Antiochos III in ThraceAuthor(s): John D. GraingerSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1996), pp. 329-343Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436430Accessed: 23/08/2010 09:50

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ANTIOCHOS III IN THRACE

In 197 BC Antiochos III's campaign along the coast of Asia Minor, part of his war with Ptolemaic Egypt which had begun in 202, was completed when his fleet reached Ephesos'. His main field army had been sent on ahead by land to Sardis2. He thus had on hand a fleet of 100 warships and 200 other vessels, and an army of about 35,000 men. During the winter a detachment of the army occupied Abydos, on the Hellespont3; in the spring the rest of the army marched to Abydos and Antiochos himself sailed with the fleet to the Thracian Cherson- ese; the army was transported from Abydos on the Asian side to Madytos on the European4. Antiochos III was invading 'Europe'.

This was the beginning of a major series of campaigns, and it also marked a major step onwards in the relationship between the Seleukid and Roman em- pires. Attention has been focussed overwhelmingly on the latter of these, which of course led to a major war, but this attention has not always been fruitful5. The collision of the empires was the culmination of the first Roman eastern adven- ture, but in the process of arguing about the negotiations which began at Lysimacheia in 196, and which led to war in 192, the activities of Antiochos in Thrace have been very largely ignored. The apparent lack of source material is some excuse for this, but in fact I hope to show that there are enough indications in the sources to enable the outlines of Antiochos' work in Thrace to be discerned, at least tentatively. Detail is mostly unobtainable, but the broad outlines can be drawn. Once his achievement in Thrace is understood, then the context of the negotiations which began in the autumn of 195 at Lysimacheia can be better appreciated. So the object here is to discover just what Antiochos did in Thrace.

I He used it as his winter quarters (Livy 33.38.1); for its importance, see Pol. 1 8.40a. 2 Livy 33.19.9-10. 3 Seleukid troops at Abydos while Antiochos was still wintering at Ephesos: Livy 33.38.4:

they will have reached it by land from Sardis. 4 Livy 33.38.8-9: by the time Antiochos had sailed from Ephesos to Madytos, the army had

already reached Abydos. 5 The most influential recent discussion has been E. Badian, "Rome and Antiochos the

Great: a Study in Cold War", in id., Studies in Greek and Roman History (Oxford 1968), 112-139, which contains full references to 1959: for later references see CAH VIII2, bibliography; the account of the Roman-Seleukid collision in that volume (by R. M. Errington, pp. 274-289) is essentially based on Badian's version; I intend to consider the whole matter again, and this article may be considered a preliminary study.

Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996) C) Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart

330 JOHN D. GRAINGER

As Antiochos pointed out later to the Roman negotiators, his dynasty had a long connection with Thrace6. The founder Seleukos I had been murdered in the Chersonese on his way to Lysimacheia7; he was travelling to take up the kingship of Macedon at the time, having defeated and killed his predecessor Lysimachos at Koroupedion. Seleukos's son Antiochos I made an initial at- tempt to break into Thrace and continue his father's work by making himself king in Macedon, but he was foiled by a local alliance of naval powers and never got another chance8. The irruption of the Galatians into Asia Minor and the distracting war with Ptolemy II prevented further Seleukid work in Thrace, and he effectively resigned any claims to Macedon by allying with Antigonos Gonatas. Antiochos II, however, had campaigned in Thrace with some success in the 250s, only for his Thracian possessions to be lost to Ptolemy III after his death in 2469. The Seleukid usurper Antiochos Hierax had been killed in Thrace in a final attempt to retrieve his lost fortunes'0. All this was sufficient evidence of Seleukid interest in the area, and demonstrated a continuing claim to rule there. It also, of course, constituted a series of clear warnings of the dangers and difficulties and frustrations involved in attempting to campaign in Thrace.

When Antiochos III arrived at the Hellespont, moreover, besides his hered- itary interest, he could have made a powerful argument that the area was masterless and anarchic, and that it required a strong hand to calm things. In the past twenty years several regimes had come and gone. The Keltic kingdom of Tylis, centred somewhere in Thrace inland of Byzantion, had collapsed about twenty years before, releasing the suppressed ambitions of Thracian tribes'". The feeble Ptolemaic control of the Chersonese and several other nearby cities had been overthrown by the violent campaign along the coast and into the Propontis by Philip V of Macedon in 20312. In turn, Philip's defeat at Kynoskephalai in 197 had forced him to withdraw and so had left no-one in control. The Aitolian League had had influence in some of the cities3, Bithynia had gained control of others14, and the Attalid monarchy had advanced else-

6 Livy 33.40.-5; Antiochos, in fact, is said only to have cited Seleukos I, not the later kings; this weakens his argument, though it may be Livy's editorial hand at work.

7 App. Syr. 62; Memnon, FGrH 434 F 8; Pausanias 1.10.2. 8 Memnon, FGrH 434 F 9-10; W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford 1911), 162-164. 9 Polyainos 4.16; E. T. Newell, Coinage of the Western Seleucid Mints (New York 1941),

337; E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus (London 1902), vol. II 176. 10 Justin 27.3.9-11 and Trogus, Prol. 27; Porphyry, FGrH 32 F 8; Polyainos 4.17. 1 1 Pol. 4.46.4 and 8.22.1. 1 2 Pol. 15.21-24; F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge 1940), 112-117. 13 Aitolian alliances existed with Lysimacheia, Calchedon and Kios (Pol. 15.23.8); Kios

even had an Aitolian as commander (ibid. 4). 14 Prusias gained Kios after Philip sacked it: Pol. 15.23.10.

Antiochos III in Thrace 331

where'5, but all these had concentrated on the Chersonese and the Asian side. In Thrace itself the Greek cities of the coast had long suffered from the attentions of both the Kelts and the Thracians. Byzantion had had to pay protection money to the Kelts of Tylis, to the value of eighty talents annually towards the end'6, and by recouping itself by taxing the trade passing through the Bosporos it had provoked a naval war with Rhodes and others'7. The city of Lysimacheia, at the root of the Chersonese, had been sacked by Thracians only a year or two before Antiochos' arrival'8. The powers involved - Rome added itself to the others within a few weeks of Antiochos' invasion - and their successive failures to establish any sort of permanent control over any part of Thrace, demonstrated not merely the difficulties, but also the attractions and the overall and wide- ranging sensitivity of the whole area.

The south, Asian, coast of the Propontis was the less troublesome when Antiochos arrived, but even that was bad enough. Prusias of Bithynia, the city of Kyzikos, and the Attalid monarch had established their power over most of the coast and the inland territories. Antiochos himself had inserted his power at Abydos but his forces had been repelled from Lampsakos'9, though their attack there had been no more than a tentative probe. No doubt Antiochos' plans included the incorporation of Lampsakos, but the matter was not urgent, and for the moment the city was left alone20.

The north, European, Thracian, coast was a much greater problem, and was the one which Antiochos addressed straight away. He landed at the small city of Madytos, directly across from Abydos, from which he brought over his army21. There was some initial resistance from the Madytenes, but the approach of Antiochos' siege machines swiftly persuaded the defenders to surrender. All the neighbouring cities of the Chersonese then gave in quickly, without waiting to be attacked. The citizens clearly preferred Antiochos' rule when the only real alternative was the Thracians. The movement to surrender was general through-

15 In the Troad especially, where Alexandria Troas, Ilion, and Lampsakos were independent but allied to the Attalids: R. E. Allen, The Attalid Kingdom, a Constitutional History (Oxford 1983), 58, 61, and 169-170. Antiochos' attack on Lampsakos took place after the death of Attalos II and so in a time when the city's alliance with the Attalids had been disrupted.

16 Pol. 4.46.3-4. 17 Ibid. 46.5-47.5. 18 Livy 33.38.10-12. 19 Ibid. 4. 20 It was not under active attack as is sometimes claimed (e.g., Errington in CAH V1112, 271:

the city was 'invested'). The lack of urgency at the situation is shown by the unwilling- ness of leading Lampsakenes to undertake the embassy to Massalia and Rome: Syll.3 591.

21 Livy 33.38.9.

332 JOHN D. GRAINGER

out the peninsula, though only the city of Sestos is named by Livy, apart from Madytos; no community in the Chersonese resisted22.

Antiochos decided to rebuild and repopulate ruined Lysimacheia. This city comrnanded the narrow neck of the peninsula, and its destruction by the Thracians had left the whole peninsula exposed to their raids - no doubt one of the main reasons for the rapid acceptance of Antiochos' authority by the vulnerable communities. Antiochos used his own soldiers for the task of re- building the city, by which process we must understand a refortification of the walls and the acropolis and a rehabilitation of the main public buildings, and he set about finding and freeing the former inhabitants. Some of these had been scattered and enslaved by the Thracians and these were to be ransomed and returned; others were living in the cities of the Chersonese as refugees and were to be collected and reinstated; also, new citizens were to be recruited23. Until the city was defensible, Antiochos left half his army there, together with 'all the naval allies' - presumably naval contingents from the Greek cities of Asia Minor and from Phoenicia - as simultaneous garrison and builder's labourers, and took the other half into Thrace on a combined reprisal raid and preliminary campaign of conquest24.

The reconstituted city was linked to Antiochos by a new treaty25. This envisaged Lysimacheia being a base for further operations by the king and his army, and at the same time ensured local self-government and defined the areas of competence of the two contracting parties. The treaty is clearly a document specific to Lysimacheia, that is, it is not a 'charter' of a type supplied by the Seleukid chancellery to all the cities who became allies of Antiochos. Indeed, those students who have studied the inscription recording the treaty in detail have been at a loss to find close parallels, and one suggestion has been that the nearest is a treaty between Pharnakos I of Pontos and Chersonesus Taurika, with a second possibility that 'the ultimate model may perhaps be ... a treaty [of Lysimacheial with Ptolemy'26. Neither of these suggestions is in any way convincing. Some confusion has also been caused by the lettering of the inscription, which has seemed to some to be typical of the time of Antiochos II rather than his grandson27, but is perhaps best explained as a local peculiarity, or perhaps as a provincialism28.

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 10-13. 24 Ibid. 14. 25 P. Frisch, Die Inschriften von Ilion (Bonn 1975), no. 45; E. Tasliklioglu and P. Frisch,

"New Inscriptions from the Troad", ZPE 17 (1975), 101-106. 26 E. Piejko, "The Treaty between Antiochos III and Lysimacheia", Historia 37 (1988), 157. 27 J. L. Ferrary and P. Gauthier, "Le trait6 entre le roi Antiochos et Lysimacheia", Journal

des Savants (1981), 327-45. 28 Piejko (as in n. 26) 161-164.

Antiochos III in Thrace 333

These peculiarities, in fact, make the existence of an individually negotiat- ed treaty between the king and the city a virtual certainty, but there were other cities in the area as well, and arrangements to regulate relations will also have had to be made between them and the king. Madytos and Sestos are both noted in Livy's brief account, but there were also other Greek communities in the Chersonese which had surrendered readily to his forces - Kallipolis, Alopokon- nesos, Elaios, for example, and others. Each of them made its agreement with the king separately, though in the case of these smaller cities the process was no doubt handed over by the king to his officials. Antiochos set off into the interior with half of his army.

Antiochos' purpose, according to Livy, was to ravage the nearby part of Thrace29, which suggests a fairly narrow ambition, But other evidence suggests that Antiochos achieved something of much greater geographical import. His real intention was scarcely a mere ravaging. In general terms he aimed at the conquest and occupation of all Thrace. Nothing less can be expected of the conqueror of Koile Syria and the restorer of the eastern empire of the Seleukids.

Antiochos' method of preparation for such campaigns was by now well established. He had, after all, been campaigning annually for a quarter of a century, and with remarkable success. His method of conquest shows a consist- ent pattern: having chosen his victim, he recruited a local ally whose existence and activity could distract the main enemy. In his great eastern campaign, an alliance with the Indian king Sophagasenos had kept Baktria quiet while he dealt with Parthia, and then Baktria was attacked when similarly isolated30. A variation on this was to suborn a subject or subjects of the enemy, used first on a small scale in the attack on Seleukeia-in-Pieria in 219, where the Ptolemaic governor of that city was paralyzed by the defection of his subordinate offi- cers3 1, and on a larger scale when he broke into Ptolemaic Syria the next year by bringing two key Ptolemaic officers over to his side32, and again in 202 when he suborned the governor of Koile Syria33. It was, of course, an updating of Odysseus' method at Troy. In the Thracian campaign, the Greek cities of the coast could perform this function to some extent though their geographical positions and general weakness made them more suitable as beachheads than as sources of vulnerability for the Thracians. A better Trojan Horse were the surviving remains of the Keltic inhabitants of Thrace.

29 Livy 33.38.16. 30 The key to this is the description by Polybios of the later alliance with Sophagasenos as a

'renewal' (Pol. 1 1.39.11) which necessarily implies an earlier alliance; Antiochos was also allied to Parthia after his war there (Justin 41.5.3).

31 Pol. 5.60.1-2. 32 Ibid. 61.3-5. 33 D. Gera, "Ptolemy son of Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War", Ancient Society 18 (1987),

63-73; J. D. Grainger, Hellenistic Phoenicia (Oxford 1991), 98.

334 JOHN D. GRAINGER

The Keltic invasion of 280 - 277 had left two Keltic communities in the Thracian area. In the east, the kingdom of Tylis had operated as a terrorist overlordship, living on raiding and blackmail: a particular target, and a notably lucrative one, was Byzantion. The rebellion of the subjugated Thracian tribes had destroyed the kingdom as a political entity about twenty years before Antiochos' invasion34. Polybios describes the Kelts of Tylis as being 'annihilat- ed', but this is likely to be an exaggeration; certainly there remained Kelts in the Balkan area even after Tylis' destruction.

The location of Tylis is uncertain, but somewhere in the Vize region, close to or in the Istranca mountains, is a favoured suggestion. The one serious geographical indication is given by Polybios, who implies that the establish- ment of the new kingdom in the 270s was especially dangerous to the Byzan- tines35. These Kelts were, however, by no means the only ones in the Thracian area. There were still groups on the move for decades, like the Aigosages who crossed the Hellespont in the 220s, to take service with Attalos II and whom he settled in the Troad in 21836.

Within the Balkan area archaeological discoveries locate the main centre of Keltic settlement well inland. In 278 one of the bands of Kelts which split away from the main force had settled near the Danube. Their descendants formed the later kingdom of the Scordisci, who fought the Roman governors of Macedonia fifty years after Antiochos' time. The connection is made explicit by one source37. The archaeological evidence suggests that the centre of the kingdom was astride the Danube, in the area later called Dacia Malvensis on the north side, and on the south the land which straddles the boundary of the later Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Moesia, where there is a dense concentration of remains of Celtic type38.

34 Pol. 5.46,4: a brief history of Tylis (all that is possible at present) is in M. Domaradzki, "L'Etat des Keltes en Thrace avec capitale Tylis et en Asie Mineure-Galatia", Pulpudeva 3 (1980 for 1978), 52-56.

35 Pol. 5.46.2-3. 36 Pol. 5.78.5-6; they were settled in the Troad, where they made nuisances of themselves

and were destroyed by Prusias of Bithynia; Attalos, having settled them, abandoned them. 37 Athenaios, 6.234b: the Scordisci are claimed by the former Yugoslavia; J. Todorovic,

Kelti u jugoistocnoj Evropi (Belgrade 1968), English summary at 161-90, and B. Jo- vanovic, "The Scordisci and their Art", Alba Regia 14 (1975), 167-71, but it is clear that only modern international boundaries separate this territory from those identified by Zirra and Papazoglu (next note).

38 V. Zirra, "Le probleme des Celtes dans l'espace du Bas-Danube", Thraco-Dacia 1 (1976), 175-82, especially the map, p. 179; F. Papazoglu, The Central Balkan Tribes in pre-Roman Times (tr. M. Stansfield-Pohovic, Amsterdam 1978), 271-391, on the Scordis- ci; J. Collis, The European Iron Age (London 1984), 23-5.

Antiochos III in Thrace 335

The reason for discussing a defunct kingdom and a future power, neither of which can have had relations with Antiochos, is to show that Kelts did not vanish from the Thracian scene with the destruction of the Tylis kingdom. There were Keltic communities in Thrace before and after Antiochos' cam- paigns, and hence they were there during them as well. And it is these Kelts who are the prime candidates to be the ally of Antiochos III in these Thracian campaigns. The source for this is Appian. He is, one must admit, never the most reliable of witnesses, but in this case his words are worth taking into account39. He gives a summary of Antiochos' activity in Thrace, emphasising his connec- tion with the Greek cities, and he also describes his alliance with the Galatians, which he acquired 'by gifts and fear', and from whom he also recruited soldiers. The context makes it quite clear that Appian is referring to Thracian Galatians, not to the more familiar Galatians of Asia Minor. These can only be either the survivors of the defunct Tylis, or the predecessors of the Scordisci in the central Balkans. Either would be ideally placed to be Antiochos' ally against the intervening Thracians. Antiochos had already employed Galatian mercenaries. They formed a regiment in his army in the battle against Molon in 22140, and were also present at Magnesia in 19041. The presumption must be that most of these soldiers were recruited from the Galatians of Asia Minor, though the remnants of the Tylians would also provide a ready source of manpower. Such men would be useful sources of information about conditions in Thrace, even useful as envoys. He also employed Thracians, at Raphia42 and later at Magne- sia43. Other sources, of a less useful sort perhaps, were the Greek cities, whose opinions of both Kelts and Thracians might well have interfered with the accuracy of their information.

Whether or not the Kelts of Thrace were Antiochos' allies from the begin- ning, the Greek cities certainly were. He already controlled the cities of the Chersonese. At the other end of the Straits, on the Bosporos, Byzantion had long had to buy off Thracian and Keltic raids. The city controlled the Bosporos - whence the resources for such a massive tribute. Appian also notes Antio- chos' alliance with the Byzantines, in words which suggest that their geograph- ical position on the Straits was decisive45. The only reason for this mention of the Bosporos is the access the strait gave to the Euxine, which creates a presumption that Antiochos used that access, once an agreement had been reached with Byzantion. Antiochos' fleet is not mentioned after it was used to

39 App. Syr. 6. 40 Pol. 5.53.2. 41 Livy 37.40.5 and 13. 42 Pol. 5.39.6. 43 Livy 57.40.8 and 11 ('Trallians'). 44 Pol. 4.46.4. 45 App. Syr. 6.

336 JOHN D. GRAINGER

transport his army across the Hellespont and some of its men used to help rebuild Lysimacheia, but it surely did not sit at the Hellespont for the whole campaigning season doing nothing. At the very least his ships provided Antio- chos with a means of communication with the coastal Greek cities; more enterprisingly, they could transport units of the army to make landings in the enemy rear, or to install garrisons in the cities, or bring supplies to the land forces. Antiochos had used his ships in all these roles in past campaigns: there is no reason to suppose he ignored the maritime possibilities at the Straits.

All this, including Appian's words, implies the negotiation of an alliance between Antiochos and the Byzantines and with other Greek cities. Byzantion was a notoriously independent city46, and the achievement of an agreement by Antiochos is a tribute to his diplomatic skills - and as much, perhaps, to the Byzantines' perception of the locus of real power. This will have been another individually negotiated treaty, in which the Byzantines no doubt safeguarded as much of their independence as they could in the face of the implied threat of the lord of Asia. It may also, as one phrase in Appian suggests, have provided for the extension of Byzantion's city territory at the expense of the nearby Thrac- ians47.

To summarize, these indications show that Antiochos cast his diplomatic net wide: he was solidly based in Lysimacheia and the Chersonese, and allied with Byzantion at the other end of the Straits; the alliance here suggested with the inland Kelts meant that the Thracian tribes of the interior were thus sur- rounded.

There are other indications of the extent and scale of the campaigns Antio- chos conducted. One of the Roman envoys sent to interview Antiochos was L. Cornelius Lentulus, who arrived in the area whilst Antiochos was still on his first campaign in 196. Unwilling to wait, perhaps intent on being the first on the scene - he had been sent to the king by the Senate, whereas the other envoys had other tasks as well - or maybe aiming to discover just what the king was up to, he went on to Selymbria on the Propontis48. There he failed to contact Antio- chos, and eventually returned to Lysimacheia. But he clearly went to Selymbria in the first place because he believed the king to be nearby, no doubt on information from Seleukid officers at Lysimacheia. Since Lentulus apparently made no effort to move from Selymbria inland in order to reach the king, the latter was clearly a long way off. Antiochos in fact returned to Lysimacheia by

46 It retained libertas and immunitas for some time in the Roman period: H. B. Mattingly, "Rome's Earliest Relations with Byzantium, Heraclea Pontica and Callatis", in A. G. Poulter (ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (Nottingham 1983), 239-252; it defied Severus four centuries later, to its destruction.

47 This is suggested by Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), in the form of a question, p. 190, note 5.

48 Livy 33.39. 1.

Antiochos III in Thrace 337

land, that is, through Thrace, reaching the city about the same time as Lentulus on his return from Selymbria49. Given the relative speed of sea and land travel, this puts Antiochos on the march somewhere between Selymbria and the Chersonese when Lentulus missed him, but also so far inland that it was not worth Lentulus' while trying to reach him. The campaign was therefore some- where in central Thrace in its late phase. But if Selymbria was a reasonable place for Lentulus to go, the earlier part of the campaign had been somewhere to the north of that city, and this points to the territory of the Astai, inland of Byzantion, which city in turn was clearly more distant from the king on his campaign than was Selymbria, otherwise Lentulus would have gone there. Further, for a campaign in central Thrace, Perinthos (or even Lysimacheia) would have been a more suitable destination. This all points to a campaign in the Hebros basin or towards the Istranca mountains.

On the other hand, another Roman commissioner, L. Stertinius, freed the cities of Ainos and Maroneia from control by garrisons of King Philip during the summer50. He made no effort to contact Antiochos, nor did he come into conflict with any Seleukid soldiers or administrators. We can conclude there- fore that Antiochos stayed well clear of that part of Thrace, and kept his people away as well. Since he was deliberately contacting the Greek cities of Thrace this omission is clearly deliberate and can best be accounted for by presuming that Antiochos knew full well that the Romans were involved there. It was not lack of ambition for control of those cities, for he seized them and garrisoned them both later. Antiochos' range of activity in the summer of 196 was there- fore from the Chersonese along the northern shore of the Propontis as far as Byzantion, and inland to the Hebros basin and the territory of the Astai.

The situation within Thrace which Antiochos faced was of a Thracian community which was both divided and impoverished. The terrorist overlord- ship of Tylis had extracted substantial wealth from the Thracians, as it had from the Greeks, and this wealth appears to have completely vanished. The incipient urbanization of the early third century - Seuthopolis, Kabyle, Kypsela - had been either destroyed or stunted5l. The periodic centralizations of power into a substantial kingdom based on the Odrysai of the Hebros basin had also been aborted once more52. Out of the wreckage emerged four tribes - the Astai,

49 Ibid. 2. 50 Ibid. 35.2. 51 A. Fol, "Le ddveloppement de la vie urbaine dans les pays entre le Danube et la mer Egde

jusqu'A la conquete romaine", Etudes Balkaniques 2-3, 1966; M. Chichikova, "The Thracian City of Seuthopolis", and V. Velkov, "The Thracian City of Cabyle", in Poulter (ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (as in n. 46), 289-303 and 233-238; D. P. Dimitrov and M. Chichikova, The Thracian City of Seuthopolis, BAR Supplementary Series S 38 (Oxford 1978).

52 L. Ghetov, "Sur I'histoire politique de la Thrace a la haute 6poque hellenistique", Dritter Internationaler Thracologischer Congress, vol. II (Sofia 1984), 134-136.

338 JOHN D. GRAINGER

whose territory extended west and north of Byzantion to Kabyle and the hinterland of Apollonia on the Gulf of Burgas on the Euxine coast; the Kaeni, apparently situated to the north of the Thracian Chersonese, and presumably the perpetrators of the destruction of Lysimacheia; the Koreles or Korpiles, perhaps inland and north of Ainos and Maroneia, and with the city of Kypsela in their territory; and the Maudatenes, unlocated, but by process of elimination perhaps in the middle Hebros valley, the old centre of Odrysian power. These tribes are not the ones which were dominant earlier, but are presumably the clans which emerged as local overlords after the overthrow of the Tylians. Of these tribes it would seem to be the Kaeni and the Astai who were Antiochos' early targets, since his main political objectives were both to extend his kingdom and to cement his alliance with the Greek cities who were threatened by the Thracian tribes53.

Antiochos will have gathered into his alliance the other cities which lined that coast: Selymbria, being Lentulus' destination, may be presumed to be in the king's power at the time, but also Bisanthe and Perinthos as well. Beyond the Straits were the Greek cities of the western Euxine coast. One of these, Apollonia, had an old Seleukid connection54. It was also regarded, much later, as a neighbour of the Astai55. The other Greek cities beyond Apollonia - Mesembria, Odessos, Kallatis, Tomi, Istros - might also respond to Antiochos' overtures, particularly if elements of his fleet had passed through the Bosporos into the Euxine, but this would depend also on the extent of Antiochos' operations, in particular if he aimed at going north of the Haemos (Balkan) mountains. It would not be worth while incurring obligations to these cities if they would then involve him in ever-growing problems.

Antiochos returned to Lysimacheia in late September 196, when the confer- ence with the Roman commissioners took place56, a time which would also be the end of his campaigning season. So the conference took place at Antiochos' convenience, not that of the Romans. Antiochos had thus spent at least three or four months in Thrace, a full summer's campaign. It was only partly successful, for he had to campaign there for two more summers at least. Beyond that the evidence cannot take us, but three campaigns in such an area was a formidable

53 Strabo 7.6.1-2 and frag. 47; Livy 38.40.7; I. Venedikov, "Les migrations en Thrace", Pulpudeva 2 (1978 for 1976), 162-180, at pp. 177-178.

54 J. Youroukova, "La pr6sence des monnaies de bronze des premiers S61eucides en Thrace: leur importance historique", Studia P. Naster Oblata I (Louvain 1982), 115-26, and A. Stepanova, "Observations sur la monnaye de bronze d'Apollonie du Pont", Thracia Pontica 2 (1985), 272-82.

55 Ptolemy, Geography 3.11.6. 56 He sailed for Syria in time to be caught by a storm off Cyprus, but before the sailing

season closed: hence September.

Antiochos III in Thrace 339

commitment of time and resources. Antiochos was clearly serious about con- trolling Thrace.

Antiochos sailed back to Ephesos after the conference with the Roman commissioners at Lysimacheia in September, but he left most of his army in the Chersonese, commanded by his second son Seleukoss7. One of the suggestions he had thrown out at the conference was that he would set up Seleukos at Lysimacheia as a viceroy58, and Seleukos was certainly left with the task of continuing the rebuilding of the city59. Antiochos returned next year, with a force large enough, so Livy claims, to have frightened the experienced consular L. Villius Tappulus. Villius had been sent by Flamininus in Greece to Antio- chos in response to a visit by envoys from Antiochos who had arrived at Corinth just as the Roman forces were coming out of their winter quarters60. These envoys had thus been sent very early in the year, well before Antiochos' own campaign had begun. Villius was away most of the campaigning season, and was able therefore to report on Antiochos' progress61.

The size of the army Antiochos was using can be estimated. In emergencies such as the great battles he fought in Syria, at Raphia in 217 and at Panion in 200, Antiochos could field an army of 70,000 men62, but this number could only be achieved by the conscription of the kingdom's reservists, and so at the cost of much disruption. In extended campaigns, such as his great eastern anabasis between 211 and 206, his army was about half that size, say 35,000 men. These men were thus his standing army. The troops included the royal guard (the agema), the argyraspides (a phalanx numbering 10,000 men), and assorted mercenary units such as the Galatians and Thracians mentioned above. The army was well balanced and very flexible, including a pioneer unit, light infantry, nomad cavalry, and Galatians, as well as the standard heavy infantry63. It could tackle a mountain campaign, as in the Elburz64, an opposed river crossing65, a large set-piece battle such as Magnesia66, or a siege such as Sardis or Baktra67. When he set off for the Aegean in 197, it was this army which Antiochos sent off to march by land to Sardis, and it was this army which he

57 Livy 33.41.4. 58 Pol. 18.51.8; Livy 33.40.6. 59 Livy 33.41.4. 60 Livy 34.35.1-2. 61 Livy 34.33.12. 62 Pol. 5.79.3-13. 63 Cf. B. Bar Kochva, The Seleucid Army, Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns

(Cambridge 1976), part I. 64 Pol. 10.28-31. 65 Pol. 10.49. 66 Livy 37.50-53. 67 Sardis: Pol. 7.15-18; Baktra: Pol. 10.49.15 and 11.39.1-10.

340 JOHN D. GRAINGER

used in Thrace in 196. He was thus campaigning with a force of up to 35,000 men.

He left much of it behind to winter at Lysimacheia under Seleukos, taking his fleet (and the fleet's allocation of soldiers) with him to Syria; according to Livy's report of Villius' report to Flamininus, a larger contingent had returned with him in the spring68. Allowing for casualties, we may assume that an army of between 30,000 and 35,000 was in Thrace again in 195; some of them would be in garrisons, but most were available for the new campaign. This was the equivalent of a Roman army of three legions with Latin auxiliaries, rather larger than that which was campaigning under Flamininus' command in Greece at the same time69.

These Thracian campaigns, involving a large army and the conquest of a strategically important land, are thus major political and military events, and yet neither the Romans in Greece nor Philip V in Macedon showed any apprehensions about them. Antiochos was at pains to keep Flamininus informed as to his intentions and his progress, for this was clearly the purpose of the visit of the king's envoys to Flamininus at Corinth early in 195, and that early arrival was followed by the return visit of Villius to the king, with whom he stayed for some time, rejoining Flamininus well into the summer. It seems likely also that Philip was being kept in the picture (though this martial activity close to the Macedonian borders may help to explain the reluctance Philip showed in sending military help to his new Roman ally in the fight against Nabis). Nor did the arrival of Hannibal at Ephesos have any noticeable effect, either on Antio- chos' conduct of affairs or on the Romans.

It is widely assumed that Antiochos returned to Thrace for a third campaign in 194, and indeed some authors place the events recorded by Appian in that year, without justification70. The only apparent evidence specific to 194 is a comment by P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who is reported by Livy to have demanded Macedonia for his consular command for that year on the grounds that a war was threatening with Antiochos, 'who had already and without provocation crossed into Europe'71. This, if it is not simply an anticipation of Scipio's participation in the later war against Antiochos, may still be only a general reference to the previous Thracian campaigns. This is somewhat strength-

68 Livy 33.41.4 and 34.33.12. 69 Flamininus had two legions plus Latin alae: Livy 31.8.5-6, plus reinforcements: Livy

32.8.2, minus casualties; with his Greek allies he was assaulting Nabis of Sparta at the

time with 27,000 men (Walbank, Philip V [as in n. 12], 186). 70 E.g., Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), 190; Errington in CAH V1112 dismisses the whole

affair in two half sentences (on pp. 277 and 278) and puts all the military activity in 195 and 194.

71 Livy 34.43.4.

Antiochos III in Thrace 341

ened by his reference to a possible war, the threat of which scarcely existed yet. Certainly the Senate was unconvinced, if the speech really was made.

This is not very strong evidence for a new Antiochan campaign in Thrace, but if he was not in Thrace we do not know where he was - an unusual problem - and it is best to assume his presence there in default of positive indications about anywhere else. The campaign is utterly unknown, nor can conjecture do more than produce guesses. The reconstruction of Lysimacheia was surely more or less complete by then, and Seleukos installed as viceroy; Antiochos will have been completing the conquest. But it is worth pointing out that, while this presumed third campaign was going on, Flamininus withdrew the Roman forces from Greece. Even if the king was not in Thrace, both his army and his son were, and so therefore was his power. It follows that the Romans, including Flamininus, entertained no apprehensions about the Seleukid conquest - unless Scipio's scaremongering was really spoken.

That conquest was clearly completed by this third campaign of 194, except for one detail. In 190, when the Roman army marched along the Thracian coastal road to attack Antiochos, it was discovered that Seleukid garrisons held the two old Greek towns of Ainos and Maroneia72. The Roman commanders simply ignored them. But these garrisons had not been in place in 194, since the towns had been freed of Macedonian rule in 196 by the Romans - which had been the purpose of Stertinius' visit, and therefore cannot have been taken over before Flamininus left. They were therefore occupied later, no doubt in 192 or 191 when it became clear that war had broken out between Rome and Antiochos and when Antiochos sent his troops into Greece. This would seem to be his final Thracian conquest73.

That these cities were only extras is shown by the reported words of Antiochos' envoys at Rome in 193. They asserted quite definitely that Antio- chos had the right, by inheritance and by conquest, to rule in Thrace, which was defined as 'the cities of Thrace and Chersonesus'74. Once again, the provenance of that speech, reported by Livy as being made to a secret senatorial committee, is such that its authenticity is highly questionable, but it would seem to imply clearly enough that Antiochos' conquests were both extensive and completed.

A further visit by the king to Thrace, in 192, has been postulated75. It was a busy summer for Antiochos, with his sieges of Alexandreia Troas, Smyrna, and

72 Livy 37.33.1 (the Romans crossed the territories of the two cities) and 37.60.7 (Antio- chos' troops were evacuated from the cities).

73 N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia, vol. III (Oxford 1988), 44 (by Hammond), claims Antiochos advanced 'as far as Maroneia' in '196/5', but he cannot have taken Ainos and Maroneia while still at peace with Rome when Rome had so recently freed those cities.

74 Livy 37.32.1. 75 0. Leuze, "Die Feldzuge Antiochos des GroBen nach Kleinasien und Thrakien", Hermes

342 JOHN D. GRAINGER

Lampsakos, and with diplomatic contacts with the Aitolians and Romans - and other Greek states also, no doubt. So any expedition to Thrace was on a smaller scale than before (for part of his army was involved in the sieges) and briefer. The king could not afford to be far from the scenes of diplomatic action at such a time. The death of his eldest son the previous year, and the consequent promotion of his next son Seleukos to the position of heir and principal royal lieutenant may have been the pretext for the visit, since Seleukos had been ruling from Lysimacheia as viceroy. No doubt other problems were dealt with at the same time. Compared with the previous expeditions this visit was perhaps more administrative than military; the Romans had no reason to claim fright, other than the need to find a justification for the war which both sides now felt was coming.

The extent of Antiochos' Thracian dominions cannot be stated, but the geographical indications may be set out. Along the coasts he either controlled or was allied with every Greek city from Maroneia to Byzantion; the cities of the western coast of the Euxine are also probable allies, at least as far as Apollonia and the Gulf of Burgas. This implies a conquered area comprising essentially the basin of the Hebros, as far as the Haemos mountains, but perhaps not as far as the abandoned Macedonian colony of Philippopolis. Had he gone so far the threat to Macedon would have become too strong for Philip to ignore. By not acquiring Abdera, Antiochos had left an unclaimed space between his new province and Macedon along the coast, and he may well have done the same inland, where the tribe of the Bessi in the upper Hebros valley could have been left as an inland buffer state. The bounds were thus, in all probability, and very approximately, the Haemos mountain range in the north, the sea to the east and south, and a line north from Maroneia to the Haemos range on the west, an area of over 35,000 square kilometres.

The conquest was thoroughly done. When the Roman forces marched through in 190, on their way to eventual victory over Antiochos at Magnesia, the Thracians did not interfere. The Romans ignored the garrisons of Ainos and Maroneia, and there were surely other garrisons in the inland areas - the land had only been conquered three years before, after all, and could hardly be left uncontrolled. These the Romans also ignored. By holding on to Thrace, Antio- chos was paradoxically making the approach of the Roman forces all the easier. This is good evidence, in other words, for Antiochos' success in his conquest. The garrison and the restored citizens of Lysimacheia were all withdrawn as the

53, 1923, 187-229 and 241-287; E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984), 630, n. 90; M. Holleaux, "L'entretien de Scipion l'Africain et d'Hannibal", in Etudes d'etpigraphie et d'histoire grecques, 2me partie. Rome, la Macedoine et l'Orient grec (Paris 1957), 184-207, at p. 194, n. 1 and in CAH VIIII 206, rejected the expedition; Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), p. x, accepted it.

Antiochos III in Thrace 343

Romans approached, in a masterly manoeuvre conducted in secret76, but this was the only example of such a move. That is, Antiochos was showing no inclination to give up his new conquest. And the Ainos and Maroneia garrisons survived until after the peace treaty was signed77. However, after they were withdrawn, when the Roman forces marched back the way they had come under the lax command of Cn. Manlius Vulso, they were ambushed by a Thracian attack, in which all four of the tribes participated78. The removal of Seleukid garrisons from the interior and the earlier removal of the power of the kingdom of Tylis, released the Thracians to fight for their land again, and, in this case, for the booty of Asia and Galatia as well.

Three years later Philip of Macedon, in alliance with Byzantion, cam- paigned through the Hebros valley, reducing the Thracian tribes there to sub- mission79. Either then or more probably earlier, he allied with the Bastarnae, a Keltic tribe of the Danube valley, urging them to migrate in order to threaten his Thracian enemies80. The parallels with Antiochos' Thracian campaign, as re- constructed from other evidence, are quite striking. So is the sequel, for Philip was then told to pull out of Thrace by the Romans. His swift success may be attributed in part to the earlier thoroughness of the Seleukid campaign, and it may be that Philip did more than copy Antiochos' political and diplomatic techniques: he may also have followed in his military tracks.

Middle Littleton, Evesham, Worcs John D. Grainger

76 Livy 37.31.1-2. 77 Ibid. 60.7. 78 Livy 38.40.7. 79 Livy 39.35.4; Pol. 22.14.12. 80 Livy 39.55.4, assuming, as Hammond does (History of Macedonia, vol. III [as in n. 73],

468, n. 2) that Livy's reference to Italy is a product of 'Roman propaganda'.

Article Contentsp. [329]p. 330p. 331p. 332p. 333p. 334p. 335p. 336p. 337p. 338p. 339p. 340p. 341p. 342p. 343

Issue Table of ContentsHistoria: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1996), pp. 257-392Front MatterWhy Did the Greek "Polis" Originally Need Coins? [pp. 257-283]Xenophon's Dana and the Passage of Cyrus' Army over the Taurus Mountains [pp. 284-314]Polybius, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279 B.C.) [pp. 315-328]Antiochos III in Thrace [pp. 329-343]Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation [pp. 344-363]The Beginning of the "Historia Augusta" [pp. 364-375]MiszellenThoughts on the Ceremonial 'Opening' of Secular Buildings in Early Imperial Rome [pp. 376-382]The Coinage of Otho: A Contribution to the History of His Reign [pp. 382-385]

Back Matter [pp. 386-392]