an analysis on the constitutionality and effects of the framework agreement on the bangsamoro on the...

AN ANALYSIS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND EFFECTS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO

ON THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF MUSLIM MINDANAO

A Term Paper Presented to

Atty. Joenar C. Pueblo

Faculty, College of Law

University of San Agustin

Iloilo City

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements of the Subject

LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Roz Lourdiz Pañada Camacho

May 2014

Table of Contents

Introduction………………...………………………………………………3

Brief History……………………………………………………………….4

Quandaries on Agreement’s Creation…………………………………….6

Grave abuse of discretion in guaranteeing constitutional amendments………………………………………..………………………7

Violation of the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern………………………….…...8

Creation of an autonomous political entity for a religious organization..........................................................................9

Creation of an autonomous political entity for a minority………………......................................................................10

Authorizing a foreign entity to aid and be part of the process in amending the Philippine Constitution…….…………....11

Effects in the Local Government of Muslim Mindanao…………..……12

Normalization.……....…………….…………………………………...…12

Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing.……………………….………13

Power Sharing……………………………………………………………14

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………16

Bibliography………………………………………………………………17

2

University of San AgustinCOLLEGE OF LAW

Iloilo CityoOo

IN THE MATTER OF FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, AY 2013-2014

ROZ LOURDIZ P. CAMACHO 2C, COLLEGE OF LAW, A.Y. 2013-14

Petitioner.

X--------------------------------------X

PETITION

PETITIONER, to this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

An Analysis on the Constitutionality and Effects of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on the

Local Government of Muslim Mindanao

Introduction

In furtherance of its duty to provide peace to its citizenry, the Philippine Government has been pursuing peaceful negotiations to bring the armed conflict in Mindanao to a definite conclusion. Indeed, long has it been awaited by the Mindanaoans that peace may be restored to the region and their economic development be focused on.1 Thus, to quell hostilities and provide settlement of decades of discontentment, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH), under President Benigno Aquino III, and

1 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Brief Background on the Moro Struggle (June 6, 2011, 17:38) available at http://opapp.gov.ph/milf/brief-background-moro-struggle

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CASE NO.1FOR: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) met halfway with the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.2

Brief History

At the southern end of the Philippine archipelago lies Mindanano, the second largest of the country's major islands.3 Its contact with Muslim traders before the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century became the catalyst for its inhabitants' conversion to Islam. Thus, Muslim Sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu were established. During the Spanish colonization period, while Spain invaded Luzon and most of the Visayas converting Filipinos to Catholicism, Mindanao confronted the Spanish with disdain and refused to profess the Christian faith introduced by the latter. This was the genesis of its conflict with the central government. Mindanao was only brought under central control at the end of the Philippine-American War at the turn of the 20th century and the conflict became dormant.

Mindanao was calm until sometime in 1967 when the conflict flared yet again between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Mindanaoans. This originated from the infamous Jabidah Massacre, otherwise known as the Corregidor Massacre, which occurred during the Marcos administration's plot to try and reclaim Sabah. Operation Merdeka, as this plan was called, involved the recruitment of nearly 200 Tausug and Sama Muslims aged 18 to 30 from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. However, upon gaining knowledge that they will be made to fight against their Muslim brothers in Sabah, the Tausug and Sama Muslims resisted against the government. The resistance only upsurged when the recruits were not accorded their promised monthly allowance. Disgruntled with the turn of events, the recruits demanded to be returned home but this was not granted and several members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines massacred the mutinous recruits.4 This incident eventually resulted to the emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and, subsequently, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – organizations representing the interests of Mindanao's Muslim population. Over the years, continued violence has been occurring in Mindanao due to MNLF and MILF's opposition to the central government and such confrontation between both parties has led to numerous deaths and poverty in war-stricken areas.

2 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0

3 Funk and Wagnalls New Encyclopedia Vol. 17, p. 345.4 Paul F. Whitman "The Corregidor Massacre - 1968" available at

http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/jabidah.html

4

In December 1976, the Government of the Philippines under the Marcos regime sought the intercession of Libya in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement5 with the MNLF. The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities and an autonomous government in southern Philippines but this provision for autonomy was not implemented. The implementation was only realized upon President Corazon Aquino's term after holding a plebiscite to determine which provinces stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement agree to being part of the proposed autonomous region. Out of the thirteen (13) specified provinces, only four (4) provinces where Muslims are a majority opted to be part of the autonomous region. With this outcome, the government again obtained desistance from the MNLF which accused the former of violating the Tripoli Agreement.

In December 1996, a peace settlement was initiated under President Fidel Ramos in continuance of the preceding administration's advocacy. The Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), headed by Chairman Nur Misuari, was made to be responsible for supervising and coordinating development projects in an area designated as the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). SZOPAD covered all the provinces specified in the Tripoli Agreement. The SPCPD agreement only added one province to the autonomous region and the problem in other areas in Mindanao continued.6

Upon President Joseph Estrada's election in 1998, the MNLF's threat was abated with its support from the government through its members' occupancy of government positions. The threat was now delivered by MILF, a breakaway group of the MNLF. Between the two Moro fronts, the Government's stellar rival is the MILF which is more religion-oriented than the nationalistic-oriented MNLF. An Islamic organization, the MILF became a threat to the country having relations with terrorist and criminal group Abu Sayyaf and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah. MILF has also maintained close relations with Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia, benefiting from their support as member of the Organization of Islamic Conferences. Consequently, Estrada declared an “all-out war policy” in April 2000, mobilizing the military in Mindanao. However, the MILF avoided the government's assault by being divided in smaller groups and hiding in remote areas.5 “The Tripoli Agreement” available at http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/Tripoli-

Agreement-December-23-1976.pdf6 Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco “THE SPCPD and the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement-- the betrayal of

the Bangsa-Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination available at https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.arkibongbayan.org%2F2011%2F2011-01Jan14-Peacetalks%2Fspcpd.rtf&ei=f0ZnU4nIINeUuASslYKgAw&usg=AFQjCNELQdIqu30VuIeCeKlpOPvrpdfKGw&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E

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On July 27, 2008, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's administration initially signed the Memorandum of Agreement – Ancestral Domain, Bangsamoro Juridical Entity which was scheduled to be formally signed on August 5, 2008. However, by virtue of a restraining order of the Supreme Court on August 4, 2008, the signing was stopped. The agreement aimed for the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity7, providing further that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity would have its own internal waters and territorial seas that should only pertain to states. This and other provisions violating the sovereignty of the Philippines were struck down because of its failure to reconcile with the Constitution. The Supreme Court deemed the aforesaid agreement to be unconstitutional on October 14, 2008.

Quandaries on Agreement’s Creation

After the failure of its predecessors, comes the making of the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. On October 7, 2012, the GPH and MILF, parties to the agreement, released by publishing on-line the Framework of Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which will pave the way for the establishment of the new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro, to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The agreement was signed on the afternoon of October 15, 2012, in ceremonies held in the Malacañan Palace, witnessed by President Benigno Aquino III and Malaysian Prime Minister Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak.8

The 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, despite its laudable purpose of promoting peace, contemplates and provides for certain measures which are dubious and essentially unconstitutional.

Grave abuse of discretion in guaranteeing constitutional amendments


8 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 available at http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/20121007-GPH-MILF-Framework-Agreement.pdf

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There is “grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.”9 In the present case, the Peace Negotiationg Panel of the Republic of the Philippines is guaranteeing changes in the Constitution, particularly its replacement of the provisions on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in order to conform with the creation of the Bangsamoro. Regardless of Peace negotiating parties' claim that the framework agreement does not compel any of the parties to work for charter change, charter change is inevitable because the Bangsamoro would not have a constitutional anchor to justify its existence, including the ministerial government expressly stipulated in the agreement and absent in the Constitution, if no amendment is to be made. Their contention that “the major political commitments that were made in the Framework Agreement can be achieved within the flexibilities of the existing constitution” is absurd because the Constitution is a rigid one. Flexibility can only come with changes or amendments. Even if the Constitution allows any citizen to recommend ideas to amend the Constitution through proper legal process10, it is merely a recommendation or a proposal that is allowed, not a guarantee in an agreement of such recommendation or proposal which is beyond the jurisdiction of the peace panel.

The Peace Negotiating Panel has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it guaranteed that there is no need to amend the Constitution, when in truth and in fact, through the agreement's provision stating the creation of the Bangsamoro autonomous political entity in Muslim Mindanao to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, a Constitutional amendment is essential or indispensable. The Agreement virtually states its guarantee to a constitutional amendment when it promised “to work on proposals to amend the Philippine Constitution for the purpose of accommodating and entrenching in the Constitution the agreement of the Parties whenever necessary...”11 The power to guarantee such amendments lies only with those who have been vested the power to make amendments possible. This power belongs ultimately to the legislature and/or the sovereign people it represents as clearly provided by the Constitution in Article XVII. In addition, it bears stressing that this agreement's latest predecessor had been deemed unconstitutional for the very same reason. According to the Supreme Court, no one has the power to commit to amend the Constitution to make it conform to any agreement:

9 Infotech Foundation, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.159139, January 13, 2004.10 Constitution, Article XVII

11 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.4.b.

7

“The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, Peace negotiating parties' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution”(Emphasis supplied)12

Violation of the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.13 The Framework Agreement is such matter of public concern because it shall be decided by the people and its implementation shall bring alterations to the fundamental law that the people have revered. The aforementioned right has been violated for there was failure to give a clear and transparent presentation of what the 2,973-word Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro is all about. Gung-ho as it is with its aims, the Peace negotiating parties failed to abide by the Constitution's provision that “the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest”.14 It leaves the Filipino citizen in confusion by the non-clarification of its provisions.

First, the Framework states that the form of government shall be “ministerial”15. Does this mean that Bangsamoro officials will compose of a prime minister and cabinet members or ministers? The Framework fatally fails to specify on this.

Second, the Framework stipulates an “assymetric relationship”16

between the Bangsamoro and the central government. Assymetric is defined as without symmetry17 Is this stipulation the same as the relationship between China and Vietnam where the former is powerful and the latter the 12 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

13 Constitution, Article III, Section 7

14 Ibid., Article II, Section 28

15 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, I.2.


8

weak one? Which then would be more powerful? This leaves the reader with more questions than answers again.

Third, The Framework's section on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing provides that “The Bangsamoro may create its own auditing body and procedures for accountability over revenues and other funds generated within or by the region from external sources”.18 This statement does not give any distinction as to what auditing body or procedure shall be implemented and is again left to the discretion of the Bangsamoro government. Without limits or restrains, this could lead to the still continuing systemic plunder in ARMM.

Fourth, and most important, the Framework asserts in its Normalization annex that the MILF will be decommissioning its forces.19

However, there is no mention of the MILF surrendering their firearms. There is also no timetable for the MILF's decommissioning of its forces. It should also be taken note of that the MILF, once the agreement is implemented, will metamorphose into members of the army of the Philippines as part of the police force of the Bangsamoro. This means that they will still be able to possess firearms, this time legally. Without the MILF's surrender of firearms, it is possible that not only rebellion in Mindanao will still continue, but the rebels will have access with impunity to the internal organs of the Philippines.

The People of the Philippines are entitled to an in-depth discussion of the above-mentioned matters but were afforded none and were clearly deprived of their right to information and its full disclosure. Ergo, despite its publication of the Agreement, the Peace negotiating parties disseminated very lacking information and violated the people's constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.

Creation of an autonomous political entity for a religious organization

The beneficiary of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro creating a political entity in Muslim Mindanao is undisputedly the followers of the Islam faith. This is due to the fact that the envisioned Bangsamoro

17 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/british/asymmetric visited October 24, 2012

18 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, IV.5.

19 Ibid., VIII.5.9

government will be populated by a Muslim majority. The Framework Agreement states: ”The core territory of the Bangsamoro shall be composed of: (a) the present geographical area of the ARMM; (b) the Municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunugan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of Lanao del Norte and all other barangays in the Municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pagkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite20” These areas that will be incorporated in the creation of Bangsamoro are part of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and are dominated ipso facto by Muslims. The supreme and fundamental law states that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion...”21 and “the separation of Church and State shall be inviolable”22 Hence, the creation then of the Bangsamoro is also the creation of a territory for the MILF, an Islamic organization, and Muslims in general which is prohibited by the Philippine Constitution.

Creation of the Bangsamoro as an autonomous political entity for a minority

As it appears in the published map23 highlighting the areas that will comprise the Bangsamoro Autonomous Political entity, the Bangsamoro territory would encompass a total area larger by a small fraction than the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and, proportionally, a population increased by an almost insignificant percentage. However, the statistics as to the areas and people who are willing to become an integral part of the Bangsamoro government is still subject to a reduction since the contiguous areas, cities and municipalities reckoned by the Agreement may not opt for inclusion in the said entity. This will lead to the creation of the Bangsamoro for a minority which is unconstitutional as this will be an encroachment of the constitutional right of other minorities to equal protection.24 It will be inequitable to the other minorities for they will not be given a government of their own as the Bangsamoro minority will have.

Authorizing a foreign entity to aid and be part of the process in amending the Philippine Constitution

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro provides that: “An international third party monitoring team shall be present to ensure that the process is free, fair, credible, legitimate and in conformity with international

20 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.


22 Id., Section 6



standards”.25 This proviso allowing the intervention of foreign entities to the possible amendment of the Constitution, which has already been established, is reiterated in its section for Transition and Implementation stating that: “There will be created a third party monitoring team to be composed of international bodies, as well as domestic groups to monitor the implementation of all agreements”.26 Both of these stipulations are unconstitutional because it would encroach the independence of the Philippine state by a unilateral and voluntary surrender of sovereignty to foreign power or foreign intervention.

“Intervention is not sanctioned in international relations except only when it is exercised as an act of self-defense or when it is decreed by the Security Council as a preventive or enforcement action for the maintenance of international peace and security.”27

Even the United Nations is bound not to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.28 The Bangsamoro Agreement's inclusion of a foreign party as a monitoring body is surely an unjustifiable intervention. An entity outside the Philippines' area of sovereignty cannot and should never be included in the amendment of the Constitution because it is a violation of this state's independence. If the Bangsamoro Agreement will be implemented, the freedom of the Philippines to control its own affairs will be foisted by foreign entities and its jurisdiction will forever be questioned, not only by other nations but by its own people.

Effects on the Local Government of Muslim Mindanao

The following issues pertain to the last three of the four annexes of the Bangsamoro Agreement which have been signed later than the annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities due to their intricate nature.

25 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.2.

26 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.11.

27 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p.102.

28 U.N. Charter, Art. 2(7)11

Normalization

Among the annexes included in the final draft of the agreement is the Annex on Normalization. Normalization was defined as “ a process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of a sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society” 29 This part of the Agreement enjoins the decommissioning of the MILF’s armed wing, redeployment of government forces within the Bangsamoro, clearing of unexploded mines in once battlefront areas; disbanding of private armed groups (PAGs), socio-economic support to former combatants, transitional justice, and grant of amnesty or pardon to persons who committed “offenses connected to the armed conflict in Mindanao.” An Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) shall see that these undertakings shall be achieved.

As good as the annex sounds, the decommissioning cannot be expected to happen in a fortnight and there are still dissatisfied members of the MILF. The fact remains that they have long been in antagonistic efforts against the government and the immobilization and disarming of their forces would become a foreign idea. There is also no mention that other Moro fronts such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) will succumb to the disarmament process. The working tandem of the government and the MILF’s pursuit to a peaceful autonomous entity through disbanding private armies is yet to be witnessed.

Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing

Aside from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) that the local government of Mindanao will be automatically appropriated, the Bangsamoro shall benefit from the income brought by taxes and natural resources. The Agreement’s annex on wealth sharing mandates that the powers that were previously devolved to the ARMM’s local government on revenue generation will be reassigned to the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro will be given the authority to create its own sources of revenue as well as 29 Annex on Normalization available at https://www.google.com.ph/url?

sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fopapp.gov.ph%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FAnnex%2520on%2520Normalization_0.pdf&ei=fsJnU-mJEMeD8gXzloDoDg&usg=AFQjCNGQLU2YVvqF5m-ZqSu9sAxNsfjAXg&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E

12

enjoy 75 percent of revenue for taxes and charges "other than tariff and custom duties" collected within its jurisdiction.30

In this geopolitical world, the natural resources of a territory must also be utilized for income generation of the local government and the benefit of the general public. It is not unbeknownst that Mindanao, particularly the areas that are covered by the Agreement, abounds in acreages of natural resources. Thus, the Agreement seeks a 75-25 arrangement in favor of the Bangsamoro for profits from metallic minerals. A hundred percent of revenues from non-metallic minerals (sand, gravel and quarry resources) will also go to Bangsamoro. In addition to this, there will be an "equal share" between the Bangsamoro government and the central government for income from energy sources, such as petroleum, natural gas and uranium.31

As shown above, the ratios in profit sharing provides the Bangsamoro entity a larger aliquot and a different scheme from the usual centralized system wherein local governments are required to give to the government their income before their shares are distributed to them.

Power Sharing

The entrenchment of the Bangsamoro would eventually make the local government of Muslim Mindanao into the equivalent of an independent state but with finances or expenses provided by the Philippine state. According to the Agreement:

The Central Government shall have powers on:

a) Defense and external security

b) Foreign policy

c) Common market and global trade, provided that the power to enter into economic agreements already allowed under Republic Act. 9054 shall be transferred to the Bangsamoro

30 Angela Casauay “GPH-MILF agree on wealth sharing” July 13, 2013 available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/33659-gph-milf-agree-wealth-sharing

31 Angela Casauay “Bangsamoro gets 75% of taxes, resources” July 14, 2013 available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/special-coverage/peacetalks/33714-bangsamoro-gets-75-of-taxes-natural-resources

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d) Coinage and monetary policy

e) Citizenship and naturalization

f) Postal service32

Even without the powers mentioned in the above-stated list, the Bangsamoro can become a state upon its implementation and not merely a “sub-state” as the Peace negotiating parties claim it is. A state is “a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience”33 In order for a state to become independent, it only needs the elements which are territory, people, government and sovereignty. These elements are just waiting to be accorded to the Bangsamoro through its establishment.

Under the rule of par in parem non habet imperium, even the strongest state cannot assume jurisdiction over another state, no matter how weak, or question the validity of its acts in so far as they are made to take effect within its own territory. All states including the smallest and least influential are also entitled to their dignity and the protection of their honor and reputation.34 The creation of the Bangsamoro which could independently work as a state would make this political autonomous entity into an equal of the Philippine state. The making of the Bangsamoro “state” is definitely unconstitutional. The Philippines cannot create a state within itself because the Constitution recognizes only the Philippine state. If the agreement wishes to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, it should only give the Bangsamoro the powers of a special local government unit and not the transcendent powers of a state.

The establishment of the Bangsamoro will also infringe the archipelago doctrine, under which we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so many thousand islands.35

Once Bangsamoro assumes its identity as a state, there is no telling if the

32 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, III.2.

33 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.

34 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p. 106.

35 Cruz, Phil. Pol. Law, 1987, p. 16.

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conflict in Mindanao will end for there will surely be a territorial dispute and other controversies. Moreover, Bangsamoro will certainly, once asked by it, be recognized by the Muslim and Arab nations in the international community which the Philippines will be unable to stop.

“The recognition of a new state is the free act by which one or more states acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of a human society politically organized, independent of any other existing state, and capable of observing the obligations of international law, and by which they manifest therefore their intention to consider it a member of the international community.”36

Should the Bangsamoro Agreement, upon the creation of a new autonomous entity, fail to make good on its provisions resulting to its inability to realize the undertakings for peace in Mindanao, turmoil will ensue. The Philippines will certainly find itself with a tapered territory, lessened populace, undermined government and retrenched sovereignty as it becomes the laughing-stock of its fellow nations for having done all these to itself.

Conclusion

The final draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law that will repeal Republic Act 9054, providing for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, has already been submitted to the President for his approval. Whether it will be a “shaky promise” or a “milestone” shall soon be determined by the entire Philippines. However, one thing is inevitable – a shift in the government once the Agreement has become legally instituted. If peace is to really reign in Mindanao, then the creators of the Bangsamoro

36 Art. I. Institute de Droit International.15

entity will have achieved their goal of delivering peace to the Mindanaoans. In the meantime, the boggled minds of Filipinos as to certain aspects of the Bangsamoro Basic Law will still have to be quelled. The citizens are rightfully entitled to be assured that such law is not merely a ploy to enrich a distinct group but a system to pave the way for better government in the country. Nevertheless, amidst all odds, every Filipino must endeavour to seek what is beneficial to his homeland and his countrymen. If a threat should emerge, it should be snuffed out before it can become a menace. Thus, the Bangsamoro Agreement will have to pass the scrutiny of the people in order to receive a judgment rendering it able to prove its true and, hopefully, noble intent.

16

Bibliography

1 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Brief Background on the Moro Struggle (June 6, 2011, 17:38), available at http://oppap.gov.ph/milf/brief-background-moro-struggle

2 Framework Agreement of the Bansamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://oppap.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0

3 Funk and Wagnalls New Encyclopedia Vol. 17, p. 345.

4 Paul F. Whitman "The Corregidor Massacre - 1968" available at http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/jabidah.html

5 “The Tripoli Agreement” available at http://pdcspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/Tripoli-Agreement-December -23-1976.pdf

6 Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco “THE SPCPD and the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement-- the betrayal of the Bangsa-Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination available at https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.arkibongbayan.org%2F2011%2F2011-01Jan14-Peacetalks%2Fspcpd.rtf&ei=f0ZnU4nIINeUuASslYKgAw&usg=AFQjCNELQdIqu30VuIeCeKlpOPvrpdfKGw&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E


8 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 available at http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/20121007-GPH-MILF-Framework-Agreement.pdf

9 Infotech Foundation, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.159139, January 13, 2004.

10 Constitution, Article XVII

11 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.4.b.

12 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008


14 Ibid., Article II, Section 28

17



17 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/british/ asymmetric visited October 24, 2012

18 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, IV.5.

19 Ibid., VIII.5.

20 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.


22 Id., Section 6

23 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://oppap.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0


25 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.2.

26 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.11.

27 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p.102.

28 U.N. Charter, Art. 2(7)

29 Annex on Normalization available at https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fopapp.gov.ph%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FAnnex%2520on%2520Normalization_0.pdf&ei=fsJnU-mJEMeD8gXzloDoDg&usg=AFQjCNGQLU2YVvqF5m - ZqSu9sAxNsfjAXg&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E

30 Angela Casauay “GPH-MILF agree on wealth sharing” July 13, 2013 available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/33659-gph-milf-agree-wealth-sharing

31 Angela Casauay “Bangsamoro gets 75% of taxes, resources” July 14, 2013 available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/special-coverage/peacetalks/33714-bangsamoro-gets-75-of-taxes-natural-resources

32 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, III.2.

18

33 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.

34 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p. 106.

35 Cruz, Phil. Pol. Law, 1987, p. 16.

36 Art. I. Institute de Droit International.

PRAYER

19

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this term paper be admitted as a partial requirement in the subject Law on Public Corporations, AY 2013-2014.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

6 May 2014, Iloilo City, Philippines

ROZ LOURDIZ P. CAMACHO

Second Year Student, Section C

University of San Agustin, College of Law

Gen. Luna St., Iloilo City, Philippines, 5000

I.D. No. 7600069591

[email protected]

+6399 8385 8110

20

an analysis on the constitutionality and effects of the framework agreement on the bangsamoro on the...

Documents

philippine government

muslim traders

brief background

moro struggle

peace process

public corporationsroz

autonomous political

brief historyat