analysis of mansteins winter campaign on the russian front 19421943 a perspective of the operational...

7/29/2019 Analysis of Mansteins Winter Campaign on the Russian Front 19421943 a Perspective of the Operational Level of

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An Analysis ofManstein's Winter Campaignon the Russian Front, 1942-43

A erspective of the 1riI

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A irector, School fies in partialrements for theies Fellowship

A

Lawrence L. Izzo, LTC, USA B.S., United States Military Academy..l967 M.S.N.E., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971 M.B.A., Long Island University, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1986

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited


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School of Advanced MlLiPary S t u d i e sAdvanced Opc r a t tonu1 S r u d i e s Fe LLowship l'rograiii

Kesn:ircIi Paper Approval-Nainc o f I~elLow: ILTC Lawrence I,. I E Z O'1'1 t.Lc i ) L Research P a p e r : A n Analysts of Nanxtein's Winter Campaign

on t:he Kussian Irront, 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 : A Perspect lve O F t.heOperational Level of War and its Impl icat ions

StudiesIJeputy CoNmandant,n k s , .Jr. ,/M.Phil.]Y)A> Coininand and GeneralS t a f f Col lege

..(LTG k o h e r t U. RLXasTi, MA) Commander, CombinedArias Center


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ABSTRACT

1\11 A l l n l y s i . ~ ; 01 ~ 1 ; l I H i l < . . . ' j n t H W i l l t ( ~ r Campaign un the Russian Front , 1942-4:1: A1"'' ' ' ' 'I)(,,'t Iv " 01 t l i " Op,'rdt 101",1 Lev,,] of Har ancl I t s Imp.l.icatlon" by LTCI.nI,oJrl'llct' J.. J zzo, US Army, 8/+ pages

ThiH study is a Ids to r lca l analys" is o f t 1 1 ( ~ campaign waged hy Field~ 1 : l r s h a l vo n MnlHi tp i l l on the H.ussian 8outhc.rn front dur ing the winter 1


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T a b l e of Cont :en txCliaprer 1:

Chapt.e r 6 :

Chapl:cr 7;

I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . ................................... I .\laiisI.ein's C a m p a i g n ................................... 1 Gcrinon O p e r o t i o n d O v e r v i e w . . ......................... I Pliatie I .: O p e r a t l o n WLNl'b;lW


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Chapter l ; 1nt:roductlon

The wtnter campaign conducl:ed by Fie ld Marsha l Eric11 von Mansteln on theK u v s h n sourlierii front w a s one of the I noa t b r i l l i a n t of World War l[. I t La acl.


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m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i t h th e ultimate stra1:egLc g o a l o f r e t a i n i n g the 1)onetzHasin, a region of s ou t he r n Kuss t a u 1-hougtit co have s t r a t e g i c and cconoinicimportance by Hit l e r .

Thi rd , th i s campaign rep l t c i r t e s fiome of t h e ve ry condl.t:Lolll; we [;ice L nYATO t:oday. Z ~ L I I I S C ~ ~ I I found himself initially 011 110th ttie st:rategLc andop cra t io na l de fens lv e . German for ces a long I:he e n t i r e soutl icrn 1:rorit wereht?aVl1y ~o111-uuiuberodl l Illen and armor. M;instcln had t o c o p w i t h p o l i t t c o iconstraints; e . g . , Hi1: ler ' s lns is tence o n holding onto a l l occupied territory.T l i L s exacerba ted Manxtcln's yrobleins s i n c e i t : r e s t r i c t e d hLs o p e r a t i o n a linaneuvf:r. :And N i i n s t e i n had t o d e a l w i t h a n a l l i e d o r m y ; by ttie cnd o t h ewint:er he w o u l d have Kusianlans, I t a l i a n s and Ilungaricins under h t s command.

V o u r t i i , and in;iybe most: impor tan t , th is cam~ialpno f f e r s an excellent:c!xampLe ~ o t he 1:riinsit:ion I r o a t h e defense I:o t h e o f f e n se . E v e r s i n c eChusewi t e s a i d that: " the deEensive form of warfare is LntrLnsLcalLy strongerthan t h e of fensLve , "2 fiome have f o u n d th is d i f f i c u l t . t:o r e c o n c i l e w i t i l l 1:lieInoKc mr.ural p r e d l s p o s t t l o n t o at:tack. hut Clau sewitz :also said that. youshould wage i i defcrisive cainpaigri w i t h o f f e n s i v e battles3 arid 1:h Ls ciiniloalgnc l e a r l y shows Iiow N:insteln p a r r i e d the Sovie t at:l:acks, I J S ~ihe t a c t Lcalof fe ns e whenever o ppor tun l ty fo r counte ra t: t acks a r ose and t:lirotigli thecumu1at:Lve c l f e c t regained che o p c r ~ t i o n a l .I.:iLti:itive. licuce the moreislporturlt quest .Lon, rattier than which form of w ar fa re Ls st -rongcst , 1s how doyou eff '6:ctlvely traristttori from one t o t h e other .

'rilts; paper w i l l f i r s t present: a review of Hai l s t e in ' s wln te r campalgn. I t .w l 1 1 then alin1yz.r. he l essons 1.e~ irned froiii the campatgn, focus ing on wh yi.larirt:c~nwas succcssfiil. mid the Sov Let:; wcrt! n o t . I t concludei i w i t h ii !;t.iidyo I t i l t ? Iinp1icat:Loiis of ~:iiosc lcssons learned as appl.led to the t:eiic~( o tAirlalid UaI:t,le Uoc~ .rinc i.n ii c u r r e n t NATO enviromnent.


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(;crm;iii Opr. i t : I .onal OverviewA s Gccman Army Group South ndvauced c?ast th rough 1 . 1 1 ~ U k r i i l l i e d u r i n g the

si iminer of 1942, L t s ar.tack began to dt ve rg e . Two s e p i i r a k Army Groups were1 orinad, Army t iroup A , which turned soutli and a t t a ck ed th rough the Caucesusw 1 i . h 2 tierman armten and Army Group 8 , w h i c h a t t a c k e d o n a b ro ad f r o n t t o w a rd sthe I)on m id StaLLngrad on the Volga. The e n t i r e southern Eront becameo v e r e x t e n d e d , ( t A i l s w as t o becoine a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of both So vl e t and Germano p e r a t i o n s ) m id o f f e r e d the S o v i e t s an o p p o r t u n l t y to l au n ch t h e l r w i n t e rc o ~ u i l : c r o l l e o s l v c . l n t r Lnted o n 19 November 1942, i t h ad a l r e a d y a c h t e v e d t h eeiicl.r(:lemenv. of ove r 200,000 Gerroan s o l d i e r s t n S t a l t n g r a d by the timeManst:cln was moved Crom t h e I .enlngrad front to assume command of the newlyIormed Arlliy C r o u p boil o n 2h November 1942 and t o t i e to ge th er Army Groups 13and A. IJnder h l s cornrnaiid h e w a s given the German h t h Arny i n S t a l t n g r a d , 4 t hPanzer Army and KurnanLan Thi rd and Four th Armies. M a ns t el n q u i c k l y r e a l Lzed1:111? c r l s i s h e f a c e d r e p r e s e n t e d a d e c t s t v e c am p ai gn a nd t h a t "The i s s u e was 110I.rmger the fa te of a s t n g l e Army but o f t h e ent i re s o u t h e r n wing of the Erontmid u l t i m a t e l y of a.11 t h e Germail arintes in t h e eas t . "4 Tlic ove rex tendedGerman F r o n t formed a wide a rc c u r v i u g Ear 1.0 t h e cast t o S t a l i n g r ad . I t ssou the rn bouuda ry i n th e Cauc;isus touched the Hlack Sea on the west and r a ne a s t t4)wards the Casplan Sen w h i l e fac tng s o u t h . I n e f f e c t t h er e were twohuge sa l i rnl :s , one s t . r e t c l i lng sou th l n t o the Caucasus and one cast. i n t oS t a 1 i i i ~ r ; u I . T h e w s o l t e n t s p r ov id ed t h e S o v i e t s ; in o p p o rt u n tt y t o c u t o f fseve ra l German armies and Lnf l l c t ii d e c i s i v e d e f e a t e ve n more s i g n t f l c a n t t h a nSl:;i 1 L ngrad .

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'Tlw Gerliian 1Lnes of coinliiunLcilt:Loiis (LOC) f o r tht? enr i rc sout:lierii win:: oft . 1 ~c; i s I crI i L ronl. c r os s e d 1 . 1 1 ~ I h e p r River a t DnepropeLrovsk and Zaporozhye.'I'IICYCt w o crossings wcrt? about: 440 niil.es lrom Staltngrad and 501) miles fromt:Iic eiist:(!rii w l n g 1 1 1 tlie Caucasus f r o n t ; y e t . I:liey were on l y 260 miles from thcc i w i y on t.lie I )on . The I.0C f o r Army Group A and the r i g h t wlng of Army Group H. i L s i ) r im ILl1rough Kostov. T h i s f r a g i l e link t o t.he Caucauus wan 375 milev t oArniy G r o u p A ' s east: w t n z 2nd even 2.50 miles t o t h e 4 t h Panzcr Army which wasI:o make t:he maLn e t l o r t f o r t h e r e l i e f o f S t a l l n g r a d . Hut a g a i n , it was on l y185 niitcs t o t h e eoc!iny brt dg ch ead on t h e Don where t he Kumanians had a lr ea dybec!n ove r r un on 19 Manstein could comparat LveLy r e c a l l how h i s'innor corps L I I thc? uiienirig days of Barbaroua in June 1941 had covered 1 7 0Iiiiles a g a i n s t r e l a r l v e l y s t r on g e r opposition in o n l y 4 days!

I r : d1.d not: t a k e Manstein iong t o grasp the g r a v i t y of the s l t u a t i o n . Ason(? o f lits contenporarles l a t e r put Lt, " L t may well he s a i d t h a t t h i s was themost d i f f t c u l t mission glven t o a general Ln t h e c o u r s e o f tlie war."6 It wast o hLs credit t h a t h e had a v i s i o n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r 1:be t a s k a t hand. Thein las ion gtve ii t o him by I l i t l e r was I:n r e l i eve the 6 t h Army i n S t a l i r i g r a d ,hr ing the enemy at tack t:o n h a l t and r e c a p t u r e lost t e r r i t ~ r y . ~T h i s was ;ishort: s i g h t e d v i e w . Manstein r e a l i z e d t.he d c c i s l v e o p e r a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n l t yfac Lng t h e S o v i e t s , principally because o l t h e i r n u m e r i c a l s u p e r l o r i t y across1 . l ~ r o n l : and the f a c t that . t:hey were closer than his owti forces t o 1:he v t r a lI.i.nks on t h e hieper and aL Rost:ov. Therefore, Manstein e nv i s i one d t h ecampa Lgn wquenccd Lnto f o u r r e q u t r e d phoseu:

(1) K e l l e f o f b t l i Army.( 2 ) Keep the rear of Army Group A Eree w hi l e i t disengaged from t h e~ : ~ l u c i l s l l u .

( ' 3 ) L'revcnt. the German l i n e s of co~nmunica t ionst o the s o u t h e r n wing fro.nbeing " t i e d o f f " .( 4 ) D e l i ve r a counte rb low t o the enemy and regain the L n l t t a t i v e .

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To c o n t r o l the E O K C ~ S o f lits Army Group, Manstein used the 41:h Pai izur Arliiyiis 111s r t g t i t w i n g an d the Rumanian T h L r d Army 011 IiLs Left. O n 5 Ueceinber lieloraecl Army I)etachmeril: ( A D ) HulLtdt I:Oc o n t r o l most o f th c sc;i t l :ercd ;itidrelnforclng German u1i i t . i .9 A n Ariny ktacl i inenr , o r Armeeabl:t: L Lung LII G i ! r i u m ,w i i s a twnpor. iry command esrnbllshed t o colit.rol t w o o r Iuore c o r p s and d i d notII:IVE t:l11! f u l l start' of an Army Ilcadquarters.

: lan: , t r in ' s v i s i o n o f 1:1it? campaign, Imwcver, wiiu r i o t : t:Iii! s m c v i s Lon i i slij.rLer's. Hil:Ler would exacerbate XansteLn's cliallciigcs by 1iixLsl:lng onh o t d i n g r t p l d l y o n t o (111 c e r r l t o r t a l ga ins ; and i,nitLal.Lyhe would a l low n owtthdrnwo L of Corces Erom tlie Caucasus reglon.

Sovie t: Op er a t io na l OverviewOve1'lald a&ntnst. tilts vis to i i by bLnsl:eLn of the i:oliducI: o f the campaign

w i i s a t iertes of v a s t Sovter oper i i tCons . S t a t i n c o n t r o l Led tIic!:;e opar atLonsI . l ~ c , ~ u ~ l i.he s t a l f oC the Nigh Comaand o f t he Sovlcl: hrmcd Vorces (STAVKA) midS T A V ~ ~ I at: tlic v a r Lous l:roiits. Tlie Frout.s ~ l i i i l : would pL:iy . Ipresc i i t a I : tvesr o l e 111 t : l i i s caiupaign were, froiu iiort:li I:O sout:R: Bryaiis l~Front coinmi~i i~~l i !dJYl;cner,il l


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trront would drive t:ow.iriis ~ u v t o vt o cut: o f f German forces i n ~ I I C ~ a u c n s u s . l O l lot 11 t IN*!;I! opcr.i l L o n t i ;iclil.eved 1 lmi t .cd swctfs!; L n Ueccniber.

1.11 . l a l i u a r y , 194'1, t.he S o v i e t s c o nt ln ue d t h e i r c o u n t e r o ff e n s l v e h o p i n g t oproduce a t:otal r:oI.L;~pseof tierman f o r c e s i n Kusslaii by Eirsl : d e s t r o y i n g t h esouther1I win.:. T h e Voroliczll Front launched a n o P f e n s t v e against t.he Hungarian% d Army :ind rwiniints O F the ItaLlan 8 t h Army along the u p p e r Don. A t the samet Liiir t:he Suul.hwcst Pcoot: drove towards the I h i e t a . To the s o u t h , the SouthF r o n t ptisht!d towards K o s t o v a n d i n the C au ca su s o t h e r S o v i e t f o r c e s p r e s s u r e dArniy Croup A . 1.11 h i : ( : .January the Hryansk and Voroneah Fronts at1:empted t oc l i c i r c l c I.he 2nd (;er!nan AKIIIY of Army Group 8 , f o r c i n g it t o withdraw with aanyu n l 1 . s surrouuded. Sovie t : S U C C ~ H S ~ Se d STAVKA t o o v e r e s t i m a t e L t sc;ipibI. l . i tLe s ; h i i d in January it. optiin1st: icaLly approved two p l a n s , GALLOP aridS'L'hH. 1.n GALLOP, the Sourliwctlt Front, beglnniug 29 Janua ry , would d r ive fromStnvobc l sk d e e p i n to the rear of Army Group Don o n towards Stalino andY.trLupol on t:he Sea of Azov mid a l s o Cor tlie I h e p r c r o s s i n g s a t Zaporoehye.O n I Februa ry , tl w Voroneah F r o nt would Launch O p c r s t l o n STAK t o r e c a p t u r eIielgorml, Rharkov and Kursk and gencrially pus11 1:he left f l a n k o t h e s o u t h e r n(:crrnan wing hack westwards. The South Front would supp or t by des t r oy in g(;erts.in fo rc es v i c i n i t y of Rostov a n d a t t a c k i n S a l o n g t h e n o r t h c o a s t of t h eSea of Azov. OLhrr Yupporti l lg oECenses were t o be conducted sCinu1,taneously a tI.enLngrad, i n t:he Caucasus , and agalnst the Demyansk poc ket . These am bi ti ou soper:itions were based u n S o v i e t estimates t h a t t h e eii1:it-e r l g h t wing of thetiermiin Arsy in souI:h Kussia was near to ta l c o l l a p s e iis t h e r e s u l t of t h e~!nclrcl.eincnt. ll : S t ; i L i n g r a d a n d the contlnuous I. ighl: ing oC December 1 942 and.I,inudry 194'3. The s1:ral:egic g o a l was t o e n c i r c l e th e s o u t h e r n armies bcl:orot . k y c o u l d w I . t t i d r i i w h a c k a c r o s s t h e U n e p r , th us in f LLctLng j u s t th e d e c i s i v ed e t c a t . t h a t Moi1st.e L n f e a r e d . l1

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T h i s , then, coinpletes the broad o v e r v i e w of the s i t u a t i o n Manstein foundon 1:he Geriii;iii souf:tiernwI.ng, iund t h e g e n e r a l concept ol- operat ions I-tic Sovtc1:swould USI! 1-11 axp1.o L t t l ia l i s l t u a r Lori. Before d e r r c r l b l n g t h e acrual p h a s e s o f1.110 campaign, it ~ 1 . 1 1be u a e l u L 10 r e v i e w Manstein's s1:yLc 01: coiniiiaiid a n dconr r i i s l . il . w i t h t l iat of his boss, A d o l f l l i t l . e r .
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C h a p t e r 2 M a n s t e L n ' s v s IiltLer's V i e w o f O p e r a t l o n e 1 Art

k l i ~ n s ~ . i ~ I n llenv1:~ lor i eda m o b i l e t y p e d c f e ~ is ef o r t:lw s o u t h e r n w l n g .b e t i e v e d l i l y sr.afl::; a n d s u b o r d Lniite u n i t s ha d a n a d v a n t a g e t n o p e r a t t o n a l111obL1Ll.yo v e r the encaiy.12 In FM 100-5, wc c a l l this c o nc e pt " a g i l i t y " , f o rwlinl M a n s t e l n was r e f e r r l o g t o W H S tlu: German a b l l i t y t o read the b a t t l e f t e l d, i n d rc i i c t I:o 11:s c i r c u a s t a n c e s ra s te r t han the enemy. The German mec ha nlz edI'.iiizi?c l.ori:es, t l i i i excellt!nr. German s t a f f s , a nd r h e i n i t l a t t v e d e mo n st r at e d byGerlilari offtcers a t al l . Levels c i i c h c o n t r i b u t e d I:o tlils a g i l i t y . H o w e v e r , InMaiisl:eIn's view, he i i l : t . c t but e d t h e G erman s u c c e s s t o two p r i n c i p l e s oft e ; i d e r s i i i p : 1:)

(I) Always ~ O I I ~ I K V . opcratlons c l a s t l c a l l y and r e s o u r c e f u l l y ;( 2 ) G i v e e v e r y possible s c o p e to t h e i n i r l a t t v e and s e l f - s u f f i c t e n c y ofcoisinanckrs a t all l e v e l s .

Cori tr ; i ry L O t h e p e r c e pt i o n t h a t th e I ' r u s s t a n s y s t e m o war f o s t e r e d :I" I ) I h i d o b e d l e n c e " m e n t a l i t y In its o f f i c e r c o r p s , M a n s t e i n took p r l d e thal:SlJlilcl.hLllg L n t h e (; er in a nl c I i e r i t a s r . f o s t e r e d an i n d i v i d u a l i t y on t h e pa rn r J icoiiiin;indcrs In bat:tle. Coupled wLt.h ;i p r e d t s p o s i t i o n t o assuIne risks, t h i s~!n;ibLed German u n t t n t o exp1.o L t I:he o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n h e r e n t in mechanle~?dwar l a r e and Ih i d o p e r a t t o n s .

1.t 1.s Lnterest lng t o nol:e t ha t M a n s t e l 1 1 r e c o g n l z e d t h a t his a b i l i t y t ogrant independence to s u b o r d Ln.ite comanders was p os s i b l e I:o a larzc de$feeI m x u s e I.lict-e existed 1.hroughout t iw Gcrlnan m i L i t a r y h i e r a r c h y "a cor i s l s t e r l cy< ) I : o u t Look" .1nd t.lie p r e s u p p o s i t tori that " a l l members of t h e m i l l t a r y h l er a rc l iya r e Linbued w i t h c e r t a i n racttczil o r o p e r a t i o n a l axioms," produced by the: i c ~ i o o ~ t:lw G e r m a n ( ;enera1 ~tatf.14 11: t s j u s t this t y p e of s imi la rf

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cul . tu ra1 b i n s in 1:eriiis of tlilnkiiig 01: oyeral: to na l art: w l i i c l i i s t t wre juvena ted g o a l of t h e new operattoals i i i : inual, FM 100-5, a n d t l w Arniy'!: Schoolof Adv:iiiced ? l i l l t i i ry S tudies a t Fort. Leiivenworth.

O n t h e o t h e r Iieirid, IiL1:ler's p r a c t i s e of e x e r c i s i n s coininand and con1:rol waslniiicli di l fe ren l : tliiin i4einst:eln's. Hi t l e r had , over s evera l . yaa r s , assullied thepri .nc ipa1 r o t e in d t r e c r i n g i n t l l t a r y o p er a t. to o s. T l i l s e vo l u t t on bcgan in l Y . ' l l lwlieu H i t : Ler ahol is l ied the War M in ls tr y and bi!cn~neCoinsonder Ln C h i e f , GeriiianArmed Forces . After the 1 Y 4 L oIIEens Lvc I n 1tussi.n bogged down i n Ikccirber,I l i I Ler Cocced Gcricrcrl vo n t3raiicliitsc:li, Cominaiidi!~. Ln C h i e I , Gcrniiln A r m y , LOru!!:irc rind nfisuined I:k r o Lc Ii iinscl f . i n September 1 Y 4 2 hc replaced (;oiiernli l a taler, 1:he C h i e f of Staff of the Army 11lgIi Coininiind (Oberkoiiimando der Iiccres(OKH) ) , w i t h G e ne r a l Z e i t z l e r , i i I I U C I I j u i i i o r ge ne r a l . A s ;i r e s u l t , H L r l c rI.i)ok cliiirge of o p e r a t t o n s on I'he (!:istern f r o n t 1.11 more and iniore detall.,i i i t ! d d l . i n g i n thc day t o d a y o p e r a t i o n s uf ijuhordinatc u n i t s a n d t l i i is s t t f l I.ii,?I n i LUI: I. vc .

111 t:I.er I d an inhertwl. d i s t r u s t of t.lie ticriaan ticoeral S t a f I and 1 hLst i Lowly grew 1.nt.o cootclupt. T h i s d a t e d froiii I - l i i ! iIoubl.s t h e (:anera L S1:;il.f I i i i g l:iliowri t o ~ i i o s toE HirLer's e a r l y p l a n s m i l ambitioiis , from I:lw S i i d ~ ! l : e i i l . i i i dt:iirougli tlic invnsloii ol: France and Po Land. His successes oi i ty fueled 1 Lscon lLiience Ln t i tase l f , rnl:lier t h a n i n thein. T h i s was re1nl:orced dur Liid 1:11~!w h t e r o f 194L-42 w h t x i l l i t l e r ignored I i L e ndv t s e r s ; ind iiis1st:ed on d I : ; i i i i i ~ .Lc . i l.res1sl:ancc t t i r o u y t i o u l . 1:lie Rus!; t i in winlxr ;ill. along flic lroii l.. Ile w o u l d a t lown o imajot wl.rlidrow~i1.arid ordered a l l . 1:errLI:ory h e t d . 'Clits worked and isay Iiiivvsaved 1:lw 6criniiii Arlny froin a ca t : a s t rophic , Napolc!ilii I 1.k~rcrrc,il. . Ilowcvcr, L Iworkod f o r tlic wrong rciisoiis. 1.11 I)ci:ember of 1 9 4 L 1 . 1 1 ~ Ceriniio Ariny l ~ i ~ t l noncidoprepiirriI LO I IS l o r


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;I imajor col l . ipse . But th is convinced t l i t l e r t h a t t h e re was no need t ov o l t i i i t ~ r i l ygLvc u p ground 110 the Sov l e ts and he p lanned the same s t ra t e gy f o rthe w i n t e r o f 1 9 4 2 .

In October , 1 9 4 2 , l l i t l e r i s s u ed O p e r a t i o n s Or de r 81, p r o v l d l n g o v e r a l lgiildaiicc or the upcoming winter . k s l n there would be no f l e x i b i l i t y ; noroom f o r maneuver; no a l l ow a nc e f o r i n i t i a t i v e by h i s Army commanders. Ln I the o r d e r e d a l l winter p o s i t i o n s h e l d a t a l l c o s t s ; no witlidrawals werea l l o w e d ; e n c l r c l e d f o r c e s were to s t a y p ut u n t i l r e l i e v e d . He made everycommander, dowii t o s qu ad l e v e l , p e r s o n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o him f o r t h ee x e c u t i o n o f t h e s e ordcrs.15 T hi s d o c t r i n e r e f l e c t e d b o th a l a c k of t K U l 3 t in111s subord1nai:eS and a l s o a a l l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e va l u e of i n i t i a t i v e a tth e lowes t l e ve l s . Most: impor tan t ly , i t c on t r a s t e d w i t h M anst el in 's v i s i on o fhow he needed t o i g h t and a lmo s t co s t t h e Germans the campaign.

I lavlng reviewed th e hand icaps Manstein was t o work wi th, we w i l l nowproceed clirough eac h phase o f the campaign.

11
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Chapte r 3 Phase 1: Opera t ion WINPISKGEWI'C'I'EK ("Minter Gale")

Although the focus of this paper does no t i n c l u d e a de t a i l e d d i li c us s lon o fth c German e r r o r s l e a d l n g t o t h e t o t a l a n n i l i l l a t i o n of the 0 t h Army 111St-allnsrad, a bricf summary will s u f f i c e f o r t h e o v e r a l l p e r s p e c t l v e of thewhter campaign. After t h e initial p a r a l y s l s a t OKH caused by t h e SovLc?te nc i r c l e m e n t o f Stalingrad had worii o f f , Hitler i n s t r u c t e d P a u l u s not: t o breako u t arid t o hold f a s t . Paulus had req ues ted frccdoiu of action and would havep r e f e r r e d I:O at te inpt ii br eak ou t. Some have criticized h1.m lo r not s e l z l n g t h eopport.unLty cI.I:her bcfore l l i t l e r ordered him not I:o or i n s p l t e of theorder.16 Paulus was urged by h i s generals to a ba ndon t h e c i t y . G e ne r alZeLtLer t:rled d e s p e r a t e l y t o get Hl t l e r t o agree t o a withdrawal f rom t h eVolga back behind the bend I n t h e Don. Manste in a l so f e l t t h a t a n a t t e m p t tohold o u t w m dangerous ; that : relief c o u l d n ' t beg in u n t l l e a r ly 1)eceinber andt h e n o n l y i f r e i n f o r c e r e n t s m a t e r l al i z e d as proruised. H l t l e r proinlsedNanste ln re inforcements of 6 I n f a n t r y and 4 p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s , p l u s otl iecs uppor t i ng un i t s ; how ever , on l y two l n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n were iinmedletelya v a i l a b l e . 1 7 When Goerlng a s s u r e d Hitler tha t he could resupply th e b t h Arn~yby d l r and proinlsed a d a l l y d e l i ve r y of 600 tons, Hlt ler madc up his mind andinsisted t h a t a l l u n i t s ndhcre to the ph l losophy of Operat:ion O r d c r 1:a b s o l u t e l y n o t one s t e p b ac k. l 8 I n H i t l e r ' s v i e w , t o r e t r e a t froin S t a l l n g r dwould be t : ~give up the declslve gaius of the e n t i r e 1942 cam~iaignaid

Sta l ingrad would e n t o l l inuch gceatxr c o s t s t o r e t a k e i n 1943.19K e q u i c e d , t h e r e fo r e , t o r e l l e v e Stal lnSrad , Hanste ln ile!;Lgnat:ed 4 t h l'aflzci.

Army i ls thc! n i a i n ef lur l : . 11: w0ul.d att:lck 01 1 I:hC e a s t S i d e O f 1.11a) I h J n , 11 1 .I~ m r i : l ~ t w : t1rcct: lun from Ihe v l c i n l t y o f Kotelnlkovo. L1.s prLi icLpo1 t o rc t : WA!II i i i e 57th Paiizer Cor ps c ons i s t i ng ot' t h e ! fit:h and 23rd Paiwer 1)ivir;loris ( l i ~ ~ d

12
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hO O toiis promised by Gocring and t:he s t c u a t l o n was o b v l o u s t y g e t t l o g worse.>laiisteLii asked Ht t l e r f o r t h e 16 t h M ot or lz ed I n f a n t r y U i v i s i on , t he n on h i srj .ghl: flank but i n Army G r o u p A . Hi t l e r r e f u s e d , not want lng 1.0 1nLtLate anya c t l o n s which c o u l d p r e c i p i t a t e a withdrawal from the Caucasus . Manstelnp e r s l s t e d i n reference I:o the 17 th and 1 6t h re tnforceinent :s , 1ns ls t : lng that: t:heGermans c ou l d lu no way launch an o f f e n s i v e b a c k t o t h e Uon hecore mid .Januarya t t he e a r l i e s t and In any case , WINTEUGEWITTER had f:o be cons lde red f i r s tp r l o r i t y . Hitter r e l e n t e d and gave Mans te in the 17t:Ii b u t not: the L6th.23

The 5 7 t h Pauzer Corps, r e t n f o r c e d w i t h t h e 1 7 t h , mnde b c r t e r p r o gr e ssd u r l u g t:he 1it?x1: f u w da ys . By th e 1 9 t h .l t had i l r tvcn t:o w i t l i i r i 35 miles oL rh epocket . I ' lans te iu d t d not think t he y c ou l d pus h f u r t he r and he or de r e d l'aulust o be pr [ .p~red t o break o u t t o t he s ou t hw e s t . Truck convoys w l t h 2000 tons ofsu p p li es were lnovtng behind 5 7 t h Corps , ready t o s upp l y 6 t h Army as soon a sthe l l n k u p was made. But Manstein and Paulus s t i l l needed Hit lc r ' s a pp r ova lf o r a breakout a t t e inp t and I l l t l er never came c l o s e t o maktiig t h a t dec i s i on .He d i d p r o v i d e a SS Dtvislori from Army Group A t o Manstein :is r e l n f o r c e m e n t ,bu t he d i d n o t consent t o tin e va c ua t i on of SealLngrad. He used o repor t f romPaulus rh a t 6 t h Army only had fu e l f o r 1 2 mlles as a n excuse t o s t w i d firmw i t h h i s e a r l l e r ln s t ru c t lo ns . Whether 6 t h Army could have e f fe c t ed a l l i i k u pif they a t t empted a breakout 1s ques t io i inb le ; wha t t H unqucs t lonabte Is on l yt r s ulti.morc Cn t c of t o t a l a n n i h i l a t L o n , g lv er i t h e s p a r s e n e s s of I t s resupplyr t l s u l t s . Thus, a1:t:er t h e 1 9 t h of IDweroher l t s chances for survLvaL decre;isedd a l l y . T h a t day marked the c loses t t h a t o p e r a t i o n WINTti:KtiI~WL'I'TERroiild COIIICt o s uc c c e d i nz .Uat t les o n t:lie Chir River-

A s 1n i l i c a t e d , S ov i e t a t t a c ks alonz the Chi r Rive r a t the h e g h n i n g o fIli?cember by the 5t:h 'rank 11r;uy a s part: of O pe r a t i on S a t u r n d l s r u p t e d r1,ilistcln'sp l a n t o u s e the 4 8 t h l 'anzer Corps ii s i i siipporl:ing a t t ack Tor t.he 57 t h .


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6attles of the Chir River -Dee 1942 !4i:25 , I 0 5 I0 IS 10 15 I

J


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Ilowevcr, ti le iict:ions of 1:lie 48th Corps In deal ing w i t h th is c r l s i s a re ill1c?xce l l en t . exainplo in iiilcrocos Ln i 0 1 t:Jic! inobllc defense used by Manste L I I ; i dt l i c r c l o r e ;ire u s e f u l t o review i n s o w dc!l.at L . T h e 48th Panzer Corpsuinsis1:ed of the 3361:h Ii iEantry Ulvls ion, !:he 7 t h [ m t t w a f f e P t e l d I)Lvi.si.on,24;und t h e 1 l l : h fanzer O l v i s l o n commandi!~l h y Cencriil. lsalck. Th e Corps C h l e r o fS t a f f was General voti Mel len th in . Che 4 8 t h Corps uued the 336t.h and 7 t : l i IO; lPEeml a l o n g the r ive r and the l l t . 1 1 Uivts ioi i at; a inobllc r e s e r v e , 1ocat:ecl I:ot:~ie rear o t ttie t n t a l i t r y . 011 7 ~)ecem~)erhe ltussian 1 s t Armorc!d Corps2 jcrossetl 1:he C l i i r and was dr . tv i i ig south , f a r 1.0 I:iie rwir ot G e r m a n r t v c rdeferises. The 1lt.h wus o r d a r e d t o defeat: r h l s 1:hreat. After meet ing i i l idsteiiiiuiiii: t l ie Sovtel: advance on 7 December, Balck regrouped h is f o r c e s tliat:nigl i t t o ivoid h;ivLn& I:,) tiiiike i i 1roiit;iL at: tack. A t dawn on A I)e(:cinl)tr lie useda Lanzt!rdccniidtar Itel: LinenI: l:or u Iiolding nt.!:ack Iroiu !:he suuI:Iiwc!~t, gL;iced l i l sdnr L a i r c r a f ~ .guiia aud ei ig ineer bnt:t;ilion as a b t o c k i n g Corcc 1.0 t I w K u s s i h t isoiit i ie:isI: illid a t t a c k e d the S o v i e t s w e l t Ln the rear w t t l i a Paozt!r Rcglincilt.Tiiicing them complete.Ly by s u r p r i s e , the Fanzer Kegilnenl: F t r s t wtpcd 0111. i i L o n i ;i:oluinn of lmotor Lzed i . i ifantry caught cmnLiig froin tlic nort-11, 1:hcn tortied obi I i icr e a r u r the Soviet i irinor catchi i ig heis is i n a v t c r w i t h the Lnrizrrt:ri!ii;~diers.1:Lft:y-three Soviet: liariks were knoc:lteil o u t and I:he Soviel: Armored Corps w a sd e l u e t e d . li111i1l.1i i c t i c a l v i c t o r i e s of t h i s sort: were t y p t c n l l o r rlie Gcrinaji!;t:lirougliout. tlit! Ihlciik days O F Ikcctnher, .January, and izcbruary, illid 1iad :I~ : I I I I I U ~ ~ I I ~ . V Cf f e c t 1 1 1 w r c s t l n g tho o p e r ; i t l o ~ ~ a l .nil:L;11.tvc away Croln t l i cS o v i e t s . l : lw e s s e n t i a l ingre i l I . e n t w a s 1:lir c o n c c n t r a t l o n or scar(:#! ( k r m i n,.muor Into i i iiiobile re se rve which w i i s wred t o desllroy Sovtcl: pciirt.riit L O I I S i n (Ipicceme;iI. lashLon; t i i i .6 exp11,tted Al l I f : ca y s ta k t . tk a n d (;erni.in t i i c t I c a l : ; k i l . I . i 1.0t.Iieir iitmos t .26
http:///reader/full/complete.Lyhttp:///reader/full/IIIIIU~~II~.VChttp:///reader/full/IIIIIU~~II~.VChttp:///reader/full/AllI%E1%A6%BAcaystakt.tkhttp:///reader/full/complete.Lyhttp:///reader/full/IIIIIU~~II~.VChttp:///reader/full/AllI%E1%A6%BAcaystakt.tk


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'The L L t h cont Lnlled 1:o be used iis ii " i l r e b r i g a d e " , d e s t r o y t n g o n e S o v l c tpeliel .ratton rll t:er iuiot I w r . S o v t e t s b r ok e t h r ou g h the .'):)Oth'? r l v e r d c f e i i s e s; i t t.wo l o c a l tons about 1.5 mlles apart. on 11 Uecember. A f t e r a nlght march,the L l t l i deat:royt?d one f o r c e at: dawn on the 12th , t h e n mdrched aga ins t tlieother S o v t e t brldgeheod, c o m p r e s s i n g t t t ha t s a w day. O n th e 1 3 t h as lt : wasabout: 1.0 at:teinpt: to dest . roy t h t s b r i d g e h e a d c o m p l e t e l y , another tilireat brokeout. on Lrs Clank. Agnln t u r l i i n g , i t d e a l t thls Force a knock out punch .m dt l i e ~ i r e t u r n e d t o dt.t:m:k I:he br idgehead . before It colild e1FinLnate t h i sI)rldgehe;id l r . W;LR orde rod to move l n t o a new p o s i t l o n t o c r o s s t:lie Don ands u p p o r t WCNPIIIU;I'.WLTTLK. A s It: d i d so on t h e 1 5 t h and 16tt1, t h e S o v i e t sLaiincliccl t h e i r o f f e n s i v e agntnnt tlie Italian 8 t h Army and Army DetachmentI l o l L t d t , on t:Iw 4Ut:l i 's left. f l a n k , a n d a l so o g a t n s t Clic 4 8 t h i t s e l f o n theC h i c . On the 1 7 t t 1 , t:hc 11th drovi? one inore So vi e t pene t ra t : lon o f the 3 3 6 t hImck I:U the river. On the L H t h , MeLlenthLn t o l d h i c k of a S o v t e t armoredc n r p s whlch had luade a d(!ep penetration of the Luf twaE le U i v t H L o n a b o u t 1 2m I L i ! s t o ii1.t; no rt hw est . Halck moved h l s reg1inent.s a t night. and f e l l o n th eSovlct .s, agatn a t dawn, astii& one Lnfan t ry regiment as a b l o c k t i i d f o r c e ;andthe other t:o p r o t e c t th e e x p o s e d f l a n k O F his Paneer Regiment as it a t t a c k e dLnt:o the ericifiiy r e a r . B a l c k a r t a c k e d t w o se pa ra te a rmor co lumns 111 sequel ice ,des t . roytng t1ie.n pLei:eineal and l n f l l c t e d 6 5 t .mk losscs w h i l e s u s t a i n i n g noiie1 . 0 111s own 25 tanks. Halck cont inued t o u s e t h e f e w t a n k s o f his d i v l s i o n asil In o h l L e r c s e r v c f o r t h e Corpu u n t i l the 11th ID lv ls lon was o r d e r e d o n 2 2I)ecetiiber I:o move t o Tii tn tnskaya , 90 miles t o the west t o hand le a new threat-t:hc p o s s i h l e l o s s of : K o s t o ~ . ~ ~Operat: io n SATLJKN

S o v i e t plans t o e x p l o l t t h e l n i t t a l s u c c e s s o f th e e n c i r c l e m e n t o fSt:;iLlngrad Lncluded t.wo new o p e r a t i o n s , KING and SATURN. K L N G was t h e plan t oreduce t:he StaLtngrad pocke t I n phases by the D on aiid S t a l t n g r a d f r o n t s . The

17


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Sout:liwosI: Front: would conduct: SATUKN, a plan which, i n i t s ELrst p h a s e ,c n v i s i o n e d I:hc d e s L r u c t i o n of t h e 1t ; i l i . an 8 th Army a n d Army I)etiicIilnciit 11,) I t i d ta.Ld!ig a 1 5 0 mile front: of t h e I)oo and Chi r r i v e r s . lo i t s 2d phase , thef r o n t ' s 2ud echelon woutd exploi t : towards I(osI:ov, capt:urLng t h a t ci1.y w1.I.b 1:hcs l : r a t : t ?g i c oh j ec t i vc of; thun tr i lpplnt : 1:lie relnliiints oE Army Group I)ou and A n u yC ~ : o u p A i n I:IIC? ( : ; i~icausus, j u s t ;is Munstctn fc.1rt.d.

Howcvcr, severa l l a c t o r s c o o t r t b u t e d I:o a reduct:ton In l . 1 ~r;cope o f 1 . l ~o p e r a t t o n b e t o r e 11: commenced. Vlrs t , i n i t : t n l iittilclcs against: tlie S t n l i n g r o ~ l~ x i c k e t o n vi n ce d S'I:AVl(h t h a t t t needed t:o e c l n f o r c e I(IN6 w i t h 2d t iuards AKIIIYCrom Sout:l~west: F e o i i t ' s 2d riclielori. T h e 4 d t . h L'anzer Corp't; s u c w s s e s ni .ont : tlicClitr again!;t: t l i t f 5 t h Tiink Arniy's at tacks and r l i r d r i v e of tlie 5 7 t h Corpst:ow.irds Si.:~i i i igr: iLldded I:o STAVKA's c o n c e r n s s o t.hat. f i n a l l y , over V a t u t f . n ' ! js t r o n g objections, STAVKA o n 14 December ordered 1 i l . m 1.0 (:o~uyly w l t l i thet ; u i d m c c f o r i i reduced scale o p e r a t Lon terined LI'P'CI.I*: SA'I'URN.

Soutliwcst: Front: was uow t:o d c i i t ~ o yLlie Lt:altan 8 t h AKIIIY .uld ArmylJ~:t:,~.~li~~~(!nl ii After tilie penet:rat Lono l i t d ~ .w l t l i sha l lower cnve log incn t .p h a w s , inobi Lc t a n k iorces would s t r i k e tn1.o th e ericiiiy r e a r , b u t i.nst.w+il I I II leadtng sout:Iiwest, would t u r n and r u n p a r a t l e l t.o the front. . LI: W ~ I HOUI:IICHS~:e n v i s i o n e d #:hat t:he ofEense would terlainat:c! w c t l s h o r t o f t . 1 1 ~


23/88

ci)rces berwceli the S o v t e t s a n d K o s t ~ ) v . Ftrst: p r l o r t t y fo r Manstetn t h e r e f o r eI)i!g;in t o s l i l l t f ro in I.hc rel .LeC o f 61.11 Army t o the more c r l r t c a l i s s u e o fi:iaintatnLn1: 1'Iic e nt t r e s o u t h e r n w ing of the I:asI:ern Front.2"

OK H now est.iibLLfihed Army Uetachincnt Frecter-Plco with reiniiaiits of several .d l v l s l o n s a n d 1:;ive t t the inlsslon o f p r o t e c t i n g the bridgefi on the Donets nearVoroslii I . ovgr ad mid t:ytng i n w i t h Army Group Don. Hut even so , Mans te ln wasf o r c e d to s h t f t . the 1 1 t h Utvl:; mid I


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T h e Germans redc tcd quickLy an d p t a c e d an ad lioc group Torued from SUiJpLytililts o n t ladaiiov's r e a r , cutting his LoC aiid b l o c k i n d h t s w1t:hdrawalnurt:hward. T h e l a t e r - i r r L v i n y 6 t h P e n z e r D t v i s i o n f r o m 5 7 t h C o r p s r e l n f u r c e dtliLs e f f o r t and b locked Iladaiiov t o t:hc west. U a l c k ' s 1lt:li U t v t s t o n , j u s ta r r i v e d troni 1:Iic Z1iI.r Kiver bat l : l es , a t t a c k e d C K U I U t:lie e a s t a ~ i d1iori.Iieast.. AuLnl :anLry d iv i s too blockad 1'he S o v i e t s t o the south . 'The 241:h c o r ps he L d out.agains t : Garlnan a t t : , i cks un t i l . the 2 8 t h ; f l n e l l y rmiiimit;s or t l i r shat:tered C o r p sbr oke out: o i i t:Iiu 2 9 t h aiid inadc theLr way biiclc to S o v t e r ILnes.

The c ! x m p l c and iaIsI::ikes o f the 2 4 t h Tank Corps, renaint?d I lie 2d Guards'Tiink Corps , 111 liorior 0 1 L ~ Hh e r o tc a c t t u o s , w o u L i 1 :it!cve the S o v i e t s t i i t h edovelopliicii t of its OFIC docI .r t i ie . 9 1 Stal . tn qutc lc ly c ~ i e s tSWI t i i s l~cuiil.commwder:; 1.0 push t i i l tk corps O h l g (?xl:elldt!d cldV2lliCe:i i l l p a i r s (JK l UOre L Our t l e r n ot to ge t . i s o l a t e d a s did I$aclanov.:12 ~ur l . l i e r t no r e , t o t insure t l i e ir.drliior o p c r a t c ! d i n s t rengI :h , STAVKA approved ii iiew TOE f o r ii I . i i d c 'iraiiy w l i l . c l iw o u l d appe,ir t l i e fol lowing summer. Other Lessons Learned were t h a t a t a u kc u r p s hiid I:O b e Eo Lloweci q u t c k l y b y IuobLLe iiifaritry; 1og ls t . tca L s ~ i ] ~ p o r t .ia d 1.0bc p r o p s r t y pl.dn1imt I I U C B U I ~ ~ i n o b l l c f o r ce s r an ou t : 0 1 fuel. ; i n d Iiad inaiiil;enaiice~irobleii is ; ao d expecl:ed r a t e s of advance of 40-8U kms/day were unreii List Lc. iimlsliould be r e v t s e d down tu about : 25-35 Irins/day.33Sunni;iry

A s Uacember 1942 drew 1.0 ii c Lose, t t was apparent: tlial W1.N'I:II:ItC~~WL'~~I:I(c o u l d not: succeed. i.l;iristeLn s i m p l y d i d 1101: have thi? coinbiil. power l i c cc s s a r y I oforce a 1.i.nkup W L t l l b t h Army. 0por;tl:Lorl I.I'I'TLE SATUKN, W l i l L a ? 1101: dbla? It,) ctllthruugli t o i lost:ov, hiid driiwli th e 411th I'aiizer Corps a w a y Crois ItIic: i n s l r i e l o r l .1:owsrds Sl:.iL LngriiJ. Hiclcr w ou ld coiirlnuc 1.0 Iiotd out: t:he I I O ~ C 01 . i i l i i ) t l t c rf u t u r e r e l t e l el,Cort., b u t 0 t h Army wouLd s t o w t y w t t . h e r away. P ~ i i l i i : i l i .Linsi! l lsurrai i r lc


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onyrliLn; p o s t r t v e c o u l d be gleaned from t.hc I OSHo f a 200,000 iiian A m y ) wti sI Iial. t:hc Sta t l i i grad puckel. r t c d u p stgiiif lcaiit: iiuinberu o t Sovtet : Corci?:; wlilcho r : h c r w i s c w o u l d liiivc bcen free t o auslsf: 111 rtic o v e r a l l c o u a t c r o f f e n s f v e .


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C h a p t e r 4Phase 2 : l!rotecting th e Kear o E Army G r o u p A

2 2


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enc Lrclcd 0 1 1 cti:lier TLiink. M a n s t e i n e x p r e s s e d s e r l o u s c o ri c er ns t o Z e i t Ler onboth 20 and 24 Ui!ceinber a b o u l tlie p o a s i b t l i t y o f l o s i n g bo th Army Group Don;ind A . I I I t l ie 241 :h ' s c o n v e r s a t i o n he concl i ided , " I a s k t h a t lt be constderedliow tlie bat.rLc? woiii.d dovelop Lf w e coininanded on the o t h e r s ide . ' *36

F i i i a l . l y , l l l t : l . c r iiiiide ii sinall compromise on 29 December arid agreed t o ther educ t lo r i ol: t.lii? C i l i i c ; i s u s He o r d e r e d t h e I.st Paneor Army t o p u l lback s o L t s f r o n t faced e a s t , n o t s o u t h , and hence lt c ou l d c o o p e r a t e wL1:li thi?4 t h I'anzer Army 011 1r.s Left f t a n k . B u t s t i l l H i t l e r r e f u s e d to a l l o w.sLgni fLca~i t l . 'o rces Lo bc? pu l l e d comple t e ly back ou t of t h e Caucasus , as:Linst.c!tn r e p e a t e d l y r e q u e s t e d, t o be used a t the d e c i s i v e po l n t . Hence th e' b a l c o n y ' , as t4;iiisI:ein c a l l e d i t , still hung ou t tow.irds t he e a s t , r eady t o bc!c u t o f f by the Sov1ol.s.

' T h e r e f o r e , f o r th e 2ud pliase of the i:iiinpaign, Manstein saw his u n i t shaving the f o l l o w i n g I :asks:DH

o I ta the r tliaii r edep loy t o the l e f t as he p r e f e r r e d , h L s Army Group hodI:,) fi .glif . f o r t i i i i e .

I) 4 t h Palizer Army ha d t o p r o t e c t 111e r e a r o f Army Group A as L t p u l l e dback Croin t.he imountains L II the Caucasus t o a more manageable f r o n t , and a t s oI ia d I:o prevent Sovlel : forces f r o m o u t f l a n k i n g i t on Its L e f t a n d s t r i k i n g1:owdrds Ib)sLov a l o n g t.lw southern bar ik of t h e Don.

o AD t l o l l t d t had t o prevenl: an e n c t r c l e m e n t of lts r i gh t wh ich wou ld.itlow t.hc enemy t o s i - r l k e t o wa r d s K o s t o v a l o n g t h e n o r t h e r n bank of the Do~iIrod I:tii?c . iat ; and a l s o p re v en t ~ J Ie n c t r c l e m e n t on its l e f t w hl ch wo uld a l l o w1:Iio ciiciiiy t o s t r i k e Kos1:ov lrom the n o r t h . L f f e a s i b l e , AD H o l l i d t was t o d owhat i t c o u l d , I n c o o r d i n a t t o n w i t h AD Fret te r -Pico , t o p r e v e n t t l i r u s t stowiirds t h e Dnepr .

The pr io r t1 .y L n t l i ts phase , however , was c l ear ly t o p r e v e n t the loss ofl


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fit.11 h i im r Ar iny ' s MolrL Lt! t)oI clise4t.h l 'anmr Ariay, consls1:l i ig prtncipally of th e 5 7 t h Panzer Corps w1r.h two

wc.ikciied dtvislons (17 and 2'3 L'anzer), and soinc i n f u n t r y , LuftwaEEe andS e c i i r l t y d l v t s l ~ n s , ~ ~ e111g pressured by The !ioviett;as t h r e e S o v i e t armtcs.li;id r e o c j p i L z cd iind on I .Snnuary th e St-al tng rad F r m t was renamed the SouthVront:. Mt:er t.urnLug L t s t h r e e iirmles over t:o Don Pronr t:o c o n t i n u e thur d u c t . L o n o f t h e 6 t h Army pocke t , t.he South l l ront was g i v e n the 5 th Shock, 2dGuards and 5Lst: Arinics w i t h the mLnsLon of pushing towards Kostov o n bo1:list i les of t:he l k ~ i i . ~ + ~ 'he 1 i I t : lx r t:wo ariuies, and l a t e r t h e 28th Army froin the(:ntrciisus rcyton, wou1.d a t 1 combine t o pre s su re th e 4 th Panzer Army o n brrtht Lnnks. MansteLn correc1:l.y assumed t h a t these t h r e e armies meant t.o n o t o n l yl J r i> SSUrx? tiic 4th eanzer Army but t o encirc le i t : complete ly.41 tie cou ld on lyr e t n t o r c e L t w l t t i the SS VL!cing Dlvi s lon which ba d been released by Army GroupA and h t e r l n mld-.lmiuary, the 16th :4otor lzed Div ts t on when it was f i n a l l yre Leased .

'I'hc! 4 t h P;inzt?r Army c onc e n t r a t e d i t s armor forces and executed a molrtledcl:ciiso, just : ; is l . 1 ~ 481:h Panzer C o r p s liad done o n the C h l r R L v e r . InI h n s t e l n ' s words, "Pourt:h Panzer Ariny's o b j e c t was not t o o f f e r inadequa ter c s t s t a n c e alirn~:.ill over-cxt-ended l i n e , but: t o keep L t s Eorces c l o s e together .Only t l i i is could L t o E f c r sl:rony o p p o s i t i o n at: v i t a l spots o r deal the enemy as u r p r i s e b l o w wlicnevcr an o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n t e d itself By s o doins, i te x w i i t e d c o u n t e r s t r o k e s L O t he l e f t and r tg l i t , buying time fo r th e 1st Panzer. \rluj. 1 1 1 Inld-.lanuary, arter repeat:ed reques t s by Mans te in ( i s a c t he o f f e r e d1.0 resign o u t ol' f r u a t r a t t o n on 5 J a n ~ s r y ~ ~ ) a u t h or i z e d 4 th Panzer Amyl l t l u r JI:O p u l t back to u l l n e a l o n g the i4;inich Canal, faclng n o r th (see map). Thisiurl : l ler c Loscd 1:hc gap between it an d 1st. Panzer Army. 44

2 5
http:///reader/full/completely.41http:///reader/full/completely.41


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Chapte r j Phase 3: Keepills the L O C s Open

! h v i r:k O p e r a t i o n a l O v e r v L c wl t Ls use fu l now t o review the d u v c l o p m c n t oE S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n a l p h n s

,aLt:er 1 . 1 1 ~ comple t io i i o f ILLTTM SATUKN. The S o v i e t s co n ti n ue d t h e l r overa l l( .oul i t .e roffe i is tve at. the l ~ ~ ~ ~ i t i i i i . n ~943 without: a rea l pause. Theyf(:o.it. Inued I:O p r e s s u r e t h e e n t i r e sou the rn f ron t : hop ing t o a t t r i t G e r ma n iorceximd c o l l a p s e !:he whole si)ut.licrn wLiig. A t the same tiuie the Sov1et.s wererwlucl ng the St a l io gr ad pocke t w1t.h Opera t i on K I N G , th e Voronezh F ron ta:ondur:tad Opera1:lon Ostrogoeh-Rossos ti and qu ic k ly to re o p e n huge gaps i n ArmyGroup I$!; TronL. Between 13 and 2 7 J a n u a r y , i t d e s t r o y e d the Hungarlan 2dArmy i i i i i l 1:lw I.talLan Alpi.nc C o r p s , c o m p l e t i n g t h e d e s t r u c t i o n oE the ALl.tedarinii:s which hiid once Eorlned the f l a n k s for tlic German b t h Army. During !:hisI: Lloe, the Southwest: Front w a s pushlng towards the Donetz wtiLLe t h e S o u t h Tronl:puslicd 41.11 laiizcr Army back towards Kostov. A second new ope ra t i on wasI..iunclied o n 24 J a n u a r y .igaLnst t h e German 2d Arliiy on t h e Lcft f lank of AKIIIYtiroup U by 1:hree arinics of the Voronezh Front and the 13th Army of the BryanskFront. Th is g a i n e d e a r l y S U C C ~ S H and 2d Army began t o w i t l ~ d r a w . ~

STAVKA now became v e r y opt:i~nls tLc. lt appea red as t h o u g h t h e entireso u th er n wing, Army Groups H, Don, mid A , were e x e c u t i n g a s t r a t e g i cwtt.hdr;iwal . T h e r e f o r e , t o w a r d s t h e end oE J a n u a r y , STAVKA ap pr ov ed 1:wo v e r y; i~nbLti.o i is , a r g e sca l e o p e r a t l o n s . lf s u c c e s s f u l , t h ey would a c h i e v e theoper:il:ional o b j e c t i v e of t o t aL l y d e s t r o y i n g t h e German s o u t h e r n w l n g and l ead1.0 t h e co LLapst? of th e German eas te rn L r o n t , the exact s c e n a r i o M a n s l i e i n hadworr icd abou t: s in ce tie assu:oed coiomand of Army Group Don t i i November. Theseo p e r ~ l . L o ~ i swere caLl.t?d STAR and GALLOP.

27


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w;.w counl.Lii?: on t lw a r r i v a l of the iiewtj, Corlned SS L'anzer Corps, expec ted I v ~a . Lwsc 11 1 t l i c Kll.irkov ;ire .&by i n i d Fa1)ru;iry. HLt.ler pL;iced grc , i l . v a l u e 11 1 1. I l t~( : o r p s i n I I i a l i t w o u l d have tlic best: i i c w equlp inent , tnc tuding 'I'Lger tanks .Ope r;i t ion GALLOI'

Opcratlon GALLOP would precede STAR by a day o r tw o and w , i s t i i in i l a r tyambi t Lous. W i t h Col . ikov pro tec t ing i t s n o r t h e r n f l a n k , t h e S o ut hw e st Frontwould conduct ii 1n;iI.n a t t a c k sou thw est to ward s Starnbe1r;lr and 1:lien swing so ut h1:owards S t a l l n o arid Marlupol and the Sc a of Azov, hence c u t t l n g o f f theCcriiians who wcrc cq)ectcd t o bc wi thdrawing west, t r y i n g t o make I t backi icross t l w U n e p r . T I i k would a l s o re ca pt ur e 1:he whole of 1:lie Donbas arrta w l t l iLt.s n a t u r a l resources . I3ut the Southwest: Front was a l s o t o c a p t u r e the Dneprc r o s s i n g s zit: Uneprope1:riPItik and Zaporozhye. So, 11s w l t h t h e Voronezh F r o n t ,its ef to r l : would have 1.0 diverge , weakening t l i n main th r u s t . And l i k e STAR,tliert! would bc no o p e r a t i o n a l p a u s e . 51 General Va1:uI: L n ' s Southwest F r o o t wasor ga n i z e d lnto f o u r arinles : O t h , 1st Cuards, 3d Guards mid 5 t h Tank; and one'~iiobLLc ~ r n u pwhich 1:ook C l i c inarne of i t s columander, Mobile Group Popov. T o ta li :o:abat s t rength was a b o u t 325,000 .ii(:n and 500 t a n k s . 21 2 of these tdnks werewnccntr ,+l :ed In Group Popov. The e n t i r e F r o n t would e s s e n t i a l l y a t t a c k L nsLrigLt! echelon. 'The f o u r 1:nnk corps o f Group Popov were t o a t t a c k through t h eo t l i Army and 1st Guards ArNy t o secure o b j e c t t v e s u p t o 300 ki lometer t i deep,1~1111si e l p l n g t o c u t : thc expectcd Gerlndii re1:reat an d a s s t s t i n the F r o n t ' s.irlvance. The F r o n t on ly he ld two 1:ank co rp s and one c a v a l r y c o r p s i n re se rve ,. u i d i?vcii these lr corninLi-.tcd e a r l y I:o support th e advance. T h e l a c k oftoper;il:ional r e s e r v e s s i g n i f 1 can l:ly r e s t r i c t e d t h e So v i e t a b i l i t y t o d e a l w l t l iI lie ( ;et-miiii C o u n t e r s t r o k e w h e n It came. Ci i i t l a l l y , how e ve r , the Front had. i I ) o u r 2 : L s u p e r i o r i t y in uien ;ind


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011 21 .Iamr;iry >lansteLn warned OKH t ha t he lied onty 4 o r 5 days left . un t :L llie wou1.d l i i i v e to r i l i L I ~ . u p 1.0 I.WO (ILvisions Croin 4 t h l 'dnzer hr~uy--stL11. sout.11o f t:Iic i)on--to v t c l i i t t - y of Voroshl lovgrad 111o r d e r 1.0 protect : his f t ank . ' P h i swould iiiciiii 1101. Kost:ov open.!j6 S t i l l Hit ler p r o c r a s t i n a t e d .e C(JUM hold

Sout:li o f t h e I)oii t h e l lus s t ans were f i g h t l n g a c r o s s the Manich Canal andC.lircatcned t o ou1:flank t:lic 4 t h P a nz e r Army on Llls l e f t . C o n ce n tr a ti n g f o u rc o r p s on 4 t h Panzer Army's l e f t . f l a nk , t he S ov i e t s punched a c r os s t h e M an ic htowardti Kostov OII 2 0 .January and r ea ch ed t h e c i t y ' s a i r f t e l d . The 4 t h PanzerAct~iy h.id bec!ii using rlie 1 . h t l i P a nz e r D i v i s t on t o d e l a y t h e S o v i e t ' s p r o g r e s sw 1 l . h t . I~rust .s lnto t h e i r f l a n k , h u t this was no t : s u f f i c i e n t t:o h a l t t h i s new;i t l a c k . At. t:lie 6:iine time the S o v i e t s a t t a c k e d t h e 5 7 t h C o rp s' f r o n t as al io ldt i ig a t t i a c k , t :hus hoping to g e t i n t o Lt:s rear .

Nanstetn needed t o re l i eve t h i H p r e s s u r e . lie had planned t o u s e t h e 7 t huw l l l . i : h P'anzer Uivislons, now w l t h Al) I i o t l i d t , t o s h l f t t o the c r i s t s d u th eI . e t t f l a n k o f the Donetz. B u t now, faced w t t h the more immediate problem o fkceptni: Ilostov open, he used t:liein t:o s t r i k e a c r o s s the I h n t o the soutlixgall ist 1:he enemy advanc ing a round 41111 Panzer A r m y ' s l e f t f l a nk t ow a r ds1k)r~t:ov. T h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k t ei n po r ar l ly r e l i e v e d t h e p r e s s u r e on Roatov . 57

Viiial . Ly, H i t Ler re l e n t ed t:o S o v i e t . and Manstein's p r e s s u r e t o releatie thel s l . Pa nz er Army froin t h e Cauc asu s mid wtthd raw It th rough K o s t o v . He p!.acedLt ~ r l i d e cManst.eLn's coininand o n 27 January. But even now it:s s ou t he r n w i ng W R B180 InLlcs from Kostov. There fo re , 4 t h t'auzer Army had still t o be t i e d downs ~ i u t l io f the i)on p r o t e c t i n g its withdrawal. Hanst:eln was now conceriiedwIie1:Iiur 4 t h l'anzer Army c o u l d be brought o v e r I:O t h e d e c i s i v e western f1.ank i l lI i.mc. 5) '

h i d u n f o r t u n a t e l y , f r o m Manstetn's p e r s p e c t t v e , t h e r e now was n o t t h e 1:nb r i ~ i so u t ; I L L ol: the f o r ce s f rom the Cauc; isus wt th th e 1st- I'anzer Army aswould have been p o s s i b l e e a r l i e r . 50th Dtvis lon and 13 th P a n z c r I ) t v i s i o n were

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- --

cliopped t:o Araiy Group A and would rrinatn In the Cauc:isus. Army Group A w a s I:owit:lidraw back I n t o an encL;ive i n the Kuban peninsuLa, w i t : i i it:s hack to t:lic? 5%oC Azov ~ n d.he K c r c h Stra i t . . Hitter rat: .lonali .zed that t:lils would I:;icllI t:;itetu l :ure Garmiin o f l e n s i v e oper nt lo i is I n t h e Cauc.isus wlitm they could oiii:(%agni i iresu:lic, Ibut ;Xaiist:elii c o u l d sec that i t mere Ly prevent :ed 400,000 Ccrnians troop!;I ro in pla , r lng a r o l e ~n t:iie dec l l i t v r caiiipaign on tile sou1:1ie~iironI.."gL s t Conference w i t h Hit:ler

111 J a n u a r y H l t : le r prolu l sed IManstein t h a t tic was asac:iibl. i ng mi S S I 'anzcrC o r p s vit:Lnlt:y Kharlcov arid I t : woul d p r ov i de the offensive c:oiinterst.roke;i&ii iwt: the Soviet: aI:t.ack which :


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I : h n k uridcr Flaiistetn's control. i4ans tetn d i smissed the or de r w t t h I \ i : i ccplyI:O 0 K H t l i e t 1w could n o t take cont : rol whtle they were so f a r a w a y , t h a t tllcItrrces were t o o meager I:o succeed , and th a t he had t o have operat:lonai Frecdom1.1) p u L L AI) HoLLLdt back over 4 5 inlles t o the M i u s ItLver and withdraw 4 t l 1I ' m m r Army from south o f the Don and Kostov to a c t as a n o p e r a t l o n u 1 r.+serve.lhrr.licrinore, on 5 February , the Southwest F ro nt ' s advance to w i t h i n 70 lnilesof the IDnepr c ross tngs led :.lansteln t o l i s t seve ra l demands to OKH :

( 1 ) Wii:lldrow AD HoiLldr. t o the M i u s .( 2 ) Linnied1at:e preporal:L o n t o r an a i r l i f t I n case t h e Unepr CrotisLiiip werec u t . ( 3 ) Itutliless 1ncre;cee I n resupply by r a l l , a t t h e expensc! oE o t h e r Armytiroups.( 4 ) T r a n s f e r of 7 t h A n t i . a l r c r a f t l ) i v i s i o n t o Stalino t o p r o t e c t the LOC.

( 5 ) SS I'aneer Corps t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k s o u t h away from Kharkov.'I'hese dciuands concerned 111 rl.er enough t o Ely Manstein t o his h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r,i personat i n t r r v i e w . 61

Manstetn wanted t o d i s c u s s two i s s u e s . F l r s l : was th e s u b j e c t o f theovi!ra L l un sa t i s f ac to ry command and cootrol of German ope r a t i one on t he NastarnFront . Manstein envi s ioned I l i t l e r a p p o i n t l n g one Chief of Staff whoin 11,- couldI .cusl. 1:u t ict i n h t s nilme t o c a r r y o u t oper. it lons i n a manner more su i t ed t o1:lie Gcriuan Army, rattier than exfrc ttilng command himself and g e t t i n s lnvolvedL n d a l l y o p e ra t t o n s , hampertng a l l i n i t l a t t v e a t I:hc F r o n t . H i t t e r evaded theLssue and of c o u r s e noth tng changed.

' h e second top ic was th e concept f o r Llie de f e ns e o f the soui:Ilern secr ,or .M;insl.c?LIi i . r led t n e x p l a i n t h e d e c l s t v e n a t u r e o f t h e t h r e a t t a c t n g the(;ccliiaiis. 'The Soviet: fo rc e s c u t t i n g t h e t r way through Army Group H's aredc0ul.d r:aslly 1:ut-(1 towards t h e lower Unellr c r o s s i n g s o r t h e Sea of Azov and cut.oEt a l l t h e s o u t h e r n German f o r c e s . T he SS Panzer Corps asscinbling nearKli,irkov could n o t stop thif i t i d e by L t s e l f . L n Hddt t ion t o the wi thdrawal o f
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1 s t Panzer ilrlny, 4th P a n ~ c cArmy should be s l i l f t e d b a c k a c r o s s t h e 1)011 I:o 1:hcLeft f l h t k to i i e t i n concert: wi1:h t h e Parizar Corps . T h l s r e q u i r e d a redi ict ioi io f 1:Iie IUonetz sal tenl : id a witl idmwal west of the Elius.

Any discuss lol i oE vo Luu ta r i l y g LvLng up ground was r epugnant co l l l l : l + r .tic i i r ~ u e d1:Iial- clie wemy should be f o r w d I:O p y o r e v e r y f o o t lie t - e c a p t u ~ e d .by so d o i n g , th e S o v t e w would be worn down u i i t t t t h e i r counI : c roL l ' r~ ~ s ivaZrduud tl) a h d t . Reducing t he l ength of 1:lie froiil: woii1.d also r e l ease Sovietfo r ces wlilcli were n o w t i e d u p . Tlir! 1)oliel.z b a s i n was als i i 1mporl:anI: I:o h h i s

~;iemis i f d e n y i n g c o a t r e s o u r c e s I:o I:iie enciii)'. A n d lroin a p o l l t i c a ls t i i ndpo in t , H l t i l c r f e a r e d r e ~ i e r c u s s . t o i i sw i t h Turkey slioulil l ip execiiI:t! .I l.sir};ew i. f: lid rriw;i 1.Xans teLu c o u n t e r e d tlial. i t was R :n:it:tt?r of Losing t he Uonetz b i i s 1 1 i , i t o i i c ,o r t h e b a s 111 and ( k r i n i i n Army Groups. The l o r c e s av; i L Lable to MarisI:eLri s Liup Lywci'u n o t enough to hold 011 I:o the r c g l o n wht le a t t e i n p t l n g a r l ~ t ddcl-cnsi!, andonly by I octlnint: 011 I : ~ C S o v i e t iirinlrs c o u l d !:lie (krmaiis ragiilii 1.he i n i t l a t i v o .s t i l l Hit- ler Iiest~::iI:ed, s e c i i i i n g l y r e l u c t a n t t o ac ce pt postul .i il :es a bo ut whatt l i t ! enemy in lg l i l : ;~cc:o~upLlslin lrlic b a t t l e f i e l d b e t o r e e v e n t s c l e a r Ly u n fo ld e d.

n u t Elansixto wi i s i n s i s t e n t and would 1101: budge. AfI.er [our Iiours ofiiit.erisc d i s c u s s Lon H l t l e r rc1elil:cd a n d gave , ipprovaL I:o Maiist.cin's OperationaLi.ntciitl.oiis, a l t h o u g h l i e d i d a s k lYaiis1:i:Lii :is I I ~ ? was l eav tng t o Iiosl-poix! hisw i tlidrciwal ii s loug i i i i necc:csary, j u + t 1.n case nri e a r l y t l i i i w 1ic.Lped Eor-esI..iLI.I.lle s o v le t . ; ldvml~:l?'>%

Although an i ii iprI :i inl: v ic t o r y f o r &iisI:eio, i t was !;I:111. unctt:nr i i i 11.1smind whether o r 1101 L t wi i s now too l a t e t o cxecutr h i s iumicuv(!r w l t l i t-lii! 41-11I'iiiizer , \ r a y o r wliollwr A U I l o lL id t c o u t d p i11 L back w i . l : I i o ~ i l . b e l u g oti1:I: I . a r i k c d I)),I I I B Lu rc cs vicLnl.i:y V,,ir(ir;hLLovgr;id. hr ri .v in l: Ixiclt at. OL I 711s l ~ ~ ! ~ i ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r l : ~February ,iiid C t n d i i i L t l i a t : ii o f I


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L o r I . i ic 41:11Pa11zor Arlay and Al l t l o l l i d t to LLght. 1:heLr way b a c k a c r o s s tile M i u sI o p s i i o n s r~cc.upLcd by Cerinaii forces the p r e v i o u s w l n t e r . T h e wit.lidr;iw.iLw i t s acco~npanied by hiuidreds of t lwumndu of r e T u g e e n a n d c i v l l l a n s mid , iL:;ocn t . , i L tm l . IS much d c s l . r ~ c too ti) Lacl:orLcs , in 1 1 r e s o u r c e s as t h c Cerm;in couLd~ r l i n i nL ! ~ t e r .W h e t h e r Lliey could Iioli l the Mius once t hey reached i t was i.nqucst .L~~nor seve ra l d a y s . One SovLet ~:orpscrossed tlic r i v e r on t h e I l l th i indp s h u d 1.3 miles west: before the Germans c o u l d c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r Lines ande ~ i i n i n a t e I A W penecrat ion. 'JJVoronexh PIXJllt: Takes Kharkov

IleZore t:hLngs g o t bei:t:er, t l i i n g s g ot worse . On Manstetn's l e f t A 0 I,anzw i i s t .rylng 1.0 IioLd o n 1.0 Khiirkov, the f o t i r t h l a r g e s t c i t y in th e S o v i e t U n l o n .l'lLtl.er, t iceinlngly CailLng t o l e a r n I:iie l e s so n of S t a l i n g r a d , d e c l a r e d tlie citya foi-t .russ and gavc! Al) I.diii! the l n t s s l o n 1o hoLd l t a t a l l c o s t s . T h e problem,l iowcvcr , w a s that Hit:ler also o r d e r e d AU Imiz I:o u s e Lts lnain combat power,I:hc I.wn divisions 0 1 tlic SS Parizcr Corps, I:o c o u n t e r a t t a c k t o the sout:hwesttowards Maiis1:ein's i l a n k . The count.eratl:ack began on 11 F e b r u a r y l ~ u tW L L Sdr ivo l i I h c k I:o Kharkov t h r e e days l a t e r . 1Iil:ler again o r d e r e d the cil:y h e l d ,even L L had t o be c a l l e d o f f . 0 4.I1e ~ ~ ~ ~ u I I I : ~ ~ ~ I I : I : ~ I ~ ~

O n 1'3 l l ebruary AU I.anz snd o ther remnants oE Army Group 8 , except tor 2 dAriny W I I Lc!i reverl.c!d to Arlny Group Center , were p1;ii:ed under M a n s t e i n ' scommand. Army Group Ii w a s removed f r o m t.he Germmi o rd e r o f b a t t l e an d Ar:syGroup 1k11reiimocd Army Group South. Manstein aoved Ills l i e i idqua r te r s wet;I: t oZ ~ i p o r o z l i y c 011 k l i c ! I h w p r i n o r d e r t o b e t t e r co n t ro l t h e upcoming e v e n t s w l l l c l l110 a~it l l : tp; itcdwoutd be decisive. T h e reinoval of Arlny Croup 11 at: a c r i t i c a lI: Line d l d car r y some d i s a d v a n t a g e s . I t caused s o ~ n c c o n f u s t o n w h i l e Nanstelnrccst; ibLLahed coiumuntcat Lon w i t h s u b o r d i n a t c u n i t s . But w i t t i A D Lanz pl.acedtiiider I I L S ~:oio~oend,he now c o n t r o l l e d ull r ! ie r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o rsyi \cl i roi iLzing an eCf t?c~: ivecounters t : rokc agatnsl: the S o v i e t s .65

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S o u t l iw c s t F r o n t S u r g e s F o r w a rdI t a p p e a r e d I:liat: the S o ut hw e sl : F r o n t ' s o f l ' e n s i v e w o ul d mal:ch tlie success

o l t h e Voroneeli Pronl: iil: K ha r l r ov . I . a unc l i e d on 2Y J a n u a r y , the a1:t:aclc IIIIJI. w i t hiinmetl1;ite s u c c e s s , d r i v i n g tlie Germans h a c k t o tilie Uoneta. Dy 5 F e b r u a r yI z yum on ttic I)onrI:z had f a l l e n , w i t h the German 3 2 0 t h I t iCanl.ry I ) t v l s l o nf i g h t l n g ro kccp f rom b e i n g e n c i r c l e d . S t u b b o r n r e s 1 s t :a n c e a r o u n d the urbanc e n t e r s did s l o w f i t 1 1 Army ' s a r i v a n c c . 6 6

'The 1 s t Guards Army w a s a l s o m a ki ng p r o g r e s s w i t h e1cmcrit:s crosslng thi!I)one~:z and p u s h i n g towards S l a v y m i s k . T h e a r r i v a l of th e German 7 t h and 3 r di ' nnz c ? r i ) L vt s l. o n s . i n S l o v y a n s l c as pirl: of the 1 s t l'anzer Army rcdepioymi?n1: w & sj u s t i n I ime t o p r e v e n t a t o t a l collepse in t h i s s e c t o r and to beg111 iiH I : I I ~ ) ~ ~ I ~ I Ie s Lstaoce Ln the u r b a n s p r a w l a r o u n d S l a v y a r i s k whtcli w o u l d I i e ! lp wwirt l w o f c r n s i v e d ow n.6 7 T I I ~f i r s t days 01: P c b r u a r y s a w fLcrcc Lig1ii:ing iirouliclS l a v y m s k . N or c ; i d m o re S o v l e t fo r ce s wect! d r a w n i n t o F l i t ! hHtI.1.e fo r t l l a ,c i t y w li l c h Iincl tiow become a major o b s 1 : a c l e F o r th e 1st: G u a r d s A r m y . 1.51:l'anzcr ,\r.;iy ~ i a di;i;ide ttie c i t y i t s w c s t i e r n anclior .6u

I 'o p o v ' s b l o b t l e G r o up s i lpportrd t:lie ; it t: ac k a c r o s s t h c l)(mel:z I :owardsS 1 a v y ; i n s k . LI: b y p a s s e d t h e c l t y arid pushe d on w u t h , t a l r lng ILhr town ( 1 1 'I < ra in a t: or sk . B u t r e i n f o r c tng German u n i t : s lid p u t i t bel i ind scl ioduli?, t l cddown 11:s U ~ L I : ~ t o w n s like Krauia1:orsk and p r e v e n t e d i t : l r o la.11 f t g l i t i n g i ne x p l o l t i i i g tlic peuetrat lon. German E o r c e s a r o u n d S L a v y a n s k were iiow orynni.;redu n d e r 4 0 t h P'i.inzer C o r p s , 1st P a l l e e r A r m y . O E C O U ~ H C tliare s t t l l e x i s t e d iihuge gap b e t w e e n I : I i~se forces and lilie n e ; i r e s t o t h e r si1;iii.F Lcaiit German Lor(:(% ,th e S S P ' a n z e r C o r p s , ~Ci.ght.ing i n an d soiicli oE K l i n r k o v . 4 0 t h Corps ' 1:Lrsf.p r t o r l t y was 1.0 I i o l d rlie c t r y iind then d r l v c S o vl e t : f o r c e s l ~ c kcross t:Iiei ) o ~ ~ e i ; z .'TO d o i.hLs 11. t r l e d t u p us 11 tlir S o v i e t s ou f . o l K c m i a t o r s k mid k e e pc o ~ ~ I : i i c I .w l t l i tlie 71:Ii IJLvtsloti L n S l i i v y a u s k . It: u s e d the 11.I.h l'anec:r I ) L v L H I o I I ,wl11cl1 liiid 111ovec1 lrolll r.lw C a u c a s u s b y t:riiin, to al:t.ack I : O W , I ~ ~ I J I(raaiaI.ovsk.O1)
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Th1.s I : Y I J ~ of urban ELglitLng slowed the Southwes t F r o n t ' s o f f e n s i v e ; STAVKAprcr;sured r:he Feonr. t o occupy S lavymisk and r e s to r e i t s momenl:um. Group I'opovW.IS I:o a s s l s t . 1 s t (:uards Army a t Slavymisk ;and a l s o push s o u t h 011Krasiio;irineyskoye aod S t i i l i n o . In d i r e c t i v e s on 10 and 1 1 Februa ry , STAVKArc1ter;il:ed I:lit! urgency of c u t t : tiig the German wLtlidrawal t o the Dnepr byp r e s s l n t : ou I:O the Sea o f A z o v . 'To STAVKA, It: appea red tile Gerlnans w e n ? in al icct tc reI:reat and l t e r c r f t g h t i i i g a t Slavyniivk was o n l y a rear gua rdi l c tton.70

Group I'opuv agg rc ss lv e l y Eorcrd its way f u r t h e r s o u t h c a p t u r i n g G r i sh ii ioc i ~ i t i I lieu Kr:isuoarmcyskoyc on 13 Februa ry . T h i s c u t a critLcaL rai lway t ine o fArmy Group S o u t h running to D n c ~ i r o p r t r o v s k . 1 s t Pauzer Army had t ocount.cral: tack. It . had th e 71.11 u n d L1I : I i P a nz e r D i v i s i o n s c o u n t e r a t t a c k ai is tf r m Slavyausk and then turn sout l i Lntm Yopov's rear . SS "Viking" U i v i s tonw o u l d a t t ack west. T h i s conceii1.r Lc a t t a c k h o p e f u l l y would d r l v e t h e S o v i e t s~)III: o f Kraslionrlueyskoye. 1st: P a w o r Army refused t o allow 40th Panzc r C o r p sI:


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6 -Phase 4 : The (:ount:erstroke._

The Sovlct ;rdv;inct? u p 1:o 18-20 February t o w1t : l i i n 1.5 miles o fI ) n e p r o p r t r r ~ v s kand t h e i r f l g h t i n g in Krasnoareeyskoye i i iark l i m i t of t h e l ro f f e i i s l v e . SoutIiw~!!jl: F r o n t had s e r l o u s l y o v e r e x t e n d e d LtaelF a n d t h e s h i f t i n go i German f o r c e s t o t he r l . g t i t p laces was t o be j u s t Ln t h e I:o make them paythe pr lce .i 4 a i i s t : 5 ?Ln's 2d Conference w i t : h Hitler

The s l t uat:LlJn was stlll Looking c r i t i c a l w h e n f l i t t e r cleclded 1:o v l s l tManstc1.Ii ,i1. t-he front.. IIe a r r i v e d a t Army Group South Headqua r te r s at:% : i p o r ( ~ ~ l i y en 17 Februa ry . ln the back of his mind he inay have intended t or e L Levc !lanst.c!I.n, l 4 h i i t 1:he f i i t u a t t o n appcared too desperat:e f o r t ha t d r a s t l c'1 i i iuve. T h e iiicel'Lngr Croin 17-19 February were c r i t i c ~ l o Manstein f o rrece Lv Lng ;approv;ll of h L s (JperL3t:Lonal. concepts.

M;instein t:oLd H F t l e i - lie proposed 1:0 torget: ilboul. re ca pt ur in g Kl iarkov,whlch hi id jnsl. been lost:, ;and concent ra te on e1.iininaI:lng t h e t h rea t to cheIhiepr c . ross l .ngs . SS Panzcr Corps would dt:t:ack s o u t h e a st tow ard s Pavlo&:l';rd and~ t hi colicerl: w i t h t.he 11th l 'anzer Army. Once t h e s e c o n c e n t r i c a t t a c k s tiadd c s r r o y c d t.hc cntwny f o r c e s t l i r c a t e n l n g t h e D n e p r crossings, t h e n iicoluii.ctr.iI:I:;ick would be launched t o recapt:ura KharkoV. H i t l e r would notap[JroVe thLs pl.an. Ile wautcd ii s y m b o l i c v l c t o r y f o r polFr. lca1 r e d s o n s i indfearc!cl :hnsi .eLn 's a t t a c k s w o u l d g e t bogged down i n the mud when t h e anow soonthawed dn d licnce thc Gt!riniln!j w o u l d i i ' 1: g e t back t o Kliarkov. H i t l e r LnsL:rI:edt l ic ;it.rdck be I:O r e c a p t u r e K ha rk ov . Manst:ctn LnsLsted t ha t t h e p r o p e rs c q ~ ~ ~ ~ n c cf i r s t t o s t r l k e t.hc erirlny f o r c e s now near Dneprope t rovsk , bu t heascoiI . tdn' t co:ivLiice 1 1 i r l c r . 7 5

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( : o n s t ~ i ~ i ty Lciirn!ng I roiii t h e i r inLsl:iikes ;uid from the Germans, b u t t h e i rin;it.uriLy ; i t : t:hr t . a c ~ : I c a l e v e l w i i s 110t i i s c o n s l s t e n t t y e x c e l l e n t :is t l ic l rI ~ l l ~ ! l l l y 's .

" ' l ' i icr Lcs iire the ciil:tLng edge o f s t r . i tegy"86 and H S s u c h t a c t t c a l n b i l l t yiiiu81 iaari:li opcrat:lona.L m b i t o n s . T h e Soviet c oun t e r o f f e ns i ve whtch grew o u t01 the S l . n l t u~ r ; i deiir:LrcLemcnt, tndced, t l ie enci rc lement Ltself, was bold andLinagLnatlvc 111s1:oyc. llad the eiicircleincnt of German forces been s i i cceus fu land t h e i r c u t , the r e s u l t s could have bc r n d e c i s i v e .Llies oC i~~~in~iiuiiii:;it.lonslhir t.1ic L l n k ; i ~ ebcl:ween o p e r a t l o n a l a r t an d t;rcI:Lcs had not: yet matured t o th er e qu t r e d de g r e e . Nial. were 1:he mLst.nlcctr a t the t a c t i c a l L c v c l whlcli proventedI lit! Sov1el.s Eroln dch levi og t h e i r opera1:imial ob je ct iv es ?

A n exampLe was tht? plrcemeal ing of thei r ioobt le s t . r ike forces . Launching1lad;iiiov's Tank C i i c p s o n i t s 120 mile deep r a id t o Tal:stnsk;cya enabled the( k r w i ns r.0 encLrc1.c and d e s t r o y i t . T h i s Led S t a l i n to coach h l s F r o n tCoiuiiiander, Vatul:l i i : "In genera l you uiust: bear i n mind that: i t Le bet t .er 1.0~ S I I I - m k carpi .~ l on ( :ext:cndccl advances C o p a t r u , rather than s i n g l y , s o a6not. to xi?l. L n 1 . o Il;idanov's p o ~ l t l o n . " ~ ' U i i t casent:laLly I:hc same prohlcinoccured L:it:er w l t l i I Iic 2'il.h Tank Corps. The Southwest Front: pushed it forwardwlien t:lw Lruiit. wiis i i lrcady overextended and i n f i e r c e f i g h t i n g . The tankc.orps was not cidcquntely silpported, encouncered f i e r c e o p p o s i t i o n , ran out. o ff u e l dnd w as de f ea t ed . 011 r? s l l . g h tl y l a r g e r s c a l e G r o u p Popov exper Lcnced th esame proli lc~n. Subjecl:c?d t:o c o n c e n t r i c a t t a c k s b y three p e n x e r d t v l s l on t ; , i twas i:hoppcd up rat:Iier k i r s h l y ~i l!~ irRrasnoarineyskoye & id had t o cry i c d Ilght:i t s m y wrt:li. The bat . t l c s on t:he C h i r by I:hc F L f t h Shock Army against tlie48th I'eiizcc Corps ol:fer ;inorlicr example. The 11th Pniizer l l ivis lon 's mo:>i le~ ~ ! I , ? I I s c : i s very successful because t:he S ov te t: ~ ave i t the oppor t un i t y t o

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d e f o ~ i rone p e n e t r a t i o n af te r another L n d e t a i l . T h e 11th was s u c c e s s f u lt)ecaum! the Soviets picceinealed t h e i r o f f e n s i v e ; f o r some reatloa t h e y were m )1ibLc ti ) synchronize their combnl: power a g a i n s t the 48th .

T h t s f a l l u r e to synchr tmtze combat power a t th e t a c t l c a l L e v e l r e f Lects iiLack of t ac t Lcal maturity the German's possesscd. A t the r l t v t s ion l e v e l , 11thl'anzcr M v i s i o n ' s counterattacks on the C h i r a r e a o f f e r the perfecl : example.A S hick a t t a c k e d one p e n e t r a t i o n a f t e r anothe r , he managed t o synchronize i l l ! ;rc~lmenl : s b c s u t i f u l l y , u a t n g R Panzcr Grenadier Keghenl: t o block o r ;is :Iii:>I.diiig a t t a c k and swtngtng his Yanzec Regiment i n t o the f l a n k and r e a r 131:( ! . I c I I S o v i e t f o r c e . A t a h igher Level , Ilotli's synchron iza t i on ol' f ivc! i x i n z c cd i v t s i o n ! . ; of t h e SS and 40th P a n m r Corps i n Khr a t k ic k n o r t h a f t e rrecaprurlo; Favlograd 1s ariotlier example o f what the Gcrmarifi i:ould do a1 thct ' i c t i c a l Level.

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baI:t:les O H t h e Chir o f f e r a n example of the a g i l i t y of t h e Ct?r~nansa t the~: ; l c t l c , i t l e v e l . l i ideed I t 1s amazing to fo l low t h t s one divls lon froin Lt:;i:liir batt-les, t o i t s moveinent: west t o r e c a p t u r e T a t u i n y a k a , then I t s movo c m tacross t l ie Ilon to suppor t 4 t h Paneer Army arid E i n s l l y LI:S drployinent wetil. 1.0p lay a p a r t I n th e colintcrofEens.ive. A t th e o p e r a t i o m i l l e v e l , I t w i l y I:IWs C i n i L ; i r i i g t l i r y 01: Geriliati u i i l t s arid lenders whtch .~llowed .2misteln t o sliLTtf i r s t t:he 1st P;inzt?r , : i d t hen th e 4 t h Yaiizcr Arluy t o strpporl . his:o1iIiI:eroLIeli:iive. L t w a s n g l l l t y which a l lowed the SS Yarizer Corps t:o ;issum(?o f i e n s l v c a c t i o n sout:li soon a f t e r bei.iig on the d c f e n s l v e and I)(?Liig l i ; i s l :Lly,?v;icuated from K1i.irkov.3 p t !r:i I: L o l r a 1 1.111t i a t i ve

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(;crinaii:i 1 . c ) r w c l . I:O ILlieir Liiteiittons. MansI:eLii was on the o p c r a t t o n a ld e l e n s t v e. A l r . h o u ~ h t h e (;,!rlnans f r e q u e n t Ly u sed the I.ca La ~ r ofI:c!nsive, a:;w i t h t.lic!i r riolillt.L?riltl:acks i n the Chi r b a t t l e s , Manstein did not have the ineansH I the o p s rn r l o n n l l c v c l to exerc lse operational Lni tLl i t :Lvc. .

I lur lng . lanunry ;ind V e b r u a r y a t r a n s i t i o n o cc ur ed . IJh i lc sl:LLl on theope ra t . to i i i i l dclen: i tve , Mans te in began 1.0 s e t z e the o p c r a t l h n al l n i t l a t i v e .'Chi:; w a s gained through l.hc c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of German s u c c e s s e s a nd S o v i e te r r o r s a t I : l i c t a c t i c x i t l eve l , arid by Manstein's c r e a t t o n n ~ i ddeployment of h i soperaI:i.tinaI wscrves ; tiis panzer f o r c e s . A t soiiie time L n th e campaign, whlle!;I i l l o n t:lie overal.1 d e f e i w i v e , he began t o s e t the terms o f b a t t l e . T h enpcr.11 ionaL in1tLat i .ve was his; y e t he s C L L 1 was on the o v e r a l l d e f e n s t v e.llis Lorces wero c o ~ ~ ~ i l : e r a l : t ~ c k t ~ i ~:ha f l a n k s of the enemy and lieat Lnd t:lw memys o 1b:idl.y I:hat the " in1 l : t a r ive" of the cmpalgn s h i f t e d t o t h e Germans.Manst.ein l w gm 1.0 set I:Iw I s r ins 01 b d t . t l e . T h e S o v t e t s began 110 r eac t I:O titsf o r c e s . F o r e x ; u n p l c , 3rd Tank Army sli1fI:ed t i 1 S ou th wc ut Front:. I n i t i a t i v e (11:1 . 1 1 ~ operat .ion: i l l e v e l ~ d n c thnugli of , IS '*iiiorneul.uin" in f o o t b a L1; e i t h e i ' t.hudr?lunsc! o r ofEensc cia11g a i n the 1nome!~t:w, hut he who h o l d s i t s e t s tllc t e r w0 1 l h C );mX?.

fM;instcLn nex t e x p l o i t e d the I n l t i a t i v e by t r a n s l t i o n l n g t r 1 the oper.it:lonalo t Icii:i t v e . isl : uiid 4th I'anzrr ArinLcs a t t a c k e d t o w ar d s t h e I)oiietz and Kharkov.T h i s 1s also an c:r:ic?ntl.;iL p o t a i t . J u s t as ii defender inlily or iiiay no t Iiavi: th eI . n t r i a ~ : i v r ? ,,I i:oinin.andr!r w 1 t . h t.he l n i t i a t l v r may o r iniiy not: exercise i t t o goon I.he o f f en s I .v e . Mcade at . (:eft-ysburg and McClelLan a t Ant:I.ei-mn had tht!i n L I id1 ivc ,iCIxr I IIB h t I : l e s and d i d n o t HI;BUIIX o f f c i i s i v c a c t i o n , whereupon1.11ey iiiiinedi,itely Lost L I : .

111 snainary, M u i s t e t n ' s genera lsh L p d e m o n s t r a t e s how t o take the Lnl t : l a t iveaway Lrun.i th! .arI. ; lckcr, bear him u p s e v e r e l y wlille on the d e f e n s i v e , t l imcant-inuc t.0 explo1.t thc LnitiatLve b y t r a n s i t t o n i n g t o I : h e o f f e n s i v e .
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L i i r e t r o s p e c t , this c i impa ign coriflrlus two Linyortant poLiits i~i.rdebyCl.ausewit z . I?.Lrst, "( t h e d e f e n s e is) s lmply the lniore effective Corm o l war:9 iuei i i is 1.0 w l i i a v i c t o r y that ewib le s one t o take the offensivr? :tfi:ers u p a r i o r i . t y has been gained .*'91 Second, "A sudden powerful trui is l . t ion t o I:Iico f f c n t i i v ~ - te f l s s l i ing sword o l ve:iyenc.e--1s r h e g r e a t e s t moment f o r r.hcdei:eiise."92*

F X 1OU-5 d e f Liic!s depth a s !:lie e x t e n s i o n of operii1:ioris L n space, time e n dr e s o u r c e s . M a u s t a L i i began w i t h n o o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , s o i r i l t l a l l y he coiil.rlMII: deploy his r e s o u r c e s 111 dep th . He was forced t o s l i l f t 111s forcesLacer;i lLy across t h e o p e r a t i o n a l bactleEi.eLd, i is lie cxpert:ly d i d w i t h 1st a r i d4 t h P a i i z e r :ArillLes. He needed rime I:o acconiplish I I iLs :ind the space ; iva i labLei n the t hea te r of o p e r a t l o u s gave h i i n t h a t time lie Inceded t o indiieuver. H u t .space wi is i iot an Lioportant f a c t o r mere l y becuuso t h e r e W ~ : J i i 101: O C l t f o r:.l;+nstein; i t W ~ I H onLy f.mportarit because Mausteli i made e w e L c i i t - iise o l i , t .T ~ P Wwore espc~ci.:~I.w o Ly iinportaiic ways lie iii;ide ~: fI:cct:i.ve use of space milhence c r w t e d deptl i t o his battlefield. The f i r s t was b y t e n a c i o u s l y i i i i l i l i n ~ :011 t n Ikcy terr,iLn which would For in the shoulders f o r lit.:; couriteratt:acks m idprov ldc cohe rence fo r IiLu deEeiise. TliLn campaign ofl:ers D goo11 i?xmipL+:


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i i r s l : , 1dent:ifyin.g 1:hal: colnponent o r part: o i the enemy, niore vi t :a l t h l iol:liers, ( h l s cen1:er o f g r o v l e y ) , which i f i1esI:royod ca n produce tlie most:r i*!c i s lve ef fect : . Sccond, deterti i ining liow t o ge t at: 11Iiti1: centt!r 01: g r a v i t y ;i . r . , de1:cr:niniIig t l i i ? sequence of U V ~ I I I : ~wiilch i C s u c c e s s f u l l y a r r a n g e d w l t ld e s t r o y t.tiat gr. iv t t:y what resuurco9 , i r e ~ i ~ ? t ? d ( ! i ieriter 01.. atid i l ccer~ i i in in~ 1.0producn ttliiit: sc?queiit:i: o f e ve n t s . Th i r d , det : er min i ng liow t o prcvelit: tlic eiit!iiiyIiroNn g e t t i n ? : 1:0 your cmiI:e r o f gr av i ty wlii.le you #!I: ! : I ) his .

L E you oii.Ly f o cus O L I c l i e l a t t e r part of t i l l s sequence, i . e . , i f you unlytrr:' co a v o i d Losing, yo u a re condeiniied I:o a dc f e l i s i ve st:cugl:ie vold of 1 . 1 1 ~ii011e (11: i l e c i a i v e siiccess. Hcre, t l ien, I s where we see Manntein's g e n i u s fo rI l ic! opcr:il:i.o1ial art:. Although lie begati t h e c;inipaign on tile opcr;it:ioiiaJ.d t ! i cns iv t : ~ t i dw t t l i o u t t l i i ? 1.nitL i t i t v e RI IJ a l t l i ough h is iintncdl.,ite C O I I C U P I I 1.11ih?i:cviiher &id .January was the prevc?nl:loii UI ' 111s own ;iriiiy's destruct . loi i ,i&inst.eiii sougli1: t:o produce tlie c o t i d i t i o n s fu r a drc ta l .v r. v l c t . o r y .

Wiiat: d i d blaiist:eLn ~ : o nu l dc r :o be t:lie S o v i e t cen t e r u C gr:ivLty L n t l i L stIiciit:er 0 1 operat ions ' ! Unf o r t u i i a t c l y , Ln his iiiemoirs i i e d i d iiot. w r i t e 1 r it e rms o r :I ceiit:er 01: Xravicy . But i t i s c l ea r t h a t h e V l i o i i ~ l i t : ,-ilong t:lic! wi i i cI. iws iis Napoleon, wh o once s a i d :

I. , .lhere a r e i n Ilurope many good genr r i i l s , but: t:liey sec 1:oo iouiiy t.liLng!; i i tonce. i !;ce o n l y on e t h i ng , na me l y t l i r ? enemy's t n u i n body. 1 t.ry 1.0 crush i t : ,c m i r t . < ~ ! n t . tliiit: secoi idary ina t: t e rs w t l l tlieii s e t t l e t i ieniseivos .B~ ' ) ( )

&iist:ein's long r a n g e f o c u s wi is on tlie iiest:ruct:i.oii of tlie cneiny ~ o J ~ c ~ ! s ;not i i i s l x a d oii c l i e ret:enrtoii o f t : e r ra in , o r H r i v e r l i t ic , or Uliarkov o rSt..i 1 Lagrad. lii!j v i s i o n W:IS o r i e n t e d on t:iie ci ic i i iy a r m y ' s destr i ic t : ioi i . Tlil!;WJ S 1:lie o nl y way toward s R decisivr! vic1:ocy.
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Ilk* r i icagnized t:li:it on l y by s lwr ten lng h t u f r o n t a n d cconosii..l.~ig111 ct!ri.iiLn!;ec.I:or!; couLd lie p r i ~ d ~ c ehe conct?nt.ratLon o arluorcd coinbat power necess;+rylo r d e c i s l v e r os u1 t . s (;iod aLso produce ;I COhcrcnt d e f e n s e ) . Ilc correc t Lyw!q~ic!n~:ed ~ V C I I ~ Xb y l e a p - i r o g g t n g First. and Vour th l'anzer ArtnLes t o tlied c c t s i v e reg ion oT 1:lie c;iiiipalgn, estabLLsliing the MLUH R i v e r d e f ' e n s l v e L Lne,mid t:iicn d1rcc : t i n s t he c o u n t e r a ckx where t:licy were inost. declsive. I t isr i i ~ i i t i c a n t t o r ~ o t et h i t wi t : l i 111s s e q u e n c i n g of events Hatisre L n wa u success fu .Li n .ichievLn,: t.wo 0 1 1:h: p c L n c i p l e s of war, Inass a n d s u r p r i s e . The p r i n c l p l eo C iiiilss "sug:l:c.st:s that: superior combat power I U U S ~ be c o u c e n t r a t e d at thedcc i : i i v i ? pL;icc! a n d t.ime i n o r d e r I:O aciileve d e c i s i v e r esu l t s TheprLiicLpLe of t iur pr Lsi! " r e s u L t : s Iroin going a g a i n s t an enclny at: a t h e a n d / o rplhcc o r 1 n ii i n i i n l w c [or wliicli he i s unprepared" ; i~ i t l w1t:li s u r p r . t s e **successout. o i p r o 1 m r t i o n 1.0 IL IWl:fort: expended niay be obt:a Lned."y8 It w a s1)rL n c L p a L Ly becaus~!o r : h n s t . c l n ' s s u c c e s s i n a c h i e v i n g x ~ r p rIE and s u p e r i o r( :c I :h . i I power < I:IW d e c i s i v e t line and pLm:e w l i t c l i cn.-ibl.edI i i ~ o t:o r ega l n I:hein i rL.~t . lvL?tro:li t:ii'> S o v i e t s .

YLnal.iy, he preveutwd 111:; own de l e a t . w h it c s t r i v i n g l o r an oper,1t:iomikll.v ic t :ory . i l i s I.OC!; were h i s points ~ l juLr ie rabLt i ty arid p r e s e n t e d t h e SovLet:!ii i n opport .uni . ty L o r d e c . 1 ~vt: YUCCBSS. Manut:ein a n t i c i p a t e d t.liat ii s u c c e s s f u lSovic l . 1.lirusl. c: i l . l ier t o I :hc Ih iepr c ross ings or thorugli Kr;isnoarmeysko

analysis of mansteins winter campaign on the russian front 19421943 a perspective of the operational...

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