an initial long-term vision for european defence...

European Defence Agency

An Initial Long-Term Visionfor European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe European Defence Agency (EDA) has had a huge amount

of help in this exercise from a pantheon of authorities :

pre-eminently from the Institute of Security Studies in Paris, who

analysed all the available literature bearing on what we call the

global context; from the EU Military Committee, who focussed on

the likely future nature of ESDP operations and what that implies

for future defence capability needs; and from distinguished

scientists and technologists across Europe, who generously helped

our understanding of what science and technology may have

in store. We are also grateful for input from the Aerospace and

Defence Industries Association of Europe; from Allied Command

Transformation, who are attempting a similar exercise;

from numerous defence academics and experts; and of course

from the defence ministries of participating Member States.

All this support and expertise has been indispensable.

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> AN INITIAL LONG-TERM VISION FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY NEEDS

European Defence Agency

An Initial Long-Term Visionfor European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs(Endorsed* by the Steering Board on 3 October 2006)

EU High Representative Javier Solana (right) and Finnish Minister of Defence Seppo Kääriäinen at an informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in Levi, Finnish Lapland, on 2-3 October 2006, during which the ministerial Steering Board of the European Defence Agency endorsed this Long-Term Vision report (Photo courtesy of Prime Minister’s Office/Lehtikuva). ‚

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* With the status of a document extensively discussed with and broadly supported by pMS – but without word-for-word agreement.


Table of contents

ExecutiveSummary 05

Introduction 08

1 TheGlobalContext 102 ChallengesforDefence 133 ImplicationsfortheMilitaryContribution

toESDPOperations 184 ImplicationsforCapabilityDevelopment 215 KeyIssuesfortheDefencePlanner 26

Annex:AFutureCapabilityProfile 34

03


Executive summary

05

Today and tomorrow, force will be intimately interwoven with political developments. ÷

1. A vision of the future nature and context of ESDP opera-tionsisessentialtoinformthosenear-termdecisionswhichwilldetermineEurope’slong-termdefencecapabilitiesandcapacities.Thepictureofferedherewillneedfurtherdevel-opment,andregularreassessment–butmaybejudgedausefulstarting-point. (Introduction)

2. Theglobalcontextissobering,withthecentralpredictionsof demography and economics foreshadowing a Europewhich,twodecadeshence,willbeolder,lesspre-eminentlyprosperous, and surrounded by regions (including AfricaandtheMiddleEast)whichmaystruggletocopewiththeconsequencesofglobalisation. Defencewillneedtocon-tend with public finances under pressure from a growingpensionburden;ashrinkingrecruitmentpool;andsocietiesincreasingly cautious about interventionary operations,concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force,and inclined to favour “security” over “defence” spending.(Section I, The Global Context)

3. Defencewillneedtocontinueadaptingto:

≠ the changing role of force. Traditionally, war and politicswere practised sequentially – and war involved large-ly unconstrained violence directed towards destroyingopposingconventionalforces.Todayandtomorrow,forcewill be intimately interwoven with political (and media)developments – and will typically be applied in opaquecircumstancesagainstanobscureenemyundertightrulesofengagementand24/7mediascrutiny.

≠ the technological revolution. Continued developments inmicro-electronics, communication and sensing technolo-gies, bio- and material sciences and energy technologieswillprovidemodernArmedForceswithgreatadvantages.But theadversarywillworkhardtoadoptandexploitour


Executive summary

06

own advances against us. Increasingly, defence will needto draw from the broadening flood of civil technologicalprogress.(SectionII,ChallengesforDefence)

4. ESDP operations will be expeditionary, multinational andmulti-instrument,directedatachievingsecurityandstabil-itymorethan“victory”.Informationwillbecritical,whetherinforming the“war of ideas” in cyberspace, or facilitatingeffective command decisions. “Asymmetry” will apply notmerely to an opponent’s tactics but also to his aims andvalues.Insuchcircumstances,themilitarywillbeonlyoneofarangeofinstrumentsappliedtoachievethecampaigngoals.(Section III, Implications for the Military Contribution to ESDP Operations)

5. Thekeyfutureforceandcapabilitycharacteristicsmaybe:

≠ Synergy–goingbeyondcombined–armswarfaretocoor-dinationofeffectswithnon-militaryactors;

≠ Agility– implyingspeedofreactionanddeployability,butalsothecapacitytoreconfigureforoptimumforcesizeandbalance,andmovequicklyatthetacticallevel;

≠ Selectivity–meaningawiderangeofcapabilities,andthemeans to ensure an informed and appropriate choice ateachstageoftheoperation;and

≠ Sustainability – suggesting the right logistic support, butalsotheatreaccess.

(Section IV – Implications for Capability Development)

6. ThesecharacteristicsaretranslatedintoaFutureCapabilityProfileforeachofthemaincapabilitydomainsofCommand,Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain. (Annex–FutureCapabilityProfile)

7. Inworkingtowardsthiscapabilityprofiledefenceplannerswillneedtoconcentrateonsomekeyissues,including;

ESDP operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability more than victory. ÷


07

Executive summary Executive summary≠ Knowledgeexploitation–improvingintelligence,information

andanalysisatalllevels,anddevelopingappropriateformsofnetwork-enabledcapability;

≠ Interoperability–preferablythroughgreatercommonalityofequipmentandsystems,andsharedorpooledcapability

≠ The manpower balance – finding ways to enable greaterinvestmentbycuttingmanpowernumbersandcosts,whilstprovidingfor“bootsontheground”;

≠ Rapid acquisition – in particular quicker exploitation of newtechnology;

≠ Industrialpolicy–avertingasteadycontractionanddeclineof the European defence industry by increasing investment;consolidatingtheEuropeantechnologicalandindustrialbase;harnessing Europe’s full potential; and targeting what wewanttopreserveordevelop;

≠ Flexibility fortheunforeseen–recognisingthe limitationstohowfarwecanpenetratethefogofthefuture. (Section V: Key Issues for the Defence Planner).


08

Introduction

1. Everyday,defenceplanners,technologistsandindustrialistsacrossEuropetakedecisionswhichmateriallyaffectthesortofdefencecapabilities, and underpinning technological and industrial base,thatEuropewillhaveatitsdisposalin20yearstime.Thoseinvolvedinsuchdecisionsare, intheFrenchphrase,“preparingthefuture”–andtheyneedthebesthelpthatcanbegiventhemtounder-stand the future for which they must prepare. Accordingly, theMinisterialSteeringBoardoftheEuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)tasked the Agency, in November 2005, to lead a wide-rangingexercisetodevelopaninitiallong-termvisionofEuropeandefencecapabilityandcapacityneeds,lookingsometwodecadesahead.

2. Any attempt to“forecast the future” – to assert with confidencethattheworldwillbethusorsoin20yearstime,orthatdefenceministriescanaccuratelyspecifywhatcapabilitieswillberequiredto meet the challenges so far ahead – would be self-deludingand dangerous. But we can reasonably aim to identify some ofthe most relevant and robust trends, and recommend them asguidelines for those working their way forward into the fog ofthe future. For example, a key hypothesis in what follows is thatthephenomenonknownasglobalisationwillcontinue. It iseasyto think of scenarios which might invalidate this hypothesis: anuncontrolledpandemic;massiveuseofweaponsofmassdestruc-tion; or perhaps regionalisation of the world’s economic system,with competition for inadequate resources leading to the emer-genceofmutuallysuspiciousregionalblocks.But,somanystandtogainsomuchfromthecontinuationoftheglobalisationprocessthat it seemsa reasonableassumptiontomake,at least fornow,about the world in which the European Security and DefencePolicy(ESDP)willoperate.

3. “Atleastfornow”isfundamental.Thisdocumentdoesnotpretendto offer a route map to be followed over the next twenty years.


09

Introduction Introduction

It aspires only to provide a sort of compass bearing, to indicatethe directions in which it would be sensible to move forward.Accordinglyitisaninitialvision,intendedassomethingtoberevis-itedonaregularbasis,tocheckwhetherthedirectionsindicatedstill seem appropriate. And it cannot answer the question howmuch effort and resource should be invested in insuring againsttheunexpectedsandtheunknownswhichwillinevitablypresentthemselvesalongtheway.

4. The European capability and capacity needs referred to in theSteeringBoard’staskingarethoseneededfortheESDP.Theyareonlyonepartofthespectrumofwhatdefencepractitionersneedto plan for, alongside, for example, separate national or NATOrequirements. Thus, the initial long-term vision (LTV) makes noclaimtoinfluencethetotalityofMemberStates’defenceplanning.Nor does it attempt to anticipate how ESDP itself may evolveoverthenext20years.However,theHeadlineGoalandEuropeanSecurity Strategy envisage a broad and significantly challengingsetofpotentialmissions.Theseincludeseparationofwarringfac-tionsbyforce,onthesortofscalethatwouldhavebeenrequiredhadagroundinvasionofKosovoin1999turnedouttobeneces-sary. They may also encompass stabilising operations in a failedstateinthefaceofadeterminedandcapableasymmetricthreat.Sothedemandsoftoday’sESDParealreadypotentiallydeepandcomprehensive.

5. Againstthatbackground,whatisofferedhereisabasis,aproposedfoundationuponwhichfollow-onworkcanbebuilt,involvingpro-gressivelymoredetailedanalysisandthereforemoreusefulguid-ancetothosedevelopingthedefencecapabilitiesandcapacitiesofthefuture.


The Global ContextWhat Sort Of Europe In What Sort Of World?

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6. Unlessglobalisationstopsorgoes into reverse, theworldof2025islikelytobemorediverse,moreinter-dependent,andeven more unequal. A forecast tripling of Chinese GDP willmake China the second global economy; India may haveoverhauledJapan,totakethirdplace.Europewillcontinuetogrowmodestly-inGDPandperhapsmembership-butwithitstechnologicaladvantageinsuchareasasIT,biotechnology,andnanotechnologybeingsteadilyeroded.

7. Europe will in particular be held back by low fertility rates(currently 1.5). The population may remain roughly stable,compensated by lower mortality and greater longevity. Butby 2025 the effective economic old age dependency ratio(retiredover65sasapercentageof theworkingpopulationaged 15-64) will have risen from 37% to 48%; and the aver-age European will be 45 years old. Europeans will by 2025comprise a mere 6% of the world population.The aging ofEurope’speoplewillleadtofiercecompetitionforyoungandskilledworkers.TheArmedForcesrecruitmentpool(16–30agegroup)willfallbyover15%by2025.

8. These demographic trends will have major implications forpublicfinances,withincreasinghealthcareandpensioncosts.Future public benefits to the elderly could rise from today’sspectrum of 11-16% of national GDPs to 17-33% over thenext4decades.Loweconomicgrowthandhighunemploy-ment could further exacerbate fiscal pressures on nationalbudgetsasunemploymentandsocialbenefitsarefundedbyadecreasingtaxpayingpopulation.Inevitably,costsofarmedforcespersonnelwillalsorise.

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The aging of Europe’s people will lead to fierce competition for young and skilled workers. ÷

The world of 2025 is likely to be more diverse, more inter-dependent, and even more unequal. ÷


The Global ContextWhat Sort Of Europe In What Sort Of World?

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The Global Context9. Globalisation will produce winners and losers, as between

countries and regions, and within societies (whilst universalcommunicationwillmakethesedisparitiesevermoreappar-ent). The regions neighbouring Europe will face particularchallenges.HighfertilityshouldseeAfrica’spopulationgrow-ing faster than anywhere else – up by 48% to 1.3 billion by2025–despiteAIDS. TheaverageAfrican’sage isprojectedto be 22. Desertification may increasingly concentrate thisyoung population in urban centres (11 African mega-citiesof5millionplusby2025)–manyof themwithouthopeofemployment. The implications for despair, humanitariandisasterandmigratorypressuresareobvious.

10.The Middle East will see a comparable growth in its youngpopulation–a50% increase in theworkingagepopulation-withsimilaruncertaintiesastohowtheyaretofindemploy-ment, and 70% of the population in cities by 2015. Russia,bycontrast,lookslikelytosuffera10%populationdeclineby2025.

11.So the prognosis is for tensions and strong migratory pres-suresintheregionsaroundEurope,atatimewhenEuropeisbecoming increasingly dependent on the rest of the world,especially for energy. Global energy demand is reckoned toriseby50%by2030–oilconsumptionup40%,gasup90%.Theresourcesareavailablebutthequestioniswhetherinvest-mentswillbemadeintimetoavoidconstantsupplypressureatthemarginandsteadypriceincreases.By2025,Europewillbeexternallydependentfor90%ofitsoiland80%ofitsgas.ChinaandIndiainparticularwilldriveglobalenergydemand,andseeknewsources incentralAsia,Africaand theMiddleEast.Inthisandotherways,Europeansecurityinterestsmaybe directly or indirectly challenged by tensions arising notonlyinthenearneighbourhoodbutalsofurtherafield.

Globalisation will produce winners and losers, as between countries and regions, and within societies. ÷

By 2025, Europe will be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas. ÷


The Global Context12.Even as Europe becomes more dependent on the wider

world, and the immediate neighbourhood becomes moreproblematic,soitmaybecomemorecautiousaboutmilitaryintervention. The“CNNeffect”andassociatedcasualtyaver-sionarealreadyfamiliar.Militaryoperationswillbesubjecttoever-increasingscrutinybyelectedofficials,mediaandpopu-lations. Governments and societies increasingly concernedaboutinternalsecurityandsocialcohesionmaybeevenmorehesitant to undertake potentially controversial interventionsabroad - in particular interventions in regions from wherelargenumbersof immigrantshavecome. Continuedprolif-eration of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities mayalsobeexpected,complicatingthecalculusofinterventions.

13.Caution may be reinforced by increased concern with thelegality of military action, as globalisation disseminates theconcept of international law. Military action, not explicitlyauthorisedbytheUNmaybecomeincreasinglycontroversial.In theconductofwar,evergreaterattentionwillbepaidtoproportion and justification in the application of force, withan increasing tendency to hold individuals responsible fortheiractionsnotjustatheadofstateormilitarycommanderlevel but down the command chain. Attention to collateraldamagewillbeevermoreacute.

14.Increasingconcernwithhomelandsecuritywillerodedistinc-tionsbetweenwhat is regardedastheprovinceof“defence”and of “security”, and indeed may call into question thetaxpayer’swillingnesstofund“defence”ifthisisseenaswhollyconcerned with interventions abroad or deterring increas-inglyimprobableconventionalattacksonEuropeanterritory.

15.Europe will remain one of the most prosperous and stableregionsontheplanet.But,asitages,loseseconomicpre-emi-nenceandbecomesmoreanxiousaboutitssecurity,itmayalsofindtheproblemsonitsperipheryincreasinglychallenging.

Military operations will be subject to ever-increasing scrutiny by elected officials, media and populations. ÷

In the conduct of war, ever greater attention will be paid to proportion and justification in the application of force. ÷

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Challenges For Defence16.Against this background: what are the principal challenges

for defence? Apart from the danger, noted above, of“defence” becoming perceived as peripheral to the primarysecurityconcernsofEuropeancitizens,we identify twokeyissues:

≠Adaptingtothechangingroleofforce ≠Adaptingtothetechnologicalrevolution

Adapting to the changing role of force17.Itisafamiliarthoughtthatwaristhecontinuationofpolitics

byothermeans.Butwehavebecomeusedtotheseactivi-tiesbeingconductedindistinctphases.Whenthepoliticiansand diplomats fail, they hand matters over to the military,re-entering to settle the peace when the military issue isdecided.Twiceinthe20thcenturywartookoverfrompoli-ticsforaperiodofyears.Similarly,expeditionaryoperationstraditionallyinvolveddispatchingtheforcecommanderwiththebroadestofobjectivesandthefreestofhands,requiringhimonlytoreportsuccesswhenthejobwasdone.

18.Theall-seeingeyeof thecameraandthespeedofmoderncommunicationhavechangedallthat.Allpartiesinmodernconflictsrealisethatthepoliticaloutcomewillbedeterminednotjustbytheachievementofmilitaryobjectives,butbythemannerinwhichoperationsareconductedorareperceivedtobeconducted.Thereseemsalwaystobeavideocameraathand,andaTVstationreadytobroadcastwhatitseestoglobalaudiences.Andtheoperationitselfwillbeimpactedbyreactionsoflocalactorsandonlookerstobreakingnews(orrumours),evenfromtheothersideoftheworld.

19.The interplay between the political, the military and themediaticisnowcontinuous;andmilitarysuccessachievedinthewrongwaycanmeanpoliticalfailure.

20.With this 24/7 scrutiny has come, as noted above, an ever-increasingpremiumon issuesof legitimacyandconformity

The Global Context

13

There seems always to be a video camera at hand, and a TV station ready to broadcast what it sees to global audiences. ÷

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Challenges For Defencewith international law – a not always precise but certainlyexpanding corpus of constraining standards. This mayinclude the interpretationof theRightofSelf-DefenceandtheThreatto InternationalPeaceandSecurityasstipulatedin the UN Charter (Jus ad Bellum), and the future balancebetweenInterventionandStateSovereignty.Thewayforceisemployed is increasinglyconstrainedby legalandpolicyconsiderations based on general international law and thelawofarmedconflictwhenapplicable.Itislikelythatpolicycouldbecome increasingly restrictiveabout theconditionsin which military force is deemed legitimate. In addition,international criminal law comes into play with the estab-lishmentoftheInternationalCriminalCourtandavarietyofad hoc jurisdictions. All these developments will create anincreasing level of complexity for the political and militaryoperatorsandplanners.

21.Alliedtothis isthewidespreadperceptionthattechnologyisputtingintomilitaryhandsthemeanstoconductopera-tionswithevergreaterprecisionandrestraint. Warfarehasbeen described as a mixture of intelligence and kineticenergy. The opening campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraqhave confirmed beyond doubt that we are transitioningfromtheindustrialagetotheinformationageofwar–thatintelligence(orknowledge,or information)willbecomeanever more important resource for successful operations,whilstkineticenergyhastobeappliedinevermorepreciseandlimitedquantities.

22.IntheKosovoairwaronly15%ofmunitionsdroppedwere“smart”; by the 2003 Iraq war, the proportions betweendumb and smart were reversed. Serious thought needs tobegiventothefutureutilityofunguidedmunitions(andofaircraft that cannot use smart weapons), as well as clusterbombs, mines and other weapons of indiscriminate effect.Theenvironmental impactofmilitaryactionwillalsocome

Intelligence will become an ever more important resource for successful operations, whilst kinetic energy has to be applied in ever more precise and limited quantities. ÷


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Challenges For Defence Challenges For Defenceincreasinglyintofocus,includingconcernforeffectsonourowntroops–aswiththecrisesovertheuseofdepletedura-niumammunitionintheFirstGulfWarandlaterinKosovo.

23.Thusthefocusofmilitaryeffortswillshifttocomplementingdiplomacy in preventing wars from occurring, containingthose conflicts that do occur, and discouraging the emer-gence of parties whose objective it is to contribute to thegenerationofacrisis.

24.All thishas reduced theplausibilityof scenarios,at least intheEuropeancontextandfortheforeseeablefuture,involv-ing traditional state-on-state warfare, with conventionalforces pitted against comparable opponents. And it hassimultaneouslyencouragedallbutthemosttechnologicallydominant (fornow theUSandEurope) to seekout“asym-metric”strategies–waysofpreventingsophisticatedforcesfrom using their technological advantage (e.g. by denyingthem clear targets), and adopting and exploiting againstthemtheirowntechnology(andmedia).Themosteffectivepractionersofsuchasymmetricstrategieswilloftenbenon-stateactors.

25.Insum,theoperationsforwhichEuropeanforcesshouldpri-marilypreparefortheforeseeablefuturewillrequireforcetobeapplied inopaquecircumstances,againstanopponentatpainstoconcealhimselfamongstcivilpopulations,undertightly constraining rules of engagement and 24/7 mediascrutiny.

Adapting to the technological revolution26.Just as globalisation is altering our geo-political landscape

andourfamiliarruleset,soscienceandtechnologycontinuetotransformtheworldweliveinatapacewhichwehavedifficulty comprehending. The proliferation of technologyandknowledgeisproceedingoutsidethecontrolofgovern-

÷The focus of military efforts will shift to complementing diplomacy in preventing wars from occurring and containing those conflicts that do occur.

ÿOperations will require force to be applied in opaque circumstances, against an opponent at pains to conceal himself amongst civil populations, under tightly constraining rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.


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Challenges For Defencements and with the commercial sector fully in the drivingseat. Unilateral advantages do not last long. Informationtechnology has been the main revolutionary driver andpushedforwardglobalisationanditsoveralleffects.

27.Scienceandtechnologyareplayingakeypartindrivingthechangingroleofmilitaryforce;andexploitationofwhattheyhave toofferwillbeakey to successfuladaptation to thatchangingrole.Mostofthetechnologieswhichmaybethekeydeterminantsofthemilitarycapabilitiesneededin2025are, according to the scientific consensus, already knownabouttoday. There is littledoubtthatcontinuedadvancesinmicroelectronics(Moore’slawshowsnosignsofslacken-ing) and in sensing and communication technologies willsupport the increasingly dominant role of knowledge inmilitaryoperations.Similarly,theprecision,speedandsafetyof military operations should benefit from rapid progressin bio- and material sciences (in these areas often associ-atedwithnanotechnology,agenericdescriptorof techno-logicaladvancebeingpursuedamongstevermoreminuteelements). Developments in power sources will enable usto materialise many of these other new opportunities intouseableequipments.

28. The“dark side” is obvious, too. The risks of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction are well-known: while thedifficulties of obtaining the materials act as some brakeon nuclear proliferation, protection against new forms ofbiologicalagentsshouldbeaparticularconcern.Ourownuniversalmeansofcommunicationarealready thoroughlyexploited by opponents both as platforms for propagat-ing ideasand ideologiesandascommunicationnetworks.CommerciallyavailableapplicationssuchasGPSandGoogleEarth (high resolution satellite imagery on your home PC)aremanifestlyopentoabuse.Andthemoredependentwebecome on technology the more interest our opponents

The more dependent we become on technology the more interest our opponents will have in attacking us via our technological infrastructure. ÷

÷Proliferation of technology and knowledge is proceeding.

Unilateral advantages do not last long.


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Challenges For Defence Challenges For Defencewill have in attacking us via our technological infrastruc-ture.

29.Science and technology will also raise false expectationsabout how far damage can be eliminated from militaryoperations. Just as increasingly any death in hospital isascribedtoafailurebythemedicalprofession,soitwillbeevenmoredifficultinfutureforpublicstoacceptthatcasu-altiessustainedarenottheresultofspecificnegligence.

30.Asthestreamofciviltechnologicaladvancebroadensandquickens,sothetraditionalroleofdefenceR&Tasamotorof wider progress is reversed; technology will be“spun in”todefencemorethan“spunout”. Maintainingthemilitarytechnological edge will therefore require better exploita-tionofciviltechnologies–andevermorerapidexploitationof technology, whatever its source, before the opponentworksouthowtoadoptornegateit.

31.The civil world of science and technology has anotherimportantlessontooffer–thattechnologicaladvancewillincreasingly come as much from combining technologiesas from linear development in one particular field. Yetno one institute, still less one person, can be competentacrossthebroadeningriveroftechnology.Innovationwillincreasinglydependuponnetworksofexcellent research-ers collaborating to combine their expertise in differentdisciplines.

32.In sum,ourArmedForcescanexpect from futurescienceand technology the universal availability of communica-tion and knowledge as well as new levels of precision ofandprotectionagainst lethaleffects. However,what theycannot expect are sustained unilateral advantages – betheymeasuredagainstconventionalopponentsinclassicalstate-to-state conflict or against asymmetric threats. Theproliferationofknowledgeremainsendemictoopensoci-etiesandaglobaleconomy.

Our Armed Forces can expect the universal availability of communication and knowledge as well as new levels of precision of and protection against lethal effects, but not sustained unilateral advantages. ÷


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Implications for the military contribution to ESDP operations

33.Whatdothechangesintheeconomic,socialandmilitaryworldaroundus–andthoseathome–meanforthefutureofESDPoperationsin,say,2025?

34.The typical ESDP crisis management operation will be expe-ditionary, multi-national and multi-instrument. The EU hasrecognised the need to be a global security actor. For suchpurposeitenvisagesacapabilitytoprojectforcesoverstrategicdistancesandtoaustereareasofoperation. InterventionswillbebasedoncommonobjectivesamongMemberStates, thussendingamessageofasharedEUcommitmenttoresolvethecrisis. Therefore, deployment of forces needs to be based onthe principle of wide multi-nationality. Furthermore, the EUwill increasingly utilise a comprehensive approach combiningits hard and soft power instruments and coordinating civilian,military, governmental and non-governmental bodies to col-lectivelyachievethenecessarypoliticaleffects.

35.Indeedinterventionswillnotnecessarilyinvolvefightingbattles.The presence of multinational forces, backed by, and indeedsymbolising, thecollectivepoliticalcommitmentof theUnion,maywellpreventhostilitiesfrombreakingout.Ortheymayhelptostabiliseacountryorregionafterapoliticalaccord.Indeed,thescopeofESDPmissionsrequiresmilitarycontributionstobeappropriately tailored, trainedandreadiedtoconductabroadrange of operations, in potentially austere areas and againstdiversethreats. Incasesofinterventionbyforcethemaintaskwill be to gain control of the dynamics of conflict, reduce itsdestructivepowerandbreakthecycleofviolence.Theobjectiveof interventions isnot“victory”astraditionallyunderstood,butmoderation,balanceofinterestsandpeacefulresolutionofcon-flicts–inshort,stability.Thatsaid,thelevelofforcerequiredtoachievesuchoutcomesmay,insomescenarios,besubstantial.

The EU will increasingly utilise a comprehensive approach combining its hard and soft power instruments. ÷

÷The objective of interventions is not “victory” as traditionally understood, but moderation, balance of interests and peaceful resolution of conflicts – in short, stability.

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In the information age, knowledge will be the vital resource in armed conflict. ÷

36.While the success of such interventions will be influenced byourmilitarycapabilitiesandactions, itwill increasinglydependonouractions,orinaction,inamuchbroaderrangeofdomainssuchasthepromotionofhumanrights,ruleoflaw,securitysec-torreform,goodgovernanceandthefightagainstinternationalcrime.ItisunlikelythatEUMemberStates’forcesundertakingacrisismanagementoperationwillbedeniedmilitarysuccess–butwemaybedeniedoverallmissionachievementbecausewehavefailedtounderstandandplanadequatelyinthiscomplexenvironment,ortobringothercrisismanagementinstrumentseffectively tobear.ArmedForcesarebutonecomponentofawider,comprehensiveandintegratedapproachtoESDPopera-tions..

37.Intheinformationage,knowledgewillbethevitalresourceinarmedconflict.Commanderswillbeabletoexploitopportuni-ties and manage operational risk in an informed manner. Butnetworkandknowledgesystemsonlyprovidetheopportunityforquickerdecision-making–theyarenotasufficientconditionforbetterdecisions.Moreover,thebenefitsandthecostsoftheinformation age also apply to the opposition.Today, not onlyhasthemostprofoundtechnologicaldevelopmentoccurredininformationtechnologybuttherateofdiffusionhasbeenevenmoresurprising.NewapplicationsandcontinuedconvergenceofITproductswillariseandbecomequicklyassimilated,atleastbysomeinallsocieties.SuchnewITproductsrequireminimuminfrastructure, and their diffusion will also empower non-stateactors-whetherbenevolentormalevolent.

38. Conceptually,theinformationagehascreatedanewcommonenvironmentthatstatesandorganisationsaspiretoaccessandcontrol-analogoustotheseainpreviouscenturies.Cyberspaceisamuchmorecomplexenvironment,notsimplyrepresented


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bytheinternet.Likeitspredecessor,thesea,ithasaninternation-alcharacterwheretradeandintercontinentalcommunicationareconducted.However,itsentryfeeforaccessandinfluenceisverylow,andthespacecanbeusedby,almostliterally,anyone.Itisexpandingnon-linearlyalmostdaily.Irregularenemiesknowtheyareabletomaximisetheirasymmetricopportunitiesbycreatingtheirownnetworks; theywill try toachieve theirown informa-tion superiority and counter our attempts to do the same.Thebenefits of globalisation in the information age have providedthemtheopportunity.

39. Asymmetricwarfarehasbecomeafamiliarterminrecentyears.It designates high-tech against low-tech, Goliath against David,centrally-controlledandnetwork-enabledoperationsagainstdis-ruptivetacticsoflocalorregional–andsometimestransnational– guerrilla groups. More relevant, however, for understandingasymmetryisthedivergenceofgoalstobeachievedandrulestobeobserved.Whereasonesidestrivestoestablishorre-establishits own concepts of stability, rule of law and democratic struc-tures, opponents will often aim at a radically different politicalorder.TheywillnotplaybytherulesoftheLawofArmedConflictsuchastheproportionalityofforceortheprotectionofthecivil-ian population. Nor will they necessarily refrain from terroristtactics,orevenuseofweaponsofmassdestruction. AndtheywillseektodeterordeflectinterventionsbyexploitingperceivedweaknessesinEUresolve.

40. Insum,theincreasingcomplexityofESDPoperations–withtheconcurrent characteristics of multinationality, expedition andasymmetry–callforanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachto the planning and conduct of interventions. The role of themilitary will be determined within a wider campaign plan thatincludes close consultation with other – civil – instruments ofpowerandinfluence.

The role of the military will be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other – civil – instruments of power and influence. ÿ


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Implications for Capability Development

41. Whataretheguidinglightsofthedevelopmentoffuturecapa-bilities for ESDP operations as described above? Capabilitydevelopmentwillalwaystrytobalancetwodifferentapproach-es:onemaintainsthatpastexperienceisareliableguidetothefuture (“learning from history”); the other suggests that theever-increasingspeedofchange inoursocietiesputsahighpremiumontheadaptabilityandflexibilityofcapabilityplan-ning.Inreality,bothperspectivescount.Forexample,relianceon well-trained and competently-led troops remains a con-stantinwarfare.Whilethatwillnotchange,thecharacteristicsthatcreatenewcompetitiveadvantagesarechanging.Thesecharacteristicsareasvalidatthetacticalasattheoperationalandthestrategic level.Andtheyareasapplicable inpreven-tion, stability and reconstruction, and peacekeeping as theyareinhighintensitycombat.

42. Which are these future force and capability characteristics?Ingeneral, such future forcesand their capabilities mustbefounded on comprehensive and effects-based planning: itis not just equipment, but more comprehensively strategicconcepts, doctrine, training and organisation that will, intheircombination,yieldthedesiredeffects.Inparticular,fourmain characteristics need primary attention: Synergy, Agility,SelectivityandSustainability.

43.Synergy. In the future, joint forces composed of land, air,space and maritime elements will increasingly use precisionfirepower,intelligenceandfocussedlogisticsinordertodelivermilitaryeffectsinamorediscriminateway.Andthecapabilitiesof other agencies and actors, including non-governmentalorganisations,willcontributetothemanagementofconflict.The media, with its increased reach and effectiveness, needincreasinglytobetakenintoaccount.Synergybetweenthesedifferent capacities will create the effects necessary for mis-

Four main characteristics need primary attention: Synergy, Agility, Selectivity and Sustainability. ÷

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sion accomplishment within acceptable levels of risk, whileminimising undesired effects. Synchronisation across organi-sational, institutional and component boundaries moves thejoint force from traditional de-confliction and coordinationprocedurestotheintegrated,comprehensively-plannedoper-ationsrequired.

44.Thetraditionalcombined-armswarfarecanbebroadlyconsid-eredastheemploymentofcomplementaryweaponsystemstoachieveasynergisticeffect.Itsmostimportantconsequenceistobringaboutdominanceoveranopponentatcriticaltimeand in critical space.Thecomponentsofcombined-armswarfare have already changed from the traditional infantry,armourandartillerymixtootherforceelementssuchascom-batUAVs,precisionweaponsand,perhapsmoresignificantly,anever-increasingarrayofsophisticatedsensorsandcommandandcontrolsystems.However,theproliferationoftechnologywillalsoacceleratehowadversariescandeveloptechnologicaland operational reactions to counter the weapons systemsandtacticsofEuropeanforces.Advancedtechnologiesinareassuchasstealth,signaturereduction,thermalmaskingandtheirrespective interdependencies require researchandadaptableapproachestoacquisition.

45.Agility.Thisreferstotheabilitytoachieverapidityofreaction,tailorableforcepackaginganddeployability.Agilityembracesconcept,machineandmind.EUMemberStates’militaryforceswill need to operate in a multinational and multilateral envi-ronment, working with EU and non-EU Member States andwithnationalandinternationalorganisations,includingtheUNandNATO,andevenwithinadhoccoalitions.Theywillneedtodemonstratestrategicreach(expeditionaryoperations)andstrategicagility,beingabletoquicklymovestrategicdistancesandenterdirectly intothetheatreofoperations, readiedand

÷Joint forces composed of land, air, space and maritime elements will increasingly use precision firepower, intelligence and focussed logistics to deliver military effects in a more discriminate way.


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prepared. Inevitably there could be instances where veryshortleadtimesapplypriortodeployment,aswellasminimalinfrastructureprovidedintheatre(e.g., fewadequateportsorairfields,limitedhostnationsupport).

46.Forcesmayneedtoberesponsive,reactingquickly,decisivelyand with precision, being knowledge-focussed and appro-priately digitised. Such joint forces may need to be quicklytailored to meet a wide range of contingencies. Continuedco-ordinationbetweentheMaritime,Land,Air,SpecialForcesandLogisticscomponentswillassist the trendtowards joint-nessinsmallertailoredunitsandtaskforces, ifrequired.Suchagile packages save lift, put fewer people in harm’s way,permitahigheroperationaltempoandthespeedierapplica-tionofcombateffect.Theywillbeabletoshowintentwhilstmaintaining sufficient combat power to prevail in contestedoperations. They will also possess the necessary command,control,communications,intelligence,surveillanceandrecon-naissance(C3ISR)toenablemissionplanningandrehearsalenroute.

47.Futurejointforceswillneedagilityattheoperationalandtacti-callevelsaswellasthestrategic.Oncedeployed,EUMemberStates’ joint forces may need to be able to operate at willwithin all domains and across the depth and breadth of theoperational area, possessing combinations of stealth, speed,informationsuperiority,connectivity,protection,andlethality.Theymayneedtooperateincomplexterrainandinsidecities.Inallcases,forcesmustbecapableofmovingquicklyinordertocapitaliseonfleetingtacticalandoperationalopportunities,applycontinuouspressureandsetanoperationaltempothatsuitsownforcesbut,atthesametime,degradestheenemy’sdecision-cycleprocessesandoperatingconcepts.

Agility embraces concept, machine and mind. Forces may need to be responsive, reacting quickly, decisively and with precision. ÷


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48. Selectivity. The selective use of kinetic and non-kineticmeanstogeneratethedesiredlethalornon-lethaleffectswillbe essential for future operations. Future forces need to beable to graduate and vary the application of force as neces-sary, and in accordance with legal and political constraints.Therefore, future capabilities may also effectively incorporatesuchnon-kineticcapabilitiesascomputernetworkattack,elec-tromagnetic or directed-energy, offensive counterspace, mili-tary deception and psychological operations. Such capabili-ties should provide EU Member States’ forces with enhancedflexibility and allow them to better engage targets whilstconstrainedbyconcernsofcollateraleffects. Theyshouldbepreparedtooperateinlessdenselypopulatedenvironmentsaswellasincomplexterrainandcitieswithdiscrimination,preci-sionandminimalcollateraldamage.

49.Selectivity makes it particularly important to determine theoverall effectiveness of force application. There is a need fortheassessmentofbattledamage,munitionseffectiveness,col-lateraldamageandeffects,consequenceanalysis,behaviouralmodificationanalysisandtheoverall reassessmentofmissionrequirements.Futureanalysis,linkedtoacomprehensive(civil-ian & military) EU operational lessons learned process, mayneed to measure the effects on behaviour and attitudes ofopposingleadership,forcesandpopulations.

50.Sustainability.IfanadversarycanimpedeordenyaccessofEuropeanforcestoneededfacilitiesortothelocaloperationalarea, the potential impact on the crisis and its managementmaybedecisive.Theadversarygainstime,extralatitudeandagreaterprobabilityofsuccess.IfEuropeanforcesarecompelledto operate from distant areas, then their capabilities will beaffectedinscale,speedandendurance. Theconverseisthat,tothedegreethat theEUcandemonstrateanability todealwithareadenialthreats,thedeterrentismademorecredible.

Future forces need to be able to graduate and vary the application of force as necessary. ÷


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51.Multinational and agile sustainability will require buildingsufficient capacity into sustainment pipelines, and exercis-ing sufficient control over the pipeline from end-to-end, toprovideahighdegreeofcertaintyofsupplytotheforcesintheatre.Theresultscouldprovideamoretimelyandprecisedeliveryofmission-ready forces,a reducedcombat supportandcombatservicesupportfootprintintheatreandamorecost effective fighter-to-support ratio within overall forcestructures. Even if sustainment pipelines remain national,a high degree of interoperability, co-ordination and use ofagreedstandardswillbevitaltoachieveaunityofeffortandpurpose.Inanycase,andalthoughtheremaybethedesireforshortdecisivecampaigns,itwillbeessentialtohaveasuf-ficientrotationalbasetosustainoperationsinlong-durationcontingencies.

52.In this context, reduced theatre footprints may require anemphasisontheseaasasphereformanoeuvreandsustain-ment.Thisreflectstheproblemsthatcivilianoppositionandinsurrectionarymovementscanposeforthelandasamilitarybase, the geo-political shift away from historical bases andalliances,andpoliticalsensitivitiesoverdeploymentandhostnationsupportoftroopsintheterritoryofallies.

53. Finally, the political sustainability of ESDP operations willdependonaconspicuousandsuccessfulfocusonforcepro-tection.

54. Thecharacteristicsofsynergy,agility,selectivityandsustain-abilityaretranslatedforeachofthesixCapabilitydomainsofCommand,Inform,Engage,Protect,DeployandSustainintotheFutureCapabilityProfileforESDPoperations(see Annex).

Reduced theatre footprints may require an emphasis on the sea as a sphere for manoeuvre and sustainment. ÷


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Key Issues for the Defence Planner

55.There has never been a more difficult time to be a defenceplanner.Asdescribedabove,theroleofforceandthecontextforitsemploymentisrapidlyevolving–asarethetechnologiesavailabletobothsidesofaconflict.Onlyafullycomprehensiveplanningapproachwitha long-termperspectivecanofferanopportunity to balance forces appropriately against ambitionandresource,andtoidentifyandmanagerisk,beitoperational,technical or financial. Imbalances, shortfalls or risks will notbe addressed through technology advances alone. Educationandtrainingwillalsobecrucialtoensurethatculturechangeparallelsconceptualandtechnicaladvance.AndtheEuropeanindustrial base will have to serve as a reliable and efficientfundament of all efforts to provide the needed capabilities inthe long term. In this wider planning context a number ofkey issues, ranging from knowledge exploitation to industrialpolicies,willdeterminehowEuropecanmeetitsfuturedefenceneeds.

56.Knowledge Exploitation.Knowledgehasbeenarguedtobeafundamentalresourceforfutureoperationalsuccess.Thetermneedstobewidely interpreted. Itembracesthehorizon-scan-ning and assessment functions that will enable us to identifyandmonitorgatheringclouds, and to takeproperly-informeddecisions about the risk-versus-opportunity balance of pos-sible interventions. Italsoencompassesculturalawareness, toallowaproperunderstandingofthemindsetsandmotivationsofactorsinthetheatre,andtofacilitateeffectiveengagementwiththem.Anditincludessituationalawarenessintheconductofoperations, fromtheoperationalheadquarterstothestreetcorner,askeytogooddecision-takingandthesafetyandeffec-tivenessofdeployedforces.

Imbalances, shortfalls or risks will not be addressed through technology advances alone. ÷

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57.Theobjectiveofknowledgemanagementistoturndataintoactionableinformation-availableatalllevelsofdecision-mak-ing,tobesharedandnothoarded.Butinitsmoreambitiousformsthisobjectivewillnotcomecheap, involvingas itwillthe development of systems of systems. Dominance in thisarea is not built upon only computers or CIS architectures,sensorsor innovativetraining. It isbaseduponalltheseandmuch more - all welded together by agreed doctrine andcommon standards. Thus network-enabled capability mustbeafundamentaldevelopmentpriorityforESDPoperations.ItwillbeessentialtoensureinteroperabilitywiththeleadingeffortsoftheUSinthisarea,interpretedthroughNATO.Butamore characteristically European approach may need to bedeveloped,different inambitionandcharacter (forexample,withastrongeremphasisoncivil-militaryinteroperability,andon the tactical level), albeit nested within NATO conceptualframeworksandstandards.

58.In order to realise the full potential of the information age,emerging trends from recent operations indicate that ifmoney is saved on information technology, we could sub-stantiallypaymanytimesmoreinotherareas. “Uninformed”forcesmustultimatelyresorttomasswarfare.Theymustcon-fronttheiroppositionincontestsofattritionratherthanmain-tain the initiative and seize opportunities to achieve effectsby speed, surprise and dislocation. Uninformed forces andtheir supporting organisations must constantly react, ratherthan capitalise on opportunity.To reduce own casualties aspartoftheoverallpoliticalobjective,theymustspendenor-mousresourcesinsecuringthemselvesagainsttheunknown,reservinglittleforachievingobjectives.Toachievetheneces-sary degree of information superiority, European forces will

Network-enabled capability must be a fundamental development priority for ESDP operations. ÷


Human intelligence and the development of reliable local intelligence networks will become more fundamental. ÷


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needtomaintainanappropriatelevelofISRpersistenceandfidelity.Thiswillrequireabroadrangeofsensorsandsystems,includingsatellites,mannedaircraft,thefullportfolioofUAVsand land systems. But again, technology alone will not pro-videthecapability.Humanintelligenceandthedevelopmentofreliablelocalintelligencenetworkswillbecomemorefun-damentalasEuropeanforcesoperateamongstthepeopleintheatre.

59.Interoperability.ThisneedstobeattheheartofallEuropeancapability development work. Expeditionary, multi-nationaloperations, with strong inter-action with civil instruments,require interoperability within national forces, betweennationalforces,andwithcivilianactors.Justasequipment isonlyoneelementofcapability,sotheinteroperabilityrequire-mentrelatestoallotheraspectsofcapability,fromlanguagetoproceduretotraining

60.Thebestformofinteroperabilityforequipmentsandsystemsiscommonality–usingthesamekit.Thisoperationalperspec-tivematchesthedefenceeconomicimperativetoconsolidatethedemandsideoftheEuropeandefenceequipmentmarket.Experience shows that common acquisitions are most suc-cessful the further“upstream” they are started – attemptingtoharmonisetechnicalrequirementsisdifficultorimpossibleif the underlying thinking on conceptual requirements, andfinancialandtimescaleexpectations,hasnotbeenconvergedfromtheoutset.

61.Butthequestforoperationalandeconomicefficiencythroughcooperationshouldnotbeconfinedtonewequipmentdevel-opments.Itshould,intheinterestofenhancedinteroperabil-ity,embracepursuitofmutually-advantageousopportunitiesfor pooled purchase of off-the-shelf equipment; or taking

Expeditionary, multi-national operations require interoperability within national forces, between national forces, and with civilian actors. ÷


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shares ina jointly-ownedcapability;ormovingtowards rolespecialisation or integration in a coherent and complemen-taryfashion.IdentificationofsuchpotentialopportunitieswillrequireMemberStatestoeducateeachotheronthecontentand priorities of their national forward defence plans andprogrammes.

62.The Manpower Balance. It is now conventional wisdominEurope that there isaneed to increase theproportionofdefence budgets going on investment – which implies theneed to reduce operating costs. A significant part of these,of course, can be the costs of deployments – which, if metfromdefencebudgets,areparticularlydamagingtocoherentcapabilitydevelopmentinthattheyareusuallyunpredictableandshortnotice.InsomeMemberStates,suchcostsaremetfromthecentralgovernmentreserve;wideradoptionofthatpracticewouldbeapowerfulsupporttothedevelopmentofthedefencecapabilitiesESDPneeds.

63. But the largest element of operating costs is for personnel– over 50% of collective EU defence spending. As armedforces professionalise, and as the falling birth-rate increasescompetitioninthelabourmarketforyoungmenandwomen,personnel costs will in practice pre-empt more and moreof defence spending unless manpower is reduced. Withapproaching2millionmenandwomencurrentlyinuniforminEurope,thereisscopetodothis.Approachesincludeout-sourcing; increased automation (from warships to robots);andreducingsuperfluouscapability(doEuropeansbetweenthemreallyneednearly10000mainbattletanks,andnearly3000combataircraft?).

64.But driving down personnel costs by manpower reductionsneedstobemanagedwithaneyetothedemandsofopera-

There is a need to increase the proportion of defence budgets going on investment – which implies the need to reduce operating costs. ÷


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tionsthatcouldrequirenumerous“bootsontheground”(forthe widespread imposition of central authority immediatelypost-conflict ina failedstate;or for thesustainmentof long-runningstabilisationandreconstructionmissions).Alternativestomaintaininganunaffordablepermanentforcestructuremayhavetobeconsidered,suchasgreateruseofreservists.

65.Rapid Acquisition.Rapidexploitationof technology isvital.It has been argued that distinctions between defence andcivilR&Twillbecome increasinglyblurred; that the latterwillbecome increasingly important for satisfying defence needs;andthatthepaceofciviltechnologicaladvanceisconstantlyincreasing.Defenceneedstoquickenthepaceatwhichtech-nologicalopportunitiesareexploitedintofieldedequipments,ifonlybecausetheoppositionwillundoubtedlydoso.Andweneedtoadjusttoanerainwhichmajornewequipmentpro-grammes become less and less frequent, with the capabilityedgemaintainedbytechnologyinsertionintoolderplatforms.Akeyaimofeffectivecapabilitydevelopmentmustbetoradi-callyshortenthetimeframesinvolvedinmovingfrominnova-tiontopracticalembodiment.

66.To do this we must consider not only new equipment butalsobeclearonwhataspectsourlegacyequipmentwillneedtobemodifiedandatwhatrateinordertomaintainrelevance.Some elements will remain relevant over a long period,perhapsthewhole lengthof its in-service life,whereasotherassets will need to be refreshed and replaced to maximisebenefits drawn from emerging technologies - such may bethecaseintheareasofsensorsandinformationmanagement.UpgradingandupdatingtoavoidobsolescenceincapabilitieswhichbenefitfromITandotherrapidlydevelopingtechnolo-gieswillremainachallengeinbothlegacymanagementand

Defence needs to quicken the pace at which technological opportunities are exploited into fielded equipments. ÷


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new design. Access, modularity, plug-and-play architecturesandafocusonnetworkenablingcapabilitywouldbeexamplesofsuchflexibility.

67.Industrial Policy. Today, Europe retains a widely capabledefence technological and industrial base (DTIB). But theprognosisisnotencouraging.IfEuropeistopreserveabroadlybased and globally competitive DTIB (which means competi-tivewiththeUS,and,increasingly,producersintheFarEast)itmusttaketoheartthefactsthattheUSisoutspendingEuropesix to one in defence R&D; that it devotes some 35% of itsdefenceexpendituretoinvestment(fromabudgetmorethantwiceas largeasthatoftheEuropeanscombined),asagainstthe European level of about 20%; and that it is increasinglydominantinglobalexportmarkets.

68.Government has a very special relationship with the defenceindustry – as customer, regulator, and principal source ofresearch and development funding. But less and less does itremainowner;and,asdefencecompaniesmoveprogressivelyfrom government to private ownership, and as shareholderfunds become increasingly prominent in the control of com-panies, so one may expect the normal laws of a globalisedeconomytoapply;capitalwillmigratetooptimisereturns.Thispatternof“industryfollowingthemoney”isalreadyapparentin, for example, BAE Systems’ significant acquisitions in theUS,andthedevelopingpresenceofotherEuropeancompa-niesintheUKmarket.

69.Un-arrested, the trendspoint towardsa steadycontractionofthe European defence industry into niche producers workingincreasinglyforUSprimes.Acombinationofcounter-measuresisnecessary.HigherlevelsofEuropeaninvestmentareessential(intheinterestsofmilitarycapabilityasmuchasindustrialpol-

Europe retains a widely capable defence technological and industrial base but the prognosis is not encouraging. ÷

Un-arrested, the trends point towards a steady contraction of the European defence industry into niche producers working increasingly for US primes. ÷


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Key Issues for the Defence Planner icy)–ifnecessarybyrebalancingwithinconstraineddefence

budgets.Theneedforthisisparticularlyapparentinthefieldof R&T, where we are now living off the fat of investmentsmade during the ColdWar, and expenditure has fallen to atrivial1.3%ofoverallEuropeandefencespending.

70.Increasinginvestmentneedstobecomplementedbyinvest-ing to better effect. In part this is a matter of ensuring thatinvestmentisdirectedtowardsfuturecapabilityneeds;thereis ultimately no future for a defence industry in Europethat does not supply what our future armed forces actuallyrequire,andwhatexportcustomersmaybeinterestedtobuy.But “better effect” also implies overcoming the notoriousfragmentation of the European defence industrial scene, toeliminate wasteful duplications and achieve economicallyviablescale.Therecentcommitmentof22MemberStatestothefirstintroductionofcompetitionintheEuropeandefenceequipmentmarketisabravestepintherightdirection,pro-vided that it is followed through. But redoubled efforts arealsorequiredtoachieveconsolidationonthedemandsideofthemarket,andto facilitate furtherprogresstowardssupplyside consolidation (where industry, facing these issues notjustasanintellectualproblembutasamatterofdailysurvival,haveshownthemselvestypicallymoreawareoftheneedtochange than their sponsoring governments). The need, inshort, is to accept that the DTIB in Europe can only surviveas one European whole, not as a sum of different nationalcapacities.

71.The European DTIB’s survival also depends on exploiting alltheresourcesavailableintheenlargedUnion.Pre-eminently,this means drawing on the advances of civil and dual-usetechnology, such as that funded by the Commission in the

The need, in short, is to accept that the DTIB in Europe can only survive as one European whole, not as a sum of different national capacities. ÿ


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Key Issues for the Defence Planner securitysphere.Italsomeansemulatingthespeedwithwhich

severalindustries(automotive,IT)haverealisedthebenefitsofcheaper production in Eastern Europe and, given the centralimportance of technology, it means exploiting the abundanthuman capital and sources of innovation to be found inuniversities, SMEs, and enterprises not traditionally regardedas“defence industries” across Europe – as well as the wealthof excellent engineers and researchers who have joined theUnionwithitslastenlargement.

72.Finally,wemustberealisticandselective;attheEuropeanlevel,weneedtounderstandthatevenifweinvestmore,investbet-ter, andharnessall thepotential thatEuropehas tooffer,wemaystillbeunabletosustainaEuropeanDTIBwhichmatchesin every particular the best that the rest of the world has tooffer.Inthosecircumstances,weneedtotakeconsciousdeci-sionsaboutwhatwewishtopreserveanddevelopinEurope,andwhatwearecontenttosourcefromtheglobalmarket.

73.Flexibilityfortheunforeseen.Finally,sinceallweknowforsureaboutthefogofthefutureisthatitconcealsthingsthatwedonotexpect,orhavenotevenconsidered,wemustaimtobuildintoourcapabilitydevelopmentsufficientflexibilityandadapt-abilitytocopewithwhatevermayemerge.Thedeploymentofmilitaryforcepresupposesanopponent–andthatopponentwillbeactivelyseekingtofrustrateourassumptions,plansandoperationalmethods.Thereisadilemmahere:toidentifythenatureoftheflexibilityandadaptabilitythatwillbemosteffica-ciousagainstarangeofrisksthatwecannotanticipate;andtodecidehowmuchresourceshouldbeinvestedinthisformofinsurance.Theregularrevisitingofthis“living”LongTermVisionmayhelpkeepthisintheforefrontofourminds.

÷We need to take conscious decisions about what we wish to preserve and develop in Europe.

“All we know for sure about the fog of the future is that it conceals things that we do not expect.

Future Capability ProfileThe following Future Capability Profile is pre-sented within the 6 capability development areas associated with the EU’s Integrated Development Teams.

Commanda. Command and Control capabilities form the

decisive element in the battle for informationsuperiority and decision superiority. It is aimedat employing EU MS forces, assets and facilitiescommensuratewiththemissionanditsdemands,sothatthedesiredeffectscanbeachieved.

b. During the preparation and conduct of an EU ledoperation, command and control must be con-tinuously ensured in near-real time and betweenall levels of command and bodies of the EU.Thiswill need to be based upon a streamlined C2organisation, clear and standardised C2 proce-dures and a secure and efficient command sup-port.Thecommandcapabilitymustsupportrapiddecision-making. The EU MS need to generatejoint and combined headquarters that are easilydeployableandsustainable,withthecapabilitytoplan,conductandassessmultinationaloperations.Theavailabilityofplanning,decisionsupportandcommandinstrumentswillbenecessaryforglobalmultifunctionalcrisismanagement.

c. Therewillbearequirementtoconductoperations,supported by network enabling capabilities aswellastoestablish,maintainandsharereal-timesituational awareness. This command capabilitymust be secure and flexible, and must minimisetheconstraintsofdistance,terrainandweather.

d. The Operation Commander will need the ability

to exercise command and control authority overrelevant EU instruments in a defined area and/orduring a defined time period.The ability to com-municateseamlesslywithpartnersatalllevels,aswellastheabilitytoplugintojointandcombinedheadquarterswillbecomepriorities.

Informa. Future operations undertaken by the EU will

rely on the capability to collect, process, select,share, disseminate, retrieve and store informa-tion. Information management systems shouldoptimisethisprocess,tailoringthedesiredoutputto the specific mission.The information needs tobe inter-departmental, inter-agency and readilyaccessible.

b. The intelligence and findings gained throughcollection and reconnaissance efforts are bothan indispensable contribution to ensuring anindependent capacity to make judgements, takeproperdecisionsandappropriateaction,aswellasrepresentingcommoninterestswithinanincreas-ingly complex environment. This requires EU MStohaveavailableabroadspectrumofrecognitionand surveillance capabilities, including analysisof cyberspace with regard to military relevantinformation. It should be the aim to achieve agreatercoveragethannow,focussingontheareasofstrategicinterestfortheEU.

c. Developing reliable strategic communication andintelligence capabilities and protecting themagainst physical and non-physical threats as wellas having access to reliable navigation and geo-graphic positioning data will be critical. Merging

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> ANNEX

Future Capability Profilethesecapabilities,mayprovidetheEUMSwiththebasis for common information dissemination andreliableandsecurecommunications.

d. The result of this capability for obtaining andsecurely managing information might becomeapparent in a noticeable increase in the respon-siveness of the decision making process of thechainofcommand,andmakingthemanoeuvreofmilitaryforcesprogressivelymoreeffective.

Engagea. To be effective forces may have to deny, or pos-

sibly control, limited in both time and space,the sea, land, air and information domains, toimpair opponents’ capabilities, both on contactandremotely,whilesimultaneouslyachievingthedesiredeffectsontargets.Thisrequirestheabilitytorapidlyengageontheground,intheair,andatsea.Precision,highspeed,engagementcapabilityisneeded.

b. Withinajointenvironmentthemilitarycapabilityas a whole takes priority over the capabilities ofthe single services. Therefore standoff engage-ment has to become an option for all services.All military capabilities should reflect the grow-ing likelihood and relevance of fighting withincomplex terrain, such as urban and littoral areas.Forces need a range of capabilities from physicaldestruction to non-lethal. Future operations willnecessitate capabilities for precise and selectivetargeting and engagement thereby optimisingcommit-to-effecttimesandminimisingcollateraldamageespeciallyinurbanareas.

c. The preparation and conduct of future EU led

operations will require continued considerationof space related aspects, such as communication,and the detection and identification of potentialthreatsinadvanceofanappropriateresponse.

d. Combat identification capabilities in order toreduce casualties amongst friendly forces, part-ners, civilians and local populations are increas-ingly important in the complex operational envi-ronment.

e. Wherefeasible,theEUMSmustalsoaimtoreducethe impact of military operations on the naturalenvironment.

Protecta. Goodpriorknowledgeoftheoverallsituationisa

prerequisite for effective ESDP operations. Hence,it could be advantageous for MS to have accessto appropriate surveillance and advanced alarmcapabilities.

b. Itiscriticaltohavetheabilitytodetect,andthencounter,thoseweaponswhich,forlegal,moralorethical reasons, are not available to EU MS forces(such as biological weapons) but which may befreelyemployedbyanadversary.Thusitisimpor-tanttoprotectour forcesagainstthebio-hazardsthat they may face. High standards of casualtyhandling and the ability to recover stranded per-sonnel become priorities, even in geographicallyremoteareas.

c. Recognising the expanded nature of the futurebattlespace,EUMSmayneedincreasinglytosafe-guardnetworksandtheareaofoperationsagainstbothphysicalandcyberattack.

d. TheconsequencesofWeaponsofMassDestruction

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> ANNEX

Future Capability Profileattacks will be particularly difficult to manage.Preventing proliferation will be important as wellastheabilitytocountertheirsubsequentemploy-ment. CBRN defence and protection capabilitiesmaybeessentialforsomeESDPmissions.

Deploya. Deployability is the precondition for ESDP opera-

tions, including the reinforcement and sustain-mentofforces.EUMSshouldhaveattheirdisposalviable means for strategic deployability over longdistances. Responsive Reception Staging OnwardsMovementandIntegrationisrequiredtomaintaintempo during operations.This requires adequate,timely and securely available air, sea and landtransportcapacitiesandprocedures.

b. Strategic deployment is planned and should becoordinated on a joint and multinational basis,using all modes of transport and available civil-ian resources. An ensured deployability forms thebasisforarapid,credibleexpeditionarycapability,which should be one of the main efforts of theEU to manage crises and prevent conflicts. It willneed to be based upon strategic air transport, onin-flight refuelling capabilities, and on strategicseatransportcapabilities,aswellasoverlandforceprojectionassets.

c. Forintra-theatremovements,capabilitiesofmobil-ityandlandmobilitysupport,tacticalairtransportandairmobilityisarequirement.

Sustaina.The success of operations will also depend on the

sustainability of deployed forces. Sustainabilitywill encompass the provision, replacement androtation of forces with the necessary means andfacilities, according to operational demands. Evenif the operational area is a long way from EU MSterritories, sustainability must be ensured for theduration of the deployment, irrespective of thethreatsituationoravailabilityofinfrastructureandotherfactorsintheoperationalarea.

b. The joint/combinedsupportarrangementsshouldbe capable of ensuring the required quality andquantity of support over long distances andprotracted timeframes. This capability may beenhanced through the provision of accurate assetvisibility and tracking. Beneath that, a multina-tionallogisticcomponentmayallowthereductionof the overall logistic footprint. Any unit has tobe capable of ensuring sustainability for a lim-ited period of time by utilising organic assets.Harmonisation, and in the longer-term standar-disation, of logistic requirements and proceduresmayeasemultinationaljoint/combinedlogistics.

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> ANNEX

T. +32(0)2 504 28 00F. +32(0)2 504 28 15

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Further information about the Long-Term Vision and the activities of the European Defence Agency is available on our website: http://www.eda.europa.eu

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