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Brexit and Historical Precedent: The Dangers of Underestimating the SNP
by
Stacey Gorski Spring
PhD CandidateDepartment of Political Science
Boston University
Working paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association’s Short Course:
“Brexit and Beyond: Implications for British and European Politics”29 August 2018
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Abstract: The Scottish National Party (SNP) has achieved unprecedented electoral success in recent years—both in comparison to its history and that of other separatist-regionalist parties in substantive democracies of Western Europe and Canada. To read the 2017 General Election as a sign of SNP decline is short-sighted: the party’s 35 seats are still the second-highest in its history. The rise of the SNP can be viewed as an evolution that started in the 1960s, as it has capitalized on key political opportunities, especially moments of potential institutional change, increasing its media saliency and membership while strategically engaging its independence narrative depending upon context and conditions. From the outset of the Brexit referendum, the Conservatives ignored the strategic position of the SNP. Continuing to do so through the Brexit negotiations—and especially afterwards—could spell disaster for the United Kingdom as Scots will likely vote again—this time to choose which union they prefer. If the Brexit Bill passes over Holyrood objections, the SNP can present its traditional narrative of Westminster ignoring Scottish interests—and push for another independence referendum. If Brexit stalls or, most unlikely, is reversed, the SNP can still claim a short-term political victory as the protector of Scotland against the imposition of English interests—and then call for a referendum to prevent future such infringements. Given the lose-lose position of the Tories in relation to the SNP, any scenario not resulting in a second independence referendum is hard to fathom, but it accommodating such a request should be viewed with great skepticism by those hoping to preserve the United Kingdom.
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Few institutions in this world are as powerful as a centralized state in a long-standing
substantive democracy. Thus, it is not surprising that in substantive democracies many Stateless
Nationalist Regionalist Parties (SNRPs), which advocate in a particular region for increased
autonomy from the existing central state, languish in relative obscurity especially. These parties
face a wide range of barriers to entry—not only in the existing systems of government, elections,
and linkage to the people through the media but also in their own platforms which call for the
destruction of the current constitutional order and the reorganization of state power. Yet, despite
these barriers, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in the U.K. has established itself as an
electoral competitor at both the regional and national levels of governance and then used that
support to garner an unsuccessful, at least in terms of achieving independence, referendum. This
party in particular seems to have managed the unenviable task of trying to be taken seriously
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when they are calling into question over 300 years of state organization in one of the world’s
most stable and successful democracies.
Part of the SNP’s rise can be explained by sharp growth following political opportunities,
which often took the form of potential (or actual) institutional change. While the first round of
debate surrounding devolution, in the 1970s, did not end with the creation of a regional
government, the SNP did learn valuable lessons for future engagement with the process,
especially as some members most frustrated in 1979 by the “independence or nothing” viewpoint
would go on to be in party leadership by the 1990s and would support the more gradualist
approach of devolution. In the 1990s, the SNP engaged in the devolution debates and had the
first significant opportunity to present themselves both at various public events and in the media
as being on par with the U.K.’s two big parties. The resulting creation of the Scottish Parliament
granted the SNP its first substantial representational opportunities—as the official opposition in
this regional body. Then, despite institutional barriers intended to prevent a single-party majority
in Scotland, the SNP mustered the first-ever (and so far only) majority government in 2011
before coming up five seats short of a repeat in 2016. Even in losing the 2014 independence
referendum, the SNP managed to emerge from the process as the third largest party in the U.K.
—again increasing its media presence. In these cases, the opportunity itself was not enough
(otherwise similar levels of success would have transpired in Wales by now); instead, the party
leaders and members had to capitalize with proper organization, resources, and messaging—a
form of agency unrecognized in a significant portion of work concerning this party type.
When the Conservative Party promised a Brexit referendum during the 2015 General
Election in effort to accommodate the right portions of the party that were growing increasingly
anti-European in sentiment, there was little consideration for the effects on Scotland as a whole
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—or the rise of the SNP who had been defeated at the polls in the 2014 referendum. As the SNP
was a regional party with minimal representation at Westminster (6 seats going into the 2015
General Election), there was little reason for the Tories to consider how the Brexit vote could
potentially underscore a substantive difference between England and Scotland. However, Scots
voted in a record 56 SNP MPs—as the party campaigned on “Standing up for Scotland” and
listed in its manifesto opposition to the EU referendum. The end result is three different levels of
constitutional crisis: one in how to disengage from the EU altogether, another on how to do so
while also considering the roles of devolved governments in certain policy areas, and finally how
to address the fact that electoral maps seem increasingly to be reflective of a case for Scottish
separatism at worst and a substantive north-south divide at best.
When the SNP lost 21 seats in the 2017 U.K. General Election, the reason was fairly
clear—Nicola Sturgeon’s claim that Brexit should mean another independence referendum
scared some 2015 SNP voters away. However, the SNP currently occupies 35 seats—which is
still the party’s second-best performance ever in Westminster elections. While the SNP is only a
part of the opposition, its potential in the Brexit scenarios is significant. If the Brexit Bill
passes over Holyrood objections, the SNP can present its now age-old narrative of Westminster
ignoring Scottish interests—and push for another independence referendum. If Brexit stalls or is
put to a second referendum, the SNP can arguably claim a historic political victory as the
protector of Scotland against the imposition of English interests—and still call for a referendum
on independence in order to prevent future such confrontations and to secure greater
representation for Scotland in the institutions of the EU (something the SNP has been touting
since the 1980s as a benefit of independence).
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This paper is organized into three sections and utilizes archival work on the SNP, existing
scholarship, and SNP election manifestos. The first portion establishes the SNP as an outlier
even among similar parties in Western Europe and Canada and explores the aspects of existing
literature on regionalist and separatist parties which have underexplained SNP success—
suggesting a need to study the SNP with greater consideration of its own agency especially with
regards to the party’s relationship with the media, its communicative discourse, and its strategic
deployment of its independence platform. The second section explores the historical precedents
of SNP breakthroughs, and then using these historical precedents, offers an evaluation of the
current conditions surrounding Brexit. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding the
continued likelihood of SNP pressure to hold a second independence referendum—and the
possible frames the party will continue to employ in its long-established discourse in making the
case for independence.
SNP “Exceptionalism” among similar parties
After being treated as “revolts, throwbacks, peripheral or niche parties” in a variety of
work spanning 1983-2008, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) have become
permanent fixtures in Europe and have begun to be treated as such in academic work (Hepburn-
2011,1). The shift certainly has to do with the increased electoral support of several of these
parties across states in Europe and Canada, as the more successful ones have moved “from niche
to ‘normal’” –having expanded their party platforms to address other issues as they compete in
the “multi-level and multi-dimensional politics” of Europe (Hepburn-2011, 11-15).
Certainly, all these factors are true for the SNP—and in expanding platforms and tackling
multi-level elections and messaging, they have out-performed every party among the separatist
parties in Western Europe and Canada, thus requiring careful consideration as an “extreme case.”
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The extreme value case bounds the population and illustrates the causal processes (Gerring-2008,
217-18); by process of elimination, the SNP is clearly the extreme case of separatist party
success. Careful consideration of the SNP’s evolution can reveal at least one process in regard to
how a separatist party can transform from the fringe to the mainstream via its own agency—and
despite its platform to redesign the constitutional order. On this basis alone, the two main
parties’ calculations with regards to Brexit outcomes should give careful consideration to the
potential of the SNP, as they are, and have come, closer than any other party to achieving their
independence aspirations. And, as will be discussed later, the SNP’s most important
breakthroughs have happened under similar conditions—in moments of potential constitutional
change when granted political opportunity via major party accommodation, all the while being
underestimated.
Especially when participating in long-standing substantive democracies, regional parties
that seek independence are positioned against a significant barrier in the form of the centralized
state; however, these parties are a subset of a larger group of regional parties. A broad definition
of a “regional” party is a party that functions in one region of a larger state, presents candidates
in that region, limits where it runs based on that territorial claim, and states political objectives
“defending” that region (DeWinter and Tursan-1998), while “entho-regionalist parties” are
frequently, and similarly, defined as having sub-national territorial borders, a group identity, and
stances that “challeng[e] the working order” (Muller-Rommel-1998 in Dandoy-2010). All told,
“regionalist parties defend the interests of their collective identity groups, with particular
emphasis on territorial autonomy and capacity goals” (Jolly-2015, 18).
Among substantive democracies in Western Europe and Canada there are a number of
parties that could be considered regionalist, and these lists are quite fluid as there are any number
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of fringe parties that either are small in number or limited in lifespan. Among the “successful”
parties, 108 have posted candidates in either regional or state-level elections since 1970 and
about half (49 of the 108 parties) have ever advocated separatism. 1 (See Appendix A: Regional
Parties in Western Europe and Canada.)
Of the 49 with any “separatist” claims in its history, even fewer have experienced any
form of electoral success—let alone sustained presence in elections—at the regional and national
levels. Of the parties with a “separatist” classification, 14 never held seats at either the national
or regional level and two parties, while two other held seats only at the national level: Bloc
Québécois is a coalition that only runs in federal elections and the Scottish Labour Party (SCLP,
1976-1981) won a seat in the U.K. Parliament in 1979. Otherwise, 16 other parties have won
regional seats, and 17 parties have won seats simultaneously at both the national and regional
levels.
Of these 17 which have successfully seated representatives at both the national and
federal level, there is a range of success as well. Two parties won a national seat just once: the
Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People, UP) which was an eight-year long
electoral coalition that won a seat in the 1979 Spanish elections and Aralar (AR) in Basque,
Spain held one seat as part of a coalition in the Spanish Parliament and four seats in the Navarre
1 Emanuele Massetti and Arjan Schakel listed 76 regionalist parties in their 2016 study on the ideologies of regionalist parties. Their list in another study includes parties that ran in federal since 1950 or regional elections since 1970 onward in the EU-15 plus Canada and Switzerland (Massetti and Schakel-2015). Seth Jolly’s research on regionalist parties in Western Europe identified 56 that have competed in at least one federal election since 1950 (Jolly-2015), and his prior work also included Initiative for Catalonia (IC) which was added here (Jolly-2007). While some of the included parties are predecessors of other parties on the list, together the three studies provide 108 different political parties in these substantive democracies that have contested elections—either at the regional or national level—in a specific region of a larger state. Using Dandoy’s typology for enthno-regionalist parties in Europe, each of the 108 parties have been categorized based on the relative strength of the party’s self-government commitment: separationist, federalist, protectionist, or ambiguous (Dandoy-2010). Separatism is the strongest claim—seeking a separate state. Then, federalism is a call for increased autonomy while protectionist claims are slightly weaker—and are aimed at protecting cultural or existing institutions of protection for the group. Finally, “ambiguous” is for periods where the party’s manifestos and other communications (such as its web site) did not emphasize any particular self-government claim. Massetti and Shakel 2016 utilized Dandoy’s typology for the 76 parties in their study, and I have added classifications for the 25 parties that they did not include and changed their listing for 11 parties’ ideology on self-government. In each case, I “upgraded” the classification—in 9 cases to “separationist” and in two cases to “federalist” from protectionist. These changes are shown in italics in the Appendix and are based on the party’s web site.
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Assembly in the early 2000s but otherwise held no seats. Others have had electoral success at
the regional and national levels but not necessarily while also advocating for independence. For
example, Lega Nord had a period in the late 1990s where it ran more forcibly on its
independence platform, but it has softened its stance in more recent years and has not held seats
at both levels while also maintaining a clearly separatist agenda. Similarly, the Galician
Nationalist Bloc (BNG) was only separationist from 1970s-1986 and did not challenge the
national elections then. Finally, two electoral coalitions have experienced success at the national
levels. Convergència i Unió, (Convergence and Union, CiU) which united Democratic
Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) in Catalonia,
split on basis of disagreements about independence and was only more clearly separationist after
2014—shortly after which the coalition dissolved.2 Likewise, Nafarroa Bai (Yes to Navarre,
NB), a coalition of Basque parties that existed from 2003-2011, held seats in both the Navarre
Parliament and the Cortes General (Spain’s lower house) for two election cycles before
dissolving.
Discounting these one-time parties, dissolved voting coalitions, and the parties which
have been separatist at some point but not while winning national and regional representation,
there are just 10 parties3 that have won seats at both the national and regional level since 1950
while actively advocating for separatism, and only seven of those parties currently exist.
Additionally, only five of the existing parties have been able to sustain an electoral presence—
which is measured as having simultaneous representation at the national and regional level for
two or more election cycles while advocating for separatism. (See Table 1.)
Table 1. Regional-separatist parties which have won at national and regional level since 1950Region, State Party Existence Persistence?
2 Massetti and Shakel categorize CiU as “Federalist (1970s-1998 and 2002-2007); Ambiguous (1998-2002; and after 2007)” (Massetti and Shakel-2016, 71). 3 Counting, in this case, Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang as the same party.
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Flanders, Belgium Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, NV-A)
2001- Y
Flanders, Belgium Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB) (previously Vlaams Blok, VB)
2004- Y
Flanders, Belgium Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) 1954-2001 NFaroe Islands, Denmark Tjóôvedldi (Republic, E) 1948- YBavaria, Germany Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) 1946- NSardinia, Italy Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action
Party, PSdAz)1921- N
Basque, Spain Herri Batasuana (United People, HB) 1979-2001 YCatalonia, Spain Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya
(Republican Left in Catalonia, ERC)1931- N
Scotland, U.K. Scottish National Party (SNP) 1934- YWales, U.K. Plaid Cyrmu (Party of Wales, PC) 1925- Y
Both Volksunie (VU) and Herri Batasuana (HB) have folded in recent years. Volksunie did not
meet the measure of persistence because it only held a secessionist position in the 1990s—when
it did manage to hold both regional and federal seats before folding in 2001. HB is an outlier
from the outset, as it was not necessarily like these others in regard to seeking a peaceful
resolution to autonomy interests. Thus, as a party, it did not take seats it won—except at the
local level—and was dissolved by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2001 for its association with
terrorism.
The Republican Left in Catalonia (ERC), Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) and Partido
Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) fail to meet the persistence measures. ERC
was only clearly separationist from 1989-1996 (Massetti and Schakel-2016, 71)—thus only
lasting two election cycles with the stronger call for sovereignty. In the case of BP, the party did
hold 17 seats in the German bundestag in 1949 and won seats as part of a coalition in 1953, but it
has not had national seats since. At regional level, BP won 17.9% in 1950 and has not held seats
at the regional level since 1962. In 2012, the party did earn 2.1% of vote in regional elections—
its highest level since 1966. However, the party has minimal influence. As for PSdAz, it has
only held seats through coalitions. Eve Hepburn’s work explains the inconsistencies in this
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particular case—much of which has to do with NOT organizing at different levels of government
(Hepburn-2009).
Thus, five truly regional-separatist parties have, since 1950, managed to win seats at both
the national and regional level in two or more consecutive election cycles. These parties are the
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, Tjóôvedldi (“Republic,”
E) in Denmark, and the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Paid Cymru (PC) in the U.K. Of
these five, the SNP is the most successful electorally at the regional and national levels. (See
Fig. 1 and 2.) At the regional level, SNP has reached 30% or higher in three successive election
cycles. Only two other parties have ever even crossed the 30% mark—the N-VA in its 2014
election and Plaid in 1999, the first regional election ever held in the U.K.
Fig. 1: Regional Electoral Results for Most Successful Regional-Separatist Parties
N-VA VB E SNP Plaid0.00%5.00%
10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%30.00%35.00%40.00%45.00%50.00%
1995-19981999-20022003-20062007-20102011-20142015-2018
At the national level, the numbers are less easy to compare, especially since a party like
Tjóôvedldi only contests the two seats that represent Faroe. In Belgium, the Flemish language
group has 88 seats while Scotland has 59 seats in the U.K. Parliament and Wales, 40. However,
again, the SNP exceeds the results of the other parties having twice earned more than 30% of the
vote in the region during a national election.
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Fig. 2: National Election Seats Won by Regional-Separatist Parties
N-VA VB E SNP PC0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2011 2012-2016 2017-2018
% o
f vot
e
Despite including parties from Canada and Switzerland in the list of 108 parties, all 10 of
these electorally successful regionalist-separatist parties are in the European Union—a point
which has long been established in a general consensus that European integration encourages
sub-national mobilization in member states (Jolly-2006; Nagel-2004, and Laible-2008). Another
explanation of this result is that Quebec’s parties choosing to organize through separate
organizations at the national and regional level, but a large factor is also that the EU makes
smaller states viable (Jolly-2006) in terms of economics and security while also advocating for
democracy and human rights. Jolly explained how regionalist party support has increased (across
western Europe) as integration in the EU has deepened (Jolly-2015). Janet Laible wrote about
the cases of Scottish National Party and the Flemish Vlaams Belang as she explored how the EU
created more political space for nationalists and how nationalism has—and has not—evolved in
Europe. Her two cases were the most electorally successful in Europe a decade ago and remain
so: underlying her work is the idea that these successful parties are made more successful with
the increased exposure via the EU (Laible-2008). For all five parties with sustained electoral
support, these explanations remain applicable.
While some authors argue that multiple levels of government increase these parties’ policy
influence and can help them maximize voter support (Elias and Tronconi-2011, 513; Brancati-
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2008), multi-level elections actually provide even greater challenges to these separatist political
parties, as they have to engage resources—and audiences—in entirely different contexts. The
phrase “multi-level governance” was first defined by Gary Marks as “a system of continuous
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks-1993, 392). Each of
those contexts requires a different set of skills as well as candidates. Thus, when the parties in
Quebec, Catalonia, and Basque choose to align in coalitions at the national (and European level
for the Spanish regions), there is less pressure on an individual organization to develop multiple
levels of communication and strategy. It is this diversity of demands on the Belgian, Danish, and
U.K. parties that sets them apart in the context of regionalist-separatist parties that are successful,
as they face the challenges—and meet them—in organizing at different levels of elections.
Other explanations for the success and viability of regionalist parties include multivariate
regression analyses, and they have explained the Belgian and Danish cases well but have under-
predicted both Scotland and Wales. In his review of the literature and his own analysis, Jolly
considered the origin of support (meaning the demographics of those voting for the regional
parties), the variable of language difference, the viability of the region to function on its own,
political economy arguments (meaning the region’s unemployment or tax rate versus the rest of
the state), and the role of integration (Jolly-2006, 41-76). Previously, Sorens (2005) did a cross-
sectional analysis of secession in advanced countries that indicated that the presence of a
regional language, a recent independence (since 1648), high income, and big population as well
as aspects of location (especially falling into one existing state—unlike the Basque case, for
example) indicate increased chances of secession support. Sorens’s study under-predicted
Scotland and Wales—but fit both the Belgian cases and Denmark well. “…It appears,” Sorens
wrote, well before the SNP’s recent historic victories, “that Welsh and even Scottish nationalists
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should be congratulated for achieving electoral success well beyond what base conditions seem
to support” (Sorens-2005, 321). Thus, a search for a more complete explanation of the Scottish
case continues.
Alternatively, institutional explanations of conditions that should impact the relative
strength of ethno-regionalist parties at large would again seem to support the Danish and Flemish
case but does not adequately account for the Scottish and Welsh cases. Several factors can
minimize regionalist party influence: “presidentialism, majority systems, and election
concurrency” (Brancati-2008, 158) as well as unitary systems (Harmel and Robertson-1985;
Willey-1998). None of the three countries in consideration have presidential systems. In
Belgium, there are proportional representation rules at all levels of government, it is a federal
state, and generally there is not election concurrency. Their European and regional elections are
held together but usually the federal is separate—except in the case of 2014 when all three levels
were held at the same time. During that 2014 “super” election cycle, the N-VA no longer
“emphasize[d] the end of Belgium in its manifesto” (Baudewyns, Dandoy, and Reuchamps-2015,
94). Denmark, on the other hand, is unitary, sometimes has concurrent elections, and is
proportional. However, the Faroe Islands has been self-governing since 1948 and is treated as a
“third country” by the European Union (Adler-Nissen-2014); the islands, via The Takeover Act
of 2005, now has been granted unilateral legislative and administrative powers except on issues
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, foreign, security and defense policy and monetary and
currency matters.4 So while Denmark itself is a unitary state, the Faroe Islands do not function
as part of that highly centralized system, and the islands’ parliament has more areas of
competency than the regional parliaments of the U.K., for example. Therefore, Faroe does
function outside a unitary system, has non-concurrent elections to its legislature and the Danish
4 Takeover Act of the Faroe Islands. Danish Act no. 578. 24 June 2005.
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parliament, and utilizes a proportional system. Finally, the U.K., unlike both Flanders and the
Faroe Islands, has both concurrent elections and a majority system at the U.K. level. So both PC
and the SNP seem to defy these factors as well—though the SNP to a greater extent.
Thus, it would seem that European integration, multi-level governance, permissive
national governments, and lack of presidentialism help all five parties; however, while the
Belgian and Danish cases are well explained by statistical analyses of the viability of regional
parties as well as the presence of non-current elections and proportional systems, the cases in the
U.K. continue to be inadequately elucidated due—and the SNP has increasingly out-performed
Plaid in recent years.
With limited satisfying explanations for the SNP’s success, it seems logical to take more
careful consideration of the party’s own agency in its evolution—and how moments of major
party accommodation combined with potential constitutional changes have been capitalized upon
by SNP leaders via growing resources and careful messaging to reach previously unbroken
thresholds. While these factors in no way guarantee that Brexit will lead to Scottish
independence, there are reasons to consider how the past can inform the present and provide a
fair warning that underestimating the SNP’s ability under these conditions has created the party’s
most important moments of growth—and breakthrough—in the past.
SNP Breakthroughs: Constitutional Change, Major Party Accommodation and Media Exposure
Bonnie Meguid suggested that the strongest institutional impact on fringe parties in
general is majority party accommodation (Meguid-2007)—when mainstream parties move
toward accommodating increased demands for autonomy and absorb the smaller party’s interest.
However, in the more specific case of the SNP or separatist agendas writ large, full
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accommodation is highly unlikely because, at the very least, independence would undermine the
entire state structure from which the majority parties benefit. At the same time, when the parties
have moved to accommodate the SNP—for example in allowing the party its first broadcast in
1965, then in creating a Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s, and in holding an independence
vote in 2014—and the effects of each have been the growth of the SNP and its phoenix-like
transition into something new and increasingly more competitive with the U.K.’s largest parties.
However, the opportunity is not enough: party leaders have to act decisively, the messaging on
independence in particular needs to be considered with care, and party organization needs to be
up to the task at hand. If opportunity alone (or institutional factors) explained separatist party
success, then SNP and PC would look much more alike.
Thus, three factors have been common to each occasion wherein SNP has broken through
Pederson and Deschouwer’s thresholds (representation, blackmail, governing potential, and
government thresholds (Deshouwer-2008)): a form of major party accommodation creates
opportunity, increased exposure in the media generates greater interest and drives up saliency
and even membership, the SNP proves relatively competent under the new conditions (often
surprising political elites), and then the party carefully chooses which frame fits best for its
independence platform based on the new conditions.
First, in 1965 the SNP was allowed its first-ever Party Political Broadcast (PPB) and two
years later, Winnie Ewing’s 1967 by-election victory in Hamilton would mark the start of a new
era for the SNP as it would break the representation threshold for good. Despite the lack of
unified campaigning procedures for the SNP between 1948-1967, there was a long-term,
concerted effort to gain more access to free media exposure—especially in television and radio
broadcasting. Somerville described the SNP as becoming “embroiled, even fixated” with this
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issue as the party engaged in a number of strategies (Somerville-2013) including pirating radio,
picking public and private battles with the BBC and parliamentarian groups over allotment of
broadcasting time, and trying to generate more resources to pay for this type of outreach.
However, after a decade-long battle over party broadcasts in particular (when the BBC and the
major parties relented allowing the 1965 broadcast), SNP leadership understood the relative
importance of the opportunity, drawing up six revisions of the script in preparation for the five
minutes of air time.5 The National Executive Committee confidently anticipated sharp increases
in membership as a result of the exposure—they aimed to add 4,000 people (Wilson-2009).
They had fly posters advertising the television broadcast and awards put in place for the branches
which expanded the most. Within 24 hours of the broadcast as the party received upward of 500
letters from the public (Sommerville-2013, 150). [For perspective, the party was thought to have
2,000 members in 1962, 16,000 in 1965, and by the end of 1965: 21,000 members in 160
branches.] Additionally, there was further exposure in the press (the Glasgow Herald and Times
featured stories)—which meant parts of Billy Wolfe’s message were reiterated in other national
and local newspapers (Sommerville-2013). The BBC would then air, for the first time, 30 full
minutes of the Annual Conference in 1966. At the December National Council meeting, Robert
McIntyre reported a 5,000 member increase (Wilson-2009, 18).
In short, this small act of accommodation—relenting on allowing a small fringe party to
10 minutes of broadcast time (5 on television and 5 on radio)—provided the opportunity, created
in part by SNP pressure and then taken advantage of by the SNP leadership, to boost the party
into electoral existence. Henceforth, the SNP would seat 1 or more MP in each General Election.
After Ewing took her seat, and she was inundated with media requests and the like, so the SNP
began reforming internally to accommodate the needs for staffing and supporting a sitting
5 BBC and ITV access: Robert McIntyre’s papers. 1960-1968. NLS: Acc. 10090.102.
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parliamentarian (something which the SNP had only needed for 3 months of 1945 but with
which it otherwise had no experience). The reforms that were done proactively—to achieve the
broadcasting allowance and to utilize time better at the party’s highest administrative levels via
reforms enacted in 1966 —helped produce the key breakthroughs in media access and
representation. However, more reactionary changes needed for actually participating in
parliament would leave problems (such as lack of personnel, communication organization, and a
branch-dominated structure) that would still belabor party progress until the next significant
breakthrough had been completed at the creation of the Scottish Parliament and eventual party
reforms in 2003.
The next big threshold the party broke was “governing potential,” and this opportunity
was presented through the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum. In the case of devolution, the
first attempt in the 1970s was not effective for the SNP—and lessons were learned that were
applied to the devolution vote in the 1990s. In the 1970s, Labour supported of a Scottish
Constitutional Convention—which the SNP supported until party leaders realized that they
would both be outnumbered and unable to discuss independence—that only devolution would be
on the table. When the SNP withdrew, Labour was able to present the SNP as uncooperative—
and the methodological hardline position of “independence only” blocked a chance at forward
progress, leaving the SNP to be defined in the press as both uncooperative and fundamentalist at
worst and at best uncompromising and impossible to work with.
There was fear among some SNP leaders and members that attention to devolution would
displace independence, and it took until the 1990s, under the leadership of Alex Salmond, for a
wider group of SNP members and leaders to accept the view of devolution as a stepping stone to
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independence. The “radical”6 viewpoint, most likely modeled after the notion of Third Estate’s
withdrawal from the Estates General at the start of the French Revolution, held to the idea that
SNP MPs would establish a separate Scottish assembly by recusing themselves from
Westminster once they achieved an electoral majority in the available Scottish seats. The
alternative viewpoint in the party called for the negotiation of a Scottish Parliament via
devolution—and then eventually an independence referendum, but this “gradualist” perspective
was seen by party activists (and some members of the leadership, too) as too risky in regard to
the potential limitations of powers granted to a devolved parliament. In the SNP’s 1974
manifesto and the 1976 reprint, the process to independence was through an SNP majority in a
U.K. General Election. The 1976 document read: “The Scotland which we seek will be created
only by electing a Scottish Parliament, and by no other means. To win support for this proposal
and to make it effective we must first elect MPs of the only party which is committed to the
establishment of a Scottish Parliament and full self-government—the Scottish National Party.”7
While this document softened previous rhetoric in party manifestos, the message was the same in
terms of achieving independence via the “radical” methods. However, in the same year, at the
Annual Conference in Motherwell, a resolution was created to support devolution, as the
resolution stated the SNP was “prepared to accept an assembly with limited powers as a stepping
stone” (Mitchell-2009, 36). Unfortunately for the SNP, Labour had taken this position—
6 “Radical” was frequently a self-descriptor employed by the SNP in the 1980s and early 1990s. In his book recalling the party’s growth, Gordon Wilson readily utilizes the term to describe his years in party leadership. Examples in SNP literature include the SNP’s first PPB in 1965, when at least one version of the script stated, that the SNP was “…a modern and radical party representing all kinds of people throughout Scotland.” (from the Papers of Robert McIntyre. Press Statements from HQ 1960-1969: NLS. Manuscript Division. Acc. 10090.102.) By 1983, the only “realistic radical alternative to British economic imperialism…” was the SNP (The Scottish National Party: 49th Annual National Conference.” 1983. Pavilion: Rothesay. 29-30 Sept; 1 Oct. 1983. NLS. Shelfmark: QP.sm.160.). And Wilson, in particular, would object to the party’s new position when it accepted the notion of devolution and a follow-up referendum, and he took the internal disputes public with an article in The Sunday Times in January of 2000 when he wrote that the party was no longer “radical”—as “The grassroots membership was not happy to see national freedom relegated to 10th place in the Scottish Parliament election” (Wilson-2015, quoting his 9 Jan. 2000 article). 7 “Scotland’s future: S.N.P. Manifesto.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP-197-]. Reprinted 1976. Book. 32p.:ill; 15X21cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelf mark: QP1. 93. 498.
18
supporting limited devolution—and it was consistently a situation wherein the SNP had limited
power to negotiate (due to low numbers at Westminster, for example). Thus, when the
opportunity for devolution presented itself (via the Labour party’s sponsorship) and the SNP
backed out, it is easy to see how their lack of cooperation was dismaying to political
counterparts.
At the same time, in an article in Polity in the spring of 1979, after the SNP had seen its
parliamentarians reduced from a high of 11 in 1974 to just 2 seats in 1979, declared that “For
both nationalist parties, the political arena is a territory neither wishes to control,” and “It is
entirely possible that should enough decentralization occur, the call for independence might be
moderated in favor of some form of federalism…In the meantime, inaction may strengthen both
nationalist movements at home…” (Fusaro-1979, 386). In short, Fusaro was describing a
fundamentalist, non-parliamentarian organization seeking independence. Yet, considering the
SNP’s internal and external documentation in this time period, it was simply not an accurate
characterization. While it was correct that SNP was not prepared for the 1974 electoral spike, as
it had difficulty organizing both communication and party discipline in voting as well as the
increased media exposure, the SNP was not failing at these traditional political roles because it
was fundamentalist—or “nationalist.” It was failing because it had no experience and no
resources. The lessons from this unspectacular entry into having a parliamentarian group would
actually provide the basis for a smoother transition to the need for larger party function when the
Scottish Parliament was seated in 1999. At that point, the SNP had done much more preparation
—starting even before the 1997 referendum was held to prepare candidates for the media
spotlight. Additionally, there was greater cohesion as the entirety of operations could be
centered in Edinburgh—the cite of both party headquarters and the Scottish Parliament. (This
19
situation is in juxtaposition to the SNP’s 1970s experience with a parliamentary group but a lack
of ability to communicate and organize well between London and Scotland.) The SNP was also
helped, at least in the short-term in 1999, by the established practice of dual officeholding—as
SNP MPs could also be MSPs. While this duality would eventually cause problems, with
opponents pointing to weak SNP presence at Westminster votes, in the short-term it enabled the
SNP to consolidate its leadership and work out a plan to merge both the party’s independence
platform and the challenge of fighting devolved elections.
However, first, to get to the 1999 Parliament, the SNP had to navigate the second
devolution vote, and this time, the SNP proved to have learned from the mistakes of the 1970s. It
was no coincidence that Salmond, who had been briefly expelled from the party in the early
1980s in part for his support of a gradualist approach, was the one leading the party in the 1990s
as it navigated the second devolution referendum. The 1997 referendum presented the SNP with
two separate opportunities. First, it allowed the party and its leadership to be seen on par with the
mainstream parties as Salmond appeared side-by-side with leaders of Labour in Scotland and the
Liberal Democrats. Salmond did well to stay positive and not exploit issues with Labour (such
as its own internal problems including one MP being investigated for corruption and another who
committed suicide). Instead, Salmond, with equal status, was now a fixture in the television
debates on devolution (Lynch-2013, 236-7). This media opportunity, combined with Salmond’s
talents as a debater, gave the party new standing and popularity. The second opportunity was the
Scottish Parliament itself. Besides thrusting the SNP into relevancy at levels thus far
unachievable at Westminster, the new Scottish Parliament also meant that the SNP had increased
opportunities for members seeking to hold public office. Whereas previously there was only the
outside hope of getting elected in a handful of constituencies to Westminster, now SNP members
20
with ambitions of serving in a public role could stand for office in Scotland. This point was not
lost to Salmond who acknowledged that members of the SNP like him—who joined the party in
the 1960s and 1970s—were risking careers in politics by choosing to join the SNP—rather than
one of the U.K.’s two big parties—during university.8 Thus, the Scottish Parliament allowed the
party to gain greater political professionalization literally—as more SNP members could fill
roles in public office.
Additionally, the creation of the Scottish Parliament included institutional structures
essentially designed to protect against the emergence of any singular party in government. The
“additional member system” stipulates that 73 Members of Scottish Parliaments (MSPs) are
selected via first-past-the-post procedures and then an additional 56 MSPs are “List MSPs”—are
chosen via a second party vote. The SNP had been advocating for proportional representation
since the 1970s when it first began to delineate its desired structures for a government in
Scotland,9 but the design of the Scottish Parliament electoral process, in this case, would also
guarantee a degree of difficulty for any singular party to govern in Scotland. Given that the SNP
won more list than constituency seats in the first two Scottish elections (7 constituency SMPs
and 28 list MSPs in 1999; 9 constituency MSPs and 27 list MSPs), there seemed little “threat” of
them taking on the challenge of a majority government. Yet, by the third election cycle, when the
SNP first ran a campaign on the basis of a party leader running for First Minister, the SNP
finished as part of the governing coalition (21 constituency MSPs and 26 list MSPs), and one
cycle later was the lone party of government (53 constituency MSPs and 16 list MSPs).
Although the SNP did lose its outright majority in the Scottish election of 2016, it was only
narrowly—by two seats—making the SNP’s 2016 finish the second best in Scottish
8 Salmond, Alex. (14 July 2017). Personal Interview.9 “SNP&You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party.” Scottish National Party: Edinburgh. 1974. Booklet. 19 pages. 22cm. Shelfmark: P.med.3505.
21
parliamentary modern history. While it was disappointing not to keep full control of government,
the SNP still dominated in the constituency vote—winning 59 of the 73 seats—making for a
complete reversal of its electoral outcomes when the parliament began in 1999. Regardless, in
achieving the coalition threshold in 2007 and then the government threshold in 2011, the party
was in position to negotiate to hold the independence referendum—after having “broken” the
electoral barriers to a majority party government in Scotland.
Finally, the holding of the 2014 independence referendum is a good example of major
party accommodation as Labour could be seen as the party of democracy and there seemed, at
least initially, little chance of the Scots voting to leave—producing a win-win scenario for
Labour. In this case, the end result for the SNP was one of unintended consequences but
nonetheless important in the party’s growth. First, the gap, which was seen as low as 25% in
support of independence as negotiations began in 2012, closed by the actual vote—with 44.7%
of voters supporting independence. Despite the disappointment of the defeat at the polls and the
decision by Salmond to step down as party leader, the SNP experienced unprecedented growth.
The saliency of the party had risen in the print press (see Fig. 3) by measures simply unseen
previously, and the attention to the independence issue seemed to spark a youth movement and
interest—even if the direction of causation is unclear. The SNP grew, in the months that
followed the referendum, at unprecedented rates,10 making it the third largest party in the U.K.
and certainly its fastest growing. Thus, the SNP was able to turn a referendum loss for
independence into a historic moment of party expansion and activity—that ultimately culminated
in its record-breaking 2015 General Election result. However, it is worth noting that these rises
in saliency—even the spikes—do not in any way compare with the volume of coverage granted
10 During the span of 2007 to 2013, the membership increased by 11,056 people. Then membership between 2013 to 2014 increased by 65,000 people, making the SNP the third largest party in the UK with 90,000 members.
22
the major parties. For context, the Labour Party, in similar searches, has averaged 18,537.3
articles per year from 2000-201711, with its lowest total of 13,909 in 2000, while “Conservative
Party” (and not Tories or Tory) yields an average of 13,213.6 articles per year with a low of
7,840 in 2002.
Fig. 3: SNP’s Saliency in the UK print media by volume12
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 20170
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
17801195 1146 1022 896 893
1194
1888
1049771 663
9991357
802
2987
4866
1811
2438
Num
ber o
f Arti
cles
In short, while the SNP’s monetary resources have caught up to these parties (at least in terms of
spending on Scottish elections, as SNP outspent Labour in the 2007 Scottish elections), the
party’s saliency in the media remains well behind on the other two parties.13 Therefore, these
moments—like Brexit—wherein the SNP is able to be relevant and to offer a narrative of being
ignored or of Scottish interests being tossed aside, the SNP often gains ground through increased
exposure that it otherwise can not maintain. Salmond declared that the SNP does well simply to
stay in the news cycle—that it does not matter if the attention is positive or negative as long as
11 The saliency of the party by volume was measured by the number of articles found in the Proquest news and newspapers database in a search for “Labour Party.” The search was limited to full-text English language articles in newspapers, magazines, and historical newspapers (excluding: trade journals, wire feeds, other sources, scholarly journals, blogs, podcasts, and websites as well as dissertations and theses) and excluded Ireland, Europe and the U.S. in terms of location. Similarly, the search was solely for the “Conservative Party” and not “Tory” or “Tories.” Thus, their results seem imbalanced—but a search for “Conservative Party” OR “Tory” yields an imbalanced report the other way with 43,000+ articles found per year.12 The saliency of the party by volume was measured by the number of articles found in the Proquest news and newspapers database in a search for “Scottish National Party.” The search was limited to full-text English language articles in newspapers, magazines, and historical newspapers (excluding: trade journals, wire feeds, other sources, scholarly journals, blogs, podcasts, and websites as well as dissertations and theses) and excluded Ireland, Europe and the U.S. in terms of location. Various limitations on the searches all yielded the same pattern of 2014, 2015, and 2017 being the highest on record as well as relative spikes in 2000, 2007, and 2012.13 These statistics could be more insightful if only completed for Scottish publications and is work still in progress.
23
the party can remain relevant.14 Although, with the with the party’s growth since 2007, those
frames may begin to matter more.
Regardless, besides these moments of major party accommodation and potential
constitutional change being timed with party expansion, the SNP’s discourse on independence
has remained an important factor all along as it keeps positing a minority viewpoint that
challenges 100s of years of state structures. While the SNP has definitely gradually de-
emphasized independence over time (See Table 2), in the context of Brexit and its aftermath, it is
more important to consider the way the SNP has framed its pro-independence stance historically
—as those potential frames are likely to be revisited in the push for a second independence
referendum.
In this regard, too, the party has faced a long internal evolution—and the party’s
manifestos provide good insight into both the extent to which a given election was predicated on
the independence platform and in what ways it was presented. In the 1970s, there was a shift
once the party had 11 MPs in 1974, as the pre-election manifesto made the economic case for
independence regarding oil and ensuring “a substantial balance of payments surplus, an adequate
supply of basic resources and the opportunity to adopt monetary and fiscal policies designed to
suit the Scottish economy.”15 While, just two years later, in a reprint in 1976, the word
“independence” is used limitedly and instead phrases like “self-government” and “national
sovereignty” were employed16--one could argue in order to quiet “separatism” accusations from
peers. In the 1980s, independence was utilized regularly—appearing 20 times in 24 pages in
1983, 10 times in 8 pages in the 1984 European election manifesto, and 16 times in 27 pages in
14 Salmond, Alex. (14 July 2017). Personal Interview.15 “SNP&You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party.” Scottish National Party: Edinburgh. 1974. Booklet. 19 pages. 22cm. Shelfmark: P.med.3505.16 “Scotland’s future: S.N.P. Manifesto.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP-197-]. Reprinted 1976. Book. 32p.:ill; 15X21cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelf mark: QP1.93.498.
24
1987.17 The context was often about independence in Europe, but also included a portion of John
Locke and the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1983, stating that the “course of human
events” can impel people to “the separation”18 and a portion in 1987 regarding the use of a
referendum. Likewise, independence was to be “regained” in 1984, as a year earlier it was
described as being “taken for granted” by other nations. In all versions, independence held many
potential advantages—especially economically for Scotland, but by 1987 independence was a
way to create a “new society” that would allow Scotland to “take part in the affairs of the world
and make a positive contribution to peace and security”—in short a potential path to redefinition
and rebirth.
Table 2: Use of “Nation” and “Independence” in SNP manifestos and PEB: 1999-201719
“Nation” Independence(t)/pg length Section on it?/first mention In PEB?1999 Scottish Election
9 36 times in 41 pages Average: every 1.1 pages
-No dedicated section.-In opening message (“potential of independence” and referendum) mentions sep. doc on econ case.
n/a
2003 Scottish Election
38 37 times in33 pagesAverage: every
-No dedicated section.Pg. 2 (“and to show why we need the powers of independence” and three other times)
n/a
2007 Scottish Election
32 19 times in 76 pagesAvg: every 4 pages
-Section in Table of Contents- reference in opening statement to referendum
“It’s Time for the SNP”-No mention.
2011 Scottish
69 (“national”=77)
33 times in 44 pages
-Section in Table of Contents- in opening message, but more
“What has the Scottish done…”
17 “Choose Scotland—The Challenge of Independence.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP, 1983.] Book. 24p; 30cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP1.205.7909L.; “SNP-Scotland’s voice in Europe: manifesto of the Scottish National Party for the 1984 elections to the European Parliament.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1984. Book. 8 pages; 32 cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: PB7.216.45/1L.; “Play the Scottish Card: SNP General Election manifesto 1987.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party 1987. Book. 27 p.; 1 port.; 21 cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP2.88.1572.18 “Choose Scotland—The Challenge of Independence.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP, 1983.] Book. 24p; 30cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP1.205.7909L.19 In coding these manifestos, the notion of “nation” was only measured when in the context of Scotland as a nation—most often in the form “our nation” and when juxtaposing Scotland to other “nations” but not when utilized to reflect a level of government or used as national agenda or resources or when in the official title for a particular committee or group. For example, a straight search for “nation” in the 1999 manifesto will reveal the use of the word 60 times. However, “National Convener” and other such titles account for 10 mentions; “nation” is part of another word (like destination, discrimination, or international) on 17 occasions, and is part of other phrases like “national” prices, framework, strategy, or resources on other mentions. Likewise, “independence” or “independent” was only categorized as appropriate to this context when addressing the future of an independent Scotland or how independence would be achieved. A straight search for “independence” in these manifestos will yield far greater results, such as an independent governing body or commission.
25
Election Avg: every 1.3 pages significant is p. 3 (after jobs/econ—about referendum—3rd paragraph.)
-no mention.
2016 Scottish Election
19 7 times76 pagesAvg.: every 9.2 pages
-No dedicated section.-First mention on pg. 9—on the 36th item in a list: about new work to persuade
No mention
2001 General Election*
1^ 24 times in 29 pagesAvg.: every 1.2 pages
[No Table of Contents.]-First line. “We stand for independence” and eight times on the first page.
“We Stand for Scotland.” No mention of independence.
2005 General Election
8 10 times in 24 pagesAvg: every 2.4 pages
[No Table of Contents.]-Opening statement (“And we will always argue the case for Scottish independence.”)-Bold/huge print p. 4.
n/a
2010 General Election
35 18 times in32 pagesAvg: every 1.8 pages
-No dedicated section.-Not until pg. 5 (which is part of opening statement—but midway through 5th paragraph).
-“Keep on”-no mention
2015 General Election
7 4 times in 56 pagesAvg: every 14 pages
-Not until pg. 10; independence and home rule.
-no mentionDoes refer to last year as a roller coaster: who really is going to stand up for Scotland?
2017 General Election
5 6 times in 48 pagesAvg: every 8 pages
--Opening message-referendum context
-Not mentioned directly.
*Heart of the Manifesto insert^2001 Heart of the Manifesto used “country” 14 times in places that later might include “nation” in the future
The manifestos between 1999-2017 would essentially reflect a sharpening of language
choices but a lot of the same angles of presentation as previously mentioned. In Scottish
Election manifestos, at least until 2016, there was often a stronger case made for independence
than in General Election manifestos. (See Table 2.) In general, the themes from 1999-2017
include the call for a referendum (at least until the 2015 General Election), the case for greater
Scottish representation and participation in Europe as a result of being independent—specifically
in the form of increased positions in EU institutions, and the promise of economic growth and
standard of living. However, there were somewhat substantive changes in the ideological
backing behind independence. Namely, starting in 2007, the phrase “natural state” began to be
used to describe an independent Scotland as a “natural” phenomenon. Alternatively, the 2015
General Election manifesto declared quite boldly, “The SNP will always support independence
26
—but that is not what this election is about.”20 Similarly, in the 2017 General Election
manifesto, independence was only mentioned six times and each use was in the context of a right
to hold a referendum. These decisions to back off on independence—while not letting go of the
platform altogether—were the product of the lack of electoral support in the independence
referendum as well as calculations on how to best attract voters under particular conditions. In
short, the SNP, unlike its tendencies and internal struggles through the 1980s, is no longer
concerned with the “radical” label—it now discusses independence in a tactical manner that
makes it much more like a traditional electoral-professional party, albeit it just with a highly non-
traditional separatist platform, than a radical or fundamentalist group with a singular purpose.
And, the only way it has grown into this role has been by taking advantage of opportunities
granted by potential institutional—or constitutional—change.
Brexit Outcomes and Future Independence Referendum
Essentially, the conditions are at least favorable, based on historical precedent, for the SNP to
experience another historic breakthrough—and the only substantive threshold it has yet to
conquer is that of independence. The presence of potential constitutional change, major party
accommodation, and underestimation of the SNP’s potential has led to the most significant shifts
in the SNP’s history—and certainly Brexit fits those three conditions. While the party has had to
respond to those opportunities with resources and organization, the SNP of 2018 appears to have
both the financial and political resources to remain political contenders at all levels. Finally, the
SNP’s messaging in past provides clear insights into how they can best frame possible Bexit
outcomes in terms of the need for independence. It is also clear that the SNP still stands to gain
from the counter-intuitive—a harder Brexit (which at this point seems less likely)—which is not
20 “Stronger For Scotland.” Scottish National Party. General Election Manifesto 2015. Edinburgh. Accessed online: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/SNP.pdf.
27
the policy they support ideologically. A hard Brexit leaves the SNP with three traditional frames
for independence while a softer Brexit, or worse a second referendum on Europe, leaves the SNP
with less convincing frames and concerns about voter fatigue as well as the possibility of a less
decisive vote in Scotland in a second vote.
The Brexit vote, held in June of 2016, was essentially determined by the desire for the
Conservative Party to accommodate a different wing—those parties to its right and its more
right-leaning members—as opposed to Labour trying to accommodate the SNP, to its left, in the
devolution and independence votes. Like the Labour-approved independence referendum, the
Tory-approved Brexit referendum was in part due to being able to present itself as a democracy-
first party. There had been no referendum in Britain for 40 years on the issue of European
integration, conditions economically and in terms of immigration changes had led to a certain
degree of saliency on the issue, and the Tories could attract some voters on the right—away from
UKIP or BNP and into the Tory fold instead. The Tories won the majority in Westminster in
2015, and Cameron held to his promise. Then, Cameron himself, an advocate for the EU and
continued U.K. membership in it, did not need to deal with the aftermath of the leave vote—as
he resigned and left the negotiation for withdrawal to others.
However, there was little calculation of Scotland or the SNP’s strategic positioning as the
Brexit referendum was promised. In this regard, media saliency volume measures can be
insightful. Proquest News and Newspapers, in a search including English-language newspapers
and magazines in the U.K. for “Scottish National Party” AND “Brexit” showed the SNP was
simply not part of the early discussion on the Brexit promise by Cameron in 2013. There is one
record in 2013, 10 in 2014, 89 in 2015, and then 733 in 2016. In short, the SNP and Brexit only
became “news” after the vote was in. Looking at a breakdown of the coverage in 2016, the
28
referendum was held 23 June, and of the 192 articles that included the SNP and Brexit in that
month, 126 were from the week following the vote. In the 50 articles prior to the vote (16
articles appeared on the day of the referendum), none discuss the strategic position of the SNP in
relation to the major parties. One article, published in the Irish Independent, came close—as it
discussed the opposite: how if Scotland left before Brexit, it would make investors pay more
attention to Brexit because the U.K. would lose “the most pro-European chunk” of its territory.21
Likewise, the terms “Scottish National Party,” “Brexit,” and “Cameron” do not appear in a single
entry until 2014—and even then, only in 8 total articles. In short, there was limited at best, and
possibly no at worst, discussion of the proposed Brexit vote and the possible implications for
underscoring big differences in perspective between English and Scottish voters.
Ignoring or underestimating the SNP’s potential impact has been a constant factor in each
of these historic breakthroughs. In 1965, worn down by a decade of SNP sniping and griping, the
major parties and the BBC granted the party broadcasting rights—likely figuring that could not
matter that much. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise in terms of the impact of that moment
on the SNP’s evolution. In the 1990s, the devolution referendum was the opportunity—and the
underestimation was that the electoral system designed for the Scottish Parliament would prevent
the SNP from becoming a majority party. It took about a decade for the SNP to “break” that
expectation. Finally, the 2014 independence referendum was obviously an opportunity to reach
the SNP’s ultimate goal of independence for Scotland; and while that aspect was unrealized, the
opportunity instead made the party more salient and prepared the way for its historic
performance in the 2015 (and 2017 for that matter—at least in a longer-term context) General
Election.
21 "Scotland and UK Euro Exit." Irish Independent, Aug 28 2014, p. 2. ProQuest. Web. 19 Aug. 2018 .
29
Besides constitutional change, major party accommodation and underestimation, the
SNP’s moments of growth have had to be matched by its resources and organization. In terms of
membership, the SNP was listed at 118,200 members as of April, 2018---as compared to 124,000
in the Conservative Party, 552,000 in the Labour Party, and 100,500 for the Liberal-Democrats.22
Being the U.K.’s “third party” is a significant position and the numbers relative to the Tories is
also telling about the SNP’s potential to continue contending for independence. In terms of
spending, the SNP still lags significantly in General Elections, for example spending £1, 475,478
in 2015 which was less than UKIP and certainly less than the two larger parties, as the Tories
spent £15.6 million and Labour, £12.2 million.23 Hypothetically, these figures would translate to
the Conservative Party spending £28,461. 54 for each constituency it contested U.K.-wide versus
the SNP spending £20,008.10 per Scottish contest. Or, even more telling: £0.34 per eligible
elector in the U.K. that the Conservatives spent versus £0.37 per eligible elector in Scotland as
spent by SNP. 24 Likewise, in Scottish elections, the SNP has often outspent competitors—a
trend that began in 2007.
While none of these resources are directly causal to independence, the relative strength of
SNP members and spending is historic in its own right—as it is certainly the strongest and
wealthiest the party has ever been. The SNP officially spent £1.4 million (97% of its legal
amount)25 on the independence referendum versus £90,830 (13%) on the Europe vote—perhaps
indicative either of how the SNP knew it stood to gain from a “Leave” vote or how the polls had
22 “Membership of UK Political Parties.” House of Commons Briefing Paper Number SN05125, 1 May 2018. Accessed online: file:///Users/sspring/Downloads/SN05125.pdf. 23 U.K. Electoral Commission. Accessed online: <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-spending-at-elections/details-of-party-spending-at-previous-elections>.24 Electoral Statistics, U.K. 2015. Office for National Statistics. Accessed online: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/elections/electoralregistration/bulletins/electoralstatisticsforuk/2015.25 U.K. Electoral Commission. Accessed online: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/campaign-spending-and-donations-at-referendums/campaign-spending-at-the-scottish-referendum
30
been so skewed for “Remain” in Scotland that there was little reason to spend. Regardless, the
party has resources that it previously lacked—and that is no longer a barrier to its performance.
In terms of strategic positioning and frames, the SNP stands to gain from a harder Brexit
—or at least moments wherein it can claim that negotiations have ignored Scottish interests. In
this case, the SNP will engage in three familiar storylines: the Westminster parties ignore
Scottish interests (and the differentiation between England and Scotland), the desire for Scottish
input in the EU, and its fallback point of the potential and “naturalness” of Scottish
independence. All of these ideas date back in the history of the party’s lexicon. In 1981, sitting
Scottish MPs, Donald Stewart and Gordon Wilson boycotted “the so-called ‘all party talks’ on
devolution…[because] Tonight’s debates are a fraud.”26 This same language would be employed
by Salmond in the SNP’s 2010 General Election PEB as he talked about how the televised
debates (to be held that night), will not be about Scotland: “None of it will apply to Scotland,” he
says, but it will be about England and the “cozy Westminster parties…three London parties [that
have] the same agenda.”27 This same line can be presented in line with the holding of a Brexit
referendum at all, and the SNP has already employed this tactic somewhat in walking out of
Commons in June (2018) and in some headlines as MSPs object over devolved competencies not
being negotiated appropriately.
Like objecting to the larger parties’ focus away from Scotland and Scottish interests, the
SNP’s dialogue on Europe is also decades old. While most scholarship places the start of the tag
line “independence in Europe” in the 1980s, older archives suggest the idea was present, though
clearly not predominate, as far back as the 1930s. In a document that initiated some of the ideas
behind the SNP’s “civic nationalism,” George Malcolm Thompson’s The Kingdom of Scotland
26 16 June 1981. Scottish National Party. “Headquarters News Releases 1981-1982.” NLS. Manuscript Division. Acc. 10754. 29.27 “SNP Party Election Broadcast—Thursday April 15, 2010. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p0kzXFHKagk>.
31
Restored argued that Scotland had a role to play in Europe (Thomson-1939, 11). Likewise, in
1951 T.H. Gibson, in his February address in Glasgow which was reprinted in a 12-page booklet
by the SNP, referred to Scotland’s push for independence in the context of a wider European
change: “Self-Government for Scotland is in harmony with the larger movement in Europe for
defending democratic rights and rule of law.”28 Then the idea would be repeated in 1978, stating
that Scotland and Scottish culture is “as venerable as that of any other European nation.”29
However, while this notion of an independent Scotland in a European context was introduced
earlier, it was certainly solidified with Jim Sillars’s turn of phrase of “Independence in Europe”30
in 1989 and then repeated in various contexts since—including manifestos in the 1990s and into
the mid 2000s.
Besides this notion of independence in Europe, the SNP has been contextualizing
independence via comparisons to smaller European states for a long time as well—starting with
the 1979 European Parliamentary elections. From the start, this democratic opportunity in
Europe meant for the SNP a chance to “have more say in what happens to us form decisions
taken remotely in Brussels.”31 In the 1980s, comparisons with Norway would abound—
including a list in the SNP’s 1983 manifesto showing how Scotland’s population would not even
make it the smallest member of the European Community. Similar comparisons have been made
since on points mostly concerning economics and population—and the context has not changed.
Thus, this point in SNP discourse is likely to remain significant, as the overwhelming abundance
28 “The Scottish National Party: What It Is and What It Stands For.” 1951. Scottish National Party. Booklet. 12 pages. Published by the SNP: Glasgow. NLS Shelfmark: 6.2393, p. 6, 8.29 “Return to Nationhood.” Scottish National Party. Nov. 1978. Booklet. 32 pages. Published by SNP Publications, West Calder, West Lothian. NLS. Shelfmark: QP4.79.92.30 Sillars, Jim. “Independence in Europe.” Scottish National Party. June 1989. NLS: QP4.92.3.31 “McIntyre for Europe.” 1979. Published by Jean McCormack, election agent in Grangeside, Middlebank, Errol, Perth. Printed by Sunprint in Perth. Car Display sheet. NLS. Shelfmark: QP4.85.2191.
32
of scholarship has shown at this point that small states, and even smaller regional parties, have
great reason to believe they will benefit in from EU membership and institutional structures.
And, finally, the point the SNP will belabor, regardless of context, is the “naturalness”
and potential of independence. As a constitutional change that will bring more governing power
to a more localized body, independence represents the values of democracy as well as unknown
impacts. The SNP has always believed in this change as having potential—economically,
socially on a range of policy areas, and in terms of realizing Scotland’s full capabilities. These
points will remain hard to dispute—and this notion of potential and aspirations has become the
emotional aspect driving the SNP’s civic nationalism—which long ago, at the party’s founding,
replaced an older, more ethnically-based understanding of nation.
At the same time, if the Brexit negotiations in fact lead to a softer outcome, as appears to
be the case, the SNP stands to gain much less from its usual frames and positions but still can
claim a victory in having protected Scottish interests under the conditions. While the arguments
concerning the desire for Scotland to have full representation in all EU institutions will remain
continuous along with the comparisons to other small European countries, the SNP will be left
with a less motivational message about needing to increase Scotland’s power over policy. This
narrative is both more complex and more mundane; it does not have the same emotive impact as
its claims to too little representation in EU institutions. Likewise, the SNP will probably try to
turn this scenario into one similar to the lost independence referendum—and push for more
powers as well as the protection of already devolved areas of competency.
Greater than these weaker frames, the SNP would be faced with voter fatigue concerns
should a second Brexit vote actually be taken. It is no surprise that Sturgeon has denounced any
such calls, as it is against SNP’s interests to vote again. The SNP feels it already has a mandate
33
on this issue in Scotland—a second vote is only likely to make the topic less clear as Scotland’s
vote for Remain was so overwhelming. Additionally, given the SNP would like to see another
independence vote, they also know that yet another referendum on Europe will mean pushing
back any timeframe for an independence vote.
Conclusion
All told, the SNP is an extreme case among regional-separatist parties in Western Europe and its
current membership numbers and resources suggest it is as strong as ever despite losing the 2014
referendum on independence. The SNP rose to this position by taking advantage of moments of
political opportunity especially in the form of major party accommodation and potential
constitutional change. With final Brexit terms looming, the SNP stands to gain most by a
counter-intuitive result—a hard Brexit—which looks increasingly unlikely, as this outcome
would allow the SNP to capitalize on its most emotive frameworks in support for independence.
Instead, the SNP will most likely be facing a situation of a soft exit—which will leave the party
with a short-term political victory with regards to having protected Scottish interests under the
conditions but also with a future process of continuing to pursue stances that will protect
Scotland’s relationship with Europe. This situation will probably weaken the immediate case for
a second independence referendum. However, due to the SNP’s ability to tie independence to
potential and aspirations, the push for independence seems unlikely to fade—leaving a
probability of a second independence referendum but a lower probability that it will happen soon
(as compared to a hard Brexit). The two main U.K. parties should be particularly careful about
accommodating a second independence referendum as historically these opportunities have
benefited the SNP. Finally, it is worth noting, forebodingly, that the SNP has been particularly
skillful when presented with second chances: it took two devolution referendums to get a
34
Scottish Parliament, a second round of a large SNP parliamentary experience to launch the SNP
into a governing coalition, and a second campaign in Scotland with attention to garnering the
First Minister position to be the party of government. Considering these historical precedents in
sum, it is worth being quite wary of another independence referendum not just based on expense
and voter fatigue but also on the fact that underestimating the SNP in conditions of major party
accommodation and potential constitutional change in the past has led to the nationalists’ most
significant breakthroughs.
Appendix A: Regional Parties in Western Europe and Canada
Found-dissolved
Contested Elections*
Held Seats
Ideology on self-government**
BelgiumFlanders Lijst Dedecker (List
Dedecker, LDD) 2007- N: 2007-2014 N, R Federalist
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N-VA)
2001- N: 2003-2014 N, R Separationist
Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc, VB) Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB)
1979-2004 N:1991-2003 N, R Separationist
2004- N: 2007-2014 N, R Separationist
Volksunie (People’s Union, VU)
1954-2001 N: 1954-1999 N, R Federalist (50s-70s) Ambiguous (80s) Separationist (90s)
German region
Pro Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft (ProDG)
2008- R: 2009-2014 R Federalist
WalloniaFront Démocratique des Francophones (Democratic Front of Francophones, FDF)
-renamed twice: 2010 and 2015. Now is DéFI
1964- N: 1968-1991(then as coalition)
N:2015
N, R
N, R
Federalist
Federalist
Rassemblent Walloon 1968- N:1968-1981 N Protectionist (60s)
35
(Walloon Rally, RW) Federalist (70s-80s)CanadaQuebec Action democratique, AD 1994-2012 ---; R:1994 R Ambiguous
Bloc Québécois, BQ 1991- N: 1993-2015 N SeparationistParti Nationaliste du Quebec, PNQ
1983-1987 N: 1984 --- Separationist
Parti Quebecois, PQ 1968- ---; R: 1970-2008
R Separationist
Quebec Solidaire, QS 2006- ---; R: 2008-2014
R Separationist
Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, RIN
1960-1968 R: 1966 R Separationist
Union Nationale, UN 1935-1989 --; R: 1970-1985 R Federalist (1940-50s, 70s-80s) ambiguous 1960s
Western Canada
Western Canada Concept, WCC
1980-2009 ---; R: 1981-2009
R Separationist
DenmarkSouthern Jutland
Slevigske parti-Schleswigsche Partei (Schleswig Party, SLE)
1920- N:1950-1964; 1968-1971
N-Municipal
only since 1973
Protectionist/ ambiguous
Faroe Islands
Fólkafklokkurin (People’s Party, FF)
1939- R: 1940-2015 R Federalist (40s-90s)Separationist 2000s
Tjóôvedldi (Republic, E) 1948- N:1973-2015 N, R SeparationistFramsokn (Progress, F) 2011- 2011-2015 R SeparationistNytt Sjálvstryri )(New Self-Government, SSF)(Sjálvstýrisflokkurin, Home Rule)
1906- 1945-1953, 1971-1973,1977-2015
R Federalist (40-90s) Separationist 2000s
Greenland Inuit Ataqatigiit (Community of the People)
1976- 1979-20015 R Separationist
FinlandÅlands Framtid (Future of Aland, AF)
2001- R: 2001-2015 R Separationist
South-western Finland
Svenske Folkpartiet (Swedish People’s Party, SFP)
1906- 1951-2018 N Protectionist (cultural)
FranceAlsace Aldace d’abord (Alsace
Frist, ADA)1989- --- R Protectionist
Brittany Union Démocratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union, UDB)
1964- 1986, 2012,2015 in coalition
N, R Protectionist (70s-80s)Federalist 2000s
Corsica Union di u populu corsu (Union of Corsican People, UPC)Di a nazione Corsa (UPC-PNC)
1977-2002
2002-
1986
R: 2002-
R Protectionist (70s-80s)
Federalist (1990s-2000s)
Accolta Nacionalista Corsa (Corsican Nationalist Alliance, ANC )
1989-2009 1993-2002 --- Ambiguous
36
Corsica Nazione, CN 1992-2008(?)
R: 1998-1999 R Separationist
Savoy Ligue Savoisienne, LS 1995-2012 1998 --- SeparationistGermanyBavaria Bayernpartei (Bavarian
Party)1946- 1953, 1969,
1987-2013N, R Separationist
Schleswig-Holstein
Südschleswigscher Wählerverband-Sydslevigsk vælgerfoerning (South Schleswig Voters’ Union, SSW)
1948- 1953-1957 R Protectionism
ItalyNorthern Italy
Lega Nord, inc. Liga Veneta and Lega Lombarda (Northern League, LN)
1983/1991-
1983-2008 N, R(96-99 period)
Protectionist (80s) Federalist 1992-95, 2000sSeparationist 1996-1999
Sardinia Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sadinian Action Party, PSd’Az)
1921- 1946-1969; 1983-2001; 2001-2018
N, R Protectionist (40s-60s) Federalist (70s, ’94-97) Ambiguous ’79-93 and since ’98Separationist 2000s
Independtia Repubrica de Sardigna (Separationist Republic of Sardinia, iRS)
2002- R: 2004-2010 --- Separationist
Partito del Popolo Sardo-Fortza Paris, PPS-FP
2004- N: 2008 ---- Federalist
Lega Sarda, LSar 1940s R: 1946 ---- SeparationistSicily Movimento per le
Autonomie, MpA2005- 2008-2013
(coalition: 2018)N, R Protectionist
Southern Italy
Lega d’Azione Meridionale (League for Southern Action, LAM)
1992- 1992-2001 N, R
-municipal only 2017
Protectionist
Moviemento per le Autonomie (Movement for Autonomies, MpA)
2005- 2008-2018 N, R Federalist
South Tyrol Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People’s Party, SVP)
1945- 1953-2018 N, R Protectionist (’48-’56) Federalist (’57 onward)
Die Freiheitlichen (The Freedomites, DF)
1992- 2006-2013 ---- Ambiguous
Sud-tiroler Freiheit (South Tyrolean Freedom, S-TF)
2007- R: 2008 --- Separationist
BügerUnion für Südtirol (Citizens’ Union for South Tyrol, BUfS—was Union für Südtirol, UfS)
1989- 1996-2008 --- Separationist
Tiroler Heimatpartei, THP 1963-1968 N: 1963 R ProtectionistTrentino Partito Autonomista
Trentino Tirolese (Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party, PATT)
Partito Popolare Trentino
1988- Coalition w/ SVP
Federalist
1948-1982(folded into PATT)
R:1973-1978 --- Protectionist
37
Tirolese (Trentino Tryrolean People’s Party, PTTT)
Trieste Associazione per Trieste (Association for Trieste, APT)
1976-2006 1979-1983 N Federalist
Valle d’Aoste
Autonomie Liberté Démocratie (Autonomy Liberty Democracy, ALD)-coalition
2006-2018 2006-2013 N, R Federalist
Union Valdôtaine (Valdostian Union, UV)
1945- 1958-1963, 1972-1987, 1994-2008
N, R Federalist
Vallée d’Aoste Vive (Lively Aosta Valley, VAV)
2005-2010 2006 (coalition) --- Federalist
Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (Valdostian Union, UVP)
2013- 2013-2018 (in coalition)
--- Federalist
Fédération Autonomiste, FA 1998-2014 1998-2013 (coalition) Protectionist
Rassemblement Valdôtaine, RV
1963-1973 1973 R Protectionist
NetherlandsFriesland Fryske Nasjonale Partij
(Frisian National Party, FNP)
1962- ---; R: 1970-2015
R Protectionist
SpainAndalusia Partido Andalucista
(Andalusian Party, PA)1965-2015 1989, 1996-2004 n/a Protectionist (70s-80s)
Federalist (90s-2000s)Partido Socialista de Andalucía (Socialist Party of Andalusia, PSA)
1979-1984 1979 n/a Federalist
Aragon Chunta Aragonesista (Aragonese League, CA or CHA)
1986- 1996-2008 R Protectionist (80s-’94) Federalist (’95-2000s)
Partido Aragones Regionalista (Aragonese Regionalist Party, PAR)
1978- 1979, 1986-1993, 2000
N, R Protectionist
Asturias Partíu Asturianista (PAS) 1985- 1989-2004 (in coalition)
--- Protectionist (Cultural)
Unión Renovadora Asturiana (Asturian Renewal Union, URAS)
1998- R R (once) Protectionist
Balearic Islands
Progressistes per les Illes Balears (Progressives for the Balearic Islands, PIB)
2004-2004 2004 --- Separationist(temporary coalition)
Partit Socialista de Menorca (Socialist Party of Menorca, PSM)- from merge of PSM-EM and PS-Me)
1977- 1979-2004 --- Separationist
Unió Mallorquina (Majorcan Union, UM)
1982-2011 1993-2008 R Protectionist (80s-92) Federalist (’93-2000s)
Basque Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque 1986- 1989-2008 R Separationist
38
Country Solidarity, EA)Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Left, EE)
1977-1993 1977-1993 n/a Separationist
Aralar (AR) 2000-2017 2004-20017 N, R SeparationistHerri Batasuna (United People, HB)
1978-2001 1979-1996 N,R Separationist
Partido Nationalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV)
1895- 1977-2008 N, R Ambiguous (1970s and 2000s); Federalist (1980s-1990s)
Partido Comunisto de las Tierras Vascas, EHAK
2002-2008 R: 2005 R Separationist
Canaries Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (Canarian Independent Groupings, AIC)
1985-1993 1986-1989 N Protectionist
Coalición Canaria (Canarian Coalition, CAN or CC)
1993- 1993-2016 N, R Protectionist (90’s-04) Federalist (’04-on)
Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People, UPC)
1979-1986 1979 N, R Separationist
Centro Canaria, CCN(into CC)
2008?-2008
2008 n/a Protectionist
Cantabria Partido Regionalista de Cantabria, PRC
1978- 1993 R Protectionist
Catalonia Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party, PDeCAT)
2016- R: 2016 R separationist
Convergència i Unió, inc. PDC and UDC (Convergence and Union, CiU)-now PDeCA
1978-2015 1977-2008 N, R Federalist (70s-98; ’02-07)Ambiguous (’98-’02 and post 2007)Separationist 2014
Coalición electoral esquerra de Cataluna (Electoral Coalition of Left in Catalonia, CEEC)
1977-? 1977 ---- Separationist
Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left in Catalonia, ERC)
1931- 1977-2016 N, R Ambiguous (70s-86) Separationist (’89-’96; ’08 onward)
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy, CUP)
1986- 2012-2015 R Separationist
Initiative for Catalonia (IC) now Iniciativa per Cataluyna Verds, ICV
1988- 1988, 2000-2011 N, R Federalist
Extremadura Coalicion Extremena, CEX 1993- 1996 R (coalition)
Protectionist
Partido Regionalista Extremeño, PREX
1990-1996(into coalition)
1993 ---- Protectionist
Extremadura Unida (EU) 1980-2007 (into coalition)
R: 1983-1997, 1999-2003
R Protectionist
Galicia Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (Galician Nationalist Bloc,
1982- 1996-2008 N, R Separationist (70s-1986) Federalist
39
BNG) (since ’87)Navarre Union del Pueblo Navarro
(Union of the Navarrese People, UPN)
1979- 1979-2016*
*w/ PP
N, R Federalist
Convergencia Demócrata de Navarra (Democratic Convergence of Navarre, CDN)
1995-2011 1996 R Federalist
Nafarroa Bai (Yes to Navarre, NB)
2003-2011 2004-2008 N, R Separationist
Rioja Partido Riohano 1982- 1993-2016 R ProtectionistValencia Union Valenciana
(Valencian Union, UV)1982- 1986-2000 R Protectionist
SwedenSkane Skånepartiet (Scania Party) 1979- ----; R: 2002-
2014 --- Separationist
SwitzerlandTicino Lega dei Ticinsesi (Ticino
League)1991- 1991-2007 N,R Federalist
U.K.Cornwall Mebyon Kernow (Sons of
Cornwall, MK)1951- 1970-1983,
1997-2010R Federalist
Northern Ireland
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
1970- 1974-2010 R, N Irish unification
Irish Separationist Party (IIP)
1977-1985 1979 ---- Irish unification
Nationalists and independents (N)
1950-1951, 1966 --- Irish unification
Republican Labour (RS) 1964-1970 --- Irish unificationRepublicans (REP) 1950, 1964-1966 --- Irish unificationRepublican Clubs (RC) 1974-1979 --- Irish unificationSinn Féin 1950, 1955-
1959, 1983-2017Irish unification
Scotland Scottish National Party (SNP)
1934- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist
Scottish Labour Party (SCLP)
1976-1981 1979 N Separationist
Scottish Militant Labour (SML)
1991-1998/2001
1992 ---- separationist
Scottish Socialist Alliance (SSA)
1996-1998 1997 ---- Separationist
Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)
1998- 2010-2015 R Separationist
Scottish Green Party 1990-- 2001-2017 R SeparationistWales Plaid Cymru (Party of
Wales, PC)1925- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist (since
2003)Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (Welsh Republican Movement, MGC)
1949-1966 1950 ---- Separationist
*national only listed—then regional if national is not available.*based on Massetti and Schakel-2016 where possible; italicized means author changed their categorization based on party’s web page or other secondary literature; underlined means the party was not included in their study
40
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