and the poor get gassed

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And the Poor Get Gassed: Multinational—Aided Development and the State-the Case of BhopalAuthor(s): Arvind RajagopalReviewed work(s):Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32 (1987), pp. 129-152

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Andthe PoorGetGassed:Multinational-idedDevelopmentndthe State-theCase ofBhopal*

ByArvind ajagopal

Thispaper s an attempto describe omeof the chief eaturesof theaftermathf theBhopaldisaster, nd to draw someconclu-sionsabout theinteractionf the IndianState withUnionCarbideCorporation.

The episode s,ofcourse,not over. Indeed, s far s the egalcase is concerned,t has scarcely egun, ince thecontentiousssuesof the appropriate udicial forumand the applicable laws of"discovery" aveonlyrecentlyeendecidedon,andthe atters still

beingappealed. For the literally) ncounted housands fvictims,thetragedys ongoing.The nominal esturesf reliefnd rehabilita-tionthattheMadhyaPradeshgovernment ade havemore or lessstopped, nd theshockingondition f the victimsworsens,s theeffectsf a non-decontaminatednvironmentnd a non-detoxifiedpeople interact nd accumulate.The scale of congregatedumanmiserys so great ere s to simplifyne'sresponseo it. At easttothosebrought p in a sheltered,iberaltradition,t seemsscarcelybelievable hat hosewith hepower ohelpthevictims f so terriblea disaster o not do so. Bhopaloffers salutaryessonon thepri-

macyand the

enduringnature of social structures,nd of the

minority-orientedharacterftheState.The eventsof the aftermathf the disasterhave led many

groupsworkingn Bhopal to chargethat there s a collusionofinterestsetween he State nd UnionCarbide, nd that heState sminimisingheextent f the disastern order o protecthe nterestsofthecompany nd its beneficiariesn government. eadingnewsreportsfter hedisaster, could see that t was difficulto explainaspectsof the case without esortingo conspiracyheory- hichfeltwasunsatisfactory.nJuly, 986,1went oBhopal, ndspent ixmonths workingwith a voluntary agency, documenting nd

* I would iketo thank atinath arangi orhisunstintingupport uringthiswork,ndfor henumerouslluminatingiscussions had withhimoverseveralmonths.



1 0 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

publishingnformationn the"gas case" (as it is referredo inBho-pal). I met with numerous ctivists, overnmentfficials,nd gasvictims.Also,serendipitously,became involved n incidents hatgaveme a less mediated erceptionftheworkingsf the State nBhopal.

In thispaper, willargue hat heresponse f the Stateto thecrisis was to underplayt in order to safeguardts own interests.MadhyaPradesh s economicallyne of themostbackward tates nIndia, and this was wherethe world's worst ndustrial isaster

occurred. The resources f the most advancedcities n the worldwouldhave been strainedftheyhad suddenly ad to becomewel-fare pparatuses ormore hanhalf heir opulation.The capitalofMadhyaPradesh was scarcely quippedto handle t. On the onehand, he Statewas overwhelmedythefantasticcale of the disas-ter, nd demonstratedconfusion nd chaos thatwasactually ut ofproportion o the inadequate nfrastructure.ne writer bservedthat, n thenight f theaccident,Civilauthorityasvirtuallyon-existent."1ndeed, here re numerous eportshatmany f thetopofficials,ncluding he ChiefMinister f MadhyaPradesh, ctuallyfled. On theother and, hegovernmentasdeterminedo maintaintheopposite- hat verythingas under ontrol,hatnothing reatlyuntoward ad happened, nd thattherewere no long-lastingffectsfrom hegasleak. To maintain his llusion,fforno other eason,twasnecessaryo suppressll informationources,nd to be fanaticalabout secrecy t every evel. To admit to the extent f the crisiswould have meant imultaneouslyo admitto an incapacityo dealwith t, and thiscould launch a politicaldebacle in place of theindustrialisaster eingdenied. t is notnecessaryoargue ntentionhere: in the absence of sustainedpolitical pressure o change tscourse, herewas no need for he State ooverhaul tself nd become

a massive welfare rganisation.The gas disasteroverwhelminglyaffectedhepoorand marginalnhabitantsfthecity,who lived nsquatter ettlements,nd worked,for the mostpart,as contractlabourers nd hawkers. For a variety f reasons,principallyheirownphysical,conomic, ndpoliticalweakness,heywerenever bleto muster he force o have theirdemands nswered xcept n frag-mentedmeasure.

Additionally,ndustrialisations, especially o an economicallybackward tate, n important riority.While the basic infrastruc-tures emain ndeveloped, partial ortofdevelopmentakesplacethroughheencouragementfbusinesses o invest n plants nd fac-tories. The regulatorypparatus or uch ndustriesmaybe virtuallynon-existentas wasthecase withUnion Carbide nBhopal), nd theactualgainsfrom he ndustry aybe limited, ut thepromisedandofindustrial rogresss a land fromwhichno governmentants obe excluded, ven if it is not clear about ust howit ought o get



RAJAGOPAL:NDTHEPOORGETGASSED 1 1

there.The social costsof ndustrialnterprisesre seenas irrelevant,or as eminentlyffordable,ince theseare invariably aid by thepoor. "Reproduction"f abour s not the ssue, ince, ntheeyesoftheplanners nd policy-makers,here s already huge redundancyof labour;killing ff everal housand,nd maiming fewhundredthousandmore,s notsomethinghey ouldobject o inprinciple,slongthevictims re appropriatelyelected.*n Bhopal,with lmostmiraculous recision,hevictimswerepoorand illiterate. wopointshave been made: thatthe State underplayedhe disaster o mini-

misethepolitical allout;and that ndustrial ccidentswere een astheprice o be paid for progress."*he firstoint ndicates hat heStatewasnecessarilynhibitedn its reaction o Union Carbide- herequirementfmaintaining stratifiednd unequal society educedits bargainingtrength. he secondpoint ndicates hat,given tsvested nterestna particular indofdevelopment,he Statedid notsee Bhopalas precipitatingcrisis n its relationswithmultination-als,or as highlightingrucial ontradictionsetweenndustrialisationand itssocial andecological onsequences.Rather,t was seen as anaccident orwhich conomic ompensationhouldbe sought.

There is a third,related,point. Given its commitmentoindustrialisation,he State eeks ogenerate inancialnd technologi-cal resourceso undertakehisdevelopment. he State s unabletomobilise ufficientesourcesnternally,nd is thereforeompelled oseek foreignssistance, rincipally rommultinationals. hus theState cannotreact oo stronglygainstCarbide;themanagementftheBhopalcase thereforeeceives xtremelyowpolitical riority.na situation here hirdWorld ountriesompetewith ach other orthe attentionfmultinationals,trict egulatoryctioncould be seenas partof an unfavourablenvestmentlimate. In all of this,thedeep ideological ommitmento "modernisation,"nd to emulating

theexample f theWest, annot e underestimated.* Dr. VinodRaina,ofEKLAVYA,an institute or nnovativeducational

action n Bhopal, ecturedt several f thecity's olleges fter hedisaster,tryingo mobilise tudentupport or itizens' ctiongroups.Therewas ittleenthusiasmmongst is audience. At thefifthollegehevisited, ewascon-frontedya question rom studentn thecrowd. Hadn'tMalthus lreadypredictedhat, ncethepopulation xpandedbeyond tsresources,isasterswould ccur nd reduce hepopulationevel? So whatwasall thefuss bout?Dr. Raina didnotgive nymore ectures.

t The Director-Generalf the Council on Scientific nd Industrial

Research, r. S. Varadarajan,aid ina press onferencenBhopalon Dec 1 ,1985: "The whole ssuehasto be seen nthecontext f thecost-benefitatio.It hasto be seen nterms fnecessity.No technologicalperations entirelywithoutisks;we can'tmake dvanceswithout hem."2



1 2 BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

The outlineof mypaper is as follows. First, will brieflydescribe he nature f theaccident, nd its consequences.Then,willdescribe ertainmportantspectsof the aftermathf the disas-ter hat lluminate:

a) therelationshipetweenUnion Carbide ndia Ltd. and thestategovernmentnBhopal,

b) the ttitudefthegovernmentofully etermininghenature ndcauses of the accident, nd its effect n the people and theenvironment,nd

c) thepolitical ulturenBhopal.

THE DISASTER AND ITS CAUSESUnion Carbide CorporationUCC), in 1984,was the 35th-

largestndustrialompanyntheUS, withplants n 38 countries.OfUCC's 1984 assetsof$11 billion nd sales of$9.5 billion, ver14%derivedfromholdings n Asia, Africa, he Middle East and LatinAmerica, s well s nearly 2%of ts$323 millionnprofits.3 t thetime,UCC manufacturedwiderange fproducts,rom onsumergoodsto industrial hemicals o pesticidessince ts 1986restructur-

ing,it has sold its consumerproductsdivision). In India, UCCoperates hroughtssubsidiary, nion Carbide ndia Ltd. UCIL), ofwhich t owns 50.9% (the restis ownedby Indian stockholders,includingheGovernmentf ndia). UCIL was formedn 1905, ndby 1983 was among ndia's 40 biggestndustrialroups. n 1983, thad sales of $202 million nd profitsf $8.8 million.4 n 1969,itopened tspesticides lant nBhopal. Originally formulationlantto mix and package pesticides mportedfrom the US, it wasexpanded, nd by 1980 manufacturedSevin" and "Temik"pesti-cides frommethylsocyanateMIC). Union Carbide's1976manual,

"Methylsocyanate," eginsby statinghatMIC is "reactive, oxic,volatile, nd flammable."t is five imesmoretoxicthanphosgene,whichwas usedextensivelynWorldWar . The manualwarns hatMIC is so unstable that traces of impurities,ncludingwater,chlorine,ndiron, an set off ncontrollableeactions.

On thenight f December2, 1984 the MIC productionnithadbeen shutdownfor ix weeksdueto an oversupplyfpesticides.At about 9:30 pm, newworker,n instructionsrom new upervi-sor,beganflushing ithwater he ines of fourprocessfilters hichwerepart f the MIC productionnit. These ineswere onnectedoanother ipelinetheReliefValve VentHeader,RVVH) designed ocarryoxicgasses scaping romheMIC tanksntheevent fa pres-surebuildup.5Withnotoriouslyeakyvalves, nd a newly-installedjumper ine in lieu of a more xpensive ack-up ystem), arallelingtheRVVH infunctionut withoutnyvalvesblocking ntrynto heMIC tank, heentryoute nto he ankwas aid out.



RAJAGOPAL:AND THE POOR GET GASSED 1 3

The temperaturen MIC tank610 was well above safe imits.As an economymeasure, herefrigerationnit had been shutdownfor everalmonths.On December , tank emperaturesanged rom15° to 20° C instead f theprescribed° to 5° C.6 The water nter-ingtank610 reactedwith heMIC, excess hloroformusedas a sol-vent), nd free ron from orrosion f the tankwalls), n an exo-thermic eaction.At about 12:30am,a mixture fMIC and othertoxicchemicals urstpast thetank'srupture isk, hotthroughheRVVH,pasttheventgasscrubber,nd into he tmosphere.

The ventgas scrubber,heplant'smain ine ofdefense gainstescaping as,hadbeen on "standby" ecausetheMIC unitwas notin operation. n anycase, itscapacitywas onlya fractionfwhatwas escapingfrom he tank. Another afety evice was the flaretower, esignedo burn ff scaping oxins.But a section f thepipeconnectinghe flare ower otheMIC tank ndtheventgasscrubberhad been removedfor maintenancework.The workers triedtodousethe eakwithwater.The spray eached100feet nto theair;thegaswasescaping rom stack oughly20feethigh.Bythetimethereactionnded, bout2 hours ater,UnionCarbide stimateshatofthe90,000 bs ofMIC in tank610, 54,000 bs ofunreactedMIC

and 26,000 lbs of "reactionproducts" lasted ntotheatmosphereoverBhopal.7

A light, outh-southeasterlyreeze was blowing, irectinghedensecloudtoward hecity.The effectt hadwas like a holocaust.The mostseriouslyffectedrea was locatedbetween and 8 kmfrom hefactory,houghhegassesmayhave travelled ver30 km,enteringll areas of thecity,whosepopulationwas 800,000. Thenextmorning, odies were littered ll over the streets, nd inhomes-peoplekilledntheir leep, rkilledwhile ryingoflee.Thewounded umbered nthehundredsf thousands.

MEDICAL DOCUMENTATIONAs early as December 4, a German toxicologist,Max

Daunderer,f theToxicology entre tMunich, ametoBhopal. Hehad workedwithBayer,which lso manufactures IC-basedpesti-cides. His is theonlyfirst-handccountwehave from he nside, fthenature fthe medical ituationnthefirst ewdays. The follow-ing reexcerptsrom nunpublishedmanuscriptyDr. Daunderer.

Not one singlepatient n Bhopalwas treated orrectly,partfrom fewdoctors....o intensivemedical reatmentookplace

in the clinics....nly one in twenty atientswithpulmonaryoedemareceivedxygen. herewerenosterileyringes....o thisveryday,no correct etoxificationeasures f anykind havebeen performedn eyesor skin [writtenn late 1985]. Thepatients remained in their contaminatedclothes untildeath....Anythinghich ouldhave somehow eenusedbythe




injuredater n as proof or ompensationlaimswas omittedor concealed....nlyafter ourmonthswere therapeutic eas-ures introducedn individualpatients,whereas n facttheyshould have beencarried ut in the first ewdays.... eithermeeting ith he head ofthe research rojectn Bhopal oftheIndianCouncilon Medical Research] nd the WHO [WorldHealthOrganization]orthemonth-longtay f twoof our col-leagues increasedwillingness o treat those poisoned andimprovehehopeless onfusion.

Manyof the around3000 women n the first hreemonths f

pregnancyt the timeof theaccident an expect o have brain-damaged hildren.

No antidoteswhatsoeverwereavailable. Drugsfrom broadwere trictlyefused nd returned.Auxilosonepray s an anti-dote to changes nducedby pulmonaryrritants ould haveprevented,r at leastalleviated,he severepulmonaryhanges(fibrosis)round100,000patients re nowsufferingrom.Allthedrug an now do is to ease theagonising eath of 25,000patients....Theequest y ndiandoctors or...00,000packs ofspray]was blockedbythe ndiangovernmentlthoughn Ger-many, hepackswerereadyfor ransport.n tests n severely

poisonedpeople, odium hiosulphateNaTS), a completelyafeantidote o poisoning y hydrogenyanate, hlorine as, andothercytotoxins,urprisinglyrovedto be an excellent rugagainst he systemicffectsf MIC and the otherpoisonousgasses- nd especially gainst he effectsn the central ervoussystem.Not one patientwas infusedwiththe 13,000 nfusion ottlesfrom ermanyecause t was fearedhat ll patients ould hendemand this treatmentas was the case with the Auxilosonesprays,whichwere not used either)....bsolutelyll thedrugs[administered]antibiotics,ortisone,tc.)haveproved ointless

or evendangerous.No measurementf thepoisonousgas constituentsf thegascloudwere aken,houghhegas-tracingpparatuswas used as amatter f course t theUnion Carbide ompanynBhopal.To date,the superblyomprehensive onographrepared ytheparent ompany, nionCarbide, n methylsocyanate,asnotbeenpublished.Dr. Daundererwas a little oo zealous n his effortsn serving

the victims, nd in threedays,he was ordered o leave Bhopal,though is twocolleagueswereallowedto staybehind. The figures

he cites re,ofcourse, stimates. ven until oday, here as been nocomprehensiveurvey one of the victims.Atthetimeof thedisas-ter,no attempt as madeto properlyount he number f thedead;the mphasiswasongettingidofthebodiesas quicklys possible.




For a statemachineryhatwas snail-likengettingmost hingsdone,it was remarkable hatnearly ll of the thousands f bodieswere clearedawaywithinhours sometimes aking ive but uncon-sciouspeople-who, ftheywere ucky, evived nd had thestrengthto swim shorewhen heyweredumped ntheriver, rwere ble tocrawl ut from nder hebodies at themorgue,rmanaged o umpoffhefuneralyre).

Within aysof theaccident, he Tata Institutef Social Sci-ence, Bombay,had offered o engage ts students nd conduct a

house-to-houseocio-economicnd medical urveynthegas-affectedareas. The Madhya Pradeshgovernment greedto providethefinancesndfacilities,incethegovernmenttself ad not conductedany survey. he interviewersntrusted ith his mportantaskwereill-equipped or t.8 Withbarely day'straining,heyweremade toelicit nswers rommostlylliterate lum-dwellersn topicssuch ashousehold ncome, and kind and extent of medical disabilitiessuffered,t a pace thatprecludedareful uestioning. he quality finformationheyobtainedwas poor and far from omprehensive.Despitetheamateurish ature f thestudy,t was treated s a high-level mission nvolvingtate secrets:instructions eregivento allsurveyorsot to divulge ny informationathered, ithparticularemphasis n avoiding ournalists,awyers,ctivists,nd even somegovernmentersonnel.9While hegovernmentas scrupulousboutsecrecy,t was less concerned bouttheactivity fthesurveytself,and thesurveyeam eftBhopal n protestgainst ack ofassistance,with nly 5,000householdsurveyed.10

For manymonths,hissurvey,nadequate s it was,was theonly existing ne, and estimates f thenumber ffected,lans forinterim eliefmeasures,tc.,were xtrapolatedrom t. The govern-mentultimatelyompleted hesurvey, ut the demarcationf"gas-

affectedreas" from naffectedreas waswidely ontested,nd theirfiguref25,000"seriouslyffected"amilieswasrejected ycitizens'groups, ince extrapolationsrom mall, ndependent urveys ug-gestedmuchhigher igures.11

Sinceno comprehensiveurveys ave beendoneyet, stimatesof the number fpeople exposedto thegas leak,thenumber seri-ously ffected,"nd the number ead,vary. In May,1985,theMin-ister f StateforHealth,YogendraMakwana, old theRajya Sabha*that200,000were affected nd 11,000criticallyll.12But in July,1985,the Commissioner orGas Relief sic), Dr. IshwarDas, told

newsmen hatabout 10,000victimsweresufferingrom cute tot The RajyaSabhain theIndianparliamentoughlyorrespondso

Britain's ouse fLords,with ne-thirdf tsmembersominatednd theotherslectedndirectly.



136 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

controllableilments.13 n another ccasion, he Minister f StateforChemicals nd Petrochemicals,aichandraingh, oldtheRajyaSabhathat 00,000were xposed, nd25,000families ffected.14

By August, 986,the number ose to "more than500,00o."15The lastfigureepresented,ot ncreasinglyefinednformation,utthenumber fpeoplewho had filed laims forcompensation.Thegovernment'sstimate f the number f dead remained t 1430 forseveralmonths fter hedisaster;many alternativeources laimedfive o ten thousand ead in the first aysafter heaccident,with

steadily rising figure fter that.16In Bhopal, when new deathsoccurred,ostmortems ere eldomdone to determinefthedeathsweregas-related.17hus the official iguref thenumber f deaths(2850 inDecember1986)must e taken s less than ccurate.

The under-reportingf morbidity nd mortality,nd theattempt o subduepublicfear,begansoon after he accident. Asearly s December , the PrimeMinister,n a brief isitto Bhopal,declaredthe environmento be safe,thoughno evidencewas yetavailable.18The Director-Generalfthe ndian Council on MedicalResearchICMR) announced,whilemedical estshadyet o be com-

pleted, hattherewere no long-lastingffectsrom hegasses.19Tosome extent, his is attributableo themisinformationruitedbyCarbide officials.n the wake of thedisaster, ven as peopleweredying,he ChiefMedical Officerf theCarbideplant,Dr. Loya,toldgovernmentospital octors hat hegaswas notpoisonous,nd thatitwouldonlycause eyeirritationnd nausea.20Later, xpertswerebroughtn to testifyhatonly heorgans irectlyxposed o thegas,namely heeyes nd the ungs,were ffected.21

Governmenttatements erePollyannesque-n the face of themanifestlyrim ondition fthe victims nd againstmuch vidence.The MadhyaPradesh HealthMinisterdeclared, n the LegislativeAssembly,hattherewas no chance of people losing heir yesight.He did not mention hat tudies ydoctors rom ombay ound hata highpercentagef the victims eveloped hronic yeproblems.22Again,voluntarygencies aisedmany uestions bout the effectsfthegasonwomen; reliminaryindingsevealedmany bnormalities.Dr. IshwarDas, however, stressed hatno abnormalbirthshadoccurred."23Ultimately,he ICMR revealedthat the spontaneousabortion atewas24.2%, hree imes henational verage.24ndepen-dent tudies uggestedvenhigher igures.25

THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSYAs early s twelvenoon on December3, 1984,post-mortemsconducted tGandhiMedicalCollege thecity's nlymedical ollege,whichwas attached o the maingovernmentospital,Hamidia Hos-pital) produced trong videncethatthe deathshad been due to




cyanidepoisoning.26 r. HeereshChandra,head of thedepartmentof ForensicMedicine and Toxicology, ound, n each autopsyper-formed,trongvidence fcyanide oisoning.

By 3 pm,HeereshChandramade his findings nown o themedical uthoritiesn Bhopal, nd recommendedhe use of sodiumthiosulphateNaTS), theprescribedntidote orcyanidepoisoning.On December , Dr. Avasia,MedicalDirector t Carbide's nstitute,West Virginiaplant (whichalso produced pesticidesfromMIC),advised dministeringaTS ifcyanide oisoningwassuspected,na

telex ent o thegovernment.27vasia later rgued hat yanidewasnot involved n the disaster. When closelyquestioned bout histelex,he claimedthat he had heard on theradio thatcyanidewasinvolved.28 In press releases and interviews,UCC officialsemphasisedhatMIC was differentrom,nd unrelatedo,cyanide.This,ofcourse,was obfuscating.MIC breaksdownat 218° C intohydrogenyanide nd otherproducts.29WhenDr. Avasia came toIndiaa week ater, e insistedhat reatmentithNaTS was inadvis-able.30Max Daunderer adbrought 3,000ampoules fNaTS, andadministeredt to over 100 patients,with generally avourableresults.

But a lobbyagainstNaTS sprang nto action,denying llreports f cyanidepoisoning,nd alleging hatadministeringaTScould be dangerous. The storybegan to be told that one ofDaunderer's atients ad dieddue toNaTS, and theofficialsid lit-tle to abate therumours.On the thirddayofhis stay,Daundererwasasked to leaveBhopal t once."31He waschargedwith reatingan unnecessaryontroversy,nd threatened ith rrest.He left nDecember .

Therejectionf thecyanide iagnosis ndNaTS treatmentaseffectivelyormalisedn a December13 letter rom he Director fHealthServices,M. N. Nagu, to Bhopal doctors: Under no cir-cumstanceshallNaTS begiven nless t s correctlyndconclusivelyproved n the aboratoryhat t is cyanidepoisoning."32his was averbatimranscriptf instructionsromJ.Dasgupta,Joint ecretaryin thecentralMinistryf Health n New Delhi. To "correctlyndconclusivelyrove"somethinghat s politicallyontroversials, ofcourse, isky,ndthisbecame banfor ll effectiveurposes.

Atmosphericests eaked to thepress ndicated hathydrogencyanidehad also escapedfrom heplant.33But ntheir fficialtate-ments, overnmentpokespersonsontinued o insist hatMIC and

onlyMIC leaked on December3. As late as December,1985,afterthecyanide ontroversyadpeaked, heDirector-Generalf theCen-trefor cientificnd Industrial esearchCSIR), Dr. S. Varadarajan,submittedhe officialcientificeport n the causes of thegasexplo-sion to parliament.This reportmaintained hat only MIC was




involved.As early as December 14, the chiefgovernmentmedical

researchnstitute,he CMR, had sent telegramoBhopal'smedicalauthorities,ecommendinghe use of NaTS. (Thiswas madepublicby the medical authorities early month ater, nd never mple-mented.)On February12, the ICMR announced he results f adouble-blind,ontrolledtudyon 40 patients.Theyrevealedthatadministrationf NaTS resultednsymptomaticmprovement.

Dr. N. P. Mishra,physician o the ChiefMinister,nd for

manyyears ompany hysiciano UnionCarbide t Bhopal,was alsoDean of Medicineat the Gandhi MedicalCollege. Locally,he wasperhaps he mostoutspokennd effectivepponent fNaTS treat-ment. He was careful o oppose NaTS treatment orthe lack ofobjectivebasis for ts use: although ramatic, eliefwas still con-sidered ubjective nd symptomatic,nd scientistswereunable toexplain reciselyow t had effect.

At a February 4, 1985meetingfdoctors,Mishra nnouncedthat ut of 200 victimswho had beengivenNaTS injections,wohadsuffereddversereactions.34 he treatment e advised,therefore,

was bronchodilatorsnd steroids,s perCarbide'srecommendations.He stuck o hisposition ven after he CMR stated,n an April4,1985 pressrelease,thatfollow-uptudieshad been done on 180patientswho had received NaTS injections, ndicatingpositiveresults.35n one meeting, e calledthe CMR a "nationalfraud."36For hispart, he Director f HealthServices, r. M. N. Nagu,toldincredulousctivists t a meetingn March23 thathe had notbeeninformedf the CMR guidelines,irstssued womonths arlier.37

The issueofthiosulphateecame the focusof activists' trug-gle,the issue epitomisinghegovernment'sallousness owards he

gas victims nd the perceived omplicity etween hegovernmentand UnionCarbide. Aftermonths f obbyingor hiosulphate,ari-ous activist roups oined together,nd openeda "People's HealthCentre" n a liberated one on thefactory rounds, n May 27,1985.38Over200 peoplewere reatedvery aywithNaTS, and dis-abled victims reated ne day would often eturn he nextday,tohelp in theclinicthemselves.On June24, on the eve of a majordemonstration,ozens of activistswere arrested nd beatenup,includinghe doctors t the centre. The centrewas raided, nd allthemedicalrecordswere confiscated. he clinicwas closedon thegroundshat t was"insanitary"thoughtcompared avourably ith

governmentospitals).Two months ater, SupremeCourtrulingdirected heMadhyaPradeshgovernmento supplyNaTS to volun-tary genciesprovidingmedicalrelief, nd to formguidelines ortreatinghe entire as-affectedopulation. However,no systematicmeasureswere ver aken.




CONSPIRACY?

That a pro-Carbide lobby existed in Bhopal was a widespreadbelief. Three prominentmembers of the Congress Party which hasheld officen Bhopal formany years),whom I spoke to, includingthecity'sMember of Parliament n New Delhi, claimed that Carbide hadtaken care to make friends in government, who came to thecompany's assistance. It was common knowledgethatthe then-ChiefMinister of Madhya Pradesh, Arjun Singh, received many favoursfromUCIL. The companydonated largesums ofmoneyto a welfare

societyset up by Arjun Singh's family. The societywas to conduct,amongotherthings, lottery, ut there wereallegationsoffraud, nda suit was filedagainst the Chief Minister.39 The company's plushguesthouse in the Shyamla Hills, an exclusive area of the city,wasavailable to anybody with influence (bureaucrats, newspapermen,businessmen), to entertain themselves and their friends,at UCILexpense. Arjun Singh reportedlyhad a suite reserved for his use,whichhe occupied on weekends.

Further, hecompanywas alwaysto be relied on to make dona-tions forany "deservingcause," if somebody important pproached

them.40Many politicians and top bureaucratswere able to get rela-tives of theirs mployedin theBhopal office. The plant's Chief Secu-rityOfficer,R. N. Nagu, was a former nspector-Generalof Police;his brother,M. N. Nagu, was the Director of Health Services in theMadhya Pradesh government. The Public Relations Officer,A. K.Awasthi, was the nephew of former state education ministerNarasimha Rao Dikshit; the purchase officer, . P. J. Rana, was thebrother-in-law f R. K. Khanna, special secretary o the governmentof Madhya Pradesh; Devinder Singh,a timekeeper,was the nephewofunion ministerDigvijay Singh;Shakeel Quereshi,a supervisor,wasthe son of the former nspector-Generalof Police; a top Congress

Party eader in thecitywas thecompany lawyer.41For Carbide itself,this was a relationshipof mutual payoffs.

Whenevertherewas an inquiry nto a safety apse, or an accident,thereportwould be shelved,or the focuswould be shifted o operationalviolationsbyworkers.* When some workersprotestedthe death of acolleague due to poor maintenance, they were fired, nd even thelabour court could be pressuredto delay hearingthe case. The Bho-pal disaster occurred n a factory hat had a place of pride in the list

* In 1982, technician,. M. Khan,diedat thefactory,ue to a phosgene

leak arisingrom

efective alves. The report f theinquiry ommissionedintothe deathwas neverreleased.42Bychance,his widowhappened o becomingnto hecity n thenight fthegasleak.One ofher ons diedintherailwaytation,nd sheand hersecond on becameunconscious rom xpo-sure.43




of achievementsfthepolitical liteofMadhyaPradesh.It was oneofonly womodern actoriesnthe apital, nd theonly oreignom-pany. "To induce foreignompany o establishtselfnany tate salways onsidered bigachievement,"aid M. N. Buch,formerrin-cipal Secretaryo theMadhyaPradeshGovernment.44nad in theMadhya PradeshGovernment'supplementn a Reader's Digestissue n 1976 said: "At UnionCarbide,we areproudof our associa-tion withMadhyaPradesh. Ourprogresso a great xtent as beenspurred y the keen interest nd enlightenedttitude f the StateGovernment.

ogether,we look forward o the

years head,when

our mutual nvolvement ill deepenand lead us to ever greaterachievements."45chooltextbooksisted heUCIL factorys a tour-istspotofBhopal, kindof modern ilgrimage. he close relation-shipbetween overnmentndCarbidewas notmerelyne ofcorrup-tion ndnepotism.On thepartof thegovernment,herewasa deepbelief hat hefuture asrepresentedyUCIL andcompaniesike t,andthat,naiding tthroughmishaps,heywerebeingmorerationalandfar-sighted.

Conspiracy an and does explain the cyanide controversy,whichremains he most scandalous tory fBhopal. That theonlydrug that seemed to promise antidotal treatmentwas deniedthousands fpoorandsufferingictims;hat nstead, reciselyymp-tomatic reatmentasgiven,withdangerous rugs,s tantamountoslow mass murder.But for his onspiracyo be possible, wothingsarepresupposed:1. An institutionalulture hat enforced trict ontrol n all its

members,nd that ould command nquestionedbedience. tis a tribute o the feudalnature f the Medical College,forinstance,hatnone of the uniordoctors aredchallengeheirprofessors'tance n treatment,r initiate tudies f their wn

to confirmheeffectsf NaTS.2. Political learance rom heCentre,ithermplicitrexplicit.One does not have to claim that the conspiracyxtended o thehighestevels. In fact, onspiracieseldom work n thatway. Butconspiracies ouldnot be toleratedfthey eviated oo farfrom, ropposed, hepolicy bjectives ftheCentralGovernment.

THE N. K. SINGH COMMISSIONThe Justice . K. SinghCommissionwas appointed our ays

afterhe disaster ythe StateGovernmentnBhopalto inquirento

thebackgroundnd causesof the disaster.Headedbya judgefromtheMadhyaPradeshHighCourt at Jabalpur,he Commissionwasscheduled o submit tsfindings ithin hreemonths f itsappoint-ment. But ittlewas donebythegovernmentesides onstitutingheone-personcommitteeto investigate his highly nvolved and



RAJAGOPAL:AND THE POOR GET GASSED 141

technical ase. It was onlyafter epeatedpublic protestshatanyfunds, r even minimal echnical ssistance,wereprovided. Evensuch ssistance s wasprovided id notgo very ar. Forinstance,nApril 20, the commissionhad sent ten samplesof MIC to theNationalChemical ab (NCL), inPune,for nalysis.On June ,theNCL informedhe Commission hat nalysis f 3 sampleshad beendone, ndthat report ad been sent o the commissionhroughheChiefSecretaryo theMadhyaPradeshgovernment. he commis-sionnever eceived hereport.Repeated omplaintslicited denial

fromheChief ecretaryhat nyreport ad everbeensent.tAfternearly yearof delaying he MadhyaPradesh state'sreportothecommittee,ue a matter f weeks fter he ccident,heChiefMinister fMadhyaPradesh,MotilalVora,on December17,1985,declared hat, ince the central overnmentad "already" etup a commission nderthe CSIR (on December4, 1984) anotherreportwouldbe redundant.Further,he eak,and the effectsf thegaswere all technicalmatters," hichwere xpected o arise n theUS courtwhere hecompensationase was pending,nd thepursuitof the EnquiryCommission ould harm the legal strategyf theIndianGovernment.46he CSIR's report, nown s theVaradarajanreport,eclaredn itsopening tatementhat hescopeof ts nquirywas imited o the"total vent" hat ookplacewithinhe MIC tank.The two reportswere hardly nterchangeable,s Vora implied.Angered ythe Government'snnouncement,heOpposition tageda walkout, lleginghat he ChiefMinister adyielded o the UnionCarbide obby,whichwas activein the Government.Vora main-tained hat he decisionwas in the nterest fthegasvictims.47 nDecember 1, Justice ingh,who was in Bombay,was informed,ohis evident urprise,f thewinding p of the Commission y an

t That therewasanythingeft o analyse t all was itself he fruit f egalintervention.heMP Government,nderArjun ingh, adsoughtodestroyall theMIC residue. nitially,n December 6, 1984, private itizen, . V.S. Murthy, ad filed suit to preventhegovernmentrom onvertingllMIC intopesticide uring massiveweek-longperationode-named pera-tion Faith duringwhich he residents fBhopaldemonstratedheir aith nthegovernmentyfleeingrom hecity n masse). The courtdirected hegovernmento storefivebottles f MIC of 300 grammesach. The StateGovernmentwanted to destroy hese as well. "The Madhya PradeshGovernment...s also theCounsel fUCIL...had, n separate etitionso theMadhyaPradeshHighCourt, oughthedestructionf thegason thegroundthat heanalysis f thesampleshad been carried ut,after ointingut the

'highrisk'the storage nd transportationf the samples presentedt theplant,"reportedhe IndianExpress n January , 1985 (emphasis dded).This from companynd a governmenthatdesignednd approved, espec-tively,hree ixty-tonanks fMIC. TheHighCourt ejectedheplea.




IndianExpress orrespondent.48How could thegovernmentfford ot to discover he whole

storyboutthe causesof theaccident, etermine here heresponsi-bility ay,and incorporatehisknowledgentostrongerafeguards?Even if improvingndustrial afety tandardswas seen to be anunaffordableriorityt thepresent tageof development,urelycomprehensiveeportwould be imperative or successfulitigationagainstUnionCarbide?

Allindependentnformation-gatheringas a threat,nd had to

be stifled.As regardshe suitagainstCarbide, t was notto be pur-sued at the costofrevealinghe extent o which hegovernmentnBhopalwas itself omplicitwith the company: his was somethingthatwas understood,nd did not have to be more thannominallyinquirednto. It is clear thatthegovernmentas countingn thecase beingsettled n the United States,preferrablyut of court.Union Carbide chose not to be obliging, nd made out-of-courtoffers hat werepolitically nacceptable o the government: 350million, bout half ts insurance overage,was offered,o be paidover a periodof twenty ears;unofficialourcesreportedhat the

governmentad beenseekingt least$1 billion.*SPY SCANDALS AFOOT:A PARTIAL HISTORY OF THE BGIA

Another,morepersonal, torymay lluminateomethingf thepolitical ulturenBhopal, nd the nature f official ork n thegascase. For sixmonths, wasworking ith voluntaryrganisation,theBhopalGroupfor nformationnd ActionBGIA), bringingutamonthlyewslettern the status f thegas victims, n governmentrelief nd rehabilitationfforts,nd othernewsrelatingo thegascase. The groupwas founded fter he failure f citizens'actiongroupsn Bhopalto effectivelyobilise road-basedupport or nysubstantial eriod. Repressivegovernmentctionalways mmedi-ately ccompanied- r sometimes re-empted- obilisation,herebylimitinghe effectivenessf anycitizens' ction. A documentationand reportingentre eemeda relativelyafe and uncontroversialactivity,nd wasmore ikely o draw he upport f theoften itterlydivided nd faction-riddenhopalactivistsndtheir upport roups.ByMay,1986,the eaders f theactivistswho,withfew xceptions,were ll young,middle-classmenand womenfrom utsideBhopal),aftermore han year f ittle-rewardedtruggle,ere eaving hopal

to resume heir ives. Buttocompletelyesert hecitywouldbe likeXNow hat he asehascome oBhopal,he overnment,pparentlyith

the im fputtingpa good how, as laimed3billion rom arbide.




an abdication othegovernment,ndan acknowledgementffailure.A smallproject hat nsured airlywidecirculation fBhopalnews,therefore,eemed ike a realisticdea. The BGIA thereforeegan nMay,1986, upportedysmalldonations rom arious ndividuals.

On the2nd ofSeptember,986,therewas a meetingalledbygovernmentoctors, ftheprivate octorsn thecity, o discuss hetreatmentf thegasvictims.*he head of thecity'sprivate octors'association adnotified henewspapersf thetime nd placeofthemeeting,nbeknownsto thegovernment.n thepast,thegovern-

ment had always excluded outsidersfromall doctors'meetings,declaringll medicalknowledge n thegas victims lassified.Themeetingtselfrevealed some interestinghings bout the state ofmedicalworknBhopal.

A circularwas distributed,roclaiminghe purposeof themeetingwas to promote he "freeflow f information"o improvemedical reatment. wo doctors rom he CMR werepresento dis-cuss the manualon medical reatmentfgasvictims hat he CMRhad published ix months arlier,nd ask forresponseso it. As ithappened, nlyone doctorhad seen it. So the mainpurpose f the

meetingwhich,manyprivatedoctorswerequick to declare,wascalled far oo lateanyway), as defeated.The Commissionerf GasRelief,Dr. IshwarDas, who took thedais, askedprivate octors ftheyhad beenmaintainingecords f thegas victims' reatment,sthis would be "useful"from a medical as well as a legalpointofview."The questionwas nearly woyears oo late,and onlyone ofthe doctorshad maintained ecords f his patients' reatment. hequestionwas then takenup by some of the governmentoctors.The ChiefMedical Officer f Gas Relief,Dr. G. S. Dheer,claimedthat the various clinics that he oversaw, n thegas-affectedreas,often orwardedatients o the mainhospital, ut thattheynever

received ollow-upnformationromhehospital.Now,in the aftermathf thegas leak,governmentoctorsn

Bhopalhave acquiredan unprecedentedegree f power nd pres-tige, ach head ofdepartment ore a feudal ordthan ever before.On hearing r. Dheer,Dr. N. P. Mishra, heDean of Medicine tGandhiMedicalCollege,who was clearlyhe unnamed ulpritnthestory, eclaredvehementlyhat all relevantnformation as beingsent. A fierceuarrel roke ut,and it seemed hat hetwo eminentdoctorswereprepared o tradeblowsto defend heirreputations.What the incidenthighlighted as that therewas no systematic

♦ Private octors orm majorityf the doctorsn Bhopal. A largeper-centageof these have little more than a 2-month iplomain medicine.Predictably,here s a great eal of fraudulent edical dvice, upported ymassive,ndiscriminaterescriptionfdrugs.




documentationf the symptomsnd treatmentf thegas victims,noranyproper rocess faccountability. he Commissionereggedthe twogentlemeno calmdown, nd requested hem o better o-ordinate heir ffortsn future.The unpleasantncident ver,Dr.IshwarDas gracefullyiverted hecompany's ttention o less con-tentiousmatters.

As themeeting asdrawingo a close, hree hours fter t hadbegun,my olleagueGoutamBanerjee nd I, having penly ecordedthewholemeetingrom central eat nthefront,reparedo leave.

Ourdeparture ould have beenrude, inceeverybody as listeningto theCommissioner,ut we wereboredenough o risk t. Alertedby some doctorssitting ehindus, Ishwar Das stoppedus, anddemanded o knowwho had let us in andwhywe had recorded hemeeting.We werethreatenednd pushed bout a little, utfinally,he toldus to leave, hough r. Dheerwanted o detainus. Our noteswere orn ut, nd our cassettes eized.

Two days later, herewas a police raid on our house whichwas also theBGIA office). was nothome,but Goutamwas arrestedandchargedwith respass,nd with iolatingheOfficial ecretsAct;

therewas a warrant ormy arrestunder the same charges. AnEnglishman,avid Bergman, ho hadbicycled rom irminghamoBhopal, ived around he corner rom s. He rana therapeutic ro-gramme orgas-affectedhildren; e was known o be a friend fours. He was also arrested,nd chargedwithoverstayingis visa;two days later,afterbeing released,he was arrested gain andchargedwith eing n accomplice.

In theraid,thepolicefound upboards ullof documents- llrelatingo thegas case. Governmentocumentswere also found,including ome that said, "For OfficialUse Only": forexample,copiesof the ndian CouncilofAgriculturalesearch eport n theeffectsf MIC on plants, nimals nd fish. Aswell, herewerenoteswe had beenmaking o exposeCarbide'sfabricatedheoryf sabo-tage as thecauseof thedisaster).Thenextday,papers arried rontpagestories,nnouncinghat two American ouths f ndianorigin,Arvind nd Rajagopal" had "videotaped top-secretCMR meet-ing,"and one of them had been allowed to "escape." Subsequentreports eclared "spyscandal": David Bergmanwas a CIA agent,and Goutam ndI were piesfor hemultinationalompany,ramingevidence or he sabotage heory."49

On previous ccasions, hegovernmentad beenopenly epres-

sive ofactivists, reaking p demonstrationsnd processionsf thegas victims, tc. This time, t was not to repress ucha perceivedpolitical hreat hat he arrests eremade. A strangerromAmerica;an Englishman ho claimed o havebicycled 000 miles- o come toBhopalof all places; official ocuments;noteson sabotage:to an




insular nd provincial ureaucracy,his combination eemed o adduptoonly nething- irtyricks.

It was inconceivable o the police and to the administrationthatthesemiddle-class utsiders ould come voluntarilyo serveacausethatdid notmateriallyenefit hem. Citizens' ctionwasvir-tually nknown,nd when t didarise, fter hegas leak,the eaders(all ofwhom, ignificantly,erefrom utsideBhopal),weredubbedas agents f vested nterests-fpolitical arties r offoreign overn-ments.Since thisattitudewas so common,t was also a tooleasily

exploited y thegovernment,nd couldbe used to quell "trouble-makers." oth spectswerepresentnthis ase. Whenmountingvi-dence made thespy charges gainstus untenable,heCommissionerofBhopalwas neverthelesseard o say, Thistime,wewillcrush llvoluntaryroupsnBhopal."The national ress,however,upportedourcause,trumpetingt as an example fgovernmentallousness othe victims nd repressionf activists. The presence f a Britonmade thestory venmorenewsworthy,nd the internationalresspicked tup,leading uestions o be asked of the ndianHighCom-missionern London. The case became an embarrassmento thegovernment,nd ceased tobe pursued ctively.However,nBhopal,we remained suspiciouscharacters," ne way or another. Theincident llustrates he difficultiesf workingn Bhopal on a sus-tainedbasis: in a city iddenwithpolitical actions,ndaccustomedtoconspiracynd intrigues thegeneral xplanation ormost vents,the hostilitynd suspicion hatoutsiders, r indeed,virtually nynon-governmentalrganisation,angenerate,s often atal.

This is not to saythat he egitimacyf the State urpassesnysuspiciondirected owards t. But "legitimacy" an take differentforms; hedialectic f consent nd coercion anoperatewith reateror lesserpublic onsent epending n historicalonditions.Further,theconcept f "public"here has to be disaggregated:ifferentec-tionsof thepopulation ave differentegrees fpolitical ower, ndthussummondifferentegemonic trategies rom he State. TheState coulddeny herighto information,ecause thosewhowouldutilise he nformation ereprincipallyrom hemiddle lasses; this(powerful)ectionwas not affectedythegasleak,however,nd wasthereforenlikelyo make an electoral ifference.egitimacyouldhave been affected,ut in a political ulture tronglynfluencedytheexperiencef feudal nd colonialrule,withonlyforty earsofelectoral olitics nd a largely oorand illiterateitizenry,heStatecan

successfullyaintain

manyf tsfeudal

privileges.ndeed,hese

privilegesregrantedhem ymostpeople. Thusthe legitimacy"ftheState,wedded s it is to a deep sense ofpowerlessnessmongstthepeople,does not tendto be seriouslyffected.How else can weexplainthe fact that the rulingCongress I) partywas returned opowerntheparliamentary,egislative,ndmunicipal lectionsafter




thegas eak?

MadhyaPradesh tselfs a post-independencereation.Apartfrom largeadivasi i.e., autochthonous,r "tribal")segment,hepopulations madeup ofpeoplefrom ll theprovinces hich orderthissprawlingentral tate. ThoughHindi is the officialanguage,there rea greatmanyforwhom t is notthe motherongue.Com-munications etween he variouspartsof the state remainpoor.Among politywith lmostno historyf struggle,here ould nothave beenanysustained ressuren the Governmentnder uchcir-

cumstances.THE STATE IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA

In theforegoingages, have described he behaviour f theStatewith especto the aftermathf theaccident, rincipallyn theissuesofmedical elief nd informationontrol. have tried o showhow thegovernment,hought had no systemf crisismanagement,neverthelessttemptedrisis ontrol, y producingnformationhatportrayedo crisis, ndbysuppressingttemptstproducinglterna-tive information. his was done to prevent emandsfrombeing

madeon the Statewhich twouldhave been unable ndunwillingoaddress.This,however, andicapstseverelynthe itigationgainstUnionCarbide, incethegovernmentas no strongvidence o dis-tinguishetween as-producedilmentsndother ilments; arbide'sarguments thatmostof thevictims' njuries re notserious, nd inanycase are sufferingrom roblems ausedmainly ymalnutritionand insanitaryonditions.Without ood evidence,whichwiththepassage of two years is an increasinglyemotepossibility,hegovernment'sase is muchweaker han tmighttherwise e. How-ever, argue hat hegovernmentas,from he tart, otdisposed obe aggressiveowards he multinational,espitethe extraordinary

lapses in Carbide'splant designand maintenance,nd the catas-trophiccale of thedisaster.This was notdue to anysimple ollu-sion of nterests etween hetwo,but was a result f thenature ndorientationf the State tself.

The colonial structureeftno single strong lass; thus,statepower s based on a coalition f thedominantlasses: he big"bour-geoisie,withbusinessesnd industriescrossthecountry;he urbanpetty ourgeoisie,ncluding rofessionalsnd smallbusinesspeople;and thedominant uralclasses:the landlords nd richpeasants.50The fact hat tatepower ested n three lassesrather hanonegave

the State a measure f strengthnd autonomy.51 nlikethepost-colonial stateanalysedbyAlavi (East Pakistan, r Bangladesh),hePartition eft ndia with what was a relativelyargeindependentbusiness lass. Havingbegun n a pathofcapitalistndustrialisation,albeit with ocialistrhetoricthefreedomtruggle as still freshn




themindsofpeople),the State had to maintain hebalance of thisclass coalition, nd could not challenge hepositionof anyconsti-tuentgroup oo strongly. he State n India was overdevelopednrelation o the level of development f theeconomy, wingto themetropolitantatehavingfashioned t during he colonialperiod.But t had a circumscribedphere fautonomy,ndhad to conformto closely-drawnimitsof action,to maintain hebalance of classforces.

Indianbusinesswasscarcelyna position oproduce hewhole

rangeof commodities equiredby the domesticmarket, nd hadnecessarilyo turn abroad for technology.52 oreigncapital wasattracted othby the market nd by the need to jump tariff ndquotabarriers. n thecircumstances,t was necessarynd useful ocollaborate ithndiancompanies,n"jointventures."

Between1948 and 1955, only284 collaboration greementswere pproved ythegovernment,ut therewere82 in 1956,103in1958, nd 380 in 1960. Between 960and 1979,the number f col-laborationgreementsveraged etween 00 and 400 a year. In thelast fiveyears, he number as risen harply,o an average f 586 a

year. In 1984, t was 730.53The reasonsfor nvitingollaborationvariedwithpolicy hifts, ut, overall, herehas been a steady rendupwards,nd this rend as acceleratednrecent ears.Governmentlegislationends o disguise ather han reveal heextent fforeignparticipationn theeconomy.*However,fwe take theyearbeforethecrucialegislation aspassed i.e.,FERA: seefootnote),he shareofforeignontrollednterprisesFCEs) in the total turnover f theprivate ectorn 1972-73was about 30% (25% in thetotal orporatesectorncludinghepublicsector).But FCEs accounted or46% ofthetotalprofitsf thecorporateectorincludinghepublic ector).56This s becauseforeignapital ends o seekthemostdynamicectors

of theeconomy,nddominate hem.

t The Foreign xchange egulation ct FERA), 1973, s theonly egisla-tionspecific o companieswithforeignquity. t requires ompanieswithmore han 0%direct oreignquity oregisternder he ct. Theother om-panies re treated nparwith ully-ownedndian ompanies.Foreignontrolthus ends o bedisguised,incecontrol anbe exertedwith s low as 5% ofsharecapital.54Other egislationhat can be used to detect nd regulateforeign-ownedquity lso tends to be weak and ineffective. or instance,legislationo regulatemonopolies equires ompanies o declare heir nter-connections oluntarily,huspermitting anycompanies, ncluding hose

inter-connectedhroughon-residentoldings,o evade the ct.55UCIL, with50.9%equity wnedbytheparent orporation,s registerednder ERA,butis exempt rom tsregulationss it s considered oemploydvanced echnol-ogy.




The weakness f Indiancapitalism s its inabilityo mobilisesufficientesources or economicgrowth.Patnaikpointsout that,giventhe level of productivity,hepossiblerate of accumulationsdeterminedy twofactors.57 irst, hegrowth ate of agriculture,and second, he relative trengthf the various lasses,whichdeter-mines how much s spenton mass or on luxury onsumption.Toimprove hegrowthate ofagricultureouldrequire eformingre-capitalistmodesoffarming,hichwouldcurb hepower fthe argelandlords the "greenrevolution" eingcarriedon mainlyby rich

peasants).Consumptionould be increased

y increasingural

pur-chasingpower sinceover 75% of thepopulation s rural), ut thiswouldmean andreform, hich,gain,wouldbe politically naccept-able. With urban mass consumptionimited y inflation,he chiefmeans fraisinghe nvestmentatehas beenthroughoreignid.

Not onlyfinancial eliance n foreignrganisations,ut alsotechnologicalependence,s difficulto reduce. The corporationsthatprovideknow-how reserve ontrolover it, and informationremains ecret. ndigenous echnical esearch emainsminimal, ndserves argely o tinkerwith xisting roducts.The spreadeffect fforeign now-how hereforeends to be minimal. This affectsheregulatorycapacity of government upervisory nits. Thus arepresentativef UCIL is to be found n every ubcommitteef theIndian Standards nstitution's ommitteewhichpublishesbookletsfor afety, andlingnd storage feveryhazardous hemical.58 ar-bide helpedset the standards ywhich t was udged. Not surpris-ingly,MIC was listed as a low-priorityazardous hemicalby theDepartmentfEnvironment,hough arbide's wn manualgave t amaximum anger ating.59

The arguments sometimesmade, as it was in Bhopal forinstance,hat he ndianState s hand nglovewithUnion Carbide:

thatthe State s dominated ycomprador ourgeois orces. But asPatnaik emarks,he manoeuvresf the State renotthemselvesro-or anti-imperialistn design.60 heir effect n foreignapitalwilldependon the objective ituation, .e., on howstrong he State isagainst oreignapital. The State s crucially ampered y ts nabil-ityto mobilise ufficientesources ordevelopment,nd,willy-nilly,has to turn broad for ssistance; histhendeepens he situation fdependence.

The gas leak occurred n December2/3. But anothermajordebaclethatfollowedt,far ess destructive,ut more lluminating,

occurred etweenDecember 15 and 22. It was Union Carbide,notthe government'seam of "experts," hatdictated he manner nwhich heremainingMIC would be disposedof. Carbide had thechoice of neutralisinghe liquid undernitrogen, singcausticsodasolution;this would have been almost completely afe. But the




nitrogennd caustic oda, large mounts fwhichwould have beenrequired,were expensive, nd, moreover,Rs. 6 million (about$450,000)wouldhavebeen ost n thusneutralisinghe MIC. A lesssafe,but moreprofitable ethodwas to producepesticide rom heMIC. The Carbideplanthad been seizedbythegovernment;ll thekey fficials ereunder rrest.But t was these fficials-.Mukund,S. P. Choudhary,nd A. Raichoudhary, iththehelpof an "MICrestartrew"fromUCC, USA,who nitiated nd directedheopera-tion. Governmentcientists,ncluding he Director-Generalf the

CSIR and his team,tood

by. "OperationFaith,"as it was

called,caused a tremendous ave of panic amongst he bastis of Bhopal,withvirtually verybody, eakened nd ailingas theywere,fleeingthe own or everal ays,many f themhaving oldtheir ropertyntheprocess.61

The incident ighlightsomeof thecharacteristicsfpresent-day technologyransfer.Whiletechniquesre certainlyransported,thetechnology sually emains nder hecontrol f thedonor cor-poration, ften o the exclusion ven of the domestic ubsidiary.While hegoodsproducedmay inkupwith heeconomy,hetechni-cal and technologicalspectsremainunintegrated,epresentingnartificial,nd to a considerablextent,xternallyovernedresence.

CONCLUSIONI have tried o showthat he Statehad two nter-relatedevels

ofresponseo thegasdisaster.On the onehand, nformationboutthe nature and extentof the crisis had to be controlled ndsuppressed,o help ensurethat the unprecedentedemandsbeingmade on their resourceswould be controlled.To accede to thedemandsforadequaterelief nd rehabilitationouldhave been toinvite political risis, ince theminority-orientedtatewould, n

anycase, have been unable to generateufficientesources o dealwith hesedemands.Repressionfpopularprotests,nd of alterna-tive, ndependentttemptso generatenformationn thedisasterwas an integralart f thisprocess.

The other evel ofthe Stateresponse, amely o Union Car-bide,was inevitablyffectedythecrisis-controllingtrategiesf theState. The informationase thatcould have illustratedhe natureand extentof the disasterwas nevergenerated.The means toprosecute arbidefor heepicdisaster,ausedbytheirwillful egli-gence,mayhave beenlacking, utthis s fundamentallyecause the

politicalwillto do so was absent.The event hathighlightedhepre-cariousnature fmultinational-aidedevelopment as seen rather san accidentfor which economiccompensationhouldbe sought.There retwo, nterlinked,easons or his. Pursuing pathofcapi-talist ndustrialisation,he nature of the dominant lass coalition




rendershe Stateunable to mobilise he resources ecessaryor hispurpose, s any adequate meansof doingso would undercut hepower f this oalition agrarianand reformo increase roductivityand/oro increase onsumption y ncreasingural urchasingower:thiswould ffectoth hebig andlordsnd thenow-considerableec-tion of industrial apitalists llied to landlords n account of thegreen evolution). oreign apital ndknow-how,hanneledhroughthe MF, WorldBank,and multinationalompanies, re seen as thesolution. The objectivenature of the situationpushesthe State

furthermidst he constraintsmposedbyforeignapital. This doesnot,ofcourse,mechanicallyeterminehe movements ftheState,but it curtails he scope foraction, nd makes t unlikelyhat theStatewillrisk ndangeringhe nvestmentlimate ormultinationals,when thereis alreadysuch fierce ompetition or multinationalinvestment.

None of this s explicablewithout hedeep,ideological om-mitment o industrialisations representedy Western xamplessuch as the U.S. The social and ecologicalcosts of thiskind of'development're seen as irrelevant,r as divertitaleo thepoliti-cally esspowerfullasses. Though nly he eventhargestndustrialcountry,ndia holds theworld'srecordfor ndustrialmishaps andthe chemical ndustryccountsforthelargest umber f industrialaccidentsnd deaths).62t is notonlymultinationalapitalthat heStateprotects,utdomestic apital s well. On the firstnniversaryof theBhopalgas disaster, herewas a major eakfrom heoleumtank at the Shriram ood and Fertiliserslant n New Delhi. Thesulphuriccid cloud thatdevelopedkilled one person nd injuredover 100. Dr. S. Varadarajan, f theCSIR, who was one of thegovernment'soothsayersfterBhopal,wenton television o assurethepublicthat ulphuriccid was not toxic. Independentnvestiga-

tions revealednumerous esign nd operational laws, ll ofwhichhad, ustas in thecase of UnionCarbide, outinelyeenpassedoverby governmentegulatoryodies.63

FOOTNOTES1. Larry verest: ehind hePoisonCloud,Banner, hicago, 986.

2. SundayObserver,3 Dec. 1984.

3. Businessndia,25 Feb.- 10Mar. 1985,pp. 102-1 1.

4. UnionCarbideCorporation,nnualReport, 984.5. The llustratedWeeklyf ndia,1 Sept.1985.6. Union Carbide Corporation: Bhopal Methyl socyanate ncident

Investigation eam Report,"March 1985, (hereafterhe "BhopalIncident eport"), -23.



RAJAGÒPAL:AND THE POOR GET GASSED 151

7. "Bhopal ncident eport," . 24.

8. IndianExpress, 0July 985;personalnterview ith nehlataGupta,member,urveyeam, n 16 Oct. 1986, nNewDelhi.

9. Businessndia,2-15 Dec. 1985.

10. IndianExpress, 0July, 985.

11. E.g.,theMedico FriendCircle:TheBhopalDisasterAftermath:n epi-demiologicalndsocio-medicaltudy, 5-25Mar. 1985.

12. Hindustan imes, 6May,1985.

13. Hindustan imes, July, 985.14. Telegraph,6 Nov. 1985.,15. Bhopal,BhopalGroupfor nformationnd Actionmonthlyewsletter,

Sept.1986.

16. Morehouse,Ward, and Subramaniam,Arun: Bhopal: A Citizen'sReport, ouncil n Internationalnd PublicAffairs,ewYork,1986.

17. Bhopal,BGIAnewsletter,ugust, 98618. FreePressJournal, Dec. 1985; Everest,bid.19. Businessndia,14-27Jan.1985.

20. FreePressJournal,0 Dec. 1984.21. Everest,p.cit.

22. "MedicalSurvey nBhopalGas Victims etween 04 to 109days fterexposure o MIC gas 16-21March1985),"published 2May 1985byNagarik ahatAurPunarvas ommittee.

23. FreePressJournal, Feb. 1985.24. IndianExpress, 6Apr.1986.25. Medico Friend Circle Bulletin: Pregnancy utcomeSurvey," ept.

1986.26. Bhopal:One YearAfter, sia-Pacificeople'sEnvironmentaletwork

Report, ongKong,1986.27. Ibid.28. Ibid.29. Carbide ublication-41443 /76, o. 17.30. IndianExpress, 8 Jan. 1985.31. Probendia,Oct. 1985.32. Businessndia,25 Feb- 10 Mar. 1985.33. FreePressJournal,5May1985.34.

"Bhopal:One Year

After,"PPEN

Report, ongKong,1986.

35. FreePressJournal, Apr.1985.36. MiraSadgopal,Medico FriendCircledoctor, ersonalnterview,n 6

Jan.1987, nHoshangabad.



152 BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

37. "Bhopal:OneYearAfter," PPEN Report, ongKong,1986.38. Visvanathan,. andKothan,R. "Bhopal:The Imaginationf a Disas-

ter," okayan, 985.39. Telegraph, May1983.40 Interviewwithnewspaper ditor, n Bhopal,27 July1986 (name

withheld).41. SundayObserver,3 Dec. 1984.42. K. N. Pradhan, ongressI) Member f Parliament rom hopal;per-

sonal nterviewn 10 Jan.1987, nBhopal.43. Bhopal;BGIAnewsletter,ov/Dec.1986.44. M. N. Buch,personalnterviewn 2» Nov. IVöo nbhopal.45. Cited n ndianExpress, 2Aug.1985.46. FreePressJournal,8Dec. 1985.47. Patriot, 8 Dec. 1985.48. IndianExpress, 3 Apr.1986.49. MadhyaPradesh hronicle,Sep. 1986.

50. Patnaik, rabhat: Imperialismnd theGrowth f ndianCapitalism,"

in E. R. J. Owen and R. B. Sutcliffeeds.),Studies n theTheory fImperialism.ondon, ongman, 972.51. Alavi, Hamza: "The State in Post-Colonial ocieties,"New Left

Review, o. 72, 1974.52. Desai, Meghnad, India: Emerging ontradictionsf Slow Capitalist

Development," ewLeftReview, 970.53. Economicnd PoliticalWeekly,7Apr.1985;Patnaik, p.cit.

54. Nagesh Kumar: "RegulatingMultinationalMonopolies in India,"Economicnd PoliticalWeekly,9 May1982.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.57. Patnaik, rabhat, 972, p.cit.58. The ChemicalWeekly,5 Jan.1985.:>y. loia.

60. Patnaik, rabhat, 972, p.cit.61. SundayObserver,3 Dec. 1984.62. IndianExpress, 1 Dec. 1986.63. Economicnd PoliticalWeekly,8Sept.1986.

and the poor get gassed

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