arches quarterly

Civility,Security andIslamism

A J O U R N A L O F T H E C O R D O B A F O U N D A T I O N

C U L T U R E S I N D I A L O U G E

Volume 1 • Edition 1 • Winter 2007 • ISSN 1756-7335

Table of CONTENTSForward by Anas Altikriti, Chief Executive 03

From the Editor – Abdullah Faliq 05

Politics, Poverty, and Rage: Misconceptions About Islamist Movements 06ANNE MARIE BAYLOUNY

INTERVIEW | Islamism & Terrorism 11PROF. ABU-RABI’ DISSECTS THE LINKS AND THE MYTHS

‘Civil’ Does Not Have To Be ‘Irreligious’: An Islamic Perspective 17DR JASSER AUD & DR. WANDA KRAUSE

Balancing Security Versus Liberty: The Wrong Scales or the Wrong Question? 21ANNE COSTELLO

Spotlight on Europe’s Muslims 26KRISTOFFER LARSSON

From Islam of Immigrants to Islam of Citizens 28KONRAD PEDZIWIATR

The Jama’ati-Ikhwani, Traditions in British-Based Islamic Organisations 35ROSA ÁLVAREZ FERNÁNDEZ

The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism 39ARUN KUNDNANI

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view of The Cordoba Foundation. © The Cordoba Foundation 2007

Anas Altikriti Chief ExecutiveAbdullah Faliq Managing Editor

Soyful Alam Associate EditorSyed Nuh Art Editor

THIS ISSUEVolume 1 • Edition 1

Winter 2007ISSN 1756-7335

The use and role of language isintriguing in either calming or inflamingfeelings of apprehension, division, fearand hatred between the conflictingparties.

In the 9-11 aftermath, people world-over were introduced to the term'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' under a newdefinition, albeit very hazy andinconsistent. Suddenly, the whole worldseemed to be engulfed by, involved inand engaged with the 'War on Terror' inone way or another. In fact parties onopposing sides of the same conflictwould each claim to be fightingterrorists and waging war againstterrorism.

This evolved to include terms such asradicalism, fundamentalism andextremism, despite the first two termscarrying definite positive connotations,the impact was to spread the net ofsuspicion and animosity much furtherand wider than was allowed by the termTerrorism.

Recently, and particularly following thefailed 7/7 terrorist attacks in London,the terms Islamism has become themust-use word in any discussion aboutIslam, Muslims and East-West relations.It seems that whilst the above labelscould have been used to describe both

Muslim and non-Muslim elements, suchas the BNP, Neo-Nazi or ultra-leftgroupings, there was no mistakingwhom were meant by 'Islamists'. It isintriguing as to what kind of intellectualprocess is used to churn out such labelsand terms, which only help in wideningthe gap, heightening suspicion andincreasing fear and hatred whilstleading to absolutely no resolution orclarity to the crisis involving absolutelyeveryone.

It is perfectly natural to disagree, oreven to vehemently disagree withanyone's views, ideas and politics,without deeming everyone we disagreewith as a potential threat.

We have in our midst a growingnumber so called experts, “formerMuslim extremists” and sadly politicianswho pursue an isolationist resolution.Their dogma is be like us, or we willdeem you a threat to our lives. Theirattitude is one that harks to empiricaltimes in which the white man sought tocivilize and educate the savages in farflung corners of the world for their owngood, as they knew not what was bestfor them. They fail to see, ordeliberately ignore, that while the Westperceives the East, and especially theMuslim East with great suspicion, theEast, battered and bruised aftercenturies of war, poverty, occupation,massacre, colonisation, slavery,hegemony, destruction, siphoning ofriches, alteration of cultures andtraditions, see the West with evengreater suspicion — with an addedingredient of realisation that it does notpossess the means to stand up to theWest's technological, military andeconomic advancement.

While the likes of Al-Qaeda, Abu

3VOLUME 1 • EDITION 1 A R C H E S Q U A R T E R L Y

FOREWORD

Labels of Division

4 A R C H E S Q U A R T E R L Y VOLUME 1 • EDITION 1

FOREWORD

Hamza, Omar Bakri and their like havedone immeasurable damage to theimage of Islam and to the minds ofmany Muslims, those who charge anyform of Islamic social or politicalreawakening as tantamount toextremism and terrorism do similardamage to the face of the West and tothe minds of many who live in fear andapprehension as a result of whatnonsense they are told and the drivelthey are fed.

As we point out the despicable aspectsof 'the other', we must never forgetthat we have our despicable andequally unpalatable features ourselves.If we do, we appear as supremists andarrogant and will be perceived asunworthy of being heard. In the currentcrisis that touches everyone, we can ill-afford to burn whatever bridges wehave remaining.

Anas AltikritiChief Executive – The Cordoba Foundation

FOUNDED IN 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF)is an independent Public Relations, Research andTraining unit, which promotes dialogue and the

culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by workingwith decision-making circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religiousissues in Britain and beyond.

Our activities include:

• Structured consultation and advisory services

• Face-to-face interaction with decision-makers andfigures of authority

• In-house research

• Workshops, seminars and debates on pertinent issues

• Training and capacity-building

• Periodicals and journals

• Resourceful website

www.thecordobafoundation.com

THE CORDOBAFOUNDATIONCultures in Dialogue


Whilst Arches was able to debate andraise issues involving prolific figures asaforementioned, we felt the need toprovide deeper and more nuancedanalysis of the issues anddevelopments in the arena of dialogue,civilisations, and a rapprochementbetween Islam and the West. ArchesQuarterly is committed to research thatgoes beyond media sound bites andsensationalised stories that increasinglydominate and shape our worldview.

In this edition, we explore the meaningand origins of Islamism as a globalphenomenon. A plethora of viewpointsand misinformation abound on theorigins of Islamism and its associationwith radicalising Muslims to the point oflinking it to terrorism. Discussing this,an array of international contributorshailing from different academic, media,legal and theological disciplinesprovide their take on the debate. Casestudies of Muslim communities inEurope, Britain and a focus onprominent British based Islamicorganisations in the United Kingdom,provide a good background to thedebate and the British Government’sresponse to the threat of terrorism, aswell as, how the introduction of variousanti-terror legislation impact ordinarypeople today.

We hope the Arches Quarterly willprovide a better appreciation of thesubject while taking the opportunity toprovide us with your views, analysis andobservations.

Best wishes,

Abdullah FaliqManaging Editor

Welcome to the first edition ofArches Quarterly, a journal ofThe Cordoba Foundation.

Arches Quarterly is a revamped journalpreviously published bi-monthly asArches, which successfully managed tohighlight the need for dialogue andmeasured discussions, betweencivilisations through a spectrum ofwriters.

Every Arches edition featureddistinguished world figures eitherthrough exclusive interviews, or featurearticles. These included Dr NormanKember, prominent peace activist takenhostage in Iraq in 2006; Dr MuradWilfried Hofmann, a German scholar,former German Ambassador to Algeria(1987) and Morocco (1990) respectively;Alastair Crooke, founder of theConflicts Forum and former securityadvisor to Javier Solana; RobertLambert, Head of the Muslim ContactUnit at the Counter TerrorismCommand (S015), Metropolitan Police,and Dr Anwar Ibrahim, former DeputyPrime Minister of Malaysia (1993-1998)and currently the advisor to thePeople’s Justice Party (Keadilan),Malaysia. Now, why the change fromArches to Arches Quarterly?

FROM THE Editor

EDITORIAL


Anne Marie Baylouny

In recent years violent movements in thename of Islam have been catapulted tocentre stage in U.S. foreign policy cir-

cles. Yet before concrete strategies can beformulated to deal with this phenomenon,the nature and dynamics of Islamist mobili-sation itself must be understood.1 Whatmotivates an individual to join an Islamistgroup and possibly engage in violent activi-ties? Under what conditions will thesegroups moderate their views, and when willthey radicalise? While our policy choicesdealing with the Muslim world and interna-tional terrorism inevitably hinge on ouranswers to these questions, a serious theoryhas been lacking.2

Lessons extracted from contentious studyare used to provide insight into complexpolitical allegiances in the Muslim worldwhich are further contributing prescriptivepolicy formulations to defuse Islamist move-ments’ violent path. Social movement theoryin particular demonstrates local politicalinclusion can stimulate moderation, stunt-ing militant Islamism progression in itsinfancy.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS ANDINADEQUACIESAnalysis of the roots of Islamism have typi-cally been based upon emotions, economicdesperation, or cultural rejection. By thisline of reasoning, poverty, hatred of Westernculture, or lack of hope spur group forma-tion that aim, either through the creation ofan Islamic state or isolation from the globalcommunity, to return the Muslim world to apast state of glory. Some link Islamism topoverty and deprivation while others includ-ing Islamists themselves, reiterate SamuelHuntington’s claim that the West is cultural-ly opposed to the rest of the world. Underthese theories, policies to decreaseIslamism’s appeal would centre on either

economic growth or cultural separation; therest of the world should work to eitherincrease living standards in Muslim nationsor relax their pace of integration into theinternational economy. Appealing as thoseobjectives may be to many, the data onIslamism, and on oppositional movementsin general, indicate that the equation of eco-nomic or cultural distress with Islamism ismisplaced, or at the very least incomplete.

Psychological and economic explanationssituate Islamism as the result of an explo-sion of pent-up grievances,3 the last resort ofa person “fed up” and gone crazy. Whilesuch a description makes intuitive sense, thetheory does not fit reality. Varying economiccircumstances across regions and time peri-ods do not match the occurrence of rebel-lions and protest movements, as manyscholars have shown.4 In fact, economicgrievances abound throughout history, butmovements based on them have been rare.When is a grievance bad enough to start amovement? And why do starving popula-tions often not rebel, while their well-offneighbours do? Iran’s Islamist revolutionoccurred in a context of economic plenty,and an analysis of Muslim countries demon-strates the lack of fit between this theory andthe actual history of Islamist actions.5

The social background of individual move-ment members further demonstrates the fal-lacy of such theories. Islamist activists areneither economically deprived nor culturallymonochrome. They are neither loners normarginalised individuals searching formeaning and belonging in modern society.Rather Islamists background is from themost technically advanced sectors of society,often students or graduates of sciences andsocial sciences. Islamist activists are wellrooted in their communities and have exten-sive personal networks, parallel to national-istic terrorists in other regions of the world.6

Politics, Poverty, andRage: MisconceptionsAbout Islamist Movements


POLITICS, POVERTY, AND RAGE: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

The 9/11 terrorists – along with suicidebombers in the Palestinian territories – are atestament to this profile.7 A survey ofHizbullah adherents found that despite itsrhetoric, the party was not in fact the repre-sentative of the lower class rather the bulk ofits support came from the middle and upperclasses.8

Focusing on religion or religiosity to identifyIslamists is similarly misguided. Religiousinvolvements in political Islam are notdirectly related since Islamists and their sup-porters are not more religious than non-Islamists. Similarly, the level of support forIslamist movements diverges sharply fromthe level of popular acceptance of their goals,particularly the establishment of an Islamicstate. In Lebanon, the overwhelming major-ity of Hizbullah adherents, along with mostShi’ites in general, prefer a Western politicalsystem (modelled on Switzerland or theUnited States), not a theocratic one.Discrepancies exist between the percentageof people who voted for Hizbullah and thosewho chose it as their favourite political partywith lower ratings for the latter, thus indicat-ing the practice of strategic voting instead ofwidespread belief in the movement itself.Hizbullah members are not significantlymore religious than the adherents of secularpolitical parties. In fact, a significant num-ber of the highly religious declared them-selves opposed to the establishment ofIslamic political parties.9 Surveys in the WestBank and Gaza found similar opinions.Overall, less than three percent ofPalestinians in the territories desired anIslamic state while almost 21% trustedHamas more than any other political fac-tions.10 The group subsequently won thePalestinian elections running on reform andanti-corruption mandate.

Culture and economy are only indirectlyrelated to Islamist mobilisation for violentand moderate groups alike.11 Grievancesalone do not create a movement as such; atmost they are but one element that organis-ers can exploit to aid in organising. Thisdirectly contradicts explanations ofIslamism based on economic opportunitiesis the fact that substantial resources and net-works are necessary for movements to

organise.12 Leaders generally have privilegedbackgrounds, thus the substance of themovement and its ability to mobilise mem-bers are more important than the broadstatements about motivations picked up bythe Western press. What does it take toattract an initial following and then organiseit into a network?

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY ANDISLAMIST RESPONSES TODEMOCRATIC CARROTS Adversarial political theories, of which socialmovement is the most prominent branch,are well situated to address these issues.13

Social movement theory has long addressedthe questions of terrorism and violent con-flict and through its lenses Islamism conun-drum – so baffling from other perspectives –becomes clear. Beyond the demonstrationsand letter-writing campaigns common todemocratic systems, contentious politicsspan a wide horizon from riots to revolu-tions to terrorism.14 Non-violent movementsmore typically recognised as social move-ments are included however these are rareunder authoritarian regimes.

In spite of the claims of movement adher-ents, the real motivating grievances ofIslamism are local issues like any othersocial movements including the anti-globali-sation campaign. The concerns that moti-vate Islamists centre in their towns,provinces, and local economies, however,Islamist movements differ considerablyfrom each other having been moulded by thestates they oppose, the resources at their dis-

Islamist movementsdiffer considerably fromeach other having beenmoulded by the statesthey oppose, theresources at theirdisposal, Islamistsnetworks, and localfactors.



posal, Islamists networks, and local factors.National movements have different goalsthan international activists, and ally onlywhen their goals coincide. Even within thesame state, movements can have radicallyopposed motivating agendas and in somecases, compete and attempt to defeat rivalIslamist movements15 as witnessed in partsof Iraq currently. Statements by group lead-ers and Islamist charters should be viewedin light of their actions in response to con-crete changes and often, the “rhetoric ofrebellion” does not equate to the actual griev-ance. Viewing entire movement practicesinstead of simply their statements reveals analternative logic.16 Consider Hamas’ politicalwin, inconsistent yet clear changes in partypolicy on Israel were voiced, including thepossibility of subjecting policy on Israel to apublic vote whose outcome the party agreedto follow. Internally, Hamas debated and dis-cussed its own positions on elections sub-jecting them to an internal referendum.17

Acknowledging Islamism as a form of oppo-sition politics means its trajectory is not ran-dom, rather governed by political considera-tions and strategic calculations. It can devel-op into different forms of protest and organ-isations, including civil society and socialwelfare associations, given appropriate andcredible incentives. The relevant influencesfor these movements are the array of politi-cal opportunities they face. The key ques-tions for policy makers are many and simplyput, what are the prevailing power relations?How does the group want these relations tochange and what paths to mainstream polit-ical inclusion are open or blocked? The thirdquestion includes splits among elites thatmovements can exploit, opportunities to par-take in elections, and the character of repres-sion by the state.

Exclusion or inclusion from the political sys-tem plays a powerful role in radicalisingmovements. While fears of “one person, onevote, one time” will remain, data indicateswhen given the opportunity to participate inpolitics at the price of moderation, move-ments will alter their very nature to respondto this stimulus. Hizbullah’s experiencedemonstrates this dynamic. The group mod-erated to enter general election by reframing

its central objective and foregoing its statedgoal of an Islamic state. Lebanon’s substan-tial Christian population makes this a spe-cial case to which Hizbullah must be sensi-tive in order to avoid renewed conflict.18 Theparty formed alliances with Christians andsupported Christian candidates in elections.The incentives Hizbullah responded todemonstrate the fundamental logic of themovement, notwithstanding any rhetoric tothe contrary. In parliament, Hizbullah repre-sentatives discussed not religion but eco-nomic development.19 Hizbullah’s politicalactions following the 2006 war with Israelfurther demonstrate the political logic ofIslamist movements. Riding on a wave ofmass support after the Israeli bombard-ment, Hizbullah utilised the democratictools of demonstrations and boycotts in afight to gain more power in government.Unsuccessful, the movement dropped itstone and offered a compromise.

Democratic theory has long held that main-stream political participation moderatespolitical parties. Movements are co-opted,choosing to work within the limits of the sys-tem. Not all will participate, howeverincreasingly Islamist political parties havechosen the electoral path. They hope forchange through the political process ratherthan risk a violent conflict. Furthermore,once leaders or political parties haveobtained a vested interest in the system, theywill exert pressure upon the more radicalwings of their movements not to jeopardisetheir established position. On the other handwhen the opposition party is illegal, noincentive to moderate exists.

To mobilise continuous support organisa-tions must provide public demonstrations ofthe movement’s endurance, a type of adver-tisement or communication with the con-stituency. Newsletters may work forGreenpeace, but an illegal movement mustemploy alternative means to advertise itsexistence.20 Front page news serves as adver-tisements for a movement’s effectiveness;international news reaches internationaladherents while local news suffices fordomestic movements. This is one way thatviolence as a tactic glues a movement togeth-er creating an identity and group solidarity.



Absent viable participation in the politicalrealm, violence also serves the movementfunction of communicating demands toauthorities.21 When groups are legal, demon-strations can perform this vital role.

Movements do not merely build upon pre-existing identities or reflect group feelingsalready in place. Social movements activelyfashion new identities mainly through fram-ing techniques. Framing is the formulationof ideological schemes akin to slogans thatsell the movement to a constituency. Framesmust resonate with the population by tap-ping into existing symbols while at the sametime transforming their cultural meanings.Problems are spun as unjust grievances forwhich clear blame can be assessed and asolution proposed by the movement.Familiar symbols are used in novel ways,much in the way that liberation theologyaltered Christianity by reframing poverty,once accepted as an act of God, now a socialissue of fundamental injustice.

Religion plays a key role in Islamist move-ments without focusing on doctrinalspecifics or religiosity of Islamists. The prac-tice of Islam within Islamist movements hasbeen shown to be malleable by adoptingaspects of left-wing politics and nationalismto deploying Leninist manoeuvres oftendeemed antithetical to the religious doctrineitself.22 Religious movements have distinctadvantages in authoritarian contexts giventhe solidarity frame provided by, particularlywhen other organisational elements are for-bidden.

State restriction on mobilisation not onlypushes religious movements to monopolisethe organisational field but religion also pro-vides symbols of justice extending beyondthe individual’s rational cost-benefit calcu-lus.23 In non-democratic environments, sym-bolic protest – the veil, the kaffiyeh, thecolours of the flag, or vague slogans such as“Islam is the solution” – dominates politicalcommunication. The necessary resourcesand networks to mobilise support – integralto social movement success – are also foundin religion’s institutional legacy and its char-itable activities. In most areas of the MiddleEast, Islamist movements have been pro-

moted by the state in previous decades as acounter to the left, a harvest whose fruit theregion is now reaping24 and currently,Islamist charities substitute for the state’sbankrupt social welfare institutions.

The democratic process itself may well becentral to removing the impetus for violenttactics in Islamist movements; however thisdemocracy must be considered fair, authen-tic, and legitimate within the states in ques-tion. The Arab world is rife with countrieswhose elections display a democratic facadewhile substantial violations pervade theprocess, escaping international criticism.Many countries use Islamism rhetoric todeny civil liberties and basic human rights,fuelling precisely the dynamic which drivestargeted organisations to use violent tacticsin their fight with the opposition. Any policyencouraging democracy must be uniform,neither barring participants from the demo-cratic process or cancelling electionsAlgerian-style.

CONCLUSIONIslamism is one of the most importantgeopolitical topics today, yet misconceptionsabout it flourish. We lose a great deal byignoring the knowledge generated throughyears of study in other parts of the world,data that could aid in correctly identifyingwhat Islamism is, what causes it, when itturns violent, and how best to meet our pol-icy aims regarding it. Movement pragma-tism provides an opportunity to craft target-ed policies. Disregarding Islamist move-ments to respond to democratic incentives istantamount to the tunnel vision that led tothe surprise at the fall of the Soviet Unionand the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Some individuals and groups may be beyondthe pale, immune to the blandishments ofdemocratic politics, however even these hardline groups originally grew out of local poli-tics which could have been defused or mod-erated at that level.

ENDNOTES

1.“Islamism” or political Islam is preferable to Islamicfundamentalism since fundamentalism was derived fromthe protestant Christian context which loosely fitted Islamicmovement.



2. Middle East and Islamic specialists are often found parochial interms of remaining uninfluenced by social sciences’ extensiveresearch into opposition politics and unwittingly operating withdiscredited theoretical frameworks. Theory-oriented scholars fortheir part generally steer clear of Islamism, perhaps out of a beliefin the area’s presumed cultural exceptionalism, or its admittedlycomplicated details.

3. This is the relative deprivation thesis of rebellion, pioneered byTed Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1970).

4. See Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression andResistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003);Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements andContentious Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998); Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain,1758-1834 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); andCharles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

5. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.

6. See Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism:A Comparison of Structures,” 237-57, and Donatella Della Porta.“Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground PoliticalOrganizations,” 3-28, both in Social Movements and Violence:Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella DellaPorta (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1992).

7. On the latter, see Lori Allen, “There Are Many Reasons Why:Suicide Bombers and Martyrs in Palestine,” Middle East Report,no. 223 (Summer 2002): 34-37.

8. Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Sourcesand Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizbullah,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 55.

9. A significant percentage of the highly religious were found to bemost distrustful of religious political parties. Harik, “Between Islamand the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support forLebanon's Hizbullah,” 41-67. Confirming these findings, seeHamzeh’s data cited in Augustus Richard Norton, “ReligiousResurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon,” inReligious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World, ed.Emile Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),229-41.

10. Interestingly, support for an Islamic state in the West Bank washigher than in the Gaza strip, the home territory of Hamas.Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Public Opinion PollNo. 42: On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics Including theCurrent Intifada - September 2001,www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2001/no42/htm.

11. The prevailing typology to date distinguishes between radical(that is, violent or extremist) and moderate movements. Thiscategorisation can be based either on the tactics the movementchooses, or more commonly, their stated end goals in relation tothe political system. The moderates work within the system, oftenconcentrating on social welfare or civil society organizations.

12. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilizationand Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal ofSociology 82, no. 6 (May 1977): 1212-41.

13. For social movement theory, see Doug McAdam, SidneyTarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2001); and by the same authors, “ToMap Contentious Politics,” Mobilization 1, no. 1 (1996): 17-34.

14. Following Tarrow, contentious politics can be defined ascollective activity on the part of claimants, which uses extra-institutional channels to communicate their demands. Demandsand activities to achieve them exist in relation to the prevailingpolitical system, members of the elite, or the opposition. Socialmovements are oppositional challenges, which are sustainedcontinuously beyond the distinct moment of protest. SidneyTarrow, “Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics,”American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 874-83.

15. Prominent examples are the various movements in Egypt.Mamoun Fandy, “Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?”Middle East Journal 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 607-25; Ziad Munson,“Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2001):487-510; David Zeidan, “Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison ofTwo Groups,” in Revolutionaries and Reformers: ContemporaryIslamist Movements in the Middle East, ed. Barry Rubin (Albany:State University of New York Press, 2003), 11-22.

16. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1978), 234.

17. See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, “Participation withoutPresence: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the Politics ofNegotiated Coexistence,” Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 3 (July2002): 1-26; and Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of SuicideTerrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August2003): 343-61.

18. See Nizar A. Hamzeh, “Lebanon's Hizbullah: From IslamicRevolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third WorldQuarterly 14, no. 2 (1993): 321-37; Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah,“Interview: Islamic Unity and Political Change,” Journal of PalestineStudies 25, no. 1 (Autumn 1995): 61-75.

19. el-Bizri, D. (1999). Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais: Lesinterventions à l'Assemblée des élus de la Jama'a Islamiyya et duHizb Allah (1992-1996). Beirut, CERMOC.

20. Social movements make collective demands and undertakemobilizing or public activities, which unify the constituency. CharlesTilly, “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” inHow Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdamand Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999),253-70.

21. Violence may be unrelated to the movement’s actual goals, butserve instead to create organizational cohesion. Martha Crenshaw,“Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and OrganizationalApproaches,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C.Rapoport (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), 13-31.

22. Henry Munson, “Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of ForeignDomination,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 40-53;As’ad AbuKhalil. “Ideology and Practice of Hizbullah in Lebanon:Islamicization of Leninist Organizational Principles,” Middle EasternStudies 27, no. 3 (July 1991): 390-403.

23. Ron Aminzade and Elizabeth J. Perry, “The Sacred, Religious,and Secular in Contentious Politics: Blurring Boundaries,” inSilence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, ed. RonaldR. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry,Jr. Sewell, William H., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2001), 155-78.

24. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, “On the Modernity, HistoricalSpecificity, and International Context of Political Islam,” in PoliticalIslam: Essays from Middle East Report, ed. Joel Beinin and JoeStork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3-25.

* Anne Marie Baylouny is Assistant Professor in the department of National Security Affairsat the Naval Postgraduate School, USA. The views expressed are her own, not that of the U.S.government or any other institutional affiliation.


INTERVIEW WITH ABU-RABI’

REFORMING ISLAMArches Quarterly: The German “Shari’areformer” Bassam Tibi, recently arguedin an interview on Spiegel Online, thatMuslims have to (1) “bid farewell to theidea of converting others”, (2)“renounce Jihad” and (3) “give up…theShariah” if they want to becomeEuropeans. With current political trend,how credible is Tibi amongst Westernpolicy-makers and do you see a societywhen Muslims would actually renouncethese as Tibi would like? Ibrahim Abu-Rabi’: To my mind the mostactive missionaries in the world today arenot Muslims but Christian Churches and itis easy to prove that statistically. There areplenty of Christian missionary organisationsaround the world and in the West that arewell-funded, highly organised and staffed byyoung and educated people. Muslims are notnear that at all. Therefore, if Christian mis-sionaries and Europeans can co-exist I donot see how Muslims cannot be Muslimsand Europeans. As for renouncing jihad it is

clear that the meaning of jihad is not con-fined to politics in the sense that, every reli-gion has its own meaning of jihad whichstrives to achieve the common good. I do notthink Tibi is advising Muslims to renouncethe common good.

AQ: What about dropping the Shari’a?IAR: As for giving up the Shari’a, how is itpossible to do that? One of the fundamentalmeanings of Shari’a is to promote humanwelfare and interest.

AQ: What does it mean to be“progressive Muslims” and “reforming”the Shari’a? I'm thinking of the likes ofIrshad Manji and Mohammed Arkoun.IAR: I do agree that as Muslims we need todebate the principles of Islam in light of anumber of issues, such as modernity andglobalisation. These issues have to be debat-ed openly and honestly with opposing yetcontemporary Islamic thoughts. I thinkIslam in its nature is progressive and thoseMuslims who adhere to its progressiveessence can be called progressive as well.

Islamism and Terrorism:Professor Abu-Rabi’Dissects the Links and the Myths

Ibrahim Abu-Rabi' is professor of Islamic Studies, Co-Director of the Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam andChristian-Muslim Relations at Hartford Seminary and co-editor of The Muslim World. His expertise include interfaithdialogue between the Islamic and Christian religious tradi-tions and contemporary Islamic thought, particularly on reli-gion and society. He has authored, translated and edited aplethora of books including Intellectual Origins of IslamicResurgence in the Modern Arab World.

INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR IBRAHIM ABU-RABI’



AQ: Is reformation of Islam theirultimate aim? Ayaan Hirsi Ali, believesthat the only way of reforming Islam “isto rid the Qur’an of its absoluteness”.Ali Sina from Faith FreedomInternational argues “Islam can’t bereformed. It must be eradicated”.

IAR: How can you eradicate a religion thathas one a half billion followers? I think it isimportant to have a dynamic dialogue on thefundamentals of Islam in light of the mod-ern age. This is not a new call. There havebeen plenty of Muslim reformers in themodern age. We got to mention just a few ofthem: Afghani, Abduh, Iqbal, and Nursi justto mention few.

AQ: How do Ayaan Hirsi and IrshadManji compare with Afghnai, Abduh andothers you mentioned? IAR: I do not think that both Ayaan Hirsi Aliand Ali Sina have any impact on contempo-rary Islam. They tell the West what it likes tohear and they make a good living that way.

AQ: We are witnessing the emergenceof numerous organisations that activelyencourage Muslims to leave Islam (e.g.Ex-Muslims Forum, Faith FreedomInternational, Apostates of Islam, andthe Council of Ex-Muslims) Should Islamslow down in an effort to stop these badapples? IAR: Those who leave Islam are a tinyminority. Islam is not a sect but a universalreligion. Those organisations are wastingtheir time. Islam is a progressive religion innature since it encourages the believers to beengaged in all aspects of society.

AQ: What about the temptation toargue that being Sufi is being the broadminded Muslim as Salafi is prone tointolerance and prejudice; meanwhileengaging with socio-political IslamicMovements like the Ikhwan makes one aclear terrorist bent on overthrowingsecular governments with Shari’a law. IAR: Both spirituality and through socio-political activism have been at the heart ofIslam from the beginning. Islam has alwaysendeavoured to improve both individual andsocial life, therefore, Islamic activism in theshape of Ikhwan or Jama’at-e-Islami hasalways been there.

AQ: Recent estimates show around 6million Muslims have left Islam inAfrican, 2 million ethnic Muslimsconverted to Christianity in Russia;50,000 Muslim teenagers apostosised inMalaysia; 10,000 French Muslimsconverted to Christianity; 35,000 MuslimTurks converted to Christianity last year;and closer to home some 200,000 BritishMuslims left Islam as reported inTimesOnline in February 5, 2005. Whatshould the Muslim reaction be: inactionor enact apostate punushment? IAR: I really doubt these numbers. How doyou verify these figures in the first place?

AQ: Well, Shaykh Ahmed Katani in aninterview on Aljazeera with late MaherAbdullah claimed the 6 million figureleaving Islam in Africa, and theTimesOnline reported 200.000 BritishMuslims. Statistics aside, are youdisputing that large numbers of Muslimsare not apostatising today? IAR: Yes, I am disputing these figures. Ifthis were the case then we would have atleast 20,000 leaving Islam in the USA. Noone has heard of that.

AQ: Can we read contemporary acts ofterrorism in a colonial frame? IAR: It depends how you define terrorism. Itis a mistake to assume that terrorism andIslam are synonymous. How about state ter-rorism as in the example of the US in Iraq orIsrael in the Occupied Territories? By-and-large those who have resorted to violence in

Those who leave Islamare a tiny minority. Islam is not a sect but a universal religion. Those organisations are wasting their time.



the Muslim world have been in the minority,a very tiny minority. We do not hear aboutMuslim states resorting to terrorism as inthe case of the US and Israel.

AQ: What are the theologicalfoundations of the disagreementsbetween Saudi scholars like late Nasir al-Din Al-Baani and Bin Baaz with theIkhwan over martyr operations inPalestine and other occupied territories? IAR: I believe most Salafis in Saudi Arabia,for example, are not militant but support thestatus quo in the country because of politicalrigidity and the absence of real democracy. Afew salafis have resorted to violence againstthe ruling elite and their international sup-porters such as the US. I do not think thereare theological disagreements on the matterof suicide operation as much as political dis-agreements.

AQ: Is their view against resistingoccupation of Muslim land purely ontheological grounds or is it politicalexpediency? IAR: The Islamic literature on resistingoccupation and oppression is quiteimmense and it needs to be revived.

AQ: What was the Muslim response tooppressive regimes in the past? IAR: A good number of the ‘ulama resistedoppression; some did not. I think we have torevive that part of Islamic history. You willfind in modern history a large number ofthe ‘ulama have opposed colonialism andoccupation. Consider for example, most ofthe Algerian and Moroccan ‘ulama since the19th century. In the case of Algeria we havethe 19th century ‘Alim [scholar] Abdel Qadiral-Jazairi and in the case of Morocco wehave the 20th century Abdel Kareem al-Khattabi, the famous leader of the Rif [coun-tryside] revolt against the French in the1930s and 40s.

AQ: What is the historical basis of al-Wala’ Wa’l Bara’ (allying oneself to theMuslims and keeping clear from theUnbelievers)? IAR: This is an interesting question. I thinkMuslims cannot cut themselves off from

their milieu especially if they live in theWest. One must revisit this theological con-cept while having the interest of the Muslimcommunity in the West in mind, especiallyin its daily dealings with its environment.The concept of al-Wala’ wa’l Bara’ becamefamous in the wake of the publication ofAyman Zawahiri’s book, al-Wala’ wa’l Bara’:‘Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud, in the1980s [see the book on www.metranspar-ent.com], in which he agues that enmity tothe unbelievers is one of the pillars of Islamand that it is impossible to dialogue with theunbelievers or their local supporters in theMuslim world, such as the ruling elite in thecontemporary Muslim world.

AQ: Is this the mainstream Muslim view? IAR: I believe this is an extremist perspec-tive and it is not shared by most Muslims.

SECULARISM AND ISLAM AQ: The American Khalid Abul Fadl,describes secularism as a “utilitarianexperience” that supports a diversepopulation but not the denial of religion.How do Islamists who believe in acomplete way of life but opposesecularism, justify participation in thepolitical life of a secular state? IAR: Secularism has been a contentiousissue in contemporary Muslim thought. It isa fact that many Muslims live in a secularenvironment. I believe that secularism, if itrespects religion, can co-exist with religion.However if secularism is not tolerant of reli-gion such as in Turkey, then it would beharmful.

AQ: And if Muslims desire to live byShari’a law? IAR: If Muslims through democratic meanschoose to live in an Islamic society, then thatfreedom should be given to them.

The Muslim world mustunite somewhat in orderto stand its ground andremain independent



AQ: Author of “Clash and Dialogue”,Muqtader Khan, criticises the West fornot being able to sustain a position ofpluralism in the sense of an ideologyrather than a descriptor. The relationshipbetween Islam and the West are basedon “relations of power” rather thangenuine dialogue. Have we learned fromeach other mostly under conditions ofdomination?IAR: I agree that the relationship betweenthe West and the Muslim world [and thethird world for the matter] is that of power. Ithink it is important to establish strongstates in the Muslim world that can standtheir ground in the new world system. Andultimately the Muslim world must unitesomewhat in order to stand its ground andremain independent.

AQ: Do you think multiculturalism isfailing in the West? IAR: Multiculturalism is a big issue in theWest. I think if it is applied correctly minori-ties in the west can keep their identity whilereaching out to the larger society.

AQ: But multiculturalism breadsghettoism? IAR: There is usually some tension betweenassimilation and preserving one’s identity.From my perspective, it is important to total-ly engage with society, British or American,while keeping your religious identity.

AQ: In your opinion, which Westerncountry best provides a model forculture and civilisation? IAR: Canada is such a country because it isserious about helping immigrants integratewhile giving them the opportunity to pre-serve their religious identity.

RESURGENT ISLAMAQ: What should the aims of resurgentIslam be in the West today?IAR: It is clear that even the most educatedpeople in the West do not know enoughabout Islam and the Muslim world. Muslimactivists should enlighten westerners aboutthat and furthermore, the process of globali-sation has not been positive for the Muslimmasses. It is important for the Muslim worldto be independent at all levels and to be treat-ed equally by the West. I think activistshould convene conferences and meetingsto promote better understanding of theMuslim World in the West.

AQ: Is Islamic revival a phase which willin time fade as has transpired with Arabnationalism? IAR: I do not think so. I do not think that thecurrent neo-con attack on Islamism in theguise of terrorism will diminish the power ofIslamic revival in the world today.

AQ: To what do you attribute the spreadof Islamic resurgence today? Is this ourEnlightenment in reaction to modernity? IAR: This is only one part. I think the mainpart of the Islamism fight is for social jus-tice, political independence and intellectualhonesty.

AQ: Syed Qutb enjoys a prominentplace in your writings whose work youdescribe as representing “a turningpoint in contemporary Islamicresurgence”. Why Qutb?IAR: Qutb is very important but not the onlyone. He was able to formulate some majortheories in a very difficult phase of Islamismin the Arab world. There are many who havereformulated his ideas in a new light.

AQ: Such as? IAR: Well, I have in mind the great array ofcontemporary Islamist thinkers such asHassan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannoushi,Sayyid Hussein Fadllallah and Munir Shafiq.

AQ: We have pockets of militants whoare quick to resort to violence in theirquest to unseat existing governments.How do you deal with this Islamistmanifestation?

Islamism or Islamicresurgence refers toattempts by contemporaryMuslims to be faithful totheir religious traditionand the requirements ofmodern life.



IAR: By and large Islamic resurgence hasopted to follow the political process; howev-er, it has been blocked by the political elite inpower. Those who say that the political pathis not useful have become tired of the politi-cal elite and they seek to remove them byforce. If mainstream Islamism is notallowed to work peacefully, the ranks of thesecond trend will swell.

AQ: Recent experiments with Islamicgovernments in Iran, Sudan, Palestine, andto a lesser degree Turkey, have brought tofore questions whether Islamists wouldtolerate diversity once in power. IAR: I think that Islamists in power is some-what of a recent phenomenon. It needsmore time to mature. The example of Turkeyis very interesting and with honesty andhard work, the ones in power have been ableto ameliorate lot of Turkish people.

AQ: How should the Western world viewthe Muslim world's aspirations forpolitical administration (a caliphate), self-determination and politicalindependence?IAR: I think the Muslim world should eman-cipate itself from any political slavery andchoose its own rulers. Real democracy is theonly way to go. If Muslims desire to unite inthe future then one should respect thischoice.

AQ: How do you explain the accusationagainst the founders of the Islamicmovements, like al-Ikhwan and Jama’at-e-Islami, as not being rooted in“traditional” Islamic scholarship ratherthey promote an erroneous brand ofextremist Islam?IAR: This is a faulty accusation. I think thefounders are well-versed in traditionalIslamic learning.

AQ: How?IAR: They have sought to promote the teach-ings of the Qur’an and elaborated on theneed to have dynamic Islamic fiqh orjurisprudence that meets the conditions ofthe present time.

AQ: Islamic movements have failed toattract the hearts of social elites to their

revolutionary call. Is it the message orthe messenger at fault?IAR: Islamic movements have been underthreat in most Muslim countries; neverthe-less, they have been able to attract a goodnumber of educated people to their leader-ship positions.

AQ: Like where?IAR: This is true in Egypt, Sudan, Jordanand Palestine.

AQ: Should the Islamic movement firstconcentrate on liberating Makkah, asopposed to Palestine? IAR: I think that Muslims wherever they areshould focus on achieving political and eco-nomic independence. It does not to begin inone place only.

AQ: Makkah is the focal point ofMuslims world-wide, any change herewill have a domino effect worldwide. IAR: I think what is more important thanliberating Makkah is getting rid of every dic-tatorship in the Arab and Muslim worlds,including the one in Saudi Arabia.

AQ: Islamic traditions vehementlyopposes monarchical rule, how is thenpossible that the Saudi regime enjoystacit support from some Islamists withinthe Kingdom?IAR: I do not know what you mean byIslamists here. If you mean Wahhabismthen this has been the case since the 18thcentury. It is very hard to break this alliancebetween Wahhabism and the Saudi familysince it has been there for a long time.

AQ: What about the role of the Saudi‘ulama (scholars)?IAR: Some Wahhabi ‘ulama have been criti-cal of the state for some time now and Ithink that the Saudi political elite cannotkeep the lid on criticism in the country for along time to come.

Qutb wanted to changehis society from the insideand not from the margins.



ISLAMISM AND RADICALISMAQ: What is your definition of Islamism?Some Muslims dislike the term as itprojects itself as another ‘ism’.IAR: One can use all sorts of terms. To meIslamism or Islamic resurgence refers toattempts by contemporary Muslims to befaithful to their religious tradition and therequirements of modern life. Scholars haveused a variety of terms to refer to this phe-nomenon. Islamism is such a term.

AQ: How did Qutb’s concept of themodern Jahiliyah came to be construedas being anti-Western and encourageradicalism? IAR: This concept was constructed in oppo-sition to Nasserist Arab nationalism, initial-ly. Qutb and the Ikhwan leadership of the1950s opted to create an Islamic state, whichwas not possible because of Nasserism andArab nationalism. There has been somedebate about this term and what Qutb exact-ly meant.

AQ: Did Qutb regard all Egyptians asliving under Jahiliyah?IAR: I do not think Qutb meant all Muslimsof Egypt were living in Jahiliyah. He mighthave meant that Muslims needed to radical-ly change those institutions that did notspread Islamic ideas.

AQ: If Qutb were alive today, would heapprove the actions of Bin Laden and hisilk? IAR: Qutb was concerned about true eco-nomic and social independence of his coun-try and the Muslim world. He abhorred allsorts of oppression, including Western.

AQ: So, what are you exactly saying? IAR: I do not think he would have supportedsomeone like bin Laden since Qutb wantedto change his society from the inside and notfrom the margins.

AQ: Sufism constituted an importantpart of Imam Hassan al-Banna’s earlylife. How did Qutb view Sufism, and howdo you explain the current opposition toSufism by the Islamic movement ingeneral? IAR: Qutb was a man of letters initially. I donot think he was as Sufi oriented as al-Banna. Islamic movements desire a funda-mental change in the current status quowhich is not always the desire of Sufism.

AQ: Al-Banna believed Egypt’s Copticcommunity was an indigenouscommunity, not compromised withWestern Christian imperialism. How didlater Islamist thinkers deal with thereality of Eastern Christianity?IAR: There is a lot of literature on that espe-cially in Egypt. To most Islamists, Copts arecitizens in addition to being members of areligious community that is protected underthe rules of Islam.

AQ: What motivates former Jihadis likeMuntasser al-Zayyat (formerly with Takfirwal-Hijra) and other ex-radicals tobecome moderates? IAR: There are lot of factors. One of whichare the tragic attacks on the US and theirimpact on the current Islamic movement.This is what al-Zayyat mentions in his excel-lent work or “Ayman al-Zawahir as I haveKnown Him”.

AQ: What is your assessment of theBritish and American Muslims psyche inthe past few years and specifically post9/11?IAR: There is no doubt that Muslims havebeen under pressure since 9/11. I think thatinstead of accusing Western Muslims, onemust engage them in a larger Muslim-Western dialogue.


‘Civil’ does not haveto be ‘Irreligious’: An Islamic Perspective

Dr Jasser ‘Auda & Dr. Wanda Krause

Muslims do contribute to the develop-ment of the vibrant civil society inEurope and the West in general.

However, there are fundamental problemsin the very definition of ‘civility’ that is usedby a number of scholars and the media,which aim to exclude anything ‘Islamic’from the concept of ‘civility.’ As such, we willpresent four fundamental flaws in populardefinitions of civility, namely, the ‘secular’condition, essentialist concepts, the ‘ideolo-gy’ objection, and the biased ideal. Further,this paper proposes that approaching theconcept of ‘civility’ through core values, suchas tolerance, participation, and empower-ment, rather than specific culturally basedorganisations and structures, offers a fairerand more universal definition that avoids theabove problems.

BASIC DEFINITIONEdward Shils provides a basic working defi-nition for civil society. The idea of civil soci-ety is the idea of a part of society which hasa life of its own, which is distinctly differentfrom the State, and which is largely in auton-omy from it. Civil society lies beyond theboundaries of the family and clan andbeyond the locality; it lies short of the state.25

Building on this basic framework, civil soci-ety is the realm loosely located between thefamily and the State in which individualsparticipate through structures of independ-ent voluntary associations, networks, or sim-ply, 'discursive space.'

THE ‘SECULAR’ CONDITIONCivil society is often utilised as a normativetool which it is claimed, must embrace ‘sec-ular politics.’ Thus, the behaviours, normsand practices that are perceived to runagainst secular (or liberal) politics are seenby some as incongruous with the project ofcivil society and the concept of ‘civility’ itself.

While we assert that some groups that are atwar with civility should be clearly excludedfrom a civil society definition, religiousgroups, in general, and other forms oforganisation that are simply different fromthe dominant Eurocentric worldview ofmodernity and progress, must not be exclud-ed. As Marlies Glasius argues

“…[C]ivil society is not the exclusive domainof ‘progressive’ human rights, environmen-tal, social justice and women’s rightsactivists, it is a space co-inhabited by conser-vatives, anti-abortionists, and religious fun-damentalists.”26

Such groups from all religions and systemsof faith are equally relevant to the sphere inwhich dominant discourses are challengedand competing views are put forward.

ESSENTIALIST CONCEPTSMany theoretical concepts of civil societyand civility focus on an essentialism that isexplained by culture and religion. The argu-ments seem to have originated from the old‘orientalist’ approach, which has now beenwidely criticised for its erroneous assump-tions, especially concerning the Islamic cul-ture and religion. Essentialists argue that‘Islam’ itself is an absolute impediment tothe development of civic values and institu-tions.27 Kamrava, for example, states that“Islam…in its current militant form poses animmovable obstacle to social and cultural

The idea of civil society is the idea of a part ofsociety which has a life ofits own, which is distinctlydifferent from the State,and which is largely inautonomy from it.


‘CIVIL’ DOES NOT HAVE TO BE ‘IRRELIGIOUS’: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

democratisation.”28 This view is by and largesimilar to other views expressed by ElieKedourie, Bernard Lewis, Albert Hourani,and Samuel Huntington.

Nevertheless, Janine Clark, Nilüfer Göle,Amani Kandil, and others, prove throughfield work and sound analysis that Islamicorganisations have an important function incivil society. Clark shows that a danger inanalyses has been the blurring between theminority of violent Islamist groups and themajority of non-violent Islamist groups andmovements.29 Göle, in fact, in her study onTurkey, speaks of the creation of anautonomous sphere in society due to Islamicvalues and the Islamicisation of politics.30

Looking specifically at Arab women, Kandilrecognises that religions play a key role as amotivating factor for their voluntary initia-tives since it encourages them to volunteertime and give charity, thus enables them toassume a profound role in civil society.31 Onthe other hand, the Tunisian Muslim scholarand thinker, Shaykh Rachid Ghannouchicautions that the civil society concept, asdeveloped in the West, has been situated asoppositional to a religious society. In hisview the roots of this conflict come fromFrench cultural history, which witnessed aviolent conflict between the church and theFrench revolution. The result of this conflictwas the idea that religion and ‘civility’ cannotbe one and the same thing. When scholarsapply the idea of civil society to Islamicforms of organising, they fail to consider the

connotations associated with the term.Ghannouchi asserts that Islam is ‘naturallystrengthening to civility.’32

THE ‘IDEOLOGY’ OBJECTION Another fundamental flaw in the assertionthat Islamic forms of activism fall short of‘civility’ is that its supporting research hasbeen directed to certain Islamist ‘ideological’groups only. In addition to the arbitraryusage of the term ‘ideology,’ the conclusionsof scholars who focus on some forms ofIslamist politics cannot be applied squarelyto the much wider circle of Islamic activism.The blurring of distinctions here is very dan-gerous because ‘Islamism’ is often usedinterchangeably with ‘terrorism,’ especiallyin the media. Thus, Muslim contribution toWestern civil society become mistakenlylabelled as some form of activism that issimilar to, for example, the Ku Klux Klan,the Mafia, or other terrorist organisations.These organisations cannot contribute to thestrengthening of civility since they demon-strate intolerance and violence.33 However,excluding Islamic forms of organisationmerely because their missions and agendaare guided by ‘ideology,’ means ignoring thefact that as well as possibly contributing tocivility, they can be the most effective meansfor responding to the needs of citizens.34

A BIASED YARDSTICKAnd yet another problem found within civilsociety works is the yardstick which hasalways been Western civilisation in its whiteChristian imagery, particularly the UnitedStates. When scholars of civil society applythe concept to communities of predominant-ly ‘other’ regions and religions, the result isthat the activisms of these communitiesnever live up to the idealised ‘Western’ con-text. Robert Hefner explains that scholarswho follow a “culturalist” line of analysisbase their conclusions on the belief thatwhat he terms a “civil democracy” rests upona constellation of values and institutionsunique to the West. Thus, when compar-isons of ‘civility’ are made between theassumed ‘white Christian West’ and othercommunities, a hierarchy still remains. Assuch, when institutions of ‘other’ origins aremeasured for “civility”, they are left withoutworth.35 Chris Hann is right to point that it is

When scholars of civilsociety apply the conceptto communities ofpredominantly ‘other’regions and religions, theresult is that the activismsof these communitiesnever live up to theidealised ‘Western’context.



the responsibility of all human communitiesto seek and create a version of civil society,and that the “burden of scholarship” is toinvestigate these different versions.36

Nonetheless, in order to compare these ver-sions scholars must then shift the debatesabout civil society away from formal struc-tures and organisations and towards aninvestigation of beliefs, values and everydaypractices. This is the essence of ourapproach in the following few paragraphs, inwhich we suggest direct relationshipsbetween civil values and Islamic values.

'CIVILITY' AS AN ISLAMIC VALUEBuilding on the above, the relationshipbetween essential components of 'civility'and some core maqasid (objectives, goals,ends, principles, and intents) of the Islamiclaw will now be outlined. This will allow forthe opening-up of these topics for investiga-tion and research, rather than to provide adetailed analysis. The values considered asessential components of civility are (a) toler-ance, (b) cooperation, (c) volunteerism, and(d) empowerment.

(a) Tolerance is about respecting the beliefsor practices of others, which as JillianSchwedler asserts, is 'paramount' for civili-ty.37 Toleration of another person’s beliefsand practices does not mean that one mustlike them, accept them for oneself, or evenbelieve that they are correct. On the contraryone must accept the condition of a co-exis-tence with people of diverse beliefs, tradi-tions and practices, with the appreciationthat others have the same right as oneself topersonal beliefs and ways of behaving. Thisunderstanding of tolerance, in the Islamicsources, is embodied in the obligation ofsamahah (magnanimity) of Muslims.Magnanimity is one of the main maqasid ofthe Islamic law. There are numerous evi-dences for the place that magnanimity hasin Islam itself as a religion. An authenticnarration reports that the ProphetMuhammad had said: 'I was sent to peoplewith a magnanimous religion.'

Participation is an indicator of how vibrant acivil society is. It means some active involve-ment on part of a group of volunteers, betheir activism religious based or otherwise.

Participation is said to occur when peopleorganise around specific interests, partici-pate, negotiate and collaborate to reach par-ticular ends. As such, one could make aquantitative assessment with an inquiry interms of volunteerism levels, growth innumbers of participants, activities/pro-grammes and size of the structures thataccommodate larger numbers of people. Inthe Islamic sources, the idea of participationis embodied in two principles, namely, coop-eration (ta’awun) and volunteerism(tatawwu’).

(b) 'Cooperation in the way of good' is a traitoften praised by the Qur’an and in theProphetic Tradition. God says (5:2):

Cooperate in matters of righteousness andpiety; do not cooperate in matters that aresinful and evil.

(c) Volunteerism is also a core Islamic valuein which a Muslim volunteer seeks a veryhigh reward from God alone, and hence ishighly motivated for the service of society.The Qur’an mentioned this concept innumerous ways in hundreds of verses. Forexample (Hud, 51):

[Hud said:] O my people! No reward do I askof you for this [message]: my reward restswith none but Him. Also, (Al-Layl, 19-21):[They are doing good] not for payment to bereceived, but only out of a longing for thecountenance of his Sustainer, the All-Highest.

(d) Although the empowerment process hastraditionally been left out of the analysis ofsocial movements and associationalactivism. Empowerment is a crucial compo-nent to include within discourse on civil

Toleration of anotherperson’s beliefs andpractices does not meanthat one must like them,accept them for oneself,or even believe that theyare correct.



society. As such, it is important to emphasisethe empowerment as also comprising aprocess whereby marginalised groupsbecome able to organise themselves to asserttheir independent right to make choices andto control resources which will assist in chal-lenging and eliminating their own subordi-nation and framing by a dominant dis-course. As we know, Muslims are increas-ingly being framed away from harbourers ofcivility to harbourers of extremism and ter-rorism. Defining empowerment as suchremoves emphasis from the sources ofoppression that Muslims may face, andinstead gives greater focus to the agency ofMuslim communities in their own right.Empowerment is another core value ofMuslim activism, which is based on theIslamic basic value of equality of humanbeing. The Prophet Muhammad said:‘People are equal like the teeth of a comb.’

The above brief paragraphs do not present,by any means, a detailed analysis of the topicat hand. Their purpose is rather to illustratethe point that approaching the concept of‘civility’ through core values, such as toler-ance, participation, and empowerment,rather than specific culturally based organi-sations and structures, offer a fairer andmore universal definition. It also avoids thefundamental problems and narrow culturalbiases outlined in this paper.

END NOTES25. Edward Shils (1992), “The Virtue of Civil Society”,Government and Opposition, vol.26, no.1, p.3.

26. Marlies, Glasius (2005), “Who is the Real Civil Society?Women’s Groups versus Pro-Family Groups at theInternational Criminal Court Negotiations”, in Jude Howelland Diane Mulligan, eds., Gender and Civil Society,London: Routledge, p. 224.

27. Carapico, Sheila (1996). “Yemen Between Civility andCivil War,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. RichardNorton, vol. 2. Leiden: Brill, Carapico 1996, p. 288.

28. Ibid., p.226.

29. Clark, Janine A. (1994). “Islamic Social-WelfareOrganizations and the Legitimacy of the State in Egypt:Democratization or Islamization From Below?” Ph.D diss.University of Toronto. Clark, Janine (1994), p.35.

30. Nilüfer, Göle (1994). “Towards an Autonomization ofPolitics and Civil Society in Turkey”, in Metin Heper, ed.,Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Boulder: WestviewPress, p. 221.

31. Amani Kandil (1999), “Women and Civil Society”, inCivil Society at the Millennium, Civicus, Connecticut:Kumarian Press, p.63. Kandil (1999, p. 63).

32. Ghannouchi, Rached (1999). Muqarabat fi al-`Ilmaniyyawal-Mujtam‘ al-Madani [Papers on Secularism and CivilSociety], London: Maghreb Centre for Research andTranslation, p. 83.

33. http://www.wordreference.com/definition/toleranceLast accessed 5 May, 2006.

34. Schwedler, Jillian 1995, p.16.

35. Hefner, Robert W. (1998). Democratic Civility: TheHistory and Cross-Cultural Possibility of a Modern PoliticalIdeal. New Brunswick: Transaction.

36. Hann, Chris and Elizabeth Dunn. Eds. (1996). CivilSociety: Challenging Western Models. London: Routledge.

37. Crystal, Jill (1995). “Civil Society in the Arab GulfStates.” In Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? APrimer, ed. Jillian Schwedler. Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers

The Prophet Muhammadsaid: ‘People are equallike the teeth of a comb.’

Dr. Jasser ‘Auda is the founding director of Al-Maqasid Research Centre (London).He wrote two PhD theses on the Philosophy of Islamic Law and Systems Analysis,Wales (UK) and Waterloo (Canada) universities, respectively. His latest book,Maqasid al-Shari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach, was pub-lished by the International Institute of Islamic Thought in 2007.

Dr. Wanda Krause is a Research Fellow at the Forum Against Islamophobia andRacism (FAIR) and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS-UK). Herinterests include civil society development, social movements, social networks,Islamist politics, gender politics, and modes of governance and state-society relations.


Balancing Security VersusLiberty: The Wrong ScalesOr The Wrong Question?

Anne Costello

The ‘War on Terror’ in Britain startedwell before the 11 September, 2001attacks. The Terrorism Act 2000

extended the definition of terrorism toinclude the threat of 'serious damage toproperty', in ways 'designed to influence thegovernment' for a 'political cause'. It gavepolice powers to detain suspects withoutcharge for seven days, later extended to14,then to 28 days and now being attempted toextend yet further.

This Act also defined innocent actions ascrimes such as the “crime of association”that is, belonging to a banned organisation,financing, sharing meeting platform with, ordistributing its literature. Organisationscould also be banned on the basis of theiractivities in other countries fitting the broad-er definition of terrorism. This process stig-matised a wide range of legitimate politicalactivity of foreign liberation movementssuch as, Kurdish, Tamil, Palestinian, andothers which are unconcerned with UK pol-itics.

Some Muslim charities had their bankaccounts temporarily frozen under meresuspicion of financing terrorism abroad, andsince 2000, the Home Office banned 44organizations under the Terrorism Act 2000,ranging from Al-Qaeda to Hamas – and thelatter remains blacklisted although thePalestinians have elected it to be theirGovernment. [In anticipation that Hizb ut-Tahrir would be banned (although in the endit was not) a students’ union official atMiddlesex University, who had invited themto address a meeting in the interest of freepublic debate, was suspended from his stud-ies.] Freedom of speech was further attackedby the creation of new offences of ‘glorifyingterrorism’ and ‘disseminating terrorist publi-cations’ under the Terrorism Act 2006.

In the 9/11 atrocity, the Anti-Terrorism,Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 grant-ed further powers of detention and surveil-lance. It became an offence not to inform theauthorities of any 'suspected terrorist' activi-ties, potentially imposing on relatives ofbombers the near-impossibility of provingthat they did not know what was going to bedone. This was the beginning of a slipperyslope. By 2006, Home Secretary John Reidnotoriously asked Muslim parents to spy ontheir own children. The ATCSA 2001 alsoauthorized the internment of non-UK citi-zens – in circumstances where the HomeSecretary had a suspicion of 'terrorist' linksbut inadequate evidence for a prosecution,and where Article 3 of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights (ECHR) pre-vented their deportation to their own coun-try because of the risk of torture. These pow-ers permitted indefinite imprisonment with-out trial or charge, a measure not used in theUK mainland since World War II. Notablyhowever, its temporary use during theNorthern Ireland ‘troubles’ was droppedwhen the resulting sense of outrageappeared to draw people into the IRA.

Internment breached the right to libertyguaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR – abreach which can only be justified underthat Convention by arguing that a seriousemergency threatening ‘the life of thenation’. After three years of protests andlegal challenges, the British Law Lordsfamously declared in December 2004 thatinternment was inconsistent with theECHR; the measure was disproportionate tothe emergency being faced and in any case,internment discriminated against foreign-ers.38 Internment powers were replaced inMarch 2005 by 'control orders', which man-dated house arrest for all save a few hourseach day.39 Recent reports suggest eleveninternees from the Maghreb and the Middle


BALANCING SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY: THE WRONG SCALES OR THE WRONG QUESTION?

East were released from Belmarsh Prison toa Control Order regime.

Nonetheless, internment was revived underdifferent powers. In the months which fol-lowed several people were re-arrested underimmigration law, which from 1971 has per-mitted detention without trial of personsawaiting deportation. Negotiations werestarted to obtain undertakings from thereceiving Governments (mainly Libya,Algeria and Jordan) not to torture the depor-tees.

The British Government is trying hard tooverturn a challenge in the European Court,specifically, the precedent allowing peoplenot to be deported and risk torture irrespec-tive of ‘danger to national security’ in thecountry which wants to expel them.Furthermore, round-up of foreign ‘terrorsuspects’ for deportation on this groundsince 2005 brought 36 individuals within thejurisdiction of the Special ImmigrationAppeals Commission.

The Commission hears their appeals againstdeportation, partly on the basis of secret evi-dence withheld from the suspects them-selves. After over a year of prison or housearrest, several abandoned their appeals andreturned to Algeria. Only one has managedto win his appeal and clear his name of the‘terrorist’ label.

Whilst the impact of ATCSA 2001 fell main-ly on foreigners, the Law Lords’ judgementrecognised a police opinion that at least 1000British citizens had visited military trainingcamps in Afghanistan. Unlike internment,Control Orders can apply to British citizensas well as foreigners. Like internment, theyserve the purpose of preventive detention,particularly when it became clear that the7/7 bombers were British.

Police attention now focussed more on theBritish population and nine out of sixteenpersons now controlled are British citizens.After two ‘controlled’ persons escaped inearly 2007, the Home Secretary floated thepossibility that internment could be re-intro-duced. Whilst Appeal Court judgementsattacked the more severe control orders, rul-ing any period of freedom less than seven

hours per day to be in breach of Article 5 ofthe ECHR40, the then Tony Blair’sGovernment made several threats to weakenor even abolish the Human Rights Act whichincorporates the ECHR into British law. Theposition of Gordon Brown thus far is not yetfully clear.

Brown’s Government plans a new anti-ter-rorism package for autumn 2007, includingan extension of the current 28 day maximumperiod for detention without charge, and ahighly controversial power for police to stopand question people in public places. The‘stop and quiz’ power, according to aParliamentary announcement of May 2007,would impose arrest and a fine of up to£5000 for refusing to answer police ques-tions – of an unspecified nature, effectivelyremoving the ‘right to silence’ from the pub-lic even before they have been arrested. ACabinet row ensued.

Peter Hain and some police spokesmenlikened the proposal to the old ‘sus’ law, thebasis of extensive and discriminatory search-es of black youth in the 1980s which is saidto have caused so much resentment that itfuelled inner city riots. The Home Officeconsultation document of June 2007 back-tracked somewhat and described the propos-al without any detail, as being at an earlystage of development.

The proposal illustrated the capacity of anti-terrorism measures to spill over into generalharassment of Muslim communities andalso of demonstrators. ATCSA 2001 includ-ed powers to stop and search people in des-ignated areas, whether or not an offence issuspected. The whole of London is so desig-nated, and the power has been widely usedto harass peaceful protestors, for exampleagainst the Docklands arms fair.Surveillance of students is also an issue. In2006, plain clothed police officers began toattend the meetings of the student IslamicSociety at Dundee University. Tayside policelater admitted that they had also visited 18secondary schools to gather intelligence andlook for signs of "extremism" amongstschool pupils.41

Brown is now seeking an all-party consensuson the new legislative package. It is an



opportune moment to examine how he willachieve this in light of the arguments andpolitical processes which have under laidanti-terrorism legislation of the last sevenyears. How has the balance of liberty versussecurity been assessed, and how hasParliament interacted with the police, withNGOs, and with the judiciary on this crucialquestion?

Parliamentary debates on anti-terrorismmeasures have been rushed and the 2001Act passed in a mood of panic following9/11.The Law Lords’ judgement ofDecember 2000 found that ATCSA 2001barely served its stated purpose. The intern-ment powers allowed non-UK suspected ter-rorists to leave the country with impunitywhilst leaving British suspects at large; andimposing indefinite detention on personswho, ‘even if reasonably suspected of havinglinks with Al-Qaeda, may harbour no hostileintentions towards the United Kingdom.’

Since Control Orders replaced internment,there has been scant Parliamentary scrutinyof their working. The debate on renewal ofControl Order powers in 2006 was allowed amere ninety minutes, and revealed thatalthough the Government had a statutoryduty to prosecute controlees where possible,police reports were giving no reasons whyprosecution was not happening.42

There has been some public consultation onthe way the anti-terrorism measures haveworked, although with little impact on thelaw making process. The ParliamentaryJoint Committee on Human Rights invitedNGOs to present evidence for its enquiry onCounter-Terrorism and Human Rights43, butits criticisms of the 2006 Terrorism Bill werelargely ignored. Lord Carlile’s enquiry on theappropriateness of the legal definition of ter-rorism reflected few of the critical submis-sions made to his public meetings by civilliberties’ groups, communities and even thepolice. Instead, he found that the definitionof terrorism was "useful and broadly fit forpurpose."44

As for detention without charge, the propos-al for ninety days seems to have been devel-oped very arbitrarily. The Guardian journal-ist Vickram Dodd, recently claimed at

London’s City Circle public meeting, thepolice originally asked Mr Blair for ninetydays, expecting considerable resistance tosuch a long period, and were surprised whenhe agreed to put this into the 2006 TerrorismBill.

No convincing case has ever been made whyit should be that long. The Government hasadmitted that the 28 day limit has not onceproved to be an impediment to police inves-tigations.45 The Liberal Democrats have sug-gested that minor charges could be madeagainst suspects and upgraded if and whenevidence of more serious crimes becomesavailable to the police. Yet Scotland Yard, theAssociation of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)and security minister Lord West are nowcalling for unlimited detention.46

There is an element of demagogy in thedevelopment of anti-terrorism measures –the public, or at least the tabloid journalists,want tougher measures against dangerouspeople, regardless of the suspects’ humanrights, thus the Government makes use ofthis both to gain popularity and to legitimiseits own agenda. Critics have argued that thisagenda includes suppressing dissent in gen-eral, in particular challenges to foreign poli-cy, as well as criminalising supporters ofoverseas liberation struggles47, through cre-ating a climate of fear amongst Muslims,migrants, refugee communities and leftistactivists. However, whenever the concerns ofthe human rights lobby are raised, the justi-fication for anti-terrorism measures fallsback on the needs and (often secret) argu-ments of the Secret Services and the police.

The ‘stop and quiz’power,…would imposearrest and a fine of up to £5000 for refusingto answer policequestions…effectivelyremoving the ‘right to silence’



The judiciary, and in some instances theHouse of Lords – more than the House ofCommons, to the latter’s disgrace – havesometimes taken a stand of principle. But [inaccepting, as they are supposed to, the sover-eignty of Parliament the judges have not andcannot challenge the exceptions to the rightto liberty which are written into the law itself– notably relating to severe national emer-gencies and to persons awaiting deporta-tion], if Parliament was persuaded to re-write the Human Rights Act, the judges’opposition to internment might find nobasis in law.

The Parliamentary backbencher looking forany coherent analysis of ‘what works’ to pre-vent terrorist attacks will find little usefulevidence either from the public statementsof security experts — although MI5 reportsmade clear to the Blair Government that thewar in Iraq has supplied a major motive forattacks on UK soil. Nor will much relevantexperience be found in UK history —beyond Northern Ireland, where punish-ment without trial was clearly a provocativefactor, as was the shooting of the Derry 13.This should be a warning against the ‘shootto kill’ policy involved in the death of theinnocent Brazilian, Jean-Charles deMenezes.

Overall, the policy formation process onanti-terrorism measures has been ratherincoherent. It does not add up to a balancedconsideration of what the ‘balance’ shouldbe between freedom and security. However,that question may be unanswerable in so faras the measurement scales are not definable.Any argument about the necessity of restrict-ing freedom in the name of security mustconfront considerable uncertainty aboutwhat the ‘trade-off’ really is.

The unknowns are so many that the issue is

quite unlike, say, the question of how muchto invest in motorway crash barriers toreduce accident deaths. The political andsecurity establishments themselves find ithard to know what measures are necessaryor sufficient to prevent terrorism. From 2001to 2005, the emphasis was on catching for-eigners, only to find that the 7/7 bomberswere British. Police strategy in relation toinvestigating British bomb plots seems tohave shown many errors of judgement.48 Ofthe 1228 people arrested under anti-terror-ism laws since 2001, only 19.6% werecharged with terrorism offences, and ofthose so far tried, only 3.6% were convictedof terrorism offences. That leaves a quarterwho were charged with ‘ordinary’ crimes(fraud, conspiracy, explosive offences, etc.)and 16.4% were convicted of these.49

One naturally wonders what the terrorismlaws have really added to security. However,the issue is not only the law, it is also policepractices. The shooting of Mr de Menezes,the failed Forest Gate raid, the recent surveil-lance of Muslim students, can and did takeplace without reference to any of the anti-ter-rorism acts – and perhaps contributed moreto community alienation than any of themeasures therein.

Can we then find any justification for depart-ing from accepted principles of justice – thatis, no punishment without a fair trial, anabsolute ban on complicity with torture, andupholding the rights of freedom of speech,expression and association enshrined in theECHR? The ‘cost-benefit’ case for settingaside these principles seems rather weak butthe case for sticking to principles has anoth-er major argument on its side; injusticemakes new enemies, becoming the basis forrevenge, for breakdown of social cohesionand respect for the law. In police reaction tothe proposal for ‘stop and question’ powerswe at last see certain realism about how thepublic, including amongst them their ownenemies, respond to the perceived fairnessor unfairness of the state.

To see how such realism might be extendedto other measures let us consider two alter-native scenarios – one which might be calledprioritising security, and the other prioritis-

The Government hasadmitted that the 28 daylimit has not once provedto be an impediment topolice investigations.



ing justice. Prioritising security would meanthe police chiefs and Security Minister,Admiral West get their way on de-limitingdetention without charge. Detention periodscreep upwards to ninety days or more; somesuspects are released with lives and familieswrecked. Deportations based on secret evi-dence continue; some deportees disappearinto foreign prisons. The Human Rights Actis weakened to permit house arrest underControl Orders for 20 or 22 hours per day.Using new ‘stop and question’ powers togather intelligence about Muslim communi-ties, police fine several dozen youths fornon-cooperation and give them a criminalrecord.

And the result? Riots develop against puni-tive street search activity and house raids.Police requests for information and surveil-lance to combat terrorism fall on deaf ears.Youth who feel targeted whether they doright or wrong turn in despair to vandalismand gangs. In universities, student Islamicsocieties are restricted from having politicalspeakers and ‘extremists’ are reported to thepolice. Muslim students graduate feelingembittered and alienated from British politi-cal life. Skilled Muslims of means emigrate,leaving serious holes in inner cityeconomies. British society becomes increas-ingly more divided and vulnerable. Peoplesuffering detention without trial or deporta-tion to torture are presented in Al Qaedastatements as ‘martyrs’ to be avenged.

Now consider the justice-oriented scenario.Brown’s Government develops plans for arapid exit from Iraq. This does not guaranteethat the UK would cease to be targeted inretaliation for its foreign policies, but a swiftexit strategy seems a necessity, if not suffi-cient, condition of removing the motive forfurther attacks. Within Britain, police areinstructed to release terrorism suspects afterseven days if no realistic charge can be foundagainst them during that time. Some who arecharged are remanded in custody, and fur-ther charges might be added later. For others,bail conditions might include some aspectsof Control Orders, for example, tagging, butthe defendant is charged and awaiting trial.

Privacy, freedom of speech and association

are respected; emphasis is placed on policingby consent and on addressing Islamophobiain the police force, the court system and insociety at large. If police perceive a seriousand immediate threat to life, ‘shoot to immo-bilise’ replaces ‘shoot to kill’. Procedures fordeportation on grounds of ‘national security’are brought into line with normal rights to afair trial. The anti-terrorism laws are gradual-ly repealed and terrorism is addressed ascriminality rather than a ‘war’.

It is surely not hard to see that the first sce-nario (‘prioritising security’) aggravates theinitial problem whilst the second (‘prioritis-ing justice’) has at least some prospect ofreducing it.

Anne Costello is an academic researcher andan activist with the Campaign AgainstCriminalising Communities – a British NGOactive in opposing anti-terrorism laws andabuses of civil liberties. www.campacc.org.uk

ENDNOTES

38. For the text of the Law Lords judgement seehttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf

39. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_order for ahistory of control order powers

40. Seewww.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1808475,00.html

41. Seehttp://www.sacc.org.uk/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=367&catid=43&Itemid=43

42. http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2006-02-15b.1499.0

43. Seehttp://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/joint_committee_on_human_rights/

44. http://www.sacc.org.uk/sacc/docs/carlile-terrorism-definition.pdf

45. See Ian Loader, Guardian, 20.7.07, onhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2130572,00.html

46. Observer, 15.7.07; seehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/humanrights/story/0,,2126844,00.html; Guardian 16.7.07,http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2127412,00.html

47. See Ben Hayes of Statewatch, speech on 2.12.06,onhttp://www.campacc.org.uk/events/conferenceSpeeches/benSpeech.doc

48. Nafeez Ahmed ;The London Bombings: AnIndependent Inquiry (London: Duckworth, 2006)

49. See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/


Kristoffer Larsson

About half a century ago, there were notmany Muslims in Europe. In a coun-try such as Sweden the Muslim popu-

lation has grown from almost non-existentto somewhere around 300,000 – approxi-mately 3% of the population. Europe is ingeneral hard for immigrants but more so forMuslims, who face prejudice and threatsmainly as a consequence of Europe’s diffi-culties in dealing with the Middle East.While the Americans are the driving forcebehind issues that divide mainstreamEuropeans from the Muslim community –such as the question of Palestine, Iraq,Afghanistan, etc – many European nationshave backed the U.S. militarily, and most – ifnot all – have given it their political support.

Stuck in the middle of this are the EuropeanMuslims, who day in and day out see theirreligion being linked to terrorism, oppres-sion of women, and honour killings, just toname a few issues.

Attacks against Western occupation troopsare common in the Middle East, butWesterners are not used to being targeted ontheir own soil. It might seem like anextremely cruel phenomenon – that civiliansare the targets – but it is a more efficientmethod. If we are no longer safe at home,then maybe we start to think about what weare doing in the Mideast. Further, theseattacks represent a shift in power – half adecade ago it would have been unthinkablefor the colonised to attack the colonisers ontheir own soil.

An outcome of these incidents inevitablygenerates anti-Muslim sentiments. Muslimscannot be held responsible for the acts of alow number of Muslims individual, yet theyare often told they have a responsibility torenounce these acts, which the Islamicestablishment in the West also does, howev-

er, yet there are people pushing blame on MrMuslim Average.

Someone who has personal experience withthe difficulties Muslims are facing isMohammed Omar – a poet, culture journal-ist and lecturer living in the town of Uppsala,just north of the Swedish capital. Omar wasborn in 1976 to a Swedish Christian motherand a Kenyan non-religious Muslim father.He was raised as a member of the SwedishChurch but abandoned his Lutheran faith infavour of Islam. He has written a number ofbooks on poetry and his articles haveappeared in a number of leading Swedishnewspapers and magazines. As a Muslim, heknows what preconceived notions EuropeanMuslims are up against.

“I wouldn’t know where to start,”Mohammed Omar replies when asked whatprejudices Muslims are subjected to in mod-ern Sweden. “Most common are perhaps thebelief that Muslims are violent and that theyoppress women. In Islam, it is claimed,women are not subjects but limited by thereligion. The assertion is that Muslimwomen really do not wish to be Muslims,that they would prefer the modern Westernway of life but are forced to be Muslim.”

Omar continues: “Muslims are cautious becausethey think they are persecuted. They try to hidethat they are Muslim in order not to provoke.”

Muslims are out to “provoke” might soundrather silly, however this is a common per-ception in certain circles. A leading memberof Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party),when asked about what he thinks when hesees a veiled woman on the street, explainedthat he wonders if she is forced to wear theveil or if she does it to provoke, that is toshow her rejection of Danish culture.

“I have personally been threatened and evenphysically abused. Just recently my [Kenyan-born] wife was threatened when waiting for

Spotlight On Europe’s Muslims


SPOTLIGHT ON EUROPE’S MUSLIMS

the bus. A man pulled up a knife and startedscreaming derogatory things.”

Despite the significantly bigger problem –Muslims being attacked instead of Muslimsbeing the attackers – media’s portrayal andemphasis has been very different emphasis.Whenever Islam is mentioned, it is withregards to terrorism or fundamentalism,and as a Muslim it is hard to recognise theimage presented.

“Almost never”, Omar answers when I askhim if he feels at home with how the mediapictures Islam. “Most of what they write issimply inaccurate and are baseless asser-tions. I think they [Westerners] have littleknowledge about Islam, people in generalknow close to nothing.”

“Many Muslims are already afraid and anx-ious. They think people are out to get them.This leads to some degree of paranoiaamong Muslims. To some extent this is alsothe case, they are being harassed.”

We go on to discuss the situation in theUnited States where the same stereotypes areflourishing, yet Muslims are better integrat-ed into society on the other side of the sea.

“There is a bigger Muslim middle-class inthe States. You have a fair share of profes-sional American Muslims, in leading profes-sions, in the culture, and so on,” he says. “InSweden the situation is more difficult. Themajority of Swedish Muslims are first gener-ation immigrants and their social status islower, most speak Swedish poorly.”

In addition to Omar’s claims, I would arguethat the United States is far better at absorp-tion in the first place due to selective immi-gration policy focusing on one’s skill-set,while Europe stands ready to accept all kindsof people – well-educated or not and even ifthey are well-educated, they often find diffi-culty in acquiring a suitable job

Secondly, Americans are more religiousthan Europeans and therefore, have greaterrespect for religious piety, unlike Europeanswho are in most cases strongly anti-religious

and have a hard time accepting Muslims’religiosity. However there is one issueChristian and Muslim Americans definitelydo not see eye-to-eye on: the Middle East.This is causing a great rift between the Muslimand the non-Muslim community in Europetoo, particularly the question of Palestine.

“If you look at the people who campaign todefame Islam, you almost always end up inthe pro-Israel camp,” Omar notes. Pro-Israeliforces try to win support by defaming Islamwhile at the same time, the victims of Israel’sactions resort to their faith. “Islam gives dig-nity to the people of the Mideast. This is whyit is growing stronger”, argues Omar.

But perhaps the most damaging event wasthe 9/11 attacks, and since then the climatehas become tougher and tougher – and theUnited States did not make things easier bylaunched its war against Iraq.

“Christians have lived side-by-side withMuslims in Iraq for 1400 years. The UnitedStates is indirectly responsible for ruiningthis. Some Christian papers write all thetime about how minorities are forced out ofIraq, which they are. But most of the mil-lions of refugees the war has created are infact Muslim,” according to Omar.

We finally end up talking about the future.What is to be expected? Will Europe come toterms with its Muslim inhabitants?Mohammed Omar is sceptical. “I don’t thinkthe situation will improve, there are peopleset out to demonise Islam. It is being por-trayed as a threat to Europe,” he concludes.

“The biggest menace is not the Nazis—theyare not that many and not very active—butthe so-called Liberals [which in a Swedishcontext denotes ring-wingers who arebehind the Americans and the Israel]. Theyuse people of Muslims origin, like AyaanHirsi Ali, as alibis,” Mohammed Omar says.“That way they can go after Islam withoutbeing overtly racist, as that is not accepted.They hide it by saying they are merely criti-cising certain features. This is a ‘legitimate’way of being racist.”

Kristoffer Larsen is a Swedish theology academic and a member of the LutheranChurch. He has been following the impact of the 9/11 attacks and also campaignsfor Palestinians through www.imemc.org


From Islam ofImmigrants to Islam of Citizens

Konrad Pedziwiatr

The Muslim populations in WesternEurope (circa 15 million) have beenundergoing profound transforma-

tions, so too their religion. Islam which wasbrought to Western Europe50 by immigrantsfrom almost all over the Muslim world, thuscontributing to one of the most importantreligious changes in this part of the conti-nent since the Reformation (Lewis 2005) andsignificantly increasing its cultural diversity,is a faith which is very closely linked with theallochtones’ ethnicity, private sphere of lifeand one that possess many features of a so-called ‘low Islam’. The faith of their childrenwho were born or spent their formative yearsin Europe is, on the other hand, charac-terised by weakening ties with the ethnicbackground of their parents. It is alsoincreasingly becoming a matter of publicsphere and acquiring a growing number offeatures of a ‘high Islam’. This paper willattempt to briefly elaborate on key differ-ences between Islam of immigrants andIslam of citizens, and thus shed some lighton the main processes within a wider transi-tion from the ‘transplanted’ to the ‘implant-ed’ Islam, to use the poetics of FeliceDassetto (2004).

First of all, it is the faithful of the two typesof Islam that needs to be portrayed, that isthose who have spent their formative yearsoutside the continent, and brought Islam toWestern Europe as part of their ‘cultural lug-gage’, and their children whose process ofsocialisation took place in non-MuslimEuropean countries. Several researchershave shown that despite the passage of time,Muslim immigrants like many other immi-grants who left their home countries toimprove their living conditions, do not fullydiscard the prospect of return. Even if theydo not manage to turn this into reality dur-ing their lifetime, many still manage to

‘realise it’ after their deaths, as the practiceof sending deceased abroad among theMuslim populations in Europe, althoughthis is less so these days. As MohammedAnwar points out, the plan of return to enjoythe fruits of their labour back home, or ‘themyth of return’, fulfils several social func-tions, among which the economic and cul-tural ones seem to be the most important.

The ‘mythologization of return’ ensures theimmigrants in their willingness to endurehardship in work and living conditions inorder to generate as much savings as possi-ble that could be later invested back home,or send in the form of remittances to themembers of their families who did not man-age to migrate. It also legitimises continuedadherence to the norms and values of theirhome countries and condemns assimilationinto the culture of the host society. Thus, theimmigrants who cherish the hope of returnare less inclined to take actions in order tointegrate with their new societies than thosewho have completely abandoned this hope.The first group of immigrants probablymore than the second are also characterisedby the phenomenon described by theAlgerian student of migrations, AbdelmalekSayad, as ‘la double absence’ (Sayad 1999).

Analysing the Maghrebian (North African)migration to France at the point of theirdeparture and arrival51, which is one of hiskey contributions to migration studies,Sayad noticed that immigrants neither fullybelong to the receiving society nor to thesending one which they have left. The immi-grant as he points out, is “atopos, a quainthybrid devoid of place, displaced, in thetwofold sense of incongruous and inoppor-tune, trapped in that ‘mongrel’ sector ofsocial space betwixt and between socialbeing and nonbeing” (Sayad 1988). Further,he points out that they are “neither citizennor foreigner, neither on the side of the


FROM ISLAM OFIMMIGRANTS TO ISLAM OF CITIZENS

Same, nor on that of the Other, s/he existsonly by default in the sending communityand by excess in the receiving society, ands/he generates recurrent recrimination andresentment in both” (ibid). The key dilemmaof immigrants can be summed up in thequestions, ‘how to be here (abroad) while atthe same time mentally being there (in thehome country)?’ and ‘how to be there, whilephysically being here?’. Out-of-place in thetwo social systems which define their(non)existence, the migrants force us, asPierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant rightlypoint out, “through the obdurate social vexa-tion and mental embarrassment they cause,to rethink root and branch the question ofthe legitimate foundations of citizenshipand of the relationship between citizen, stateand nation” (2000).

The foundations of citizenship are beingquestioned by the children of immigrants,those who were born or has been living inEurope since very early age and yet they havebeen perceived by the majority groups as theothers, or to use the words of GeorgeSimmel, as those who “come today and staytomorrow” (1971: 143). The only problem isthat the offspring of Muslim immigrants didnot come to Europe today, but it has been liv-ing on the continent for more than 20, 30and sometimes even 50 years.

In contrast to their parents, children ofMuslim immigrants do not think aboutmoving to their parents’ countries of origin.Their usual answer to the calls of theEuropean Far Right parties ‘to go backhome’ is ‘this is our home!’ Their geograph-ical contact52 with Turkey or Morocco, tomention only the countries of origin of thelargest Muslim groups in Europe, is usuallylimited to short holiday visits. Even ifMuslim citizens in some of the countriesmight not identify strongly with the nation-states within which they are living (e.g. theNetherlands – Entzinger 2003: 108) they arefrequently characterised by firm local identi-fications (e.g. Babès 1997: 165, Tietze 2002,Entzinger 2003: 108). They feel strongattachment to certain districts of their citiesor to the whole cities and happily describethemselves as Londoners, Berliners,Parisians, etc. Their local identities bear not

only many cultural marks, as they oftenspeak European languages with strong localaccents, but also participatory ones, as it isnot uncommon to see them getting involvedin projects of the local civil societies. Whilethey often lack sufficient cultural capital tofeel at ease in their parents countries of ori-gin, they possess numerous tools that enablethem to get involved much more fully thantheir parents in the European publicspheres.

Speaking and writing skills, basic workingknowledge of the social and political sys-tems, skills in accessing and processinginformation, and interpreting political talkare only some of the tools that enable citi-zens to make use of their rights. These‘tools’ are part of the civic skills that a greatmajority of poorly educated Muslims immi-grants (with exception of minority of busi-ness people and professionals) who livedtheir formative periods outside Europe veryoften lack. Those born in Europe or whoarrived in their early childhood, on the otherhand, even if they have not managed to gainsubstantial amounts of cultural capital in theform of educational qualifications (institu-tionalised cultural capital), still posses muchwider knowledge than their parents of themechanisms through which the Europeansocieties work (embodied cultural capital53),acquired during the process of socialisation.The members of the new Muslim elites – onwhich this research focuses – posses in factnot only substantial amounts of the embod-ied cultural capital, but also the institutionalform of it, as the vast majority of personsinterviewed finished universities and some-times very prestigious ones.

Having pointed out the main differencesbetween the Muslim immigrants and theMuslim citizens, it is time to move to pres-ent the key features of their religiosity. Asmentioned above, one of the attributes ofIslam as it is practiced by the immigrants isits profound ethnicisation. For the vastmajority of Muslims who spent formativeyears outside Europe religion is inseparablylinked with ethnicity. To be a Moroccan,Turk, Pakistani or Bangladeshi, hence ex def-inition means for them that one is aMuslim54 . Thus, Islam of immigrants has



been functioning largely within the ethnicsymbolic boundaries. By attaching religiousmeaning to certain ethnic practices, Islamhas been sacralising55 ethnicity, giving thesepractices additional importance. For exam-ple, by proclaiming such South Asian mar-riage customs like dowry and wearing ofregional dress to the mosque to be Islamic,the Muslim immigrants in Leeds researchedby Ron Geaves, have been bolstering theirethnic identity (Geaves 1995: 13). Religionhas been not only protecting ethnic practicesfrom change but also if necessary, legitimis-ing the changes that have already takenplace56 (Pedziwiatr 2003).

A crucial role in reinforcing ethnic bound-aries have been playing also religious institu-tions, and amongst them Mosques. As asymbolic representation of 'the land ofIslam' in Europe, they have also been to agreat extent representation of the immi-grants’ countries of origin. Like other reli-gious institutions functioning within immi-grant groups, Mosques perform two keyfunctions: integrating - they have been“assuring the group of the ability to sustainitself under the new conditions” - andexpressive - they have been “easing livingtogether with 'others'” (Kubiak 1982: 49).

They serve as a refuge for the immigrantsfrom the receiving societies and as a focalpoint for the recollection of a personal andcorporate identity that is rooted in theircountries of origin. This recollection hasbeen facilitated by the recruitment of Imamsfrom the same area from where the particu-lar Muslim community originated. Similarlyto Italian Catholic congregations in the USA,as analysed by Andrew Greeley (1972: 90),Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani or othermosques are thus community centres thathelp members preserve their cultural andsocial roots. Not only the religious but alsothe social lives of different Muslim groups

revolve around their Mosques. This isbecause European Mosques are not merelyplaces of worship, but to a greater extentthan in Muslim world, also places of socialgatherings. The fact that the vast networks ofMuslim organisations have been built alongthe ethnic lines is yet another aspect of ehni-cisation of Islam amongst immigrants.57

Although the relationship between ethnicityand religion in the Islam of citizens does notdisappear, it significantly weakens. Muslimsborn in Europe easily distinguish betweenthe realm of religion and the one of ethnici-ty. They sometimes call upon religion toquestion the legitimacy of certain ethnic cus-toms and practices, which appear to be high-ly dysfunctional in the European social envi-ronment, and with its help try to reshapethem so as they become more compatiblewith the surrounding reality58. Thus Islam ofcitizens functions not only within the sym-bolic boundaries of specific ethnic commu-nities, but also beyond these boundaries. Itdraws its own symbolic boundaries whichare the basis of the new forms of self-descriptions alternative to ethnic identity.

As numerous studies have shown, the reli-gious identification amongst the second andthird generations appear more widespreadthan the ethnic one (e.g. Cesari 1994,Modood and Berthoud 1997, Peach andVertovec 1997). Why ‘a Muslim’ took theplace of ‘a dead beur’59, as Xavier Ternisien(2005) has put it? Or to put it differently, whyreligion as a source of identity becomesmore popular amongst children of theMuslim immigrants than ethnicity? There isno room here to account at length for possi-ble explanations, suffice to mention the onesprovided by the prominent Belgium andBritish scholar and anthropologist EugeenRoosens. Religious identification, explainsEugeen, is subsuming the ethnic (and theclass one) because Islamic membership is‘more prestigious’ than the ethnic one. Theauthor of “Creating ethnicity” sees thesources for it in the fact that “Islam is still aworld power, whereas the Turkish orMoroccan proletariat are not. Thus, empha-sising Islamic membership becomes ameans of social promotion for immigrantworkers and their families” (1989:145). He

Muslims born in Europeeasily distinguish betweenthe realm of religion andthe one of ethnicity.



also aptly notes that “at present-day (that is atthe end of the 80s in Belgium – KP) Turksand Moroccans are voiceless because theyhave no muscle” and adds “ironically, claimsmust be formulated by people who arealready equals in some way and who havepower” (1989: 154). Interestingly, claims donot have to be made necessarily by peoplewho have power as this research will demon-strate, but by people who have some meansof attaining power.

A different explanation proposed by JessicaJacobson, argues that a beur looses its battlewith a Muslim or that the ethnic identity issubsumed by the religious one, because thelast one is firstly more universal. Claimingto be part of the world-wide Muslim commu-nity gives the offspring of the Muslim immi-grants an opportunity to belong not only tothe community that is larger than the ethnicminority to which they belong, but also big-ger than the surrounding majority. Thus itoffers the possibility of a wider world inwhich to live (Jacobson 1997b). The mem-bership in the Muslim ummah, which is animportant aspect of self-definition forEuropean-born Muslims is thus more‘rewarding’, to use Barth’s (1969) category,than belonging merely to the ethnic minori-ty. At the same time, the reference to the reli-gious identity allows a person who bears var-ious marks of identity to unite all of them inone. Jacobson argues also that Islam is moresignificant source of identity for the British-born Pakistanis than ethnicity because itdelineates very clearly the boundary betweenthem and the rest of society and thus, itenables them to easily locate themselveswithin a wider social milieu. Ethnic bound-aries have on the other hand lost their lucid-ity and ability to generate social distancebetween the ethnic minority and the majori-ty (Jacobson 1997a: 127).

As discussed above, yet another feature of‘transplanted Islam’ is its limitation to theprivate sphere. Although, the ‘public visibili-ty’ of Islam has been steadily growing sincethe petrol crisis of the 1970s, and accelera-tion of the processes of family reunificationthat significantly widened the scope ofimmigrants interactions with the receivingsocieties, for the majority of Muslims situat-

ed in the lowest social strata of Europeansocieties the natural place of religion washome. They did not openly claim the recog-nition of their religion in the public sphere,being quite comfortable with the freedomsthat European democracies had to offerthem. The formal recognition of Islam inBelgium in 1974 as a faith of its citizens, wasfor example not a consequence of the socialmobilisation of the Muslim immigrants, buta result of the diplomatic negotiations in thecentre of which there was an issue of the oilsupply for the country (Panafit 1997)60.Growing visibility of Islam until the end ofthe 80s was an outcome of the internationalevents such as Iranian revolution or the warbetween Iran and Iraq and national onessuch as opening of new Mosques. Althoughthey were rarely purposed-build edifices61

and usually opened in the converted houses,warehouses, parking space, and so on, fromthe very beginning have met with a greatdeal of contention. Thus Islam of immi-grants had its public face mainly due tomore or less distinguishable places ofMuslim worship.

Islam has become a permanent element ofpublic debates and fully entered into thepublic sphere only from the end of the1980s, which saw the outbreak of theSalman Rushdie affair and the Hijab debate.At this time European Muslims consisted ofsubstantial number of members who weresocialised in Europe, and began to ask fortheir rights which were already beingenjoyed by other religious groups. In France,young Muslim women began to call for thepermission to wear Hijab in school, as theJewish pupils were allowed to wear the kip-pahs. In Britain, Muslims demanded anexpansion of law on blasphemy which wouldapply not only to the Christian God (andmore specifically the Anglican one) but alsoto God of other religious groups. Islam hasgained a public face not only thanks to vari-ous Muslim political demonstrations butalso due to numerous examples of activeinvolvement of Muslims in European soci-eties. From early 1990, one may observe agrowing number of representatives of thenew Muslim elites starting to dynamicallyshape the politics of the state at both local



and national level. At the same time theyhave been increasingly influencing thegrowing number of Muslim organisationscreated by their fathers or setting up theirown organisations and in this way giving anew character to the Muslim civil society.

The final key feature of Islam of the firstgeneration is its strong folk character. Inorder to fully comprehend this, one needs toremember that Muslim immigrants who set-tled in Europe after WWII were often notonly moving from one continent to theother, but what is even more important,from little towns and villages to large citiesand metropolises. The religion that wastransplanted by immigrants to Europe hasbeen to a large extent a religion of the ruralareas. It is characterised among others bysaint veneration, presence of black magicand countless superstitions. This kind ofIslam in which the faithful’s attitudestowards the main religious dogmas are moreemotional than rational was named by E.Gellner as ‘low Islam’ (Gellner 1968). In thiskind of Islam an important role is played bythe Sufi tariqas (orders). In Britain for exam-ple, the institutional base for Sufism is madeup of the largest network of Mosques in thecountry that are affiliated to the the Barelwimovement.62 One of the distinguished Sufileaders whose arrival had a great impact onthe revival of Barelwi traditions was PirMaroof. Between 1987 and 1988, for exam-ple, he organised under the World SufiCouncil umbrella, celebrations of theProphet's Birthday (milad) in Hyde Park,

which attracted 25,000 people from over thecountry (Lewis 1994: 25).

The European-born and educated Muslims,in contrast to their parents are largely anurban religion. As such it possesses numer-ous features of the ‘high Islam’ generally ori-ented in Gellner's definition towards puri-tanical and scriptural. For young EuropeanMuslims religion is usually not a matter ofethnicity, but of identity, ethics and spiritual-ity. Their Islam acquires the features of the‘high Islam’ inter alia through the process ofintellectualisation of faith which commonlytakes place outside their family home, atconferences and seminars organised byMuslim associations, meeting of religiousstudy groups, and more. Leila Babes veryconvincingly argues for example that theyoung Muslims cut off from the traditionalbasis of religious culture of their parents,have very little chances of rediscovering lowIslam, and are somehow predestined torediscover High Islam (1997: 137). Theirapproach to the faith that they have inherit-ed from their parents is often deeply reflex-ive. This is not only a consequence of thefact that they are part and parcel of the soci-eties which, as Giddens points out, “arecharacterised by a growing capacity of activeengagements with diverse sources of incom-ing knowledge” (1996: 216), but also becausebeing a Muslim in a non-Muslim country isnot as straightforward as being a Muslim inthe place where Islam is a religion of themajority.

During the process of socialisation Muslimsborn in Europe are being presented withdivergent sets of allegiances and ideals.Religious and ethnic allegiances are just twoout of many identity options. Thus the wayof being a Muslim and of practicing Islam isfor the Muslim citizens a matter of privatechoice to a much greater extent than it wasfor the Muslim immigrants (Tietze 2002).The individualisation of religiosity ofEuropean born Muslims manifests itself notonly in the personal tint of their religiouspractice (individualisation of religious prac-tice), but also in their own interpretation ofreligious beliefs (individualisation of reli-gious beliefs). However as Brigitte Maréchalobserves, the individualisation of religious

With the generationalpassage, Muslimcommunities are losing atleast part of their ethnicfeatures and identificationwith their countries oforigin, but they are notautochthonous yet, atleast not as communities.



beliefs does not necessarily need to result inquestioning of the key religious dogmas, butonly in the critical analysis of the traditionalreligious interpretations (2003: 13). Thesame point is made by Nilufer Göle, whenshe says that “although there is a strong indi-vidualist component to the religious experi-ence in modern times, this does not neces-sarily mean that the content will be individ-uating” (2003: 814).

The students of the individualisationprocesses within European Muslim popula-tions advance two opposing theses. Whilesome argue that religious individualisationand related to it fragmentation of religiousauthority is leading to the ‘liberalisation ofIslam’ and emergence of ‘critical Islam’ (e.g.Schiffauer 2000, Mandaville 2004), othersclaim that in spite of individualisation andthe diversification of authority structures,the current situation is characterised by arelative stability of dogma and in any case,not by a liberalisation of Islam (e.g. Roy1999, 2002, Wiktorowicz 2005). The propo-nents of the first thesis argue that the emer-gence of the critical Islam is to a large extenta reaction to the heightened intra-Islamicpluralism of the dias-pora, which is increas-ingly valorized byMuslims in Europe,and that the mainactors behind thisdevelopment are young European Muslims‘dissatisfied with the Islam of their parents’(Mandaville 2004: 121) and highly skepticalabout the ability of the ‘ulama to re-articulatethe Islamic tradition in the vernacular (ibid:124). Its opponents, on the other hand,believe that the individualised Islam onlyrarely brings forth a ‘critical discourse’ andinstead remains tightly linked to the ‘dog-matic affirmation of immutable principles’(Roy 2002: 90). While the careful observationof processes within the Muslim communi-ties seems to suggest that both theses areactually to some extent valid, furtherresearch on these issues is definitely needed.

Reflections on different features of Islam ofimmigrants and Islam of citizens (as well asthe transition from the former to the latter,which are at the background of the new

Muslim claims of difference and sameness),and although there is no European Islamyet, the processes of construction of suchIslam especially in France and Britain arewell advanced. Stefano Allievi is correct toargue that the European Muslim world is liv-ing through a process of extremely rapidtransformation and that it will be of strategicinterest to see how the process of restructur-ing of Muslim communities continues whenthey are no longer ethnic communities arriv-ing from somewhere else (Allievi 2003).With the generational passage, Muslim com-munities are losing at least part of their eth-nic features and identification with theircountries of origin, but they are notautochthonous yet, at least not as communi-ties. In France, Britain, Belgium and a fewother European countries in which Muslimsstarted to settle in large numbers in the1950s and 1960s, the majority are howeverautochthonous, as they were born in Europe,and it is them who are most dynamicallyadvancing changes within their religiouscommunities and developing a distinctiveFrench, British and Belgian way of livingIslam.

REFERENCES:Allievi, S. (2003). Multiculturalism in Europe. Paperpresented at the conference Muslims in Europe post 9/11,25-26 April, Oxford, St. Anthony's College.

Babès, L. (1997). L'islam Positive. Paris: Les Editions de L'Atelier.

Geaves, R. (1995). Muslims in Leeds, Community ReligionsProject, University of Leeds

Gellner, E. (1968). A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam.Annales Marocaines de Sociologie, 1, 5-14.

Jacobson, J. (1997a). Islam in Transition: Religion andIdentity Among British Pakistani Youth. London: Routledge

Jacobson, J. (1997b) Religion and Ethnicity: Dual andAlternative Sources of Identity Among Young BritishPakistanis. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 20, no. 2

Lewis, P. (1994). Islamic Britain. London: I.B.Tauris

Lewis, P. (2005). Muslims in Europe: Managing MultipleIdentities and Learning Shared Citizenship. PoliticalTheology, 6(3).

Modood, T. and Berthoud, R. ed. (1997). Ethnic Minoritiesin Britain - Diversity and Disadvantage. London: PolicyStudies Institute.

Islam of immigrants Islam of citizens

Religion and Ethnicity - Strong relationship - Weakening relationship

Place of religion - Mostly in the private sphere - Increasingly in the public sphere

Character of religiosity - Largely 'low Islam' - Increasingly 'high Islam'



END NOTES

50. Note the presence of Islam in this part of the continentis not completely a new phenomenon as Muslims ruled inSicily (827-1091) and on Iberian Peninsula (711-1492) andhave been living in (with interruptions) and travellingthroughout the geographical region practically since thebeginning of historical Islam itself. (see for exampleLapidus 1988: 378 – 389 or Fletcher 1998)

51. Sayad famously emphasized that the sociology ofmigration must start, not from the receiving society, butfrom the structure and contradictions of the sendingcommunities or that the sociology of immigration cannotdo without the sociology of emigration.

52. I use the category of ‘geographical contact’ so as not toconfuse it with other channels of communication throughwhich the Muslim immigrants, as well as, Muslim citizenskeep themselves informed about the situations in differentparts of the Muslim world. This translocal politcs is analysedin depth by Peter Mandaville in his ‘Transnational MuslimPolitics: Re-imaging the Umma’ (2004).

53. Both terms are used in the sense given them by PierreBourdieu (1986) that is as “long-lasting dispositions of themind and body; individual’s ‘culture’ or ‘cultivation’assimilated or acquired over a long period” (embodiedcultural capital p. 243-245), and as “educationalqualifications” (institutionalized cultural capital p. 248).

54. Here it has to stressed that being a Muslim does notnecessarily imply that a certain person is a devout believer.On different ways of being a Muslim see for exampleMaréchal 2003: 5-18 or Pedziwiatr 2007: 42-45.

55. By ‘sacralisation’ it is meant after Hans Mal ”the process bymeans of which man has pre-eminently safeguarded andreinforced this complex of orderly interpretations of reality, rules,and legitimations” (Mol 1976: 15)

56. This role of religion in reinforcing ethnic boundarieshave been also noticed by researchers studying non-Muslim immigrant communities (See Marzec 1998 orRutledge 1985).

57. In Islam of citizens this has been considerably changinginter alia as a result of the accession of the young peopleborn in Europe to the position of leadership in mosquesand community centres.

58. This has been done particularly often by young Muslimwomen who strive to redefine the role of woman within thehighly patriarchal Muslim communities (P_dziwiatr 2006).

59. A French slang term for a descendant of immigrants ofNorth African origin living in France, Belgium or Spain.The word is a reversal of the word "Arab".

60. For this reason Panafit has pointed out that at thisperiod (the 1970s) one had to do in Belgium with ‘Islamwithout Muslims’ (2003: 60)

61. On average there are no more than 10 percent ofpurpose-build mosques in Europe. (see Peach 2000, Galeand Nylor 2002)

62. Barelwis are named after a village in India where thesect's founder Ahmad Raza Khan was born. Theirteachings combine the fundamental tenets of Islam withthe teaching of the international Sufi Orders. Theirmembers for example believe in intercession with Godthrough pirs - holy men - both living and dead. In thistradition the person of the prophet Muhammad isextremely important. The great veneration for the ProphetMuhammad among the Barelwis is, inter alia, based on thebelief in his miraculous powers. More information aboutBarelwis and other Muslim movements in the UK see forexample Rex 1991 .

Konrad Pedziwiatr is author of a monograph entitled 'From Islam of Immigrantsto Islam of Citizens: Muslims in the Countries of Western Europe' (2005, 2nd edi-tion 2007). He has numerous other articles on Islam and Muslim populations inEurope. He is currently conducting a research at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven(Belgium) on 'Religion and Active Social Citizenship Amongst Young OrganisedMuslims in Brussels and London'.


Rosa Álvarez Fernández

Since the tragic events of September 11,the Madrid train bombings and the 7/7London tube attacks, we have wit-

nessed the move from casting blame onIslam as a religion to blaming Islam as anideology of political violence. Similar neo-orientalist63 perceptions and constructions ofIslamism64 in the Muslim World have beenapplied to the Islamic tenets of Muslimorganisations in Britain, belonging to theMuslim Council of Britain65, the so calledpro-Jama’ati-Islami (Mawdudist) and pro-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood)networks. Among these are the UK IslamicMission (UKIM), Islamic Forum of Europe(IFE), Da’watul Islam, Islamic Society ofBritain (ISB), Young Muslims UK (YMUK),Young Muslim Organisation UK (YMO UK),Muslim Association of Britain (MAB),British Muslim Initiative (BMI) and theFederation of Student Islamic Societies(FOSIS). Behind the accusation of not doingenough to tackle Muslim extremism and indefending Western values lies the assump-tion that their Jama’ati-Ikhwani credentialsare in themselves extremist and encourageviolent radicalism.

At the same time the discourse on “goodMuslim and bad Muslim”66 is taking place inBritain. Accordingly, the Islam of the MCB isportrayed as an anomalous and exogenousIslam, mere appendance of the “islamistmalady” affecting the Muslim world, versusthe natural and authentic British Islam ofthe Sufi Muslim Council (SMC)67, because ofits apolitical attitude. If in the colonial dis-course of the nineteenth century traditionalSufi-oriented Islam was perceived as back-ward and irrational, the cause of stagnationand the main obstacle to modernity, surpris-ingly in the 21st century, the West has re-dis-

covered this branch of Islam not just as theonly vehicle for integration of Muslims inBritish society but also as the panacea for allexisting troubles between Islam and theWest.

This battle for true Islam in Britain entailsold Western anxieties, distrust and fears.The simple invocation of, or reference to, theJama’ati-Ikhwani influences came togetherwith the distortion of Islam and the connec-tion with terrorism, despite the fact that intheir long and diverse trajectories in theMuslim World, they have demonstratedstrongly a stance against violence and a com-mitment to a reformist approach using polit-ical means. Nevertheless, these intellectualand cultural affiliations of some BritishMuslims organisations to the Jama’at-e-Islami and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun areviewed as sinister and coded strategy to“infiltrate” Europe – ultimately seeking theconquest and Islamisation of Europe as awhole68. Indeed, this contemporary accountshows an interesting resemblance to themediaeval narrative of the Arab hordesinvading Spain and threatening the “sup-posed” genuine European Christian roots.The purpose of this false dichotomy is toestablish the validity and legitimacy of tradi-tional Islam versus the invalidity and illegit-imacy of Islamism and therefore the refusalto accept them as part and parcel of Islam inBritain.

Studies carried out recently have validatedthe relevance of the Ikhwani and theJama’ati traditions in Britain as an intellectu-al source to providing guidance and theintellectual underpinning for BritishMuslims to be active in their commitment tocivic society and shared values. They notonly intermingled in the Muslim world butalso in Britain, where both ideological influ-

The Jama’ati-IkhwaniTraditions in British-BasedIslamic Organisations


THE JAMA’ATI-IKHWANI TRADITIONS IN BRITISH-BASED ISLAMIC ORGANISATIONS

ences are being developed and contextu-alised.69 However, the recognition of theseinspirations and values does imply neitherthe existence of an organisational link nor astrict following of the religious and ideologi-cal tenets, political agenda and modes ofactivism of the mother organisations in theMuslim World, which in themselves are verydiverse in approaches according the theirspecific contexts.

Islamism, as another symbolic frameworkencompassing identity and culture, socioe-conomics and politics, is changing and con-stantly undergoing adjustments and modifi-cations according to the specific political andsocio-economic realities of the British socie-ty. In this process, ideological frames of theJama’ati-Ikhwani traditions in Britain arebeing re-interpreted with new connotations,whilst others are rendered irrelevant ordated according to70 specific and differentapproaches that define these organisations.

A deep interest and a constant thread can beascertained within these organisations creat-ing greater awareness and rescuing theIslamic heritage, considered a cornerstoneof a self-perceived “awakening”71. This can beobserved when glancing at the numerouseducational and training activities providedby these organisations where alongsideArabic language, Tafsir, Shari’a, Fiqh, andclassical Islamic History, focus is placed onmodern and intellectual, cultural, religiousand socio-political ramifications of Islamismas a living phenomenon.

However, the publication and disseminationof the works of Al-Banna, Mawdudi, SayyidQutb, Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, Al-Qaradawi among other thinkers – give riseto strong suspicions in some sections of theBritish society. By depicting them as “for-eign” and dismissing them as “godfathers ofterror”, the vast, diverse and rich works ofthese figures are criminalised and con-demned in blanket fashion.

Here, two interrelated acts of denial are atwork. First, Muslims are denied the processinherent in all civilisations, of re-reading,adapting and re-elaborating their culturaltraditions. Secondly, in this ethnocentricvision the West and the Muslim World are

essentially made into separated entities, notsubjected to cultural osmosis. Paradoxically,the West finds it very valid and legitimate toexport its ideas and values (as it has been thecase since the major “encounter” in the 19thcentury), such as nationalism, secularism,Marxism, Western life-styles, technologiesand so on in the Muslim World. Howeverthe same West is unable to stomach culturalpermeation from others. Moreover, if we arestill at pains to fully accept the heritage of Al-Andalus (Andalucia) and the fruitful transferof classical Islamic culture to Europe, howare we going to accept the modern and con-temporary Islamist influences that could bea part of the cultural European landscape?

Ironically, if the emergence of Islamism inthe Muslim world was a reaction and aresponse to foreign colonial domination andto the repressive and exclusive nature of thepost-colonial nation-state, in Britain the revi-talisation of this tradition has been forged asan important element in the crystallisationof the British Muslim identity in response tonational and international issues. On theinternational level, the neo-colonial enter-prise inaugurated with the “NewInternational Order” in the First Gulf War.At the European level, the Bosnian conflict,the Rushdie Affair and the problems of iso-lation, racism, discrimination and socio-eco-nomic disadvantages of the neo-liberal erainaugurated by Margaret Thatcher and con-tinued by Blair’s New Labour. Thus the longstanding tradition of anti-imperialism andsocio-political involvement in domesticissues have been transferred by BritishMuslim citizens from the “colonized”Muslim world to the “colonial” metropolis,as part of their cultural resources to engagewith British domestic and foreign policies.

These perspectives illuminate strong pres-ence of three inter-related symbols ofIslamism72, belonging to Jama’ati- Ikhwanitraditions through the British-based Islamicorganisations. “Islam as a way of life”,Islamic Social Justice” and Islam as the mid-dle, balanced path or “al-Wasatiyya”, re-invented to respond to both the internation-al and national challenges experienced byBritish Muslims. The all encompassingIslamic way of life derives from the Qutbi-



Mawdudi concept of a dynamic and activeIslam (haraki and ‘amali), derived from theQur’an, the Shari’a and Islamic Fiqh. Thisspirit imbued in Muslim organisationsbrings about, in turn, a set of correlations:the interconnectivity between acts of wor-ship “ibadaat” and social relations “mu’a-malaat”, between faith and practical life, andthe translation of religious beliefs into socialaction. Within this notion of an Islam “appli-cable” in the daily lives of Muslims,“Shari’a”, the straight path, can not be sim-ply reduced to the law of the state, nor thepenal or private but a broad code of ethicsand moral principles which vertebrate andinstruct all aspects of one’s life. This extendsfrom the individual relations with God andthe spiritual development “tazkiyya”, con-nected to “tarbiya” – the comprehensive cul-tural formation and education of Muslims,helping them to interact in the differentrealms of society including political, socialand economical.

What is the intersection of Islam and politicsin these Muslim organisations that raises somany fears? Indeed it is not a rigid ideologi-cal system with a political manifesto basedon what is seen from outside as the fusion,in the sense of confusion, of religion andpolitics. The more salient features are theinterest in and the exercise of politics thatMuslims see as an inseparable dimension ofthe human being and the notion of a citizenpolitically aware and socially engaged. If, inthis sense, Islamism is about politicalactivism seeking changes in existing policiesin the national and international arena, isthis Islamic perspective of the MAB and theBMI, by essence, confrontationally oppositeto the secular perspective of the concept“Homo politicus” which vertebrates thepolitical activism of Stop the War Coalition?

“Social Justice” is probably one of the pivotalold frames in Islamism, sophisticatedly elab-orated by Sayyid Qutb in the pre-confronta-tion phase with the Nasserist-state againstthe background of the interrelated issues ofcolonialism and capitalism. All the Islamicorganisations in Britain inspired by theJama’ati-Ikhwani traditions, view social jus-tice as Qutb understood it, as a comprehen-sive concept encompassing social, econom-

ic, educational and political issues. YoungMuslims point out to mutual responsibilityin society, equality of all citizens, freedom ofreligious consciousness and individual andcollective wellbeing. Moreover, when theseMuslim organisations explain their supportand cooperation with “Respect” or the “oldLabour” political activists, they bring theframe of social justice as the commonground.

From this perspective, it is not difficult tounderstand the socio-political activism andinvolvement of leaders of the IFE, YMO UK,ISB and YMUK in social work to combatMuslim ghettos with high unemploymentrate, educational underachievement, drugabuse and crime. British Muslims do notnecessarily find contradictions between theprinciples of Islam and British liberalism,social democracy and leftist postulates,regarding their modes of “contentious poli-tics”. This extends to their critique of capital-ism and neo-liberalism and the adherence tothe tenets of the welfare system, against theretreat of the state, the privatisation of publicservices, education and heath care, and infavour of a more just taxation according toincome and a fairer redistribution of nation-al wealth.

Interestingly, “al-Wasatiyya”, the social proj-ect based on civilisational Islam, “Islam al-Hadhari”, believed to be coined in Egypt by agroup of intellectuals led by Al-Qaradawi73

and Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, have arrivedand rooted in Britain. The twin objectives ofthese “New Islamists”74 was on the one hand,to tackle extremism and violence among theEgyptian youth trapped between state vio-lence and the unofficial violence of someIslamic groups, by looking into the causes ofextremism. On the other, it was a responseto the increasing Egyptian polarisationbetween Islamists and secularists.

Since 2001, the project of “moderate Islam”

Islamism,…is changing and constantlyundergoing adjustmentsand modifications

has been successfully adopted in Britain bythe MCB to counteract the literalist salafi-jihadi reading by some young Muslims andto empower their associations in order todemocratically channel youth frustrations inthe socio-economic, political and cultural-identity spheres. However, like in theMuslim Word, the project of revival entailsnot only the irradiation of an enlightenedIslam but also a close examination of thepolitical roots of the phenomenon. From thisperspective, we have to understand theassumed responsibility of these Muslimassociations towards extremism and the cri-tique of British foreign policy.

The three cultural frames which could havebeen elaborated in the Muslim world toestablish the incompatibility of Islam andthe West in terms of an indigenous systemversus an imported and alien one, traced inthe British context, reveals that Islamisttenets are not fully at odds with secularism,democracy and Western values.

To fully understand the nature of theMuslim organisations in Britain, it is neces-sary that the West accepts the legitimateright of British Muslims to re-elaborate andincorporate the broad Jama’ati-Ikhwani tra-dition and the positive intellectual legacy ofthe great figures of the Islamic movementsinto their own cultural spaces. In turn, itimplies the acceptance of the diverse mani-festations of Islam: as a religion that belongsto the private sphere with its spiritual-mysti-cal dimension and its secularised trend aswell as an identity-cultural and socio-politi-cal phenomenon.

All these manifestations must be seen asvalid strategies for the integration and ascomplementary parts of the vast tree of theIslamic heritage. They are open to seriousdebate and criticism without stereotypicalassumptions about an inherently irrationaland violent Islamism. Ultimately, thismeans the importance of recognising thattheses multi-vocal heritages will be part andparcel of the future of Islam in Europe and

therefore an integral component of theEuropean civilisation.END NOTES

63. If Orientalism, coined by E. Said, refers to a cultural andpolitical phenomenon whereby the production ofknowledge about the Middle East, Islam and Muslims wasused to justify Colonialism, Neo-orientalism refers nowadaysto the continuity of these discourses on Islam and Islamismas essentialist, monolithic and anomalous phenomena,which still serves as an instrument of political power.

64. Islamism is not just the politicization and ideologizationof religion or “Political Islam”, but a more complexphenomenon entailing also the adherence to Islam as asource of identity and culture. See the excellent studies byFrançois Burgat on Islamism.

65. The academic field has shown great deal of maturity inthe study of Islam in Britain by contrast to sectors ofpolicymakers, mass media, intellectuals and terrorist experts.

66. Expression taken from Mahmud Mamdani referring topro and anti America Muslims.

67. SMC was launched in 2006 with the backing of theBritish government in order to counteract the MCB byputting in question its representation and credibility amongMuslims. They claim to represent the spiritual, mystical andapolitical branch of Islam in opposition to what theyconsider the extremist Political Islam of the MCB.

68. Whine, Michael “The Advance of the MuslimBrotherhood in the UK” Current Trends in IslamistIdeology vol. 2 (Hudson Institute, September 12, 2005);Lorenzo Vidino “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest ofEurope”. Middle East Quarterly Winter 2005; WinstonPickett and Mark Gardner “the Book and the Sword: theMuslim Brotherhood in Europe” Anti-Semitism andXenophobia Today Institute for Jewish Policy ResearchLondon 2005

69. Anthony McRoy From Rushdie to 7/7: theRadicalization of Islam in Britain (London: The Social AffairsUnit, 2006)

70. See constructivist approaches to ideology in the worksof Fred Halliday and James Galvin

71. Awakening understood as the expression of therenaissance and revitalization of Islam in the Muslim worldsince the seventies but intellectually rooted in the XIXcentury. It has been applied to the re-discovered of Islamby British Muslims, as a powerful cultural identity re-affirmation to face contemporary challenges. It emergedwith the institutionalization process in the 80s and 90s andhas taken new impetus since 11/S.

72. Abu Rabi´, Ibrahim, The Intellectual Origins of IslamicResurgence in the Modern Arab World (New York: StateUniversity New York Press, 1996)

73. See the seminal book of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, IslamicAwakening: between Rejection and Extremism (London:International Institute of Islamic Thought, Second RevisedEdition 1991)

74. See the in-depth study about this trend in RaymondWilliam Baker, Islam without Fear: Egypt and the NewIslamists (Harvard University Press, 2003)



Rosa Álvarez Fernández has a BA in Arabic and Islamic Studies from Universidad Complutensede Madrid. She has an MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS, University of London.Currently, she works as a Research Assistant for Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid.


Arun Kundnani

Speaking at a Fabian Society conferencein January 2006, Gordon Brownannounced that he would make the re-

articulation of ‘Britishness’ the guiding ideaof any future premiership. In the past, heargued Britishness could be taken for grant-ed as an authentic feeling of belonging butnow, it needed the State to intervene to posi-tively produce a new sense of nationhood.Being sure about what it meant to be Britishwould help the nation ‘champion democra-cy’ globally and be a ‘beacon’ for freedom,while domestically it would allow a betterresponse to the issues of asylum and immi-gration and improve community relations.The 7/7 terrorist attacks, he added, high-lighted the need for more integration inBritish society. Britain therefore, needed torediscover from history the ‘golden thread’of shared values that binds it together: liber-ty, responsibility and fairness. There neededto be a new emphasis on this national storyin the teaching of history in schools and aBritishness day should be introduced inwhich these shared values should be cele-brated. Behind the podium from whichBrown delivered his speech, a flag pole helpup the Union Jack.

The noun ‘Britishness’ has only entered thepolitical lexicon relatively recently but it hascome to be seen as central to the future ofthe centre Left, a fact reflected in the FabianSociety’s decision to dedicate a conference tothe subject. British nationality had histori-cally been complicated both by the absenceof a clear idea of what it meant to be a citizenof Britain and by the fact that it was a Statemade up of multiple nations (England,Scotland and Wales). However, NewLabour’s politics of national identity har-boured no ambition to genuinely reformBritain’s obscure sense of citizenshipthrough the introduction of a codified frame-

work of rights and obligations. Neither couldnational identity any longer be, as conserva-tives had traditionally held, a reflection of asingular unchanging ethnicity. Rather, thenew conventional wisdom is that a set of‘core values’ is the glue that must holdBritishness together. According to this ‘thirdway on identity’, it was now vital that a‘national story’ be developed by the State tobind the nation together. That national storyhad to show how a set of core values wereembedded in what it meant to be British andnew symbols were needed with which theState could celebrate Britishness defined inthis way. These core values would also be themechanism by which limits could be set onmulticulturalism, while allegiance to thesevalues would be a factor in assessing themerits of different categories of migration aswell as a necessary condition for the settle-ment of immigrants.

It has long been the contention of those onthe right of British politics that culturaldiversity is a threat to national cohesion andsecurity. For the New Right ideologues of the1980s, a non-white presence in Britain wasconditional on its assimilating to a nationalculture, which they took to be an unchang-ing set of norms running through the histo-ry of English political life. It was no surpriseto find right-wing newspaper columnistsadvocating a new emphasis on assimilationafter 7/7, calling on the Government to ‘tearinto those Muslim ghettos’ and to ‘accultur-ate’ Muslims to ‘our way of life’. Like manyothers, Melanie Phillips in the Daily Mailblamed a ‘lethally divisive’ multiculturalism,while Anthony Browne of The Timesthought that political correctness had‘allowed the creation of alienated Muslimghettoes which produce young men whocommit mass murder against their fellowcitizens’.

However, since the riots in Oldham, Burnley

The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism


THE POLITICS OF ANTI-MUSLIM RACISM

and Bradford in the summer of 2001 and the9/11 terrorist attacks shortly afterwards, cul-tural diversity has been attacked equally vig-orously by liberals and by those on the centreLeft. They have argued that an over-toleranceof cultural diversity has allowed Asians innorthern towns to ‘self-segregate’, resultingin violent tensions on the streets of Britain.They have argued that public confidence inthe welfare state is being undermined by thepresence in Britain of immigrants of a differ-ent culture. And they have argued that multi-culturalism has encouraged Muslims to sep-arate themselves and live by their own values,resulting in extremism, and ultimately, thefostering of a mortal home-grown terroristthreat. As a leading liberal commentatorHugo Young wrote, soon after 9/11, multi-culturalism ‘can now be seen as a usefulbible for any Muslim who insists that his reli-gio-cultural priorities, including the defenceof jihad against America, override his civicduties of loyalty, tolerance, justice andrespect for democracy’.

Since 2001, therefore, the existing right-wing critics of multiculturalism have foundnew allies from the centre and left of thepolitical spectrum; all agree that ‘managing’cultural diversity is at the root of many of thekey problems facing British society.

Furthermore, in the cacophony of voices thatmake up this new media-driven ‘integrationdebate’, it is Muslims who are routinely sin-gled out: it is their cultural difference whichneeds limits placed on it; it is they who mustsubsume their cultural heritage within‘Britishness’; it is they who must declaretheir allegiance to (ill-defined) British values.By 2004, the liberal intelligentsia as a wholeseemed to have abandoned its earlier toler-ance of cultural diversity and adopted thisnew ‘integrationism’, which redefined inte-gration as effectively, assimilation to Britishvalues rather than, as Roy Jenkins had statedin 1966, ‘equal opportunity accompanied bycultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutu-al tolerance’. A coterie of New Labour-friend-ly intellectuals and commentators, such asDavid Goodhart of Prospect magazine andTrevor Phillips, former Chair of theCommission for Racial Equality, acted asoutriders for this new position. After 7/7,

integrationist demands reached a new inten-sity. Trevor Phillips spoke of Britain as‘sleepwalking to segregation’. Tolerance ofdiversity, he argued, had led to isolated com-munities, ‘in which some people think spe-cial separate values ought to apply’. Theresponse to 7/7, he added, ought to be areminder of ‘what being British is about’.

It mattered little that segregation, in thoseparts of Britain where it existed, such asOldham, Burnley and Bradford, was not theresult of a liberal over-emphasis on diversitybut an interaction between industrialdecline, ‘white flight’ and institutionalracism. After 2001, that history had been for-gotten and its causality reversed so that itwas ‘Muslims’ who were held responsiblefor refusing to mix, while ‘multiculturalism’was blamed for allowing their ‘self-segrega-tion’. A new doctrine of ‘community cohe-sion’ was introduced which focused on theneed to integrate Muslims. Thereafter, indi-vidual and institutional racisms whichremained the principal barriers to the cre-ation of a genuinely cohesive society,received little attention. The integrationistsmade much of the need to correct the errorsof an earlier politics of ethnic difference. Butrather than challenging the underlyingassumptions of that politics, they merelyreversed its one-sidedness. Whereas the pol-itics of ethnic difference held that any kindof solidarity automatically diluted ethnicidentity, the politics of integrationist heldthat any kind of ethnic identity underminedsolidarity. Both shared the dystopian anddangerous New Right assumption that therewas a necessary trade-off between solidarityand diversity and neither could imagine howsolidarity and diversity could co-exist.

The same assumption encouraged the thesisof a slippery slope from segregation toextremism to terrorism, which was widelyaccepted despite its inconsistency with theactual biographies of terrorists. Of thoseinvolved in terrorism who grew up inBritain, most have lived lives that involved alarge degree of interaction with people fromother backgrounds and seemed to have beencomfortable in the mixed neighbourhoodswhere they lived. Mohammad Sidique Khan,the leader of the 7/7 bombers, was a gradu-



ate who mixed freely with fellow teachersand students from all backgrounds at theprimary school in Leeds where he worked.Friends described him as ‘Anglicised’.Khan’s accomplice, Shehzhad Tanweer,helped his father in his fish and chip shop ina mixed area of Leeds. Omar Khan Sharif,who attempted to detonate a bomb in a TelAviv bar in 2003, was educated at a privateschool in Derbyshire. The most plausibleexplanation for these individuals’ actions is asense of injustice that morphed into anapocalyptic and pathological form throughthe ideology of global jihad. There is nodoubt that part of the appeal of that ideologyis its MAnchaean vision of a ‘them and us’militancy. However, those whose lives arerigidly divided on racial or religious lines donot seem to be any more or less susceptibleto it than those whose lives are more mixed.There is no reason to believe that the reachof this ideology is somehow linked to ethnicsegregation.

In short, a whole raft of problems to do withsegregation, immigration and terrorism arelumped together and misdiagnosed by theintegrationists as resulting from an ‘excess’ ofcultural diversity. This integrationist agendais now increasingly not only a pre-occupationof New Labour but also of David Cameron’sConservative Party. ‘We need to re-assertfaith in our shared British values which helpguarantee stability, tolerance and civility’,Cameron said in 2005. He added that teach-ing history, especially in relation to empire,should avoid politically correct criticisms ofempire so that all children are taught to beproud of British history and values.

The fault line of this new agenda is the per-ceived incompatibility between British socie-ty and Muslim communities in which sup-posedly alien values are embedded. Whilethe anti-terrorist legislation of the ‘war onterror’ institutionalised anti-Muslim racismin the structures of the state, integrationismhas normalised an anti-Muslim political cul-ture. This anti-Muslim discourse in Britainpreceded 9/11 and emerged, in particular, inthe wake of the Rushdie affair. It was thesame discourse that Edward Said spoke of asbased on ‘an unquestioned assumption thatIslam can be characterised limitlessly by

means of a handful of recklessly general andrepeatedly deployed clichés’. Since 9/11,however, it has become a regular refrainfrom high-profile ‘muscular liberal’ colum-nists such as Rod Liddle, Niall Ferguson andMelanie Phillips, who harangue Muslims fora supposed failure to share in the valuesaround which Britishness is thought to coa-lesce: sexual equality, tolerance, freedom ofspeech and the rule of law. Without con-fronting this reality, they suggest Europefaces a gradual ‘Islamicisation’ as increasingMuslim immigration creates Islamic ghet-toes across the continent. The new integra-tionists of the Left rarely challenge suchviews and start from the same point – theperception that there is a threat fromMuslim values embedded in ‘alien’ commu-nities. Their only difference with the Right isthat, whereas the Right is pessimistic aboutthe possibilities of absorbing this alien pop-ulation into modern Britain, the Left integra-tionists feel that Muslims can be assimilatedthrough suitably aggressive policies.

This anti-Muslim political culture has verylittle to do with the ways in which Muslimsactually live their lives or practise their faith.The complexity of faith identity and the dif-ferent levels on which it operates, compris-ing belief, practice and affiliation, is easilybelittled. Nor is there a recognition of themulti-faceted identity that a British Muslimcitizen of Pakistani heritage, for example,holds in which faith, heritage and culturesare separable and potentially conflicting.Instead, to be ‘Muslim’ in the ‘war on terror’is to belong to a group with common ori-gins, a shared culture and a monolithic iden-tity that can be held collectively responsiblefor terrorism, segregation and the failure ofmulticultural Britain.

The ‘Muslim community’ becomes effective-ly an ethnicity rather than a group sharing areligion. Politicians and journalists oftenconfuse religious and ethnic categories byreferring to relations between ‘Muslims’ and‘whites’, as if one is the opposite of the other.At the same time, anti-Muslim sentimentrationalises itself as no more than criticismof an ‘alien’ belief system – hostility to reli-gious beliefs rather than to a racial group –and therefore entirely distinct from racism.



However, such distinctions are underminedby the fact that religious belonging has cometo act as a symbol of racial difference. Thenew official language of ‘faith communities’largely takes faith to be, like race, a destinyset at birth and something that someone canobserve about you from your appearance.There is a truth to this of course faith is notjust a matter of private contemplation butalso to do with belonging to a community,which more often than not one joins at birthand identifiable through distinctive forms ofdress. Nonetheless, in blurring the distinc-tion between faith and ethnicity the alreadyimpoverished language for describing racial,ethnic and cultural differences is furtherdeprived of substance.

The model for this kind of racial ideology ismodern European anti-Semitism. The twen-tieth century European anti-Semites hatedJews, not because of their lack of Christianreligious beliefs, but because they were likeMuslims today regarded as an alien intrusioninto the national homogeneity that modernEuropeans sought. No matter how muchthey integrated themselves into gentile socie-ty, they continued to be perceived as a threatto a cohesive national identity because theiraffiliation to a trans-national religious identi-ty had become the marker of a racial differ-ence. Today, a similar exaggerated dividingline between an ‘alien’ Islamic identity andmodern Britishness serves as the basis fordividing communities into fixed, immutable‘natural’ identities – the hallmarks of aprocess of racism. Those who were onceabused as ‘Pakis’ are now also abused as‘Muslims’. What had before been interpret-ed as a problem of Asians living in separatecultures has, since 9/11, been taken to be aproblem of Muslims living by separate val-ues. The solution to these problematic val-ues is always found to lie in the use of coer-cive force by the State indicating that theyhave been made into symbols of racial differ-ence and that those groups who are per-

ceived as holding them are not being accord-ed their own rationality and citizenship.

The role of the State’s own policies and pro-nouncements under the banner of the ‘waron terror’ is crucial in legitimising this anti-Muslim Racism. While the State’s officiallanguage of race relations prohibits hostilityto persons defined by their (say, Pakistani)ethnicity, the language of the ‘war on terror’legitimises hostility to the same personsdefined by their Muslim faith. What is beingproduced are new stigmatising discoursesthat bypass and undermine existing struc-tures of official acceptability. The shift inperceptions brought about by this processhas been felt intensely and immediately byBritish Muslims in their everyday interac-tions, not just in terms of an increase inphysical and verbal abuse but also in the waythat a whole set of mistaken integrationistassumptions about their very presence inBritain is now aired publicly. People who hadbeen British citizens, occasionally labelled‘coloured’, ‘black’ or ‘Pakistani’, are now an‘enemy within’. Every Muslim in Britain hascome to be perceived as a potential terroristand has had to explain themselves to the restof the country, as if what happened on 9/11was somehow their doing. Ultimately, theimpact of this stigmatising discourse is to bemeasured in the numbers of racially moti-vated attacks. Reported racist attacks onMuslims and those perceived to be Muslimincreased six fold in the weeks after 7/7, andin all eight Muslim men have been killed inracist attacks in Britain since 9/11. The anti-Muslim dimension to such attacks is oftenovert: the gang of youths who murdered aPakistani man, Kamal Raza Butt, inNottingham just days after 7/7 taunted himwith the word ‘Taliban’ during the attack.

Extract from 'The End of Tolerance: racismin 21st-century Britain' by Arun Kundnani,published by Pluto Press (see www.endoftol-erance.com).

Arun Kundnani is a commentator and activist on issues to do with racism, immi-gration and multiculturalism in the UK. He is deputy editor of the journal Race &Class, published by the Institute of Race Relations.

CRISIS MANAGEMENTSaturday 19 January 2008

Practical training on how to react and proactively engage with the media

TRAINER: Andrew Carapiet has worked on the BBC’s Six O'clockand Nine O'clock News with Michael Buerk and Peter Sissons alsoworked with late Jill Dando.

MEDIA INTERVIEW TECHNIQUESTuesday 5 February 2008

Practice radio, press and TV interviews in front of a camera with microphone analysis and professional feedback.

TRAINER 1: Ernie Rea, a full-time broadcaster (incl. 'Beyond Belief'on Radio 4), headed a government-commissioned project to lookinto reporting of the Burnley and Oldham disturbances in the summer of 2001.

TRAINER 2: Gaynor Vaughan-Jones is a media professional of more than 25 years, especially in freelance radio and television production. Both Ernie and Gaynor trained representatives fromThe King's Fund, Lancashire Council of Mosques, UK Skills, Barclays Bank, Muslim Hands, Free Trade and others.

MARKETING & PUBLIC RELATIONSSaturday 16 February 2008

Basic skills of marketing, to engage effectively with the media and create business opportunities.

TRAINER: Geoff Deehan has over 3 decades of broadcasting experience, now helping the Third Sector to work more effectively with the media.

FREEMEDIA &PUBLICRELATIONSTRAININGFor Young Muslimss

REGISTRATIONThe Cordoba Foundation – MMEPWestgate House, Level 7, Westgate Road,Ealing, London W5 [email protected]

The Muslim Media Empowerment Project (jointinitiative of The Cordoba Foundation and TowerHamlets council) is offering a series of free pro-fessional media courses to young Muslims inTower Hamlets. Individuals trained through thesecourses will be expected to help local organisa-tions and Mosques by offering voluntary mediaguidance and liaison

C U L T U R E S I N D I A L O G U E

Westgate House, Level 7, Westgate Road, Ealing, London W5 1YYTel 020 8991 3372 • Fax 020 8991 3373

[email protected] • www.thecordobafoundation.com

arches quarterly

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