopingalongtheroadfromKarniki.Bydoingso,itistodeprivetheenemyofinfluencealongthatroad.”ThebattlegroupformedunderOberstKleemannstartedtheattackonacold

andmisty24November.Themain effortwas along the rightwing,where thetankcompanyandelementsof theantitank forceswerecommitted.Byaround0800 hours, Nowonikalkaja had been crossed. At that point, a 52-ton tankprevented further progress. The 2./Schützen-Regiment 394 remained at thatlocationuntilearlyafternoon.A10-centimetercannonthatwasbroughtforwardwasfinallyabletodriveawaythesteelmonster.The3./Schützen-Regiment3didnot get any farther, either, and spent the night inKrjukowa. The II./Schützen-Regiment3gotasfarasthe3rdCompany’slocation.Becauseoftheearlyonsetofdarkness,Makejewkacouldnotbetakenthatday.TheLIII.Armee-KorpshadcloseduptotheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)onthe

right and cleared the area aroundStalinorgorsk.Agroupof enemy forces thathadpulledbackwasencircledeastofthecitybyelementsofthe29.Infanterie-Division(mot.)oftheXXXXVII.Armee-Korps(mot.),whichwasadvancingfromthesouth.Elementsof the4.Panzer-Division sealedoff theencirclement fromthenorth.The17.Panzer-Division,whichhadcrossed theSchatnext to the3.Panzer-Division,advancedfartothenorththatday,takingWenew.Onthenextday, its reconnaissancebattalionadvancedanother twentykilometers inaboldraid,takingittotheareathreekilometerssouthofKaschira.Thatturnedouttobe the northernmost point reached by elements of the 2. Panzer-Armee. ThesignstoMoscowindicateditwasonlyanothereightykilometers.KampfgruppeKleemanncontinueditsattackat0700hourson25November.

Leutnant Lohse’s 1./Schützen-Regiment 3, which had been sent ahead to

reconnoiter, determined that Makejewka was clear of the enemy. MajorWellmannhadtherestofhisbattalionattackimmediately,eventhoughtherewasnocontactwiththe2ndBattalion,whichhadmovedouttothewesttoenvelop.Around 1030 hours, Wellmann’s battalion had cleared Makejewka, followedshortly thereafter byApeschkowo. Thewhitewashed tanks andSPW’s pressedthrough to the west and linked up with the II./Schützen-Regiment 3. As theycontinued tomovenorth, they encountered fleeingRussians outsideGryslowoandMaratuja,immediatelyopeningfire.Duringthatperiod,theXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)waspositionedinasalient

inthefrontthatextendedeastofTulaandreachedasfarasKaschira.Thatmeantthat the areas the divisions had to coverwere not getting any shorter. Enemyforces thatwereever increasing insizewerepressingagainst those thinlyheldlines.The3.Panzer-DivisionwasscreeningtheentirewesternflankofthecorpsfromWenewtotheSchat.Facingthedivisionwereelementsofthe154th,413th,and299thRifleDivisions,the31stCavalryDivisionandmilitia.TheSovietshadreenteredStalinogorsk.Since itwas their intention tobreak

throughfromtheretoTula,thecorpshadtotakeallstepsnecessarytoeliminatethat threat. The 4. Panzer-Division was reinforced considerably. The combatelementsofPanzer-Regiment6wereemployedinthatsector.Thecommanderofthose elements,Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski, was wounded for the fourthtimeon26November.Thebravecommanderofthe1stCompany,OberleutnantVopel,was killed on the battlefield.He became the seventeenth officer of theregimenttobekilledsincethestartofthecampaign.Duringthefightingon26November, the 1st Company lost five Panzer III’s and three Panzer IV’s.Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott assumed command of the three provisional tankcompanies.Oberleutnant Markowski’s 2nd Tank Company was attached to the 17.

Panzer-Divisionthatday.Astherewasnocontactwiththecompany,nothingisknownofitsactivitiesthatday.OberleutnantMüller-Hauff’s3rdTankCompanywastheonlytankassetsleftinthedivision,withtheexceptionoftheregimentalheadquarters. The company, with its eight Panzer III’s and four Panzer IV’s,formedthedivision’sreserve.TheregimentalheadquartersalsohadthreePanzerIII’s,onePanzerIV,andonecommandtankatitsdisposal.The command element of the armor regiment left its quarters in

Schwarzewsky on 27 November along with the men no longer capable ofcombat,reachingOrelbytheonsetofdarkness.ItwasintendedtosendPanzer-

Regiment 6, along with several other armor regiments, to Germany forreconstitution. The headquarters occupied quarters at the same places thatportionsoftheregimenthadstayedatpriortotheattackacrosstheSsushaandwerebeingmaintainedbyrear-areapersonnel.Asmallsectionofeleventrucksandonefieldmesswasformedoutofvehiclestheregimentdidnotneed.Itwasattachedtothedivisionsupportcommand.On1December,GeneraloberstGuderianappearedinOrel tobidfarewell to

Panzer-Regiment 6 and Panzer-Regiment 35 in ceremonial form. Theheadquartersofbothregiments,alongwiththreebattalionsfrombothregiments,assembled in anopen rectangle in frontof the formerRussianarmorgarrison.The farewell ceremony commenced right at 1200 hours in biting cold.OberstleutnantMunzelwasthecommanderoftroopsandreportedtheelements.Guderian then trooped the line, accompanied by the strains of a presentationmarch.Thecommanderinchiefcommemoratedthedead—from22Junetothatday,Panzer-Regiment 6 had lost 172 officers and enlisted personnel—praisedthelivingandextendedhisbestwishesforasafereunionearlyinthenextyear.TheregimentwasusedoverthecourseofthenextfewdaystoguardOrel.It

reported to the local military commander,Oberst Usinger, who was also thecommander ofArtillerie-Regiment 622.2Oberstleutnant Munzel’s forces wereresponsibleforamultitudeoftasks,includingprotectionofbridges,waterworks,electrical plants, the leather factory, ammunition depots, the militaryadministrative offices, the airfield etc. At his disposal were the personnel ofPanzer-Regiment 6, Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon 83,3 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, acompany from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521, and the Orel Security Group.4Duringthattime,thedivisionalsoconductedcoursesfortankdriversandjuniornoncommissioned officer candidates in Orel. It also processed personnelreplacementsforonwardtransporttotheformationsatthefront.The riflebrigadeof thedivision remainedat the front in thesectorbetween

Wenew and the Schat. It had established defensive positions along that longsector.TheSovietswerepressingwithstrongforcesagainstthedeepsalientofthecorps.The17.Panzer-DivisionwaspulledbackasfarassixteenkilometerssouthofKaschira,sinceitwasthreatenedwithbeingcutoff.On27November,the division ordered all available mobile forces pulled out of the line. Theseelements,suchastheI./Schützen-Regiment3and the3rdTankCompany,wererefueledand rearmed.Theywere tobeprepared foremployment in threatenedsectors of the corps. The field army attempted to insert the 296. Infanterie-

Division in the ever-wideninggapbetween theXXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) andtheXXXXIII.Armee-Korps.Unfortunately,onlyonebattalionfromthedivisionwasable tomakeit to theUpabecauseof theextremedifficultyof thatmove.Eventhoughtherewerenomajorenemyattacksalongthefrontofthedivisionover thenext fewdays, the situationwasanythingbutquiet.Notonlydid thesoldiershavetobearthecold,whichturnedworsebytheday,buttheywerealsosubjected to constant air attacks. The 3rd Company of engineers suffered aparticularlygrievouslosson29November,whendirecthitsfromRussianbombsstruck an occupied building foundation. The company lost twenty dead andseveral wounded. In the rear areas, the partisans were also conducting morefrequent operations. They temporarily occupied sections of the main supplyroutealongtheOrel–TularoadintheareaaroundTschern.TheGermanleadershipthereupondecidedtoconcentrateallofitsforcesone

more time to bring about a change in the fighting. The 2. Panzer-Armee wasdirectedtocutoffTulafromtheeastandthewestand,bydoingso,clearingthedirect routebetweenMoscowandTula.Thestronglyfortified“strongpoint”ofTulawouldthenbecutofffromitsrearwardlinesofcommunicationsandthe2.Panzer-Armee freedup to attack, since the city couldbe encircledby infantryforces.Inactualfact,the2.Panzer-Armeehadceasedtobeanarmorfieldarmyfor some time. It had the following numbers of tanks operational on 30November:Panzer-Regiment 6, twenty-eight;Panzer-Regiment 35, thirty-four;andPanzer-Regiment39,ten.ThethirtiethofNovemberwasthefirstAdventSundayofthateventfulyear.

The forces prepared for the reorganization and had no time for a quietlycontemplativecelebration.During that time, the3.Panzer-Division announcedits achievements from22 June to 22November 1941: 52,289 prisoners taken;485 tanks, 71 armored cars, 905 artillery pieces, 203 antiaircraft guns, 567antitankguns,366mortars,1,540machineguns,3,130trucks,100staffcars,19motorcycles, and 157 tractors captured or destroyed; 89 destroyed, 119 shot-down,and63capturedaircraft.Thefightingforceswere1,300kilometersfromthe western borders of Russia and had covered 4,500 kilometers. Theammunitioncolumnshadcovered17,000kilometers;thefuelcolumns,20,000.The 3. Panzer-Division occupied its assembly areas for the attack.Oberst

Kleemanncommandedtherighthandbattlegroup,whichconsistedofSchützen-Regiment3, the3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung543, the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 39, the6./Flak-Regiment59,andthe2./Artillerie-Regiment75.Tosecure theassembly

area, the I./Schützen-Regiment3 pushed forward on 1December and took thelocalitiesofDjukowaandGrezewo.ThelefthandbattlegroupofOberstleutnantZimmermann consisted of the I./Schützen-Regiment 394, the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39, a battery from Artillerie-Regiment 75, the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 543, and a tank platoon under Leutnant von Arnim.Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 (Major Pape) relieved the screening group of the II./Schützen-Regiment394.Themotorcycleinfantrywerereinforcedbyaplatoonofantitankelements.ThethirdbattlegroupwasledbyMajorFrank.AttachedtohimwerePanzerjäger-Abteilung 521, the 3./Panzer-Regiment 6, and the 3./Pionier-Bataillon 39. That battle group staged in the Nowosselsjskije–Wasselki–Kornitschi–Arssenjewo area on 1 December and prepared to advance west,reconnoiteringroutesinthedirectionofMakejewa–Dubki.KampfgruppeAudörschwasrelievedbyPionier-Bataillon45,5withonly the

5./Artillerie-Regiment 75 remaining in its old positions. The I./Infanterie-Regiment“Großdeutschland”(HauptmannHagen)wasattachedtothedivisionandpreparedforoperationsoutsideofKarniki.OberstleutnantDr.Weißenbruchwas directed to bring the remaining battalions of the divisional artillery—1stBattalionunderHauptmannHaas, 2ndBattalionunderHauptmannNebel, and3rdBattalion underHauptmann Kersten—into position in such amanner thattheycouldplaceharassingfiresonLeshlaandIwrowka.TheelementsofMajorPetsch’sPionier-Bataillon39 thatwere not attached to battle groups screenedthe crossings over the Schat at Petrowka and positioned all of their bridgingvehiclesthereforimmediateemployment.BridgingSection1providedaplatooneachofsixteen-tonassetstothe1stand2ndCompaniesofthebattalion,withthe3rd Platoon remaining the battalion’s reserve. Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 waslocatedinKarniki.Thenightof1–2Decemberwasclearandilluminatedbythemoon.Thewind

haddieddown.Asaresult,ithadturnedcolderandthetemperaturesregistered-20 (-4 Fahrenheit) and even colder. It was still dark over the snow-coveredterrain, when the batteries of the 3. Panzer-Division and 4. Panzer-Divisionopened fire on the Russian positions. Artillerie-Regiment 75 concentrated itsfires along the flanks of the attacking battle groups, in an effort to eliminatethreatsfromthatdirection.Shortlyafter0400hours,theriflemenofthetwodivisionsmovedouttoattack

west. Schützen-Regiment 3 initially advanced with its 1st Battalion (MajorWellmann)tothesouthwestinthedirectionofDubki.The1stCompanymoved

aheadinitsSPW’sandreportedthelocalityasoccupiedbytheenemy.The2ndCompany closed rapidly,while the 3rdCompanyworked itsway towards thevillage through a depression from the north. The Russians occupying thestrongpoint were surprised. Although they defended stubbornly, the fight wasshort.Dubkiwas takenandcleared.MajorWellmann immediately reorganizedhis companies for the continued advance.HauptmannPeschke’s2ndBattalionfollowedcloselybehindthe1stBattalionwithengineersandantitankelements.Theymovedonaroutefarthersouth.ThebattaliontookPosslowaandpressedpastDubkitothewest.Schützen-Regiment394 likewisebroke into thefirstRussianposition. Its1st

Battalion worked its way towards Romanowa. The Soviets were prepared forthatattackandplacedconsiderableartilleryandmortarfireonthebattalion.Inaddition, the reservoir in front of the village had been blown up. The ice hadsunk,sotherewasonlyonecrossingpointoverthedefile.Thebattalionthenhadtotoilacrossit.The1./Pionier-Bataillon39constructedafordacrosstheSoshafor the riflemen. The company commandeer, Hauptmann Kalkbrenner, waswounded in the process, along with 15 enlisted personnel. Leutnant Harzerassumed acting command of the engineer company. The 2nd Battalion ofOberstleutnant Dr.Müller—whom the soldiers referred to as “AttackMüller”(Angriffsmüller)—attacking to the left, put down tough resistance outsideBronikowo, before it was able to penetrate into the locality. The battalion’scasualtieswere high. In the first fewhours alone, fourteen vehicleswere lost,unfortunatelyalsoincludingthefullyloadedbattalionambulance.Theregimentlost forty-seven men dead and wounded in the attack; the regiment’s 2ndBattalion alone accounted for thirty-five, with the 8th Company sufferingnineteen.Schützen-Regiment 3 had reached the large forest that stretched from the

southwesttothenortheast.The1stCompany,movingasthepointelement,wasabletocrossthewoodsthroughawell-maintainedcut.ItreachedthevillageofKolodesnaja, which was in a clearing. The riflemen were offered a spectaclethere. The Russian soldiers appeared to have no idea the Germans wereattacking; they were busily engaged with target practice. The company’smachineguns soon scattered theSoviets,whoescaped into thenearbywoods,abandoningallweaponsandequipment.Thecompanytooksixtyprisoners.Thebattalionpivotedtothenorthwest,combedtheclosestwoodsandtookthe

villageofDorofejewkaafter eliminatinganenemybattery.Theelectricitywas

still functioning.But therewas little time tocelebrate.Thebattalioncontinuedits advance and reached Torchowo after 1300 hours. That meant the day’sobjective hadbeen crossed.TheTula–Wenew roadhadbeenblocked.The1stBattalionhadachievedthatsuccesswithouttakinganycasualties.The 2nd Battalion moved out behind the 1st Battalion again, but moved

directly west from Dorofejewka, occupying Barybinka and Krjukowa. Theenemyfledatthoselocationsinundisciplinedflightintothewoodstothenorthandthewest.TheI./Artillerie-Regiment75hadtochangepositionsinordertobeable tohave the range to fire.As a result of the rapidovercomingof the firstRussianresistance,itwaseasyforthearmoredgroupofMajorFranktofollowtheriflemen.The groups from Schützen-Regiment 394 and Infanterie-Regiment

“Großdeutschland” thatwere employed on the left encountered strong enemyforcesandwerestill involvedinheavyfightingbytheonsetofdarknesstothesouthwestofDubkiandTretschtschewa.The last localitywas finally takenbythe“Großdeutschland”grenadiers,whiletheriflemenofSchützen-Regiment394attemptedtoclearthelargeexpanseofwoodsatTeminewa-Gamowo.

BattleforTula.

Byevening,theSovietsappearedtohaverapidlyrecoveredfromtheshockofthe initial successes of the3. Panzer-Division.While the battle groups set up

their security for the night, the Soviets placed heavy fires—especially fromStalin organs—on the localities that had been occupied by the Germans,inflictingconsiderablecasualties.Theartilleryfiredisruptedallofthewirelinesand,sincetheradioswerenotworkingeither, thedivisionheadquartershadnocontact with the lead elements in the evening.Generalmajor Breith thereforeorderedhiscommandpostmovedforwardthefollowingmorning.Shortly after 0600 hours on 3December,Schützen-Regiment 3 conducted a

reconnaissance-in-force around the occupied villages with its SPW company,sinceithadbeendeterminedthattheenemywasstilltotherearoftheregiment.The1stCompanyencountered theenemyatOlenina, to thesouthof itsparentbattalion. The enemy had even occupied the village of Kolodesnaja in theclearing in the woods the previous night. Among other things, it took theregiment’s vehicle that stored the personal-demand items. The 1st Battalioncommittedits3rdCompanyandLeutnantBraun’splatoon(SPW’s fromthe1stCompany) against the village. The riflemenwere able tomake good progressback through the woods, but they received considerable fire once outside thevillage. The acting company commander, Leutnant Oesten, was felled byRussianbullets.Itwasimpossibletorunthroughthefireandenter thelocalityagain.ThecompanywaspulledbacktoDorofejewka,whereitscreened.Hauptmann Peschke’s II./Schützen-Regiment 3 started turning back strong

RussianarmoredattacksonKrjukowaatfirstlight.Thebattaliondidnotenjoyasinglequiethour;italsosufferedterriblyundertheenemyfireandthecold.Thedivision ordered the battalion to pull back toTorchowo,where the companiesscreenedtheroadbetweenthatvillageandWolynzewo.Itwastherethattheleadcompany of themotorcycle battalion, the 2ndCompany, arrived and providedwelcome support. Themotorcycle battalion proper occupied Iwrowka and thehighground to thewest.The I./Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland”closed thegapbetween the tworegimentsnorthwestofDubkiandwasable toenterthevillage.Schützen-Regiment 394 advanced to the west that day in the face of heavy

enemyfire.Thecombatvehicleswerenotsentforwardandlefteastoftheriver.TheRussians defended the village ofGamowo especially hard, using artilleryandheavymortars.Sincea frontal attackpromised little success,MajorFrankattemptedtobypassthevillagewithhistankbattalion.Itwasnotpossibleforthetanksand theriflemenofSchützen-Regiment394 to takeTeminewauntil1900hours.After2200hours,LeutnantLangeledanengineerassaultdetachmentto

thewest,whereitenteredthewoodsoutsideofNowossjolki.The advanceof the3.Panzer-Division on 4December never stood under a

lucky star. From the very beginning, it was questionable whether the forcesavailableweresufficienttoaccomplishthemission.Theenemygrewinstrengthbythehour;thewintermobilityandthesimpleneedsofhisSiberianforcesalsocametohisaid.Enemyformationsthathadbeenbypassedorpushedbackheldoutinthedeeplysnowed-inwoodsintherearofthedivision.“Großdeutschland” tookthehotlycontestedKolodenajafor thesecondtime

thatdayandrelievedelementsofSchützen-Regiment3fromtheirpreviouslimitofadvance.TheRussians,whohadtransitionedtotheattack,wereabletotakebackKrjukowo in the afternoon and even felt theirway forwardwith patrols,even though all of them were turned back. The southern battle group ofSchützen-Regiment 394 met with more success. In the morning, the regimentpressed to the northwest and took Demidowka and Nowossjolki. The successwas all the more significant, inasmuch as the Tula–Wenew road was finallyblocked,onceandforall.Tanksandmountedriflemencontinuedreconnoiteringfurther tothesouthandsouthwestsoas toblockthepathofanyenemyforcespossiblyattemptingtobreakoutofTula.Generalmajor Breith, who temporarily established his command post at

Krjukowa,orderedSchützen-Regiment3andtheattached2./Artillerie-Regiment75,which had been pulled out of the line, to be prepared to launch an attacktowardsthehighgroundwestofMeschtscherskoje,fifteenkilometerssoutheastof Tula. The ongoing movements could only be partially executed, since thevehicleswerenotcooperating.Theoilandthefuelwerefreezingattemperaturesof -27 degrees Celsius (-16.6 Fahrenheit), which went down to -31 (-23.8Fahrenheit)atnight.Eventhebattlestaffofthe3.Panzer-Divisionnolongerhadanyoperationalmotorizedvehicles.It turned even colder during the night of 4–5 December. The temperature

registered-37(-34.6Fahrenheit).Technologycapitulated.Theengineswouldnolongerstart;themachinegunswouldnotfire;thetankturretswouldnottraverse.Germanforceswere immobilizedon thatmorningandexposed to theonsetofRussianattacks.The4.Panzer-Division,whichwasalreadyblockingtheTula–Moscow road, had to pull back to the east, leaving behind all of its vehicles,since new Siberian regiments had inserted themselves between it and the 17.Panzer-Division.The 3. Panzer-Division, which was positioned in the villages west of the

Tula–Wenew road, had to defend against constant Soviet attacks, which tookplace all along its front. The enemy tried especially hard at Nowossjolki andKrjukowo to shatter the lines of the division. In the process, the Siberiansadvanced through the thickwoods south of the road and reachedKolodesnajalate in the afternoon.They attacked thevillage and themen thereby surprise,entering the locality and butchering everything that got in their way. Thecommander of the IV./Infanterie-Regiment “Großdeutschland” was shot downwithhisheadquarters andelementsof the17thCompany.Onlya few infantrywereable toescapetheslaughter,clothedonlyin theirshirtsandtrousers.TheGerman casualties were high. In addition to the dead officers and men of“Großdeutschland,” forty motorcycles, several trucks, one fuel vehicle, oneassault gun, one heavy infantry gun, and numerous small armswere lost. TheSovietssetupforthethirdtimeinKolodesnaja.Thedivisionnolongerhadthestrength to eliminate that “boil” in its front.The field armyordered theXXIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) to attack onemore time via Krjukowo so as to establishcontactwith the296. Infanterie-Division,whichhadreached theUpa.GeneralGeyrvonSchweppenburg,whohadintendedtoallowthe3.Panzer-Divisiontorest thatday,acquiescedto theorderandhadabattlegroupformedtoexecutethe mission under the command of Oberst Kleemann. To that end, theI./Schützen-Regiment 3, an artillery battalion, a motorcycle infantry company,andtherestofPanzer-Regiment6werepulledoutofthefrontlines.That afternoon, however, the commanding general radioed the field army

headquarters in Jassnaja-Poljana. His impression of the development of thesituationhadchanged: “Situation fundamentally changed, since theenemyhasalso broken into the gap between the 17. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen; strongenemy forces along the Sserpuchowo–Tula rail line and road. No relief isexpectedfromtheXXXXIII.Armee-Korpsanymore.Owntanksnotoperational.”The fifthofDecember1941 sawa change in the fortunesof thewar in the

East.The daily logs of the headquarters of the2.Panzer-Armee recorded thatday: “. . . combat power of the brave forces is at an end after incredibleexertions.Itisimperativetopreservetheforce.ThefieldarmywillmovebacktotheDon–Schat–Upapositionincrementally.”

__________________1.Bothof thesewereseparateartillery formationallocated to fieldarmiesandequippedwithheavyhowitzersofatleast15-centimetercaliberor,morelikely,21-centimetercaliber.2. This was actually Artillerie-Regimentsstab 622, a regimental artilleryheadquarterswithoutanylinebattalions.In1942,itwasusedtoformthebasisfor the divisional artillery of Infanterie-Division (mot.) “Großdeutschland”whenthatregimentwasreorganizedasadivision.3. This was the division field replacement battalion. It processed incomingreplacements. It usually conducted some sort of additional training based onlessonslearnedatthefrontbeforesendingreplacementsontothenewunits.4.ItisnotknownwhetherthiswasadivisionaladhocformationoranelementattachedtoOberstleutnantMunzelforthedurationofhisdutiesinOrel.5. A separate engineer battalion that frequently supported the XXIV. Armee-Korps(mot.)duringthisperiod.

AttheschoolyardinLochwiza:GeneraloberstGuderianatthecommandpostofthe3.Panzer-DivisionwithGeneralleutnantModel.Itwastherethatthedirectivewasissuedforestablishingcontactwiththe16.

Panzer-Division,thuseffectivelyclosingtheKievPocket.

Romny.

HauptmannvonCochenhausen,thecommanderofthe1./Kradschützen-Bataillon3(seenhereasaMajor).HissoldierstookthecommanderinchiefoftheSoviet5thArmyprisoner.

The2./Schützen-Regiment394duringabreakinoperationsduringtheadvanceonLochwiza.Fromlefttoright:OberfeldwebelEverth,LeutnantPeter,OberleutnantLotze(companycommander),and

OberfeldwebelMüller.

On30September,the3.Panzer-DivisionmovedouttothenortheastfromGluchow.Soldiersfromthe2./Schützen-Regiment394areseenheremountedonaPanzerIIfromPanzer-Regiment6.

Theattacksoonboggeddowninthemuck.

Mzenskhasbeentaken.Aknocked-outT-34andStalinorganareseenhereononeofthestreets.

ThedestroyedbridgeatPlawsk.

Bolchow,northofOrel,hasbeenreached.

GeneraloberstGuderianandOberstleutnantMunzel,thecommanderofPanzer-Regiment6.

TheKnight’sCrossispresentedtoLeutnantStörck.Fromlefttoright:GeneralleutnantModel,MajorvonOppen,OberstleutnantAudörsch,andLeutnantStörck.

ThefirsttrenchesaredugoutsideTula.

CHAPTER13

FromtheSchattotheTim:TheWinterFightingforKursk

The fifth of December 1941 marked the culminating point for the GermanoffensiveonMoscow.Thedivisionshad literally fought theirway towards theRussiancapitalmeter-for-meter,andtheirleadelementscouldseethehigh-risesofthecityofmillionsthroughtheirbinoculars.Atnight,theinfantrycouldseethe muzzle flashes of the antiaircraft guns firing around the pinnacles of theKremlin.Atthetime,theXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)waspositionedwithitsdivisions—

the3.Panzer-Division,4.Panzer-Division,and17.Panzer-Divisionandthe25.Infanterie-Division(mot.)—ina loosefrontbetweenTulaandnorthofWenew.Despiteallofthepreviouscasualtiesandhardships,thecorpsstillpresentedtheenemywithaseriousthreat.GeneralfeldmarschallvonBock,thecommanderinchiefofHeeresgruppeMitte,informedthecommandinggeneralthatthe“XXIV.Panzer-Korps had been a ray of hope during these turbulent days.”1 Twodecadeslater,GeyrvonSchweppenburgwrote:“Inadditiontotheotherterrificdivisions that reported to me at the time, that was especially true of the old,steely3.Panzer-Division.”TheRussianoffensivebrokeloosealongmuchofthefrontaroundMoscowon

6December.Thenorthernfield-armygroupstartedfirst,inanefforttodefeatthe3. Panzer-Armee and4. Panzer-Armee. Shortly afterward, the field armies onbothsidesofMoscowmovedsouthandadvancedagainsttheinfantrydivisionsofGeneralfeldmarschall von Kluge. The sector around Tula was still sparedfromtheoffensiveon6December.In its order for the withdrawal, the 2. Panzer-Armee had directed the

followingdivisionsdisengagefromtheenemyandpullbackacrosstheSchat(inorder of sequencing): 4. Panzer-Division, Infanterie-Regiment (mot.)“Großdeutschland,”and17.Panzer-Division.The25.Infanterie-Division(mot.)hadonlyafewelementsonthenorthbankoftheriveratthetime.Forthetimebeing,the3.Panzer-Divisionwastoremaininplace.Itwasonlytopivotbackto

protecttheflanksofthewithdrawalmovementslateron.Thatspecial“distinction”forthedivisiondidnotfilltheofficersandenlisted

personnelwithsatisfaction.Theyknewthat theformationsonlyhadabouthalfthe combat power they once did and that they could barely be considered anarmored force any more. The organization, weaponry and equipment of thedivisionismirroredinthesenumbers:

Schützen-Regiment3,withsixcompaniesofsixtymeneach;threeantitankguns;sixSPW’sSchützen-Regiment394,withsixcompaniesoffiftymeneach;noantitankgunsPanzer-Regiment6,witheighteenPanzerIII’sandfourPanzerIV’sArtillerie-Regiment75,withnineteenlightfieldhowitzers,twoheavyfieldhowitzers,andthree10-centimetercannonKradschützen-Bataillon3,withonemotorizedcompanyandtheremainingpartiallymotorizedcompaniesPanzerjäger-Abteilung521,withelevenself-propelledgunsPanzerjäger-Abteilung543,withtwoheavyandonelightantitankgun

The division had to match the withdrawal movements of the 4. Panzer-Divisionwithitsrightwing.ThesisterdivisionwaspullingbackinthedirectionofTjoplaja.Schützen-Regiment3 receivedorders to takeKolodesnaja again inorder to keep the withdrawal route through the woods to Dubki open. Thewithdrawalmovementsofthatregimentwerenotsimple,sincetheSovietshadalreadyworkedtheirwayforwardalongthefewroadsandwoodlandpaths.The6thCompanyoftherifleregimentwasabletoenterSchurwljowkarapidly,driveout theenemyandextendoutposts farenough forward that the2ndBatteryofartillerycouldgointoposition.Bythen,the1stand2ndCompanieswerereadytoattackKolodesnaja.Theywereabletoassaultthevillageandclearthelaneinthewoods.Byaccomplishingthat,theregimenthadestablishedtheoutpostlineneededfortheday.The night that followed saw not only temperatures of -38 degrees Celsius

(-36.4 Fahrenheit), but also the start of the Russian offensive against the 2.Panzer-Armee. The Soviet 10th and 50th Armies, as well as the I GuardsCavalryCorps, smashed into the thinlyheldGermanoutpost linesearly in themorning of 7 December. They ripped them open and forced the Germanformationstoretreat.ThefieldarmyhadarrangedforthecrossingofSchatthat

day, so the movement was already planned to a certain extent. The enemyoffensivestruckwithfull forceagainst theeasternflankof thefieldarmy.The10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had to yield to the superior enemypressure andevacuateMichailow.Whoamongthesoldiersandofficersevenstoppedtothinkthatthatdaywas

the Second Sunday of Advent? Although a large amount of personal-demanditemshadreachedthedivisionfor thefrontlinetroopsin largequantities, therewas hardly any time available to properly distribute the extensive “Christmasbonus.”Noonehadtheleisuretimeavailabletoenjoyhearingthenewsontheradio that reported theentryof Japan into thewarand its successfulattackonPearlHarbor.Onthat7December,thedivisiontelephonicallynotifieditselementstomove

back.Not all of the telephone lineswere intact, however, with the result thatsomeformationsdidnotget theordersuntil late in theday.Thatwas thecasewith the I./Schützen-Regiment 3, which only heard about the retrogrademovements fromitsneighbors, the4.Panzer-Divisionand Infanterie-Regiment(mot.)“Großdeutschland.”Bothof thebattlegroupcommanders,OberstKleemannandOberstleutnant

Audörsch, issued orders to disengage from the enemy. The companies ofPionier-Bataillon39 andPionier-Bataillon45 started to emplacemines in thelocalities and prepare the non-operational vehicles to be blown up. Right atmidnight on 8December, the first rifle units disengaged from the enemy andpulled back to localities further to the rear, which had been occupied thepreviousafternoonbycompaniestoprotecttheretrogrademovements.BridgingSection1 set up two sixteen-ton spans atKurakino in themorning; bothwerealsoriggedtobeblownup.Theretrogrademovementsneededtobecompletedbyfirstlight.Themarches

wereanunbelievablehardship for theofficers andmen.Thecolumns trampedtheirway through thedensewoodsandhighsnowdriftson foot.Thewoundedwereloadedonsleds,sinceonlyafewvehicleswerestillcapableofmoving.Assoonasanelementleftitsdwellingplace,itwasminedbytherearguard.Despiteall of the unpleasantness that night, the movements were completed by latemorningandthedesignatedlinesreached.Atthatpoint, thedivisionwasinanoutpost line approximately nine kilometers southwest ofWenew that ran fromthere about even with Gryslowo and then as far as Prissady. An ice andsnowstorm swept over the area that day and presumably prevented the enemy

fromfollowingrapidly.The forces remained in the positions they had reached on 9December and

conducted combat reconnaissance. That day, the division had to cover theretrograde movements of the other divisions. The Soviets had identified theGermanmovementsandhadstartedattackingthe2.Panzer-Armeeagain.Again,theyconcentratedagainst theeasternflankof thefieldarmy,hittingthealmosttwenty-kilometer-wide gap that existed southwest of Tula between the XXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)and theXXXXIII.Armee-Korps.Theattacksweredirectedwithfullfuryagainstthealreadyexhausted296.Infanterie-Division,whichwasreinforced that day with the first battalion of “Großdeutschland” that becameavailable. In the afternoon, the elements of the 4. Panzer-Division that weresouthof theSchatwere ejected from that area.When the17.Panzer-DivisionwasthenwithdrawnfromtheSchatriverline,tobemovedtotherightwingoftheXXXXVII.Armee-Korps(mot.),the3.Panzer-Division founditselfallalonein the sector and facing a hard-pressing enemy.Thebatteries of thedivisionalartilleryattemptedtoholdbacktheRussiansbymeansofcontinuousfire.On9December,GeneraloberstGuderianreleasedageneralordertohishard-

pressed field army. The order closed with these words: “My comrades! Thehardertheenemyandthewintertrytodefyus,themorefirmlyyouneedtocloseranks.Maintainirondiscipline,justasyoualwayshave.Everyoneistoremainwith his unit. . . . Only by unified willpower and action can success beguaranteed.IknowthatIcanrelyonyou.ThefateofGermanyisatstake.”Ingeneral,boththedayandtheeveningpassedwithoutheavyfighting,after

KampfgruppeAudörschsucceededinturningbacktheenemyflankattacksthatweredirectedagainst the296.Infanterie-Divisionand,by theirnature,brushedagainst the division’s own front. In the process, the7./Schützen-Regiment 394lost threedeadandfourwounded.During thenight,ordersarrivedstating thatany remaining civilian populace in the villages north of the Schatwere to beevacuatedtothenorthandthenorthwesteffective0800hourson10December.Duringthenight,theSovietsapproachedthecombatoutpostsofthedivision

atdifferentplaces.Forinstance,LeutnantEckardt’s2./Schützen-Regiment3hadtoturnbackstrongattacksdirectedagainstGryslowo.TheSovietssucceededininfiltratingintothedepressionatIwanenkowa.TheywerenotdrivenawayuntilLeutnantLohse’s1./Schützen-Regiment3launchedanimmediatecounterattack.Therear-areaservicesofthedivisionhadalreadystartedflowingbackacross

the Schat the previous day. Despite the many difficulties, the traffic control

detachmentledbyHauptmannKersten(theIII./Artillerie-Regiment75)providedfor a relatively fluid and disciplined rearward movement over the bridge atKurakino.Major Petsch was there with his Pionier-Bataillon 39 so that hisforceswouldbeimmediatelyavailableshouldthesituationchange.Onceagain, thistimeduringtheafternoonof10December,Kleemann’sand

Audörsch’sbattlegroupsdisengagedfromtheenemy.ThetwoSPWcompaniesof the two rifle regiments formed the rearguard. They moved back and forthacrossthesectors,firingtheir3.7-centimeterantitankgunsandmachinegunsinanefforttoportraystrongforces.ThepursuingRussiansweredeceivedanddidnot interferemuchwith the retrogrademovements.ThecompaniesofPionier-Bataillon45 emplacedmines along the roadways and destroyed bridges. Thatbattalion’s 2nd Company (Oberleutnant von Drewitz) became entangled withenemyforcesintheprocess,butitwasabletosuccessfullydisengageitself.Themedicalpersonalhadanespeciallydifficultmission.Allmedicalvehicles

were constantly on the go. The vehicles of the ambulance platoons werecompletelyfullwithwoundedandsickpersonnel.Thenumberofwoundedandcases of frostbite increased steadily. On top of that, the first cases of typhusappeared in thedivisionon7December.Thesituationwasmadeworseby thefactthattheairstripatTschernhadbeenevacuatedbythenandthedistancesthedrivershadtocovergrewbyhundredsofkilometers.ThewithdrawingriflemenoftenfoundthatthebadlywoundedwereslaughteredbytheRussians,whohadbrokenthrough,inabestialmanner.Manyofthewoundedwerestrippedbythemercilessenemyandleftnakedintheicycold.Bythen,thedivisionhadmoveditscommandpostbacktoKalmyky-Bolsch.

At0030hourson11December,itissuedorderstomovethedivisiontothesouthbank of the Schat: “Starting at 0300 hours on 11 December, the 3. Panzer-Division disengages from the enemy in its current positions,moves across theSchatandorganizesthereforthedefense.”ThethreetankscompaniesunderthecommandofOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ott

were the first units to pull back from their quartering areas, as soon as themoonlight alloweda rapidmovement.Shortly after0300hours, the remainingelementsfollowed.Theroadwayswerecoveredinsnowandbarelyrecognizableduetothesnowdrifts.Thestormhadknockedoverthedirectionalsignsaswell,with the result that the columns, which stretched for kilometers on end,occasionallyfaltered.ThelastcombatvehiclescrossedthebridgeovertheSchataround0500hours.The forces on foot that followedwere guided across on a

bridgemadeoutofice.Justasitstartedtoturnlight,therearguardsreachedthesouthern bank, and the engineers started to tear down the bridge, completingtheirworkat0930hours.The2.Panzer-ArmeemovedbacktoalinerunningfromJefremowtothearea

southeastofTula thatday.TheSoviets thenstartedpressinghardallalong thefront,notallowing theGermanforces togetany rest.Thedivision,whichhadbeenexhaustedbyweeksof fightingdefendedwith thecourageofdesperationagainst thewell-equippedenemyformations.Amongotherthings, theMoscowInformationOfficeannouncedon11December:“TheforcesofGeneralBoldinhave shattered the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions of the enemy, as well as the‘Grossdeutschland’ regiment. They are continuing the offensive and areenvelopingtheenemy’s296thInfantryDivision.”The rear-area detachments of the division in the Orel area, including the

headquartersofthearmoredregiment,alsofelttheeffectsoftheRussianwinteroffensive.Iftheofficersandsoldiersofthearmoredregimenthadhadhopesofbeing transported back to the homeland just a few days previously, those“dreams” started to rapidlyevaporate.Onordersof the local areacommander,OberstleutnantMunzelhadtoestablishacombatoutpostlineandamainlineofresistancealongtheOptuchaeastofthecitywiththeregiment.Therewasgreatdifficultyindoingthat,sincethegroundwasfrozenuptosixtycentimetersandexplosives were initially not available to eliminate the layer of frost. On 12December, Munzel discovered from Oberstleutnant i.G. Freiherr vonLiebenstein, the chief of staff of the field army, that transport back to thehomelandcouldnotlongerbeanticipatedduetothetensesituation.Thearmoredregimentplacedtwomotorcycleplatoonsat thedisposalof the

local area commander, since the appearance of enemy airborne forces wereanticipated at any moment. When the I./Panzer-Regiment 182 assumed theresponsibilityfor theguardandworkdetails inOrel,allelementsof thearmorregimentwere then employed in improving thedefensivepositions east of thecity. In fourdays, themenof theregimentsetup23bunkers,16machine-gunpositions, and 50 foxholes. By 20 December, an additional 18 bunkers, 14machine-gunpositions,and105foxholeswereadded.Therewas a sudden and unexpected thaw on 12December. The snowwas

transformedintoawhite,stickymushthatsappedenergyworsethantheregularsnow. The fighting continued with undiminished harshness. The enemyadvanced into thegapbetween the31. Infanterie-Division and296. Infanterie-

Division.The4.Panzer-Divisionwasdirectedtointerdicttheenemyforces,butitwas unable to do so since all of its vehicleswere immobilized south of theSchat. The left wing of the 3. Panzer-Division was also exposed to attacks,especially fromcavalry,butSchützen-Regiment394wasable to turnback thatadvancebyemployingallofitsforces.Schützen-Regiment3establishedcontactwiththe167.Infanterie-Division,whichwasinsertedintothelineontheright.Thedivision,whosecommandposthadbeenmovedback toGorjatschkino,

directedfurthermeasuresthateveningtopullbackthefront.ItsrightwingwastobepulledbackduringthenighttoprepareitselfforamovementtopositionsbehindtheSchirowonathefollowingnight,whereitwastodefend.AnofficerofSchützen-Regiment 394 noted the following in his diary: “Nights veryprecarious.Dayswithoutrations,teethchattering...wefightourwaythrough.Horrific night. Kept the men together with extreme energy. A sad march insilence.Thebattalionasmallband.Noonecanallowhimselftobecomesick.”Thebattalionsanddetachmentsdisengagedfromtheenemyat0100hoursand

moved back to the designated areas. In the course of that operation,Kampfgruppe Zimmermann—Schützen-Regiment 3, Pionier-Bataillon 39, theI./Artillerie-Regiment75,the1./Flak-Regiment11,andthe6./Flak-Regiment59—reached a line running southeast of Dedilowo–Chruschtschowka–northernedge of Borodino. There was contact on the right with the 167. Infanterie-DivisionandKradschützen-Bataillon3ontheleft.TheRussiansremainedhardon theheelsofZimmermann’sforces.By0300

hours,theybrokethroughthefrontofSchützen-Regiment3,quicklyreachingtherearofOberleutnantMente’s7thCompany.LeutnantLohse’s1stCompanywasalertedimmediately,andthebraveunitsucceededinreachingthe7thCompany,whichhadpulledbacktothehighgroundatProkowskaja.Itattackedthevillageproper from twosidesand scattered theSoviets thathadbroken through.Thatmorning,theenemysuffered400dead.TheSPWCompanythenhadtorelieveHauptmann von Zamory’s 3rd Company, which had been surrounded by theRussians.Withtheassistanceofthreetanks,theenemycouldfinallybedefeatedthereaswell.Bytheafternoon,therifleregiment’sfrontlinehadstabilized.TherightwingofthedivisionformedabridgeheadatDedilowo.Themaineffortofthe defense centered around the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 and Aufklärungs-Abteilung1.Thesofthailof thedaywasreplaced in theeveningbysnowandice.During thenight, the temperature fell toas lowas -20degreesCelsius (-4Fahrenheit).

ThebridgeovertheSchirowonhadaloadcapacityoftwelvetons.Twospansconsistingof twoendand threemiddleelementshadbeenplacedon the fifty-centimeter-thickice.Duringthenightandearlyinthemorningof14December,the division crossed over that bridge. Starting at 0700 hours, the engineersstarteddestroyingDedilowo.Thatlocalityhadalreadysufferedconsiderablythepreviousdayastheresultofartilleryfireandhalfofithadalreadyburneddown.Schützen-Regiment 394 destroyed an enemy column at Ssitinka with antitankand infantryguns. Itsmachinegunswouldno longer firedue to thecold.Theenemy attacked again a short while later, but he was again turned back withbloody losses. The regiment lost three battle-tested officers: OberleutnantVölkel,LeutnantKahl,andLeutnantSajitz.The7thCompanywasdowntooneofficerandthirty-onemen.TheSovietspursuedthewithdrawingforcesandattackedinbattalionstrength

about 0800 hours from the north. Leutnant Eckardt’s 2./Schützen-Regiment 3wasabletokeeptheenemyatbaythroughaimedfire,untilthe1stCompanyandthe available fighting vehicles arrived to assist. Led by Leutnant Lohse, themotorizedelementsadvanced into theenemy,scatteredhis forcesand inflictedmanycasualties(300dead).OnePanzerIVwas lost toantitank-gunfire,but itcould be evacuated by a fighting vehicle, albeit with great difficulty. The 1stCompany also lost a vehicle,whereby onemanwentmissing and the vehiclecommander,FeldwebelHoffmann,waswounded.Starting at 0900 hours, Schützen-Regiment 3 moved across the bridge. The

2ndCompanyandelementsofoneof the tankcompanies remainedon the farside to fend off pursuing enemy forces.The enemyhadbrought up additionalforces and showed up at the bridge site around 1300 hours with two tankscomingfromBykowa.Theenemytankstooktheroadunderfire.Bythen,Sovietriflemenhadoccupiedthehighgroundinfrontofthevillage

and fired at the bridge site with heavy machine guns. The men of Schützen-Regiment3hadtotrytogetacrossthebridgeasrapidlyaspossible.ThelastfewSPW’srattleduptothebridge.Oneofthemskiddedofftheslickroadandwasabletobeblownupintime.Thatmeanttheriflebattalionwasacross.Lateron,tanksarrivedtodriveofftheRussianssothattherestofthedivisioncouldgetacrosstheSchiworontothenearbankinadisciplinedmanner,albeitwithafewbumpsandbruises.Schützen-Regiment 3 then screened around Panino, while the engineers

scouted routes for the next bridging efforts across theUpa north and south of

Kostamarowo.Thefact that theroadswerecompletelyicedovermademattersextraordinarily difficult. That same evening, the engineers received orders toscoutanotherbridgesiteatIkonki.Themedicalpersonnelevacuatedthelastofthe clearing stations forward of the Upa, frequently under enemy fire. InperformingthatGoodSamaritanduty,ObergefreiterLangnerpaidwithhislife.The2ndMedicalCompanyassumedresponsibilityfor thehospital inBolchowandsetupitsoperationsthere.On15December,thedivisionpulledbackagain.ItcrossedtheUpawithallof

itsforcesatKrjukowaonthebridgethere,withtheresultthatanotherbridgewasnotnecessary.Thedivisionwasabletodisengageinanorderlymannerfromtheenemywithmostof its formations. Itwasonlyalong thesouthernwing thatacrisisemerged.Towardsnoon,RussiantankswithmountedinfantryattackedtheI./Schützen-Regiment3. Since the battalion no longer had any armor-defeatingweapons, it had to pull back to Oslanowka. When the German resistancestiffenedthere,theSovietssuddenlyturnedoffinthedirectionofPanino,wherethe2ndBattalionof the rifle regimentwas inposition.The3rdCompanywasscatteredasaresultofthesurpriseattackbytheenemyandlostcontactwiththebattalion.AdditionalenemyarmoredforcesappearedoutsideofSmirnowkaearlyinthe

afternoon. Six T-34’s rolled over the German screening forces and suddenlyappeared in front of the firing positions of the 1st Battery of the divisionalartillery.Thebattery commander,Oberleutnant von Studtnitz, did not lose hiscomposure. He allowed the enemy tanks to approach ever closer. When itreached the point that no shell could miss, the officer blew a whistle tocommencefiring.Fourrounds left theGermangunsandfourT-34’swereshotaflame and stopped! The remaining two got out of there as soon as possible,receivingmachine-gunfirefromthe1./Schützen-Regiment3,whichwasrollingin support. By then, the 3rd Company had linked back upwith the battalion,whichquarteredinSchandrowkaforthenight.The fighting continued through the night with individual groups of enemy

forces that continued to pursue. There were some losses, including LeutnantKuhlow of the 7th Battery of artillery.Most of the division reached the nearbanks of theUpa.At 0500 hours on 16December, the rearguards crossed theriver.ThedivisionthenoccupiedalinerunningSchandrowka–Ljubogoschtsch–Subarjowka–Golowina–Lipki. The division command post was located inOgarewskithatday.

On16December,GeneraloberstGuderianintendedtopullhisfieldarmybackthirtykilometerstoalinerunningtothewestofJefremow–PlawaRiver(asfarasKrapiwna).TheXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)wasgiventhefreedomtodecideifit needed to pull back to the Solovia a day later based on enemy pressure.Guderian’s intentwas topull theentirecorpsoutof the line, if the fieldarmywasinapositiontooccupyalinerunningalongtheSsushaandOkaRiverswithotherelements.Once again, the division disengaged from the enemyon the night of 16–17

December. The temperatures registered less than -17 degrees Celsius (1.4Fahrenheit). Not a star could be seen. Occasionally, the long fingers ofantiaircraftsearchlightspenetratedintothenighttimedarkness,wheneverenginenoise could be heard. Muzzle flashes could be seen again and again on theenemyside;villages,individualhutsandblown-upvehicleswereburning.Lining up the columns in that darkness was a difficult thing in itself. The

marchrouteswerebarelymarked,andtheguidesfromthemilitarypoliceorthetrafficcontrolpartieswerenotalwayswheretheyneededtobe.Theindividualbattalions,companiesandbatteriesandplatoonswereoftenseparatedfromtheirmarchserials,sometimeswithcontactbeingcompletely lost.For instance, thathappenedtothelogisticssectionofSchützen-Regiment394.Itdidnotrejointheregimentuntildays later.The roadsand trailswerecompletely fullofvehiclesheadedwestward.Totherightandleftoftheroadsweredestroyed,burned-out,blown-up, or abandoned trucks, staff cars, SPW’s, and medical vehicles. TheGermanArmywasexperiencingthehorrorsofaretreat.GeneraloberstGuderiancrossed the path of the retreating division that day.As always, he greeted thesoldiers.The division reached the Tula–Orel road, the first improved road along its

retreat route. There were stragglers everywhere from assorted formations thatwerefightinginthearea;theywantedtobetakenalongtotherear.Byorderofthe field army, the large supply dump at Plawsk was blown up. In order to“salvagewhateverwassalvageable,”thedivisionsentaconvoyofsixteentrucksthereunderthecommandofLeutnantBecker.Themenloadedupwhatevertheycouldgrab.AmongotherthingsweresacksofChristmasmail.Alloftheothertroopelementhadalsosent“retrievaldetails,”whichloadedtheirvehicleswithprecious itemsas the first enemyartillery rounds started impactingaround thedepot.OberleutnantMangelsdorffwasbarelyableto“rescue”acratewiththirtybottles of champagne. By the time he delivered his “treasure chest” to the

commandpostinSkuratowo,twelveofthebottleshadfrozenandburstbecauseofthecold.On 17 December, most of the formations of the division reached the area

aroundTschern.Guderianorderedthedivisionpulledoutofthefrontandmoveto an area thirty kilometers northeast of Orel. The division was directed toreorganize there in order to be prepared to be employed by the field army atsectorsofthefrontthatwerebeingthreatened.Theinitialreorganizationsstartedtakingplaceduringthemovementthereand

during the few remaining afternoon hours when the forces occupied theirdesignated quarters. It was intended to improve the leadership andmovementoptions for the individual formations. To that end, OberstleutnantZimmermann’s Schützen-Regiment 3 formed a completely motorized battalionanda“foot”battalionstartingon18Decemberandextendingoverthecourseofthenexttwodays.Themotorizedbattalionconsistedofthreelinecompanies,aheavycompany,andaSPWcompany.Thenewlyformedmotorizedcompaniesgenerally consisted of a company headquarters, three rifle platoons, a heavymachine-gunplatoonandamortarsection.Duringthenightof18–19December,thedivisionreceivedmovementorders

fornewareas.TheentireXXIV.Armee-Korps(mot.)was tobemoved into thearea south of Mzensk as the ready reserve of the field army. The movementthere, starting after 0600 hours, did not proceed without incident. Russianfighter-bombers attacked the columns, which were barely able to defendthemselveswithoutFlakinsupport.Duringoneoftheattacks,LeutnantEckert(the 3./Schützen-Regiment 3) was badly wounded, along with fourteen othermen.Theenemyaircraftdidnothavetosearchlongtofindtargets.Ontheroadto Orel, there were twomotorized columnsmarching parallel to one another.Soldiersweremarching in the two roadsideditcheson foot.Gigantic trainsofprisonerswereheadedwestwardalongthesnowed-overfields.Most of the motorized elements of the division reached the area twenty

kilometers south of Mzensk on 20 December. The foot battalions assembledsouthofTschern.Theneighboring4.Panzer-DivisionoccupiedtheareaaroundKromyatthesametime.GeneralmajorBreithmovedwithhiscommandposttoProtassowa. While the troop elements took up their frequently miserablequarters, they heard on the radio sets that were still working that Hitler hadrelievedthecommanderinchiefoftheGermanArmy,GeneralfeldmarschallvonBrauchitsch,andhadassumedthatpositionhimself.

ThedivisioncontinuedtoreorganizeitsformationsintheMzenskareaon20and21December.Schützen-Regiment394wasstagedintheGorbatschewoareaand formed two battalions like its sister regiment.Oberstleutnant Dr. Müllerassumed command of themotorized elements, which were sent to Oleschnja,eastofOrel.MajorHaasledthefootcompanies,whileHauptmannFreiherrvonderHeyden-RynschwasinchargeofthecollectionpointfordamagedvehiclesinOrel.WithinSchützen-Regiment3,MajorWellmannwasgivencommandofthe motorized battalion: Hauptmann Peschke commanded the 1st Company;Oberleutnant Biegon, the 2nd; Oberleutnant Brandt, the 4th; and LeutnantComberg, the heavy company. As the leader of the trains elements, LeutnantHinrichs moved his sections to Rosslawlj. The armored regiment establishedthree infantry companies. With the exception of machine guns, they had noheavy weapons. Machine-gun training for the tankers was conducted byHauptmann Lanig, the regimental engineer. Two 3.7-centimeter antitank gunsweremountedonsleds,formingasortof“poorman’sartillery.”Combat power decreased daily. Some troop elements registered 45 percent

losses due to frostbite during the period. It had become even colder, and thehowlingeastwindcauseddensecloudsofsnowtoblowacrossthecountryside.The weather conditions naturally affected the progress of the preparations offieldfortificationsalongthenewmainlineofresistanceoutsideofOrel.Detailsfrom the armored regiment, which had previously been in the city, were stillbusywithdiggingthetrenches.Bytheendoftheyear,themenoftheregimentestablished a trench system six kilometers in width. The regiment formed adetail of 1 officer and 100 men (in two platoons) to secure and guard theammunition,weaponsandequipmentstockpiledthere.Lateron,theregimentwasorderedtoestablishadditionaldefensivepositions

on both sides of theOrel–Mzensk road and in the direction of Bolchow. ThearmorregimenthadonlysixoperationalfightingvehiclesinOrel.ThefightingelementsunderOberstleutnantSchmidt-Ottcontinued tobeattached toOberstEberbachof the4.Panzer-Division.The3.Panzer-Divisionwasreleasedfromits attachment to the XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.) and placed directly at thedisposal of the Army High Command. General der Panzertruppen FreiherrGeyrvonSchweppenburgsaidfarewelltohisolddivision,onlyhimselftoleaveforGermanyshortlythereaftertoconvalescefromanillness.GeneraloberstGuderian,thecommanderinchiefofthe2.Panzer-Armeeand

thecreatoroftheGermanarmoredforces,wasrelievedofhispost.TheSupreme

CommanderoftheArmedForcescouldnotgetoverthefactthatGuderianhadissued orders on his own initiative for a retreat. Nonetheless, Hitler did notpunish theGeneraloberst, since the nameGuderian had a special place in theGermanArmy.Everyman in the fieldarmywasdeeplyaffectedby the relief.Guderian turned down a request by the armor regiment to give him an honorguard. The new commander in chief of the field army was General derPanzertruppenRudolfSchmidt.3

The division celebrated Christmas in its quarters. A snowstorm hadtransformedthelandscapewithathicklayerofsnow,anditcontinuedtosnowfrom theheavenswithout a letup.The supply systemcouldnotoperate at fullspeed,butthesectionswereabletoensurethatatleasttheChristmasmailmadeit forward. The division distributed personal-demand items for Christmas,includingLebkuchen,4cigarettes,andalcohol.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatnot all of the unitswere able to enjoy those things. For example,Haas’s footbattalionwas in Bludowo,which could not be reached by a field kitchen, letalone for distribution of personal-demand items. If possible, the battalionscelebratedChristmasEveatcompanylevel.Bothofthechaplainsstartedvisitingall of the quarters on 23December to hold field services.The firstChristmascelebratedintheEastwasmarkedbyasurprisinglyclearsky,whichallowedthemoontoilluminatethebroad,snowyterrainalmostasbrightasday.TheRedArmy ensured that itwas not quiet that night, either. Its divisions

assaultedthepositionsofthe2.ArmeeseventykilometerssoutheastofOrelwithundiminished ferocity. They achieved a breakthrough, resulting in that fieldarmyrequestingthe2.Panzer-Armeeforhelp.Withitsownlimitedforces,the2.Panzer-Armeewasunabletoassist.It thenrequestedthe3.Panzer-Divisionbereleased;itcouldonlybeemployeduponordersfromtheHighCommand.Itdidnottakelongforpermissiontobegranted.The2.Panzer-Armeepassed

on the following by radio and telephone late in themorning of 25December:“ByorderoftheFührer,the3.Panzer-Divisionistemporarilyallocatedtothe2.ArmeeforthepurposeofpreventingabreakthroughoftheenemywestofTrudkibymeans of a counterattack across theNerutsch. Effective 0600 hours on 26December, the3.Panzer-Division isprepared tomovefromitsquarteringareatwenty-fivekilometerssouthofMzensk.”At2030hours,anotherorderreachedthedivisioncommandpostthatdirected

amotorizedbattalionimmediatelybesenttotheNerutschtoestablishablockingposition.

A battle group under the command ofOberstleutnant Audörsch assembledthat night andmarched off in the darkness. The pathways and roads were socoveredwithsnowthatarapidmovementwasimpossible.Thecolumnsfalteredand there were hold-ups. It was until it brightened up with morning that thebattlegroupwasabletopickupthepace.Duringtheafternoonof26December,themotorized battalion ofSchützen-Regiment394 (Oberstleutnant Dr.Müller)reached Malo-Archangelsk with its attached antitank companies. That samemorning,MajorZiervogel’sreconnaissancebattalionreceivedordersandmovedout. The troops reached the Nerutsch at Sergejewskoje in the evening afterencountering untold difficulties along the route. They immediately startedscreeninginthesectorthere.WhilethefirstbattlegroupsofthedivisionweremovingtotheNerutsch,the

remaining elements of the rifle brigade had to give up their quarters on 26Decembertothe293.Infanterie-Divisionanddrawnewquarters.Ashortwhilelater,thedivisionreceivedmovementordersfortherestofitsformations,withtheexceptionoftheelementsofthearmorregimentemployedaroundOrelinascreeningmission.Attached toOberstKleemannfor theformationofhisbattlegroupwere the

I./Schützen-Regiment3,Kradschützen-Bataillon3,theI./Artillerie-Regiment75,Pionier-Bataillon 39, and the 6./Flak-Regiment 59. That group departed itsquartersat0700hours,workeditswaythroughthehugesnowdriftstotheroadto Orel, reached the city around 1000 hours, refueled and rearmed and thenstarted its roadmarch again at 1300hours.Ahalf hour later, a radiomessagearrived from the fieldarmystating that the3.Panzer-Divisionwasattached totheLV.Armee-Korps.Inaddition,thenewmissionstatedthatadditionalgroundwastobetakenon27December,asfeasible,movingfromMalo-ArchangelskinthedirectionofDroskowo.Theenemythathadpenetratedwastobeejectedbymeansofacounterattack.Oneofthetwomarchserialsofthedivisionmovedalongthedeeplysnowed

overroadfromOreltoChotetowo,whiletheotherserialheadedsouththroughAlexandrowka.The routepastChotetowowas impossible tonegotiatebecauseofthesnowdrifts,andthecolumnswereunabletoadvance.Consequently,theyquartered in Chotetowo and Guropkino. The division intended to requestsnowplows and determine new routes via reconnaissance. But neither optionworked. Instead, the individual vehicles had to be towed one after the otherthroughthesametracks leftby the leadvehicles.Asaresult, themarchon27

December was considerably delayed and placed a tremendous strain on bothmenandmateriel.ThedivisionheadquartersarrivedinBogorodiskojearound2100hoursaftera

march of fourteen hours that only covered a distance of sixty kilometers. At2210hours,aradiomessagewasreceivedfromthe2.Armeethatstated,amongother things:“It isofdecisiveimportancethat thedivisionget toDroskowoassoon as possible!” The division directed all formations to move out again atdaybreak.Noneof thebattlegroupcouldmake thedeparture time, since eventhe forward elements of Kampfgruppe Audörsch had only entered Malo-Archangelsk the previous evening and had suffered so many mechanicalproblems with its vehicles that a continuation of the march could only startaround 1100 hours on 28 December. The motorized battalion of Schützen-Regiment 3 was stranded due to a lack of fuel. OnlyOberleutnant Biegon’scompany was in a position to move out at 1200 hours. Finally, shortly afternoon, a sled column arrived with fuel. That enabled the tank battalion ofOberstleutnantSchmidt-OtttoreachJudinka,eastofMalo-Archangelsk.On themorningof29December,OberstleutnantAudörschassembledallof

theforcesthathadarrivedintheareaandcontinuedthemarchinthedirectionofDroskowowithelementsofSchützen-Regiment394,the2./Pionier-Bataillon39,the6./Flak-Regiment59,acompanyoftanks,andabatteryofartillery.Despiteextremely difficult road conditions (huge snowdrifts), the reinforcedSchützen-Regiment 394 reached Droskowo in the afternoon. Oberst Burgdorf, whoseforceswere desperately defending inDroskowo, breathed a sigh of relief andrequestedOberstleutnant Audörsch to employ some tanks at the edge of thevillage. That never happened. The battle group commander received orders toturnaroundimmediately,movein thedirectionofSenowjewkaandtakeit.Bydoingso,hewastopreventtheadvanceoftheRussianforcestowardsthewestand Malo-Archangelsk. To do that, all of the elements that had reachedDroskowo or were headed there had to be intercepted and turned around.Kampfgruppe Audörsch was outside of Senowjewka around 1900 hours. Incontrasttowhatwasmarkedonthemaps,itwasanextended“street”villageandmannedbystrongenemyforces.Audörschorderedashortpreparationwithhisheavyweaponsandthenanattackonthecenterofthevillage,whichsucceeded.Thereinforcedrifleregimentthensetupanall-rounddefenseinthecenterofthevillage. Following reconnaissance efforts, the right-hand portion of the villagewas taken in an aggressive attack, followedby the lefthandportion.Bydoingthat,theadvanceoftheRussianforcestothewestwashalted.Theimportanceof

thecaptureofSenowjewkaforthe“bigpicture”couldbeseeninthefactthataRussian division headquarters had already set up its command post in thevillage.The battle group was unable to rest either that night or the next day. The

Soviets,whowereinitiallysurprisedandconsistedofelementsofthreecavalrydivisions, attacked the village several times from all sides. The riflemen,engineers, cannoneers, and tankers were in uninterrupted combat. They wereabletoturnbackalloftheenemy’simmediatecounterattacks,however.The German forces suffered terribly from the rigors of the weather. The

divisionhadspreaditselfoutovertheareabetweenMalo-ArchangelskandOrel.Therewerevehicles stuck in thesnoweverywhere.Only thehorse-drawnsledcolumnswereabletonegotiatethesnowwithanyspeed.Ontopofallthat,theenemywas located on both sides of the roads, and no one had any idea howstronghewas.Theformationsofthe221.Infanterie-Division,whichhadalreadybeenfightingtherefordays,wereunabletomoveasaresultofthecoldandthesnow.Kampfgruppe Audörsch was well ahead of most of the division. On 30

December,itslowlystartedmovinginthedirectionofMalo-Archangelsk.MajorWellmann’sbattalionclearedtheareaaroundNishnjaja-Ssossna.Intheprocess,OberleutnantBiegonandhiscompanyrelievedanencircledGermanforcethatwasbeingledbyapaymasterandaveterinarian.Thecapablecommanderofthe5thBatteryofartillery,OberleutnantGrigo,waskilledduringtheoperationsofhisbattery aroundDroskowo.Once again, themedical companieshad a lot todo.The 1stAmbulancePlatoonwas up front;UnteroffizierReimann from theplatoonwasmortallywoundedduringoneoftheoperations.Despitealloftheexertions,hardshipsanddisappointmentsofthetime,there

wereoccasionalhappymoments.Forinstance,UnteroffizierGöschlarrivedonedayatthelocationofthe1./Schützen-Regiment3,whichhadonlybeenable toget threeSPW’s as far asMalo-Archangelsk at that point.His vehicle had runover a mine at the beginning of December outside of Tula, and he had beenreportedasmissingeversince.Buthewasbackwiththecompanyafterhavingdrivennearly400kilometersbyhimselfthroughenemy-occupiedterritory.AndhebroughthisSPWwithhim.Inplaceofoneofthefrontwheelsthathadbeenblownoffby themine,hehadmountedasled. Itwasanachievementwithoutequal.The last day of the year arrived. There was deep snow everywhere, which

severelyaffectedallmovement.Correspondingly,ittooksometimetoassembleall of the battalions and troop elements. The enemy’s strengthwas increasingdaily.General der Infanterie Vierow’sLV. Armee-Korps ordered the divisionsattachedtoittoretakealineinacounterattackthatthecorpscouldholdforthewinter.The3.Panzer-Divisionregroupedonthatday,andPionier-Bataillon39relieved Kampfgruppe Audörsch at Senowjewka. Since the beginning of thecampaign, the engineer battalion had suffered nineteen officers killed andwounded;onthatday,ithadsixteenofficersonitsrolls(itstableoforganizationand equipment authorized twenty-six). Schützen-Regiment 394 was pushedforward to Droskowo and staged for operations. The first elements ofMajorPape’smotorcycleinfantrybattalionhadalsoarrivedtherebythen.Thebattalionhadmarched by foot toChotetowo, caught rail transport as far as thewhistlestop atPonyri from there and thenmovedon toDroskowousing all availablevehicular lift capacity. The I./Schützen-Regiment 3 cleared Werchsaja-SsosnawithPeschke’s,Biegon’sandLohse’scompanies.HauptmannPeschkeassumedcommandofthebattalion,sinceMajorWellmannwasnolongerabletoperformdutyduetofrostbittentoes.On31December,BataillonHaasattackedNischnijKunatsch with companies commanded by Leutnant Dr. Lotze (Schützen-Regiment 394), Leutnant von Sternberg (Artillerie-Regiment 75), LeutnantSchuppius (Schützen-Regiment 3), andLeutnant Stahlberg (Schützen-Regiment394).Thebattalion,whicheventuallylost90percentofitspersonneltofrostbite,consistedononecompanyintheend.ItwascommandedbyOberleutnantAlexofthedivisionalartillery.For its first attack in the New Year, the division formed a new, reinforced

battlegroupunderthecommandofOberstKleemann.ItconsistedofSchützen-Regiment 394, the I./Schützen-Regiment 3, Kradschützen-Bataillon 3,Panzerjäger-Abteilung543, thecombatelementsofPanzer-Regiment6,andanartillerybattalion.ItsordersreadthatitwastoadvanceasfarasTrudy,withthemain effort being themotorizedbattalionofOberstleutnantDr.Müller.At thesame time, the motorcycle infantry battalion, to which Major Prinz vonWaldeck’sgrouphadbeenattached,wastotakeGrowsewoandscreenalongthecreek to theeast.MajorPetsch’sengineerbattalion,withanattachedcompanyfromPanzerjäger-Abteilung543andabatteryofartillery,assumedthemissionof guarding the area between Sinowjewka and Wjasowoje and clearing it ofscatteredenemyelementsandstragglers.New Year’s Eve had arrived. It was a “temperate” night. The men of the

divisionwerescreeningandknewthattheywouldhavetomoveouttoattackthe

next day. The morning was dreary and gray. Snow was falling and thetemperature had dropped to -30 degrees Celsius (-22 Fahrenheit). Ever since0200hours,thedivision’selementshadbeenonalert.Theremainingbattalionsmovedforward.At the stroke of 1000 hours, the cannon and howitzers of the divisional

artilleryroaredintolifeagainandflungtheirroundsagainsttheenemypositions.MajorPape’smotorcycleinfantryattackedalongtherightwingfromBeresowezto the northeast. To the left,Oberstleutnant Dr. Müller’s motorized battalionfromSchützen-Regiment394moved forwardaswell.Hauptmann Peschke andthe3rdTankCompanyofOberleutnantMüller-Hauffadvancedonthepatchofwoods north of Beretschka. Infanterie-Regiment 133 of the 221. Infanterie-DivisionandMajorHaas’sbattalionwereonthenorthernwing.TheyadvancedalongthebottomlandoftheKunatschandapproachedUst-Kunatsch.ThefootbattalionofSchützen-Regiment394numberedonly150menatthatpoint.Asaresult of the extremelydifficult roadway conditions and thephysical exertionsattendant to that, the men were at the end of their rope and on the verge ofcollapsing.Theenemywasveryactiveand showedno signsofdefeat.Therewas such

heavydefensivefirecomingfromthewoodsbetweenBeretschkaandPopowy-DworyagainstHauptmannPeschke’sbattalionthat theattackbyitscompaniesbogged down. Itwasn’t until the four attached fighting vehicles and theSPWcompanyenveloped thewoodsfromtheeast that theenemygaveway.At thatpoint, the rifle companies could advance again. They took Popowy-Dwory,Filatowka, Woltschi-Dwery, and Rasplaki one after the other. Müller-Hauff’stankcompanyknockedoutfiveT-34’s.TheRussiansstartedpullingbacktothenorth everywhere, leaving behind a lot of dead.Oberstleutnant Dr. Müller’sbattalionattackingon therightwaswestofUst-LeskibynoonandestablishedcontactwithHauptmannPeschke’sbattalion.Themotorcycle infantrybattalionalso gained ground and tookGrowsewo,whichwas completely destroyed, bynoon.OberleutnantSchmidt’s7thBatteryofartillerywithits10-centimetercannon

rolled up front alongwith themotorcycle infantry and assault guns ofMajorPrinzvonWaldeck,sincetheyweretheyonlyarmor-defeatingweaponsontheright wing of the division.Major Pape then approached Ust-Leski with hiscompanies, and the motorcycle infantry finally succeeded in getting to theoutskirtsofthevillage.

Byafternoon,theimpetusoftheattackstartedtowane,withtheexceptionofthe motorized battalion of Schützen-Regiment 3, which entered Nachalowkaaround 1500 hours. The village was clear of the enemy. That allowed theneighboringbattalionofOberstleutnantDr.Müllertomoveforwardaswell.AnassaultdetachmentadvancedinthedirectionofTrudy-Merjeawaat1900hours.Therewasastrongenemyforcethere,however.Itwasabletostoptheattackofboth battalions outside of the village outskirts for the time being. The riflecompanies continued to close up, and they assaulted the western portion ofTrudy around 2100 hours. Screening elements had to be established in alldirections, since therewasnocontactwithneighboringbattalions.TheSovietsdefended stubbornly in the eastern portion of the locality and even advancedagainsttheGermanbattalionswithtanksinthedarkness.The enemy forceswest of the I./Schützen-Regiment 3 grew stronger by the

hour.TheRussianswereattemptingtoescapetotheeastbetweenUst-KunatschandTrudy.Intheprocess,theyranintotherearoftheGermanforcesthatwerein thevillage.At first light, the soldiersof the twobattalion realized that theyhadbeenencircledinTrudy.Thefirstenemyattackofregimentalsizetookplaceearly that morning from the north. The battalions succeeded in stopping theenemyattackontheopenplainbyusingconcentratedfiresfromthefewinfantryguns.Leutnant Lohse’s SPW’s conducted reconnaissance in all directions anddeterminedthattheSovietsweregrowinginstrengthbythehour.The division ordered Infanterie-Regiment 133 andHaas’ battalion to attack

Trudytorelievetheencircledbattalions,whichweresustainingheavycasualties.TheI./Infanterie-Regiment133startedscreeningatUst-KunatschandalongtheTrudy,whileMajorHaas andhis exhausted soldiers approachedTrudyproper.WhenHaas’battalionreachedTrudyat1725hours,hisforcesnumberedninetymenand threemachineguns.Hismenwere immediatelydirected to screen tothesouth.BothofthebattlegroupsalreadyinTrudyhadlostsome150menbynoon,.Hauptmann Peschke was badly wounded, resulting in Leutnant HeiseassumingactingcommandoftheI./Schützen-Regiment3.Despiteallofitslosses,thedivisionhadachievedallofitsattackobjectives

for the day. In the morning, the motorcycle infantry battalion had taken Ust-Leskiafteroneandone-halfhoursoffighting.Thesituationhadbeenstabilizedandthelineforthewinterfightingpositionstaken.Pionier-Bataillon39,whichwas screening to thewest at Sinojewka,was to be pushed forward during thenightandattached toOberstKleemann’s force.Theengineers startedworkon

establishing field fortifications along a general line runningHill 236.7 inUst-Leski to Ust-Kunatsch. Trudy, which was located in a deep defile, was notincludedintheeffort,sinceitcouldnotbeheldinthelongrun.Correspondingly,theI./Schützen-Regiment394leftthevillageduringthenightof2–3January.Atnoon on 3 January, the II./Schützen-Regiment 3 received orders to evacuateTrudy around 1700 hours, along with its attached tanks. The temperatureregistered-42degreesCelsius(-43.6Fahrenheit).Itwasthecoldestnightofthewintersofar.ThedivisionalengineerswereattachedtoOberstKleemannforbuildingfield

fortifications.Panzerjäger-Abteilung 521 was moved to Orel, since it was nolonger capable of conducting operations. The corps informed the division at1300hoursthatmeasuresweretobetakentomovethemotorizedelementsintotheareaaroundFateshassoonaspossible.PullingtheII./Schützen-Regiment3outofthelinewasdelayed,becausetheevacuationofthewoundedwasdifficult.Themedical vehicles had not come forward.TheGerman artillery,which hadnotbeenespeciallynoticeableuptothatpoint,firedwithvisiblesuccessintotheeasternportionofTrudy.Thebattalionwasfinallyabletopulloutofthevillage,andtheRussiansdidnotnotice.Theywerestillfiringintothevillagelongafterthedivision’ssoldiershadleft.Thetemperaturesagainfellto-42,andthereweremanycasesoffrostbite.The221. Infanterie-Division assumed responsibility for thenorthernportion

of the division sector. Infanterie-Regiment 133, which had been given thatmission,didnotarriveuntil0500hours thenextday; thereliefwascompletedby 1000 hours. Major Pape’s motorcycle infantry and Major Haas’s footbattalion remained in the southern sector and were attached toKampfgruppeMoser of the infantry division. The remaining formations of the 3. Panzer-Division pulled back to the area aroundMaloarchangelsk to reorganize there.Themovementtotherearwasfullofdifficulties.Manyvehicleswerestrandedduetothethicksnoworalackoffuel.Enemybomberscircledabovetheroadcontinuously and strafed the columns with machine-gun fire. It was not untilevening that Peschke’s and Müller’s battalions arrived in Grinew. Thedismounted elements were still in Droskowo, awaiting trucks or sleds. Thedivision logistics officer,Major i.G. Barth, had commandeered all availablevehicles for the movements. Even the bridging sections had to unload theirbridgetruckstomakethemavailableforthehaulingofpersonnel,weaponsandequipment. Shuttle service was initiated from and to Maloarchangelsk andmaintained,albeitwithdifficulty.

The division commander, who had moved to his command post inMaloarchangelsk,preparedanorderon5Januaryforthe“ReorganizationoftheMotorizedElementsoftheDivision.”Thefirstsentenceoftheorder:“Inordertomakeitpossibleforcombat-capableelementstoparticipateinoperations,themotorized elements of the division are to be reorganized immediately.” Therestructuringandreorganizationwithinthedivisionstartedonthatcoldwinter’sday.The I./Panzer-Regiment 6 formed two line companies underOberstleutnant

Schmidt-Ott.The“new”battalionhadonecommand tank,elevenPanzerIII’s,twoPanzer IV’s, and one Panzer II. The two motorized rifle battalions wereconsolidated under the command of Oberstleutnant Dr. Müller and theheadquarters of the II./Schützen-Regiment 394. Müller received one companyeachfromthetworifleregiments,aswellastheheavycompany.Inaddition,hereceived the two SPW companies, the 6./Flak-Regiment 59, andPanzerjäger-Regiment 543. The company formed from Schützen-Regiment 3 was led byOberleutnantDittmer.HisplatoonleadersweretheLeutnantReintjes,LeutnantMüller,LeutnantPauli,andLeutnantvonOhlshausen.Thecompanyalsohad35noncommissioned officers and 220 enlisted personnel. OberstleutnantZimmermann took command of the foot battalions, using the headquarters ofSchützen-Regiment 3. The headquarters of Schützen-Regiment 394 and theelementsofbothrifleregimentsthatwerenolongermobilebecausetheyhadnovehiclesweremoved toOrelunder thecommandofOberstleutnant Audörsch.Thenoncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnelsenttherewerereassignedto Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon 83. The reconnaissance battalion formed a mixedcompanyoutofallof its remainingvehicles.Thedivisionalengineerbattalionkept twocompanies,afteronebridgingsectionwasattached to themotorcycleinfantry battalion and the other bridging section to the division supportcommand. The division signals battalion remained unchanged, with one radiocompanyandonefield telephonecompany.Themedicalbattalionconsolidatedits ambulance platoons, forming one platoon under the command ofOberleutnant Queck. The headquarters ofPanzerjäger-Abteilung 521 reporteddirectlytothedivision,asdidtheheadquartersoftheriflebrigadeinOrel.Decisive measures were taken within the divisional artillery. The only

command element left was the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion. The twobattalionheadquartersthatwerefreedupweresenttoOrelandthenintotheareaaroundRoslawl toestablishnewbattalions.Panzer-Beobachtungs-Batterie327also moved to Orel. The remaining battalion was under the command of

Hauptmann Kersten. His adjutant was Oberleutnant Kochan. The battalionconsisted of batteries from all three battalions. They were OberleutnantSpeidel’s 2nd Battery andOberleutnant Lange’s 5th Battery, both with 10.5-centimeterlightfieldhowitzers.Inaddition,therewasHauptmannSchultheiß’s7th Battery, with its cannon, andOberleutnant Jahnke’s 9th Battery, with itsheavy15-centimeterhowitzers.TheelementsofthedivisionthathadremainedbehindintheOrelareaunder

Oberstleutnant Munzel continued to be employed digging fortifications andscreening.On4January,atelephonemessagewasreceivedfromthe2.Panzer-Armee stating that a march battalion was to be formed. Munzel was givencommandofthatbattaliononexpressordersfromGeneralSchmidt.Additionalinstructionsstated thatexperiencedpersonnel,suchas tankdrivers,mechanics,gunners etc. were to remain in Orel and continue with the work on thefortifications. Since the new Kampfgruppe Munzel was to be as mobile aspossible,sledshadtoberequisitionedorbuilt.Munzelreportedhisbattlegroupasoperationaltwodayslater.The remainingportions of the battalion thatwere immobilewere loadedon

columns of the XXXXVII. Armee-Korps (mot.) and MG-Bataillon 55 andtransportedtoBolchow,northeastofOrel.Thesledcompaniesandthemotorizedtrainsfollowedseparately.Sincethebattalionhadnoheavyweapons,permissionwas granted by the headquarters of the field army for it to bring along twoPanzerII’s, threePanzerIII’s, anda command tank.Theadhoc battalionhadOberstleutnantMunzelincommand,withLeutnantAdemekashisadjutantandLeutnant Jacob and Leutnant von Schell as his liaison officers. There was asignals platoon, three rifle companies, one platoon of tanks and one heavymachine-gunplatoon.Inall,thebattalionnumberedsome678men.Inadditionto the tanks, thereweresevenstaffcars, fifty-fivepanje sleds,andforty-sevenhorses. The forces remaining behind in Orel were under the command ofHauptmann(Ing.)Lanigandhisadjutant,OberleutnantvonTwardowski.Thoserear-areaelementsthenhadtosupplythewidelyscatteredregiment.To

thatend,atransferpointwasestablishedinBolchowunderLeutnantDr.Heuer.TheveryfirstnightthelasttwofieldkitchensandtwoadditionaltruckshadtobesentfromOreltomakeupforthevehiclesBataillonMunzelhadalreadylost.Themaintenanceplatoonscontinuedtoworkonrepairingvehicles—itwasupto-18 degrees Celsius (-.4 Fahrenheit) in the “heated” motor bays—sinceKampfgruppe Schmidt-Ott with the division main body continued to need

vehicles. The vehicles were in such bad shape that hardly a single one couldcover the stretch from Orel to Bolchow without breaking down. The secondcalamitywasthelackofalltypesoffuel,whichmeantthatthelastdropshadtobe siphoned out of the vehicles that no longer couldmove due tomechanicalproblems.Alloftheremainingsoldierswerestillinvolvedwiththeconstructionoffortifications.Theregimentwasespeciallyconcernedwithtakingcareof itssoldiers.Under the supervision ofOberleutnantGraf vonKageneck, a theatertroop was assembled, which called itself the Panzersprenggranate.6 In thecourse ofmore than 100 performances over the next fewweeks andmonths,thousandsofGermansoldiers,andnotjustfromthedivision,wereabletoenjoyaheartylaughoncemore.Despitetheinexpensivecostofadmission,morethan70,000Reichsmarkwerecollectedintheend,whichwereintendedtobeusedtoerectamemorialtoPanzer-Regiment6.Overcoming biting cold and a snowstorm,BataillonMunzel covered ninety

kilometersandreachedtheoperationalareaofthe296.Infanterie-Divisionon7January. The battalion received the mission to occupy two villages along themain line of resistance that were considered to be clear of the enemy. Onapproaching,theleadcompanyofLeutnantRukfußreceivedheavyinfantryfire.The first losses were taken, including the young company commander. Thevillage of Iwanowka could not be taken initially. It was only after LeutnantBecker’scompanycametosupportthatitwastaken.Thebattalionwaspositioned in thatsectorof thefront—allby itselfandfar

removed from the 3. Panzer-Division—halfway between Belew and Brjansk,wheretheSoviet61stArmyhaddrivenadeepwedgeintotheGermanlinesfromthe north. To the right and left of Munzel’s forces were the battle groups ofOberst Kiessling and Oberst Rathcliffe, with Munzel initially reporting toRathcliffe.ContactwiththeregimentinOrelcouldonlybemaintainedthroughtheradio in thecommandtank.Munzel’smenwere toholdIwanowkafor twomonthsagainstaconstantlyattackingenemy.

SixMonthsofWarintheEast:Routeofthe3.Panzer-Division.

TheSovietssucceededinenteringthevillagetwicebyadvancingthroughthe“Ivan”defile;theywereejectedtwice.Thesituationwasanythingbutenviable,sincethevillagewasfrequentlyundermortarfire.Thevillagesauna,whichwasputbackintooperation,couldonlybeusedatnight.ItwasonlyattheKireikowostrongpoint,wherethesledsectionofLeutnantKofelwithitsnearly120panjesledsdefended, that themenof thebattlegroupcouldgeta temporary respite.The self-sacrificing actions of the battalion during that severewinter, coupledwith its constant defensive skirmishes, earned special praise from the infantrydivisiontowhichitwasattachedandfromthefieldarmy.Unfortunately,manybrave tankers rest in eternal peace at Iwanowka.Leutnant Jacob andLeutnantHacker, as well as Panzerschütz Hoppe and Panzerschütz Tanke, are amongthem. In February, the commander of the neighboring regiment, OberstKiessling,waskilled.OberstMunzelassumedactingcommandofthatregiment,whileHauptmannvonPrittwitzwasgivencommandofthebattalion.Itwasnotuntil the March sun had conjured away the snow and replaced the iced-overlandscape with mud and morass that the infantry employment of Munzel’stankerswasended.Duringtheseverewinterof1941–42,thedivision’sarmorregimentnolonger

existedasacohesive formation. Ithadbeensplitup into severalbattlegroupsandsections,whichwereemployedatdifferentplacesalong theEasternFront

andupto600kilometersawayfromeachother.Forinstance,anothercompanywas formed on 10 January in Orel from elements remaining there. It wasdirected to assume a securitymission for theBrjansk–Orel rail line.LeutnantHinpeterand120men,alongwithtenlightmachineguns,andtwotrucks,wereloadedontrainsandsenttobeemployedinKaratschew.TheremainingelementsoftheregimentcontinuedtoestablishdefensivepositionsintheOrelarea.WhenanotherthirtymenhadtobesenttoreinforceKampfgruppeSchmidt-Ott,thetaskoftheremainingelementsgrewevenmoredifficult.Themaineffortoftherear-areaserviceswasinsupplyingtheassortedbattle

groupsof the regiment and inmaintaining thevehicles.Sledof all typeswereconstructed:fiveformedicalpurposes,oneforafieldmess,andtwentyhorse-andforty-fiveman-drawnsleds.Inaddition,recoveryoperationswereconductedfor stranded vehicles of all types, as well as courses for tank mechanics andradio operators. More and more men and materiel was detached for supportelsewhere.On17January,forexample,onePanzerII,twoPanzerIII’s,andtwocommandvehiclesweredispatchedtothetwobattlegroups;tendayslater,fivefightingvehicleswere sent to the17.Panzer-Division.By the end of January,another twenty men were sent toKampfgruppeMunzel. At the same time, asecurity company was established under Leutnant Jacobs (later OberleutnantBüschen),followedshortlylaterbyadefensecompany,whichwassupposedtobe employed if the city of Orel was threatened. That company was led byOberleutnant Oehlrich and had 3 officers, 18 noncommissioned officers, and160enlistedpersonnel.Fora reportduewithaneffectivedateof2February, thearmored regiment

hadassembledthefollowingstatisticsconcerningitsstatus.Thenumberofdeadsuffered:20officersand187noncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnel.Thenumberofwoundedtotaled40officersand551noncommissionedofficersand enlisted personnel. Enemy equipment andweapons captured or destroyedtotaled: 317 tanks; 30 armored cars; 406 artillery pieces; 80 antiaircraft guns;274 antitankguns; 83mortars; 440machineguns; 369 trucks; 5 staff cars; 40tractors;34aircraft;1armoredtrain;2transporttrains;and9bunkers.The headquarters of the division and its availablemotorized elementswere

sentmarching towardsKursk on 6 January. The lead elements of the divisionarrived there after a 125-kilometer movement in the evening. GeneralmajorBreithwentaheadofhisforcesandreceivedabriefingthatafternoonfromthecommanding general of the XXXXVIII. Armee-Korps (mot.), General der

Panzertruppen Kempf, to which the division was attached. The Soviets hadbrokenthroughalongabroadfrontsoutheastofKursk,andtheirleadelementshadalreadyreachedtheKursk–Obojanroad.TheoutskirtsofObojanhadbeenoccupiedbytheenemy.Uptothatpoint,onlytheI./Infanterie-Regiment2457ofMajorSchmidt,whichhadjustarrivedfromFrance,hadbeenemployed.ItwasgivenascreeningmissionatPolewajaalongtheKursk–Ssolnzewaroad.AroundSsolnzewa proper, Infanterie-Regiment 528 andAufklärungs-Abteilung 299 ofthe 299. Infanterie-Division were holding. That evening, the 2./Artillerie-Regiment75wassent toPolewajaas thefirstunitof the3.Panzer-Division tosupporttheinfantryinvolvedinhardfightingthere.At the same time, the enemy attacked the southern wing ofGeneralmajor

Henrici’s 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) with strong forces. He was trying tobringadditional regiments through theSeimValley, inaneffort to takeKursk.Thedivision received themission to eliminate the threat to the16. Infanterie-Division(mot.)fromthesouthandturnbackadditionalenemyforcesalongtheroad to Wypolsowa. The next day, the division sent the first available tankcompanies of Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott toward Afanassjewka and themotorized infantry division, some sixy kilometers away. The companiesadvancedacrosssnow-coveredplains,pushedbackenemyforcesatKamenskijandtothesouthandworkedtheirwaytowardstheroad,constantlyencounteringheavy Russian resistance. Once at the road, the fighting vehicles took updefensive positions and disrupted all Russian traffic coming from the east.AlthoughtheRussiansattemptedtopushbacktheGermanfightingvehiclesbymeans of artillery and tanks, they did not succeed. By 8 January, the tankcompaniesofthearmorregimentwereabletogaingroundtothesouthandeastandpreventedanyfurtherbreakthroughonthepartoftheenemyatthatsectionofthefront.GeneralmajorBreithwasgivencommandresponsibilityforthesectorsough

andwestof theSeimon8January.TheheadquarterssetupshopinKursk.Atthe time, the only elements available to the commander and his operationsofficer, Major i.G. Pomtow, were the I./Infanterie-Regiment 245, Infanterie-Regiment 528,Aufklärungs-Abteilung 299,8 and, from the 3. Panzer-Division,twobatteriesofthedivisionalartillery,onetroopofthereconnaissancebattalion,andtwocompaniesofengineers.ThegeneraldirectedtheI./Infanterie-Regiment245 toadvanceviaKrassnikowoand reach thecreekatMilidowka.Thebravebattalionworkeditswayforwardthroughhighsnowdrifts,reachedKrassnikowo

andtookthevillage,supportedbyonePanzerIVand twoassaultguns. It thenmovedontothecreek,achievingitsattackobjective.Additionalelementsofthe3.Panzer-DivisionarrivedinKurskduringtheday.

They included the rifle companies ofOberstleutnant Dr. Müller and, a shortwhilelater,themotorcycleinfantrycompaniesofMajorPape,arrivingbytrain.Major Ziervogel’s reconnaissance battalion, whose remaining elements hadarrived, worked their way forward through Polejawa to Ljubiskoje, along thecompletely exposed southernwing of the division, and assumed the screeningmission.The headquarters of Oberstleutnant Zimmermann’s Schützen-Regiment 3

(adjutant:Hauptmann Haspel) was sent to Milidowka to exert command andcontrolovertheinfantryforcesthere.TheI./Infanterie-Regiment245advancedthroughSchumakowo and towardsWypolsowa fighting both enemy resistanceand terrain and weather difficulties in equal measure. The batteries of thedivisional artillery supported the attack, which was crowned by the terrificbattalion takingWypolsowa. In theprocess,Leutnant Jacobof the2ndBatterywaskilled.Withthecaptureofthevillage,thewestbankoftheSeimhadbeenreached.Infanterie-Regiment528,whichhadbeengiventhesameobjective,hadnotfollowedtheattackoftheotherinfantryforces,sinceitwasheldupbytheenemy. For similar reasons, the friendly tanks had been unable to help theI./Infanterie-Regiment245;theywereonlyabletogettothewestbanklateron.TheSovietshadbroughtupreinforcementstotheirformationsandattackedin

the direction of Milidowka in the afternoon. The enemy forces encounteredOberstleutnantDr.Müller’sbattalion,whichhadarrivedinthemeantime.Inthecourseofthefighting,OberleutnantDittmer’scompanyfromSchützen-Regiment3had togiveupSsorotschinonemore timeandpullback toMilidowka.ThatcompanylostonedeadandfourwoundedduringitsfirstoperationintheKurskarea.Forunknown reasons, Infanterie-Regiment528 evacuated Ssolnzewo during

the night and moved back to the west. The division ordered the regiment toMilidowka,buttheregimentdidnotreceivetheorders.Asaconsequenceofthatretrogrademovement,KampfgruppeZimmermannwasindangerofbeingcutoffatWypolsowa.The divisionmade efforts to free up the I./Infanterie-Regiment245—oncefromthenorthandoncefromthesouth—whichwasinacutedanger.BataillonMüller’s forceswere unable tomake it out ofMilidowka, however.Theenemyhadbeenconsiderably reinforcedduring thenightand turnedback

allattacksledbythecompaniesofOberleutnantDittmerandLeutnantSchiller,whichsufferedcasualties.Panzergruppe Schmidt-Ott was employed in an immediate attack in the

direction of Wypolsowa from the south. The 3rd Tank Company, led byOberleutnantMüller-Hauff,whowouldbeplacedontheArmyHonorRollon1March 1942, ran into an enemy trap. The tanks were advancing onSchumakowo.All of a sudden, severalT-34’s appeared.Themaingunsof thePanzerIII’swerepowerlessagainstthem.NineGermantankswereknockedoutbytheenemyfire.TheremainingoneshadtopullbacktotheSeiminthefaceofthesuperiorenemyforcesandcross thefrozenriver.Oneplatoonfromthe1stCompany of engineers, consisting of one officer and thirty-four enlistedpersonnel,hadfollowedthetankattack.Onlytwelveengineersreturnedwithoutwounds.Itwasonlypossibletomoveasfarforwardastheknocked-outtanksinthecourseofanimmediatecounterattacklaunchedlateron.TheGermansoldiersfoundout that theirwounded comrades hadbeen stabbed to death in a bestialmannerandthenplundered.Bythen,Infanterie-Regiment528hadarrivedcompletelyexhaustedalongthe

Polnajaon10January,afterhavinghadtofightapursuingenemy.Itwasabletoestablish contact with Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 there. The regiment remainedattachedtothedivision,butitwasbarelycapableofoperations.OberstleutnantZimmermannassumedtemporarycommandoftheregiment.On 11 January, theRussianswere still positioned at Ljubiskoje. Theywere

increasing their pressure in the direction of Ssorotschin–Milidowka from theMurynowka Valley. The encircled I./Infanterie-Regiment 245 and the tankbattalioncontinued to fightagainstnumerically superior forces.TheSovietsatWypolsowo attempted to break out to the east to escape the attacks of the 2.Armeeandthe6.Armee,whichwereslowlystarting togathersteam.Thenexttwodayswere spent inpatrol activatesonboth sides,without a change to thebasic situation. Unfortunately, the commander of the 3rd Tank Company, thebraveandexemplaryOberleutnantMüller-Hauff,waskilledduringoneofthoseoperations.The thirteenth of January saw Infanterie-Regiment 528 involved in hard

fighting that resulted in a lot of casualties. It was only possible for themotorcycle infantry battalion to temporarily relieve the encircled I./Infanterie-Regiment245atWypolsowa.Themotorcycleinfantrycompaniesattackedinthedirection of Machnino to the right of Bataillon Müller. Despite considerable

terrain difficulties, the motorcycle infantry were able to take the enemypositions, which were being held by elements of an entire cavalry division.Major Pape and the commander of the 3rd Company, Hauptmann vonCochenhausen,servedasexamples indriving theirmenforward toattack.Theenemy suffered a considerable setback. The rifle platoon of OberfeldwebelKruse,whichwas employed as a flank guard,was able to gain ground in thedirection of Bynino and Schumakowo. After the successful attack of themotorcycle infantry battalionwas concluded,Kruse’s platoon heading back toMilidowka that evening. The I./Infanterie-Regiment 245 was still on its own,however. Only Hauptmann Markowski, who had taken over the 3rd TankCompany,wasabletoescortsuppliestotheinfantrybattalion.ArenewedattemptbyInfanterie-Regiment528tobreakopentheenemyfront

andadvanceonSsorotschinwasunsuccessfulandresulted inheavycasualties.At that point, the division orderedBataillonMüller to attack south onemoretime.Fortunately,MajorHaas’sfootbattalionhadarrivedinMilidowkathatday.Itwasabletoassumeresponsibilityforsecuringthevillage,albeitwithonly120men.OberstleutnantDr.Müller’stworiflecompaniesconductedanenvelopingattackagainstSsorotschin.OberleutnantDittmerandhisplatoonssucceededinenteringthelocalityfromthenorth,establishingcontactwiththeleadelementsof Infanterie-Regiment 528. That evening, Oberstleutnant Zimmermann tookoverthesecurityresponsibilitiesforSsorotschinwithhisbattlegroup.Theenemydidnotslackeninhisefforts.Duringthemorningof15January,

helaunchedasurpriseattackbytenT-34’s,whichsmashedintothepositionsofthe battered and completely burned out I./Infanterie-Regiment 245 atWypolsowa.The commander,Major Schmidt,was killed in that fighting.Thebattalion,ormoreaccurately,whatwas leftof thebattalion,pulledbackunderthe command of anOberleutnant, since it no longer had any armor-defeatingweapons and the fighting vehicles that had been up front were also out ofcommission.Thebraveinfantry,whohadtoleavebehind39deadcomradesand126woundedormissingones,waspassedthroughthelinesbythecompaniesofthemotorcycleinfantrybattalionatMachnino.Asaconsequenceof retakingWypolsowo, theenemywasonceagainalong

the road. The division ordered a temporary cessation of all movement and atransition to the defense, until an attack could be launched on 17 January inconjunctionwithGeneralleutnantNeuling’s239.Infanterie-Division.Inaccordancewithitsorders,OberstleutnantDr.Müller’sbattalionmovedout

at0600hours,afterthebatteriesofHauptmannKerstenfiredashortpreparationon the enemy positions. Six fighting vehicles supported the attack of theriflemen, who immediately started receiving heavy enemy fire. Once again,OberfeldwebelKruseandhisplatoonwereupfrontandenteredSchumakowoat0750 hours. A short while later, the remaining platoons of OberleutnantDittmer’s company had closed up and occupied the locality. The riflemenestablished contact by 1130 hours with the motorcycle infantry battalion inMachnino,thusachievingtheirattackobjective.Thecompanylosttwodeadandfifteen wounded, including Leutnant von Ohlshausen. Oberst Schmidt, thecommanderofInfanterie-Regiment245,assumedcommandoftheforcesintheSchumakowoarea;BataillonMüllerwasattachedtohim.The Soviets did not give up, however. Starting in the afternoon, they

conductedcounterattacksthatwereprecededbywavesofbombers.Theenemypressure was especially focused onMachnino, where the motorcycle infantrybattalion knocked out two T-34’s and ejected the Russians, who had alreadyentered the village. The enemy continued his efforts during the night andshowered the terrain and the positions of the motorcycle infantry with heavyartillery fire. An attack on theMachnino positions on 18 January was turnedback;an8.8-centimeterFlakknockedoutaKV-I.Theenemywaspresentinsuperiornumberseverywhere.Heavyartilleryfire

wasplacedonallof the localitiesoccupiedby theGermanforces,whichwerealso repeatedlyattackedby fighter-bombers. Itwasdirected for the3. Panzer-DivisiontoadvanceagainstSsolnzewo,assoonastheattacktothesouthbytheneighboring XXIX. Armee-Korps of General der Infanterie von Obstfelderstartedtoshowaneffect.SincethepromisedStukasupportdidnotmaterialize—aswasfrequently the

case—theoperationwasnotstarted.Initsplace,theSovietsbecameactiveandadvanced one more time against the positions of the motorcycle infantry atMachnino with tanks. Once again, the motorcycle infantry had to save theirskins, forcing the enemy back and knocking out two T-34’s in the process.Apparently,itwastheRussians’plantocutofftheelementsofthedivisionthatwereechelonedforward.Tocounterthat,Infanterie-Regiment528wasmovedtoByninoandemployedasaflankguard.Thatregimentrelievedthebadlybatteredmotorcycle infantry the next day. The headquarters of Schützen-Regiment 3underOberstleutnant Zimmermann,which had been involved in the defensivefightingsincedayone,returnedtoOrel.

On20 January, theSovietsmade it their point to try to takeMachnino andMilidowka. They attacked at first light, but they were turned back by 0700hours. Another attempt by the enemy to roll up the German front in theafternoonalsofellapartafteranhour.AmineobstaclethathadbeenemplacedbytheGermanengineersblewupasaresultofsympatheticexplosionscausedbyadirecthit.Friendlylosseswereconsiderable.By then, strongRussian formationshadbroken through thewinterpositions

along the Tim and at the boundary between the LV. Armee-Korps and theXXXXVIII. Armee-Korps (mot.). They were advancing with cavalry and rifledivisions in thedirectionofSchtschigry.OberstleutnantDr.Müller’sbattalion,alongwithanattachedbatteryofartilleryandanengineercompany,werepulledoutofthelineandsentbymotortransporttothesectorofGeneralleutnantRittervonHubicki’s9.Panzer-Division. In thecourseof theday, theheadquartersofthe3.Panzer-Division followed, as did all of the divisional elements that hadbeenemployed in thatsector.OnlyMajorPape’smotorcycle infantrybattalionandMajorHaas’sfootbattalionremainedwheretheyhadbeen,incontactwiththeenemy.Haashadtodetailoneofficer(LeutnantSchupius)andthirtymentoreinforceMüller’sforce,however.MajorFrankledthesecuritybattalion,whichwas then taken over by Major von Türckheim. The battalion remained atSsobatschenko until 21 February as Sperrverband Türckheim.9 GeneralmajorGollwitzer’s88.Infanterie-Division,whichwasgraduallyarrivingfromFrance,assumedcommandofthesectoraroundMilidowkafromGeneralmajorBreith.That signaled the endof the first roundof fighting aroundKursk for the3.

Panzer-Division.Theunfavorable situationdictated that thedivisioncouldnotbeemployedas such. Instead, ithadhad to fightwith formations ithadneverworkedwithbefore. In the time from4 to21January, thedivisionhad foughtagainst the Russian 2nd Guards Rifle Division, the 62nd and 293rd RifleDivisions,andthe14thTankBrigade.Allof thoseforcesbelongedto the40thArmy. The enemy lost five tanks and four guns; 281 prisoners were taken.Friendlylossesduringthesameperiodconsistedof13officerand271enlistedpersonnel dead; 15 officer and 610 enlisted personnel wounded; 102 enlistedpersonnel missing; and 585 sick personnel. Materially, the division lost eightfightingvehicles,onecommandtank,twoself-propelledguns,andoneFlak.Since theSovietswerecontinuing theiroffensiveaimedatKursk, therewas

notimeforthedivisiontotakeabreak.Duringthenightof21–22January,theRussiansbrokeopen theboundarybetween the9.Panzer-Division and the95.

Infanterie-Division and advanced far to the west. As a result, orders wereimmediatelyissuedtotheelementsofthedivisionintheKurskarea—artillery,engineers, tanks, and the reconnaissance battalion—to screen the area to thefront of Kursk. At the same time, the 2. Armee brought a march battalionforward. Itwasattached toMajorFrankandwasdirected to immediatelystartscreening the railway line between Orel and Kursk. On 23 January, MajorZiervogel’sreconnaissancebattalionmovedtoWedjanoje, toreconnoiter inthevalleys that were running from the south to the north. Oberstleutnant Dr.Müller’sbattalionwasalreadyengagedwith theenemyandwas locatedalongthesouthbankoftheOlchowatka.By23January,theSovietswereattackingthenewly occupied positions. Oberleutnant Dittmer’s and Leutnant Schiller’scompanieswereabletoholdontotheirpositionsaroundWerch–Olchowatoje.Duringthemorningof24January,thecorpsorderedthemovementofallof

thedivision’selementsintheKurskareatoAlekssandrowkaalongtheTuskarij.It was intended to interdict the enemy’s breakthrough there by means of animmediatecounterattack.Anattacklaunchedbythe9.Panzer-Divisionprior tothecompletionofthemovementsfailed.Thatresultedinthecompaniesofthe3.Panzer-Division that were already in position having to be pulled back. Thatevening,thedivisionreceivedorderstolaunchanimmediatecounterattackwithallavailableforcesinthedirectionofSchtschigry.MajorFrankwasdirectedtomoveeastwithhisbattalionthroughtheTuskarj

Valley.HewastodepartformBudanowkaandattempttocover10kilometersaday.HewastoreachKriwzowka,whilesimultaneouslyreconnoiteringalongtheavenue of advance and in the valleys. BothOberleutnant Fredenhagen’s andOberleutnant Hagenguth’s companies from Schützen-Regiment 394 were totemporarily remainat thebridgesover theTuskarj ina screeningmission,andthe companies ofOberleutnantMente andOberleutnant von Studnitzwere toadvanceeastsouthoftheriver,whileOberleutnantDziallaswastomovenorthoftheriver.Theadvancewasmadedifficultbythedeepsnow,theicyeastwindand temperatures that went as low as -40 degrees Celsius [-40 Fahrenheit].Nevertheless, Nisch-Demkino, about twelve kilometers away, was reached bythe evening.Leutnant Berg assumed command of the 7./Schützen-Regiment 3there. The next day, the battalion moved as far as Kartaschowka. FeldwebelBachert’s platoon from the 2./Schützen-Regiment 3 screened there, while thethreecompanieswentintopositionaroundPropowetz.Theenemypulledbackinthe face of the battle group,whichwas being commanded byMajorFreiherrvonTürckheimby then.On27January,Romaschowkawasreached.Bydoing

so, thegap thathadpreviouslyexistedalong thewesternsideof the frontwasclosed.Thebattalionstayedtheretwodays.ThedivisionwasthenmovedtotherailwaystationatOchotschewka,withthe

reconnaissancebattalioninthelead.GeneralmajorBreitharrivedatthelocationof the command post of the 9. Panzer-Division during the afternoon of 25January.Withhimwere the leadelementsofKampfgruppeSchmidt-Ott,whichconsistedofallavailabletanks,threeself-propelledantitankguns,onebatteryofthe divisional artillery and one 8.8-centimeter Flak. The situation grew morecriticalbythehour.JusteastofOchotschewka,theSovietshadalreadypressedacrosstheraillineandwerealreadyinthenorthernportionofSchtschigry,whileadditionalforceswererollingtowardstherailline.Major Ziervogel’s reconnaissance battalion moved straight from its line of

march without regrouping against the enemy forces along the railwayembankment. As soon as Oberstleutnant Schmidt-Ott arrived with his battlegroup,histanksandgunsadvancedonSchatalowkainordertocleartheroadtoSchtschigry.The9.Panzer-Divisionalsocommitted two infantrycompanies inthatdirection.Thefightingforthelocalitywasfairlyhard,buttheRussianswereforced out. At the same time, a hastily assembled battle group, comprised ofelements from the rear-area services and under the command ofOberleutnantBachmannofSchützen-Regiment 394, drove the enemy out of Schtschigry bymeansofanaggressivelyledattack.Exploitingthesuccess, thereconnaissancebattalionadvanced to thenorthandoccupiedapatchofwoods twokilometerssoutheast of Alekssandrowka. The Russians pulled back in the face of thehammerblowsoftheGermanattacktowardsPoschidajewka.Thedivision intelligenceofficer summarized the reports and reconnaissance

resultsasfollows:

Theoverallsituationshowedthattheattackofthe9.Panzer-Division tothe north had failed and that it had been abandoned farther to the eastalong the Koserscha River between Butyrki and Stakanowo. Thecounterattackhadnotbeenresumed,sinceenemywaspresentinTuskarjValley atKriwzowka and in the valley atMasslowka.As the result ofaerial reconnaissance and statements from the local populace, strongenemy cavalry forces had been determined especially in TerebuschValley,butalsoatKarschakaandatKasinowka.

Those few words also include the brave and self-sacrificing fighting of

Bataillon Müller (Schützen-Regiment 394), which was attempting to takeStakanowo as part of the 9. Panzer-Division. On 25 January, at the onset ofdarkness,OberleutnantDittmer’scompanysucceededintakingStakanowo.Thecompanyencounteredstubbornresistance,andsufferedfourdead,includingthecompanyheadquarterssectionleader,FeldwebelNitz,andsevenwounded.Sincethe companywas all by itself and had no contact at all with the neighboringelements, it had to be pulled back during the night. After a few hours, theriflemenhadtoattackagain,buttheeffortdidnotsucceed.LeutnantSchiller’scompany,whichhadclosedup in themeantime,suffered twenty-twodeadandwounded that day. The enemy was stronger. The battalion transitioned to thedefensearoundNisch-Olchowatoje.On26January,thedivisionwasabletoscoreanicesuccesswithitstwobattle

groups. Major Ziervogel and his reconnaissance battalion advanced fromSchtschigry,alongwithsometanksandartillery,whileOberstleutnantSchmidt-OttheadedinthedirectionofAlekssandrowkawithhisbattlegroup,consistingof elements of the armor regiment and Infanterie-Regiment 133,10 fromPoschidajewka,whichhadbeen taken thatmorning.TheRussianswerehit ontwo sides and ejected fromAlekssandrowka after a short firefight. The battlegroups exploited the success and continued the advance in the direction ofKriwzowka,whichwasreachedintheevening.Theenemylostthewilltofightandfledback.Thenextmission for thedivisionwas theclearingof thevalleydepressions

around Kriwzowka. On 27 January, the motorcycle infantry battalion,transported by trucks, arrived in Werch-Olchowatoje from Wodjanoje. Oncethere, Major Pape assumed command of a battle group consisting of hisbattalion,anSSinfantrybattalion,11 tanks,andantitankelements.Shortlyafter1330 hours, the men of the battle group assaulted from Werch-Olchowatoje,overrantheinitialenemystrongpointsandpositionsandenteredSolowjewkabysurprise. Pape’s men sustained few casualties—only three wounded. Theregiments of the Soviet 32nd Cavalry Division that were holding there werecompletely surprised by the power and aggressiveness of the German attack.Despite that, theystubbornlydefended in the impoverishedhutsandhousesofthe locality.Major Pape led from the front and rallied his men forward. TheSovietcavalrymenstartedtoscatterinalldirections.Theirdivisioncommanderwas among those takenprisoner.The attached tanks continued rolling forwardwiththeirlastfewlitersoffuelandwereabletochasetheremnantsofaSoviet

divisionoutofNikolskoje.ThethirtiethofJanuarywasmarkedbythecrowningachievementofallofthe

heavyfightingandprevioussacrifices.Thedivisionconcentrateditsforcesforaconcentricattackaimedatdefeating theenemyforces in theButyrki–Judinka–Stakanowo area. The main effort was with Kampfgruppe Pape, which wasdirected toadvanceonStakanowo.Thebattlegroupstaged for theattackwithhalfoftheII./Infanterie-Regiment246anditstanksinSolowjewkaandwiththemotorcycle infantry battalion and SS-Bataillon Zeitler in Rudino. OberstNeubauer intended to onlymove his battalions out in the direction ofButyrkiafterKampfgruppePapewassuccessful.HauptmannKersten’sbatteries,whichhadclosedup,openedtheattackwitha

short preparation on the enemy trenches. It was still dark across the snow-covered terrainwhen themenofKampfgruppePape roseoutof their trenchesandadvancedagainsttheRussianpositions.By0630hours,theyhadsucceededinenteringNowo-Danilowka;halfanhourlater,theattachedtankshadreachedMoskwinka.BothofthelocalitieswereinGermanhandsafterashortfight.Theenemylefthispositionsfairlyquickly.ThebattlegroupgainedmoregroundbythehourandreachedStakanowoby1100hourswiththetanksinthelead.KampfgruppeNeubauermovedoutat0800hoursandhadto“chew”itsway

into Butyrki meter-by-meter against extremely tough resistance. TheI./Infanterie-Regiment133 tookheavycasualties,before itwasable to take thevillage in hard house-to-house fighting. The III./Infanterie-Regiment 156,12which was employed on the right wing and supported by tanks from the 9.Panzer-Division, moved through Orljanka and quickly closed on Judinka,althoughthetankswerethenheldupbythebottomlandoftheKosorschaandtheinfantrycouldnolongerfollow.Atthatpoint,thefightingvehiclesofHauptmannMarkowskijoinedthefray.

They advanced from Stakanowo to the southeast in the direction of Judinka,rallying Kampfgruppe Neubauer in the process. The enemy took extremelyheavycasualties in thefightingandevacuated thebattlefield.ThebattalionsofOberstleutnantDr.MüllerandMajorFranknolongerneededtobecommitted;they remained to the rear to secure the area that had been taken. By theafternoon,thedivisionhadreacheditsattackobjectives.The weather that day was anything but nice. An icy wind from the east

broughtwith itmore snow,whichwas alreadymeters deep.Fuel, ammunitionand rations just did not make it forward. The men of the divisional signals

battalion had to master extraordinary difficulties, just to lay wire. The radiosectionswereboggeddownsomewhere.As a result, it was only possible to use tanks to reconnoiter as far as

Chochlowkathatafternoon.Theresultsdemonstrated,however,thattheenemywas beaten everywhere. The same results were obtained when thereconnaissancebattalionandKampfgruppeFrank sentoutpatrols.TheSovietswerepullingbackalongthenorthernflankofthedivision.TheArmedForcesDailyreportof31January1942announcedthefollowing:

“AcounterattackbyGerman infantry and tanks ledbyGeneralmajorBreith intheareanortheastofKurskhas led toacompletesuccessafterseveraldaysoffighting.Agroupofenemyforcesconsistingofseveral [infantry]divisionandarmored formations that had broken into the German lines was defeated,sufferingheavylosses,andthrownback.”MajorPape,whosebattlegroup formed themaineffortof thoseoperations,

received theKnight’sCross for theperformanceofhis forcesandhispersonalleadership.13Theentiredivisionwashonoredbyapersonal telegramfrom theSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForces,whichGeneralmajorBreithreceivedon that same day: “In grateful appreciation for your heroic leadership in thecourse of successful counterattacks against superior enemy forces, I amawarding you the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross as thesixty-ninthsoldieroftheGermanArmedForces.”Theweatherdidnotchangeof1February.Heavysnowstormshowledacross

the countryside that did not abate somewhat until the afternoon. Thecontinuation of the advance was scheduled for 3 February. The second ofFebruary had to be used for establishing supply lines of communication andbringinguptanksandothermotorizedsectionstoIsakowoandJudinkainordertohavesufficientforcesonhandforthenewattack.The operations started right at 0700 hours on 3 February. Oberstleutnant

Schmidt-Ottadvancedwithhis tanksandSS-BataillonZeitler fromIsakowotothe southeast and intoDolgajaValley.Onehour later,KampfgruppeNeubauermoved out from Judinka, advancing on Chochlowka. The advance gainedgroundrapidlyafter1000hours,whentheI./Infanterie-Regiment133reinforcedSchmidt-Ott’sforces.TheSovietsonlyputupminorresistanceandwerepullingback. After receipt of the aerial observation report of the withdrawal, thedivisionorderedNeubauertomovehisforcesbeyondtheoriginallydesignatedattack objective. By 1700 hours, all of the localities in Dolgaja Valley were

retaken.Intheend,asmallbattlegroupfromthe9.Panzer-Divisionalsojoinedtheoperation.The Russian front was losing its cohesiveness. The formations of the III

Guards Cavalry Corps that were employed—the 5th and 6th Guards CavalryDivisions, the 32nd Cavalry Division, and the 34th Rifle Brigade—were in astate of dissolution or were pulling back across the Tim. The enemy left sixtanks, eleven guns, ten antitank guns (including fiveGermanones), six heavymachine guns, fourteen trucks, and an untold quantity of horses, wagons andsledsonthebattlefield.Inaddition,130prisonersweretaken.The3.Panzer-DivisionexploitedtheimportantsuccessandassaultedUrynok

ontheTimon4FebruarywiththeinfantrybattalionsofOberstNeubauer.Thatmeant that thewinter position that hadbeendesignatedby the field armyhadbeen reached. The 2. Armee could set up its defenses there. In the area ofoperations around Kursk, the division suffered the following losses from 22Januaryto4February:3officersand34noncommissionedofficersandenlistedpersonnel killed; 4 officers and 165 noncommissioned officers and enlistedpersonnelwounded;2missingenlistedpersonnel;and156sickpersonnel.Thesuccessesallowed thedivision tobe relieved in its sectorover thenext

fewdaysbyinfantrydivisionsandbemovedtotherear.Thebattlegroupsandall of the separate elements of the division moved back into the area aroundKurskbythemiddleofFebruary,wherethedivisionreassembled.Not all elements of the 3. Panzer-Division were involved in the winter

fighting around Kursk. A number of elements remained in and around Orel.Alongwithalloftheotherelementspositionedaroundthecity,theyhadtoformabattalionon27 January,which reporteddirectly toOberstUsinger, the localarea commander. Hauptmann von Zamory, the company commander of the3./Schützen-Regiment3,wasentrustedwithcommandof thebattalion.Hewasassisted by the headquarters of the 1st Battalion of the rifle regiment; hisadjutantwasLeutnantHeise.Thebattalionconsistedofelementsfromthe tworifle regiments, thearmor regiment, thedivisionalartilleryandsupplysectionsofthe2.Armee.Employedindefensivefightingninetykilometersfarthernorthwasthesledbattalionofthearmorregiment.The battalion in Orel received orders on 30 January to establish combat

outposts twentykilometerswestof thecity thatwereorientedto thewest.Theenemyhaddramaticallyreinforcedhisforcesnorthwestofthecityoverthelastfew days, and the danger was manifest that he could advance towards Orel

acrosstheOrel–Karatschewrailline.ThebattalionmovedoutthenextdaywithitsthreecompaniesunderLeutnantSchulze(Schützen-Regiment394),LeutnantJacobs(Panzer-Regiment6),andOberleutnantKrallmann(Nachschub-Bataillon583).AnadvancepartyunderFeldwebelNawrathhadalreadybeendispatchedtolookforquarters.The battalion reached the area aroundNaryschkino,where it established its

outposts. The weather was very bad. High snowdrifts prevented any type ofrapidmarchmovements,withtheresultthatallofthevehiclesofthecompanieshad to remain behind in Naryschkino. It was almost impossible to send outpatrols or build bunkers.As a consequence of the snowstorms, elementswereconstantly getting lost. Resupply was conducted on the fly. It was not untilFebruarythattheweatherimproved.Thecompaniesstartedtoconstructbunkersand fieldpositionsandconductpatrols intoOrlikValley.Therewasnoenemycontact,so thebattalionwassummonedback toOrelon5FebruarybyOberstUsinger.Afewdayslater,SovietforcesbrokethroughatKirow,tothenorthofOrel. The commander of the rear area,Generalleutnant vonUnruh, formed abattle group which pushed the enemy back by 21 February. The 3. Panzer-DivisionparticipatedinthatoperationwithonecompanyunderthecommandofOberleutnant Heuke of the division headquarters. Although it suffered heavycasualties,ittook80prisoners.ThesecondhalfofFebruaryandthefirsttwoweeksofMarchwereusedby

thedivisiontograduallyreassembleitsforcesintheareaaroundKurskinordertoallowthemtorest,refitandreorganize.Thedivisionheadquarterswaslocatedin the city. A personnel replacement battalion of 1,000 men arrived on 12February. In addition to the assignment and training of the new personal andissuanceofmateriel,“normal”dutieswerealsoconducted.From9Februaryto12March1942,thedivisionreporteddirectlytotheArmy

High Command. Those few weeks of essential rest also saw changes in thepersonnel structure and commands of the division. Oberst Kleemann, thelongtime commander of the 3. Schützen-Brigade, was promoted toGeneralmajorandtookcommandofthe90.leichteDivision,whichwasfightinginNorthAfrica.OberstWesthovenfollowedhimincommand.Thatofficerwasclosely associated with the armor branch through his work in the ArmyPersonnelOfficeandhadbeenthecommanderofSchützen-Regiment1ofthe1.Panzer-Division, fighting around Leningrad, Kalinin and Moscow. OberstMunzel remained commander of the armored regiment and Oberstleutnant

Zimmermann continued to command Schützen-Regiment 3. Oberst AudörschgaveupcommandofSchützen-Regiment394 to be reassigned to theWeaponsDirectorateoftheArmyHighCommand.HewasreplacedbyOberstChalesdeBeaulieu.FromhisdutiesasthechiefofstaffoftheXVI.Armee-Korps(mot.)inFrance,hewaswellknowntothe3.Panzer-Division.Priortobeingreassignedto the division, he was the chief of staff of the 4. Panzer-Armee ofGeneralHoepner. Major i.G. Barth, the industrious division logistics officer, wastransferred at the end of February. Starting on 5 March, Hauptmann i.G.Dankworth from the Army High Command assumed duties as the divisionlogisticsofficer.

__________________1.TheoriginalpassageinGermaniswritteninthesubjunctive,soitisuncertainwhether this is literally what von Bock or they are being paraphrased fromanothersource.HemayhaveactuallywrittenPanzer-Korpsatthetime,sinceitwascommontorefertothemotorizedarmycorpsasarmoredcorps,eventhoughtheofficialdesignationwastheformerone.2.18.Panzer-Division.3.SchmidtislesswellknownamongtheGermanarmoredgenerals,eventhoughhiscontributionstothebranchwereenormous.LikeGuderian,hewasrelievedofcommandofthefieldarmy(1943),butnotbecauseofleadershipissues.Hisbrotherwascaughtupinantigovernmentintrigue,andSchmidt’scorrespondenceto him, which came to light when the brother was imprisoned, also cast theleadership of the regime in a very negative light.Hewas court-martialed andreleasedfrommilitaryservice,nevertoholdacommandpositionagain.Toaddinsulttoinjury,hewasarrestedbytheSovietsafterthewarintheSovietZoneand then condemned to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Like most of theGermanseniorofficersincarceratedbytheSoviets,hedidnotreturntoGermanyuntil 20 September 1955.A brokenman, he died inKrefeld in 1957 after anillness.4.AtraditionalChristmastreat,similartogingerbread.5.Aseparatemachine-gunbattalion,whichwaslaterassignedtothe78.Sturm-Division (February 1943), where it was reorganized and redesignated as

Granatwerfer-Bataillon5.6.Armoredhigh-explosiveround.7.Thiswaspartofthe88.Infanterie-Division,whichwasformedinDecember1939. It was employed in France and then temporarily inactivated. It wasreactivated in March 1941 and performed occupation duties in France whilebecomingoperationalagain.8.Thelattertwoformationsfromthe299.Infanterie-Division.9.BlockingFormationTürckheim.10.Thiswaspartofthe45.Infanterie-Division,whichwascomposedprimarilyofAustrians.11.Basedonadditional informationprovidedbelow, thiswasundoubtedly theIII./SS-Infanterie-Brigade 1 (mot.), which SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfons Zeitlercommandedduringthisperiod.12. This was one of the motorized infantry regiments of the 16. Infanterie-Division(mot.).13.Papewasofficiallypresentedwiththeawardon10February1942.Helaterwentontobecomethe301strecipientoftheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossof the IronCross (15September1943).Hepassedaway inhisnative townofDüsseldorfon21January1986.

OberstleutnantAudörschwithofficersofhisregimentoutsideTula.

Eventhetanksnolongermadethingshappen.Theenemyhasbecomestrongerandwinterhasarrived.

ThemainclearingstationofthedivisionwaslocatedintheTolstoyEstateinJassnaja-Poljana.

SupplyelementsofthedivisionontheroadbetweenBrjanskandOrel.Thesemenperformedinanexemplarymanner.Withoutthem,thefightingelementswouldhavehadtohavelaiddowntheirarms.

Firingpositionofa10-centimeterbatteryinBolochowka.

ThereservesofSchützen-Regiment394advancetowardthefrontaroundBolochowkaundertheleadershipofLeutnantSchickerling.

The“mountedsquadron”ofthe3.Panzer-DivisionbringsweaponsandammunitiontoTula.ThecommanderoftheprovisionalelementwasHauptmannHöpfner.

BetweenTulaandWanew.

EastofTula.

TheBattleofTulaisover—hopelesslyboggeddowninthesnowandice.Victor:Winter.

GeneralmajorBreith,whoassumedcommandofthedivisionduringthedifficulttimesoutsideTula.

Oberstleutnanti.G.Pomtow,thedivisionoperationsofficer.

APPENDIX1

RankTable

APPENDIX2

MajorCommandandDutyPositions,1935–42

APPENDIX3

WinnersoftheKnight’sCrosswhileAssignedtotheDivision

APPENDIX4

WinnersoftheKnight’sCrossAssignedtothe3.Panzer-DivisionatOneTime

APPENDIX5

RecipientsoftheGermanCrossinGold

APPENDIX6

InductionintheArmyHonorRoll

APPENDIX7

AccreditedSkirmishes,Engagements,andBattlesofthe3.Panzer-Division,1939–42

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