an exploration of conditional clause exegesis with reference to galatians 1, 8-9

8/13/2019 An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis With Reference to Galatians 1, 8-9

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(1) R.A. YOUNG, A Classification of Conditional Sentences Based on SpeechAct Theory, GTJ10/1 (1989) 30.

(2) See D.B. WALLACE , Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids1996) 680.

(3) WALLACE, Grammar, 680.

An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesiswith Reference to Galatians 1,8-9

The semantics of the different classes of Greek conditional clauses

have long been controversial. They manifest subtle differences in

mood and tense, areas of syntax which have themselves been the

subject of debate. It has accordingly proved difficult to assign

particular meanings to the different types of conditional clause. Young

has even proposed that grammatical analysis cannot throw much light

on what these clauses signify, and advocates a pragmatic approach

based on Speech Act Theory(1).

Conditional clauses are widespread in the New Testament(2), and

are often of exegetical importance. Indeed, Wallace suggests that it is

no overstatement to say that some of the great themes of biblical

theology cannot be properly understood apart from a correct

understanding of conditions(3). The aim of this article is to explore

conditional clause exegesis with reference to the two conditional

statements found in Galatians 1,8-9. These conditional clauses are

striking in having identical apodoses, and substantial similarities in

their protases. The protases also have noteworthy differences; most

significantly v. 8 uses ejavn with a subjunctive verb, whereas v. 9 uses ei jwith an indicative verb. Given the similarities in content, these clauses

provide an intriguing test case for theories that suppose particular

differences between these two types of condition.

The first section of this paper considers the syntax and semantics of

conditional clauses in general, and explores the distinctions between

first and third, and third and fourth class conditions. Secondly, the

semantics of the conditional clauses in Gal 1,8-9 are examined, and the

third section investigates the pragmatic function of these clauses from

the standpoint of Speech Act Theory. Finally the implications for

exegesis of conditional clauses, and the key implications for

understanding Gal 1,8-9, are summarized.


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An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis 367

This system has been seriously criticized (6); an issue of relevance

here is that apart from tense, central elements of the classification

(shown in table 1 under key features) are based on the perceived

sense of the conditions, rather than their structure. A number of

grammarians (notably Gildersleeve) (7) have proposed instead that

conditional clauses should be categorized primarily with reference to

mood. Table 2 shows a widespread classification according to mood(8):

(6) E.g. S.E. PORTER, Verbal Aspect in the Greek New Testament, withReference to Tense and Mood(New York 1989) 292-293; WALLACE, Grammar,706-707.

(7) See WALLACE, Grammar, 705-706.(8) Adapted from WALLACE, Grammar, 689. A similar scheme is used by

(amongst others): H.E. DANAJ.R. MANTEYA Manual Grammar of the GreekNew Testament(Toronto 1955) 289-290; J.A. BROOKS C.L. WINBERY, Syntax of

New Testament Greek(Lanham 1979) 182-184.(9) There are a small number of examples in which ei j is found with the

subjunctive, and a similarly small number in which eja vn is found with theindicative.

(10) PORTER, Verbal Aspect, ch.6.

CLASS

CLASS PARTICLE MOOD

Indicative in protasis,

any mood in apodosis

Any tense except

futuree

i

j

I - AssertionIa

Indicative Secondary tensese

i

j+

a

[n

in apodosisIb

Subjunctive Any tensee javnIIa

II - Projection Optative Present / aoriste

i

j

IIb

Indicative Futuree

i

j

IIc

TENSE

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

PARTICLES(9)

e

i

j

Indicative in protasis, any mood in apodosis Any tense

e

i

j,

, a

[n

usuallyfound in apodosis Indicative Secondarytenses

e

ja

vn Subjunctive Any tense

e

i

j

Optative Present / aorist

TENSEMOOD

A modified version of this, shown in Table 3, has been proposed by

Porter(10).

This division into class I and class II categories, emphasizing

the importance of attitude (Porters designation for what is

grammaticalized by the mood forms), has much to commend it. Porter

himself has, however, made further use of the conventional


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368 David J. Armitage

designations (1st, 2nd etc.), albeit incorporating the alterations in the

categories shown above(11). These designations are likewise retained

here.

2. Comparison of semantics of first and third class conditions

The relative functions of first and third class conditional structures

are of particular interest here, since it is these which occur in Gal 1,8-9.

First and third class conditions are distinguished primarily by mood,

the former using the indicative and the latter the subjunctive. Porter has

proposed that the indicative is the mood of assertion whilst the

subjunctive (together with the optative and imperative) expressesprojection. By assertion, he refers to the portrayal of an action or

state as the condition of reality(12). This has no necessary

correspondence to reality (since the speaker may be misinformed) nor

to the speakers beliefs (since they may be lying)(13).

Projection on the other hand, involves portrayal for examination

of a projected realm which may at some time exist, or may even now

exist(14). Dana and Mantey go as far as to suggest that the subjunctive

assumes unreality(15). It is perhaps better to think of the subjunctive

(and the other moods of projection) as assuming that what they

portray is, at the time of speaking, not available for specific

verification. The statement may eventually prove to have been true or

untrue, but the use of the subjunctive leaves this undetermined(16).

There are several possible reasons for the non-verifiability ofstatements using the subjunctive. Contingency associated with futurityis the most obvious, but simple lack of access to information aboutevents in progress might necessitate use of a mood of projection. If astatement is general or hypothetical, this also implies that at the time ofspeaking specific verification is not possible. Since the subjunctiveimplies indeterminacy it cannot express assertion. The indicative,however, may include elements of projection in its semantic field. For

(11) PORTER,Idioms of the Greek New Testament, Sheffield 1992, 254-267.(12) PORTER,Idioms, 51.(13) PORTER,Idioms, 51. See also A.T. ROBERTSONA Grammar of the Greek

New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (New York 31919) 915.

(14

) PORTER,Idioms, 56.(15) DANA MANTEY,Manual Grammar, 170.(16) ROBERTSON, Grammar, 915, notes that most untruths are in the indicative

mode. Moods of projection do not lend themselves to lying because thesituation portrayed is not assertedone way or the other.


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example the imperfective aspect of the present indicative allows it to beused in ways which encompass a portion of the future (e.g. gnomic use).

In first class conditions, the force of the indicative is modified by

the presence of ei j. This introduces a hypothetical element (17) whichpushes the indicative towards the realm of projection. Such uses of the

indicative no longer make assertions in the normal sense, but as

Wallace puts it, they address an argumentfrom certainty(18). Because

what is stated is presented as part of an argument, the speaker may

quite acceptably assert something (for the sake of argument) (19)

which neither they nor their hearers believe to be true.

The suggestion of certain grammarians that first class conditionscan be translated using since rather than if demonstrates the

perception in some quarters that the protasis of such a clause actually

corresponds to reality, or at the very least to the speakers beliefs about

reality. BDF suggests that first class clauses are predominantly used

with reference to a present or alleged reality(20) and ei j is said toborder on causal since(21). There is no useful sense in which such a

statement could be referred to as a condition. Goodwin rightly suggests

that the Greek has no form implying that a condition is or was

fulfilled, and it is hardly conceivable that any language should find

such a form necessary or useful(22).

Boyer has convincingly demonstrated that in the New Testament

first class conditions vary greatly in their relationship to reality (23).

Frequently, first class conditions have protases that are clearly untrue,and for many others the truth of the protasis is not known. Boyer

therefore proposes that first class conditions just demonstrate logical

connection; nothing is implied as to the fulfilment or the probability of

the protasis(24). Porter suggests that since all conditions imply logical

(17) See BDAG, 277.(18) WALLACE, Grammar, 446 n. 2.(19) See PORTER, Verbal Aspect, 294.(20) BDF, 188.(21) BDF, 189.(22) GOODWIN, Syntax, 391. WALLACE, Grammar, 692, points out that the NT

writers had other words (such as e jp ei v) to express causal links, as represented bysince in English.

(23

) J.L. BOYER, First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?, GTJ2/1(1981) 77. See also L.W. LEDGERWOOD III, What does the Greek First ClassConditional Imply? Gricean Methodology and the Testimony of the AncientGreek Grammarians, GTJ 12/1 (1991)118-119.

(24) BOYER, First Class Conditions, 82.


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connection, such a description is of limited value(25). However if the

other conditions have implications in addition to logical connection,

the first class could then function as a basic condition, with other

forms being used given the need for particular additional nuances.

Third class conditions, by using the subjunctive, communicate a

greater degree of contingency than is implied in first class conditions.

The protasis presents something which is not at the time of speaking

specifically verifiable by the speaker, and attempts to draw out the

consequences. The non-specificity implicit in the subjunctive is

enhanced by the use of ejavn, with which, according to BDAG, the

probability of activity expressed in the verb [is] left open and [it is]thereby suited especially for generalized statements(26).

Boyer suggests that third class conditions can be described as

future conditions(27), but futurity is not the only possible reason for

non-verifiability. Wallace points out that third class conditions are used

to express a range of ideas including logical connections in present

time, hypothetical situations, and more probable future occurrences

(28). The fulfilment of such conditions may happen (relative to the time

of speaking) in the future, but to describe them as future conditions is

not especially useful. The time reference is not necessarily of

significance to the speaker, and in any case the present indicative when

used in first class clauses may also encompass futuristic time reference.

Pauline usage of third class conditions broadly conforms to these

categories. He frequently uses them to make general points of wideapplicability (e.g. Rom 2,25; 10,9; 1 Cor 11,14), to draw consequences

from purely hypothetical situations (e.g. 1 Cor 12,15-16; 13,3, 14,8)

and to consider the consequences of things that have not yet come to

pass (e.g. Rom 11,23; 2 Cor 9,4). Paul does sometimes use first class

conditions to make general points (e.g. 1 Cor 3,18; Gal 2,18), but also

to make points based on protases which were (in principle) open to

verification at the time of utterance (e.g. Rom 2,17; Gal 5,11).

There is thus some overlap in the semantic field of first and third

class conditions. In relation to first class clauses, time reference,

particularity, and the relationship of the protasis to objective reality, or

to the beliefs of the speaker, have to be inferred from context(29). Third

(25

) See PORTER, Verbal Aspect, 294.(26) BDAG, 267.(27) J.L. BOYER, Third (and Fourth) Class Conditions, GTJ3/2 (1982) 167.(28) WALLACE, Grammar, 696.(29) Cf. PORTER, Verbal Aspect, 309, who notes that since no mood gram-


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class conditions express some form of potentiality which invariably

entails futurity, although time reference will not necessarily be a

primary consideration. Again, the degree of specificity can only be

inferred from the context.

3. Comparison of semantics of third and fourth class conditions

Third and fourth class conditions both use moods which expressprojection(30); it is thus of relevance here to consider what significancethere may be in a writer preferring one over the other. The semantics ofthird and fourth class conditions are frequently presented as representing

points on a continuum of probability, with fourth class conditionsdemonstrating a higher degree of contingency. This is thought to reflectthe semantics of the mood forms used: subjunctive in third classconditions and optative in fourth class conditions. Wallace suggests (interms which he himself acknowledges as simplistic) that the subjunctivecan be thought of as expressing an idea that is probable or desirable,whereas the optative expresses something possible(31).

Caution is needed in using these formulations, since describing thesubjunctive as expressing that something is probable might imply thatthe use of the optative necessarily meant that what was being describedwas improbable, which is quite different to possible. Thus in 2Thess 3,5, Paul prays thus:

o J d e ; ku vri o " ka t e u q u vn a i u Jm w'n t a ;" ka rd i va "e i j" t h ;n a jga vp h n t o u ' q e o u ' The use of the optative ka t e u q u vn a i does

not imply that the answering of his prayer was unlikely; merely that iswas contingent on the will of someone else. The optative is actuallyused in two distinct ways(32), one expressing potentiality (perhaps witha higher degree of contingency than the subjunctive), and the other(voluntative(33)) expressing wish or desire.

If the use of the optative (including fourth class conditions) implies

maticalizes absolute facts, it is possible for 1st class conditions to expresscontingency in much the same way as 3 rd class conditions.

(30) ROBERTSON, Grammar, 925, who suggests that subjunctive and optativeare really variations of the same mode.

(31) WALLACE, Grammar, 446. See also BROOKS WINBERY, Syntax, 124, wholikewise summarise the subjunctive as the mood of probability and the optative

as the mood of possibility, with the optative making an assertion which is moredoubtful than that of the subjunctive.

(32) J. MILLER, Bad Moods and the Oblique Optative [online]http://www.bible.org/page.asp?page_id=1815 [accessed 1/4/06] (2004)

(33) WALLACE, Grammar, 481.


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greater contingency, can one conclude that the choice of subjunctive(including in third class conditions) necessarily implies lesscontingency, and higher probability? Can the third class conditionlegitimately be described as probable future(34)? Such a connectionmay have been present in Classical Greek, when the optative was morewidely used and thus presented a commonplace alternative to thesubjunctive, thereby narrowing the latters semantic field. However inHellenistic Greek, the use of the optative had diminished enormously(35).Table 4 shows the proportion of finite verbs in the indicative, imperative,subjunctive and optative in two major works in Homeric Greek(36), and

in the Greek of the Septuagint and New Testament.

(34) BROOKS WINBERY, Syntax, 121. See also DANA MANTEY, ManualGrammar, 290, who describe the third class condition as more probable future.

(35) Cf.C.F.D. MOULE,An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek(Cambridge1960) 150.

(36) ROBERTSON, Grammar, 926, notes that in Attic Greek, the frequency of thesubjunctive was lower than in Homeric Greek, and he draws attention to the veryhigh frequency of optative use in some Attic texts (p. 936).

(37) WordHoard is an application for the analysis of morphologically taggedtexts (including various examples of Early Greek Epic) available at:wordhoard.northwestern.edu/userman/index.html (accessed 16/9/06).

(38) BibleWorksTM Version 6.1.012r; BibleWorks, LLC.(39) The following apocryphal materials were included in this search: 1

Esdras, 4 Esdras, Judith, Tobit, 1, 2, 3, 4 Maccabees, Wisdom of Solomon, Sirach,Baruch, Epistle of Jeremiah, Susanna, Bel and the Dragon, Prayer of Azariah,Prayer of Manasseh, Odes, Psalm 151, Psalms of Solomon. The additions to

Esther were not included given constraints imposed by the organisation of thematerial in Bibleworks.

(40) 4 Maccabees includes 46 optatives, accounting for 6.3% of the finite verbsin that book. 4 Maccabees thus markedly inflates the figure for optatives in LXXApocryphal material.

MOOD / ATTITUDE

TEXT Indicative Imperative Subjunctive Optative DATA SOURCE

Instances % Instances % Instances % Instances %

Odyssey 10366 81.8 689 5.4 837 6.6 767 6.1WordHoard(37)

Iliad 12996 83.1 847 5.4 1078 6.9 712 4.6

LXX OT 51665 83.5 5473 8.8 4301 6.9 460 0.7

LXX

Apocryphal 10057 81.5 1178 9.5 968 7.8 131(40) 1.1

writings(39) BibleWorks 6(38)

NT 15628 81.4 1648 8.6 1863 9.7 68 0.4

Luke-Acts 4419 85.3 409 7.9 320 6.2 28 0.5

Pauline

epistles2839 75.9 425 11.2 496 13.1 31 0.8


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Thus in Homers epics there are proportionally around seven times

as many optatives as in the Biblical material(41), and in Homer the

numbers of subjunctives and optatives are relatively close (42).

Porter suggests that the reduction in use of the optative took place

because speakers felt that they could do the same thing the optative

did by using the subjunctive, but without having to worry about the

rather awkward paradigm(43). The optative might thus be described as

a literary luxury (44), for which many writers substituted the

subjunctive. Consequently when the optative was used in Hellenistic

Greek (apart from idiomatic usage), it was chosen deliberately, for

special effect. It communicates contingency with sharpened focus. Thesubjunctive, on the other hand, cannot be seen as necessarily implying

less contingency. It allows for such an interpretation, but as a function

of the context, not based on use of the subjunctiveper se. As Wallace

points out, the subjunctive may be used to express: mere possibility or

even hypothetical possibility (as well as, at other times, proba-

bility)(45).

Figure 1 represents diagrammatically the shift in the semantic

fields of these moods(46).

(41) Cf. DANA MANTEY,Manual Grammar, 173.(42) WALLACE, Grammar, 699, suggests that a marked drop can also be seen

between the Septuagint and the New Testament but this conclusion is harder tosustain, given the considerable variation within both documents. For example, inJob, of 1998 finite verbs, 124 (6.21%) are optatives, but of the 3018 finite verbs inthe minor Prophets, only 3 (0.10%) are optatives.

(43) PORTER,Idioms, 59.

(44

) Cf. ROBERTSON, Grammar, 936.(45) WALLACE, Grammar, 462. See also BOYER, Third (and Fourth) Class

Conditions, 170-171.(46) Cf. WALLACE, Grammar, 462. MOULE,Idiom Book, 23, also notes how the

domains of the two moods overlap.

Subjunctive

Subjunctive

Lesscontingent

Morecontingent

Morecontingent

Lesscontingent

ClassicalGreek

HellenisticGreek

Optative

Optative


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Paul uses the optative thirty-one times. Of these, fourteen are the

formulaic mh; g e vnoi t o (47). This idiom(48), used to express strong

denial, has, according to Wallace (49), lost its distinctive optative

nuance. The sense of the optative here would in any case be wish

rather than potentiality. Thirteen Pauline optatives are in blessings or

prayers(50), expressing wishes (51). Two more express wishes of other

kinds(52). The final two examples both take the form of a fourth class

protasis: e i j t uvcoi (53). Louw and Nida identify this as an idiom:

literally if it should happen, best translated as probably (54).

Thus the only two instances in the Pauline epistles of optatives

expressing potentiality rather than wish are strongly idiomatic. It istherefore reasonable to suppose that Pauline usage reflects the

Hellenistic trend in which the subjunctive impinges on the semantic

field of the classical optative. If Paul used a fourth class condition that

would be a striking indication that he wished to make a point about

the degree of contingency, but the choice of a third class condition

cannot be pressed in the same way (55).

II. The Conditional Clauses of Galatians 1,8-9

1. Gal 1,8

a) Lexical and syntactic issues

Gal 1,8 raises the possibility of a gospel contrary to that preachedby Paul and his associates being preached by them or by a heavenly

(47) Rom 3,4.6.31; 6,2.15; 7,7.13; 9,14; 11,1.11; 1 Cor 6,15; Gal 2,17; 3,21;6,14.

(48) See J.L. BOYER The Classification of Optatives: A Statistical Study,GTJ9/1 (1988) 131.

(49) WALLACE, Grammar, 481.(50) Rom 15,5.13; 1 Thess 3,11.12; 5,23; 2 Thess 2,17; 3,5.16; 2 Tim 1,16.18.(51) As WALLACE points out (Grammar, 447), Paul presumably did not think

that answers to these prayers were more contingent than if he had used thesubjunctive.

(52) 2 Tim 4,16; Philemon 1,20.(53) 1 Cor 14,10; 15,13.

(54

) J.P. LOUW E.A. NIDA (eds.), Greek English Lexicon of the NewTestament based on semantic domains (New York 1988) I, 670. See also BDAG(1019), where ei j tuvcoi is described as a formula meaning perhaps or if it shouldturn out that way.

(55) BOYER, Optatives, 139.


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being(56). The first person plural pronouns and verbs in v8 could be

examples of editorial we(57). However there is no intrinsic reason

to suppose that hJmei '" in v. 8 refers only to Paul. In fact the point that hemakes here, by its very nature, has plurality of reference, so it seems

perverse to categorize this as editorial we. Regarding eujhggeli -s avmeq a, there is again no reason not to take the plural at face value,since Paul did travel with co-workers who would have shared

responsibility for preaching. The reference here may be to Paul and

Barnabas(58).

Betz(59) suggests that the reference to a[ggelo" e jx o ujran ou'

reflected actual cases of Pauls opponents claiming angelic revelation.Alternatively, Witherington(60) suggests a link with the mention of

angelic intermediaries for the law in Gal 3,19, or with Pauls

description of the Galatians receiving him like an angel in Gal 4,14.

However it is equally possible that Paul was just using hyperbole to

stress that the authority of the messenger is derived from an authentic

message(61).

Burton(62) notes that parav could mean besides rather thancontrary to, implying that Pauls adversaries were supplementing

rather than contradicting the gospel. He rejects this option, given the

paucity of other evidence for this usage. There are examples of parav +accusative in the Pauline literature which imply one thing is beyond

another (e.g. 2 Cor 8,3), or alternative to or besides something else

(e.g. Rom 1,25; 1 Cor 3,11). Contrary or against are nonethelessrequired in several instances (e.g. Rom 1,26; 16,17). The context

demonstrates that Paul had in mind not a minor deviation from his

(56) Significant manuscripts omit the first uJmi 'n in v. 8; others place it before,rather than after, eu ja ggeli vzht ai. Retaining uJm i 'n, as B. METZGER, A TextualCommentary on the Greek New Testament(Stuttgart 21994) 521, points out, limitsthe application of the statement. He suggests that it might have been original,being subsequently removed by copyists who thought the statement should bemore general. The external evidence, however, favours the shorter text.e

u

ja

g

g

e

l

i

vz

h

t

a

i is replaced in some texts by eu jaggeli vs hta i or (in some later

manuscripts) eu jaggeli vz eta i. The present subjunctive reading has the greatestrange of support (ibid.).

(57) WALLACE, Grammar, 396.(58) B. WITHERINGTON, Grace in Galatia. A Commentary on St Pauls letter to

the Galatians (Edinburgh 1998) 83.(59) H.D. BETZ, Galatians (Hermeneia; Philadelphia 1979) 53.(60) WITHERINGTON, Grace in Galatia, 83.(61) Cf. R.N. LONGENECKER, Galatians (WBC; Dallas 1990) 17.(62) E. BURTON, Galatians (ICC; Edinburgh 1921) 27.


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message, but something fundamentally different, so contrary is

appropriate here.

ajn avqema, found in the apodosis of this condition, is used to denotesomething which is either consecrated to God, or delivered over for

destruction by God (63), and is used in the Septuagint to translate r j

(ban)(64). Betz suggests that Gal 1,8-9 may constitute the first

instance of Christian excommunication(65). However as Longenecker

notes, what is in view here is not disciplinary action imposed by the

church; rather the idea is delivering up to the judicial wrath of

God(66). Kuhn similarly notes that when the term is used in the New

Testament humans are never presented as the agency by which thecurse is carried out(67), a pattern reflected here by the use of a third

person imperative, e[s tw, in relation to ajnavqema..

b) Conditional clause semantics

The message of this letter implies that for Paul to start preaching

contrary to the gospel would be unexpected: he was zealous for the

gospel. Thus this conditional clause undermines the idea that third

class conditions necessarily imply higher probability. It is curious that

both Longenecker(68) and Witherington(69) persist in describing this

clause as future more probable. If something is more probable it

must have a higher degree of probability than something else. In

classical Greek that alternative might have been a fourth class

condition, but use of these diminished in Hellenistic Greek and the

semantic field of the third class condition expanded correspondingly.

To be fair, both Longenecker(70) and Witherington recognise the

surprising nature of the supposition in the protasis, but this makes their

use of the future more probable terminology even stranger.

(63) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 17; J. BEHM, a jna vqe ma ,, a jna vqhma ,, ka ta vqe ma,,TDNT, I, 354.

(64) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 17. See also F.F. BRUCE, The Epistle of Paul tothe Galatians (NIGTC; Exeter: 1982) 83.

(65) BETZ, Galatians, 54.(66) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 17. See also BEHM, a jnavqem a, 354, and J.B.

LIGHTFOOT, Saint Pauls Epistle to the Galatians (London 1905) 78) who observesthat use of ajnavqema to denote excommunication was a later development.

(67) H.W. KUHN, ajnavqem a,, ato ",, to,,EDNT, I, 81.

(68

) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 16.(69) WITHERINGTON, Grace in Galatia, 83.(70) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 16. He states that in this third class condition

what is expressed is a matter of some doubt but with the possibility ofrealization.


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One can speculate that a classical Greek speaker might under these

circumstances have used the optative to express the hypothetical idea.

Paul perhaps thought it conceivable that he might, one day, begin to

preach a message that was not the true gospel. He knew that apostolic

status was not proof against mistakes, having had to rebuke Cephas for

separating himself from the Gentiles (Gal 2,11-14). There is also an

interesting parallel to Gal 1,8 in 1 Cor 9,16b: ajnavgkh gavr moi ejpi vkei taio ujai ; gavr m oi v e js ti n e ja;n m h; e ujaggeli vs wm ai .. Here also, using a thirdclass condition, Paul raises the possibility of his failing to preach the

gospel. Again it seems that this eventuality was not inconceivable to

Paul, but he feared it, recognizing that it would bring him woe. Ifsomething is probable, that usually implies an expectation that it will

happen unless circumstances change. For Paul to turn from the gospel

was possible, but to present this as the likely outcome would be bizarre.

He was humble enough to recognise the possibility of falling, but

surely not so despairing of himself that he expected this.

The limited likelihood of fulfilment of this protasis is signalled in

the text, but not by the mood. Rather the kai v (even) makes the clauseconcessive so as to emphasise that a surprising suggestion is being

made(71). Burton describes the clause as unfavourable to the

fulfilment of the apodosis(72), noting that the inclusion of the intensive

kai v shows that what the protasis expresses is only rhetorically apossibility(73). Taken as a whole this condition has general

applicability(74

), but this is not because it is third class, but because ofits content. The startling suggestion that even apostate preaching by a

heavenly messenger would lead to anathematization implies that the

same consequence applies universally.

2. Gal 1,9

a) Lexical and syntactic issues

In Gal 1,9, Paul describes the consequences of anyone preaching

contrary to what the Galatians received. The apostate preaching is

described in v. 8 as par o } e u jhggeli s avm eqa u Jmi 'n, but in v. 9 as par o }

(71) LIGHTFOOT,Epistle, 77, suggests that kai ; e javn is characteristically used to

introduce a highly improbable supposition.(72) BURTON, Galatians, 25(73) BURTON, Galatians, 26.(74) This general applicability is sl ightly reduced if the textual variant of v. 8

which includes uJmi 'n is taken as original.


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parelavbete (75). Pauls use of paralambavn w is distinctive. On threeoccasions he uses it in connection with teaching received from Christ

(1 Cor 11,23; 15,3; Gal 1,12). Of the other eight times he uses it, three

refer to receipt by others of the gospel (1 Cor 15,1; Gal 1,9; 1 Thess

2,13). Three occurrences refer to the standard of conduct received by

Pauls correspondents through his teaching and behaviour (Phil 4,9; 1

Thess 4,1; 2 Thess 3,6). One refers to a ministry received by Archippus

from the Lord (Col 4,17) and one refers to the Colossians having

received Christ as Lord (Col 2,6). The common factor is reference to

something received ultimately from the Lord, often mediated by Paul

and his associates. Thus the content ofo

} e

u

jh

g

g

e

l

i

s

a

vm

e

q

a

ando

}

parelavbete is essentially the same, although the latter expressionavoids mentioning the messengers.

b) Conditional clause semantics

Longenecker suggests that the use of the indicative

(eujaggeli vz etai) in the protasis of v. 9 emphasizes the reality of thesituation(76). However, as previously noted, it is not possible to derive

information about the objectivity of a protasis from the use of the

indicative. Witherington is more circumspect in his description of the

semantics of this clause, describing it as a simple condition which

assumes a reality(77). However the reality may only be assumed for

the sake of argument, so this description is inadequate. First class

conditions can present the consequences of a particular circumstance

regardless of whether the circumstance is actualized. The use of a first

class condition here does however invite the Galatians to consider

whether the assertion is true. In v. 8 the third class condition implied

that the statement about Paul or an angel preaching contrary to the

gospel was purely hypothetical, and not (at the time of writing) open to

verification. In v. 9, on the other hand, a statement is made which

implies a distinct possibility of present fulfilment.

The application of this first class condition is not strictly specific,

as signalled by the intrinsically indefinite subject of the verb ( ti "). Thisindefiniteness has implications for the time reference of the clause. It is

(75) In the Y manuscript p are la vb et e in v. 9 is replaced by eu jhgge li s avmeq au

Jm

i

'n. This text is late, and this variant can be explained as assimilation to the

language of v. 8; a change in the other direction would be harder to explain.(76) LONGENECKER, Galatians, 18. Cf. LIGHTFOOT, Epistle, 77. H.N.

RIDDERBOS, The Epistle of Paul to the Churches of Galatia (London 1954) 51,suggests that the construction speaks of a present concrete situation.

(77) WITHERINGTON, Grace in Galatia, 83.


15/28


not just a simple present supposition(78). Given an indefinite subject,

the essentially imperfective aspect of the present tense form used here

(eujaggeli vz etai) need not imply a particular time reference. Rather itcould be intended to have gnomic force, which would be best

represented using a form such as preaches or proclaims(79), rather

than is preaching as used in numerous contemporary translations(80).

The context may suggest that this conditional clause referred obliquely

to specific individuals, but the syntax alone cannot confirm this,

although it allows for it.

3.Relationship of protases to apodosesPorter notes that discussion of the relationship between protases

and apodoses has often centred on their temporal relationship( 81). In

Gal 1,8-9 the apodoses both use present imperatives which say little

about timing in themselves(82). The time reference of the apodoses is

controlled here by the protases, that in v. 8 being inherently futuristic

and that in v. 9 being either present or future.

Alternatively the protasis / apodosis relationship may be

considered in terms of how they are connected logically. Nutting

proposed two major categories of conditional clause: the consequence

period and the proviso period(83). In the former category the

concept expressed in the protasis is the logical starting point; this

concept entails the concept expressed in the apodosis (84). In a proviso

period the logical starting point is the apodosis, and the fulfilment ofthis is shown to be dependent on the fulfilment of the protasis (85). The

conditional clauses of Gal 1,8-9 are both of the former type. Paul

presents the idea of apostate preaching, and states the consequence of

this. He does not start with the ajn avq ema, and then outline whatcircumstances would need to be fulfilled for this to be actuated.

Nutting divides consequence periods into three main cate-

(78) BURTON, Galatians, 30.(79) See NRSV.(80) E.g. ESV, NASB, NIV.(81) PORTER,Idioms, 265.

(82

) Cf. PORTER,Idioms, 53.(83) H.C. NUTTING, The Order of Conditional Thought, AJP 24 (1903)

27-28.(84) NUTTING, Order, 27.(85) NUTTING, Order, 32.


16/28


gories(86). Cause and effect means the coming to pass of one event

is (will be, etc.) followed by the coming to pass of another (87).

Ground and inference, on the other hand, expresses a relationship in

which the concept expressed in the protasis presupposes the concept

expressed in the apodosis(88). Equivalence conveys a relationship in

which the concept in the protasis is explicated or defined by that in the

apodosis(89). The conditions in Gal 1,8-9 can only be defined as cause

and effect, since the apodoses contain an element of will, in the

imperative e[s tw. Since the imperative does not grammaticalizeassertion, but presents something as intrinsically potential, these

apodoses cannot define something else, nor can they express apresupposition on which something else is based (90). It will not work

logically to say that let them be anathema can be inferredfrom the

fact that someone is preaching apostasy(91).

Describing the conditions of Gal 1,8-9 as cause and effect is not

entirely adequate, since the use of a third person imperative in the

apodosis introduces a projected action which depends on the will of a

third party. The link between apostate preaching and ajnavq ema e[s twistherefore indirect.

4. Semantic interrelationship of conditional clauses

The two conditional clauses in Gal 1,8-9 are separated by the

statement wJ" p ro ei rhvkam en kai ; a [rti p avli n levgw. wJ" p roei rhvkamen

could refer back to the statement in v. 8, or to a prior occasion. Bruceproposes the former, on the grounds that the issue addressed by Paul in

this letter would not have arisen at the time he was with them(92).

Alternatively Betz suggests that prior use of the conditional curse

(86) H.C. NUTTING, The Modes of Conditional Thought,AJP 24 (1903) 284.J. MILLER, Second Thoughts on First and Third Class Conditions: SomeExegetical Distinctions [online] http://www.bible.org/page.asp?page_id=1811[accessed 8/3/06] (2004)) notes that these categories cut across the differentclasses of Greek condition.

(87) NUTTING, Modes, 284.(88) NUTTING, Modes, 288.(89) NUTTING, Modes, 290.

(90

) Cf. NUTTING, Modes, 286, 287 n. 1, 289.(91) Such an inference could work (logically if not theologically) given an

indicative apodosis; apostasy would then be a consequence of anathema, ratherthan vice versa.

(92) BRUCE,Epistle, 84.


17/28

formula was intended precisely to envision the seemingly

unthinkable, and thus to include all forms of heresy (93).

The shift from the first person plural of wJ" p roei rhvkamen to thefirst person singular in a[rti p avli n levgwmight support the view that v.9 refers to a previous occasion, rather than to the statement in v. 8. The

latter option seems to require that the authoring of v. 9 was in some

way distinct from that of v. 8. This is not impossible, since the letter is

introduced as from Pau'lo" a jpovs tolo "kai ; o i J s u;n e jmo i ; p avnte"ajd elf oi v. Various commentators suggest that this plural attribution ofthe letter just reflects endorsement of Pauls message by his

companions(94

), but contribution to the shaping of its content cannot beruled out. Under these circumstances Paul may have wished, by the use

of the first person singular, to emphasise his personal approval of the

statement concerning the preaching of a contrary gospel.

The positioning of the wJ" p ro ei rhvkam en clause between the twoparallel conditions is striking. If the use of these conditional clause

formulas did hark back to a previous occasion, it is surprising that wJ"p roei rhvkamen kai ; a [rti p avli n levgwdoes not precede the first of thetwo conditions, especially as the first is more general. On balance it is

therefore preferable to regard wJ" p roei rhvkamen as a reference back tov. 8 rather than to a previous occasion, with the first person singular of

levgw representing a very personal endorsement of the point by Paulhimself.

One effect of placing these two very similar conditions in suchproximity is actually to highlight their differences. The presence of one

of these clauses influences the semantic possibilities of the other. Thus

while the first class condition with its indicative protasis may not on its

own tell the reader very much about such matters as fulfilment /

unfulfilment, its juxtaposition with the third class clause might shed

further light on such matters.

In v. 8 Paul uses hyperbole to make his point, choosing an

improbable supposition to make a general point. Bruce describes his

language at this point as rather rhetorical, and suggests that Paul

emphasises the seriousness with which he is speaking by repeating his

point more soberly(95) in v. 9. The Galatians cannot then just dismiss

v. 8 as a rhetorical flight of fancy. Both Burton and Betz attach


(93) BETZ, Galatians, 53.(94) E.g. LONGENECKER, Galatians, 5; BRUCEEpistle, 74; BETZ, Galatians, 40.(95) BRUCE,Epistle, 84.


18/28


importance to the way the features of the conditional statements shift.

Burton notes the way in which the element of concession and

improbability disappears in v. 9 (96), and Betz suggests that the

differences show that Paul deals with real situations, not with

improbabilities(97). The contrast between the two clauses stresses both

the seriousness, and the real applicability, of Pauls statement in a way

that neither would do on their own. Pauls point in v. 8 could

conceivably have been expressed using a 1 st class condition with a

present indicative verb understood gnomically, but the use of the third

class condition, with its narrower semantic field, is less ambiguous in

communicating the hypothetical idea, and sharpens the contrast withv. 9 (98).

5. Semantic relationship of conditional clauses to context

Galatians 1,8-9 forms a distinct unit within the paragraph in which

it is located. This paragraph starts at Gal 1,6, but it is less clear at what

point it finishes. Possible options include after v. 9, after v. 10, or after

v. 12. Gal 1,13 onwards comprises an extended narrative in which Paul

recounts his dealings with the other apostles, and this serves to

illustrate Pauls point in vv11,12 that his gospel, which was not kata;a[n qrwpon, was not received para; ajnqrwvpou.

In v. 6, Paul expresses amazement at the Galatians rapid shift in

loyalty: they are turning to another gospel. He then explores further the

nature of this alternative gospel (v. 7): there are individuals who aretroubling the Galatians, and wishing to distort the authentic gospel (99).

ajllav is used to link vv. 8-9 to what precedes. Here, the adversative

(96) BURTON, Galatians, 30.(97) BETZ, Galatians, 53.(98) W. HENDRIKSEN,A Commentary on Galatians (London 1969) 41, points

out how the truth expressed in the first conditional sentencegreatly strengthensthat expressed in the second.

(99) Many English translations (e.g. NRSV) represent v. 7 as suggesting thatPaul is denying the existence of an alternative gospel, despite the fact that he hasjust mentioned such an entity in v. 6. Vanhoyes suggestion (A. VANHOYE S.J.,La dfinition de lautre vangile en Ga 1,6-7,Bib 83 [2002] 396) in which o }o

u

jk

e

[s

t

i

n

a

[l

l

o is considered to be more closely connected to ei j mhv, is to be

preferred. He translates v. 7 thus: qui nest autre que [ceci:] il y a des gens qui

vous troublent et qui veulent subvertir lvangile du Christ. On thisunderstanding v. 7 expands on e{tero n e uja ggevli o n, describing the essence of thedifferent gospel in v. 6 without somehow denying its existence. An approximateparallel might be drawn with the way in which a[llo o ujkand ei j m hv work togetherin John 6,22.


19/28


force of ajllav is best represented using yet or indeed rather thanbut, since it does not introduce a statement opposite to v. 7, but one

that stands against it in so far as it presents v. 7 as insufficient. The

contrast is with the supposition that the problem Paul identifies in v. 7

is insignificant(100).

This link can be represented using a paraphrase such as: there are

some who are distorting the gospel of Christyet even if we did such

a thing, we would be worthy of the most serious punishment. In this

way Paul stresses that the authenticity of the gospel matters very much,

and matters more than identity of the messenger. The indicative

repetition in v. 9 is then used to stress the point in language that invitesan altogether less hypothetical application.

The block of material following the twin conditional statements of

v. 8 and v. 9 is linked to it by gavr. While this may signal a logicalconnection, it is often used as a narrative marker equivalent to dev (101),with no particular causal force. The nature of the material in v. 10

suggests that rather than explaining or expanding the specific argument

of vv. 8-9, it constitutes a separate comment (emotively expressed) on

a broadly similar theme, which leads into the wider discussion initiated

in vv. 12-13.

III. APragmatic Approach to Conditional Clauses

1. Speech Acts and Illocutionary Force

Semantic and syntactic analyses, though vital for exegesis, are not

sufficient. A word, taken in isolation, does not have a meaning as

such; it merely has a semantic field defined by the range of

conventional usages in utterances(102). The same is true of a series of

syntactically linked words. Such juxtaposition further constrains the

semantic possibilities for each word, but does not firmly define their

meaning. Therefore knowing everything about the semantics of third

class conditions (for example) would not allow the meaning of a

particular instance to be defined. The semantics, do, however, put

limits on what the construction can conventionally be used for. The

(100

) Cf. BURTON, Galatians, 25; LONGENECKER, Galatians, 16.(101) BDAG, 189.(102) Utterance is here understood to refer to a particular instance of the use

of a sentence (cf. P. COTTERELL M. TURNER, Linguistics and BiblicalInterpretation [London 1989] 16).


20/28


third class condition does not mean future more probable, although

that may be within the range of things for which it is typically used.

When a conditional clause (or indeed any other grammatical

construction) is used in the context of a specific utterance, the author

usually intends to communicate a particular idea (103). There may be

other possible meanings in the combination of words used, but if a

speakers intent is ignored by those to whom they are speaking, their

attempt at communication is liable to fail. In seeking to understand an

epistle, it thus makes sense to consider what the writer was trying to

achieve. This necessitates going beyond grammar, whilst allowing it to

limit the possibilities. Speech Act Theory, which proposes a theoreticalbasis for how writers or speakers achieve things using words, provides

a potential framework for exploring these issues(104).

Speech Act Theory is based on the premise that when humans

communicate with words, they use those words to do something(105).

Many verbs can be described as performative in that, when spoken

under the appropriate conditions, they bring about the effect that they

describe(106). For example, if someone says I rebuke you, the rebuke

is both described by the utterance and achieved through it. Utterances

do not always include explicit performative verbs, but can nonetheless

still function as illocutionary acts (that is, they convey a particular

force) because the performative idea can be inferred by the hearer or

reader. Thus the meaning of an utterance is more than its grammatical

structure(107

), and identical sentences can be used in utterances withentirely different illocutionary force, depending on the context (108).

Searle argues that use of language is governed by conventions(109).

For a particular speech act to achieve what the speaker intends, it needs

to fulfil certain conditions(110), (sometimes described as felicity

conditions (111)). As Schiffrin explains, these address what is

predicated or referred to by the utterance (its propositional content),

(103) Cf. K.J. VANHOOZER,Is there a Meaning in this Text? (Leicester 1998)211: Meaning is a matter of intending to convey a message to another person.

(104) See YOUNG, Classification, 48.(105) See COTTERELL TURNER,Linguistics, 91.(106) J.S. PECCEI, Pragmatics (London 1999) 45.(107) YOUNG, Classification, 33.

(108

) J.R. SEARLE, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language(Cambridge 1969) 24.

(109) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 37.(110) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 54.(111) PECCEI, Pragmatics, 50.


21/28


various elements of background knowledge that the speaker and hearer

need to have (preparatory conditions), the psychological state of the

speaker (sincerity condition), and what the point of the utterance is

(essential condition)(112). Searle proposes felicity conditions for

various illocutionary acts(113). For example he notes that warnings are

constrained in regard to propositional content in that they must refer to

some future state. Regarding preparatory conditions, the speaker must

have reason to think an event is approaching that is unfavourable for

the hearer. For a warning to be authentic, the speaker must genuinely

believe that the event referred to will harm the hearer (sincerity

condition). Finally, the essential condition is that the statement countsas an undertaking to the effect that [the event] is not in [the hearers]

best interests(114).

In human communication speakers often leave things to be inferred

by their hearers; thus the felicity conditions for a particular

illocutionary act may sometimes not be explicitly fulfilled.

Nevertheless the illocutionary force can still be communicated by

questioning or stating one or more of the appropriate felicity conditions

(115). Thus a warning can be communicated by questioning the relevant

preparatory condition: Will that be good for you? In an appropriate

context this will be understood as more than a request for information.

Alternatively the sincerity condition could simply be stated: I do not

believe that will be good for you. Neither of these formulations

contains the performative verb warn, yet both can function aswarnings. They are thus indirectspeech acts.

Since illocutionary acts can be indirect a single utterance can be

multifunctional; it is often possible to discern more than one

illocutionary force in a particular utterance. This partly reflects the

difficulty of classifying illocutionary acts, for which categories could

be multiplied ad nauseam. Searle has suggested that there are five

major categories(116), and within these categories illocutionary acts

share crucial elements of their felicity conditions. However utterances

(112) D. SCHIFFRIN,Approaches to Discourse (Oxford 1994) 56.(113) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 66-67.

(114

) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 67.(115) YOUNG, Classification, 39; PECCEI, Pragmatics, 55.(116) Noted in SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 57. The five categories are:

Representatives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, Declarations. (See alsoVANHOOZER,Meaning, 209.)


22/28


may function with multiple illocutionary forces that cut across these

major divisions(117).

The relationship of individual speech acts to entire discourses is

complex. When speech acts are juxtaposed in a particular context they

will each affect what felicity conditions apply to the neighbouring

utterances. As Schiffrin points out, when one speech act expands upon

another, the illocutionary force of the second is inextricably bound up

with that of the first(118). For this reason, it may be that units larger than

sentences function as illocutionary acts(119). Since speech acts interact

in this way, analysis of real (as opposed to hypothetical) examples

inevitably leads to analysis of discourses(120

).Indirect speech acts are used for two major reasons(121). Firstly,

people tend not to duplicate, in their words, information already availablefrom the context(122). Secondly, direct performatives can be perceived asvery harsh, and are therefore often inappropriate. Politeness frequentlyrequires that statements be made in a less direct fashion(123). This may beinfluenced by the relative social position of the individuals involved(124).Peccei points out that the use of indirect speech acts provides the hearerwith an easy escape route if they do not wish to comply with what hasbeen said. They may also function as a subtle expression of mutualsolidarity(125); the use of an indirect speech act tacitly acknowledges thatcertain presuppositions are shared. In relation to conditional statementsNutting points out how sometimes the use of the conditional particle

gives the impression of virtuous self-depreciation (126

).Young suggests that all conditional statements should be seen asimplicit performatives which are used to do something in addition to

stating a condition(127). Stating a condition is itself a representative

(117) SCHIFFRIN,Discourse, 63-76, gives an example of an utterance which,based on its surface structure, is an assertion, but which can be understood as aquestion, a request (directive) or an offer (commissive).

(118) SCHIFFRIN,Discourse, 78.(119) SCHIFFRIN,Discourse, 81.(120) SCHIFFRIN,Discourse, 49.(121) See YOUNG, Classification, 34.(122) One of the key elements allowing effective communication, proposed by

Grice, is the convention that utterances are as informative as required, but notmore informative than necessary (noted in SCHIFFRIN,Discourse, 194).

(123

) PECCEI, Pragmatics, 62.(124) YOUNG, Classification, 34.(125) PECCEI, Pragmatics, 64.(126) NUTTING, Modes, 282.(127) YOUNG, Classification, 40.


23/28


illocutionary act, but this will rarely be an end in itself. Conditional

statements lend themselves to use in indirect illocutionary acts

because, expressing things with a degree of uncertainty, they

intrinsically necessitate the drawing of inferences by the hearers.

2.Reading Galatians 1,6-9 in the light of Speech Act Theory

The illocutionary force of the statements made in Gal 1,8-9 cannotbe considered in isolation since they are semantically linked to eachother and to what precedes. In v. 6 Paul expresses his astonishment at theturning of the Galatians, from the one who called them, to a different

gospel. This directly asserts something about Paul, but may also functionindirectly as rebuke or lament. Thuren (128) actually suggests that usingq a u m a vz w in this way is a standard rhetorical device which says littleabout Pauls emotional state, but just indicates the authors unhappinessvis--vis the addressees behaviour and attitudes(129). Possible felicityconditions for rebuke and lament, based on Youngs work (130), are shown(with those for other relevant Speech Acts) in Table 5.

(128) L. THUREN, Was Paul Angry? Derhetorizing Galatians, The RhetoricalInterpretation of Scripture (ed. S.E. PORTER D.C .STAMPS) (Sheffield 1999) 307.

(129

) See also LONGENECKER, Galatians, 11.(130) YOUNG, Classification, 40-42.(131) YOUNG, Classification, 40-41.(132) YOUNG, Classification, 41-42.(133) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 66.

ILLOCUTIONARY

ACT

Rebuke(131)

Lament(132)

Assert / Argue(133)

PROPOSITIONAL

CONTENT

Past act of hearer

Past event

Any proposition

PREPARATORY

CONDITION

Speaker does not

believe act was in

speaker or hearers

best interest

Speaker does not

believe event wasin speaker or

hearers best

interest

Speaker has

evidence for truth

of proposition

Not obvious to

speaker that hearer

knows

SINCERITY

CONDITION

Speaker

angered by the

act

Speaker

grievedbecause of

event

Speaker

believes

proposition

ESSENTIAL

CONDITION

Speaker intends

utterance as

reprimand

Speaker counts

utterance asexpressing sorrow

Counts as

undertaking to the

effect that

proposition

represents the actual

state of affairs

For Argue:

Counts as attempt to

convince hearer of

truth of proposition


24/28


Pauls expression of amazement points towards fulfilment of the

preparatory condition for both rebuke and lament. This preparatory

condition is not directly asserted, but its fulfilment would be implied to

someone who believed that Paul had the Galatians best interests at

heart. The propositional content of Pauls statement also fits with what

rebuke and lament require. Both acts can legitimately be inferred from

this verse; they do not exclude each other. Events in Galatia had caused

Paul deep sorrow and perplexity (cf Gal 4,19-20), but also anger,

directed primarily at those who were leading the Galatians astray.

In v. 7 Paul clarifies the use in v. 6 of e {t e ron e u ja gge vli o n, assertingthat those troubling the Galatians are distorting the gospel of Christ. Thisis followed by an assertion in v. 8, the propositional content of which isessentially that preaching contrary to the gospel by anybody leads toanathematization. Since v. 8 is linked to the preceding assertions bya jlla v, it functions as an expansion of the point they are making, andunder these circumstances, these utterances can be thought of asfunctioning as parts of a single illocutionary act, in this case anargument. Felicity conditions for assertion and argument based onSearles suggestions(135) are shown in Table 5. The only differencebetween them is that the essential condition for an argument includes thenotion of attempting to convince someone else. By asserting that it isunacceptable for anybody to preach an alternative gospel, v. 8 attemptsto convince the Galatians of the seriousness of the distortion of thegospel mentioned in v. 7. Together these two statements clarify Paulsrebuke in v. 6: the Galatians have turned from the only authentic gospel.

Young discusses the use of conditional statements to express

assertion(136). He suggests that assertions are recognized in

conditionals when the thenclause does not follow logically the if

(134) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 67.(135) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 66.(136) YOUNG, Classification, 44-45.

Warn(134) Future event / state Speaker has reason

to believe that

event / state will

occur and is not in

hearers best

interest

Not obvious to both

speaker and hearer

that event / state

will occur

Speaker

believes event /

state is not in

hearers best

interest

Counts as

undertaking by

speaker that event /

state is not in hearers

best interests


25/28


clause, giving as an example a sentence in which the apodosis is so

obviously untrue that the sentence functions as a strong denial (or

negative assertion) of the protasis. This pattern would work for the type

of conditional identified by Nutting as ground and inference(137), but

cause and effect conditionals, as found in Gal 1,8, can function as a

different type of assertion. Aground and inference condition makes

an assertion about the propositional content of the protasis by linking it

to the apodosis in a particular way. When a cause and effect

condition is used to make an assertion, however, the whole causal

sequence of protasis and apodosis is what is affirmed.

The conditional clause in v. 9 functions differently from that in v. 8.It is expressed such that it could be more than hypothetical, referring to

specific individuals. It is interesting to consider this clause in the light

of the felicity conditions suggested by Searle for a warning(138), as

shown in Table 5. Paul refers to a situation which may have been

actually happening; he is no longer just talking hypothetically. He

asserts that the consequences of apostate preaching, for those engaging

in it, are of the utmost seriousness, so this statement indirectly

constitutes a warning to such individuals. However Paul is not here

addressing those individuals, but those to whom they are preaching.

Stating the seriousness of the consequences for those who preach a

contrary gospel communicates strongly the idea that following such

individuals cannot be in the best interests of the Galatian believers, so

this also functions as a warning for them.The sequence of illocutionary acts in Gal 1,6-9 might thus be

approximately represented as shown in Fig. 2.

(137) NUTTING, Modes, 288.(138) SEARLE, Speech Acts, 67.

v. 6 I rebuke you for turning from the onewho called you, to a different gospel

v. 9 I warn you that the consequences for those doing this are severe(=I warn you that following them will certainly not benefit you)

v. 8 by asserting that for anybody (myself included),preaching a different gospel leads to the mostsevere consequences

CLARIFICATIONv. 7 I argue that this different gospel can only be a

troubling distortion of the real thing


26/28


If this analysis is correct, it may be asked why Paul expressed

himself using conditional clauses rather than more direct forms of

address. In v. 7 Paul clearly asserts, using a straightforward present

indicative, that there are individuals present in Galatia who are causing

trouble. However he does not then directly pronounce judgment on

them.

Ridderbos concludes from the use of a first class condition in v. 9

that the apostle is not appalled into timidity in applying the curse

concretely(139), but this description goes too far. Rather, the use of a

conditional formulation by Paul makes his statement intrinsically

tentative (although this need not equate to timidity). As Betz notes,expressing the judgment conditionally avoids the outright act of

cursing others, and thus respects the early Christian prohibition of

cursing(140). The use of a conditional formula thus makes the apodosis

less direct. This is not the only effect. Using a condition rather than a

direct pronouncement of judgment implicitly calls on the readers to

decide whether the protasis is fulfilled, and thus Paul appeals to their

own discernment(141), rather than simply imposing his(142).

In v. 8, the use of a hypothetical conditional clause to express what

might be directly asserted as for anybody, preaching a different gospel

leads to anathema, again involves the reader more closely in the logic

of Pauls argument, by trusting them to make the appropriate inference.

The point is also made more vivid by Pauls acknowledgement that the

point applies to him as well, which as Cousar points out, proves he isnot just anxious to maintain his own status(143). As the preparatory

conditions for a rebuke show (Table 5), this speech act may be used in

connection with things that have damaged the speakers interests,

rather than their hearers interests. Pauls inclusion himself in v. 8 is

therefore needed to make clear that he is rebuking the Galatians, not in

order to further his own agenda, but for the sake of the gospel, and for

their sake. Since Paul was not at this point preaching contrary to what

(139) RIDDERBOS, Epistle, 51. See also HENDRIKSEN, Commentary, 41, whodescribes the statement as not a mere wish, but an effective invocation. Theapostle, as Christs fully authorized representative, is pronouncing the curse uponthe Judaizers.

(140) BETZ, Galatians, 53.

(141

) SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 70, observes that it is typical for directives (ofwhich warn is an example) to be expressed indirectly.

(142) Cf. WALLACE, Grammar, 692: There is great rhetorical power in if. Totranslate ei j as since is to turn an invitation to dialogue into a lecture.

(143) C.B. COUSAR, Galatians (Interpretation; Atlanta 1982) 23.


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he had preached before, this point was intrinsically hypothetical. A

conditional formulation was therefore needed to postulate the

consequences of an imaginary situation.

IV. Conclusions

1.Implications for conditional clause exegesis

Exegesis of conditional clauses requires an integrative approach

which takes note of lexical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic issues.

Analysing conditions based on grammar and semantic relationships is

essential for delineating the range of possible meanings, but this needs

supplementation by attention to their function in the discourse.

The intended function of an utterance cannot be determined with

certainty(144). Speech Act Theory is useful in that it provides criteria

(felicity conditions), with which a given utterance can be compared,

but it does have limitations. From a practical perspective, the

multifunctionality of indirect speech acts, particularly in sequences,

complicates analysis. Furthermore, readers of a text lack access to the

entire original context which provided the set of presuppositions

necessary for indirect speech acts to function as intended. As

Vanhoozer (145) stresses, inability toprove the illocutionary force of a

statement is not rooted in intrinsic indefiniteness in the meaning of

utterances, but in this lack of complete information. Analysing

discourse with reference to Speech Act Theory can be of value, since it

facilitates integration of the information that is available.

Cotterell and Turner observe concerning another approach to

discourse analysis that its contribution is not to solve the problem, but

topose it in the sharpest possible way(146). This comment is equally

appropriate for analyses based on Speech Act Theory, which, whilst

not guaranteeing better answers, may provoke better questions. Two

key questions which it raises in relation to conditional clauses concern

the nature of their indirect illocutionary force, and what the basis is for

the choice of conditional rather than more direct forms.

(144) See COTTERELL TURNER,Linguistics, 225. They suggest that a proposal

as to the illocutionary force of a statement might at bestattain widespreadassent, but only that sort of assent that is won by any strongly probable reading.

(145) VANHOOZER,Meaning, 212.(146) COTTERELL TURNER,Linguistics, 226. They make this point in relation

to Semantic Structure Analysis.


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2. Understanding Gal 1,8-9.

Gal 1,8-9 may be translated as follows: 8Yet even if we, or an

angel from heaven, should preach a gospel contrary to what we

preached to you, let him be accursed. 9As we have said already, also

now again I say: if someone preaches a gospel to you contrary to what

you received, let him be accursed.

In v. 8 Paul presents a hypothetical situation in which a false gospel

is preached by his team or by a heavenly messenger, and presents the

consequences of this: ajn avq ema e [s tw. By insisting that these conse-quences hold even for him, he forcefully argues for the applicability of

the same dire consequences to real situations, thereby consolidating hispoint that the existence of an alternative gospel is unthinkable.

In v. 9 the use of a first class conditional construction implicitly

invites the Galatians to consider whether the situation alluded to in v. 8

is actually happening. The language of v. 8 is shown to be more than a

rhetorical trick, and v. 9 serves to warn the Galatians not to follow the

false teachers, by drawing attention to the cost of their behaviour.

Use of conditional forms, rather than direct modes of expression,

invites the Galatians into active engagement with what Paul writes. He

refrains, even under these trying circumstances, from using pure

authoritarian directives; instead he appeals to them. In v. 8, by using a

hypothetical third class condition, he is able to apply his point even to

himself. This demonstrates that his rebuke is rooted not in selfish

ambition but in concern for the Galatians, and simultaneously indicatesthe seriousness of the problem in Galatia. Paul does not lord it over

the Galatians (cf 2 Cor 2,14). His apostolic authority is, in his own

estimation, only as good as his faithfulness to the gospel of Christ.

Trinity College David J. ARMITAGE

Stoke Hill Bristol BS9 1JP

United Kingdom

SUMMARY

This paper explores various issues pertaining to the exegesis of Greek conditionalclauses, using as a case study the pair of conditional statements found in Galatians1,8-9. These conditional curse formulations are broadly similar with reference to

content, whilst also showing significant differences, notably in terms of mood.These conditional statements are firstly examined from syntactic and semanticperspectives. Their function in the discourse is then analysed with reference toSpeech Act Theory. An integrative approach to exegesis of conditional clauses isadvocated.

an exploration of conditional clause exegesis with reference to galatians 1, 8-9

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