ams-02 permanent magnet

1ESCG\L. D. Hill

AMS-02 Permanent Magnet

Safety Impact

AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010

AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010 2ESCG\L. D. Hill

General Safety Approach• Building on Existing AMS-02 Safety Analysis and

documentation• Following Order of Precedence of Hazard Control in

New Hazard Analysis• Remove Hazards Eliminated by design change.

• Establish if New Hazards Created• Examine Rationale for Design for Minimizing Risk

• New and altered DFMR• Examine Active/Automatic Control Methodologies for

Hazards for Impact• Examine use of Procedural Controls/Warnings


General Safety Approach

• Update to Hazards• Review Validity of Existing Causes• Look for New/Changed Causes

• Review Validity of Existing Controls• Look for New/Changed Controls

• Review Validity of Existing Verifications• Look for New/Changed Verifications


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F01 – Structures• New/Changed Structures and Loading Conditions

• Control 1.1 may require update• VC becomes Vented Structure

• Control 1.5 may require update• New Materials

• New Composite Structural Elements• Control 10.1 may need updating to reflect protection

methodology of new carbon fiber planes/containment • Plane 1N to use heaters in conjunction with composite

structures.• Add Control 1.7 for heater control methodology.


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F01 (cont)• New Fasteners/Heritage Fasteners• Control 4.1 may require update (Quality)• Control 5.1 may require update (Backoff)

• No Welding of Structures with PM• Change Controls of Cause 6 (Welding) to address

heritage welded structure of permanent Magnet• Removal of Non-linear Straps• Remove Control 1.2• Remove Cause 8


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F02 – Offgassing • No changes made to DDRS-02 in Orbiter• DDRS ISS will be documented separated from

AMS-02


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F03 – Cryogenic System• Cryomagnet System Removed• Withdraw Hazard Report


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F04 – Over P Payload Bay

• Super Fluid Helium Tank Removed• Remove Cause 1• Remove Cause 2

• Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed• Remove Cause 3

• TTCS fill quantity may change• Control 5.1 will require modification to reflect change. • TTCS will have new components and unwelded connections.

• Cryocoolers and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed• Remove Control 5.2, 5.6

• Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) Loop Heat Pipe Removed• Remove Control 5.5

• Alterations in Blanket/MLI Usage• Reopen review of applications for blockage issues.


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F05 – Pressurized Systems• Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed

• Remove Control 1.3, 5.2, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2• Update Control 10.1 to remove Warm Helium Gas Supply

• Cryocoolers/Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed• Remove Control 1.10, 1.11, 5.8, 8.8, 8.9

• CAB Heat Pipe/ Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Update Control 1.8, 8.6 to delete CAB HP.• Remove Control 1.9, 5.7, 8.7

• TTCS Modified• Update Control 1.4, 5.3, 8.4, 8.11 for fill quantity change and any

impact to MDP• New loop and components, non-welded connections to be used.


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F06 – Thrust/Overturning Moments

• All Cryosystem Sources Removed• Remove Control 1.1, 1.3, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5• Update 2.1 for removal of cryosystem vents• Update 2.3 for the removal of Warm Helium Supply and it’s fill caps• Remove Cause 5, Sloshing of Superfluid Helium

• All Warm Helium Sources Removed• Remove Source of Thrust Potential

• Magnetic Field has new characteristics• Update Control 4.1 to reflect lower magnetic field intensity and its resulting

torque difference.• Magnetic Field can not be shut off

• Control 4.2 needs to be changed to address compatibility of AMS-02 PM field with the Orbiter, SRMS and SSRMS

• Magnetic Field is no longer variable• Remove Control 4.3 (Quench)


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic• Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying• Substantial rewrite of Controls 1.1 reflect Permanent

Magnet design.• Control 1.2,review to confirm TIA-310 valid as it

envelopes the reduced magnetic field.• Sub. rewrite of Control 1.3 to reflect Permanent

Magnet does not interfere with Robotic Operations on ISS, Remove required to dissipate field Control 1.11.


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic (Cont)• Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying (Cont)

• Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address compatibility with Orbiter Operations.

• Remove Control 1.5 ,1.7, 1.8, 1.9 addressing charging/discharging controls

• Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address EVA compatibility of new field

• Remove Cause 3 for charging/discharging effects of magnetic fields on other systems/structures

• EMI sources from CAB will have to be accounted for in EMI testing results.


Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F08 – Electric Shock/Discharge• Remove CAB/Cryocoolers• Revise Control 2.7 to remove Cryocoolers and CAB

heaters• Removed Uninterruptible Power Supply• Remove Control 1.2

• New Structure Inside open VC• Revisit Bonding Implementation in Control 2.2

• No Helium Source• Revise Control 4.1 to remove helium as a released

neutrally charged gas


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F10 – Flammable Materials• Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed• Remove Control 2.3 to reflect removal of propylene

• CAB Heat Pipe/Loop Heat Pipe Removed• Remove Control 2.4

• AMS-02 requires no Power on for Ascent• Update Control 3.1 to reflect no power during ascent


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F11 – Mechanism Failure• No Mechanisms Add, Removed or Altered• No changes to Causes or Control required


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F12 – Mate/Demate of Connectors• Remove UPS• Remove Control 1.4

• EVA Connector Swap to allow for magnet charging after power loss no longer required• Still a viable opportunity for the AMS-02 as a

contingency EVA action, Control 1.1 must be rewritten to accurately reflect the new configuration.


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F13 – Battery Failure• UPS Removed• Withdraw hazard report


Hazard Report• AMS-02-F14 – EVA Operations Hazard• New Hardware

• Review of new hardware/modified hardware for possible sharp edges/ corners/ entrapment• Potential impact to Control 3.1

• New Heaters• Need to review for EVA accessibility/thermal control

• Potential impact to Control 4.2

• Cryogenic System Removed• Control 4.3 rewritten to remove references to extreme cold

impingement potential• Fixed Magnetic Field

• Control 8.2 updated to new field strength (entrapment of crew)


Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F16 – Shatterable Material Release• New Tracker Planes Added• New Tracker enclosure Plane• New Design of Tracker planes and replacement plane

for plane number 1 must be designed and build in the spirit of Control 1.6 and Control 1.6 updated to reflect details of implementation and new verifications.


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F17 – EPDS Damage• UPS Removed• Remove Control 2.2


Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F18 – Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfig.• Cryomagnet replaced with Fixed Magnet that can

not be switched on and off.• Control 2.2 rewritten to reflect the lower intensity and

lack of charging/discharging• Removal of Cryosystem, Opening of VC• Control 3.2 Revised to remove VC and Helium tank from

Control parenthetical note


Hazard Reports• AMS-02-F20 – Lasers• Removal of Plane Number 1 LBBXs

• Half of LFCR outputs will no longer be utilized, ports will be blocked.• Update Control 1.1 to clarify use of laser output• Update Control 1.1 or add Control 2.7 to address use of blocking

connectors to close off unused laser ports.• Update Control 2.6 to remove reference to “top” tracker plane (Plane

number 1.)

• Possible reconfiguration of thermal blankets• Control 2.6 references that the fiber optics are routed

exclusively under MLI/blankets. In reconfiguration of AMS-02 Thermal Management, all blankets may not required and installed.


Hazard Reports

• STD-AMS-02-F02 – 1230 DDRS-02• No Changes


Verifications• Previous pages did not highlight verifications that have

already been identified as potentially being impacted by this redesign.• Verifications that are no longer relevant• Verifications that have to be reexamined for applicability• Verifications that must be reopened and closured activities

redone• New Verifications

• The plan is to review all Verifications that move forward in the safety process to confirm their status.

• A new SVTL will be developed in conjunction with a new Verification Tracking Tool.


Safety Review

• All updated safety documentation will be processed through the Payload Safety Review Panel in accordance with NSTS/ISS 13830.• DDRS ISS will be processed separately through the

applicable safety processes

ams-02 permanent magnet

Documents

pm design review

hazard control

strapsremove control

existing ams

design change

hillhazard reportsams

ttcs modifiedupdate

heater control methodology