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Cryptography the Quantum Way Cryptography the Quantum Way Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow Andrea Pasquinucci UCCI.IT December 11th, 2012 Dipartimento di Informatica Università di Verona

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  • Cryptography the Quantum WayCryptography the Quantum WayYesterday, Today, TomorrowYesterday, Today, Tomorrow

    Andrea PasquinucciUCCI.IT

    December 11th, 2012Dipartimento di Informatica

    Università di Verona

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:2

    Contents

    Who I am A QKD Quick Tour QKD and Physics QKD and Cryptography: Myth, Legends and

    possible Truths? QKD and Protocols QKD on the Market

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:3

    Andrea Pasquinucci First student in C.S./Physics (A.D. 1979 ...) Then career in Theoretical Physics of High

    Energy Elementary Particles (USA, DK, CH, BE, IT) ... but also C.S. as SysAdmin and to “compute”

    From 2000 back to C.S. in Industry (and still teaching once in a while): Networking, OS (Unix/Linux), High Performance

    Computing and Web Applications Security, Cryptography

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:4

    QKD

    Create and distribute (symmetric) secret keys using elementary particles ruled by non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics

    Photons

    No encryption, only key-exchange

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:5

    Brief History 1970 approx.: Stephen Wiesner's protocol for quantum

    cash (published 1983) 1979: Bennet & Brassard idea of QKD (published

    1982) 1984: Bennet & Brassard first and main QKD protocol

    “BB84” 1989: Bennet & Brassard experimental prototype 1992: first QKD lab implementation 1994: 23Km QKD on Telco optical fibers 2004: 150Km QKD; first commercial products

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:6

    How QKD works - 1

    Alice & Bob need a Random Symmetric Secret Key for OTP, 3DES, AES ...

    Eve wants the key

    Alice & Bob need: a Quantum Communication Channel to

    exchange elementary particles; a Classical Communication Channel with

    authentication and integrity guaranteed.

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:7

    How QKD works - 2

    Simplest Eve's Setup Eve can do anything allowed by Physics on the

    Quantum Channel

    Eve can only listen undetected on the Classical Channel (Eavesdropping) This usually requires that Alice & Bob share an initial

    Secret (QKD can be seen as a Secret Key Expansion Protocol or even as a Stream Cipher)

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:8

    How QKD works - 3

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:9

    How QKD works - 4 We detect Eve only after having generated the key

    Eve must tamper with the Quantum Channel, information from the classical channel is not enough

    Thanks to Q.M., Alice and Bob can discover Eve tampering on the Quantum Channel

    We cannot use QKD directly to transfer information in a secure way There are efforts to devise “Quantum Ciphers”

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:10

    How QKD works - 5

    Encoding: 1 Key Bit in 1 Elementary Particle Generate single photons

    No disturbances Send single photons in Dark Fibers

    No repeaters Send single photons in Air/Space

    Line of Sight => Distance limitation

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:11

    The Physics of QKD - 1

    In Quantum Mechanics, it is not possibile to measure a particle without modifying it, unless: We already know something about the particle And we use a compatible measurement

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:12

    The Physics of QKD - 2

    There are NO Quantum Photocopying Machines (sorry Eve ... )

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:13

    BB84 - 1

    We use photons either in fibre or air/space We choose 2 sets of incompatible states and

    measurements, for example: Vertical polarization = 1 Horizontal polarization = 0

    Diagonal Right polarization = 1 Diagonal Left polarization = 0

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:14

    BB84 - 2

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:15

    Eve in Action

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:16

    Errors and Security All Errors Belong to Eve

    Both experimental and induced by Eve Run an Error Detection / Correction Algorithm

    (Reconciliation) Amount of Error => Quantum Bit Error Rate

    (QBER) => Amount of Information that Eve could have obtained

    Shannon Information Theory: if QBER

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:17

    QBER and Secret Key

    0.40.0

    Shan

    non

    Info

    rmat

    ion

    0.1 0.2 0.30.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1.0

    QBER

    I AB=1−H (QBER)

    IAESecret key rate

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:18

    At Last: the Secret Key

    Alice & Bob Run a Privacy Amplification Algorithm on the Key Reduces to 0 the information that possibly

    Eve has obtained

    The final Key is much shorter than the original photon-encoded key: 25% or less

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:19

    QKD vs Classical Cryptography

    Do we need QKD? Or RSA, DH ... are enough?

    QKD RSAHW (fiber, “air”) SWMath proven secure Math undecidedExpensive CheapQC ready QC failsLimited Distance Any-where/how

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:20

    QKD, RSA and QC RSA, DH will be defeated by Quantum

    Computers (Shor's Algorithm) Integer Factorization & Discrete Logarithm Problems

    Symmetric and Hash algorithms are safe (Grover's Algorithm is a minor theoretical speed up)

    New Post-Quantum Public Key Cryptosystems are safe Hash-, Code-, Lattice- based and Multivariate

    cryptography

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:21

    QKD + OTP or QKD + RSA

    QKD + One Time Pad: Proven Secure but (today) very slow (Kbps) Limit on distance (100Km) Expensive

    QKD + RSA: XOR of the symmetric keys generated by QKD and

    RSA Frequent key refreshment (10 times per sec.) Future proof and Perfect Forward Secrecy

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:22

    QKD Network Implementation

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:23

    A few QKD ProtocolsBit Encoding:

    Polarization encoding Phase encoding: normal, self-aligned, sideband modulation

    (frequency encoding) Entangled photon pairs: polarization / energy-time entanglement Continuous variables

    Protocols depend on physics implementation: BB84: 2 + 2 orthogonal states B92: 2 non-orthogonal states 6-state: 2 + 2 + 2 orthogonal states Ekert o E91: entangled photons Higher dimensions: more than 2 orthogonal states

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:24

    Implementing a QKD Protocol

    Depends on: Quantum Mechanical (Physics) Implementation Assumptions on HW Realization and Behaviour Protocols / algorithms adopted in each phase Shannon Information Theory C.S. Algorithms (eg. Error Correction, Privacy

    Amplification)

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:25

    QKD in Real Life Multiple-Photons Sources (Weak Coherent Pulse,

    Parametric Down Conversion) Eve can intercept one of many equal photons

    Imperfect detectors (Avalanche Photodiode) Eve can trick the detectors

    Proven-security can be not-so-secure after all ... Counter-measures:

    Protocols (eg. Decoy states, SARG) HW

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:26

    Commercial QKD id Quantique (Geneva CH) MagiQ (NY USA) Elsag Datamat (Genova, Italy) NEC, Toshiba, Siemens et al.: research and

    developing products Military, Secret Services and Government

    Agencies, Banks and Financial Institutions (eg. VISA) have shown interest

    EU (SECOQC) and USA (DARPA) funding of research projects

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:27

    Latest Developments

    Recent news on Quantum Memories: extending QKD distance

    limitations (technologies similar to QC) Quantum Dots: true single-photon sources Airborne QKD: ground to airplane (Munich D) QKD on Ordinary Fibre: QKD photons in the

    same fibre as network data (Toshiba + Cambridge UK – requires new sources and new detectors)

  • A.Pasquinucci – Cryptography the Quantum Way – Verona 11/12/2012 Page:28

    Thanks

    Andrea Pasquinucci

    [email protected]

    © Andrea Pasquinucci - Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0

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