antonio v. romuáldez - towards a history of the renaissance idea of wisdom

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T o w a r d s a H is to r y o f th e R e n a iss an c e

Id ea o f W is d o m

HE history of Tudor and early Stuart England’, Pro-fessor Mark Curtis writes at the beginning of his bookOxford and Cambridge in Transition 1558-1642, ‘defiesall attempts to characterize it briefly. In the life o f theperiod the old and new were almost inextricably in-

tertwined. They can now be separated only at therisk of sacrificing truth to misleading oversimplification.’1 Indeed, ofthe Renaissance in general the same can be said, and must be said as aprimary assumption by one undertaking the study of the developmentof the period’s ideas. For, as again Curtis observes, ‘Though the revi-sionists who have attempted to make the Renaissance a part of theMiddle Ages may have failed to prove their case, they have demon-strated first that some phenomena, once thought uniquely characteristicof Renaissance culture, were present by more than coincidence in medi-eval civilization and second that important features of medieval thoughtand attitudes persisted as fundamental, constituent parts of the Renais-sance mind’.2 To do justice to their subject, therefore, students of theRenaissance must remind themselves constantly of the significant roleplayed by certain scholastic habits o f mind in the thinking of men of theperiod. Though often bitterly antischoolmen, the humanists neverthe-

less had been educated in a system still permeated by scholasticism. Iftheir approach was mainly grammatical and rhetorical, the fact remains,they could not totally break away from the dialectical methods of theuniversities. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the properperspective by which to view the history of the Renaissance ideas of

wisdom should be one that includes an awareness of the undercurrentsof medieval, and even dialectical, elements in Renaissance culture, andone that is capable o f realizing the really distinct notions of wisdom

recognized by the period’s writers and their audience. Essential to sucha perspective should be the assumption that to men o f the middle ages

1 Mark H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition 1558-1642 (Oxford, 1959), p. 1.2 Ibid., pp. 1213.

[ 133 ]



134 THE RENAI S S ANCE I DEA OF W I S DOM

and the Renaissance, the realm of supernature was the ultimate realityin which man had been allowed a share by a personal and a loving God.

In a quick survey of sapiential tracts from Augustine to Pierre Char

ron, the temptation is almost irresistible to trace in them an evolutionas it were of the idea of wisdom, to observe how in patristic writingsthe wisdom of the ancients was ‘transformed from a pagan and natu-rally acquired human virtue to an attribute of the Christian God and ahuman participation, made possible by grace’,3 and how in the Renais-sance it was ‘secularized, drained, that is, of its religious meanings anddisassociated from Christian Revelation by a conscious return to theantique’.4To succumb to such a temptation would be fatal to an accu-rate understanding of the Renaissance mind; it would indeed be to‘sacrifice truth to misleading oversimplification’ . A careful study o f thetexts will reveal that during the Renaissance, with the exception ofthinkers belonging to the tradition o f St. Augustine or o f the eudaimonist philosophies o f Plato and Plotinus, who retained the Augustiniannotion o f wisdom as solely divinely infused, most writers held at leasttwo fundamentally distinct ideas of wisdom, one an infused grace of

God, the other an acquired virtue of man. The wisdom of the fatherscontinued to exist and be recognized by later ages in the gift of wisdomof St. Thomas and in the divine wisdom of Pierre Charron. But, as weshall see, secularization did transform a notion o f wisdom; natural wis-dom, an intellectual virtue in St. Thomas, took on a directive char-acter. It became during the Renaissance what Salutati speaks o f as a‘new type o f speculation and the study o f a true and moral philosophy’.6

That this transformation occurred partly under the influence of redis-

covered classical authors is not to be doubted; that, however, it signifiesa return to antique or pagan ideals is at least debatable. Though notmany of the humanists were as explicit as Joseph Hall concerning thelimitations o f the moral doctrines o f the ancients,6the essentially Chris-tian orientation of their assumptions and conceptions seems clear.7

3 See, for example, Eugene F. Rice, Jr., The Renaissance Idea of \Visdom (Cambridge,Mass., 1958), pp. 23.

4 Ibid., p. 3.

6 Quoted by Rice, op. cit., p. ix.6 Joseph Hall says in Heaven upon Earth that ‘not Athens must teach this lesson [con-

cerning the true heaven], but Jerusalem’ . In the editon o f Heaven upon Earth and Characters of Vertues and Vices by Rudolf Kirk (New Brunswick, 1948), the quotation is on p .86.

7 The Christian orientation o f their assumptions and conceptions can be readily seen,for instance, in their notions about the state. It has often been said that one of the peculiar



136 THE RENAISSANCE IDEA OF WISDOM

ceased to be an end in itself, having then becom e a human virtue which

could be useful, though not as a necessary condition, towards predis-

posing man for the grace o f divine wisdom. Its ch ief value in scholastic

philosophies lies in its usefulness towards metaphysically indicating theperfection human nature is capable o f achieving. Th e natural virtue o f

wisdom differs from the gift o f divine wisdom in that both its mode

and its object o f knowledge are different from those o f the latter.

Thomas Aquinas writes in the Summa contra gentiles that ‘there are two

modes o f truth regarding our knowledge o f the divine; certain truths

are beyond the ken o f human reason, the truth o f the Trin ity fo r in-

stance; other truths are within the reach o f human reason, for example

the truth o f the existence and the unity o f God (which even the phi-

losophers proved by demonstration, led by the light o f natural reason)’ .9

Divine w isdom is a knowledge o f God ‘not on ly so far as He can be

known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him — That which

is known o f God is manifest in them (Rom. i. 19)—but also so far as He

is know n to H im self alone and revealed to others’.10 Th e tw o ideas o f

wisdom therefore are not m erely complementary aspects o f one and the

same thing. Infused wisdom is know ledge o f God by means ‘o f a certainconnaturality or union with the divine’.11 A man in mortal sin can

possess natural wisdom; he cannot possess infused wisdom.

Apropos o f m y thesis, this paper w ill exam ine the sapiential treatises

o f four men reputedly am ong the more notable secularizers o f the idea

o f wisdom during the Renaissance: C arolus Bovillus, Hieronymus

Cardanus, Pierre Charron, and Jacopo Cardinal Sadoleto. It will reveal

the thoughts o f these men in their proper setting, genuinely Renaissance

in their appreciation o f the secular as we ll as the heavenly ends o f man,and truly Christian in their foundations and aspirations.

9 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 1 ,3,2: ‘Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero suntad quae etiam ratio naturalis pcrtingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, etalia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalislumine rationis.’

10 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, I, 6: ‘Sacra autem doctrina propriissimc

detcrminat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa: quia non solum quantum ad illudquod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. I,19: quod notum est Dei, manijestum est illis) ; sed etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibisoli de seipso, et aliis per revelationem communicatum.’

11 Ibid., 45, 4: ‘Respondco dicendum quod sapientia quae est donum SpiritusSancti, sicut dictum est (a. 2. 3), facit rectitudinem iudicii circa res divinas, vel per regulasdivinas de aliis, ex quadam connaturalitate sive unione ad divina.’



A N T O N I O V . R O M U A L D E Z 137

O f Bov illu s’ doctrines concerning w isdom it has been alleged that he

‘reinforces humanism’s insistence that wisdom is naturally acquired,

adapting fo r this purpose Pico della Miran dola’s idea o f man as a Pro-

tean being w ho has no nature o f his ow n but can freely become allnatures and a similar idea . . . that man can know all things and by

knowing them become them’.12 Bovillus’ D e sapiente has, therefore,

been said to discuss a wisdom w'hich is a ‘selfachieved hum anity . . . in-

dependent o f any peculiarly Christian presuppositions’. 13 Th is, o f

course, is neither the time nor the place to argue the assumption that

Renaissance hum anism wras a philosophical system or m ovem ent which

insisted on the notion o f w isdo m as naturally acquired.14 N o r is this the

time or the place to debate Pico della Mirand ola’ s concept o f m an.15

W e need not detain ourselves in a discussion concern ing Aristo tle’s doc-

trine that ‘anima est quo dam m odo om nia’ . Th at the Stagirite’s teaching

expresses P ico ’ s alleged ideas o f a Protean man is, to say the least, a

matter for argum ent, considering the wealth o f m edieval sources not

on ly com men ting on Aristotle’s doctrine but also making use o f it in

Christian philosophies.16 Needless to say, St. Thomas Aquinas uses it to

the advantage o f his o wn philosophy o f man in the Summa theologiae.17 O ur concern at the m oment is the notion o f w isdom in Bo villus’

thought.

A careful study o f the D e sapiente18 reveals three important considera-

tions about human nature: first, that man is a microcosmos;19 second,

12 Rice, op. cit.yp. 107.13 Ibid., p. 122.

14 On the nonphilosophical character of Renaissance humanism, read P. O. Kristeller,

‘Philosophical Movements of the Renaissance’ and ‘Humanism and Scholasticism in theItalian Renaissance’, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Roma, 1956), pp. 1731and 553 583 .

15 On the debate concerning Pico della Mirandola’s concept of man, read AveryDulles, Princeps Concordiae, Pico della Mirandola and the Scholastic Tradition (Cambridge,Mass., 1941), pp. 105128.

16 M y use of the term ‘Christian philosophy’ is in the sense explained by E. Gilson inhis History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.

17 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, 80, ic and 84, 2 ad 2.18 My references to the Liber de sapiente are from the edition by Raymond Klibansky

which has been included among the appendices of Ernst Cassirer, Indiuiduum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Berlin, 1927). I have also used a microfilm copy of the15 11 edition now at the Harvard University Library.

19 Liber de sapiente, p. 303: ‘Homini omni insunt a natura Substantia, Vita, Sensus etRatio. Est etenim, vivit, sentit et intelligit omnis homo. Ast alii hominum duntaxat utsimplicis Substantie, alii ut Substantie et Vite, alii ut Substantie, Vite et Sensus, alii deniqueSubstantie, Vite, Sensus et Rationis actu atque operatione funguntur.



138 T H E R E N A I S S A N C E IDE A OF W I S D O M

that man has a ‘proper place’ (proprio loco) and a ‘proper dignity’ (suo

fastigio) in the hierarchy o f b ein g;20 and third, that for m an to ‘exist’

m erely ‘l ike a rock ’, or to ‘l ive’ m erely ‘l ike a plant’, or to ‘l ive accord-

ing to his senses’ merely ‘like a beast’ is to fall from his proper place, isto be cast dow n from his proper rank, is to be ‘ unfinished’.21 N o t one

o f these notions is o f pecu liarly Ren aissance vin tage. A ll are ancient and

medieval commonplaces.22 Pico della Mirandola writes in the Heptaplus

‘Unde fit, ut cuncti homines natura et substantia sint similes et speciei equalitate tantumunus Homo: vivendi autem modo, functione et arte varii ac dissimillimi. Alii siquidemmineralibus aut simplicibus elcmentis comparantur, vegetantibus alii, alii brutis animantibus; supremi soli merito Hominum similes, Rationis et habitu et functione rationales,

veri perfectique Homines dictitentur.’

20 Ibid., p. 308: ‘Sunt igitur naturalium capita rerum in triplici differentia: viventiumequidem deorsum et abditum in terra; animalium in medio et ad latus; Hominum sursumet in summo, ad sui ipsorum corporis mundique fastigium.* Also p. 305: ‘Gula sive corporee alimonie irrepressa aviditas hunc a primo propriove loco dejicit in tertium plantisque persimilem efficit. . Also p. 304: ‘Ex camis vero corporisve illecebris fit item Homotriniter Homine inferior ab humanoque fastigio prolapsus in trinam abyssum mergiturinfelix . . .’

21 Ibid., pp. 303304: ‘Etenim cum gemine sint passiones animi, quibus in varia hincinde intranquilla mens divellitur, honoris scilicet appetitio et camis delectatio: utraquehuiusmodi passio trinas sagittas lethali arcu in Animam excutit, trinis veneno madentibusspiculis improvide sauciatam interimit. Nempe ex honoris appetitione Homo, cum supraseipsum extolli, cum medio et sui equalitate fieri superior cupit, in tres immanes scopulosinfaustis ventis propulsatur: in Superbiam, Iram, Invidiam, quas spiritales animi labes vocant. Ex camis vero corporisve illecebris fit item Homo triniter Homine inferior abhumanoque fastigio prolapsus in trinam abyssum mergitur infelix: in Luxuriam, Gulam, Acediam, quas Hominis corporeas esse maculas dicunt.’ Also p. 305: ‘Efficit quippeLuxuries et immoderatus fede libidinis amor Hominem haud bestiis absimilem illumqueab humana sede in brutorum animantium gradum infeliciter exturbat, quandoquidemnil prestantius brutis animantibus adsit quam seminis profusio sueque speciei propagatio.Gula sive corporee alimonie irrepressa aviditas hunc a primo propriove loco dejicit intertium plantisque persimilem efficit, que licet totius sensationis et voluptatis probenturexpertes, officia tamen alimentationis exercent. Porro extrema Acedia Hominem inimuni ultimumque gradum extrudit facitque mineralibus persimilem.

‘Sicut enim mineralia, que in extremo sedent gradu, haud aliud aliquid habent quamipsum Esse nullaque naturali operatione exerceri aut per seipsa dimoveri illis indultumest: ita et quoscunque portentosum Acedie monstrum obsederit, assiduo ferme somnoconsopescunt, ab actu omni et operatione remittuntur, immoti ut lapides perstant, tanquam si simplex Esse sine ulla preclara vi atque laudabilium operationum facultate Na-tura mater illis esset elargita.’ Also p. 319: ‘Sapiens finitus Homo est, id est fine compositus atque perfectus. Insipiens vero infinitus est, inconsummatus, imperfectus. Nempe hieprincipium sine fine, potentiam sine obiecto, vim sine operatione se esse palam ostendit;ille autem principium fini coniunctum, potentiam minime ab obiecto separatam et vimin actu, usu et opere se continentem esse dcmonstrat. Hie rursum est ut oculus in tenebrisaut a re visibili dimotus; ille vero oculorum aciei lumine perfuse ipsique soli, visibiliumrerum fonti, iugiter exposite comparatur.’

22 See, for instance, St. Augustine, City of God, v, 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa

theologiae, 1, 9 1 , 1 ; 96, 2; i®nac, 17, 8 ad 2.



A N T O N I O V. R O M U A L D EZ 139

that the doctrine o f man as a m icrocosmos is a trite saying o f the

schools.23 T hat m an can bec om e like beasts or like plants or like minerals

w e find in the w ritings o f Augustin e, Boethiu s, Thom as Aquinas, and

R o g e r B aco n just as much as in Bo villus and P ico.24Th e first lines o f the De sapiente tell us that man’s essential character-

istics are: substantial, living, sentient, and rational; that is, man exists a

living, feeling, and thinking creature. Infants, the unwise, and the wise

have similar hum an natures.25 T h ey m ay differ in the degree o f the de-

velo pm ent o f their potentialities as creatures o f in te lligence and w ill.

The infant has not yet begun its development towards that perfection

o f its human pow ers o f intellect and w ill (virtute) w hich is the mark o f

the wise man, and the lack o f wh ich is the m ark o f the un wise.25 B o v il-lus refers to the wise man as finished (Jinitus homo) and the unwise as

unfinished ([infinitus): finished or unfinished as the case m ay be as regards

the perfection o f virtue, not n ature.26 T h at is w h y he writes o f men

differing not by nature but by the way they live (vivendi tnodo ) .27 M a n

does not choose to assume the nature o f a rock , o r a plant, or a beast; he

becomes com parable to these, according to Bo villus. W h en a man

chooses to act like a rock or a plant or a beast, he degrades himself; he

falls ‘ from that rank pro pe r to m an ’ and is ‘u nh ap py ’ .28 H e is cast dow n

fro m his first or pro pe r place.29

23 Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, Pr. ad lect., p. 8, quoted in Avery Dulles, Princeps

Cottcordiae, p. 113.24 See Boethius, De consolations philosophiae, iv, 2 and 3; Roger Bacon, Moralis philos-

ophia, ed. Eugenio Massa (Zurich, 1953), pp. 5557‘, St. Thomas Aquinas, Sumrna theologiae, iFii®0, 64, 2 ad 3; that sin renders man comparable to minerals, vegetables, andbeasts is the basis of much symbolism in the “ Inferno” o f the Divine Comedy.

25 See note 19 above. Also Liber de sapiente, pp. 310311: ‘Manifestum ex his, quediximus, est hominem trifariam tribusve de causis Hominem posse did. Aut enim homo simpliciter est Homo, hoc est ex humano corpore et rationali Anima confiatus’, quopacto homo omnis est Homo, tam Insipiens quam Sapiens, tarn infantulus quam qui virile robur est consequutus. Hie enim Hominis modus est a natura, quo inter sensibiles substantias humana species quartum efficere gradum comprobatur. Aut Hominem quidem vocamus eum, qui perfectasui corporis accepit incrementa quique vir actu evasit; quopacto infans et puer Hominesminime dicuntur. Aut denique Homo est, qui animo maturus est virtuteque perfectus; quomodo neque infans neque insipiens vir Homines sunt, sed studiosi soli atque sapientes. Est enim studiosus Homo omnifariam sive triniter Homo: Homo inquam natura, Homo etate et Homo virtute.Qui autem studiosus non est: hie tantum bifariam Homo esse potest; nam et etate et na-tura Homo. Qui autem etate non Homo est, ut infans: hie unice duntaxat, hoc est a na-tura, Homo esse declaratur, etate autem et virtute non Homo.’ Italics added.

26 See notes 21 and 25.27 See note 19 above.28 See note 21 above.29 See note 20 above.



140 T H E R E N A I S S A N C E I DE A O F W I S D O M

T h o u gh the wise m an is indeed like a god on earth,30 B ov illus is quick

to remind us that man is not, and cannot choose to be, God. Man is at

best the true, no ble, an d substantial im age o f the eternal, first, and nat-

ural G od from W h o m he has received both substance and virtue .31There are truths be yon d the reach o f human po wers, the truth o f the

Trinity for example. No wise man, no philosopher, no magus could

attain these truths b y means o f the natural light o f the hum an intellect.32

M an b y h im self cannot achieve the supernatural— that which is b eyon d

the realm o f created natures, his o w n included. B ov illus does w rite that

human w isdom is capable o f kn ow ing not on ly itself but also something

o f the angelic and the divin e.33 B u t he m akes clear a fe w pages later that

divine w isdom , G o d’s kno w ledge o f H imself, can be reached by man

on ly throug h the m ediation o f C hrist.34 W h en he therefore claims that

man can k n o w the divine, his mean ing is ob vious. H e is m erely repeat-

ing St. Paul’s statement in Romans i. 1920 that something can be

known about God through created things. Bovillus is clear, moreover,

w hen he says that hum an w isdom alone cannot but leave us ‘ hungry

and thirsty*. W h at w e hun ger and thirst for, the lifeg ivin g nourish-

ment, on ly divine w isdom can give .35 Th e closing w ords o f the D e sapiente exhort man to turn to God, ‘ from whom all l ight proceeds’, i f

30 Liber de sapiente, p. 318: ‘Sapienti in promptu adcst suiipsius numerus; partes omnessuas apprehendit: corpus, Animam. Congruum in seipso Nature ordincm servat, ut hecpars dominetur, ilia huic famuletur. Cunctas animi vires naturalesve potentias atque fac-ilitates iuxta seipsas metitur; illam cunctis prefert ac super omnes excolit, qua ad immortalitatem et beatitudinem via illi reseratur. Vivit denique in terris ut Deus alter . . .*

31 Ibid.: ‘Vivit denique in terris ut Deus alter: etemi, primi naturalisque Dei—a quo et

Substantiam et Virtutem mutuavit—vera, precipua et substantial imago.’32 Ibid., p. 358: ‘In huius autem summe ac supersubstantialis omnium cause, beatissime

trinitatis cognitione et sacratissima fide merito pre ceteris gloriari possunt Christicole,quod archana ilia, suprema et eminentissima veritas, que a condito mundo omnem latuitheresim sive gentilium sive Hebreorum, quam nulli mundi sapientes, philosophi et magiper mundanam sapientiam naturali intelligence lumine rimari potuerunt, que nullis velpaucissimis prophetarum sub nubis et caliginis temp us innotuit, sibi solis adaperta ac dilucidata sit. Solus inclytus Christianorum dux, novo et insolito sydere e virginis uteroortus in mundum, tante scientie (hoc est divine trinitatis) lumen e sydereis sedibus inorbem terrarum advexit, solus divine substantie numerum et fecunditatem palam edocuit

atque publicavit.’33 Ibid., p. 374: ‘Humana vero Sapientia ultima est Sapientia ac tryas; est enim trium

entium cognitio: Anime, Angeli, Dei.’34 See note 32 above.35 Ibid., p. 410: ‘Humana etenim doctrina nos ut plurimum ieiunos relinquit atque siti

bundos. Divina autem Sapientia esca eiusmodi est, “ que” , ut Bigus ait, “ satiat vivo pectora nostra cibo.” ’




he is to be granted a share in perfect and consummate wisdom.36

Cardanus, it has been asserted b y some, ‘m irrors every va riety o f

Renaissance wisdo m . In the confused mass o f the ten folio volum es o f

his works he defines it variously, calling it piety and theology, meta-physics or a know ledge o f pure forms, a universal human kno wledg e

w hic h includes every liberal and mechanical art. H e defines it finally, as

the art o f livin g lon g and v irtu o us ly.’37 It has been further claim ed that

‘W itho ut e xp licitly rejecting his other definitions, he . . . devotes his

ch ief attention to this [the idea o f w isdom as the art o f living lon g and

v irtu ously ]’ .38 It has been proposed in conclu sio n that in him , as in a

num ber o f other authors o f the Renaissance, w e see the ‘progressive

transformation o f the idea o f wisdo m . . . secularized in its source, in its

object, and in its end. Its source is no lo ng er G o d but m an or Nature*.39

Th e texts, ho w ev er, indicate first that Card anus recogn izes at least four

ideas o f w isdo m 40 o f w hich on ly the tw o h igher notions need concern

us here: the one divine, the other natural, the former being absolutely

superior to the latter; second, that he dwells at great length on natural

w isdom fo r a reason that is so und at least to Chris tian philoso phers .

Th at he should ‘de vote his ch ief attention’ in the De sapientia to nat-ural wisdo m Cardanus e xp licitly adm its.41 He is eq ually e xplicit w hen

36 Ibid., p. 4 11: * “ Age igitur, o Homo” , ut sacer Dionysius suadet, “ cognoscentia etprovida corda gerens sursum erigere. Agnosce patrem luminum, a quo lux omnis proeedit suique motus initium sumit.” Ac ne pro iis, que non sunt, ipsum ens verum unquampermutes: cuius sapida et suaveolens agnitio vera est, perfecta et consummata Sapientia/

37 Rice, op. cit.y p. 166.38 Ibid., p. 169. 39 Ibid., p. 177.40The four ideas of wisdom which Cardanus recognizes are: divine wisdom, natural

wisdom, human wisdom, and demonic wisdom. He divides the De sapientia according tothese four kinds o f wisdom. My references to the De sapientia are from a microfilm copyo f an edition of Cardanus' works now at the Harvard University Library, Hieronymi Cardani medici Mediolanensis De sapientia libri quinque. Eiusdem de consolatione libri tres, alias aeditiy sed nunc ab eodetti authore recogniti. Eiusdem, de libris propriis, liber unus (1544).

41 De sapientia, sig. e ir: ‘Ergo nimirum est o Sfondrate optime veram Aristotelis illamfuisse sententiam: Maximam partem eorum que scimus, minimam esse illorum quaeignoramus: Si de cunctis rebus, atque manifestissimis, adeo pauca etiam imperfectacognoscimus. Atque ideo si vel arte aliqua, vel studio, divina sapientia nobis adveniret:superflua certe omnis alterius sapientiae tractatio foret: Verum cum adeo pusilla, atque

exigua, ut ne vestigium quidem humano generi concessum esse videatur: illaque quantulacunque sit, nulla industria nullave solicitudine nobis pateat: cogimur non solum dealiis abundc, verum de ipsa parte admodum scribere. Est enim prorsus audacis imo temerarii consilii, velle alios docere que nescias, et ea scribere quae ignores. Quamobrem obhanc causam non solum, verum etiam quia quae scriberem cum difTicillimum esset intelligere, longe tamen difficilius esset scribere quae sentirem, divinae sapientiae historiabrevissima evasit.’



142 THE REN AIS SA NCE IDEA OF W I S D O M

he explains w h y his ‘history o f divine wisdom must be very b rie f’.41 It

is not that he considers natural w isdo m superior or m ore perfective o f

man, or the on ly valid notion o f wisdo m , but that he know s little o f

divine w isdom . Cardanus, it seems, is fully aware o f the fact that divin e wisdom is essentially an element o f the central m ystery o f the Christian

faith. Since it is a free gift o f G od to be given w here the spirit wills,

Cardanus feels he cannot hope to gain k no wledge o f it b y diligent study;

and it would be foolhardy ‘to wish to teach others what you do not

kn ow , and to write about wh at yo u are ignorant o f ’.41 Indeed, he states,

i f it could be ours either b y a certain art or by study, all treatises on other

wisdoms would be superfluous.41 In Card anus’ mind the distinction be-

tween divine wisdo m and natural wisdom remains real. D ivine w isdom

stands supreme, is the loftiest goo d o f man. Th ere should be no doubt,

Cardanus writes, that divine wisdom comprehends the highest happi-

ness o f m an.42

Since man has not been granted the ability to achieve even a small

part o f divin e wisd om by his ow n efforts, he is forced to seek that kind

o f wisdom which is with in his capabilities, difficult and com plicated

though it be; seek it man must with all his po w er and with the greatestindustry.43 B y that wisdom man can at least be rid o f those evils wh ich

are within his powers to overcome, or keep and strengthen the good

that he can by his own faculties retain and deve lop .43 Tha t w isdom is

natural wisdom , the art o f living lon g and virtuously. In Cardanus’

doctrine, it embraces those things which pertain to the good life: the

virtues o f the soul, good health, integrity o f the senses, the consciousness

o f a go od life, h onesty, and love , w hich w e call friendship.44 It seems

fairly obvious that natural wisdom presents man with a proximate end,

42 Ibid., sig. C3V: ‘Ergo nulli dubium esse debet, sapientiam divinam summam hominisfoelicitatem comprehendere.”

48 Ibid., sigs. e ire iv: ‘Nanque quod ad subiectam rem pertinet, cum omnia quae abaliis tribus continentur late ipsa amplexa sit: si vel eius portio aliqua digna nobis nota foret: vel tarn exiguae partis adipiscendae ratio aliqua pateret: sane multo maiorem diligentiam in ilia, multoque minorem in reliquis explicandis laborem impendissemus. Verumcum vel ob nostram inertiam, aut pravitatem, vel naturae humilitatem neutrum horumconcessum nobis sit, cogimur quanquam rem arduam ac multis modis implexam, totis

viribus summaque industria pertractare. Atque ut altius parum repetam, cum omniumeorum quibus nulla medicina adhiberi potest malorum, una sit ratio sapientiae consolatio:de qua alias in tribus libris disseruimus, reliquum est ut hie vel de malis quae tolli aliquaarte possunt, vel de bonis parandis aut retinendis sermo ipse instituatur.’

44 Ibid., sigs. I2rl2v: ‘Ergo naturalis sapeintiae institutum, quod ad beatam pertinet vitam, animi virtutes, bonam valetudinem, integritatem sensuum, conscientiam rectae vitae, honestatem et amorem, quem amicitiam nuncupamus amplectitur.’



A N T O N I O V. R O M U A L D E Z 143

something to strive fo r in this life. It, o f course, does no t rule o ut a hope,

implicit throughout the treatise, fo r the grace o f divine wisd om from

the abundant love and me rcy o f God . A fter all, in spite o f the five per-

fections natural w isdom can confer on man,45 the supreme felicity, thehighest peace, the highest security man can ever know lies in the know l-

edge and lov e o f G o d ,46 and h ow else can w e kn ow and love G od i f not

by divine wisdom ?47 Indeed, the fruit o f divine wisdo m is a long , secure,

and supreme happiness.48

Pierre Ch arron , according to some, ‘com pletes the Renaissance secu-

larization o f the idea o f w isdom ’ .49 In his thought, it is said, ‘W isdo m

and Christianity . . . are totally independent____W isdom is an autono-

mous and naturally acquired moral virtue. R eli gio n is a gift o f grace,

“ a pure gift o f G od , wh ich w e must desire and ask for h um bly and

ardently, and prepare ourselves fo r as well as we can by the exercise o f

the moral virtues and an observation o f the law o f nature” .*50 Lo oked

at from the perspective offered in this paper, Charron’s position in the

history o f the Renaissance ideas o f wisdom is changed considerably.

The notion that he is a ‘secularizer* o f wisdom in the sense that he con-

tributes towards reconverting ‘wisdom from its Christian service*81becomes untenable.

Th e preface o f the second edition o f Charron*s De la sagesse52 contains

45 Ibid., sig. b v: ‘ Quinque enim seopi esse videntur illius qui naturali sapientia praeditus est, animum eruditione et virtute excolere, corporis vires servare, vitae commodapraestare, personae decorem tueri, honestatem sic in cunctis operationibus praeferre, utnihil iure reprehendi queat.’

46 Ibid., sig. d6V: ‘Ergo summa hominis foelicitas, summa quies summa securitas estdivina sapientia. At divina sapientia erit Deum cognoscere, diligereque.’

47 Ibid.: *. . . aut quomodo Deum cognoscemus sine divina sapientia?’48 Ibid.: ‘Fructus est diutuma, secura, ac summa foelicitas, quae homini in hac vita possit

contingere/49 Rice, op. cit.yp. 20$.50 Ibid., pp. 204205.51 Ibid., p. 205.52 My references to the De la sagesse are from a microfilm copy o f the 1604 edition now

at the Harvard University Library: De la sagesse trois Jwres (Paris, 1604). The warning tothe readers is on pp. 2122. ‘Bien veuxie aduertir le lecteur qui entreprendra de iuger decet oeuvre, qu’il se garde de tomber en aucun de ces sept mescontes, comnie out faict

aucuns en la premiere edition, qui sont de rapporter au droit & devoir ce qui est du faict: Au faire ce qui est du juger: A resolution & determination ce qui n’est que propose,sccoue, & dispute problematiquement & academiquement: a moy & a mes propresopinions, ce qui est d’autruy, & par rapport: A l’cstat, profession, &r condition extcme,ce qui est de l’esprit & suffisance interne: A la religion & creance diuine, ce qui est deI’opinion humaine: A la grace & operation sumaturelle, ce qui est de la vertu, & actionnaturelle & morale: Toute passion & preoccupation ostee, il trouuera en ces sept points



144 THE RENAISSANCE IDEA OF WISDOM

a word of warning to the reader, a precautionary measure prompted,it seems, by misunderstandings concerning the first edition. Some o fCharron’s readers apparently saw in the first edition what some scholars

today seem to have read into it, ‘the transformation by which the Ren-aissance reconverted wisdom from its Christian service, stripped it of itstranscendent meanings’.63 The author consequently seems to have feltobliged to make certain qualifications in the preface to the second edi-tion which was published about three years later. He says in effect thathis subject in the De la sagesse is that wisdom ‘which is proper to naturaland moral virtue’,64 not that wisdom which is proper to ‘grace andsupernatural inspiration’,64and that the reader should not confuse thetwo orders. One is not to read into the treatise a secularized notion of

wisdom; rather, one should realize that it is a secular kind o f wisdomthat the writer wishes to discuss.

Manifestly taking great pains to avoid further misunderstanding,Charron limits his subject in the preface of the second edition in a man-ner not as oversimplified as it had been in the first edition. He begins byreferring to the three kinds of wisdom: divine, humaine, and mondaine.ib

In the De la sagesse, he writes, allusions will not be made to the mundane wisdom except to condemn it.66 Nor does he intend to write aboutdivine wisdom; philosophers consider it purely speculative, having todo with the knowledge o f principles, first causes, and even of GodHimself. The philosophers’ idea of divine wisdom is really metaphysi-cal. It resides wholly in the understanding, of which it is the perfection.It is the highest o f the five intellectual virtues. Man can possess it thoughhe be lacking in honesty and the moral virtues. Theologians on the

other hand speak of two distinct species o f divine wisdom, one acquiredby study and the other freely given by God as one of the gifts o f theHoly Spirit. The latter is the subject of the first of Charron’s trois verites and of his discourses in theology.67

It follows, Charron writes, that the subject of his book is human wisdom, not as it is commonly understood but as described and defined

bicn cntendus, dcquoy se resouldre en ses doubtes, dequoy respondre a toutes les objec-

tions que luymesme & d’autres luy pourroint faire, & s’esclarcir de mon intention ene’et ceuure.”

53 Rice, op. cit., p. 205.54 See note 52 above.55 De la sagesse, p. 2.56 Ibid., p. 3.61 Ibid., pp. 34.




by philosophers and theologians in their moral doctrines.58 The phi-losophers, in Charron’s estimation, handle this subject more sweetlyand pleasantly than the theologians primarily because it belongs prop-

erly to their field of studies, which is nature.58Human wisdom, accord-ing to Charron, is a ‘droitture, belle & noble composition de l’hommeentier, en son dedens, son dehors, ses pensees, paroles, actions, & tousses mouuemens e’est excellence & perfection de l’homme commehomme, e’est a dire selon que porte & requiret la loy premiere fondamentalle & naturelle de l’homme, ainsi que nous disons vn ouurage bienfait & excellent, quand il est bien complet de toutes ses pieces, & quetoutes les regies de 1’art y ont este gardees’.59 Human wisdom, in thelast analysis, is founded on the natural law: ‘e’est a dire la raison pre-miere & vniuerselle loy & lumiere inspiree de Dieu’.59In both the firstand the second editions, Charron explains why his treatise must deal

with human wisdom alone: ‘If I had undertaken to instruct men for thecloister and the retired life, that is, the evangelical profession, I mustnecessarily have followed the advice of the theologians; but my bookprepares one for the civil life, forms a man for the world, that is to say,

to human wisdom, not divine.’60Nothing in his words suggests that hehas little or no regard for either the cloister or divine wisdom.From what we have seen of the De la sagesse we can safely conclude

that Pierre Charron holds diverse ideas o f wisdom, each basic in itsorder. The subject of his treatise is human wisdom. O f divine wisdomhe has already treated in his theological works. The latter remainsChristian in Charron’s thought just as the former retains its humanisticassociations.

Religion in Charron’s treatise on wisdom is, as in the doctrines o f thescholastics, a requirement o f the natural virtue o f justice, a purely nat-ural obligation. Considered as such, religion obviously is a constituentelement of human wisdom. According to Charron, it is the first dutyo f the wise man.61 Hans Baron, in a revievvarticle on the ‘Secularization

58 Ibid., p. 5. 59 Ibid., p. 8.60 Ibid., p. 7: ‘Si i’eusse entreprins d’instruire pour le cloistre, & la vie consiliaire, e’est

a dire profession des cotiseils Euangeliques, il m’eust falu suyure, adamussim, les aduis desTheologiens, mais nostre liurc instruit a la vie ciuile, & forme vn homme pour le monde,e’est a dire a la sagesse humaine & non diuine.’

61 Ibid., p. 378: ‘Les preparatifs faits, & les deux fondemens jettcs, il est temps dc bastir& dresser les reigles de sagesse; dont la premiere & plus noble regarde la religion, &seruice de Dieu. La piete tient le premier lieu au rang de nos deuoirs, & est chose de tresgrand poids; en laquelle il est dangereux & tresfacile de se mecompter & faillir.’



146 T H E R E N A I S S A N C E I D E A O F W I S D O M

of Wisdom and Political Humanism in the Renaissance’,®2 explains

quite soundly why Charron should stress the natural aspect o f religion

and wisdom in the De la sagesse: from the experience of the religious

wars in France and, later, in most European countries, ‘in alliance withthe rise o f natural science, there was to originate before long an effort to

discover a neutral, secular sphere in every field—a natural ethics, anatural law and politics, eventually a natural religion’.63 Charron never-

theless is definite when he writes that though all religions claim to be

the true and Godsent one, we all know that Christianity is the truereligion.64It is Christianity, not religion in general, that is a gift o f God.

In conclusion, it seems clear that in spite o f his stress on natural wisdom

and natural religion, Charron in the De la sagesse still holds that Chris-

tianity is the true religion based on revelation, and that it is, as the true

religion, closest in its essence to the notion of divine wisdom .65If‘wis-dom and Christianity . . . are totally independent’,66 therefore, it is only

because human wisdom is totally independent o f the true religion;even St. Thomas Aquinas would accept such a judgment as this, and

perhaps he would give the examples of Plato and Socrates to demon-

strate the point. Divine wisdom, however, is essential to the Christianreligion.

That in the De laudihus philosophiae67 the ‘wisdom o f Sadoleto . . .

[should be] the culminating virtue o f the natural man’68 is not to be wondered at or to be seized upon as evidence for a secularization process

undergone by the idea o f wisdom, since the subject o f the treatise is

philosophy. Indeed Sadoleto’s thesis is that wisdom, or philosophy by which man acquires wisdom, like similar notions found among pagans

and Christians, is the highest virtue within the grasp o f unaided human

62 Hans Baron, ‘Secularization of Wisdom and Political Humanism in the Renais-sance’, JH I xxi (i960), 149150.

63 Baron, op. cit., p. 150.64 De la sagesse, p. 381: ‘Mais Ton n’est point en doute ny en peine de sijauoir quelle est

la vraye, ayant la Chrestienne tant d’auantages & de priuileges si hauts & si authentiquespar dessus les autres, & priuatiuement d’icelles. C ’est le sujet de ma seconde verity, oil estmontre combien toutes les autres demeurent au dessous d’elle.’

65 The true religion is closest in its essence to the notion o f divine wisdom since in a

sense, a very real sense, Christianity is a participation in God’s knowledge o f Himself.This truth is contained in the mystery of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ.

66 See note 50 above.67 My references to the De laudihus philosophiae are from a microfilm copy of the 1543

edition now in the University o f Toronto Library: Jacobi Sadoleti de laudihus philosophiae libri duo (1543).

68 Rice, op. cit., p. 92.



A N T O N I O V. R O M U A L D E Z 147

reason. Philosophical wisdom is not, however, the only or the highest

notion of wisdom recognized by the cardinal. While he praises it for

being perfective o f man in terms o f his natural potentialities so that by

it man is capable of achieving his natural end, which is the contempla-tion o f tilings divine, Sadoleto, in his encomium o f philosophy as well

as in other works, is explicit concerning its inability to help man reach

his supernatural end, the Beatific Vision w'hich is a participation in

God’s knowledge of Himself. The real distinction between human

knowledge o f the divine and divine knowledge o f Himself as shared

with man, we shall see, remains in the mind o f Cardinal Sadoleto.

It must be noted that Sadoleto begins his praise o f philosophy with a

clear reference to the distinction betw'een philosophical wisdom and

divine wisdom. The very first lines of the prefatory letter to a friend,

while expressing the author’ s highest esteem for philosophy, refer to a

‘sacred’ doctrine by which one can gain a ‘true knowledge o f God’ not

only preserved from the weaknesses and disorders proper to human

nature, but also more certain and containing more tniths about God

than philosophical wisdom.69 In lines which are a virtual summary o f

St. Thomas Aquinas’ thesis in Summa contra gentiles i, 4 concerning thenecessity of revelation, Sadoleto reveals his awareness of the fact that

though human reason is capable o f great things—even a knowledge o f

the divine—human nature being what it is, grace still has to intervene

if man is to achieve the perfection he has been destined for by his Creator.

Speaking o f the relationship between philosophy and the true religion

in reply to an objection made earlier in the dialogue, Sadoleto suggests

that philosophical wisdom aids in, rather than detracts from, predispos-

ing man for receiving the gift o f faith. And in this faith alone grantedby God to us who venerate Christ His onlybegotten Son is the salva-

tion of man and the teachings for right living on earth and for eternal

life in heaven.70 To embrace as fully as he can these very same sacred

69 De laudihus philosophiae, p. 3: ‘Omnis, Mari Volacerrane, quae ad bene beateque vivendum pertinet doctrinae institutio, ducta primum milii quidem a Philosophiae praeceptis videtur esse: atque ab eius facultate disciplinae, quae in contemplatione rerum naturalium, & moribus ad virtutcm fingendis, constitucndisque ceniitur. Post autem his

literis, quae quemadmodum sunt, sic etiam vocantur sacrae: in quibus vera Dei percipiturcognitio cum aucta & corroborata, turn ad extremum ex variis fluctibus iactationibusque

vite, quas nostra imbecillitas fert, ad stabilem certamque spem immortalitatis conversa,atque translata.’

70 Ibiil., p. 189: ‘Qui si praeter has communes Philosophiae rationes, quae similitudinem8c imitationem praepotentis Dei insinuant nobis atque proponunt, ilia quoque praetereamaxima atque amplissima eiusdem Dei beneficia in genus humanum cognoverit: quae



148 T H E R E N A I S S A N C E I D E A OF W I S D O M

teachings wh ich prom ise the true k no w ledg e o f G od , the cardinal de-

cides to forsake philosophy. The De laudibus philosophiae, for all its

praise o f philosophical w isdom , is, one m ust remem ber, a valedictory

delivered, as it w ere, b y a man loo kin g back from the threshold o f the-o lo g y .71 A fter all, Sadoleto asks elsewhere, tow ard s wThat end m ust a

m an d irect his life and those lives entrusted to his care i f n ot tow ards

that ‘W isdom , w hich, springing from the heart o f the Father w ith

w h o m it is linked in indisso luble unio n and harm ony b y the sp irit o f

love , manifested itself lon g ag o to illum ine the life o f m en; and though

it remained none the less unmoved in the Father’s being, yet bestowed

itself up on us, so as to arouse in us w h o w ere cast d o w n in the dust, and

had no u pw ard glancing thoughts, the sure hope o f hea venly blessings

and immortal life? For to that is due all perfection, which is to be con-

templated best in the T rin ity.*72 O f this w isdo m Sad oleto w rites in his

Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans in terms that definitely em-

phasize tw o crucial points about its nature: first, that it is a gift o f G od

freely given to man throu gh a certain con naturality w h ich is a result o f

un ion in love , and second, that divine w isdom has to do w ith the deep-

est secrets o f G o d ’s ow n w isdom , thus indicating that it is G o d ’s kn o w l-edge o f Him self, som ething, therefore, beyo nd the reach o f m an’ s

natural powers.73

It seems fairly obvious that wh en Sadoleto w rites o f philosophical

w isdom and divin e w isd om he is refe rrin g to tw o totally distinct v ir

uni tantum generi, nominique nostro, qui Christum filium unigenum Dei colimus, &profitemur, proprie ac singulariter data sunt: quod in hac una religione & salus hominibusest, et vera beatae vitae in terris ratio, in coelo immortalitatis adeptio: nedum per Phi

losophiam, a pura & integra religione non deflexerit, quemadmodum tu Phaedre, dudumcalumniabare: sed magis in ea etiam statuetur, & confirmabitur.’

71 Ibid., p. 4: ‘Ac nos, qui (ut tu ipse optimus testis es) harum artium utranque adama vimus semper, & nunc quidem iam in alteram hanc, quae nostrae & personae propria est,& religionis, tanquam in portum vela deflectere, & pleno cursu contendere cogitamus---- '

72 I have used the translation by E . T . Campagnac and K. Forbes o f Sadoleto’s De pueris recte instituendis (Sadoleto on Education, London, 1916). The quotation is from p. 84.

73 M y references to Sadoleto’s Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans are from theeighteenthcentury Verona edition: Jacobi Sadoleti Cardinalis et Episcopi Carpentoractensis viri disertissimi, Opera quae extant omnia (Verona, 17371738). The passage mentioned is

Opera, iv, 3, col. i.Cf.also 2, col. 2. ‘Nostra vero haec, quae sola veram in se continetsapientiae facultatem, sacrarum rerum, litterarumque cognitio, tametsi ea summis, atquealtissimis divinorum consiliorum mysteriis referta est, nullis tamen ingeniis, nisi credulis,atque simplicibus percipiendam se praebet, genereque novo instituendi, et docendi priuspersuasos vult esse sectatores sui, quam aliquid illis ipsa persuadeat, prius ut credant, quamdoceantur: prius ut ament, quam noverint plane, quid illud sit, quod ante omnia illis estamandum/




tues, the one having for its object God’s knowledge of Himself, theother having for its object man’s knowledge o f the divine as humanreason discovers it in creation;74the one ultimately founded on the in-

fused theological virtue o f charity, the other really based on the devel-opment of the intellective faculties of man. Emphasis on one does notrule out belief in the other. The fact that Sadoleto stresses that wisdom

winch is within our powers to develop should not suggest that he hasrejected the notion of that wisdom which we can but hope and pray for.

Granted the perspective offered in this paper, certain conclusions which provide a necessary foundation for studies towards an accuratehistory of the Renaissance ideas of wisdom become evident. At leasttwo fundamentally distinct notions o f w'isdom were recognized by thethinkers of the period: the one supernatural, derived essentially fromScripture and Christian dogmatic tradition; the other natural, borrowedfrom classical sources and developed by Christian philosophies o f themiddle ages. During the Renaissance, an idea of wisdom did undergosecularization. The natural virtue of wisdom was, as it were, rescuedfrom the hands o f disputatious scholastics and hawked in the market-

place in order that it might exercise directive influence on the affairs ofmen. The period’s stress on this new ‘study of a true and moral philoso-phy’ is not to be construed as a result of w'hat has often been alleged asa rejection o f the supernatural or as the extension o f human nature andpowers to divine magnitude. The tendencies of the Renaissance in gen-eral towards fideism led its thinkers to refrain from speculating on divine w'isdom which, they seem to have been well aware, was in the lastanalysis an essential element of the mystery of the Christian faith.

Prompted nevertheless by the universal need for moral reform, the menof the Renaissance seem to have thought it profitable to teach the worldthat w'isdom which every one could study and cultivate. This extraor-dinary interest in natural wisdom might have led to the repudiation ofdivine wisdom in centuries to come; that such a repudiation, however,occurred during the Renaissance is yet to be proved conclusively. Onemust not ignore the fact that even in their many writings on the wise

74 To appreciate fully Sadoleto’ s realization of the limitations of human knowledge without grace, read his discussion on how man can know things divine in the De laudihus philosophiae, pp. 165 ff. Here he stresses that man can know only as much of things divineas his reason can reach. To explain his point o f view, Sadoleto compares the relationshipbetween human reason and things divine to the relationship between our power o f sightand the sun. Human knowledge of the divine is at best indirect just as human eyes can seethe sun only indirectly.



150 T H E R E N A I S S A N C E I D EA O F W I S D O M

life on earth, Renaissance thinkers rarely failed to distinguish the wis-

dom o f their treatises from that w'isdom about which they, perhaps

prudently or perhaps humbly, considered themselves unqualified to

write. What has been shown o f Bovillus, Cardanus, Charron, andSadoleto in this paper is indeed true o f other writers o f the period. For

while extolling human w'isdom, whether implicitly or explicitly, these

men were praying with that English poet, w'hose major poem can in a

sense be thought o f as a book on w'isdom, for that highest grace, a share

in the wisdom o f God, that ‘soveraine dearling o f the Deity’ , o f Whom

Non e . . . wo rthy be, but those wh om shee

Vou ch sa feth to her presence to receave, And letteth them her lo vely face to see.75

Ateneo de Manila University a n t o n i o v . r o m u a l d e z

73 Edmund Spenser, ‘An Hymne o f Heavenly Beautie’ (The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, ed. J. C. Smith and E. de Selincourt, London, 1957), 11. 253255.

antonio v. romuáldez - towards a history of the renaissance idea of wisdom

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