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8 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM John N. McMahonDeputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT Report

1. Enclosed is a repor_t_. _or c_o_nvenience ofreference by NFIB agencies, the codeword has beenassigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agentsources of CIA's Directorate-of__Onerations. The word

is-classified and is to be used onlyamong persons authorized to rea and-handle this material.

2. This report must be handled in accordance withestablished security procedures. It may not be reproduced forany purpose. Requests for extra copies of this report or forutilization of any part of this report in any other form shouldbe addressed to the originating office.

7ohn N. McNahon

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Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

Director of Intelligence and ResearchDepartment of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Army

Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, _ IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/USSR

DATE OF DATE 8 October 1980

INFO. March 1980SUBJECT

Miscellaneous: Soviet Military Organization;MBFR Talks; Polish Operational Training

SOURCE Documentary

-Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled"Report on Visit of Polish Armed Forces General Staff Delegationto the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and to the CombinedCommand of the Combined Armed Forces" and classified SECRET OFSPECIAL IMPORTANCE. The subjects discussed during the visitinclude: operational employment and development of the PPR ArmedForces during the next 5-year period; problems pertaining to PPRdefense, operational training, expansion of special commu-nications lines, delivery of armaments and military equipment;procedural tactics of the Vienna.talks; and matters pertaining topreparation and conduct of Exercise WIOSNA-80 [SPRING-80).

Of particular note is the information obtained by the Polishdelegation concerning changes in organization and subordinationmade or envisioned in the Soviet Air Force, National Air Defense,Civil Defense, premilitary and military training, and militarydistrict commands.

End of Summary

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SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSEThe General Staff

REPORT ON VISIT OF POLISH ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF .DELEGATION TO USSR ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF AND THE

COMBINED CONMAND OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

During 25 to 27 March 1980, the Chief of the General Staff(GS), Polish Armed Forces (PAF), with his deputies for operationaland organizational-mobilization matters, the Chief of SignalTroops, and a group of officers of the GS, PAF, paid a workingvisit to the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and the Combined ArmedForces (CAF) Combined Command. In the working consultationsparticipated concerned deputy chiefs of the GS of the USSR ArmedForces and chiefs of directorates of that Staff.

The subjects of the talks were matters pertaining tooperational employment and development of the PPR Armed Forcesduring the next 5-year period, and certain general problemspertaining to the defensive capacity of PPR, operationaltraining, expansion of special communications lines, delivery ofarmaments and military equipment to PAF, procedural tactics atthe Vienna talks, and matters related to preparation and conductof exercise WIOSNA-80 [SPRING-80].

The Chief of the General Staff, PAF, met with the Chief ofthe GS of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal OGARKOV and the Chief ofStaff, CAF, General of the Army GRIBKOV. He also held talks withthe Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Combined Armed Forces,Marshal KULIKOV. At the conclusion of the visit he was receivedby the Minister of National Defense, USSR Marshal USTINOV. Inaddition, taking advantage of his stay in Moscow, the Chief ofthe GS, PAF, also paid a visit to the Commandant of the GeneralStaff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the ArmyKOZLOV, and met a group of PAF students attending the militaryacademy.

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The talks held at the Headquarters of the GS of the USSRArmed Forces and CAF Combined Command provided much datanecessary for properly preparing the plan for development of thearmed forces as a whole and rationally resolving many detailedquestions, especially in the fields of operational planning,organizational-structural planning, and authority planning.-Problems were also defined pertaining to positive finalization ofthe delivery of armaments to the PAF, as well as implementationof provisions of the recently approved CAF wartime statute.

1. On the matter of operational planning, the Sovietcomrades informed us that revision of the plan will take place inmid-1981. This is caused by the necessity of taking intoconsideration provisions of the CAF wartime statute concerningparticipation in this planning of the CINC of CAF of the theaterof military operations (TMO), 'and also by the consequencesresulting from present changes being made in the Soviet ArmedForces in the structural arrangement of the air forces, nationalair--de-fense and-AA-defense, within-th-e-framework of -operat-i-onallarge units. At the same time, they stressed that in operationalplanning, the presently established interrelationship will remainas basic, namely, the GS of the USSR Armed Forces--the GS, PAF,(including also in regard to employment of the Combined BalticFleet and participation in it of the PPR Navy). Detaileddiscussions of agreements on problems of operational planning isincluded in a separate document held at the Directorate forOperations of the GS, PAF. [See Attachment 4.1

With reference to implementation of the wartime CAF statuteMarshal KULIKOV mentioned, among other things, the necessity ofissuing mobilization assignments to officers envisaged forfilling positions in CAF command organs in the theater ofmilitary operations. He also mentioned the instituting ofnational groups at the Supreme High Command. He again brought upthe inadequacy of strength of the Polish Front against the tasksfacing it (particularly of the strength ofeements envisaged assecond echelon of the Front) and the necessity of having agreater number of reserve divisions.

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It was agreed that study of the successive version ofthe protocol on assignment of PPR Forces to the composition ofthe CAP and their development during 1981-85 will begin in June1980 in MOSCOW on the level of Chiefs of GS of PAF and CAF (thistype of meeting with the other armed forces will take placeearlier).

The Soviet comrades did not bring up the matter ofprognosticating and planning the prospective development of thearmed forces--even in the methodological aspect. However, theyshared their experiences in the field of planning of training.The essence of it is issuance every 2 years of concise (about20-25 pages) training orders of the USSR Minister of Defense andorganization guidelines of the Chief of the GS of Soviet ArmedForces for operational training. During the years in'which anorder is not issued, directive guidelines of the Defense Ministerare prepared which precisely define training tasks of the armed-forces. -Deputies of the Defense-Minister issue -each-yearorganizational guidelines for specialist training. They arguedconvincingly that planning of training activities for. time

v intervals longer than 2 years does not pass the test. Withreference to self-education of the cadre, they informed us thatin the Soviet Army it constitutes an integral part of the wholesystem of operational training. Its forms, methods, and typesare presented in Attachment 1. The basic training undertakingsconducted in the main commands and institutions of the USSR ArmedForces for each training year are presented in Attachment 2.(Supervised self-education in central institutions of the Ministryof Defense is organized twice a month, 2-3 hours each, in theNfternoons, during duty hours.

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We were informed that combat and service manuals of staffsof the USSR Armed Forces cannot be made available to us becausework on them has not yet been completed. Completion of this workand issue of manuals is envisaged no sooner than 1981, and forthis reason it was suggested that it is necessary for the Polesto continue their own studies in this field.

The concept of the WIOSNA-80 [SPRING-801 exercise wasanalyzed by the CAF staff and met with general approval andacceptance. Only certain comments on specifics were made, andthese will be taken into consideration in future works. Generalof the Army GRIBKOV was very much interested in the exercise,suggesting that all Polish officers under the Combined Command beincluded in the directing organs of the exercise. Also, a groupof appropriately authorized officers from CAF Combined Commandswould be sent as observers of the exercise. At the same time,Marshal OGARKOV on his part expressed particular interest in themobilization -exercise played within-the -framework of. the - -

WIOSNA-80 exercise, requesting that familiarization with theconduct of the exercise be made possible to a group of officersfrom the GS of the USSR Armed Forces headed by General PolkovnikABOLINS, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR ArmedForces for Organization-Mobilization Matters. It was agreed thattheir presence at the exercise could be combined with consul-tations on establishing a sector for handling technology andtechnical support matters in the PAF for which the Sovietsclamor.

General of the Army GRIBKOV, Chief of Staff of the CAF,expressed praise for the work of the Polish officers assigned tothe Combined Command, pointing out that both sides can be blamedfor not keeping these officers fully occupied because of--amongother things--insufficient information available to them on givenaspects of life and activities of the PAF. In addition, hesuggested that greater attention be paid to health conditions ofofficers assigned to work at the Combined Command (to date, therewere three incidents of death and several officers, because oftheir health status, qualify for retirement).

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2. Much essential and specific data was obtained in thefield of organizational development of the armed forces,preparation of youth for military service, and representation ofdefense matters in nonmilitary elements. In particular, theSoviet comrades informed us on undertaking the following works onstructural-authority changes in the armed forces.

The problem is being examined of structurally combining theair forces and air defense forces and subordinating them to thecombined arms commanders, at least on the operational level. Atpresent there exists, in the opinion of the Soviet comrades,occurrences of duplication of many means appearing independentlyin both branches of the armed forces, but serving the samepurpose.

In three combined arms armies an organic army aviation is beingexperimentally formed, headed by a commander and staff fully subor-dinate to the army commander. The composition of this aviationincludes helicopters, but as may be expected the need is envisionedfor incorporating also assault aviation, including vertical takeoffaircraft. In a solution under discussion, aviation-technical suppliesare provided through the air force channel, however, general suppliesand POL--which is considered particularly important--through thecombined arms channel. It is expected that such organizationalsolutions will permit elimination of basic weaknesses in utilizationof aviation on the operational level, and primarily, on the one hand,the incompetent cooperation of support aviation with ground forces,and, on the other hand, the limited interest in aviation on the partof the combined arms army. Even now positive results are noted fromthe subordination of the commander of the air army to the commander ofthe military district. Marshal OGARKOV described it this way, "thecombined arms commanders have grown up by a head, as far as famili-arity with aviation matters is concerned." In the practicalarrangement of command organs only insignificant changes took place.The staffs retained their structures and remained in their places,only the technical and financial administrative sections werecombined. The essence of these changes consists of total subor-dination of the air army commander to the military districtcommander--as his deputy for aviation matters. In the wartimestructure the current command of the air army will command the frontaviation. The principles of deploying command points have notchanged.

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Similarly, the National Air Defense (NAD) forces disposed inthe area of a given military district were subordinated to themilitary district commander, whereupon in military districtsadjacent to state borders, the NAD forces were combined withdefense troops, creating at the same time a new post of airdefense commander.

They reported the introduction of new divisional TO&E intofirst echelon military districts. Among others, the number ofinfantrymen in tank divisions was considerably increased, whichpermitted increasing the combat strength of a division by 20-30percent.

In the Soviet Army research is being conducted on improvingtechnical support and on the role of the deputy commander fortechnical matters, a position which has been presently introducedon the military district level. The ordfnance and motorvehicle-tank services have been directly subordinated to thisdeputy for whom a staff has also been created. However, thetotal scope of his authority has not been defined with regard totechnical activities of other services (arms of troops). TheSoviet comrades, knowing that we are conducting studies onsolutions to these problems, would.like to arrange closeconsultation (Marshal OGARKOV made this proposal). In turn, theyare ready..tQ advise us on matters of pilot training, however,they-request that we send to the GS of the USSR Armed Forces alist of problems of interest to us, before the group of Sovietspecialists arrives in Poland. Marshal OGARKOV also agreed tohold consultations with representatives of the GS, PAF ontraining of military administrative cadre at the SARATOV TrainingCenter.

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The Soviets reported on the research in progress oncombining militar commissariats of appropriate levels withcivilian defense _CD) staff . By doing so it is endeavored tocoordinate efforts and concentrate under one authoritydecisionmaking on matters such as: organization ofcommunications (to date, communications of the militarycommissariats and CD staffs have been independent), evacuation ofthe population, and utilization of human reserves, vehicles, andthe like. This problem is considered difficult to resolvebecause of various principles for maintaining and financingmilitary commissariats and CD staffs (the commissariats aresupported by the budget of the Ministry of Defense; CD staffs,being nonmilitary elements, are supported by the budgets of *executive committees of the Delegate Councils)-. However, theyhave no intention of forming--on the basis of militarycommissariats or the above-mentioned combined staffs--specificarea commands with subordinate units and with command authorityover . a given -area; these tendancies sometimes appear in the-- - --opinions of certain leadership organs of PAF.

Discussions were also held on the position and authority oforgans for defense matters in civil ministries of the USSR.Elements such as our military departments with real tasks(coordination of military production, performance of services onbehalf of mobilization, the armed forces, and preparation of thedefensive capability of the national territory, as well as civildefense and security) do not exist in the USSR. In the SovietUnion one of the deputy ministers of a civil ministry, togetherwith a special branch subordinate to him, is responsible for theministry fulfillment of tasks on behalf of the armed forces bothin peacetime and wartime. These are civilian elements whichwillingly employ reserve officers. The Deputy Minister ofNational Defense for Equipment and Armament Matters has the rightto inspect these elements.

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Civil defense matters, however, are handled by civil defensestaffs present on the ministerial level and are supervised by oneof the deputy ministers, frequently the same one who isresponsible for the above-mentioned defense matters. In largerenterprises special functionaries are designated for militaryrecords, where particularly strict discipline is applied inmaintaining registration rosters of conscript age youth (duringregistration, data on the conscripts come in from the organ oflocal administration and, in addition, from the place of work orschool--independently of each other). Military representationsat places of work, charged with supervision of special productionand its receipt, are developed to a greater extent than in ourown industry. Two-thirds of the strength of these elements areofficers, even though they are established outside of themilitary norm and are maintained by funds designated for defenseproduction. Distribution of these funds is adjusted annually,and theTO-E ._of the representations are appropriately changed by._the GS on request of the Deputy Minister of Defense for ArmamentMatters. These representations have the right to inspectpreparations for conversion of appropriate industrial plants.

On the subject of division of authority between the GeneralStaff and the Deputy Minister for Technical Matters, the Sovietcomrades fully support the views of the GS, PAF, which favorgiving the GS the leading role in preparation of the five-yearplan. for developing the armed forces in its full dimension--withregard to the plan's basic components (organizational structure,dis osition, basic armament) and the balancing role of thetechnical sector--with regard to preparing lists of requirementsfor armament and equipment, representing the Ministry of Defensein talks with the planning commission and industry in regard toplacing orders, and overseeing production and fulfillment ofdeliveries. The Soviet comrades admitted that under theirconditions incidents also occur of the technical sector trying tooverstep the limits of authority assigned to it.

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At command organs of the central and district level,.essential changes were made in arranging elements directingmilitary education and training outside of the armed forces. Themost important change was instituting at military districtcommands the positions of deputy military district commander fortraining matters outside of the armed forces and a staff section(unit) subordinate to him. The task of this organ is supervisionof military training of students within the framework of militarystudies at colleges, military training of.youth conducted at highschools, training activities of the Voluntary Society forCooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), as wellas responsibility for improving the cadre of military departmentsof colleges and high schools. Also on the central level, theDirectorate for Training outside the military was detached fromthe current Military Training Directorate and subordinated to theDeputy Minister of Defense--the commander of the ground forces.The Military Training Directorate retained the responsibility for -

coordinating training at colleges and officer schools (inmilitary districts, a section with the combat training unit isresponsible for this)..

The changes in establishing authority in the field ofcontrol, described above, resulted in a considerable increase inthe role of military district commanders. In this light theposition of military district commanders stands out particularlystrongly in relation to so-called central disposition units. Allunits disposed in the area of the military district, except unitsof the academy and scientific-research institute type, aresubordinate to the district commander. Only specific activity ofdesignated units, requiring central instructions, is supervisedby appropriate central institutions of the Defense Ministry, andeven in such an event, cadre matters are conducted by militarydistrict commanders. The chief of a central institution of theMinistry of Defense has only the right to appoint the commanderof a given unit (e.g., the commandant of a special trainingcenter).

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Important definitions of authority and accordinglystructural-organizational definitions are being made at theinformatics organs. On the central level, the Directorate forAutomation and Control Points is located at the Main Directoratefor Operations. Its task is development of a concept (idea) ofcontrol with application of automation means. The function ofcentral supply organ (CSO) for technical development and supplyof automation means as well as links and circuits essential fortheir operation, is performed by the Signal Troops Headquarters.However, there are definite differentiations. Automation ofcontrol of the combat means remains a function of commands ofbranches of the armed forces and headquarters of arms of troops,whereas the Signal Troops Headquarters performs, in this case,the function of coordinating CSO. With reference to generalpurpose automation means, including PASUV, the Signal TroopsHeadquarters performs the function of indirect CSO. Within thestaffs of military districts and branches of the armed forcesthere are automation and control point units. _They. are.components of operational directorates or constitute separatesections subordinate to one of the deputies of the chief ofstaff. Subordinate to these units are the electronic computercenters.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the knowledge gained onmatters of military training of youth--including premilitarytraining for performing specific technical tasks in the military.Of particular importance is the fact that the majori.ty of juior...specialists is being trained directly in the unitis~and at theexpense of personnel strenigths of the units. This is in contrastto the Polish Armed Forces, in wh'ih almiost all NCO's and juniorspecialists are trained in TO&E slots (a's a result of whichapproximately one-third of the NCO and junior specialist strengthis continuously in schools); whereas in the Soviet Army, even inthe most complex specialties only 80 percent of the requiredpersonnel are trained, in the air forces--approximately 60percent, in communications--40 percent. The average fluctuateswithin the limits of 40-50 percent, which is 50 percent less thanin the Polish Armed Forces. With regard to specialists trainedoutside of TO&E strengths, the mandatory principle in the SovietArmy is to call up conscripts--with appropriate civilian skilland DOSAAF training--directly to the units where, upon transfer

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of equipment to them by older troops being released to the Vreserve, they are trained within 2-3 months in a temporary,;"extemporaneously organized training subunit.* This practice isfacilitated by a contingency existing in the Soviet legislationfor extending military service of a soldier, which is broadlyapplied to specialists in order to overlap the troops of theolder class with conscripts who are replacing them and to whomthe equipment is transferred (for example, for a conscript calledliup in October, the 2-year service begins in January of thefollowing year, and for those called up in May--1 July).

DOSAAF offers youth training in as many as 18 types ofspecialties. City youth are trained under a system which iscapable of organizing groups for up to 19 days, and rural youth,also under a boarding system for periods up to 3 months. Other.distinct problems are the training of youth for service inmilitary aviation under the 2-year DOSAAF training program andthe training, also within the framework of DOSAAF, of reservepilots, including on MIG-17 jet aircraft. In view of the specialconsultations planned on matters of aviation training and theexpected arrival in Poland of a Soviet specialist group, theabove-mentioned problems were not discussed in detail.

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* For example, drivers of APC's, multiton trucks, ordrivers-electricians are trained for 3 months. The primarysubject of their training is familiarization with thecharacteristics of equipment, knowledge on how to service theequipment of the vehicle, and knowledge on how to drive in acolumn. This is concluded with a practical long distance march.

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Great importance is attached to patriotic indoctrinationattained within the framework of military training of youth inhigh schools. In these schools there is a position of deputyprincipal--director for military training, who as a rule is amale with the rank of reserve officer, frequently trained in aspecial field. Testifying to the importance attached to militarytraining of youth are also the organizational-authorityundertakings previously mentioned, carried out by the leadershiporgans at the central and district levels of the Soviet Army.

The consultative talks cleared up for the PAF thecontroversial matter of arrangement and sizes of mobilizationgroups or nucleus groups for newly mobilized rear units (QM). Inthe Soviet army mobilization groups similar to our own mostfrequently a rear base administrative large unit) are designatedonly if -the unit forming them is. low level and- limited _inpersonnel strength and capability, whereas the unit beingexpanded is- superior in rank, size, and the like (e.g., a smalldepot forming a rear base headquarters). In other instances thecommander, together with the best cadre of the mobilizing unitexisting during peacetime, is designated commander of the unitbeing.formed (e.g., the commander of a hospital is designatedcommander of a hospital base), thus strengthening, to the extentnecessary, specific sections with functionaries for maintainingmobilization documentation, conservation of supplies, and thelike.

In the structure of the operational rear, the Sovietsintroduced the concept of a material support brigade.which isequivalent to our own mobile base of the front (army),eliminating the intermediate control elements (e.g., thetransportation regiment command, which was a component of thebase, was disestablished, leaving only separate battalionsdirectly subordinate to the brigade command).

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We gained full insight into the TO$E of units of.interest tous, particularly those units envisagecT~or formation in the PAFequipped with VEGA and OSA systems, and MI.G-23 aircraft. Thestructures of all units are characterized by considerably moreeconomic organizational construction in comparison with Polishsolutions. In the peacetime TO$E, as a rule, a limited degree ofreduction in strength is applied--including units equipped withVEGA-type equipment (e.g. 1 a'VEGA regiment in peacetime has 548men and in wartime 862). Soviet units are also numerically lesexpanded in comparison with similar PAF units (e.g., a SovietVOLKHOV battalion in peacetime has 109 men and in wartime 142, aPolish battalion has 177 and 134 men respectively; in a Sovietradiotechnical company the P-l radar station has a crew of 8 to10 men, in a Polish company--15). The Soviets also have asmaller number of engineers with college education (e..g., anaviation regiment equipped with MIG-21bis aircraft has 11-engineers, while we have 34).

The method of staffing Soviet units designated forperforming alert duty indicates that the Soviets have anappropriate rotation system in contrast to the full four shiftsappearing in our own National Air Defense forces, a systemexcessively expanded, even for wartime conditions.

During talks on organizational matters, the Soviet comradespointed to the need for a penetrating and highly absorbinganalysis of requirements submitted by interested arms of troopsand services, particularly when new structures are formed and newequipment introduced. For this reason, in order to avoidanswering questions on TO E, investments, and other matters atbilateral specialist consultation, it was agreed, with fullappproval of Marshal OGARKOV, that all consultations onorganizational matters may be conducted only with participationof representatives of the general staffs of both parties.

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3. On the subject of deliveries, most attention during thetalks was devoted to equipment of the Polish Navy. The Sovietcomrades are waiting for an answer to comrade KOSYGIN's lettersent to comrade BABIUCH in March 1980, with reference todeliveries and construction of ships for the needs of the navy.They underscored that this- matter requires decisions on the Statelevel, and that the Soviet side intends to designate a delegationfor the talks headed by comrades GRISHIN and FILONOVICH. At thesame time, they mentioned that plans are underway to send toPoland in April a Soviet delegation for signing an importagreement for delivery of ships and vessels from Poland to theUSSR. They also emphasized that the Soviets had requested thatconsideration be given to the possibility of Poland undertakingconstruction of landing ships of greater displacement, all ofwhich they are prepared to purchase. The Soviet comrades arealso prepared to consider a prospective plan for 10-15 years,proposing construction of naval ships with the cooperation ofthree countries: Poland, USSR, and the German DemocraticRepublic. The Chief of the Polish General Staff expressed theview that this matter could be discussed with comrades GRISHINand FILONOVICH during the visit of the Soviet delegation.

It will be difficult to increase deliveries of aviation fuelfor the needs of the Polish air force. The GS of the USSR ArmedForces suggested that in this matter we once again ask the SovietMinistry of Foreign Trade. The problem of aviation lubricants,in view of the small volume, can be favorably resolved.

Meeting Polish requirements for ambulances on UAZ chassisalso will be unrealistic. The Soviet army also receives them insmall numbers (200 units annually--that is just as many as thePolish side would like to receive annually), in view of which theSoviets use mobilization allocations of vehicles at the disposalof the civilian health service; however, for evacuation ofwounded from the battlefield, theyare preparing special"vehicle-stretchers."

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Marshal KULIKOV mentioned that the problem of constructionof armament works in Libya jointly with Poland is being studiedagain. No obstacles are expected. in the way of joint undertakingof construction of assembly works for certain types of armament.

The Soviet comrades confirmed the need to organize on Polishterritory tropospheric communications for the needs of the GS,PAF, and the GS of the USSR Armed Forces, and in time of war alsofor the needs of the high command organs of the CAF, the front,and the armies. The equipment of the proposed troposphericcommunications, which at this time is undergoing state testing,will not interfere with the television wavelengths, which untilnow constituted a basic obstacle in installing thesecommunications on Polish territory. The communications networkunder discussion on our own territory will require installationof six stations deployed in hardened positions. The estimatedcost of the investment will be approximately 18 million rubles(approximately 1 billion zlotys). Half of the capacity of thestations (approximately 30 channels) could be used duringpeacetime for internal national needs.

With reference to space communications the Chief of theSignal Troops of the Soviet Army will organize for signal troopheadquarters of armies of Warsaw Pact countries a demonstrationin June 1980 on the operation of these means of communications,and will discuss the principle of their use. At present, thesemeans of communications ensure telecommunications with Vietnam,Cuba, and Afghanistan.

4. Soviet views on the subject of VIENNA talks on MBFR inCentral Europe were presented by General Le tenant N.F. .CHERVOV,chief of the newly instituted Legal-Negotiations 1irectorate ofthe GS of the USSR Armed Forces. He stated that the drawn outimpasse and lack of results in the talks is not the result ofOfficial differences regarding data on numbers of troops in thezone of reductdion. The frel'reason is the aspiration of NATOCOUntries to attain military superiority in Central Europe.During the last 2 years alone, these countries increased theirarmed forces by 26,000 troops, and since 1 January 1976, by atotal of 45,000 troops.

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The draft agreement on the subject of first stage ofreduction presented by the delegation of NATO countries on 20December 1979, proposes reduction of USSR forces by 30,000 menand USA forces by 12,000 men, at the same time setting up a broadpacket of confidence building measures. These proposals--considered by the West as compromises--do not constitute a stepforward because NATO countries:

- oppose inclusion into the proposed reduction ceiling forthe USSR of the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks currently beingwithdrawn from the GDR on the basis of a unilateral.decision ofthe Soviet Union;

- practically withdrew from talks on the subject ofarmaments reductions, limiting themselves only to negotiations ofpersonnel strengths of the armed forces;

- demand that within the framework of reduction measures theUSSR withdraw three full divisons from the zone, while the USonly individual soldiers, companies, and at most, battalions;

- do not agree to establish limitations on development ofarmed forces of the FRG and Great Britain, which comprise 75percent of NATO forces, at the same time striving to imposelimitations on appproximately 50 percent of the Warsaw Pact (WP)forces (the FRG in particular does not appprove reduction of itsarmy by even a single soldier or by a single tank);

- oppose freezing of troop strengths during the talks. Thesocialist countries are repeatedly submitting this proposal,considering it an important factor in halting the uncontrollabledevelopment of NATO armed forces;

- by introducing inspections, they desire to legalizeintelligence operations against the WP states.

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In sum, acceptance of the Western proposals would meanagreement to a fourfold reduction of WP troops (50,000 against13,000), which would constitute an indirect confirmation of NATOarguments on decreasing by WP states the numerical data on theirtroops. It would also mean giving NATO states, with theexception of the USA, freedom to continue further expansion oftheir forces in Central Europe.

The WP states cannot accept these conditions. An agreementcan be signed anytime, but only when the NATO states agree to:

- freeze current troop strengths and their armaments duringthe negotiations;

- take into account, within the reductions proposed for theUSSR, the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks being currently withdrawnfrom the GDR;

- reduce personnel strengths in the composition of specificdivisions, brigades;

- reduce troops of the remainder states, particularly the.Bundeswehr, during the second stage.

The February proposal of PPR Ambassador STRULAK, pertainingto updating the numerical data on armed forces strength as of 1January 1980, took the Western states by surprise and thus farthey have not given an answer on this matter. It is assumed thatthis problem, after consultations within NATO, will come upduring the 21st round of talks starting on 12 May 1980. TheSoviet side believes that the Western negotiators will present adetailed breakdown of their forces, including indicators of thedivisional structure, demanding reciprocation on this subject.The WP states should be prepared for' this.

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The correction of the numerical data should show an increasein NATO forces, giving basis for a demand for equal reductionceilings. Breakjgj-the-ieimpass.e will. be. possible.only if. bo.thsides a..gx.ej;o compromise. In the present stage of worsening'inteinational relations, to which suspension of all talks betweenthe USSR and USA is related, VIENNA remains the only negotiatingplane on the East-West line. Therefore it is necessary to seekopportunities to continue the talks.

With reference to the initiatives of Comrade E. GIEREK andG. MARCHAIS pertaining to the European Conference of CommunistParties on the problems of armaments and disarmament, it was.confirmed that the conference would be of great propagandaimportance and that more attention than thus far should bedevoted to it. The WP states should take advantage of weakpoints in the position of the West. It is necessary to point outinvalid arguments of NATO states about the threat of tanks,stating that no war, particularly modern war,. can be conducted byone branch of the armed forces. In propaganda activities, acomprehensive balance should be underscored and not parity offorces between NATO and WP. Even data presented in works ofWestern strategic studies institutes, e.g., of Great Britain andothers,. speak in favor of the existence of such a balance.

In conclusion the Soviets presented for coordination theproposals of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces pertaining tonumerical data on USSR and PPR armed force strengths as of 1January 1980, which will be submitted during the next round ofthe VIENNA negotiations. This data is included in Attachment 3.Durine a critique of this problem in Marshal OGARKOV's office,the Soyiet cmi.ad sproposed tiat during the VITNNA talks Polanddeclare a new cate ory in the nomenclature of the branches of thearmed forces, whic thus far has been excluded from the contextof the talks, 'It would be desirable if the numbers of PPR troopsin this service amounted to 13,000 men. This could be, forexample, the constant and variable strength of aviation. schoolswhich fall into the category of territorial defense units andwhich thus far are not included in the negotiations. At the sametime it was underscored that this sort 'of declaration of a newcategory cannot under any circumstances mean or even imply thatnumbers, thus far concealed, are being disclosed and what

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follows--that Western charges for decreasing the numericalstrength of the WIP armed forces are justified. This would be--asMarshal OGARKOV noted--even more illogical in the situation wherethe withdrawal of 20,000 troops from the GDR is in progress and,at the same time, the number of troops exceeding this number wererevealed on our side. The updating of.data can be understood asan enumeration of a new category of troops which until now hasremained outside of talks but of which both negotiating sideswere aware. It was agreed that this matter requires furtheranalysis and consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,including our delegation participating in the talks, and onlyupon comprehensive consideration, appropriate proposals will bepresented for decision of the leadership bodies of parties andgovernments.

S. In the final stage of the visit, the Chief of the.GS,PAF,-and-his--deputies-were recei-ved by Marshal-USTINOV who wa-s-- --accompanied by the Chief of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces anddeputies for operations and organization-mobilization matters, aswell as the Chief of Staff of-the CAF.

The Chief of Staff, PAF, reported on the national situationsubsequent to the Eight Party Congress and during the elections,and also broadly explained the state of readiness of the PAF,emphasizing the problem of mutual collaboration and Sovietassistance required for resolving successfully matters on theequipping our armed forces, in particular the navy, training ofpilots, and making available a larger number of acceptances bythe K. VOROSHILOV Academy of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces.

Marshal USTINOV stated that in the present situation whereoutright adventurous behavior characterizes our adversaries--itis necessary to be more restrained in contacts with thecapitalist countries and maintain alertness, particularly againstintensified efforts to destroy the unity of the states of ourcommunity.

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Marshal USTINOV stated that he is satisfied with theprogress of work in Poland on starting production of the T-72tank and that development of the defense industry is for variousreasons beneficial and profitable. Limited deliveries withinnational scope are not to be feared--the products of defenseindustry, including e.g., SU-25 aircraft, will find a market inthe Soviet Union, in the Socialist countries, and elsewhere.Assistance in developing coproduction should be wise--it is notadvisable to prepare for production of only simple components,counting on the cooperating partners to deliver the more complex -components. It is necessary to undertake production not only ofthe fuselage of an aircraft but also more complex equipment,e.g., internal gear, sights, hydropneumatic installations, andnaval guns. Polish industry is sufficiently strong to handlethese tasks. Therefore, excessive caution is unnecessary; whenthe need arises--the Soviet side will be ready with assistance,particularly in the beginning. Also,---production should beundertaken by gradual projection of complexity--do not startimmediately with the more complex products. For example, onlyafter overcoming difficulties and developing production of theSTRELA-1 can production in Poland of the STRELA-10 be presentlyconsidered. Similarly, the earliest possible start of productionof the T-72 tank will condition the capability of introducingsuccessive modifications. At the same time, it is necessary toundertake planning on a broader front of new solutions--independently and jointly with the Soviet Union--involving to agreater degree civilian higher schools and institutes, and usingthe great potential of the Military Technical Academy.

In view of the expression of satisfaction of the Chief ofthe GS, PAF, with the successful implementation of theresolutions of the Political Consultative Committee concerningthe high command organs of the CAF, Marshal USTINOV remarked thatthe Supreme CINC, Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV--being a realistic andprecise man, no doubt will ask all of us about the status offulfillment of the defense tasks assigned to us

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While requesting to convey his respects to comrades GIEREK,BABIUCH, JARUZELSKI, and KANIA, he underscored the indispensa-bility of serious talks with comrade BABIUCH on the matter ofdefense needs. One of the urgent and no doubt expensive needs,according to Marshal USTINOV, is expansion of the airfieldnetwork on Polish territory (the Combined Command recommends fiveairfields, of which the construction of at least three should bestarted in the current 5-year period). In addition, he commentedthat he is an advocate of airborne--to some extent aisault-zivisi5,~ which can be usid immediately as was the case inAfganistai. -

With reference to increasing the number of Polish studentsat the K. VOROSHILOV Academy of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces,Marshal USTINOV promised to increase the number by four; betterchances will exist after 1983, when a new building will be turnedover to the academy.

*

The GS, PAF, is currently conducting a comprehensiveanalysis of the information obtained from the talks andconsultations in order to profit from them in the process ofplanning the development of the armed forces during the next5-year period and to improve the system of national defensecapability.

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BASIC TRAINING UNDERTAKINGS Attachment 2

Conducted in Military Districts, Groups of Armed Forces, and Fleetsunder the Direction of Commanders during Training Year 1980

Number ofBasic undertakings conducted during undertakings

No. training year Cycle

In military districts, groups of armed forces

1. Front (army) command-staff exercises Annually 1

2. y (corps) op-tac exercises with troops Annually 1

3. Army (corps) command-staff exercises in the field, when Annually with one 2-4

op-tac exercise not conducted army (corps)

4. Comand-staff exercises with wartime military districts Once every 2 yrs. 0.5(mobilization and civil defense exercises combined

5. Comand-staff op exercise with the air force or na- One exercise for 1

tional air defense (NAD) (involving air force (air air force or NADarmy) and AA defense in the role of trainees) annually

6. Op courses for the leadership cadre Annually I

7. Exercise in the field of rear area or specialist- One exercise annu- 1technical support under the direction of the cam- . ally (successively)

8. Op field trips under the direction of the CO Once every 2-3 yrs 0.5

9. Joint staff training in the field under the direction One exercise an- 1of the CO nually

10. Experimental (research) exercise ~ Once every 2-3 yrs 0.5according to gui-dance from GS orbranches of thearmed forces

11. Tac divisional exercises with troops and divisional Annually 1-2 tac Total of Lcommand-staff exercises (with the remainders under div or command- 2-4the direction of the army or corps CO) staff exercises

12. Tac large unit commanders methodical courses Annually .

13. Courses in the field of mobilization, for leadership Annually 1cadre

14. Comprelensiy. inspection of forces Semiannually \ 2.- (winter-sumner)

15. Scientific-military conferences Once every 2 yrs 0.5

16. Participation in exercise as umpires in other Average once every 0.5military districts 2-3 years

Total undertakings in a year 17-20

Coment: At the expense of decreasing the number of command-staff exercises with armies

(corps, fleets), divisional exercises conducted directly by CO's of military districts,and with the conduct of 501 of two-sided exercises, the number of training undertakingsin a district can be decreased by 4-8.

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M2nRIC/AL Srh1UNC11i

of USSR and 'IR Aimed Forces for the Vienna Talks According of 34 pagesto Strength as of 1 January 1980 (In thousnols of me Attcont 3

-' - Air Force andTotal Incisuling National Air lefense

Previously Currantly Ground Forces-Sagrued upon bling agreed

Total -_ _uding -Agreed __ _- -

. Category Category IIAgreed upon

II( Agreed upo

- Previously Currently Previously Currently Previously Currently Previously Currently -

. USSRl 466.3 445.3 426.3~ 404.8 ~ 344.6 334.4 81.7 70.4 40.5 40.5 .

I 215.9 228 .9 148.6 161.6 115.0 115.0 33,6 46.6 67.3 ~67.3+ 13.013-i + 13.0 /; +3.0

N-strical strength of the Wfest (in thousands of men): presentod by NA10 states acconding to strength as of 1 January 1976, total 981.8 inclmlinug:ground forces--791.5; according to our ealIumtilon a of 1 January 1980, total--1.026.2 including ground forces--833.5.

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Attachment 4

SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

REPORT

in the Field of Operational Planning

The subject of the consultations were problemspertaining to certain issues of operational planning,employment of aviation of the front, and the Polish Navy.

Consultations on subject problems established thefollowing- -

In the Field of Issues of Operational Planning

1. Existing forms, methods, and scope of planning willnot undergo basic changes. We will continue to receiverecommendations and hold consultations in this field withthe GS of the USSR Armed Forces. However, broadening of theauthority of the staff of the Warsaw Pact CAF (CINC of theWestern Theater of Military Operations) in the field ofoperational planning is envisaged.

In the near future the CINC of the Western Theater ofMilitary Operations (WTMO) will study (analyze) thesubstance of tasks of individual fronts on the WTMO, theoperational-strategic groupings, the organization ofdisplacement of forces to assembly areas, and other relatedmatters.

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In this connection, the Soviet side has not given us avalid reply to suggestions and proposals submitted withregard to reviewing the tasks of the Coastal Front (possibleassignment of one axis), elimination of the Central Troopovement Control Groups (CTMCG Nos. 1 and 2), and making newallocations of roads for regrouping forces and the like.The Soviets assured us that these suggestions and proposalswill be taken into consideration in the course of planningwork of the CINC of the WTMO.

The methodology of updating operational documentationwill be defined at a later date.

2. The organization of delivery of nuclear warheadsremains unchanged--in accordance with accepted provisions ofthe obligatory operational.plan (from "WISLA" installa-tions). In addition, the Soviet side confirmed the numberand yield of the nuclear charges. Recommendations are alsoin the process of preparation which are supposed to clarifythe following recurring problems: system of delivery ofspecial ammunition to missile troops and Air Forces, matingof warheads, command and control, communications, camou-flage, and the like.

3. The time of subordination of the forces of.theCoastal Front to the CINC of the WTMO may differ. However,it should be assumed that forces of the front will besubordinated to the CINC WTMO upon attaining full combatreadiness.* This is conditioned by the fact that theNational Command is responsible for bringing the armedforces to full combat readiness.

*Tactical large units and units expanded to combatreadiness, of incomplete strength, but staffed uponintroduction of full combat readiness.

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4. In the Soviet armed forces, on the operationallevel (front, army), the following command and controlpoints are prepared: hardened and concealed on theterritory of military districts from which command andcontrol is exercised during the time the armed forces areattaining higher states of combat readiness; and fieldcommand points (alternate command posts, command posts, andrear command posts).

5. With regard to the proposal that the Sovietsallocate from their own or from the German DemocraticRepublic depots 8,000 tons of ammunition for the needs ofthe front, the Soviets assumed a positive attitude with thereservation that this problem should be 'coordinated with theMain Staff of the GDR Armed Forces.

In<the Field of. Employment of Front Aviation

1. In conjunction with organizational changes inaviation of the front (introduction of air forces of thefront instead of an air army), the role and place of frontaviation in offensive operations remain unchanged. Only therole increases of the present air army commander, whobecomes deputy commander of the front for aviationmatters--the commander of front aviation--to whom also theaviation of the ground forcesis subordinated. The airforces of the front constitute an aviation operational largeunit, similar to the air army, with its own command posts.Positioning of front air force CP's in relation to frontCP's, and the forms of planning, instructing, andrecording-reporting documentation remain the same as in theair army. Also, the responsibility of the front commanderfor preparation, and combat employment of the front air forceincreases.

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2. According to the new concepts, an air operation isconducted in order to destroy (weaken) missile-nuclear andaviation groupings of the enemy, and to gain airsuperiority. An air operation can be conducted under thefollowing conditions: at the outbreak of hostilities (inthe event preemptive operations are conducted by our side;upon repelling an enemy invasion; and in the course ofconducting a strategic offensive operation in the theater ofmilitary operations. In principle, an air operation will beconducted under conditions of operations without use ofnuclear weapons. However, conduct of air operations underconditions of use of nuclear weapons should not be ruledout.

An air operation is directed by the combined armscommander (CINC of theater of military operations). Thefollowing may- participate in the operation: the air forcesof several fronts, air armies subordinate to CINC TMQ, andforces and means of other branches of the armed forces andarms of troops.

It is proposed that during an air operation six toeight massed air strikes will be delivered in 5 days. Theoperation will encompass an area of 1,000-1,500 kilometersalong the front and to a depth of 1,000 kilometers. Toaccomplish the operation, up to 3,000 aircraft may beemployed which can fly 20,000-25,000 sorties.

3. With regard to an airfield network for the Polishair force on GDR territory, it was confirmed that eightairfields are assigned (excluding GUSTROW airfield), ofwhich three airfields are for joint basing with the 16thFighter Aviation Division. It is apparent from availabledata that only five airfields are suitable for use by modernaircraft. Efforts are made (pressure is applied) to havethe Main Staff of the NPA, GDR, expand the airfield networkin the northern part of the GDR.

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4. In reference to the task assigned to the 16th AirArmy (USSR), it was confirmed that operations of the Polishair force assigned to GDR airfields will be supported byground support forces and means of the 16th Air Army duringthe first 2 days, with sorties intensified to two within a

24-hour period.

Our proposals to coordinate material-technical supportproblems directly with the headquarters of the 16th Air Armyin view of difficulties anticipated in conjunction withreconstituting readiness of aircraft in the armament of thePolish air force for successive sorties, as well as the needfor more precise planning of tasks and maneuver--wereconsidered meaningless by the consultants who claimed thatarmy level commands are not involved in operationalplanning. However, the tasks of material-technical supportrendered-to-the PAF air force-by the 16th Air Army (USSR) inthe assembly area are contained in appropriate operationalplanning documents of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces.

At the same time the consultants considered it usefulto conduct flights to airfields assigned to the Polish airforce within the framework of .flights conducted to airfieldsof coordinated action, complying with the principles ofcamauflage, as well as to conduct reconnaissance of theseairfields.

In the Field of Employment of the PPR Navy

The Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF) organized for time ofwar is supposed to be, according to the concepts of theSoviet comrades, a strategic-operational large unit composedof: the USSR Baltic Fleet, the PPR Navy, and the GDRPeoples Navy--higher operational large units.

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The PPR Navy, operating within the framework of theCBF, will carry out tasks independently on a designated axisas well as jointly with the USSR Baltic Fleet and the GDR

Peoples Navy.

In the operational planning involving the PPR Navy, nobasic changes are envisaged for peacetime. Wartime tasks ofthe navy will be determined through coordination between the

GS of the USSR Armed Forces and the GS of the PAF.

In view of the fact that in wartime a new command and

control element will be created in the WTMO, it is possiblethat a need will occur for introducing during the planningprocess certain changes in the field of organization ofcoordination between the forces of the Coastal Front and theforces of the fleets, particularly for sea landingoperations. ---- - -

In the opinion of the Soviet comrades, the problem ofpeacetime contacts among staffs of allied fleets--a problembrought up for discussion during the talks--appears asfollows: in peacetime more frequent than thus far directcontacts between staffs of allied fleets will be necessaryin order to work out detailed undertakings in the field ofunified training of forces and to maintain operationalprocedures in the Baltic Sea. According to the statement ofAdmiral AMELKO, Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR ArmedForces for Naval Matters, the suggestions put forward by theChief of Staff of the USSR Baltic Fleet at the Februarymeeting at SWINOUJSCIE on the subject of participation ofthe PPR Navy in maintenance of operational procedures in theBaltic, "should be understood as proposals which can beaccepted by the Polish side in such a capacity as Polanddeems appropriate. The Chief of Staff of the USSR BalticFleet in peacetime is not, after all, the Chief of theCombined Baltic Fleet."

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Conclusion

The scope of the clarifications obtained during thetalks conducted, and the inclusion of the CINC of the WTMOinto the command and control system indicate the need forholding further consultations in the field of problems ofinterest to us and which arouse operational uncertainities.

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