anna marmodoro aristotle on perceiving objects

4/6/2015 MetaphysicalFoundationsofPerceptionOxfordScholarship

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AristotleonPerceivingObjectsAnnaMarmodoro

Printpublicationdate:2014PrintISBN13:9780199326006PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:August2014DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001

TheMetaphysicalFoundationsofPerceptionAnnaMarmodoro

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0002

AbstractandKeywords

Aristotleaddressestheproblemofthestructureandthefunctionalityofthefacultyofperceptionasametaphysicalproblem,andresolvesitthroughmetaphysicalinnovation.HisinnovationisgiveninthePhysicsinhisaccountofcausationintermsofactivationofcausalpowers.Thekeyfeaturesoftheaccountareasfollows.Causationisanactivityinvolvingtwo(ormore)causalpowers,whichbelongtodifferentsubstancesorpartsofsubstance(s).Eachoftheactivatedpowersengendersanactivationofadifferenttype,butthetwo(ormore)typesareinterdependent,coexistingpartneractivities.

Keywords:Aristotle,perception,causation,causalpowers,activation,Physics

IntroductionOneofthecornerstonesofAristotlestheoryofperceptionisthattheworldistrulyascolorfulasitlookstous,asnoisyasitsoundstous,etc.Bygeneralization,Aristotleholdsthatweperceivetheworldthroughthesensesasitisinotherwords,thecontentsofourperceptionsarejustliketherealpropertiesoftheexternalobjectsweperceive.1WhilethereisscholarlyconsensusonAristotlesrealismwithrespecttoperceptiblequalities,avarietyofwaysofinterpretingithavebeenputforwardintheliterature.ThisbookmakesanoriginalcontributiontothedebatebymotivatingtheviewthatAristotlestheoryofperceptionisalignedwithoneofhismostfundamentalpositionsinmetaphysics,namelythatall



propertiesarecausalpowers(,potentialities),andthatcausationistobeaccountedforintermsofpowersandtheiractivation(or,actuality).2Thus,inthecaseofperceptiontheperceptiblequalitiesofobjectsarerealpowersoftheobjecttointeractcausallywiththeperceivers,andperceptionitselfistheactivationoftherelevantpowersintheperceiverbytheobjectsofperception.Theactivationoftheobjectsperceptiblequalitiesandtheactivityofthecorrespondingperceptualexperienceintheagentaremutually(p.4) dependentinavarietyofways,whichareuniquetoAristotlesperceptualrealism.

Beforeexploringthisviewinmoredetail,itwillbehelpfultobrieflyintroducethekeytermsthatwillberelevantforthefollowingdiscussion.TheAristotelianscholarmightindeedalreadybesurprisedbymyuseofthetermspowerforpotentialityontheonehand,andactivationforactualityontheother.Theseareinterpretativechoices,andinsomewaysdeparturesfromthereceivedtraditionIwillexplainthempresently.TheGreekterm,asAristotleusesit,referstoapropertywhosenatureisdefinedintermsofthechangeitcanbringabout,orwhichitcanallowitsbearertosuffer.ThemostcommonEnglishtranslationofthusunderstoodispotentiality.Thistranslation,albeitwellestablished,isunhelpfulwhenweembarkonaninvestigationofAristotlesviews,forthreemainreasons.Firstly,itblurstheconceptualdistinctionbetweenthepropertyitself,thatis,thecausalpower,andthestateitisin,becausetheybothendupbeingreferredtoaspotentiality.Secondly,itobscurestherelevanceofAristotlesviewtocontemporarymetaphysics:thetermpotentialitydoesnotfigureinthecontemporarydiscourse,althoughwhatitreferstoinAristotleisverymuchatthecenterofcurrentdiscussioninmetaphysics.3Thirdly,itgeneratesunnecessarydifficultiesforourunderstandingofwhatanactivatedpoweris.Ithusproposetousethetermpowerasatranslationofwhenitreferstocausalpowers,andtousethetermpotentialitywhenreferringtothestatethatcausalpowersareinwhennotactivated.

Somepowers,forAristotle,existinnatureorandothersor.FortheseexpressionsIusethecurrenttranslationinpotentialityorpotentially,andinactualityoractually,respectively.Whilekeepingtothestandardtranslation,Iofferhoweveranoriginalinterpretationofwhatitisforapowertobeinactuality.Iarguethattheactualityofapoweristo(p.5) beinterpretedasitsstateofactivationitsexercisingpowerfulness.ForAristotle,apowerdoesnotceasetobepowerfulwhileactivated,norisitspowerfulnessreducibletomerepotentiality,aswewillseeinmoredetaillater.Thepowerfulnessofapoweriseitherthepotentialitytobringaboutchange,ortheactualityofbringingaboutchange.ThatthepowerfulnessandthepotentialityofapowerarenotreducibleonetotheothercanbederivedfromthefollowingstanceAristotletakes.Hedifferentiatesthreestatesasubjectsmaybeininrelationtoapower:smayhaveapowerinpotentiality(asinthecaseofachildhavingthepowertolearntoplaysoccer)smayhaveapowerinfirstactuality(whenthechildhaslearnedtoplaysoccer)andsmayhaveapowerinsecondactuality(whenthechildisplayingsoccer).4ForAristotlesomepowersretaintheirpotentialityonlyuptothestateoffirstactuality,butnotinsecondactuality.Forexample,whenwaterisfreezingandbecominganicecube,inthefirststagesofthisprocesstheicecubeinthemakingisnotactuallyfragilebutcanacquirethecapacitytobreakifitcooleddownmore.Whenitiscooleddownmoretheicecubebecomesharderandbrittle,andcanpotentiallybreak(e.g.bybeingcrushed).Crushingitactivatesitsbrittleness,namelyitspowertobreak.Whentheicecubeisactivelybreakingitlosesthepotentialitytobreak.Bycontrast,otherpowersretaintheirpotentialitywheninsecondactualityforinstance,thechildspotentialitytoplaysoccerispreservedwhileplayingsoccer,namelywhilethepowerisactivated.Aristotleexplains:

Eventhetermbeingacteduponisnotusedinasinglesense,butsometimesitmeansakindofdestructionofsomethingbyitscontrary,andsometimesratherapreservationofthatwhichispotentialbysomethingactualwhichislikeit,aspotencyisrelatedtoactuality.Forwhentheonemerelypossessingknowledgecomestoexerciseit,heisnotaltered(forthedevelopment(p.6) isintohisrealselforactuality),orelsethisisadifferentkindofalteration(DA417b27)

,,,,()



.

Apowerispowerfulbecauseofitsrelationtochangeitcanleadtochange,oritengagesinchangethatpreservesit.5

1.1AristotlesPowerOntologyAristotlespowerontology,asbrieflysketchedthusfar,bearsonhistheoryofperception.Forhim,theperceptiblequalitiesthatcharacterizetheworldaroundusarerealcausalpowersobjectshave,aswewillseeinthenextchapters.WhyarepowerssocentraltoAristotlesmetaphysics,andconsequentlytoalldomainsofhisinvestigation,includingperception?Howdidhereachthisview?Aristotleaimsatarationalexplanationoftheworldallthewaydowntothebedrockofreality.IntheDeGenerationeetCorruptionehestatesthatatthisfundamentallevelofrealitytherearepropertiesandbodies,andthereisarationaletothenumberofbodiesandthewaythepropertiesaredistributedamongthem.Hewrites,

The[fundamental]differences[i.e.,properties]arereasonablydistributedamongtheprimarybodies,andthenumberofthelatterisconsonantwiththeory.

(GC330b67,myemphasis)

,.

(p.7) Inthinkingaboutthepropertiesthatcharacterizetheprimarybodies,Aristotlenarrowsdownthecandidatesforthisroleoffundamentalpropertytothetangiblecontrarieties(GC329b69),whichforhimare:

[Properties]...capableofacting[and]beingaffected...saidofthingsinvirtueoftheiractinguponsomethingelseorbeingacteduponbysomethingelse.

(GC329b2122)

..........

ClearlythenforAristotlethesepropertiesarepowers:theyarepropertieswhosenatureistobringaboutorallowtheirbearertosufferchange.Aristotlegoesthroughananalysisofthelistoftangiblecontrarieties,andconcludesthattheyareallreducibletofourprimaryorfundamentalones.Theseprimarypowersareheat,cold,wetness,anddryness:

Itisclear...thatalltheotherdifferencesreducetothefirstfour,butthattheseadmitofnofurtherreduction...Hencethesemustbefour.

(GC330a2429)

........

Theseprimarypowersdonotexistseparatelyeachonitsowntheypairupandconstitutethefoursimpleelements:namelyfire,air,water,andearth:

Fireishotanddry,whereasAirishotandmoist...andWateriscoldandwet,whileEarthiscoldanddry.

(GC330b35)

,...,.



(p.8) Aristotleholdsthattherearenootherprimarypropertiesthatanyofthesimpleelementspossessesinadditiontothetwocontrarypowerseachsimpleelementisqualifiedby.Thesimpleelementscanreciprocallytransformintooneanotherbygainingorlosingtheirpowers.6Forexamplethesimpleelementswaterandfirehavetwocontrarietieseach,andwhentheycomeincontacttheinteractionbetweenthemresultsintheheatoffireoverpoweringthecoldnessofthewaterwhilethewetnessofwateroverpowersthedrynessoffire,givingrisetowhatishotandwet,namelyair.Andwhenairlosesitsprimarypowerofheat,whichisreplacedbythepowerofcold,ittransformsintowateragain.Aristotlewrites:

Forthesebodies[Fire,Waterandthelike]changeintooneanother(theyarenotimmutableasEmpedoclesandotherthinkersassert,sincealterationwouldthenhavebeenimpossible),whereasthecontrarietiesdonotchange.

(GC329a35b3,myemphasis)

,(),.

TherewillbeAir,whenthecoldoftheWaterandthedryoftheFirehavepassedaway(sincethehotofthelatterandthemoistoftheformerareleft)whereas,whenthehotoftheFireandthemoistoftheWaterhavepassedaway,therewillbeEarth,owingtothesurvivalofthedryoftheFireandthecoldoftheWater.So,too,inthesamewayFireandWaterwillresultfromAirandEarth.FortherewillbeWater,whenthehotoftheAirandthedryoftheEarthhavepassedaway(sincethemoistoftheformerandthecoldofthelatterareleft)whereas,whenthemoistoftheAirandthecoldoftheEarthhavepassedaway,therewillbeFire,owingtothesurvivalofthehotoftheAir(p.9) andthedryoftheEarthqualitiesconstitutiveofFire.

(GC331b1424)

,(),,,.,(),,,,.

Thesimpleelementscancombinebetweenthemindifferentproportionstomakeupmorecomplexkindsofstuff.Thusthe(instantiated)primarypowersaretheprimitive(orbasic)andfundamentalbuildingblocksofreality.Theprimarypowersareprimitivebecausetheyarenotconstitutedofanyfurtheritemsastheirbuildingblocks.Therearenoitemsconstitutingtheprimaryproperties,andthereforetherearenofurtheritemsconstitutingthesimpleelementsair,water,earth,andfireapartfromtheirprimarypowers.Ontheotherhand,theyarefundamentalbecausetheprimaryproperties,towhichtheotherpropertiesarereducible,7interactwitheachotherinthecyclicaltransformationsoftheprimaryelementstheyconstitute,8therebymakingupastructureofinteractingpowersthatisthefoundationofallthereisinnature.InviewofthefactthatforAristotleeverythinginphysicalnatureisbuiltoutofthefoursimpleelementsandtheirmixtures,andthesimpleelementsarebuiltoutoftheprimaryproperties,itfollowsthatallthereisinnatureisbuiltoutofpowers.Allphysicalchangesinnaturederivefromchangesinthecombinationsoftheprimarypowers.Since,onAristotlesview,powersrequireotherpowerstoactivatethem,thisgivesrisetoanetofinterdependentpowers,(p.10) which,ultimately,constituteeverythinginnature.Itisastructureofdependences,notofrelationsbetweenpowers.Norisitastructureofrelationsthatconstitutepowersdependencedoesnotintroducerelationsormakepowersrelationalentitiesintheirconstitution.Furthermore,asweshallsee,forAristotlethemanifestationofeachpowerisintrinsictothepoweritself.Beingactivatedissimplyexercisingthepowerfulnessthatdefineswhatthepoweris.9

1.2TheNatureofCausalPowersIngeneralterms,forAristotle,apowerisfirstandforemostthecapacitytobringaboutchange:



Allpotentialitiesthatconformtothesametypearestartingpointsofsomekind,andarecalledpotentialitiesinreferencetooneprimarykind,whichisastartingpointofchangeinanotherthingorinthethingitselfquaother.

(Met.1046a911,myemphasis)10

,,,.

ItisimportanttonotefromthestartthatAristotlesveryexplanationofpowersasbeingsourcesofchange,andnothingotherthanthat,commitshim,albeitimplicitly,totheviewthatallthereistoapoweriswhatitcando,orisdoing.Nothinginertorimpotentisneededinthepowersnaturetoanchorthepowertoreality.11Thiscommitment(whichissharedbyanumberofcontemporarypowermetaphysicians)12isnotuncontroversial13however,itiscrucialtofreeAristotlespowerontologyfromanyoftheregressesthatensueforotherpowerontologies,aswewillseelater.

(p.11) Inadditiontotheprimarytypeofpowersjustmentioned,thatistheactiveoneswhichcaninitiatechange,forAristotlethereexistpassivepowersthatarecapacitiestosufferchange:

Foronekindisapotentialityforbeingactedon(i.e.,theprincipleintheverythingactedon)whichmakesitcapableofbeingchangedandactedonbyanotherthingorbyitselfregardedasother.

(Met.1046a1113)

,.

Examplesofsuchcapacitiesorpowersare,forexample,fragility,ormalleability,orflexibility,etc.ForAristotlebeingabletochangeisasmuchacapacityorpowerasbeingabletoeffectchange,ashestates:

Inasensethepotentialityofactingandofbeingactedonisone(forathingmaybecapableeitherbecauseitcanbeactedonorbecausesomethingelsecanbeactedonbyit),butinasensethepotentialitiesaredifferent.Fortheoneisinthethingactedonitisbecauseitcontainsacertainmotiveprinciple,andbecauseeventhematterisamotiveprinciple,thatthethingactedonisactedon...forthatwhichisoilyisinflammableandthatwhichyieldsinaparticularwaycanbecrushedandsimilarlyinallothercases.Buttheotherpotencyisintheagent(e.g.heatandtheartofbuildingarepresent,oneinthatwhichcanproduceheatandtheotherinthemanwhocanbuild).

(Met.1046a1928)

(),.(,,(p.12) ...,),,,

AnotionthatisdistinctivetoAristotlesaccountisconceivingofpassivepowersasoriginativesourcesofchange(seeMet.1046a1113a23).Itisnaturalforustothinkthatanoriginativesourceofchangeisapowertobringaboutchangebutitisnotasnaturaltothinkthatanoriginativesourceofchangeisacapacitytosufferchange.YetAristotleseesbothactiveandpassivepowersasoriginativesourcesofchange,theoneasasourcethatchangessomething,andtheotherasasourceofsufferingchange.Infact,Aristotlegivesseveralexamplesoforiginativesourcesofsufferingchangetomakehispointclear,suchas,forexample,oilorbrittlematter.14BothactiveandpassivepowersarementionedinAristotlesdefinitionofpowerinMet.V12:



Thingswhicharecalledcapable()inonesensewillbethosewhichoriginatechangeoralteration...inotherthingsorquaotherinanothersense,ifsomethingelsepossessessuchcapacityoverthem.

(Met.1019a33b1)

...,.

TheformeristheprimarycaseforAristotletheothersarecalledcapableeitherfromsomethingelsespossessingacapabilityofthatkindoverthem,orfromitsnotpossessingit,orfromitspossessingitinaparticularway(Met.1020a24).

AsIwillarguebelow,itisafundamentaltenetforAristotlethatpowersaredependentonotherpowersinordertobeactivated.For(p.13) examplethesolubilityofsaltrequiressalttobeplacedinanappropriateliquidinorderforittodissolve.ThepositionwasfirstputforwardbyHeraclitus,endorsedbyPlato,15andthendevelopedbyAristotleinterestinglyitisgainingconsensusamongcontemporarymetaphysicianstoo.16ButitisadistinctiveAristotelianview(andfarfrombeingapointofconsensusamongcontemporarypowermetaphysicians)thatactivepowersdependonpassivepowersfortheiractivation(andviceversa).Aristotledefinesanactivepowerasonethatexercisesitspowerfulnessonacorrespondingpassiveone.17AsIwillarguebelow,thedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassivepowersispivotalforasoundaccountofcausation,foritgivesmetaphysicalunderpinningtoitsasymmetry.18

1.3CausalPowersinActualityPowersarecapacitiesforchangethechangeistheend()theyaredirectedtoward.19Forapower,reachingitsendisexercisingitspowerfulness,andtherebybecomingactual.Mostimportantly,forAristotletheactualityofapowerisitsactivation,namelyatransitiontoadifferentstatusofthepoweritself.20Thisnewstagereachedbytheactivatedpoweristhecausalactivitythepowerisengagedin.Forexample,thepowertoheatwhenactivatedisheatingsomethingelse.Aristotleinfactdistinguishesbetweenpowerswhoseactivationisanactivityinthestrictsense(,),andotherswhoseactivationisaprocess().Thepowerswhoseendsareactivitiesarerealizedinstantaneously,suchasinthecaseofthepowertoseeatanyonemomentoneseesandhasseen.Thepowerswhoseendsareprocessesarerealizedinstages,suchasinthecaseofthepowertobuildahousewhileoneisbuildingahouse,onehasnotbuiltahouse.Processeshaveanaturalcompletionpoint:whentheendoftheprocessisreached,suchasthecompletionofthe(p.14) houseactivitiesdonothaveanaturalcompletionpoint(e.g.,inthecaseofseeing).StrictlyspeakingAristotleassociateschangewithprocessesonly,becauseinthecaseofprocessestheresultingstateisqualitativelydifferentfromtheinitialstateasforinstanceinthecaseofheating(process),butnotofseeing(activity).21TomakeAristotlespointevenclearerwemightsaythatprocessesonlyhaveanoutput,whilebothprocessesandactivitieshaveaneffect.AristotlesdistinctionsaremainlypresentedinthefollowingtextfromtheMetaphysics:

Sinceoftheactionswhichhavealimitnoneisanendbutallarerelativetotheend(e.g.,theprocessofmakingthinisofthissort)andthethingsthemselveswhenoneismakingthemthinareinmovementinthisway(i.e.,withoutbeingalreadythatatwhichthemovementaims),thisisnotanactionoratleastnotacompleteone(foritisnotanend)butthatinwhichtheendispresentisanaction.Forexample,atthesametimeweareseeingandhaveseen,areunderstandingandhaveunderstood,arethinkingandhavethought:butitisnottruethatatthesametimewearelearningandhavelearned,orarebeingcuredandhavebeencured.Atthesametimewearelivingwellandhavelivedwell,andarehappyandhavebeenhappy.Ifnot,theprocesswouldhavehadsometimetocease,astheprocessofmakingthinceases:but,asitis,itdoesnotcease:wearelivingandhavelived.Oftheseprocesses,then,wemustcalltheonesetmovements(),andtheotheractualities().Foreverymovementisincompletemakingthin,learning,walking,buildingthesearemovements,andincompletemovements.Foritisnottruethatatthesametimewearewalking[toadestination]andhavewalked[tothedestination],orarebuildingandhavebuilt,orarecomingtobeandhavecometobeitisadifferentthingthatis



beingmoved(p.15) andthathasbeenmoved,andthatismoving[toalocation]andthathasmovedbutitisthesamethingthatatthesametimehasseenandisseeing,oristhinkingandhasthought.Thelattersortofprocess,then,Icallanactuality(),andtheformeramovement().What,andwhatkindofthing,theactualis,maybetakenasexplainedbytheseandsimilarconsiderations.

(Met.1048b1836)

,[][],,,[].,.,.,,,.,.,,.,,,[],.,.,.

Fromtheabovetextwelearnthatpowersareactualized,accordingtoAristotle,aseitheractivitiesorprocesses.Thedifferencebetweenthemisthatprocesseshaveabeginningandanendwhicharedifferentfromeachother,socompletingtherealizationoftheendrequiresqualitativelydifferentstagesinaprocesswhileinanactivitythebeginningandtheendarethesame,ina(p.16) continuousrealizationoftheend.Sincewhileaprocessistakingplaceithasnotreacheditsendpointyet,itcanbethoughtofasapowerintheprocessofbeingactualized,whichishowAristotlethinksaboutit.Aprocessisanactuality,becausetheunfoldingrealizationofitsdifferentstagesishappeningbutatthesametimeitisnotfullyrealized,insofarasithasnotreacheditsendyet.Inthatsenseachangeisanactualprocessinprogress,realizingitsremainingpotentialstages,asAristotleexplainsinthePhysics:

Theactualityofthepotential,quapotential,ischange(e.g.,theactualityofwhatisalterableasalterable,isalterationofwhatisincreasableanditsopposite,decreasable(thereisnocommonnameforboth),increaseanddecreaseofwhatcancometobeandcanpassaway,comingtobeandpassingawayofwhatcanbecarriedalong,locomotion).Thatthisiswhatchangeis,isclearfromwhatfollows:whenwhatisbuildable,insofaraswecallitsuch,isinfulfillment,itisbeingbuilt,andthatisbuilding.

(Phys.201a918,transl.slightlymodified)

,,,,,,(),,.,.,,,,

Someconfusionmightariseinreadingthepassage:itmightappearthatapowerispotentialbeforeitisactualized,andagainpotentialafteritisactualized,asiftherewereunactualizedandactualized(p.17) potential.ToavoidconfusionitisimportanttobearinmindthedistinctiondrawnbyAristotlebetweentheactivationofapowerthatis,itsrealizationandthecompletionoftheprocessofitsrealization.Thus,thepowerofhousebuildingbecomesactualwhenactivatedatthebeginningofthehousebuildingprocess,andcontinuestobeinactualityuntilallthestagesofhousebuildingarecompleted.Althoughinactivitiestheendisreachedassoonastheactivityoccurs,andsetsnolimitstothedurationoftheactivity,inthecaseofchangestheendiscomplextheprocesshastobeinitiatedandcontinueactivateduntiltheendpointoftheprocessisreached,completingtheprocess:



Whileinsomecasestheexerciseistheultimatething(e.g.,insighttheultimatethingisseeing,andnootherproductbesidesthisresultsfromsight),butfromsomethingsaproductfollows(e.g.,fromtheartofbuildingthereresultsahouseaswellastheactofbuilding),yetnonethelesstheact[ofseeing]isintheformercasetheendandinthelatter[theactofhousebuildingis]moreofanendthanthemerepotentiality[tobuild]is[evenifitislessofanendthanthecompletionofthehouse].

(Met.1050a2328)

(,),(),,

Thecontrastisbetweenthepotentialityforbuildingahousewhennothingisbeingbuilt,andthepotentialityforbuildingahousewhileahouseisbeingbuilt.Thelatterpotentialityistheactivationoftheformerpotentiality,andhasanendpointthatmarksitsfullactualization.Thisiswhattheactualityofthepotentialqua(p.18) potentialistheactualprocessofbuildingthehouse.Duringthebuildingprocess,thepowertobuildisasactivated(andasactual)asisthepowertoseewhenoneisseeing.Thus,whenthepowerisactivelydoingwhatitisinitsownnaturecapableofdoing,thenthepowerisactualized.Priortothisitexistsbutinapotentialstate.Thustheactualityofapower,whetherforanactivityoraprocess,istheactivationofthatpower:22

Thatwhichisintheprimarysensepotentialispotentialbecauseitispossibleforittobecomeactual(e.g.,Imeanbycapableofbuildingthatwhichcanbuild,andbycapableofseeingthatwhichcansee).

(Met.1049b1216)

,(,,,

Aristotlefurtherdistinguishestheactivationofapowerfromtherealizationofthepowersend.Theendofapowerisgiveninthepowersdefinition:

Thatwhichiscapableiscapableofsomethingandatsometimeinsomewaywithalltheotherqualificationswhichmustbepresentinthedefinition.

(Met.1047b351048a2)

.

Asmentionedabove,forAristotle,theactualityofapowerisnotanewpropertythatcomesabout.23Rather,itistheactivationofthepower,eitherasitisexercisingitscausalinfluenceonthepassivepowerorasthepassivepowerissufferingthatinfluence.Forexample,ifapeachhasthepowertoripenintheheat,theripeningistheactualization(p.19) ofactiveandpassivepowersatplayintheenvironmentandinthepeach.Theripestateofthepeachthatcomesaboutistheaftermathoftheactivationofthepowers,nottheirmanifestation,whichistheripeningprocess.Similarly,inthecaseofabuilderwhohasthepowertobuildahouse,thebuilthouseistheoutputoftheactivationoftheactiveandpassivepowersinplayinthecircumstances.

ForAristotleapowerinpotentialityisthesamepowerasthatpowerinactuality(i.e.,whenitisactivated).Inotherwords,thedifferencebetweenpotentialandactualpowerisnotanumericaldifference.ThisisaveryimportantanddistinctivetenetofAristotlesmetaphysics,whosephilosophicalsoundnessshowsupclearlyifweconsideritinrelationtothreedebatesintherecentliteratureonpowermetaphysics.Inbrief,theseissuesare:firstly,whetherpurepower



ontologiesofthekindAristotleendorses(wherethereisnothingcategoricalanchoringthepowerstoreality)arecommittedtoaworldofmerepotentialitysecondly,whetherpowershaveanessentiallyrelationalnatureandthirdly,inwhatsenseapowersdirectednesstowarditsmanifestationisintrinsictothepoweritself.Ishallnowexamineeachofthesedebates,showingineachcasehowAristotlesviewmakesafreshcontribution,andadvancesthecontemporarydebate.

Tobeginwith,isAristotlesaccountvulnerabletothecriticismthatallthereisorcanbeispotential,andthatchangeissimplyatransitionfromonepotentialstateoftheworldtoanothersuchstate?Thisisaproblemfacedbymanycontemporarypowerontologies,sometimesreferredtoastheAlwayspacking,nevertravellingproblem.24DavidArmstrongformulatestheproblemthus:

Givenpurelydispositionalistaccountsofproperties,particularswouldseemtobealwaysrepackingtheirbagsastheychangeproperties,yetnevertakingajourneyfrompotencytoact.(1997,80)

(p.20) Theproblemstemsfromthepositionheldbycontemporarypowerontologistswherebythemanifestationofapowerisanewpower.25Thispositioncommitsthemtoanetworkofpowersinpotentiality,astheactivationofeachpowerinpotentialityisatransitiontoanewpowerinpotentiality.Thus,nothingeverseemstobeactualized.AvoidingacommitmenttoworldsofmerepotentialityispreciselytheworrythatAristotlespositionavoids.Onhisview,andincontrasttoalternativeviewsinthecontemporaryliterature,thetransitionapowermakesfrombeinginpotentialitytobeinginactualitydoesnotamounttobringingaboutanotherpowerinpotentiality.Itisratheratransitionthepowermakestoitsownactivatedstate.Anactivatedpoweristheverysamepowerasthepowerinpotentiality,butisnowmanifesting(e.g.,thepowertoheatactivelyheatingsomething).Atheoryofpowersthatdidnotallowthemwhenactivatedtoexercisetheirpowerfulnesswouldberatheroddindeed.ForAristotlepowersthatareexercisingtheirpowerfulnessareactivelybringingaboutchange,andresultinanewconfigurationofpowers.Buttheexerciseofpowerfulnessisnottheresult,butrathertheprocesstowardtheresult.FromthisdiscussionitfollowsthatforAristotlethepowerfulnessofapowerisnotreducibletomerepotentiality.(Thisaddressesthefirstofthethreeissuesincontemporarymetaphysicaldebatementionedabove).Powerfulnessisthepotentialitytobringaboutorsufferchange,butalsotheactivityofbringingaboutorsufferingchange.Additionally,theactivationofapowerisneithertheendofthatpower,nordoesitrenderthepowerinert.Onthecontrary,thepowerisactivelybeingpowerfulbyengenderingchangeorsufferingchange.

Thus,therelationbetweenapoweranditsactualityisintrinsictothepoweritself,inthewaythat,forexample,therelationofagirltothewomanshebecomesisintrinsictothatperson.26Itisacommonassumption,afterAristotle,thatpowersaredefinedintermsoftheiractuality.Contemporarypowerontologiestakethemanifestationofapowertobeafurtherpower,therebyestablishing(p.21) anetworkofrelationswherebyeachpowerisdefinedintermsofitsrelationstosomethingdifferentfromitself,namelyotherpowers.Bycontrast,onAristotlesviewtheactualityofapowerisnotanotherpowerthattheoriginalpowerisrelatedto.(Theactualityofthepowertoheatisthepowersheatingupsomethingelseandnotanotherpower.)ItfollowsthatAristotlesontologyisnotrelationalapowerisnotdefinedintermsofitsrelationtootherpowers.Rather,apowerisdefinedintermsofitsownstateofactivation,whichisanintrinsicstateofthepoweritself.

ItremainsnowtoinvestigatewhetherpowersforAristotlehaveanessentiallyrelationalnatureonaccountoftheirdependenceonotherpowersfortheiractivation.Toconsiderthispoint,weneedtolookattheconditionsforactivationofpowersthatAristotlesetsout.ForAristotle,theactivationofcausalpowersrequirestwosetsofconditionstoobtain.Ontheonehandthereisavarietyofwhatwewouldcallenablingconditionspertainingtotherighttime,therightsituation,therightexternalconditions.Aristotlesummarizestheminsayingthatthemoveriscapableofsomethingatsometimeinsomeway(withalltheotherqualificationswhichmustbepresentinthedefinition)(Met.1048a12).Ontheotherhand,hecollectivelydescribeswhattriggerspowersintherightcircumstancesintocausalactivitygenerically,intermsofcontactbetweenpowers:



Toactonthemovableassuchisjusttomoveit.Butthisitdoesbycontact,sothatatthesametimeit[themover]isalsoactedon.Hencemotionisthefulfilmentofthemovableasmovable,thecausebeingcontactwithwhatcanmove,sothatthemoverisalsoactedon.

(Phys.202a59)

,,,,,,.

(p.22) Whatwelearnfromthispassage(andothersalreadyquoted)isthefollowing.First,powersforAristotlearedependententities.Aswewillseeinmoredetaillaterinthischapter,forAristotlepowersarecoactivatedwiththeirpartnerpowers.ForexampleAspowertoheat(p)requiresBscapacitytogethotter(p)inordertobeabletoachieveitsmanifestation,thatis,heating.Hence,everypowerisdependentonotherpowersforactualizingitsnaturebyreachingitsfullactivationstate.Butdependenceisnotarelationitisratheraconditionforexistence.27Thus,aswewillseelaterinthechapter,powersarenotforAristotlerelationsorrelationalproperties.Secondly,contactisthetriggeringcondition,withalltheotherconditionsmentionedinthedefinitiondeterminingtheenablingconditionsforcausalefficacytotakeplace.Itisthereforeimportanttounderstandwhatisinvolvedinthecontactbetweentheactivepowerandthepassivepoweritoperateson.Aristotletellsusthat:Thingsaresaidtobeincontactwhentheirextremitiesaretogether(Physics226b23).Hefurtherexplainsthat,Thingsaresaidtobetogetherinplacewhentheyareinoneprimaryplaceandtobeapartwhentheyareindifferentplaces28(Physics226a213).Sothingsthatareincontacthavetheirextremitiesinthesameplace.Forthepurposesofcausation,havingtheextremitiesinthesameplacewillhavetobeunderstoodaseithertouchingorbeinginproximity.(Itmusthavebeenascleartoeverybodyinantiquityasitistousthatthereiscausalimpactevenwhenthingsaremerelyproximate,namely,inthesameplaceinthesenseofsamespatialregion.)Forexample,proximitytoafireissufficientforheating,andevenforcatchingfire.SoforAristotlecontactisakeyfactorforcausalefficacy.Itdoesentailatypeofproximityorsamenessofplace,butmoreimportantly,inacausalcontext,ithascometomean,forhim,triggerofthechange,allowingthatthereissomekindoftouchingeveninsituationswherethetouchingisnotphysicalandnotevenreciprocal:(p.23)

Ifanythingimpartsmotionwithoutitselfbeingmoved,itmaytouchthemovedandyetitselfbetouchedbynothingforwesaysometimesthatthemanwhogrievesustouchesus,butnotthatwetouchhim.

(GC323a3133)

,,,.

Torecapitulate,theconditionsunderwhichtheactualizationofpowerstakesplacearedeterminedintheverydefinitionofthepowers.Thedefinitionofapowerspecifiesthetypeofpoweritis,namelywhatitisthatitcanbringaboutorsuffertheappropriateoccasiononwhichthepowercandothisthewayinwhichitcandoitandanyotherconditionsthatneedtoobtainforittodowhatitdoes.Whenalltheconditionssetoutinthedefinitionaremet,includingtheappropriatepairofpowerscomingintocontact,intherelevantsenseofcontactforthetypeofpowertheyare,thennecessarilytheagentpoweractsonthepassivepowerandbringsaboutitseffect:

Sincethatwhichiscapableiscapableofsomethingandatsometimeinsomewaywithalltheotherqualificationswhichmustbepresentinthedefinition,...asregardspotentialitiesof[thosethingsthatarenonrational,(e.g.,fire)]...whentheagentandthepatientmeetinthewayappropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,theonemustactandtheotherbeactedon...Forthenonrationalpotentialitiesareallproductiveofoneeffecteach.

(Met.1047b351048a8myemphasis)



,,,(p.24) ,,,,

Themodalityisnaturalnecessity,stemmingfromthenatureofthepowersthemselves.WhenAristotlesays,inthequotationabove,thatwhentheagentandthepatientmeetinthewayappropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,theonemustactandtheotherbeactedonheisstatingwhatisineffectamostgenerallawofnature.Thatis,heisstatingwhatapowerisintermsofhowitbehaves.Whennaturefollowsitscourse,accordingtoAristotle,itdevelopsasitspotentialitydictates,unlesssomethingexternalinterferes.Hesaysaboutthenaturaldevelopmentofanorganism(e.g.,anacorn)inBookVIIIoftheMetaphysics:

Inthecasesinwhichthesourceofthebecomingisintheverythingwhichcomestobe,athingispotentiallyallthosethingswhichitwillbeofitselfifnothingexternalhindersit.

(Met.1049a1214)

[],[].

Thisishownatureoperates:therearephysicaltendencies,whichunfold,unlesssomethinggetsintheirwayandpreventstheircourse.Thismayhappeninthecaseofcausalinteraction,orinthecaseofthenaturaldevelopmentoforganismsaccordingtotheirnature.ThisiswhyAristotledescribesthelatterasbeingsuchandsuchforthemostpartinBookVIoftheMetaphysics:

Physicsmustbeatheoreticalscience,butitwilltheorizeaboutsuchbeingasadmitsofbeingmoved,andaboutsubstanceasdefinedforthemostpart.

(Met.1025b2628)

(p.25) ,,...

Bothchangeanddevelopmentaretheresultsofunfoldingpotentialities,whichfollowtheirowncourse,forthemostpart,ifnothinghinders.

Aristotlescharacterizationofthistypeofphysicalmodalityisalandmarkinmetaphysics,demarcatingwhathascometobethoughtofasphysicalnecessity.29AgainintheMetaphysics,Aristotleexplainsthenotionofbeingforthemostpart,contrastingittoabsolutenecessity,asfollows:

Since,amongthingswhichare,somearealwaysinthesamestateandareofnecessity(notnecessityinthesenseofcompulsionbutthatwhichweassertofthingsbecausetheycannotbeotherwise),andsomearenotofnecessity,noralways,butforthemostpart...Forinstance,ifinthedogdaysthereiswintryandcoldweather,wesaythisisanaccident,butnotifthereissultryheat,becausethelatterisalwaysorforthemostpartso,butnottheformer.

(Met.1026b2735,myemphasis)

,,,,...,,,.



Whatcharacterizesthenotionofbeingforthemostpartisregularity,thetypeofregularitythatonefindsinnature,underthedomainofnaturallaws,whicharenotexceptionless.30

(p.26) Torecapitulatethediscussionsofar,causalchangeforAristotleinvolvesthemutualactivationofactiveandpassivepowers,broughtaboutbythecontactbetweenontologicallyinterdependentpairsofpowers,suchaswhatcanheatandwhatcanbeheated.Themutualactivationofinterdependentpowersmayresulteitherinactivity(e.g.seeing)orinaprocessofchange(e.g.,beingheated)AllthathappensinAristotlesworldisthatpowersinpotentialitycometobeactivated,eitherasagentsofchangeoraspatientsofchange.Whatisdistinctiveabouttheview(incontrastwiththeversionsincontemporarymetaphysics)isthatittakestheactivationofacausalpowertobetheexerciseofthatpower(i.e.,anactivityorprocess).

1.4RelationsandRelativesPowersforAristotlearenotrelationalproperties.Thereisno(external)relationconnectingapowerinpotentialitytoitsactuality(rather,theactualityistheverysamepowerinadifferentstate,namelyengagedinanactivity).Therearegoodreasonsfornottreatingpowersasrelations,evenifAristotledoesnotdiscussthemexplicitly.Ontheonehand,ifapowerisdefinedintermsofitsactuality,wherethedefinitiondefinesthepowersnature(e.g.,thepowertoheat)itshouldbethecasethatthepowerisonewithitsessentialnaturetheessentialnatureofapowershouldnotbeadifferententitytowhichthepowerisrelated.ThisweknowfromAristotlesargumentsinMetaphysicsVIII6.Norshouldapoweronlytendtowardsitspowerfulnessasifitspowerfulnesswereexternaltothepoweritselfbecausethislatterviewwouldnotmakephilosophicalsense.Thatis,itwoulddivideapowerfromwhatitis.Furthermore,thereisnorelationconnectingmutuallydependentpowers.Rather,forAristotlepowersarerelatives.Aristotlespowersaredependentonotherpowersinordertobeactivated,butontologicaldependenceisgrounded(p.27) onmonadicproperties,suchasybeingafatherandxbeinganoffspring,thatbelongtointerdependententities.Aristotlespowersarenotrelatedtootherpowersthroughpolyadicrelations,suchasxbeingthefatherofy.Aristotleexplainedtheontologicaldependencebetweenrelativesreductively,asacounterfactualdependence(e.g.,ifthereisnomasterthereisnoslave).31Ifweapplythisunderstandingofontologicaldependencetothecaseofcausalrelata,itfollowsthattakingcausalrelataasontologicallyinterdependentamountstotheviewthatifthereisnopatientofchange,thereisnocauseofchange(thereisnopowertoheatifthereisnopowerforbeingheatedup).32IwillbeginbyofferingwhatIthinkistherationaleforthisapproach,bysketchinganintuitionthatstemsfromAristotelianmetaphysicalprinciples.33IsubmitthatthisrationalemotivatesAristotlesreductiveaccountofrelationsintermsofmonadicproperties.

WeknowfromAristotlesCategories(chapter1)andfromtheMetaphysics(bookVIIchapter4)thatevenincidentalproperties(e.g.,beingpale,orbeinghot)haveessencesanddefinitions.Furthermore,propertiescannotexistunattached,ontheirown,buttheyhavetobelongtoasubject(seeCategorieschapter2).Ifwethenconsiderarelationbetweentwothings,forexample,MarcobeingthefatherofPietro,andwetrytothinkofthisrelationasasinglepolyadicpropertythatconjoinsthetwo,MarcoandPietro,decisivedifficultiesfollow.Ontheonehand,thispolyadicpropertywouldbelongtobothsubjects,sinceitcanonlyexistbybelongingtosomething(s)assubject,andbothsubjectshaveaclaimtoitbybeingconjoinedbyit.Ontheotherhand,althoughMarcoisrelatedtoPietroasafather,PietroisnotrelatedtoMarcoasafather,butasasonhence,eitherthepolyadicpropertywouldbelongtoPietrowithoutbeingtrueofhimorthepolyadicpropertywouldhavetwodifferentnatures,endowingeachofthetwoconjoinedentitieswithdifferentqualifications,ofbeingafatherandbeingason,whichisincompatiblewiththepropertybeingoneandthesame(p.28) property(i.e.,relation).Theasymmetryoftherelationintroducesapluralityofnaturestherelationisthesenatures,andthispluralityunderminesitsoneness.ConceivingofrelationsaspolyadicpropertieswasnotevenentertainedbyAristotle.ForAristotle,whatweconsiderrelationsareaccountedforintermsofmonadicpropertiesthatareontologicallyinterdependentthatis,relatives.Theyaremonadicpropertiesofaspecialkind,whichhecalledtheprosti(thetowardsomething)typeofproperty:suchpropertiesinthemselvespointtowardsomethingotherthanthemselves.Thus,Aristotlesays:



Wecallrelativesallsuchthingsasaresaidtobejustwhattheyare,oforthanotherthings,orinsomeotherwayinrelationtosomethingelse.Forexample,whatislargeriscalledwhatitisthansomethingelse(itiscalledlargerthansomething)andwhatisdoubleiscalledwhatitisofsomethingelse(itiscalleddoubleofsomething)similarlywithallothersuchcases.

(Cat.6a36b2)

,,,,.

(Aristotledoesnotdistinguishbetweenrelativesandrelations.Itakeitthisisforthereasongivenabove:thatneitherrelativesnor(asymmetric)relationscanbesinglepolyadicpropertieswithasinglenaturebelongingtoeachofthetworelataitistrueof.)WhatdoesAristotlemeanbytakingrelativestobeprostitowardsomething?Heexplainsitasfollows:

Allrelativesarespokenofinrelationtocorrelativesthatreciprocate.Forexampletheslaveiscalledslaveofamasterandthemasteriscalledmasterofaslave

(Cat.6b2830)

(p.29) ,...

Prostipropertiesaremonadicpropertiessuchthattheirmanifestationoractivationdependscounterfactuallyontheactivationoftheircorrelatives.Someoneisactuallyamasteronlyifthereisaslaveofwhomheismaster,andviceversafortheslave.Therelationbetweenthereciprocatingcorrelativesisnotalinguisticorasemanticrelation.Itisanontologicalinterdependence,asAristotlestatesclearly:

Ifthereisnomaster,thereisnoslaveeither...Whenthereisaslavethereisamasterandsimilarlywiththeothers[sc.otherrelatives]Also,eachcarriestheothertodestructionforifthereisnotadoublethereisnotahalf,andifthereisnotahalfifthereisnotadouble.Sotoowithothersuchcases.

(Cat.7b522)

....,.

SothepointingnatureofrelativesisAristotleswayofdepictingontologicaldependence.Thisiswhatbindsmonadicpropertiesintoreciprocalpairsfortheiractivation(e.g.,beingamasterandbeingaslave).Butontologicaldependenceisnotapolyadicrelationbetweenrelata.Justasthereisnopolyadicconnectionbindingaspeciestoitsgenus,inspiteoftheirontologicalinterdependence,similarly,forAristotle,thereisnopolyadicconnectionbindingoneactivatedmonadicpropertytoitscorrelativeproperty.34Thesameholdsfortherelationbetweenmatterandform,andsubjectandproperty,whereAristotleisexplicitthatthereisno(polyadic)(p.30) entityunifyingthemintoone.35Therelationbetweenthereciprocatingcorrelativesisnotalinguisticorasemanticrelation.Itisanontologicalrelationofinterdependence,asAristotlestatesclearlyinthelastpassagequoted.SothepointingnatureofrelativesisAristotleswayofdepictingontologicaldependence.Thisiswhatbindsrelativemonadicpropertiesintoreciprocalpairs(e.g.,beingamasterandbeingaslave):thatthecorrelativesareontologicallyinterdependent.ThelastquotationaboveisimportantforunderstandingAristotlesnotionofdependence,asitappliestorelata.Hesaysthateachrelatumcarriestheotherrelatum



todestruction.Heisthereforeclearlydescribinganexistentialdependencebetweenrelata:ifthereisnomasterthereisnoslave.(Somedependenciesareexpressedingenericterms,andsomeinspecificterms,withthedependenciesspecifiedrespectively.)36

1.5CausationWithoutGlueThetwopillarsofAristotlestheoryofcausationarehisaccountofpowersandhisreductiveaccountofrelations.Inanutshell,forAristotle,causationistheactivationofreciprocalcausalpowers.Aristotleconsiderscausalpowersasrelativesnamely,theagentandpatientinacausalpairarecausalrelatives.InMetaphysicsbookVAristotleexplainsthetermrelativeorrelationasfollows:

Thingsarerelative[prosti](1)asdoubletohalf,andtrebletoathird,...andthatwhichexceedstothatwhichisexceeded(2)asthatwhichcanheattothatwhichcanbeheated,andthatwhichcancuttothatwhichcanbecut,andingeneraltheactivetothepassive(3)asthemeasurabletothemeasure,andtheknowabletoknowledge,andtheperceptibletoperception.

(Met.1020b2632,myemphasis)

(p.31) ,...,.

Causalexamplessuchasheatingandbeingheatedareincludedintheaboveamongrelativessuchasdoubleandhalf,andtheyarecollectivelygroupedunderthedescriptionofbeingactiveandbeingpassive.Itfollowsthatgenerally,forAristotle,themoverandthemovablenamely,theactiveandthepassivepowersincausalinteractionsareengagedinacausalrelationwhich,accordinghistheoryofrelations,involvestwomonadicpropertiesratherthanapolyadicone.Inthecausalcases,thetwomonadicpropertiesarethepowersthemselves,namelytheactivepowerandthepassivepower.Usingtheexamplejustgiven,itwouldbetheheatingpowerandthepowertobeheated,thecuttingpowerandthepowertobecut,thepowerofperceptiontothepowerofbeingperceived,andgenerallytheactiveandthepassivepowers.AccordingtoAristotlesaccountofrelations,then,theactiveandpassivepowersaremonadicpropertiesthatareontologicallyinterdependent.

WesawthatAristotleexplainedtheontologicaldependencebetweenrelataasanexistentialdependence(e.g.,nobodyisaslaveifthereisnomaster).Similarlytheontologicaldependencebetweenthecausalrelataentailsthatthereisnomoverifthereisnomovable.Butherethequestionariseswhethertheontologicaldependencedeterminesthepotentialortheactivatedstateofthepowersinquestion.Clearly,ifthereisnothingthatcanbeaffected,thenthemoverwillnotbringaboutanyeffectthereisnoactualmovingchangingifthereisnothingthatcanbemovedchanged.Forinstance,ifnothingcanbeheated,noheatingwilltakeplaceeither.(p.32) Butcantherebeamoverinpotentiality,evenifthereisnothingthatcouldbemoved?Couldtherebe,forexample,aknifeinaworldwherenothingcouldbecut?Wealreadysawthatthedefinitionofapowermentionstheendtowardwhichthepowerisdirected:whatthepoweriscapableofbringingabout(Met.1047b351048a8).Butifthereisnothingthatcanbesoaffected,howcantherebeapowerwhosenatureistobringaboutthateffect?AristotlebelievesinsomeformofthePrincipleofPlenitudenamely,thatwhatispossiblewillhappen.37Ifso,thenitfollowsthathebelievesthattheendofeachpowerinpotentialitymustberealizable.So,therecouldbenomover,eveninpotentiality,inaworldwhereitwasnotpossibleforittomoveanything.Hence,wemustassumethattheontologicaldependencebetweenactiveandpassivepowersappliestotheirpotentialstate,asmuchastotheiractivatedstate.38

CausationisthusaccountedforbyAristotleintermsofpairsofcausalpowers(anactiveandapassiveone)thatcometobeactivatedinmutualdependenceoneachother.Thismutualdependencebindsthecauseandeffecttogether,butwithout



reifyingarelationbetweenthem.ThislatterconclusionfollowsfromAristotlestheoryofrelativesthatwehaveexaminedintheprecedingsection.WhatmakesAristotlestheoryofcausationuniqueinthehistoryofphilosophyisthatitisgroundedinhisaccountofrelationsintermsofmonadicproperties,whichareontologicallyinterdependent.Onthisview,powersdependfortheiractivationontheactivationoftheirmutualpartnerpowers.Becauseoftheirmutualdependenceforactivation,partnerpowersrealizetheirnaturesinactivitiesthatarecodetermined,covarying,andcoextensiveintime.Thus,onthisaccountthereisreciprocityincausation.ConsiderthecausalscenariowhenAcausesBtobecomehotter.OnAristotlesaccount,AspowertoheatisactivateditsmanifestationisheatingBup.ButthiscantakeplaceonlyifBspowertobeheatedisactivatedtooandmanifestsitselfinBsgettinghotter.AsheatingandBsbeing(p.33) heatedaremutuallydependentinavarietyofwaysandeachactivitylastsaslongastheotherlasts.IntheDeAnimaAristotlewonderswhythesensesdonotperceivethemselvessincetheyperceiveotherthingsmadeofperceptibleelementsandtheythemselvesaresocomposedofsuchelements(DA417a17).Heconcludesthatthepowerofsenseisparalleltowhatiscombustible.Forthatneverignitesitselfspontaneously,butrequiresanagentwhichhasthepowerofstartingignition(DA417a710).Theexternalagentisperceptionspartnerpower,whichactivatesit.Bydevelopinganaccountofcausationastheactivationofcausalpartnerpowers,Aristotleputsforwardarealisttheoryofcausationthatdoesnotreifytheinteractionofthecausalpartnersintoarelation.39

Thatcausationisthemutualactivationofcausalpowersisaviewthatisgainingconsensusincontemporarymetaphysics.40However,thereisanimportantfeaturetocausationthatisleftoutinthecontemporaryviewsofthiskind,namelyagencyanditsomissionleavesimportantmetaphysicalworkundone.Aristotlesanalysisoftheinteractionbetweenmutuallyactivatingcausalpowersisdifferentfromthoseadvancedinthecontemporarydebate,inthatitdoesjusticetotheintuitionthatthereisagencyincausation.Aristotledrawsadistinctionbetweenthecausalagentandpatient,associatingagencywithwhatbringsaboutchangeandpatiencywithwhatchanges.Accountsthatdonotdrawthisdistinctionprovidenoargumentthatcausationneedstobesymmetricwithrespecttochangeandfurthermore,theywouldnotbeabletoexplainthepossibilityoftheexerciseofapowerthatdoesnotitselfchange(unlessbychangetheyunderstandthemeremanifestationofapower).BychangeImeanthattheresultingpower(property)isdifferentfromtheoriginalone,asinthecaseofheating.Aristotledoesnotconsiderthemereexerciseofapowerachange(e.g.,whenthefloorissustainingmyweight,theweightdoesnotchangebutitiscausallyexercisedonthefloor).

(p.34) Iwillnowturntoexaminethenatureofthecausalagencythatanactivepowerexercisesonapassivepower.Therearetwoaspectsofcausalagencythatrevealitsnature.Thefirstiswhatitbringsabout,andtheotherishowitachievesit.Inthinkingabouttheinteractionbetweencausalagentandpatient,itmightbenaturalorintuitivetothinkofitasatransmissionofpowerfulness.TheideathatcausationhappensbecauseofthepassingaroundortransmissionofpropertiescanbetracedbacktoanancientGreekconceptionknownintheliteratureastheContagionModelofcausation.Aristotletootalkedofthetransmissionoftheformoftheagentspowerontothepatientspower.41But,evenforAristotle,aswewillsee,thisisafigurativewayofdescribingthepowerinteraction.Thetransmissionofpowerfulnessisawayofdescribingwhatisbroughtaboutbycausation,asifthepatientreceivedthepowerfulnessoftheagent.Nothingisactuallytransferredfromtheagenttothepatientwhattakesplaceisnotthetransmissionofanything.OnAristotlesview,allthereistopowersinteractingistheirmutualactivationthereisnoexchangebetweenthem,notransmissionofanything,andnorelationbridgingthetwo.Theinterdependenceoftherelativepowerstranslatesintotheirmutualqualitativetransitiontoexercisingtheirpowerfulness,whichiswhattheircausalinteractionconsistsin.Mutualmanifestationisthesimultaneoustransitionofeachofthepartnerpowerstotheiractivatedstates(e.g.,heatingandbeingheated).42

LetusnowlookmorecloselyatAristotlestalkofcausationintermsoftransmission,andathowwecangainabetterinsightintocausationitself.InthePhysics,Aristotledescribeswhatthemoverdoestothemovableintermsoftransmissionoftheformofthemovertothemovable:

Themoverwillalwaystransmitaform,eitherathisorsuchorsomuch,which,whenitmoves,willbetheprincipleandcause(p.35) ofthemotion(e.g.,theactualmanbegetsmanfromwhatispotentiallyman.).



(Phys.202a912)

,,,,.

Thetransmittedformmightbeasubstantialform,asinthecaseofthetransmissionoftheformofahumanbeingtothemenstrualfluidsinthegenerationofanembryooritmightbeaquality,asuch,asforinstanceofheatorofweight,etc.So,ingeneralterms,thecausalactionoftheactivepoweronthepassiveoneconsistsinthetransmissionofaformfromanagenttoapatient.Thetransmittedformisthenthecausetheprivationoftheforminthepatientiswhatallowsfortheformsreception,andthephysicalprocessfacilitatingthetransmissionoftheformiswhatgroundsthecausalchange(e.g.,inbuildingthemovementsofthebuildershandsfacilitatethetransmissionoftheformofthehousetotheconstructionmaterialsforafire,contactfacilitatesthetransmissionoftheformtotheobjectheated).Aristotlewantstofindawaytoexplainthechangethatisbroughtaboutbytheactivepower,andthisisonewayinwhichtalkoftransmissionmaybehelpful.Intheexampleabove,thegenerationofanewhumanbeingisaccountedforbythetransmissionoftheformofahumanbeing,whichistheprincipleandthecauseofthemotion.Theformtransferredistheformthatdeterminestheend()ofthepotentialityinthemovingpowersdefinition.Thusaparenthasthepotentialitytogenerateahumanbeing,andapainterthepotentialitytogenerateapaintingoncanvas.Thesearetheendsthatthemoverspowersaredirectedtowards,intheirpotentialstate(e.g.,theendsthattheparentandthepainterhaverespectively).Theyexpresswhatthepowerscanbringaboutwhenactualized.

(p.36) Whatdoesitmeantosaythattheformofthemovingpoweristransmitted?Onceagain,Aristotlesexplanationofcausationintermsofthetransferenceofaformfromtheactivepowertothepassiveoneshouldnotbetakenasaliteraldescription.Aristotleisnotreifyingtheformofthepowerintoanactiveagentofitsown,overandabovethepoweritself.Thereisnohomunculusformthatistransmittedfromtheparenttotheoffspring.Thereareonlymotionstransmittedfromtheparenttothemenstrualfluidsbythespermthatisimplantedinthembutthetransmittedmotionshaveaform(theyareshaped)thustheheatintheparentsspermgeneratesthemotionsinthefluids,whichgraduallyshapetheembryo,asAristotletellsusexplicitly.43Similarly,thereisnoformofastatuethatisliterallytransferredfromthesculptortothemarbleasculptortransferstheformofafigureinhermindtothemarblethroughthemovementsofherhandsandchisel.Nevertheless,talkoftransmittedformsmightbethebestwayavailabletoAristotletodescribecollectivelythetypeofeffectthattherespectivemovingpowershaveonthepassiveones.Themovementsgeneratedfromtheheatofthesperminthefirstcase,andfromthehandsofthesculptorinthesecond,bringaboutchangesofparticulartypes,whicharedeterminedbythekindofactivepowerthatisactingonthepassiveone.Theresultingchangeisasifthespermtransferredaformontothemenstrualfluids,whichenformedthemandshapedthemintoanembryoandasifthesculptortransferredaformontothemarble,whichenformeditintoastatue.ThereaintnomagicAristotlesaccountisrealisticandintuitive.Physicalmacrochangesemergefrommicrochangesbroughtaboutbythefundamentalpowers(i.e.,thehot,thecold,thewet,andthedry,aswehaveseen),whichaffecttheirpassivecorrelates.EvenifonetookAristotletobesayingthat,literally,thereisa(reified,matterless)formthatistransmittedtothepassivepower,thiswouldstillnotexplainhowcausationtakesplace.Wewouldwanttoknowhowthatformdoesitwhatcausal(p.37)efficacyaformcanhaveonapassivepower.AssumingAristotleislookingforananswerastohowonepoweraffectsanother,addingafurtheritemtothecausalserieswouldnotofferanexplanation.Itwouldonlycontinuetheregressgeneratedinthesearchforthemechanismofcausalefficacy.Thenhowdoescausalefficacyoperate?Evenifmacropowersdependonmicropowerstobringabouttheireffects,howdomicropowersexerttheircausalefficacyonothermicropowers?Aswehaveseen,Aristotleavoidstheregressiveseriesofintroducingfurtherintermediariesbyassumingtheefficacyofanactivepoweronapassiveoneallthathappensisthatwhentheagentandthepatientmeetinthewayappropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,theonemustactandtheotherbeactedon(Met.1048a67seealsopp.214).Thisisthelevelatwhichthereadinessofactiveandpassivepowersinappropriatecircumstancesengenderscausalefficacy.Thereisnofurtherunderlyingmechanismtouncover.HerewereachtheexplanatoryrockbottominAristotlestheory.Thetransferenceoftheformoftheactivepowertothepassiveoneisnotadescriptionofthemechanismofcausal



efficacy,butonlyofthetypeofqualitativechangethattakesplaceinthepassivepower.Aristotlehasidentifiedagroundlevelactivitythatcannotbeexplainedbymoreprimitiveontologicaltools.44

Aristotlesviewcanthusbecontrasted,despiteapparentsimilarities,withthepassingaroundmodelforcausationputforwardbyMumfordandAnjum(2011).TheydevelopthismodelasananswertotheAlwayspacking,nevertravellingargumentdiscussedbefore(pp.1921).Theyintroducethemodelthus:

Onreflection,theideaofcausationasapassingaroundofpowers,especiallyforapandispositionalist,startstolookextremelyattractive(Mumford2009).Someexampleswillillustratethis.Youcomeinfromthecoldandsitbythefire.Yousitbythefirebecauseitishot,whichforthepandispositionalistmeansthatit(p.38) hasthepowertowarmyourbody.Causationoccurswhenthefirewarmsyourbody,changingitfromcoldtohot.Armstrongretortsthatsuchcausation,forpandispositionalism,consistsinthemerepassingaroundofpowers.Inthepresentcase,thatwouldmeanthattheheatofthefire,whichconsistedinithavingthepowertowarmsomeotherobject,hasbeenpassedontoyou.Butthatsoundsquiteright.

(2011,56,myemphasis)

ThedifficultyIhavewiththepositionadvocatedbyMumfordandAnjumisthatthenotionofthepassingaroundofpowerscanexplainthetransferofenergybetweenobjects(e.g.,heat)butnotcaseswherethecausaleffectalsoinvolvesqualitativechange.Forexample,thebrokenvasethatreceivedthehammersblowhasnotbecomemorepowerfulinthewaythebodynearthefirehasbecomehotterrather,itshattered.Passingaroundforcedoesnotdescribebeinginpieces,bycontrasttopassingaroundheat,whichdescribesbeinghot.Thisisimportantbecauseitshowswhatwecanandwhatwecannotexplainfurtherincausation.Thetransferofparcels,whetherofenergyorparticlesormatter,cannotbeallthereistocausation,becausetransferencedoesnotexplainqualitativechange.Aristotleexplainswhathappensincausationnotasatransmission,atthebottomlevel,butasthemutualactivationofinterdependentpowers.Ontheotherhand,thelanguageoftransmissionishelpfulingivingusawayoftalkingoftheactivationoftheagentquaagentasthetransmissionoftheform,andoftheactivationofthepatientquapatientasthereceptionofthatform(resultingintheeffect).Inotherwords,thelanguageoftransmissionhelpscapturethedifferencebetweentheactivationoftheactiveandpassivepowersinvolvedinacausalinteraction.Thedifferenceneedstobeexpresses,somewhatAristotlemakesthispointinthePhysicsthus:

Itiscontrarytoreasontosupposethatthereshouldbeoneidenticalactualizationoftwothingswhicharedifferentin(p.39) kind.Yettherewillbe,ifteachingandlearningarethesame,andagencyandpatiency.

(Phys.202b13)

,.

TobrieflyrecapitulatesomeoftheconclusionsreachedsofarregardingAristotlesaccountoftheactivationofcausalpowersininteraction:theiractualitiesareessentiallydifferentactivitieswemightcallthemcausingandsufferingrespectively,wherethesufferingistheactivationofthepassivepower,whilethecausingistheactivationoftheactivepowerinvolvedinthecausalinteraction.45Thecausaleffectistheactualityoractivationofthepassivepower,whichisachange.46Giventhatincausationboththeactiveandthepassivepowersareactivated,andeachhasitsowntypeofactuality,onemightwanttopressthequestionofwhyonthisaccountthecausalchange(i.e.,theeffect)isidentifiedwiththeactualityofthepassivepower.ThisisbecauseinAristotlesaccountthepassivepowerisactivatedasarecipientofchange(i.e.,itchanges)whiletheactiveoneisactivatedasanagentofchange.ThisdivisionofrolesbetweenactiveandpassivepowersisnotfurtherexplainedbyAristotle,butIbelieveisrequired.

Iwouldliketobrieflynotehere,withoutargument,adifferenceIfindinthewayAristotlethoughtofcausationandthe



waycontemporarysciencedoes.Aristotlethoughtthereisqualitativechange,whichincorporatedquantitativechange(i.e.,asqualitativechangewithrespecttoamount).Thuswhenthereis,forexample,lossofbodyheat,Aristotlewouldexplainthisasatwowayqualitativechange(i.e.,twoprocessesofcausalinteraction:thehotbodywarmsuptheairinitsenvironment,whilethecoldaircoolsdownthebody).Accordingtocontemporaryscience,thiscausalprocesswouldbeexplainedasaquantitative(p.40) changeanexchangeofenergybetweenthebodyandtheairaroundit.Ultimately,contemporaryscienceaimstoreduceallchangetoquantitativeenergyorparticleexchanges.Isubmitqualitativechangecannotbefullyreducedtoquantitativechange.Ifthisisright,Aristotlespowerontologywouldproveexplanatorilystrongerinexplainingchangebecausequalitativeinfluencebetweenpowerswouldaccommodatequantitativechange,butnottheoppositewayaround.

Thatcausationhasadirectionisagenerallysharedintuition.47Theorthodoxviewonthedirectionofcausationhasbeenthatitreducestothedirectionoftime:causesoccurpriortotheireffects.Butthetemporalviewhasfallenintodisfavoroflate,48again,49andanumberofalternativeshavebeensuggested.Aristotlesaccountdoesjusticetotheintuitionthatcausationhasadirectionnotreducibletothedirectionoftime.ForAristotleapoweraimsatastateotherthanitspresentone.Thedistinctionbetweenagentandpatientincausationispivotaltoaccountingforthedirectionofcausation,andthusitsasymmetry.50Thus,togobacktothepicturesketchedinPhysicsIII3,forAristotlethinking(atleastfiguratively)oftheoperationofthemoveronamovableastransmissionofformfromthemovertothemovableisawayofunderpinningcausaldirectionmetaphysically.

Ontheotherhand,thereisnoreasonwhycausingcouldnotbeintwodirectionsatonce,wherebothpowersactasagentsandpatientsofchange(e.g.,asinthecaseofacubeoficeinaglassoflemonade,whentheoneiscoolingandtheotherisgettinghotter).Aristotleacknowledges,forexampleinPhysics202a512,thatinmostcausalinteractionsinnaturethechangeismutual.Theagentchangesthepatientandthepatientchangestheagent.Beinganagentorapatientofchangearerolesthepowersplayinmostcases,Aristotlethinksthateachpowerisatthesametimebothactiveandpassive,sincepowersoperateoneachother.Theoccurrence(p.41) ofmutualchangeincausationisnotevidenceagainstAristotlesagentpatientmodelofcausation.Casesofcausalinteractioninwhichbothagentandpatientundergoachangearetobeunderstoodsimplyastwopairsofsimultaneousinteractions.Forexample,wheretwoplayingcardsrestagainsteachother,eachplayingcardactsontheother,andeachofthemsufferstheothersagency.

Aristotleslanguageoftransmissionofformishelpfulforpresentinganotherofthefundamentalfeaturesofcausation,thatis,itsincompleteness.Aswehaveseen,causalinteractionbeginswithcontactbetweentheagentandpatient(Physics202a57,seesection1.3).Thecontactfacilitatesthetransmissionoftheformfromthemovertothemovable.Transmissionisaprocessthattakesplaceintime.Whileitlaststhetransmissionhasnotbeencompleted.Theunfoldingofthestagesoftransmissionmarkstheincompletenessofthecausalprocess(e.g.,buildingastructure).Oncethetransmissioniscompleted,thecausalinteractionisnottakingplaceanymore.Theagentisnotactingonthepatient,whichnowpossessesthetransmittedform.Sotheprocessofrealizationoftheagentscapacitytotransmittheformandthepatientscapacitytoreceivetheformisthecausalprocess,whichlastsuntilthetransmissioniscompleted.Theactivitytakesplacethroughtime,duringwhichperiodtheprocessisdrivenbythenotyetfullyfulfilledpowersoftheagenttotransmittheformandofthepatienttoreceiveit.Sothecausalprocessoftransmissionisactualwhilethesepowersareactive,priortothetimeatwhichtheyarefullycompleted.Inthatsense,thecausalprocessisactualonlywhilethepowersthatdriveitarestilltransmittingtheform(i.e.,whilethetransmissionisstillincomplete).AristotlewritesthatMotionisthoughttobeasortofactuality,butincomplete,thereasonbeingthatthepotentialwhoseactualityitis,isincomplete(Phys.201b3133,translationslightlymodified).51

Finally,thinking(figuratively)oftheoperationoftheactivepoweruponthepassiveoneintermsoftransmissionishelpfulin(p.42) bringingoutfurtherfeaturesofAristotlesaccountofcausation,someofwhichareparticularlyrelevanttohistheoryofperception,aswewillseeinchapter1.Transmissibilityrequires(i)thatthereisasuitablepatientforreceivingtheform(ii)thatatthetimeoftransmissiontheformispresentintheagentinactuality(iii)thattheformispossessedbytheagentinawaythatissuitable,giventhecircumstancesinwhichtransmissionhastotakeplace,andthe



typeofpatientwhowillreceiveit(namely,theagentpowerofthattypecanfunctioninitsenvironment)(iv)thatthereiscontactbetweenmoverandmoved(asdiscussedon,pp.214).Conditions(ii)and(iii)requirefurtherinvestigation.ThattheformhastobepresentintheagentinactualityatthetimeoftransmissioniscapturedbyAristotleinaclearexample:Theactualmanbegetsmanfromwhatispotentiallyman(Physics202a10,addedemphasis).Insomecases,theagentpossessestheforminactualityinunusualways,andpossiblyinmorethanonewaywhenthetransmissionoccurs.Considerasculptorhavingtheformofthestatueinmind,whichisawayofpossessingtheforminanontransmissibleway,inherimagination,andalsohavingtheformembodiedinthemovementofherhandsthroughwhichshesculptsthestatue,whichisawayofpossessingtheforminatransmissibleway.Orfurtherconsiderthemathematicsteacherhavingthedemonstrationofatheoreminmind,andhavingitwrittenontheblackboard.Byanalogytothecaseinwhichthemathematicsteacherhasthedemonstrationofatheoreminmind,inthecaseofcolorAristotleholdsthatanobjectinthedarkhascoloronlyinfirstactualitythisistheobjectspotentialitytohavevisiblecolor.Thecolorpropertyisthesame,evenbeforethecolorbecomesvisible:

Everycolorhasinitthepowertosetinmovementwhatisactuallytransparentthatpowerconstitutesitsverynature.Thatiswhyitisnotvisibleexceptwiththehelpoflightitisonlyin(p.43) thelightthatthecolorofathingisseen.

(DA418a31b3myemphasis)

,.,.

Aswewillseeinchapter3,itisclearthatitisthesamepropertythatisinthedark,capableofactingonthetransparent,aswhenactivatedbyactingonthetransparent.Theobjectpossessesvisiblecolorthatis,colorinsecondactualityonlywhenitisilluminatedactivatingthetransparent:withoutthehelpoflightcolorremainsinvisible(DA419a9).Thecolorisvisibleinsuchconditionsbecauseitcanbeseenonlywhenitisinsecondactuality.Whenthecolorisactuallyseen,itactualizesitspotentialityforvisibility.Thisisinasenseitsthirdactuality,butAristotleneverusesthisexpression.Yet,itisagainthesamepropertythatbecomesactuallyseen,aswesawinthequoteabove:itisthecoloroftheobjectthatisseen.(Iwillnotcontinuetousetheexpressionthirdactualityinordernottocomplicatefurthermydiscussionofthetextorofothercommentatorsonperception.Rather,Iwillconsidervisiblecolorasthefirstactuality,andseencolorasthesecondactualityofthepower.)Analogouslywithsound,thereareunperceiveddisturbancesintheairthatcouldbeheardifaperceiverwaspresent,andtherearesuchdisturbancesthatarealsoperceived(i.e.,soundings).Anobjectssoundinglastsonlywhileaperceiverhearsit,andthehearinglastsonlyaslongasthesounding:

Itispossibletohavethecapacitytohearandnottohear,andthatwhichcanproducesoundsisnotalwaysdoingso.Butwhenthatwhichcanhearishearingandthatwhichcanproducesoundisproducingit,thenhearinginactualityandsoundinginactualitycometobeatthesametime,andonemightcall(p.44) theonehearingandtheothersounding.

(DA425b28426a1,mytranslationandemphasis).

,,,,.

Sincetheactualitiesofthesensibleobjectandofthesensitivefacultyareoneinactuality,whiledifferentintheirmodesofbeing,actualhearingandactualsoundingappearanddisappearfromexistenceatoneandthesamemoment,andsoactualsavorandactualtasting,etc.,whileaspotentialitiesoneofthemmayexistwithoutthe



other.Buttheearlierphilosophersofnaturedidnotstatethematterwell,thinkingthatthereiswithoutsightnothingwhitenorblack,norflavorwithouttasting.Forinonewaytheywererightbutinanotherwrongforsincetheperceptionandtheperceptiblearesospokenofintwoways,aspotentialandasactual,thestatementholdsofthelatter,butitdoesnotholdoftheformer.Thisambiguitytheywhollyfailedtonotice.

(DA426a1526,mytranslationandemphasis)

,,,,,,.,,,,..

(p.45) Tosumupandgeneralize,transmissibilityrequiresthattheformispossessedbytheagentinawaythatissuitable,giventhecircumstancesinwhichtransmissionhastotakeplace,andthetypeofpatientthatwillreceiveit.Transmissioniscontextrelative.Considertheteacherwhopossessesknowledgeofatheorem,butonlyinalanguagethatherpupilwouldnotunderstand.Possessingknowledgeofthetheoremdoesnotmakeherintoateacher(ofthetheorem)untilsheembodiesthisknowledgeinthespokenEnglishwordsthattransmitittothestudent.Secondlyandforthesamereason,namelythattheformmustbetransmissibletoaparticulartypeofpatientandinaparticularsetofcircumstances,notypeoftransmissionismoreprivilegedthanothersnonehasmoreclaimtobecalledcausationthananyother.Thismeansthatnotypeofpossessionoftheformbytheagentismoreprivilegedthanothers.Thus,whetherthelessonisinalectureorinanarticle,neitherismoregenuinelythelessonthantheother.Theteacherpossessesthelessonindifferentwaysinhermemory,herlecture,andthearticle.Allofthemaretransmissibleforms,eachfittingdifferentcircumstancesinwhichtransmissioncouldtakeplace.ThishasimportantconsequencesforAristotlestheoryofperception,aswewillseeinchapter3.

1.6TheCausalPowersModelinPhysicsIII3Inlightoftheabovediscussion,wearenowinapositiontounderstandAristotlesprogrammaticstanceatthebeginningofPhysicsIII3:accountingformotion/change52doesnotrequireappealingtoanynew,primitivecategoryofbeing:

Thereisnosuchthingasmotionoverandabovethethings.Itisalwayswithrespecttosubstanceortoquantityortoqualityor(p.46) toplacethatwhatchangeschanges.Butitisimpossible,asweassert,tofindanythingcommontothesewhichisneitherthisnorquantitynorqualitynoranyoftheotherpredicates.Henceneitherwillmotionandchangehavereferencetosomethingoverandabovethethingsmentionedforthereisnothing,overandabovethem.

(Physics200b32201a3,myemphasis)

,,,,.

ThisisinlinewithAristotlescommitmentnottoreifycausationintoarelation.Insteadofintroducingnewmetaphysicalbuildingblockstoexplainmotion(andmoregenerallycausation),Aristotlemakesuseofhisthreewellknownprinciples:theform,theprivationofform,andthesubstratumthatremainsthroughchange.Inaddition,heappealstohisdistinctionbetweenbeinginpotentialityandbeinginactuality,whichisaprimitivedistinctionofwaysinwhichthingsare,53andplaysacrucialroleinaccountingfortheconnectionbetweencauseandeffect,aswewillseeinwhatfollows.AristotledescribeshisaccountofcausationintermsofcausalpowersinsomedetailinPhysicsIII3,wherehelooksat



theinteractionbetweenamoverandamovableinthecaseofmotion().Wethuslearnmoreabouttherelationofdependencebindingtogetheractiveandpassivepowers.Aristotleputsfleshonthebonesofhisaccountofthedependencebetweenactiveandpassivepowersinacausalpairduringtheiractivation.Duringthecausalinteraction,themovermovesinactuality,andthemovableisactuallymoved.Thesetwoactualitiesarenotcasuallycoincident.Theoccurrenceofthefirstrequirestheoccurrenceof(p.47) thesecond.Therelationbetweenthetwoactualitiesisexploreddialectically,inwhatIcalltheActualitiesofMotionDilemma.Inbrief,Aristotleconsiderstwopossibilities:thatthetwoactualitiesofthemoverandthemovablearedifferent,andthattheyareoneandthesame.Iftheyaredifferent,eitherbothactualitiesoccurinoneofthetwo,eitherthemoverorthemoved,oroneoccursineach.Ifboththeactualitiesoccurinoneofthem,then,first,oneofthemwillnothaveitsownactualityrealizedinit(e.g.,theactualityofthemoverwilloccurinthemoved,notinthemover)buthowcouldthatbe,thattheactualityofthemoverwillbeinthemoved?Andsecondly,whateverhasbothactualitiesinitwillchangeintwodifferentwaysinrelationtooneform.54Ifontheotherhandtheactualityofthemoverisinthemover,andtheactualityofthemovableisinthemovable,theneitherthecausalagencyofthemoverwillimpactonthemoveritself,butnotonthemovable,oritwillimpactonnothing,inwhichcaseitisnotbeingamoverinactuality.Finally,iftheactualitiesofthemoverandthemovedarethesame,thenwereachabsurdity,sinceagencyandpatiencycannotbethesame.Inwhatfollows,IwillfirstgiveanargumentanalysisoftheDilemmainitsentirety,andthenselectivelydiscusstheclaimsthatarethemostrelevantforthereconstructionofAristotlesaccountofcausation.

TheActualitiesofMotionDilemmaInthestructuredrepresentationoftheargumentbelow,theconventionIfollowistoindentundertheconclusionthepremisesorthesubargumentspertinenttothesupportofthatconclusion.55Thepremisesjustifyingorobjectingtoaconclusionaregroupedatthesamelevelofindentation.IindicateinparenthesesthepremisesIhavesuppliedforcompletenessoftheargument,inadditiontowhatisfoundinAristotlestext.

(p.48) CTherealizationoftheagentsandthepatientscapacitiesareneitherthesamenordifferent.(Supplied).

P1Becauseitisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityisdifferentfromtherealizationofthepatientscapacity.(Supplied).P2Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityisdifferent(innumber)fromtherealizationofthepatientscapacity,oneofthefollowingdisjunctsistrue:

(2.1)eitherbotharerealizedinthepatient(2.2)orbotharerealizedintheagent(2.3)oroneisrealizedintheagentandoneinthepatient(e.g.therealizationoftheagentscapacitytakesplaceintheagentandtherealizationofthepatientscapacitytakesplaceinthepatient).(SeePhys.202a257)(2.2)and(2.3)aresupplied.)56

P3Butnoneofthedisjunctsistrue.P4Because(2.1)isimpossible.Namely,itisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityandtherealizationofthepatientscapacityarebothinthepatient(Supplied).P5Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityandtherealizationofthepatientscapacityarebothinthepatient,thenbothconsequencesfollow:

(5.1)theagentscapacitywillnotberealizedinthesubjectthathasthecapacity,theagent(5.2)thesamesubject,thepatient,willundergotherealizationoftwo[opposite]capacitiesatthesametimeinrelationtooneform.(See202a336.)

P6But(5.1)isnonsense(202a36).P7And(5.2)isimpossible(202a36).P8Andmutatismutandisfor(2.2).(See202a2930.)(p.49)



P9Anditisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacitytakesplaceintheagent,andrealizationofthepatientscapacitytakesplaceinthepatient(Supplied).P10Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityandtherealizationofthepatientscapacityareeachineach,thenoneofthefollowingdisjunctsistrue:

(10.1)eithereveryagentwillalsobeactedupon(10.2)ortheagent,havingcausalefficacy,willnotbecausallyefficacious.(See202a28b1).

P11But(10.1)isfalse,andleadstoinfiniteregress(Supplied).P12And(10.2)isfalse(Supplied).P13Anditisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityisoneandthesamewiththerealizationofthepatientscapacity(202a36b2).P14Becausethenagencyandpatiencywouldhavethesameactuality,andsoactingandbeingacteduponwouldbethesamething.(See202b25fortheexample).P15Butagencyandpatiencyarenotthesameactuality(Supplied.).P16Becauseagencyandpatiencyaredifferentinessence(Supplied).P17Becausetheagentscapacitytoactandthepatientscapacitytosufferareessentiallydifferentthings.(See202a20and201b1.)P18Andtheessenceofanactualityisthesameastheessenceofitscapacity(Supplied).P19Anditisnonsensethattwothingsdifferentinessence(e.g.theagentsactingandthepatientsbeingactedupon)haveoneandthesameactuality.(202a36b2).P20Becausetheactualityofsomethingistheinstantiationofitsessence.(Supplied.)

(p.50) IndiscussingtheDilemma,IshallbeconcernedmainlywiththewayAristotleunderstandstherelationofmovertomovable(whichisnotreifiedbyAristotle).Iwillfirstidentifythequestionshethinksneedtobeaddressed,andthenexaminethesolutionshegives,therebydevelopinghisowntheoryofcausation.Iwillbeginbyconsideringtheroleoftheform(),whichistheprincipleandcauseofthemotioninAristotlesaccountofcausation.Therearethreeinterrelatedsubthemestobeinvestigated.First,thereisthetransmissionoftheformfromthemovertothemovable(202a912).Secondly,theactualityofthemoverandtheactualityofthemovedareinrelationtooneform,thetransmittedone.57Andfinally,thesetwoactualitiesareofdifferenttypes.58

Inviewofwhathasbeensaidaboutthetransmissionoftheformsofar,weareinthepositiontounderstandthetransmissionoftheformasawayofdescribingcollectivelythetypeofchangethatiseffectedbythemoveronthemoved.Theformthatistheprincipleandcauseofthemotionistheformthatistransmittedfromthemovertothemovable.Forexample,thecausalefficacyoffireconsistsinitstransmittingtheformofheattothepot.Itfollowsthatthemotionsufferedbywhatismovableconsistsinthereceptionoftheformthatistransmittedtoit.Sothemoversbeingamoverandthemovablebeingmovedwillbeachievedinrelationtooneform.Butsincethemovertransmitsandthemovablereceivestheform,theirachievementsareofdifferenttypes,59becausetheyrelatetothesameformdifferently.Thus,infigurativeterms,theactualityofthemoverasamoveristhetransmissionoftheform,andtheactualityofthemovableasmovableisthereceptionofthatform.

ThesecondissuethatarisesoutoftheDilemmaoftheActualitiesofMotionisthedistinctionAristotlemakesbetweenthesubjectstheactualitiesoccurin,andthesubjectstheybelongto.HereAristotlesmetaphysicalintuitionsaretestedtotheextreme,andhefinallyoptsforanaccountthatopensnewgroundinthe(p.51) areaofcausation.Aristotleaskswheretheactualitiesofthemoverasmovertheactionandofthemovableasmovablethepassionare(i.e.whethertheyareinthemoverorinthemovable(inwhat?,202a25)).Byaskinginwhattheactionoftheagentandthepassionofthepatientare,hedistinguishesinoneandthesamequestiontwometaphysicalrelations:belongingtoasubjectandoccurringinasubject.60Weneedtoexaminewhythisdistinctionariseshere,andhowitcanbeunderstood,forthisdistinctionwillplayanimportantrole,especiallyinAristotlestheoryofperception.LetusfirstlookatAristotlesownattempttojustifythedistinction.Hewrites:Sincethentheyareboth[theagentsactionandthe



patientspassion]motions,wemayask:inwhatarethey?(202a25).Hethenproceeds:

Itisnotabsurdthattheactualizationofonethingshouldbeinanother.Teachingistheactivityofapersonwhocanteach,yettheoperationisperformedinsomethingitisnotcutadriftfromasubject[theteacher],butisofonething[theteacher]inanother[thelearner].

(Phys.202b58)

(,,,)

InthefirstbriefquotationAristotlemakesageneralpoint:hetellsusthatinrelationtomotionswecanaskwheretheytakeplace.Thus,mywalkcantakeplaceinthepark,andmytanningattheseashore.ButinneithercaseamIdoingsomething(atleastinanywaysignificant)to,orchangingthatinwhichmymotiontakesplace.Mywalkandmytanningareexternaltotheparkandtheseashore.Theyareintheminalocalsense,whichmustnotbewhatAristotlemeanshere,ifheisnottoconflate,forexample,mytanningtakingplaceintheseashorefromitstakingplaceinme,whotans.61Thesecond(p.52) passageclarifiesthetypeofdistinctionthatAristotlehasinmind.Heconcentratesononeofthetwoactualities,theagents,andsaysthatteachingisperformedbytheteacherinsomething.Ifthisistobemoreilluminatingthanthefirstpassage,wemusttakeAristotletobesayingsomethingotherthanthatteachingtakesplaceinaclassroom.Indeed,hedoestellusthatteachingtakesplaceinthelearner.Buthowisthistobeunderstoodandgeneralized?AclueastowhatAristotlemeansbytalkingofwhereanactiontakesplacecanbefoundinasubargumentintheDilemma(P912),inthefollowingdialecticalmove:

[Suppose]theagencyisintheagentandthepatiencyinthepatient.[Then]...themotionwillbeinthemover,forthesameaccountwillholdofmoverandmovable.Henceeithereverymoverwillbemoved,or,thoughhavingmotion,itwillnotbemoved.

(Phys.202a2631)

,...(),,.

Thekeyideasinthisargumentarethatwheretheactivityofthemoverasamoveriswillalsobewherethemotionisandthethingthemotionisinissetinmotion.Aristotlesjustificationforthefirstclaim,thatmotionfollowstheactivationofthemoverasmover,isthattherationaleinthecaseofthemovermustbethesameasinthecaseofthemovable.Becauseif,aspertheinitialhypothesis,theactionofthemovermovesthemovable,thenitmustbethattheactionofthemovergeneratesmotion.Butiftheactionofthemoverisinthemover,thegeneratedmotionwill,forthatreason,alsobeinthemover.Butthenthemoverwill(p.53) beinmotion,forotherwisethoughhavingmotion,itwillnotbemoved,whichistreatedasabsurdandclosesthisbranchoftheargument.Sothemotioniswheretheactualityofthemoverasmoveris,andwhateverthemotionisin,itsetsthatthinginmotion.Inthatcasewecaninterpretthequestion(inwhat?,202a25)asaskingwheredoesthemotionbringaboutthechange?.Teachingisinalearner,asheatingisinacolderobject,becauseitistheseobjectsthataresetinmotionbythemovers.Sotheactualityofthemoverasmoverisinthepatient,generatingthemotioninit.Thewayitisinthepatientislikethewaytheformisinmatter.62

Ontheotherhand,theactualityofthepatientaspatientisalwaysinthepatient,becausethepatientalwayssuffersthemotionthatcomesabout.Thepicturewhichemergesfromthedistinctionofthetwometaphysicalrelations,belongingtoasubjectandoccurringinasubject,isthatthereisamotionthatisthecoincidenceoftwoactivities,theagentsandthepatients,inthepatient.63ImmediatelyfollowingtheActualitiesofMotionDilemma,Aristotledeniesthreeofitspremises:



[1]Itisnotabsurdthattheactualizationofonethingshouldbeinanother.[2]Thereisnothingtopreventtwothingshavingoneandthesameactualization.[3]Norisitnecessarythattheteachershouldlearn,eveniftoactandtobeactedonareoneandthesame,providedtheyarenotthesameinrespectoftheaccountwhichstatestheiressence...butinrespectofthattowhichtheybelong(),themotion.(Phys.202b521,translationslightlymodified)

(p.54) ThisleadsAristotledirectlytothediscussionofhisownposition,whichhehadalreadysketched,justbeforeenteringtheDilemma,asfollows:

Thesolutionofthedifficultyisplain:motionisinthemovable.Itisthefulfillmentofthispotentialitybytheactionofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotionandeventheactualityofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotionisnototherthantheactualityofthemovableforitmustbethefulfillmentofbothfor,itisonthemovablethatit[themover]iscapableofacting.Hencethereisoneandthesameactualityofboth.

(Phys.202a1318,translationslightlymodified)

,[].,,,.

IwilloutlineAristotlespositionbeforediscussingitindetail.Causalinteractionconsistsintheactivationofboththeactiveandpassivepowersinvolvedintheinteraction(e.g.beingabletoteachandbeingabletolearn)itisfigurativelydescribedastransmissionoftheformindicatingthetypeofactivitythatisengenderedbytheactivepowerandsufferedbythepassivepower.Theactivationofthesepowersisaprocess(e.g.,themovementsofthesculptorsarmsandchiselonthewood)that,atoneandthesametime,constitutesthecausingandeffecting.Theprocessisbothacausingandaneffecting,whicharedifferent,interdependent,activatedasymmetricpowers.Theirasymmetryliesinthefactthattheactivepowerisrealizedinthebearerofthepassivepowers,producinganeffectinwhatisactedupon.

(p.55) Thechallengeistoexplainthenatureofthespecialbondbetweenthetwopowers(ortheirbearers)engagedincausalinteraction.Aristotlessolutionistomakethemotionofthecausallyinteractingsubstancesthesame.Theirmotion,beingoneandthesamebutbelongingtobothsubstances,bindsthetwosubstancestogether.Buthowcanthemotionoftheagentbethesameasthemotionofthepatient?

Itiscontrarytoreasontosupposethatthereshouldbeoneactualization[]oftwothingswhicharedifferentinkind.Yet,therewillbeifteachingandlearningarethesame,andagencyandpatiency.Toteachwillbethesameastolearn,andtoactthesameastobeactedontheteacherwillnecessarilybelearningeverythingthatheteaches,andtheagentwillbeactedon.

(Phys.201a35202b5)

,,,.

Aristotledoesnotdrawbackfromhissolutioninviewofthisproblem,butisledtoinnovate.Hewillkeeptheonenessofthemotion,butaccountforitstwonessinametaphysicallynovelway,whichfollowsdifferentprinciplesfromhisessentialismaboutsubstances.Aristotletellsusthatthemotionthatisinthemovable,broughtaboutbythemover,

...isthefulfillmentofthispotentiality[ofthemovableasmovable]bytheactionofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotion[themover]andtheactualityofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotion[themover]isnot



otherthanthe(p.56) actualityofthemoveableforitmustbethefulfillmentofboth.

(Phys.202a1416)

[].

Thetermstranslatedasfulfillmentandactualityareandrespectively,whichareusedinterchangeablyinthiscontext.64Clearly,sodescribed,thesolutionfacestheprimafacieobjectionweencounteredabovethatteachingwillbethesameaslearning,andthattheteacherwilllearnwhatsheteaches.SoAristotleproceedstorefinehisanswerbyaseriesofexamples.Beforelookingattheexamples,itmaybehelpfultosaythatheisonlyelucidatingtheviewhehasalreadystated,andnotalteringthisvieworproposinganewtheory.Thisissurprisingsinceonewouldhaveexpectedhisanswertousedifferentterminologyinviewoftheclarificationhemakes.ButAristotledoesnotchangetheterminologyofhissolution,despitethefactthathehastheopportunitytodosowhenherepeatsit(atPhys.202b9).Indeed,hissolution,enrichedbytheexamples,doesavoidtheobjection,asIshallarguebelow.Butonewouldhaveexpectedaredescriptionofhissolutionthatdidnotretaintheobjectionablesamenessofthetwoactualities,whichhissolutiondoesnotrequireandismisleadingforthereader.Aswedonotgetaredescription,wemustconcludethatAristotleisusingthetermsandbroadlyhere,tomeanbyactualizationtheactivityinwhichtheagentandpatientaremutuallyengaged,ratherthanthenaturesoftheiractivities.Aristotlegivesfourexamplestoelucidatehisview.Hesetsuptheproblembystatingtheexplanandumfirst:

Athingiscapableofcausingmotionbecauseitcandothis,itisamoverbecauseitactuallydoesit.Butitisonthemovablethatitiscapableofacting.

(Phys.202a167)

(p.57) ,,.

Theactionofthemovercanberealizedonlybyactingonthemovable.ThisrequiresAristotletoexplainhowthemoverscapacityisboundupwiththemovable.Followinghisstatementoftheproblem,herestateshissolutionandelucidatesitwiththefirsttwoexamples:

Hencethereisoneandthesameactuality[]ofboth[themoverandthemovable]alike,justasonetotwoandtwotoonearethesameinterval,andthesteepascentandthesteepdescentareone.

(Phys.202a1820)65

,.

Aristotleexplainsthesamenessinvolvedintheseexamples:Fortheseareoneandthesame,althoughtheirdefinitions[]arenotone.Soitiswiththemoverandthemoved(Phys.202a20).Thisisimportantbutincomplete.Itisimportantbecauseitblockstheobjectionthatteachingwouldbethesameaslearning,bystatingthattheyhavedifferentessentialnatures.Butiftheyhavedifferentessentialnaturestheyarenotoneandthesameentitydescribedintwodifferentways.Whateveritisthatisoneandthesamebetweenthetwointervalsorbetweentheascentanddescentmusthavetwodifferentdefinitions/natures.Themajorityofthecommentators,ancientandmodern,whoreadasaccount/descriptionratherthandefinition,taketheexamplestointroduceasinglecommonentityineachcase(e.g.,theunitvalueone,ortheinclinedroadorthenondirectionalrelationbetweentheextremes).66Bycontrastwiththemajorityview,myreadingofAristotlesexamplesandexplanationtakesat202a2021tomeandefinition.



(p.58) Theontologicalcomplexofthetwodirectionalintervalsandtheirground,orthecomplexofthetworoutesandtheirground,arenotanyofthefamiliartypesofentityinAristotelianontology(althoughtheircomponentsare).Aristotleishereengaginginanovelexplorationofontologicaldependence,notofmatterandform,orsubjectandproperty,orpotentialandactual,butoftwointerdependentnatures.WhenAristotlesaysthatthereisasingleactuality()ofboththemoverandthemovable(asthereisbetweenthetwointervalsorthetworoutes),hemustmeanthatthemoverandthemovablearesorelatedintheiractivityastobeoneinsomesense,butnotoneinthedefinitionsthatdescribewhateachofthemdoesorsuffers.Whatmakesthedefinitionsofthevectorlinesfrom1to2andfrom2to1twoaretheiroppositedirectionsbutwhatisitthatmakesthesevectorlinesone?Itisthenondirectionalintervalbetweenoneandtwothatisthesameforbothvectorlines.Theintervalwouldnotbethesame,forexample,betweenvectorlines1to2and4to3(onaline).Similarlywiththeuphillanddownhillroutes:theyaredifferentbecauseoftheiropposeddirections,butareboththesamestretchofland,asopposedtotworoutesondifferentsidesofthehillthatsharenocommonstretchofland.AlthoughtheseexamplesandthisexplanationgosomewaytowardsexplainingwhatAristotlemeansbyclaimingthattheactualityofthemoverandthemovableisthesame,hispositionisnotasexplicitasintheexplanationweshallfindinhisnextsetofexamples,towhichInowturn.AftertheDilemma,Aristotlestateshisownposition,resolvingthepuzzlesencounteredinthecourseoftheDilemmaitself.Ontheissueweareexamininghere,hewrites:

Norisitnecessarythattheteachershouldlearn,eveniftoactandbeactedonareoneandthesame,providedthattheyarenotthesameinrespectoftheaccount[]whichstatestheiressence[](asraimentanddress),butare(p.59) thesameinthesenseinwhichtheroadfromThebestoAthensandtheroadfromAthenstoThebesarethesame,ashasbeenexplainedabove.

(Phys.202b1014)

,,,,,

Theuseofthetechnicalexpression,coinedbyAristotlehimself,foressence,,settlestheissueastowhetherbyaccount,,hemeansdescriptionordefinitionofnature.67Thisisfurthersupportedbyhisimmediateexampleofthingsthathavethesameaccount,namelyraimentanddress.Raimentanddressareindeedonething,undertwonamesordescriptions,butwithonedefinitionwhichexpressesitsessence.InTopicsI7,103a257,Aristotlesaysthatwhateverisoneinessenceisoneintheprimarysense(),andindeedwefindtheretheverysameexampleoftheraimentanddresstoillustratethistypeofonenessthisisnotthecasewiththetworoutes,butitwouldbeifthedescriptionsweretheroadfromAthenstoThebesandtheroadwetravelledonlastweekfromAthenstoThebes.TheroutefromThebestoAthensdiffersindefinitionfromtheroutefromAthenstoThebessincetheyarenot,asAristotletellsus,likeraimentanddress.Thereferencebacktowhathasbeenexplainedaboveinthelastquotationistothepassagejustexamined,202a1920,ontherelationoftheuphillroutetothedownhillonethatdiffersinaccount,hencethere,too,Aristotleintendstobethedefinitionofessence.Thereisfurtherevidencethathereisthedefinitionofessence,andnotameredescription.ThiscomesinanunexpectedmetaphysicalobservationthatAristotlemakesinthelinesimmediatelyfollowing.Thisobservationalsomakesit(p.60) evidentthatAristotlesaiminthetwopassagesweareexaminingistointroduceasenseofqualifiedsameness,asensedifferentfromidentity,bymakingsuchstatementsasthatmoverandmovableareoneandthesame,orthatoneactuality...mustbethefulfillmentofboth,orthattoactandtobeactedonareoneandthesame:68

Foritisnotthecasethatallthesamepropertiesbelongto[]thosethingswhichareinanywaythesamerather,thisisthecaseonlyforthosethingstobewhichisthesame[].(202b146,mytranslation)



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Theexpressionmustrefertoattributesofsubstances,andnottothesubstratumunderlyingasubstanceforitwouldbeextremelyunnaturalforAristotletosaythattheunderlyingsubstratumbelongsto()asubstance.Furthermore,althoughheonlytalksofthingstobewhicharethesame(literally,thathavethesamebeing,),Itakeitthathemeansthingswhoseconstitutionisthesame.Onecouldtakethistobelimitedonlytoforms,sincetheirbeingexhauststheirconstitutionandsothesamebeingentailsthesameproperties.Butonecouldtakeitmoreliberallytomeanembodiedbeing,sothatsubstanceswhoseembodiedformisthesamehavethesameproperties.69

Thereareother

anna marmodoro aristotle on perceiving objects

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