islam in western thrace

8/3/2019 Islam in Western Thrace

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Islam in Western Thrace-Greece after 1923The role of internal and external actors

By Ali Hseyino lu

St Antony's College, University of Oxford December 2010

Working paper presented at the conference

After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international net-works in the Balkans

European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2010


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Islam in Western Thrace after 1923. The role of internal and external actors | Ali Hseyino lu | Oxford | 2010

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Working paper presented at the conference

After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and internationalnetworks in the Balkans

European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2010

Islam in Western Thrace-Greece after 1923The role of internal and external actors

Ali Hseyino lu

University of Sussex/UK

[email protected]

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Western Thrace is one of the ten regions of Greece. It extends to an area of 8,575 square

kilometres in the northeast of the country. It is surrounded by the Maritza River in the East

and the Nestos River in the West, the Rodopi Mountains in the North and the Aegean Sea

in the South. It is composed of the three prefectures of Xanthi, Rodopi and Evros.


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Muslims in Western Thrace number around 145,000 people. 1 They are the only minority

within Greece that is officially recognized by the Greek state. Apart from their constitu-

tional rights, their citizenship and minority rights are protected by bilateral and interna-

tional agreements that Greece signed and ratified. These people make up a predominantly

agrarian community residing mostly in the Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures. Almost all of

them are Sunni Muslims, while there are only a few minority villages in the highlands of

the Evros prefecture with a concentration of followers of the Alevi-Bektashi sect. Before

discussing the Muslims of Western Thrace, I will briefly explore the debates on the ethnic

identification of the minority, which started in the early 1950s and still continues today.

The Muslim minority in western Thrace has indeed been shaped to a significant extent by

the two states with which they were associated: their home state Greece, and their ethnic-

kin state Turkey. These states often promoted different models of identity based on reli-gion or ethnicity.

Defining the Muslim minority of Western Thrace: Etic and emic perspectives

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish decision makers have

insisted consistently on calling Muslims in Western Thrace Turkish, hence establishing

proximity with other Turkish communities in the Balkans. In comparison, Greek policy

regarding the definition of the minority has changed over time. From the 1920s until the

mid 1950s, Greece referred to the minority either as Muslims or Turks and did not try

to prioritise one identity over the other. Especially after the Greek Civil War in the late

1940s, the state promoted the Turkish identity in Western Thrace in order to increase the

resistance against threats from its Communist neighbour, Bulgaria. The Fessopoulos order

of 1954 is one of the most prominent examples for indicating the Greek promotion of the

ethnic Turkish identity in Western Thrace. In this document, the general administrator of

Thrace, G. Fessopoulos, following the order of the President, conveyed to the mayor of

the prefecture of the Rodope, we ask you that from now on and all occasions the termsTurk-Turkish are used instead of the terms Muslim-of Muslim. 2

Around the same time, however, Turkish-Greek relations started to deteriorate as a

result of the dispute over Cyprus. Between 6 and 7 September 1955, pogroms were organ-

ised against the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. These events put an end to the

1 According to latest figures, the minority population in Western Thrace varies between 140,000 and145,000, constituting almost one-third of the Thracian population http://www.remth.gr [Retrieved on22.7.2010].

2 Cited by Soltaridis, Simeon, [The History of the Muftis of Western Thrace] (Athens: Nea Synora, 1997), p. 210.


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1950s dtente across the Aegean. Since then, Greek officials gradually chose to refer to

the Muslim minority in Western Thrace; eventually, any official reference to the exist-

ence of a Turkish minority within Greek national territories was strictly rejected. In the

beginning of the 1990s, Greeces ethnic identification policy changed once more when the

Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, during his visit of Western Thrace from14 to 15 May 1991, laid out a new model of identification. He referred to a Muslim mi-

nority, but one that was composed of three different ethnic groups: the Turkish-born (not

Turks), the Pomak and the Roma. 3 Since then, consecutive Greek governments have main-

tained this ethno-religiously differentiated policy of identification.

Today, each member of the minority has the individual right to identify himself as Turk,

Roma or Pomak, as any other Greek citizen. However, regarding the collective identifica-

tion, there have been different possibilities: Pomaks and Roma have been allowed offi-

cially to identify as such, while Turks are denied the collective right of ethnic identifica-tion. That is to say, while Pomaks and Roma can form associations bearing terms like

Pomak or Roma in their titles, Turks are prevented from forming Turkish associa-

tions in Western Thrace. In spite of relevant decisions of the European Court of Human

Rights (ECHR), Greek courts are still refusing to register existing Turkish unions on the

basis that the ECHR decisions do not supersede Greek law. 4

Among the Muslims in Western Thrace, ethnic identification became a matter of debate

especially in the 1960s, when Greece began to apply discriminatory measures against the

minority. According to Oran, 5 both identity layers, the Turkish and the Muslim one, hadnot gone beyond mere subconscious affiliation. However, the more individuals experi-

enced discrimination, the more consciously they affiliated themselves with ethnic Turkish

and religious Islamic values.

Until the 1990s, when the Greek state began to differentiate between Turks, Pomaks and

Roma, discriminatory measures targeted all Muslims of the region. In other words, as long

as your name was not Alekos but Ali, you were likely to face a series of disadvantages

and discrimination. Until the beginning of 1990s, even basic individual human rights were

being been violated by local authorities and the Greek state at large. Muslim Turks were banned from using tractors and their rights to own property was severely restricted. The

authorities refused them permits to build new houses, and even to repair existing ones. 6

Indeed, these policies actually promoted Turkeys increasingly central role as the mother- 3 Statements of Mitsotakis in his Komotini speech quoted in Paratiris , 15.5.1991. 4 [The Court of Appeal in Thrace dissolves the Xan-

thi Turkish Union], Xronos , 11.12.2009.5 Baskn Oran, Trk- Yunan likilerinde Bat Trakya Sorunu [The problem of Western Thrace in Turkish-

Greek relations] (Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1991) p. 306.6

For more information see Ali Chousein, Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: TheCase of Western Thrace, Unpublished MSc Thesis, Department of International Relations, Middle EastTechnical University-Ankara/Turkey, 2005, pp. 81-117.


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land and the sole guarantor of Muslim Turkish existence in Greece. Even today, and des-

pite Greeces membership in a range of bodies such as the European Union, the vast ma-

jority of Muslims in Western Thrace see Turkey as the main guarantor of their survival in

Western Thrace and their primary safe haven in case of conflict in the Balkans.

One of the key outcomes of my fieldwork in Western Thrace in 2008 and 2009 was that

not only Muslims of Turkish origin in the region identify as such, but that also Pomak and

Roma Muslims predominantly identify themselves with ethnic Turkish identity, despite

the Greek policy of ethnic differentiation. Hence, I also use the term Muslim Turks

while referring to the minority in Western Thrace. In doing so, I am not ignoring the inter-

nal ethnic and linguistic differentiation in the minority. I am simply employing the conclu-

sions derived through my fieldwork: the Greek differentiation since 1991 has not stopped

the last Ottomans in the Balkans from identifying themselves with ethnic Turkish iden-

tity.

A brief history of the Western Thracian minority

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the region became a Greek territory in the

early 1920s. Since then, as I mentioned above, the community has officially been defined

as consisting of Greek citizens of Muslim faith, predominantly referred to simply as

Turkish. In the last eighty years, a great number of ethnic and religious minority groups,

like Vlachs, Arvanites and Macedonians, either stayed in Greece and largely assimilated

within the greater Greek culture or left the country and found refuge in different parts of Europe and America. Unlike such groups, Muslim Turks survived in their region despite

major discriminatory measures, imposed especially during the Cold War years. Compared

to other minority groups in Greece, it can be argued that one of the main obstacles to the

assimilation of the Muslim identity in Western Thrace was their dual affiliation with Islam

and for the vast majority during the Cold War years, an attachment to ethnic Turkish iden-

tity. However, both of these identities became highly interrelated with each other even in

cases of non-Turkish speaking Muslims in the region. From 1923 onwards, Islam was not

only often interpreted as the historical enemy of Christianity, but also framed within thenotion of enmity towards newly-founded Turkish Republic.

For decades, Islam and Turkishness have often been perceived as synonymous and have

been used interchangeably in Western Thrace. For most of the Greeks, Islam implied cen-

turies of slavery under Ottoman rule, while Turks and Turkey represented neighbouring

enemies and the primary threat from the East. Despite the rapprochement in Turkish-

Greek relations in the last decade and different attempts for inter-religious and intercul-

tural dialogue across the Aegean ethnic, religious, and cultural boundaries still shape rela-

tions between Muslim Turks and Christian Greeks in Western Thrace.


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In spite of the Turco-Greek rapprochement following the earthquake diplomacy of the

late 1990s, members of both communities have continued to behave with the hidden

boundaries in mind, while socialising with one other. Despite growing levels of interaction

in recent years, mixed marriages, for instance, continue to be major social taboos. Even

the younger generations of the region, encompassing those who have not experienced theheydays of discrimination in the pre-1990s are still segregated along ethno-religious lines.

The cafs in Komotini for instance, are frequented by Greeks and Turks alike on Saturday

evenings. It is rare, however, to see Greeks and Turks sitting together at the same table..

Both ethnicity and religion have played a significant role for the continuity and survival of

the Muslim and Turkish presence in the region; they remained the main shield against

the assimilationist bent of the minority policies endorsed by subsequent Greek gov-

ernments. This paper aims to discuss the forces that have shaped the minority community

in Western Thrace by focusing on the main actors that have affected Muslim identity andreligious institutions in Western Thrace since 1923: Greece, Turkey and external actors.

Greece had a significant impact on the fate of Islam in Western Thrace; neighbouring

Turkey played a major, if not always overt, role. Finally, international actors, including

Arab and Islamic countries, have entered the scene with acute influence especially in the

last three decades.

1 . T h e r o l e o f t h e G r e e k s t a t e a n d t h e m i n o r i t y a c t o r s i n We s t e r n

T h r a c e

With the inclusion of Western Thrace into the Greek state, Greece assumed the most sig-

nificant role in the religious life of the Muslim Turkish minority. The 1913 Athens Treaty

between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, in which a number of measures for the regula-

tion and practice of Islam in Greece were codified, determined religious rights. 7 With Law

No. 2345 of 1920, 8 the provisions of the Athens Treaty were incorporated into Greek law,

7 The Protocol No.3 of the 1913 Athens Treaty defined the religious rights of the Muslims in alloverGreece. According to the treaty, both the chief mufti of Greece, other muftis and members of their of-fices would have the same rights and duties as all other Greek public officers. Also, members of theMuslim communities would be in charge of administration of their own waqfs . All the private Muslimschools, medreses both the existing ones as well as the ones created afterwards would be recognized. Infact, the 1913 Athens Treaty was signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire before the inclusion of Western Thrace into Greek national territories in the early 1920s. However, according to Article 2 of theTreaty, Protocol No. 3 would be applied to all Greek territories. It means that it would be applied also inWestern Thrace. For the full text of the 1913 Athens Treaty, see The Treaty of Peace Between Turkeyand Greece, The American Journal of International Law , No. 1, 1914, pp. 46-55.

8 The Greek Official Gazette, FEK A 148, 3.7.1920. However, it was replaced with the LawNo.1920/1991 that provided significant authorities for the Greek state authorities on appointment of muf-tis and other matters regarding their functioning in Western Thrace. For the Law No.1920/1991 see theGreek Official Gazette, FEK A11, 4.2.1991.


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awarding a number of religious rights to Muslims. The most important provisions regu-

lated the election of the religious leaders, i.e. the Chief mufti and the regional muftis, as

well as the administration of Muslim foundations ( waqfs ). Many issues related to freedom

of religion, conscience and belief in Western Thrace were reinforced under the 1923

Lausanne Treaty.

The leaders of the community: The Muftis

Greeces policy towards Islam in Western Thrace has been ambiguous, especially with

regard to the representative capacity of religious leaders, i.e. the muftis. Although the Law

No. 2345/1920 provided for elections of the head mufti ( ba mft ), who would have rep-resented all Muslims of Greece, such elections never occurred. The Greek state has been

wary of the emergence of an institution that could assume a representative function with

real authority vis--vis Athens. Consequently, no institution responsible for Muslim reli-gious matters in Greece exists, while the issue of Muslim identity remains relegated to the

local level. All other Muslim communities in different parts of Greece gradually disap-

peared. 9

Yet even on the level of the three prefectures of Western Thrace, state policy remained

inconsistent. From the 1920s, local muftis continued to be elected by the members of the

Muslim community, highlighting the importance of the Mufti not only for religious mat-

ters, but also for the community as a whole. In 1990, however, the state introduced Law

No.1920/1991, 10 putting an end to the election of muftis in the three prefectures of West-

ern Thrace. According to the new law, muftis were to be appointed by the Greek state for

ten years due to their judicial functions in matters of marriage and inheritance arising from

the application of Sharia Law.

It was clear that this change in status was a response to the political mobilisation of the

1980s, when the elected muftis and imams played a major role in mobilising the Muslim

Turks in the region against violations of their human and minority rights. The critical junc-

ture that enabled the Greek authorities to reconsider their general minority policy of West-

ern Thrace, however, didnt occur until 1988. For the first time since 1923, approximately

10,000 minority members, both men and women, gathered in Komotini in order to protest

against the fundamental human and minority rights violations of the Greek state that had

9 The Cham Albanians were forced to flee the Epirus region in Northeastern Greece in 1945. Furthermore,after the inclusion of the Dodecanese Islands into Greece by 1947, Muslims in Rhodes and Kos islandsstarted to constitute a significant community. In time, however, their numbers decreased as a result of Greek policies of discrimination. For example, educational instruction in Turkish ceased in the 1970s,and most of the mosques remain closed. Today, there are only a few thousand Muslims residing on thetwo islands. For a recent synopsis, see The Situation of the Turkish Minority in Rhodes and Kos, Reso-lution taken by MPs from CoE-PACE available at http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11904.htm [Retrieved 20.10.2010].

10 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, The Legal Status of Islam in Greece, Die Wielt des Islams, 44:3, 415-416


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made their daily lives unbearable. Elected muftis and their imams played a noteworthy

role in the protest in Komotini.

Noting this rising activism, the Greek state sought ways to control the religious leadership

of the communities by replacing the elected Muftis. When the Mufti of Komotini died in

1985, his office was governed for five years by temporary officers. After the introduction

of the new law in 1991, Greece appointed Meco Hafiz Cemali as the mufti of Komotini,

whose tenure was renewed in 2001, after a decade, for ten more years. The authorities fol-

lowed a similar policy in the Xanthi Prefecture. When the mufti of Xanthi died in 1990,

his son, Mehmet Emin Aga, was appointed. However, he resigned in order to protest the

appointment of Mufti in Komotini by the Greek state. Hence, Greece appointed Mehmet

Sinikoglu as the new mufti of Xanthi under the new law. As for the Evros Prefecture,

Mehmet Serif Damataoglu was appointed to the mufti office in Didimotiho.

Not surprisingly, such appointment of muftis in the beginning of the 1990s created re-

sentment in the Muslim community. Most congregations in the three prefectures refusedthe appointed muftis and instead elected their own. Furthermore, although both Ibrahim

Serif and M.Emin Aga were elected in the Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures, they were put

on trial in the 1990s for usurping the authority and title of the appointed mufti. Both Serif

and Aga applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 1997 and 1999, respectively.

Regarding the cases of Serif versus Greece 11 and Agga versus Greece 12 , the ECHR con-

cluded that Greece had violated the rights to the freedom of thought, religion and con-

science. However, Greece continued to reject Serif and Aggas statuses as muftis. Thus,

from the early 1990s until today, there are two parallel muftis in Komotini ( Gmlcine )

and in Xanthi ( skee )13 and one in Didimotiho ( Dimetoka )14 . This contested structureleads to a number of problems in terms of the practice of Islam in everyday life, while

simultaneously disregarding a clearly expressed popular will of the minority to elect their

leaders in a democratic fashion.

The Islamic foundations as a remnant of Ottoman jurisdiction: The waqfs

Charitable foundations ( waqfs in Arabic, vakf in Turkish) stand at the core of the religious

and social lives of Muslims all over the world and even more so in countries with non-

11 The decision of the ECHR available at www.echr.coe.int/ eng/press/1999/dec/serif_jud _epresse.htm

[Retrieved on 3.5.2005].12 The decision of the ECHR is available at www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2002/oct/aggano.2judepress. htm.

[Retrieved on 3.5.2005].13 For more information about office and activities of the elected muftis of Komotini and Xanthi visit

http://www.gumulcinemuftulugu.info / and http://www.iskecemuftulugu.org . As for those of the ap-pointed ones visit http://www.muftikomotini.com and http://www.iskecemuftulugu.com / [All retrieved

on 1.8.2010]14 The mufti of Didimotiho is appointed by the Greek state and no elections were conducted because theMinority concentration at this prefecture is comparably quite low.


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Muslim majority structures, where they play a major role in the organization of com-

munity life. In the absence of formal administrative structures such as municipalities

manned by members of the community, these foundations played a major role in the life

of Muslims in Western Thrace. Yet administrative measures to obstruct the operation of

such foundations go back to the Junta regime of April 1967 and have been continued ever since. As part of the authoritarian measures of the Junta, the foundations elected minority

members were all removed from the administrative boards of these organizations and re-

placed with appointed members. In fact, the colonels even appointed a non-Muslim Greek

as the head of one of these boards in 1973. 15

Effectively taking away the control of the foundations from the Muslim community also

meant taking over the many properties that had belonged to the foundations in the main

cities Komotini and Xanthi as well as in the villages. In this process, Muslim Turks not

only lost the rights to administer their own foundations, they also lost the properties be-longing to the foundations. In spite of their financial immunity as charitable organisations,

Greek governments impose excessive taxes on waqf properties, precipitating their gradual

decline. Under the new Law No. 3554/2007, all debts of waqfs to Western Thrace were

expunged except the fines and income tax imposed by the Greek state. To give an exam-

ple, the total debt of the Komotini waqfs recently rose to 775,463 Euros, resulting in the

revocation of 23 shops and 1 farm owned by the administration. 16 Due to the limited ac-

cess to the accounts of waqfs , the number and revenues of waqf properties and the change

so of these numbers is still not clear. What is clear, however, is that a number of valuablewaqf properties do not belong to the administrations today. Many members of the minority

have blamed the appointed board members for cooperating with Greek authorities to

squander valuable properties in the city centres of Komotini and Xanthi.

The Junta regime came to an end in 1974, unlike the administrative changes in Western

Thrace, which were never retracted. In fact, minority members appointed by the military

regime of 1967 still continue to administer waqf properties in all three prefectures. Giventhis history, the promise of the Karamanlis government (2004-2008) that elections for the

administrative boards of Muslim waqfs would now finally be held seemed like a bold de- parture from established practice. In the end, no action was taken either by the Karamanlis

government or by the current one to realize these promises.

15 Tzn Baheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder: Westview Pres,1990) p. 181. 16

Violation of Freedom of Religion or Belief: The Turkish-Muslim Minority of Western Thrace-Greece,Report submitted by WTMUGA at OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 9-10 July 2009, Hofburg-Vienna/Austria.


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Mosques, schools and the Ottoman heritage

Unlike the structural barriers to the operation of muftis and waqfs, the religious practice of

Muslims has not been restricted. Mosques have been functional in localities with Muslim

minority populations and the call to prayer, the edhan , with some exceptions, has not nor-

mally been obstructed, echoing throughout Western Thrace five times a day. The mosques

also double as schools for instruction on the basis of Quran and religious practice. As of

2009, there were three hundred mosques in Western Thrace, and most of them were in useand had an imam. 17

Problems do, however, occur regularly concerning the maintenance of the material heri-

tage of the community. Since the promulgation of Law No. 1369/1938 18, Muslims were

required to seek permission from the local Metropolitan Greek bishop in case of the con-

struction of a mosque. The permission of the bishop needed to be further approved by the

Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. Until the beginning of the 1990s, local Greek

authorities, together with local metropolitan bishops, frequently delayed or refused to

grant building permits for new mosques or obstructed the restoration of old ones. In the

municipality of Iasmos ( Yassky ) for instance, local authorities refused the building per-

mit of the Muslim community to complete a half-built minaret for more than 25 years. 19

However, from the mid-1990s, such restrictions were imposed increasingly less often, and

after 2006, the bishops role regarding the construction of places of worship was trans-

ferred to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs.20

Today, the local metropolitanchurches have no say in the establishment of mosques and it is hence easier for the mi-

nority to build new mosques in the region without having to confront major bureaucratic

hindrances. Yet, as for the restoration of dilapidated places of worship, Greek authorities

still postpone demands for the restoration of the Ottoman heritage in the region. For ex-

ample, the restoration of the Bayazit mosque started in the mid-1990s and remains unfin-

ished today. 21

In addition to the state, however, there are also other actors in the region who often play a

significantly more destructive role. All manifestations of Ottoman material culture, bethey sacred places like mosques, cemeteries, or even bridges, are regularly targeted by ex-

tremist and ultra nationalist groups. Such attacks often include the defacing of monuments

17 Mosques in Western Thrace, Report submitted by the Western Thrace Minority University GraduatesAssociation (WTMUGA) at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 10.7.2009, Vienna.

18 The Greek Official Gazette, FEK A317, 10.9.1938.19 Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity-The Turks of Greece (NY: Helsinki Watch, 1990) p. 27.20 The speech of Marietta Giannakou, the then Greek Minister of Education and Religious Affairs at the

Greek Parliament, 25.5.2006. Available at http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/showfile.asp?file=es60525

.txt [Retrived on 11.6.2006]21 Maria Nikolaou, SOS [Didimotiho SOS fromthe oldest mosque of Europe], Makedonia , 1.12.2008.


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with slogans like Out the Turks from Thrace. Mosques and mesjids (prayer rooms) are

also physically attacked. The mosque in Toxotes/ Xanthi (Okular), for instance, was at-

tacked and severely damaged three times in the last six years. 22 Especially in cemeteries,

vandalism results in the destruction of Muslim tombs. 23

Regarding religious schools in Western Thrace, since the 1950s, there are only two me-

dreses , one in Komotini and the other in the Echinos municipality of Xanthi. This is a

very low number in comparison to the situation in 1925, when there were 16 religious

schools: 8 in Komotini (Gmlcine), 3 in Xanthi ( skee), and one in each of the Ehinos(ahin ), Paxni ( Pa evik ), Dimario ( Demercik ), Oreo ( Yassren ) and Sappes ( ap ) vil-lages. 24 The main role of these schools was to provide imams. Since the 1970s, however,

courses taught in Turkish, as well as those concerning Islam and its practice, were gradu-

ally replaced by courses taught in Greek. Greek state authorities gradually increased their

control over these schools. As a result, the medreses largely ceased to function as religious

schools of the minority. Today, the great majority of courses are taught in Greek. As a

matter of fact, due to the discriminatory policies of the Greek state, the Turkish Muslim

community has lost almost all of its religious and educational institutions and many of its

properties. Even though open pressure against Muslims has largely dissipated since the

1990s, the autonomy of the community has effectively been destroyed.

2 . G r o w i n g b o n d s w i t h Tu r k e y a n d Tu r k i f y i n g I s l a m

Since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Turkey has been the guarantor 25 as well as the

motherland of the Muslims and Turks living in Western Thrace. Considering the historic

role of the Ottoman Empire in the region, it would not be exaggerated to argue that Turkey

has been the most important actor from the point of view of the survival of Muslim com-

munities, even though its impact has not been even. In 1923, for instance, and counter-

intuitively, it was the anti-religious worldview of the Kemalist regime that led to a

strengthening of the religious life of Western Thrace. When the Kemalist reforms led to

attacks on the institutions of Islamic learning and attempted to Turkify the practice of Islam, many religious scholars fled Turkey to take on positions in Western Thrace. Greek

administrators, who were confident that these anti-Kemalist religious scholars would

22 Evren Dede, Her Ikisi de barbarlik, Azinlikca , Vol.51, October 2009, 25.23 In 2009 and 2010, six major violent attacks were reported against mosques and cemeteries in both Ko-

motini and Xanthi prefectures. For more information on these attacks, see the written report of theWTMUGA submitted to the OSCE Human Dimension Meeting, Combating hate crimes in WesternThrace, 30 September-8 October 2010, Warsaw/Poland.

24 Cited in K.G Andreadis, The Moslem Minority in Western Thrace (Thessaloniki: 1956) p. 74.25 To note, the 1923 Lausanne Treaty doesnt give any status for Turkey and Greece as guarantor of their

co-ethnies in Western Thrace and Istanbul.


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help to keep the Muslims of Greece in the fold of Islam and protect them from the secular-

nationalist influence of the Turkish Republic, welcomed these scholars. At this point in

time, Islamic identity was clearly preferable to the emergence of a secular Turkish iden-

tity, which, in the eyes of Greek decision makers, would lead to irredentist stirrings in

Western Thrace.

Indeed, the hold of a rather conservative form of Islam further intensified with the arrival

of the last eyhlislam , the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Hewas accompanied by other religious leaders, also known as part of the contingent of the

Hundred and fifty ( 150likler), a group of leading personalities suspected of opposition

to the Turkish Republic. Not only did they find a safe haven in Western Thrace, but they

also contributed to the continuation of a specifically Ottoman religious life based on

Islamic principles. However, their arrival did not lead to the emergence of a uniformly

conservative way of life. Despite Greek policy to support Islamic over Turkish-nationalist

actors, the values of the new Republic were promoted by Turkish emissaries and were

generally brought home by Western Thracians who studied in Turkey. By the mid-1920s,

a schism had already divided the community, pitting minority elites against the masses,

with Kemalists and modernists on the one side and traditionalists and conservatives on the

other.

The Kemalists were supporting the highly regulated and Turkified Islam promoted by

the Turkish state and its official religious authority (the Diyanet ), while traditionalists re-

mained staunch supporters of the institutions and practices of Ottoman Islam. In fact, and

still not sufficiently known in Turkey or elsewhere, some minority newspapers refused to

follow some of the most influential reforms of the Kemalist era, such as the abolishment

of the Ottoman Arabic script and the introduction of the Turkish-Latin alphabet. The

newspaper Sebat, for instance, continued to be published in the Ottoman script until the

early 1970s, making Western Thrace the only place in the world where the Ottoman lan-

guage was still visible almost half a century after its official demise. In time and is spite of

the support of Greek authorities, the traditionalists lost ground and the influence of Turkey

in the region proved to be too powerful. Thus, the schism between the traditionalist and

the modernist reading of Islam faded. From the 1970s, the more ethnically defined Turkish

Islam, promoted by the Turkish state and the Diyanet , came to flourish in Western Thrace,

contributing to the strengthening of Turkish identity among all Muslims.

Indeed, such a transformation from the more traditional and Ottoman-rooted Islam to a

more Turkish-oriented contemporary form of Islamic practice remains visible today. Reli-

gious education in Turkey has been the single most important variable in terms of this de-

velopment. The Muslim Turkish religious elite, educated in Turkey in the last decades, has

played a very important role. The elected muftis in Komotini and Xanthias distinct from


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the Greek-appointed muftis formed strong functional bonds with the Diyanet (Presi-

dency of religious affairs of the Turkish Republic). Today, imams associated with the

elected muftis are sent to summer courses organized by the Diyanet , where they are taught

in different matters of Islamic theology and practice. More recently, preachers of the Di-

yanet have also been allowed to give hutbas (Friday sermons) and talks on contemporary

Islam during the holy month. From 1990s onwards, Turkish Television channels, widely

available through satellites, provided another influential tool for the development of Islam

in Western Thrace and for the growing role of Turkey.

Secondary education in Turkey has provided other important opportunities for Muslim

Turks of Western Thrace. For many decades, Turkey was the primary destination for

young Minority students who wanted to develop their knowledge and understanding of

Islam at religious high schools while keeping their conservative lifestyles. The attendance

of religious high schools in Turkey, so called Imam Hatip schools, which provide both

religious and scientific education, used to be highly popular. More recently, this trend has

diminished in part to a change in the educational preferences and expectations of the fami-

lies, who have begun to prefer educating their children in Western Thrace rather than

sending them to Turkey.

As a result, the majority of influential people within the Muslim Turkish community in

Greece, including the elected muftis of Komotini and Xanthi and most leading imams and

other religious personnel, now have a predominantly Turkey-based educational career and

professional socialisation. It may hence not be surprising that the Greek state began to ap-

point muftis who were not educated in Turkey in the early 1990s, while the Turkish gov-

ernment has been emphatically supporting the Turkey-educated elected muftis and imams

following them.

Even today, in times of relative rapprochement, Turkish representatives visiting the region

make a point in not meeting with Greek-appointed muftis and instead visit the elected

ones. Representatives of the Greek state in the region likewise only recognise the ap-

pointed muftis as religious leaders of given prefectures. The elected muftis are still viewed

as acting illegally and usurping the authority of mufti. Yet, for the Muslims Turks, the pre-

ferences are pretty clear-cut. Based on the general mood in the region, as reflected in jour-

nals, newspapers and popular discussions, it is fair to say that the great majority of Mus-

lims in the three prefectures of Western Thrace accept the elected muftis as their legiti-

mate religious leaders, while they keep at a distance those appointed by the Greek state,

with whom they interact only if they need some officially-recognised services in matters

of divorce and inheritance.


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3 . T h e d i s t a n t i n f l u e n c e o f A r a b a n d M u s l i m C o u n t r i e s

Compared with Turkey, the influence of other Muslim countries in Western Thrace re-

mained relatively low. Islamic groups and state representatives from the Muslim world

have visited the region and raised concerns against the discriminatory policies of theGreek state. Colonel Qaddafi, for instance, reminded Greek officials of complaints about

religious freedom in Western Thrace during his visit to Greece in the 1980s, 26 while a

group of journalists from Saudi Arabia who visited the region reported on the lives of

Muslim Turks in Western Thrace. 27 This, however, had no impact on Western Thrace it-

self.

Yet, Muslim majority countries were influential in other ways. Particularly Syria, Egypt

and Saudi Arabia constituted the main destinations for a few minority students, mainly

graduates of the two medreses of the region, who opted for higher education outsideGreece during the Cold War years. Greek authorities preferred education in such Muslim

countries rather than in Turkey. 28 However, by the 2000s, this phenomenon had largely

subsided, and by 2010, there were almost no Muslim students from Western Thrace pursu-

ing higher education in the Arab and Islamic world.

In terms of the influence of religious networks, Western Thrace has been rather isolated.

Compared to other countries in the Balkans, different Islamic groups like Naqshibendis or

Wahhabis had little or no impact. Although some members of such groups continue to

visit Western Thrace, none of them was able to establish any network of influence in theregion. Thus, one can say that the phenomenon of different and competing versions of

Islam does not apply to todays Western Thrace, as there remains a highly homogenised

and shared common understanding of what constitutes Islam, a notion that remains heavily

influenced by contemporary Turkish Islam and that is reflected in all levels of social, eco-

nomic and political life. This relative insistence on a bounded way of life and the con-

siderable orientation towards the mainstream Turkish tradition of Islam has kept Western

Thracians away from the influence of Arab Muslim networks. Additionally, this insistence

has also created a gulf between immigrant Muslim communities from Southeast Asia who

have been settling in Athens since early 1990s and the Arab world.

In spite of sharing the same religion, the Muslim minoritys religious elite, which could, at

least in theory, play a role in the future of Muslim immigrant communities in Greece,

26 Bahceli, op.cit. p. 183.27 HakkaDavet, 9, August 1982:21. See S.Sonyel, Muslims in Greece-the forgotten alien elements in

BatiTrakya , 208, 15.08.1984:2-5.28 In 1984, speaking with villagers of Echinos/Xanthi the Vice Minister of the Greek Foreign Affairs. M.

Kapsis, had overtly suggested to them to replace their teacher of Turkish citizenship with another from

Saudi Arabia as the former is ethnically less-dangerous [sic.] than the latter. (Ios tis Kiriakis, Eleft-herotipia, 22.1.2005).


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shows little concern for the religious needs of the Athenian Muslim immigrants. Some

minority NGOs and members of the religious elite, indeed, do not go beyond criticizing

the Greek state at regional and international platforms for delaying the establishment of a

mosque and a Muslim cemetery in Athens. Such a low level of interest might also be wel-

comed by the Greek state, who would not want to see the institutions of Western Thrace be revitalised and strengthened by the immigrant Muslim communities of Athens. This

instance, among others, seems also to reflect the understanding that Islam and Turkishness

have become so heavily intertwined that the absence of one of these elements (Turkish-

ness) seems to diminish the other one (Islam) for the Muslims of Western Thrace as well

as their religious and political leaders. Hence, Arabic and other non-Turkish Muslim net-

works never really assumed a decisive role in terms of the fate of the minority.

4 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s

The role of international actors increased from the 1980s onwards, at a greater pace fol-

lowing Greeces entry into the European Union in 1981. With the new opportunities aris-

ing from this membership, the religious and political leaders of the minority, MPs, muftis

and presidents of associations began to establish relations with regional and international

bodies. Most notably, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe became key

platforms for publicising information about the discriminative measures of Greek state

agencies. Hence, and for the first time since its emergence in the early 19th century, the

Greek state was confronted with criticism of its minority policy in Western Thrace.

Criticism was voiced from a range of institutions of the EU and CoE as well as from

international human rights organizations such Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty

International. The reports of HRW (1990, 1992, 1999) depicted clearly to what extent re-

ligious freedom, alongside with other fundamental issues in Western Thrace, was re-

stricted by the Greek authorities. Both HRW and Amnesty granted special attention to the

trials of the elected muftis of Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures, Ibrahim Serif and M. Emin

Aga. These agencies also highlighted the obstructions of the building and repair permits of

the mosques in Western Thrace. 29 Another important source that brings the problem in

Western Thrace to the attention of an international audience is the International Religious

Freedom Report of the U.S. State Department. Since 2000, the US has been monitoring

29 For more information see Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity-The Turks of Greece , (New York:Helsinki Watch, 1990), the 1992 and 1999 Reports of the HRW on Greece available athttp://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm andhttp://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/greece/greece924 [Both retrieved on 1.7.2010]. See also the public

statement of Amnesty International on 24.2.1998 available athttp://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR250141998 [Discontinued]


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the level of religious freedom of different communities not only in Western Thrace but

also in the remaining regions of Greece. 30

Furthermore, since the 1980s, religious issues of the Muslim Turkish minority, especially

those regarding the election of muftis and the administration of charitable organizations,

have frequently been raised at the annual summits of the Organization of the Islamic Con-

ference (OIC), an intergovernmental organization functioning since 1969. From time to

time, elected muftis of Western Thrace participate at their meetings and summits where

they inform OIC members about the latest developments concerning the place of Islam in

Greece. The OICs role in Western Thrace has also been further strengthened by the fact

that it is now presided by the Turkish Islamic scholar Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who sup-

ports both the religious and the ethnic aspect of minority identity in the region. Yet, des-

pite the opportunities such international organisations might have created for community

leaders, it would still be fair to say that criticism from international bodies had little impact on the day-to-day policies of the Greek state.

C o n c l u s i o n

In this brief overview, I have sought to show that Islam has survived in Western Thrace

after the region was incorporated into Greece in 1923 and that it is alive today, even

though Muslims of Western Thrace continue to face a range of problems regarding issues

of religious freedom. Turkey has been a key actor in all respects of the shaping and suste-nance of Muslim and Turkish identities in Western Thrace. Over the years, Turkish policy

has led to an aggregation of the disparate identities in the region into a Turkish-Muslim

identity. The Greek state has been concerned by Turkeys pro-active policy in the region

and by the opportunity structures it created for the Muslims from Western Thrace, but it

has done little to find a constructive engagement with the minority and its leaders. The

persistence of the problems, from the obstruction of the election of muftis and the control

of waqfs to the arson attacks against mosques and cemeteries, suggest that the Greek state

has continued to see the Muslim minority as a security threat rather than a group whose

members enjoy full and equal citizenship rights. This perspective has not changed with the

entry of Greece to the European Union, but it neither seems to have been effectively re-

considered under the current PASOK government of Prime Minister George Papandreou.

30 The US reports are available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ [Retrieved on 28.7.2010] Matters of

religious freedom in Greece have also been evaluated at the US State Department Reports since the late1970s.