Brexit and Historical Precedent: The Dangers of Underestimating the SNP

by

Stacey Gorski Spring

PhD CandidateDepartment of Political Science

Boston University

Working paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association’s Short Course:

“Brexit and Beyond: Implications for British and European Politics”29 August 2018

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Abstract: The Scottish National Party (SNP) has achieved unprecedented electoral success in recent years—both in comparison to its history and that of other separatist-regionalist parties in substantive democracies of Western Europe and Canada. To read the 2017 General Election as a sign of SNP decline is short-sighted: the party’s 35 seats are still the second-highest in its history. The rise of the SNP can be viewed as an evolution that started in the 1960s, as it has capitalized on key political opportunities, especially moments of potential institutional change, increasing its media saliency and membership while strategically engaging its independence narrative depending upon context and conditions. From the outset of the Brexit referendum, the Conservatives ignored the strategic position of the SNP. Continuing to do so through the Brexit negotiations—and especially afterwards—could spell disaster for the United Kingdom as Scots will likely vote again—this time to choose which union they prefer. If the Brexit Bill passes over Holyrood objections, the SNP can present its traditional narrative of Westminster ignoring Scottish interests—and push for another independence referendum. If Brexit stalls or, most unlikely, is reversed, the SNP can still claim a short-term political victory as the protector of Scotland against the imposition of English interests—and then call for a referendum to prevent future such infringements. Given the lose-lose position of the Tories in relation to the SNP, any scenario not resulting in a second independence referendum is hard to fathom, but it accommodating such a request should be viewed with great skepticism by those hoping to preserve the United Kingdom.

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Few institutions in this world are as powerful as a centralized state in a long-standing

substantive democracy. Thus, it is not surprising that in substantive democracies many Stateless

Nationalist Regionalist Parties (SNRPs), which advocate in a particular region for increased

autonomy from the existing central state, languish in relative obscurity especially. These parties

face a wide range of barriers to entry—not only in the existing systems of government, elections,

and linkage to the people through the media but also in their own platforms which call for the

destruction of the current constitutional order and the reorganization of state power. Yet, despite

these barriers, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in the U.K. has established itself as an

electoral competitor at both the regional and national levels of governance and then used that

support to garner an unsuccessful, at least in terms of achieving independence, referendum. This

party in particular seems to have managed the unenviable task of trying to be taken seriously

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when they are calling into question over 300 years of state organization in one of the world’s

most stable and successful democracies.

Part of the SNP’s rise can be explained by sharp growth following political opportunities,

which often took the form of potential (or actual) institutional change. While the first round of

debate surrounding devolution, in the 1970s, did not end with the creation of a regional

government, the SNP did learn valuable lessons for future engagement with the process,

especially as some members most frustrated in 1979 by the “independence or nothing” viewpoint

would go on to be in party leadership by the 1990s and would support the more gradualist

approach of devolution. In the 1990s, the SNP engaged in the devolution debates and had the

first significant opportunity to present themselves both at various public events and in the media

as being on par with the U.K.’s two big parties. The resulting creation of the Scottish Parliament

granted the SNP its first substantial representational opportunities—as the official opposition in

this regional body. Then, despite institutional barriers intended to prevent a single-party majority

in Scotland, the SNP mustered the first-ever (and so far only) majority government in 2011

before coming up five seats short of a repeat in 2016. Even in losing the 2014 independence

referendum, the SNP managed to emerge from the process as the third largest party in the U.K.

—again increasing its media presence. In these cases, the opportunity itself was not enough

(otherwise similar levels of success would have transpired in Wales by now); instead, the party

leaders and members had to capitalize with proper organization, resources, and messaging—a

form of agency unrecognized in a significant portion of work concerning this party type.

When the Conservative Party promised a Brexit referendum during the 2015 General

Election in effort to accommodate the right portions of the party that were growing increasingly

anti-European in sentiment, there was little consideration for the effects on Scotland as a whole

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—or the rise of the SNP who had been defeated at the polls in the 2014 referendum. As the SNP

was a regional party with minimal representation at Westminster (6 seats going into the 2015

General Election), there was little reason for the Tories to consider how the Brexit vote could

potentially underscore a substantive difference between England and Scotland. However, Scots

voted in a record 56 SNP MPs—as the party campaigned on “Standing up for Scotland” and

listed in its manifesto opposition to the EU referendum. The end result is three different levels of

constitutional crisis: one in how to disengage from the EU altogether, another on how to do so

while also considering the roles of devolved governments in certain policy areas, and finally how

to address the fact that electoral maps seem increasingly to be reflective of a case for Scottish

separatism at worst and a substantive north-south divide at best.

When the SNP lost 21 seats in the 2017 U.K. General Election, the reason was fairly

clear—Nicola Sturgeon’s claim that Brexit should mean another independence referendum

scared some 2015 SNP voters away. However, the SNP currently occupies 35 seats—which is

still the party’s second-best performance ever in Westminster elections. While the SNP is only a

part of the opposition, its potential in the Brexit scenarios is significant. If the Brexit Bill

passes over Holyrood objections, the SNP can present its now age-old narrative of Westminster

ignoring Scottish interests—and push for another independence referendum. If Brexit stalls or is

put to a second referendum, the SNP can arguably claim a historic political victory as the

protector of Scotland against the imposition of English interests—and still call for a referendum

on independence in order to prevent future such confrontations and to secure greater

representation for Scotland in the institutions of the EU (something the SNP has been touting

since the 1980s as a benefit of independence).

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This paper is organized into three sections and utilizes archival work on the SNP, existing

scholarship, and SNP election manifestos. The first portion establishes the SNP as an outlier

even among similar parties in Western Europe and Canada and explores the aspects of existing

literature on regionalist and separatist parties which have underexplained SNP success—

suggesting a need to study the SNP with greater consideration of its own agency especially with

regards to the party’s relationship with the media, its communicative discourse, and its strategic

deployment of its independence platform. The second section explores the historical precedents

of SNP breakthroughs, and then using these historical precedents, offers an evaluation of the

current conditions surrounding Brexit. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding the

continued likelihood of SNP pressure to hold a second independence referendum—and the

possible frames the party will continue to employ in its long-established discourse in making the

case for independence.

SNP “Exceptionalism” among similar parties

After being treated as “revolts, throwbacks, peripheral or niche parties” in a variety of

work spanning 1983-2008, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) have become

permanent fixtures in Europe and have begun to be treated as such in academic work (Hepburn-

2011,1). The shift certainly has to do with the increased electoral support of several of these

parties across states in Europe and Canada, as the more successful ones have moved “from niche

to ‘normal’” –having expanded their party platforms to address other issues as they compete in

the “multi-level and multi-dimensional politics” of Europe (Hepburn-2011, 11-15).

Certainly, all these factors are true for the SNP—and in expanding platforms and tackling

multi-level elections and messaging, they have out-performed every party among the separatist

parties in Western Europe and Canada, thus requiring careful consideration as an “extreme case.”

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The extreme value case bounds the population and illustrates the causal processes (Gerring-2008,

217-18); by process of elimination, the SNP is clearly the extreme case of separatist party

success. Careful consideration of the SNP’s evolution can reveal at least one process in regard to

how a separatist party can transform from the fringe to the mainstream via its own agency—and

despite its platform to redesign the constitutional order. On this basis alone, the two main

parties’ calculations with regards to Brexit outcomes should give careful consideration to the

potential of the SNP, as they are, and have come, closer than any other party to achieving their

independence aspirations. And, as will be discussed later, the SNP’s most important

breakthroughs have happened under similar conditions—in moments of potential constitutional

change when granted political opportunity via major party accommodation, all the while being

underestimated.

Especially when participating in long-standing substantive democracies, regional parties

that seek independence are positioned against a significant barrier in the form of the centralized

state; however, these parties are a subset of a larger group of regional parties. A broad definition

of a “regional” party is a party that functions in one region of a larger state, presents candidates

in that region, limits where it runs based on that territorial claim, and states political objectives

“defending” that region (DeWinter and Tursan-1998), while “entho-regionalist parties” are

frequently, and similarly, defined as having sub-national territorial borders, a group identity, and

stances that “challeng[e] the working order” (Muller-Rommel-1998 in Dandoy-2010). All told,

“regionalist parties defend the interests of their collective identity groups, with particular

emphasis on territorial autonomy and capacity goals” (Jolly-2015, 18).

Among substantive democracies in Western Europe and Canada there are a number of

parties that could be considered regionalist, and these lists are quite fluid as there are any number

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of fringe parties that either are small in number or limited in lifespan. Among the “successful”

parties, 108 have posted candidates in either regional or state-level elections since 1970 and

about half (49 of the 108 parties) have ever advocated separatism. 1 (See Appendix A: Regional

Parties in Western Europe and Canada.)

Of the 49 with any “separatist” claims in its history, even fewer have experienced any

form of electoral success—let alone sustained presence in elections—at the regional and national

levels. Of the parties with a “separatist” classification, 14 never held seats at either the national

or regional level and two parties, while two other held seats only at the national level: Bloc

Québécois is a coalition that only runs in federal elections and the Scottish Labour Party (SCLP,

1976-1981) won a seat in the U.K. Parliament in 1979. Otherwise, 16 other parties have won

regional seats, and 17 parties have won seats simultaneously at both the national and regional

levels.

Of these 17 which have successfully seated representatives at both the national and

federal level, there is a range of success as well. Two parties won a national seat just once: the

Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People, UP) which was an eight-year long

electoral coalition that won a seat in the 1979 Spanish elections and Aralar (AR) in Basque,

Spain held one seat as part of a coalition in the Spanish Parliament and four seats in the Navarre

1 Emanuele Massetti and Arjan Schakel listed 76 regionalist parties in their 2016 study on the ideologies of regionalist parties. Their list in another study includes parties that ran in federal since 1950 or regional elections since 1970 onward in the EU-15 plus Canada and Switzerland (Massetti and Schakel-2015). Seth Jolly’s research on regionalist parties in Western Europe identified 56 that have competed in at least one federal election since 1950 (Jolly-2015), and his prior work also included Initiative for Catalonia (IC) which was added here (Jolly-2007). While some of the included parties are predecessors of other parties on the list, together the three studies provide 108 different political parties in these substantive democracies that have contested elections—either at the regional or national level—in a specific region of a larger state. Using Dandoy’s typology for enthno-regionalist parties in Europe, each of the 108 parties have been categorized based on the relative strength of the party’s self-government commitment: separationist, federalist, protectionist, or ambiguous (Dandoy-2010). Separatism is the strongest claim—seeking a separate state. Then, federalism is a call for increased autonomy while protectionist claims are slightly weaker—and are aimed at protecting cultural or existing institutions of protection for the group. Finally, “ambiguous” is for periods where the party’s manifestos and other communications (such as its web site) did not emphasize any particular self-government claim. Massetti and Shakel 2016 utilized Dandoy’s typology for the 76 parties in their study, and I have added classifications for the 25 parties that they did not include and changed their listing for 11 parties’ ideology on self-government. In each case, I “upgraded” the classification—in 9 cases to “separationist” and in two cases to “federalist” from protectionist. These changes are shown in italics in the Appendix and are based on the party’s web site.

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Assembly in the early 2000s but otherwise held no seats. Others have had electoral success at

the regional and national levels but not necessarily while also advocating for independence. For

example, Lega Nord had a period in the late 1990s where it ran more forcibly on its

independence platform, but it has softened its stance in more recent years and has not held seats

at both levels while also maintaining a clearly separatist agenda. Similarly, the Galician

Nationalist Bloc (BNG) was only separationist from 1970s-1986 and did not challenge the

national elections then. Finally, two electoral coalitions have experienced success at the national

levels. Convergència i Unió, (Convergence and Union, CiU) which united Democratic

Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) in Catalonia,

split on basis of disagreements about independence and was only more clearly separationist after

2014—shortly after which the coalition dissolved.2 Likewise, Nafarroa Bai (Yes to Navarre,

NB), a coalition of Basque parties that existed from 2003-2011, held seats in both the Navarre

Parliament and the Cortes General (Spain’s lower house) for two election cycles before

dissolving.

Discounting these one-time parties, dissolved voting coalitions, and the parties which

have been separatist at some point but not while winning national and regional representation,

there are just 10 parties3 that have won seats at both the national and regional level since 1950

while actively advocating for separatism, and only seven of those parties currently exist.

Additionally, only five of the existing parties have been able to sustain an electoral presence—

which is measured as having simultaneous representation at the national and regional level for

two or more election cycles while advocating for separatism. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. Regional-separatist parties which have won at national and regional level since 1950Region, State Party Existence Persistence?

2 Massetti and Shakel categorize CiU as “Federalist (1970s-1998 and 2002-2007); Ambiguous (1998-2002; and after 2007)” (Massetti and Shakel-2016, 71). 3 Counting, in this case, Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang as the same party.

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Flanders, Belgium Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, NV-A)

2001- Y

Flanders, Belgium Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB) (previously Vlaams Blok, VB)

2004- Y

Flanders, Belgium Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) 1954-2001 NFaroe Islands, Denmark Tjóôvedldi (Republic, E) 1948- YBavaria, Germany Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) 1946- NSardinia, Italy Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action

Party, PSdAz)1921- N

Basque, Spain Herri Batasuana (United People, HB) 1979-2001 YCatalonia, Spain Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya

(Republican Left in Catalonia, ERC)1931- N

Scotland, U.K. Scottish National Party (SNP) 1934- YWales, U.K. Plaid Cyrmu (Party of Wales, PC) 1925- Y

Both Volksunie (VU) and Herri Batasuana (HB) have folded in recent years. Volksunie did not

meet the measure of persistence because it only held a secessionist position in the 1990s—when

it did manage to hold both regional and federal seats before folding in 2001. HB is an outlier

from the outset, as it was not necessarily like these others in regard to seeking a peaceful

resolution to autonomy interests. Thus, as a party, it did not take seats it won—except at the

local level—and was dissolved by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2001 for its association with

terrorism.

The Republican Left in Catalonia (ERC), Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) and Partido

Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) fail to meet the persistence measures. ERC

was only clearly separationist from 1989-1996 (Massetti and Schakel-2016, 71)—thus only

lasting two election cycles with the stronger call for sovereignty. In the case of BP, the party did

hold 17 seats in the German bundestag in 1949 and won seats as part of a coalition in 1953, but it

has not had national seats since. At regional level, BP won 17.9% in 1950 and has not held seats

at the regional level since 1962. In 2012, the party did earn 2.1% of vote in regional elections—

its highest level since 1966. However, the party has minimal influence. As for PSdAz, it has

only held seats through coalitions. Eve Hepburn’s work explains the inconsistencies in this

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particular case—much of which has to do with NOT organizing at different levels of government

(Hepburn-2009).

Thus, five truly regional-separatist parties have, since 1950, managed to win seats at both

the national and regional level in two or more consecutive election cycles. These parties are the

New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, Tjóôvedldi (“Republic,”

E) in Denmark, and the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Paid Cymru (PC) in the U.K. Of

these five, the SNP is the most successful electorally at the regional and national levels. (See

Fig. 1 and 2.) At the regional level, SNP has reached 30% or higher in three successive election

cycles. Only two other parties have ever even crossed the 30% mark—the N-VA in its 2014

election and Plaid in 1999, the first regional election ever held in the U.K.

Fig. 1: Regional Electoral Results for Most Successful Regional-Separatist Parties

N-VA VB E SNP Plaid0.00%5.00%

10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%30.00%35.00%40.00%45.00%50.00%

1995-19981999-20022003-20062007-20102011-20142015-2018

At the national level, the numbers are less easy to compare, especially since a party like

Tjóôvedldi only contests the two seats that represent Faroe. In Belgium, the Flemish language

group has 88 seats while Scotland has 59 seats in the U.K. Parliament and Wales, 40. However,

again, the SNP exceeds the results of the other parties having twice earned more than 30% of the

vote in the region during a national election.

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Fig. 2: National Election Seats Won by Regional-Separatist Parties

N-VA VB E SNP PC0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2011 2012-2016 2017-2018

% o

f vot

e

Despite including parties from Canada and Switzerland in the list of 108 parties, all 10 of

these electorally successful regionalist-separatist parties are in the European Union—a point

which has long been established in a general consensus that European integration encourages

sub-national mobilization in member states (Jolly-2006; Nagel-2004, and Laible-2008). Another

explanation of this result is that Quebec’s parties choosing to organize through separate

organizations at the national and regional level, but a large factor is also that the EU makes

smaller states viable (Jolly-2006) in terms of economics and security while also advocating for

democracy and human rights. Jolly explained how regionalist party support has increased (across

western Europe) as integration in the EU has deepened (Jolly-2015). Janet Laible wrote about

the cases of Scottish National Party and the Flemish Vlaams Belang as she explored how the EU

created more political space for nationalists and how nationalism has—and has not—evolved in

Europe. Her two cases were the most electorally successful in Europe a decade ago and remain

so: underlying her work is the idea that these successful parties are made more successful with

the increased exposure via the EU (Laible-2008). For all five parties with sustained electoral

support, these explanations remain applicable.

While some authors argue that multiple levels of government increase these parties’ policy

influence and can help them maximize voter support (Elias and Tronconi-2011, 513; Brancati-

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2008), multi-level elections actually provide even greater challenges to these separatist political

parties, as they have to engage resources—and audiences—in entirely different contexts. The

phrase “multi-level governance” was first defined by Gary Marks as “a system of continuous

negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks-1993, 392). Each of

those contexts requires a different set of skills as well as candidates. Thus, when the parties in

Quebec, Catalonia, and Basque choose to align in coalitions at the national (and European level

for the Spanish regions), there is less pressure on an individual organization to develop multiple

levels of communication and strategy. It is this diversity of demands on the Belgian, Danish, and

U.K. parties that sets them apart in the context of regionalist-separatist parties that are successful,

as they face the challenges—and meet them—in organizing at different levels of elections.

Other explanations for the success and viability of regionalist parties include multivariate

regression analyses, and they have explained the Belgian and Danish cases well but have under-

predicted both Scotland and Wales. In his review of the literature and his own analysis, Jolly

considered the origin of support (meaning the demographics of those voting for the regional

parties), the variable of language difference, the viability of the region to function on its own,

political economy arguments (meaning the region’s unemployment or tax rate versus the rest of

the state), and the role of integration (Jolly-2006, 41-76). Previously, Sorens (2005) did a cross-

sectional analysis of secession in advanced countries that indicated that the presence of a

regional language, a recent independence (since 1648), high income, and big population as well

as aspects of location (especially falling into one existing state—unlike the Basque case, for

example) indicate increased chances of secession support. Sorens’s study under-predicted

Scotland and Wales—but fit both the Belgian cases and Denmark well. “…It appears,” Sorens

wrote, well before the SNP’s recent historic victories, “that Welsh and even Scottish nationalists

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should be congratulated for achieving electoral success well beyond what base conditions seem

to support” (Sorens-2005, 321). Thus, a search for a more complete explanation of the Scottish

case continues.

Alternatively, institutional explanations of conditions that should impact the relative

strength of ethno-regionalist parties at large would again seem to support the Danish and Flemish

case but does not adequately account for the Scottish and Welsh cases. Several factors can

minimize regionalist party influence: “presidentialism, majority systems, and election

concurrency” (Brancati-2008, 158) as well as unitary systems (Harmel and Robertson-1985;

Willey-1998). None of the three countries in consideration have presidential systems. In

Belgium, there are proportional representation rules at all levels of government, it is a federal

state, and generally there is not election concurrency. Their European and regional elections are

held together but usually the federal is separate—except in the case of 2014 when all three levels

were held at the same time. During that 2014 “super” election cycle, the N-VA no longer

“emphasize[d] the end of Belgium in its manifesto” (Baudewyns, Dandoy, and Reuchamps-2015,

94). Denmark, on the other hand, is unitary, sometimes has concurrent elections, and is

proportional. However, the Faroe Islands has been self-governing since 1948 and is treated as a

“third country” by the European Union (Adler-Nissen-2014); the islands, via The Takeover Act

of 2005, now has been granted unilateral legislative and administrative powers except on issues

of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, foreign, security and defense policy and monetary and

currency matters.4 So while Denmark itself is a unitary state, the Faroe Islands do not function

as part of that highly centralized system, and the islands’ parliament has more areas of

competency than the regional parliaments of the U.K., for example. Therefore, Faroe does

function outside a unitary system, has non-concurrent elections to its legislature and the Danish

4 Takeover Act of the Faroe Islands. Danish Act no. 578. 24 June 2005.

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parliament, and utilizes a proportional system. Finally, the U.K., unlike both Flanders and the

Faroe Islands, has both concurrent elections and a majority system at the U.K. level. So both PC

and the SNP seem to defy these factors as well—though the SNP to a greater extent.

Thus, it would seem that European integration, multi-level governance, permissive

national governments, and lack of presidentialism help all five parties; however, while the

Belgian and Danish cases are well explained by statistical analyses of the viability of regional

parties as well as the presence of non-current elections and proportional systems, the cases in the

U.K. continue to be inadequately elucidated due—and the SNP has increasingly out-performed

Plaid in recent years.

With limited satisfying explanations for the SNP’s success, it seems logical to take more

careful consideration of the party’s own agency in its evolution—and how moments of major

party accommodation combined with potential constitutional changes have been capitalized upon

by SNP leaders via growing resources and careful messaging to reach previously unbroken

thresholds. While these factors in no way guarantee that Brexit will lead to Scottish

independence, there are reasons to consider how the past can inform the present and provide a

fair warning that underestimating the SNP’s ability under these conditions has created the party’s

most important moments of growth—and breakthrough—in the past.

SNP Breakthroughs: Constitutional Change, Major Party Accommodation and Media Exposure

Bonnie Meguid suggested that the strongest institutional impact on fringe parties in

general is majority party accommodation (Meguid-2007)—when mainstream parties move

toward accommodating increased demands for autonomy and absorb the smaller party’s interest.

However, in the more specific case of the SNP or separatist agendas writ large, full

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accommodation is highly unlikely because, at the very least, independence would undermine the

entire state structure from which the majority parties benefit. At the same time, when the parties

have moved to accommodate the SNP—for example in allowing the party its first broadcast in

1965, then in creating a Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s, and in holding an independence

vote in 2014—and the effects of each have been the growth of the SNP and its phoenix-like

transition into something new and increasingly more competitive with the U.K.’s largest parties.

However, the opportunity is not enough: party leaders have to act decisively, the messaging on

independence in particular needs to be considered with care, and party organization needs to be

up to the task at hand. If opportunity alone (or institutional factors) explained separatist party

success, then SNP and PC would look much more alike.

Thus, three factors have been common to each occasion wherein SNP has broken through

Pederson and Deschouwer’s thresholds (representation, blackmail, governing potential, and

government thresholds (Deshouwer-2008)): a form of major party accommodation creates

opportunity, increased exposure in the media generates greater interest and drives up saliency

and even membership, the SNP proves relatively competent under the new conditions (often

surprising political elites), and then the party carefully chooses which frame fits best for its

independence platform based on the new conditions.

First, in 1965 the SNP was allowed its first-ever Party Political Broadcast (PPB) and two

years later, Winnie Ewing’s 1967 by-election victory in Hamilton would mark the start of a new

era for the SNP as it would break the representation threshold for good. Despite the lack of

unified campaigning procedures for the SNP between 1948-1967, there was a long-term,

concerted effort to gain more access to free media exposure—especially in television and radio

broadcasting. Somerville described the SNP as becoming “embroiled, even fixated” with this

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issue as the party engaged in a number of strategies (Somerville-2013) including pirating radio,

picking public and private battles with the BBC and parliamentarian groups over allotment of

broadcasting time, and trying to generate more resources to pay for this type of outreach.

However, after a decade-long battle over party broadcasts in particular (when the BBC and the

major parties relented allowing the 1965 broadcast), SNP leadership understood the relative

importance of the opportunity, drawing up six revisions of the script in preparation for the five

minutes of air time.5 The National Executive Committee confidently anticipated sharp increases

in membership as a result of the exposure—they aimed to add 4,000 people (Wilson-2009).

They had fly posters advertising the television broadcast and awards put in place for the branches

which expanded the most. Within 24 hours of the broadcast as the party received upward of 500

letters from the public (Sommerville-2013, 150). [For perspective, the party was thought to have

2,000 members in 1962, 16,000 in 1965, and by the end of 1965: 21,000 members in 160

branches.] Additionally, there was further exposure in the press (the Glasgow Herald and Times

featured stories)—which meant parts of Billy Wolfe’s message were reiterated in other national

and local newspapers (Sommerville-2013). The BBC would then air, for the first time, 30 full

minutes of the Annual Conference in 1966. At the December National Council meeting, Robert

McIntyre reported a 5,000 member increase (Wilson-2009, 18).

In short, this small act of accommodation—relenting on allowing a small fringe party to

10 minutes of broadcast time (5 on television and 5 on radio)—provided the opportunity, created

in part by SNP pressure and then taken advantage of by the SNP leadership, to boost the party

into electoral existence. Henceforth, the SNP would seat 1 or more MP in each General Election.

After Ewing took her seat, and she was inundated with media requests and the like, so the SNP

began reforming internally to accommodate the needs for staffing and supporting a sitting

5 BBC and ITV access: Robert McIntyre’s papers. 1960-1968. NLS: Acc. 10090.102.

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parliamentarian (something which the SNP had only needed for 3 months of 1945 but with

which it otherwise had no experience). The reforms that were done proactively—to achieve the

broadcasting allowance and to utilize time better at the party’s highest administrative levels via

reforms enacted in 1966 —helped produce the key breakthroughs in media access and

representation. However, more reactionary changes needed for actually participating in

parliament would leave problems (such as lack of personnel, communication organization, and a

branch-dominated structure) that would still belabor party progress until the next significant

breakthrough had been completed at the creation of the Scottish Parliament and eventual party

reforms in 2003.

The next big threshold the party broke was “governing potential,” and this opportunity

was presented through the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum. In the case of devolution, the

first attempt in the 1970s was not effective for the SNP—and lessons were learned that were

applied to the devolution vote in the 1990s. In the 1970s, Labour supported of a Scottish

Constitutional Convention—which the SNP supported until party leaders realized that they

would both be outnumbered and unable to discuss independence—that only devolution would be

on the table. When the SNP withdrew, Labour was able to present the SNP as uncooperative—

and the methodological hardline position of “independence only” blocked a chance at forward

progress, leaving the SNP to be defined in the press as both uncooperative and fundamentalist at

worst and at best uncompromising and impossible to work with.

There was fear among some SNP leaders and members that attention to devolution would

displace independence, and it took until the 1990s, under the leadership of Alex Salmond, for a

wider group of SNP members and leaders to accept the view of devolution as a stepping stone to

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independence. The “radical”6 viewpoint, most likely modeled after the notion of Third Estate’s

withdrawal from the Estates General at the start of the French Revolution, held to the idea that

SNP MPs would establish a separate Scottish assembly by recusing themselves from

Westminster once they achieved an electoral majority in the available Scottish seats. The

alternative viewpoint in the party called for the negotiation of a Scottish Parliament via

devolution—and then eventually an independence referendum, but this “gradualist” perspective

was seen by party activists (and some members of the leadership, too) as too risky in regard to

the potential limitations of powers granted to a devolved parliament. In the SNP’s 1974

manifesto and the 1976 reprint, the process to independence was through an SNP majority in a

U.K. General Election. The 1976 document read: “The Scotland which we seek will be created

only by electing a Scottish Parliament, and by no other means. To win support for this proposal

and to make it effective we must first elect MPs of the only party which is committed to the

establishment of a Scottish Parliament and full self-government—the Scottish National Party.”7

While this document softened previous rhetoric in party manifestos, the message was the same in

terms of achieving independence via the “radical” methods. However, in the same year, at the

Annual Conference in Motherwell, a resolution was created to support devolution, as the

resolution stated the SNP was “prepared to accept an assembly with limited powers as a stepping

stone” (Mitchell-2009, 36). Unfortunately for the SNP, Labour had taken this position—

6 “Radical” was frequently a self-descriptor employed by the SNP in the 1980s and early 1990s. In his book recalling the party’s growth, Gordon Wilson readily utilizes the term to describe his years in party leadership. Examples in SNP literature include the SNP’s first PPB in 1965, when at least one version of the script stated, that the SNP was “…a modern and radical party representing all kinds of people throughout Scotland.” (from the Papers of Robert McIntyre. Press Statements from HQ 1960-1969: NLS. Manuscript Division. Acc. 10090.102.) By 1983, the only “realistic radical alternative to British economic imperialism…” was the SNP (The Scottish National Party: 49th Annual National Conference.” 1983. Pavilion: Rothesay. 29-30 Sept; 1 Oct. 1983. NLS. Shelfmark: QP.sm.160.). And Wilson, in particular, would object to the party’s new position when it accepted the notion of devolution and a follow-up referendum, and he took the internal disputes public with an article in The Sunday Times in January of 2000 when he wrote that the party was no longer “radical”—as “The grassroots membership was not happy to see national freedom relegated to 10th place in the Scottish Parliament election” (Wilson-2015, quoting his 9 Jan. 2000 article). 7 “Scotland’s future: S.N.P. Manifesto.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP-197-]. Reprinted 1976. Book. 32p.:ill; 15X21cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelf mark: QP1. 93. 498.

18

supporting limited devolution—and it was consistently a situation wherein the SNP had limited

power to negotiate (due to low numbers at Westminster, for example). Thus, when the

opportunity for devolution presented itself (via the Labour party’s sponsorship) and the SNP

backed out, it is easy to see how their lack of cooperation was dismaying to political

counterparts.

At the same time, in an article in Polity in the spring of 1979, after the SNP had seen its

parliamentarians reduced from a high of 11 in 1974 to just 2 seats in 1979, declared that “For

both nationalist parties, the political arena is a territory neither wishes to control,” and “It is

entirely possible that should enough decentralization occur, the call for independence might be

moderated in favor of some form of federalism…In the meantime, inaction may strengthen both

nationalist movements at home…” (Fusaro-1979, 386). In short, Fusaro was describing a

fundamentalist, non-parliamentarian organization seeking independence. Yet, considering the

SNP’s internal and external documentation in this time period, it was simply not an accurate

characterization. While it was correct that SNP was not prepared for the 1974 electoral spike, as

it had difficulty organizing both communication and party discipline in voting as well as the

increased media exposure, the SNP was not failing at these traditional political roles because it

was fundamentalist—or “nationalist.” It was failing because it had no experience and no

resources. The lessons from this unspectacular entry into having a parliamentarian group would

actually provide the basis for a smoother transition to the need for larger party function when the

Scottish Parliament was seated in 1999. At that point, the SNP had done much more preparation

—starting even before the 1997 referendum was held to prepare candidates for the media

spotlight. Additionally, there was greater cohesion as the entirety of operations could be

centered in Edinburgh—the cite of both party headquarters and the Scottish Parliament. (This

19

situation is in juxtaposition to the SNP’s 1970s experience with a parliamentary group but a lack

of ability to communicate and organize well between London and Scotland.) The SNP was also

helped, at least in the short-term in 1999, by the established practice of dual officeholding—as

SNP MPs could also be MSPs. While this duality would eventually cause problems, with

opponents pointing to weak SNP presence at Westminster votes, in the short-term it enabled the

SNP to consolidate its leadership and work out a plan to merge both the party’s independence

platform and the challenge of fighting devolved elections.

However, first, to get to the 1999 Parliament, the SNP had to navigate the second

devolution vote, and this time, the SNP proved to have learned from the mistakes of the 1970s. It

was no coincidence that Salmond, who had been briefly expelled from the party in the early

1980s in part for his support of a gradualist approach, was the one leading the party in the 1990s

as it navigated the second devolution referendum. The 1997 referendum presented the SNP with

two separate opportunities. First, it allowed the party and its leadership to be seen on par with the

mainstream parties as Salmond appeared side-by-side with leaders of Labour in Scotland and the

Liberal Democrats. Salmond did well to stay positive and not exploit issues with Labour (such

as its own internal problems including one MP being investigated for corruption and another who

committed suicide). Instead, Salmond, with equal status, was now a fixture in the television

debates on devolution (Lynch-2013, 236-7). This media opportunity, combined with Salmond’s

talents as a debater, gave the party new standing and popularity. The second opportunity was the

Scottish Parliament itself. Besides thrusting the SNP into relevancy at levels thus far

unachievable at Westminster, the new Scottish Parliament also meant that the SNP had increased

opportunities for members seeking to hold public office. Whereas previously there was only the

outside hope of getting elected in a handful of constituencies to Westminster, now SNP members

20

with ambitions of serving in a public role could stand for office in Scotland. This point was not

lost to Salmond who acknowledged that members of the SNP like him—who joined the party in

the 1960s and 1970s—were risking careers in politics by choosing to join the SNP—rather than

one of the U.K.’s two big parties—during university.8 Thus, the Scottish Parliament allowed the

party to gain greater political professionalization literally—as more SNP members could fill

roles in public office.

Additionally, the creation of the Scottish Parliament included institutional structures

essentially designed to protect against the emergence of any singular party in government. The

“additional member system” stipulates that 73 Members of Scottish Parliaments (MSPs) are

selected via first-past-the-post procedures and then an additional 56 MSPs are “List MSPs”—are

chosen via a second party vote. The SNP had been advocating for proportional representation

since the 1970s when it first began to delineate its desired structures for a government in

Scotland,9 but the design of the Scottish Parliament electoral process, in this case, would also

guarantee a degree of difficulty for any singular party to govern in Scotland. Given that the SNP

won more list than constituency seats in the first two Scottish elections (7 constituency SMPs

and 28 list MSPs in 1999; 9 constituency MSPs and 27 list MSPs), there seemed little “threat” of

them taking on the challenge of a majority government. Yet, by the third election cycle, when the

SNP first ran a campaign on the basis of a party leader running for First Minister, the SNP

finished as part of the governing coalition (21 constituency MSPs and 26 list MSPs), and one

cycle later was the lone party of government (53 constituency MSPs and 16 list MSPs).

Although the SNP did lose its outright majority in the Scottish election of 2016, it was only

narrowly—by two seats—making the SNP’s 2016 finish the second best in Scottish

8 Salmond, Alex. (14 July 2017). Personal Interview.9 “SNP&You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party.” Scottish National Party: Edinburgh. 1974. Booklet. 19 pages. 22cm. Shelfmark: P.med.3505.

21

parliamentary modern history. While it was disappointing not to keep full control of government,

the SNP still dominated in the constituency vote—winning 59 of the 73 seats—making for a

complete reversal of its electoral outcomes when the parliament began in 1999. Regardless, in

achieving the coalition threshold in 2007 and then the government threshold in 2011, the party

was in position to negotiate to hold the independence referendum—after having “broken” the

electoral barriers to a majority party government in Scotland.

Finally, the holding of the 2014 independence referendum is a good example of major

party accommodation as Labour could be seen as the party of democracy and there seemed, at

least initially, little chance of the Scots voting to leave—producing a win-win scenario for

Labour. In this case, the end result for the SNP was one of unintended consequences but

nonetheless important in the party’s growth. First, the gap, which was seen as low as 25% in

support of independence as negotiations began in 2012, closed by the actual vote—with 44.7%

of voters supporting independence. Despite the disappointment of the defeat at the polls and the

decision by Salmond to step down as party leader, the SNP experienced unprecedented growth.

The saliency of the party had risen in the print press (see Fig. 3) by measures simply unseen

previously, and the attention to the independence issue seemed to spark a youth movement and

interest—even if the direction of causation is unclear. The SNP grew, in the months that

followed the referendum, at unprecedented rates,10 making it the third largest party in the U.K.

and certainly its fastest growing. Thus, the SNP was able to turn a referendum loss for

independence into a historic moment of party expansion and activity—that ultimately culminated

in its record-breaking 2015 General Election result. However, it is worth noting that these rises

in saliency—even the spikes—do not in any way compare with the volume of coverage granted

10 During the span of 2007 to 2013, the membership increased by 11,056 people. Then membership between 2013 to 2014 increased by 65,000 people, making the SNP the third largest party in the UK with 90,000 members.

22

the major parties. For context, the Labour Party, in similar searches, has averaged 18,537.3

articles per year from 2000-201711, with its lowest total of 13,909 in 2000, while “Conservative

Party” (and not Tories or Tory) yields an average of 13,213.6 articles per year with a low of

7,840 in 2002.

Fig. 3: SNP’s Saliency in the UK print media by volume12

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 20170

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

17801195 1146 1022 896 893

1194

1888

1049771 663

9991357

802

2987

4866

1811

2438

Num

ber o

f Arti

cles

In short, while the SNP’s monetary resources have caught up to these parties (at least in terms of

spending on Scottish elections, as SNP outspent Labour in the 2007 Scottish elections), the

party’s saliency in the media remains well behind on the other two parties.13 Therefore, these

moments—like Brexit—wherein the SNP is able to be relevant and to offer a narrative of being

ignored or of Scottish interests being tossed aside, the SNP often gains ground through increased

exposure that it otherwise can not maintain. Salmond declared that the SNP does well simply to

stay in the news cycle—that it does not matter if the attention is positive or negative as long as

11 The saliency of the party by volume was measured by the number of articles found in the Proquest news and newspapers database in a search for “Labour Party.” The search was limited to full-text English language articles in newspapers, magazines, and historical newspapers (excluding: trade journals, wire feeds, other sources, scholarly journals, blogs, podcasts, and websites as well as dissertations and theses) and excluded Ireland, Europe and the U.S. in terms of location. Similarly, the search was solely for the “Conservative Party” and not “Tory” or “Tories.” Thus, their results seem imbalanced—but a search for “Conservative Party” OR “Tory” yields an imbalanced report the other way with 43,000+ articles found per year.12 The saliency of the party by volume was measured by the number of articles found in the Proquest news and newspapers database in a search for “Scottish National Party.” The search was limited to full-text English language articles in newspapers, magazines, and historical newspapers (excluding: trade journals, wire feeds, other sources, scholarly journals, blogs, podcasts, and websites as well as dissertations and theses) and excluded Ireland, Europe and the U.S. in terms of location. Various limitations on the searches all yielded the same pattern of 2014, 2015, and 2017 being the highest on record as well as relative spikes in 2000, 2007, and 2012.13 These statistics could be more insightful if only completed for Scottish publications and is work still in progress.

23

the party can remain relevant.14 Although, with the with the party’s growth since 2007, those

frames may begin to matter more.

Regardless, besides these moments of major party accommodation and potential

constitutional change being timed with party expansion, the SNP’s discourse on independence

has remained an important factor all along as it keeps positing a minority viewpoint that

challenges 100s of years of state structures. While the SNP has definitely gradually de-

emphasized independence over time (See Table 2), in the context of Brexit and its aftermath, it is

more important to consider the way the SNP has framed its pro-independence stance historically

—as those potential frames are likely to be revisited in the push for a second independence

referendum.

In this regard, too, the party has faced a long internal evolution—and the party’s

manifestos provide good insight into both the extent to which a given election was predicated on

the independence platform and in what ways it was presented. In the 1970s, there was a shift

once the party had 11 MPs in 1974, as the pre-election manifesto made the economic case for

independence regarding oil and ensuring “a substantial balance of payments surplus, an adequate

supply of basic resources and the opportunity to adopt monetary and fiscal policies designed to

suit the Scottish economy.”15 While, just two years later, in a reprint in 1976, the word

“independence” is used limitedly and instead phrases like “self-government” and “national

sovereignty” were employed16--one could argue in order to quiet “separatism” accusations from

peers. In the 1980s, independence was utilized regularly—appearing 20 times in 24 pages in

1983, 10 times in 8 pages in the 1984 European election manifesto, and 16 times in 27 pages in

14 Salmond, Alex. (14 July 2017). Personal Interview.15 “SNP&You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party.” Scottish National Party: Edinburgh. 1974. Booklet. 19 pages. 22cm. Shelfmark: P.med.3505.16 “Scotland’s future: S.N.P. Manifesto.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP-197-]. Reprinted 1976. Book. 32p.:ill; 15X21cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelf mark: QP1.93.498.

24

1987.17 The context was often about independence in Europe, but also included a portion of John

Locke and the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1983, stating that the “course of human

events” can impel people to “the separation”18 and a portion in 1987 regarding the use of a

referendum. Likewise, independence was to be “regained” in 1984, as a year earlier it was

described as being “taken for granted” by other nations. In all versions, independence held many

potential advantages—especially economically for Scotland, but by 1987 independence was a

way to create a “new society” that would allow Scotland to “take part in the affairs of the world

and make a positive contribution to peace and security”—in short a potential path to redefinition

and rebirth.

Table 2: Use of “Nation” and “Independence” in SNP manifestos and PEB: 1999-201719

“Nation” Independence(t)/pg length Section on it?/first mention In PEB?1999 Scottish Election

9 36 times in 41 pages Average: every 1.1 pages

-No dedicated section.-In opening message (“potential of independence” and referendum) mentions sep. doc on econ case.

n/a

2003 Scottish Election

38 37 times in33 pagesAverage: every

-No dedicated section.Pg. 2 (“and to show why we need the powers of independence” and three other times)

n/a

2007 Scottish Election

32 19 times in 76 pagesAvg: every 4 pages

-Section in Table of Contents- reference in opening statement to referendum

“It’s Time for the SNP”-No mention.

2011 Scottish

69 (“national”=77)

33 times in 44 pages

-Section in Table of Contents- in opening message, but more

“What has the Scottish done…”

17 “Choose Scotland—The Challenge of Independence.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP, 1983.] Book. 24p; 30cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP1.205.7909L.; “SNP-Scotland’s voice in Europe: manifesto of the Scottish National Party for the 1984 elections to the European Parliament.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1984. Book. 8 pages; 32 cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: PB7.216.45/1L.; “Play the Scottish Card: SNP General Election manifesto 1987.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh: Scottish National Party 1987. Book. 27 p.; 1 port.; 21 cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP2.88.1572.18 “Choose Scotland—The Challenge of Independence.” Scottish National Party. Edinburgh [SNP, 1983.] Book. 24p; 30cm. National Library of Scotland. Shelfmark: QP1.205.7909L.19 In coding these manifestos, the notion of “nation” was only measured when in the context of Scotland as a nation—most often in the form “our nation” and when juxtaposing Scotland to other “nations” but not when utilized to reflect a level of government or used as national agenda or resources or when in the official title for a particular committee or group. For example, a straight search for “nation” in the 1999 manifesto will reveal the use of the word 60 times. However, “National Convener” and other such titles account for 10 mentions; “nation” is part of another word (like destination, discrimination, or international) on 17 occasions, and is part of other phrases like “national” prices, framework, strategy, or resources on other mentions. Likewise, “independence” or “independent” was only categorized as appropriate to this context when addressing the future of an independent Scotland or how independence would be achieved. A straight search for “independence” in these manifestos will yield far greater results, such as an independent governing body or commission.

25

Election Avg: every 1.3 pages significant is p. 3 (after jobs/econ—about referendum—3rd paragraph.)

-no mention.

2016 Scottish Election

19 7 times76 pagesAvg.: every 9.2 pages

-No dedicated section.-First mention on pg. 9—on the 36th item in a list: about new work to persuade

No mention

2001 General Election*

1^ 24 times in 29 pagesAvg.: every 1.2 pages

[No Table of Contents.]-First line. “We stand for independence” and eight times on the first page.

“We Stand for Scotland.” No mention of independence.

2005 General Election

8 10 times in 24 pagesAvg: every 2.4 pages

[No Table of Contents.]-Opening statement (“And we will always argue the case for Scottish independence.”)-Bold/huge print p. 4.

n/a

2010 General Election

35 18 times in32 pagesAvg: every 1.8 pages

-No dedicated section.-Not until pg. 5 (which is part of opening statement—but midway through 5th paragraph).

-“Keep on”-no mention

2015 General Election

7 4 times in 56 pagesAvg: every 14 pages

-Not until pg. 10; independence and home rule.

-no mentionDoes refer to last year as a roller coaster: who really is going to stand up for Scotland?

2017 General Election

5 6 times in 48 pagesAvg: every 8 pages

--Opening message-referendum context

-Not mentioned directly.

*Heart of the Manifesto insert^2001 Heart of the Manifesto used “country” 14 times in places that later might include “nation” in the future

The manifestos between 1999-2017 would essentially reflect a sharpening of language

choices but a lot of the same angles of presentation as previously mentioned. In Scottish

Election manifestos, at least until 2016, there was often a stronger case made for independence

than in General Election manifestos. (See Table 2.) In general, the themes from 1999-2017

include the call for a referendum (at least until the 2015 General Election), the case for greater

Scottish representation and participation in Europe as a result of being independent—specifically

in the form of increased positions in EU institutions, and the promise of economic growth and

standard of living. However, there were somewhat substantive changes in the ideological

backing behind independence. Namely, starting in 2007, the phrase “natural state” began to be

used to describe an independent Scotland as a “natural” phenomenon. Alternatively, the 2015

General Election manifesto declared quite boldly, “The SNP will always support independence

26

—but that is not what this election is about.”20 Similarly, in the 2017 General Election

manifesto, independence was only mentioned six times and each use was in the context of a right

to hold a referendum. These decisions to back off on independence—while not letting go of the

platform altogether—were the product of the lack of electoral support in the independence

referendum as well as calculations on how to best attract voters under particular conditions. In

short, the SNP, unlike its tendencies and internal struggles through the 1980s, is no longer

concerned with the “radical” label—it now discusses independence in a tactical manner that

makes it much more like a traditional electoral-professional party, albeit it just with a highly non-

traditional separatist platform, than a radical or fundamentalist group with a singular purpose.

And, the only way it has grown into this role has been by taking advantage of opportunities

granted by potential institutional—or constitutional—change.

Brexit Outcomes and Future Independence Referendum

Essentially, the conditions are at least favorable, based on historical precedent, for the SNP to

experience another historic breakthrough—and the only substantive threshold it has yet to

conquer is that of independence. The presence of potential constitutional change, major party

accommodation, and underestimation of the SNP’s potential has led to the most significant shifts

in the SNP’s history—and certainly Brexit fits those three conditions. While the party has had to

respond to those opportunities with resources and organization, the SNP of 2018 appears to have

both the financial and political resources to remain political contenders at all levels. Finally, the

SNP’s messaging in past provides clear insights into how they can best frame possible Bexit

outcomes in terms of the need for independence. It is also clear that the SNP still stands to gain

from the counter-intuitive—a harder Brexit (which at this point seems less likely)—which is not

20 “Stronger For Scotland.” Scottish National Party. General Election Manifesto 2015. Edinburgh. Accessed online: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/SNP.pdf.

27

the policy they support ideologically. A hard Brexit leaves the SNP with three traditional frames

for independence while a softer Brexit, or worse a second referendum on Europe, leaves the SNP

with less convincing frames and concerns about voter fatigue as well as the possibility of a less

decisive vote in Scotland in a second vote.

The Brexit vote, held in June of 2016, was essentially determined by the desire for the

Conservative Party to accommodate a different wing—those parties to its right and its more

right-leaning members—as opposed to Labour trying to accommodate the SNP, to its left, in the

devolution and independence votes. Like the Labour-approved independence referendum, the

Tory-approved Brexit referendum was in part due to being able to present itself as a democracy-

first party. There had been no referendum in Britain for 40 years on the issue of European

integration, conditions economically and in terms of immigration changes had led to a certain

degree of saliency on the issue, and the Tories could attract some voters on the right—away from

UKIP or BNP and into the Tory fold instead. The Tories won the majority in Westminster in

2015, and Cameron held to his promise. Then, Cameron himself, an advocate for the EU and

continued U.K. membership in it, did not need to deal with the aftermath of the leave vote—as

he resigned and left the negotiation for withdrawal to others.

However, there was little calculation of Scotland or the SNP’s strategic positioning as the

Brexit referendum was promised. In this regard, media saliency volume measures can be

insightful. Proquest News and Newspapers, in a search including English-language newspapers

and magazines in the U.K. for “Scottish National Party” AND “Brexit” showed the SNP was

simply not part of the early discussion on the Brexit promise by Cameron in 2013. There is one

record in 2013, 10 in 2014, 89 in 2015, and then 733 in 2016. In short, the SNP and Brexit only

became “news” after the vote was in. Looking at a breakdown of the coverage in 2016, the

28

referendum was held 23 June, and of the 192 articles that included the SNP and Brexit in that

month, 126 were from the week following the vote. In the 50 articles prior to the vote (16

articles appeared on the day of the referendum), none discuss the strategic position of the SNP in

relation to the major parties. One article, published in the Irish Independent, came close—as it

discussed the opposite: how if Scotland left before Brexit, it would make investors pay more

attention to Brexit because the U.K. would lose “the most pro-European chunk” of its territory.21

Likewise, the terms “Scottish National Party,” “Brexit,” and “Cameron” do not appear in a single

entry until 2014—and even then, only in 8 total articles. In short, there was limited at best, and

possibly no at worst, discussion of the proposed Brexit vote and the possible implications for

underscoring big differences in perspective between English and Scottish voters.

Ignoring or underestimating the SNP’s potential impact has been a constant factor in each

of these historic breakthroughs. In 1965, worn down by a decade of SNP sniping and griping, the

major parties and the BBC granted the party broadcasting rights—likely figuring that could not

matter that much. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise in terms of the impact of that moment

on the SNP’s evolution. In the 1990s, the devolution referendum was the opportunity—and the

underestimation was that the electoral system designed for the Scottish Parliament would prevent

the SNP from becoming a majority party. It took about a decade for the SNP to “break” that

expectation. Finally, the 2014 independence referendum was obviously an opportunity to reach

the SNP’s ultimate goal of independence for Scotland; and while that aspect was unrealized, the

opportunity instead made the party more salient and prepared the way for its historic

performance in the 2015 (and 2017 for that matter—at least in a longer-term context) General

Election.

21 "Scotland and UK Euro Exit." Irish Independent, Aug 28 2014, p. 2. ProQuest. Web. 19 Aug. 2018 .

29

Besides constitutional change, major party accommodation and underestimation, the

SNP’s moments of growth have had to be matched by its resources and organization. In terms of

membership, the SNP was listed at 118,200 members as of April, 2018---as compared to 124,000

in the Conservative Party, 552,000 in the Labour Party, and 100,500 for the Liberal-Democrats.22

Being the U.K.’s “third party” is a significant position and the numbers relative to the Tories is

also telling about the SNP’s potential to continue contending for independence. In terms of

spending, the SNP still lags significantly in General Elections, for example spending £1, 475,478

in 2015 which was less than UKIP and certainly less than the two larger parties, as the Tories

spent £15.6 million and Labour, £12.2 million.23 Hypothetically, these figures would translate to

the Conservative Party spending £28,461. 54 for each constituency it contested U.K.-wide versus

the SNP spending £20,008.10 per Scottish contest. Or, even more telling: £0.34 per eligible

elector in the U.K. that the Conservatives spent versus £0.37 per eligible elector in Scotland as

spent by SNP. 24 Likewise, in Scottish elections, the SNP has often outspent competitors—a

trend that began in 2007.

While none of these resources are directly causal to independence, the relative strength of

SNP members and spending is historic in its own right—as it is certainly the strongest and

wealthiest the party has ever been. The SNP officially spent £1.4 million (97% of its legal

amount)25 on the independence referendum versus £90,830 (13%) on the Europe vote—perhaps

indicative either of how the SNP knew it stood to gain from a “Leave” vote or how the polls had

22 “Membership of UK Political Parties.” House of Commons Briefing Paper Number SN05125, 1 May 2018. Accessed online: file:///Users/sspring/Downloads/SN05125.pdf. 23 U.K. Electoral Commission. Accessed online: <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-spending-at-elections/details-of-party-spending-at-previous-elections>.24 Electoral Statistics, U.K. 2015. Office for National Statistics. Accessed online: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/elections/electoralregistration/bulletins/electoralstatisticsforuk/2015.25 U.K. Electoral Commission. Accessed online: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/campaign-spending-and-donations-at-referendums/campaign-spending-at-the-scottish-referendum

30

been so skewed for “Remain” in Scotland that there was little reason to spend. Regardless, the

party has resources that it previously lacked—and that is no longer a barrier to its performance.

In terms of strategic positioning and frames, the SNP stands to gain from a harder Brexit

—or at least moments wherein it can claim that negotiations have ignored Scottish interests. In

this case, the SNP will engage in three familiar storylines: the Westminster parties ignore

Scottish interests (and the differentiation between England and Scotland), the desire for Scottish

input in the EU, and its fallback point of the potential and “naturalness” of Scottish

independence. All of these ideas date back in the history of the party’s lexicon. In 1981, sitting

Scottish MPs, Donald Stewart and Gordon Wilson boycotted “the so-called ‘all party talks’ on

devolution…[because] Tonight’s debates are a fraud.”26 This same language would be employed

by Salmond in the SNP’s 2010 General Election PEB as he talked about how the televised

debates (to be held that night), will not be about Scotland: “None of it will apply to Scotland,” he

says, but it will be about England and the “cozy Westminster parties…three London parties [that

have] the same agenda.”27 This same line can be presented in line with the holding of a Brexit

referendum at all, and the SNP has already employed this tactic somewhat in walking out of

Commons in June (2018) and in some headlines as MSPs object over devolved competencies not

being negotiated appropriately.

Like objecting to the larger parties’ focus away from Scotland and Scottish interests, the

SNP’s dialogue on Europe is also decades old. While most scholarship places the start of the tag

line “independence in Europe” in the 1980s, older archives suggest the idea was present, though

clearly not predominate, as far back as the 1930s. In a document that initiated some of the ideas

behind the SNP’s “civic nationalism,” George Malcolm Thompson’s The Kingdom of Scotland

26 16 June 1981. Scottish National Party. “Headquarters News Releases 1981-1982.” NLS. Manuscript Division. Acc. 10754. 29.27 “SNP Party Election Broadcast—Thursday April 15, 2010. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p0kzXFHKagk>.

31

Restored argued that Scotland had a role to play in Europe (Thomson-1939, 11). Likewise, in

1951 T.H. Gibson, in his February address in Glasgow which was reprinted in a 12-page booklet

by the SNP, referred to Scotland’s push for independence in the context of a wider European

change: “Self-Government for Scotland is in harmony with the larger movement in Europe for

defending democratic rights and rule of law.”28 Then the idea would be repeated in 1978, stating

that Scotland and Scottish culture is “as venerable as that of any other European nation.”29

However, while this notion of an independent Scotland in a European context was introduced

earlier, it was certainly solidified with Jim Sillars’s turn of phrase of “Independence in Europe”30

in 1989 and then repeated in various contexts since—including manifestos in the 1990s and into

the mid 2000s.

Besides this notion of independence in Europe, the SNP has been contextualizing

independence via comparisons to smaller European states for a long time as well—starting with

the 1979 European Parliamentary elections. From the start, this democratic opportunity in

Europe meant for the SNP a chance to “have more say in what happens to us form decisions

taken remotely in Brussels.”31 In the 1980s, comparisons with Norway would abound—

including a list in the SNP’s 1983 manifesto showing how Scotland’s population would not even

make it the smallest member of the European Community. Similar comparisons have been made

since on points mostly concerning economics and population—and the context has not changed.

Thus, this point in SNP discourse is likely to remain significant, as the overwhelming abundance

28 “The Scottish National Party: What It Is and What It Stands For.” 1951. Scottish National Party. Booklet. 12 pages. Published by the SNP: Glasgow. NLS Shelfmark: 6.2393, p. 6, 8.29 “Return to Nationhood.” Scottish National Party. Nov. 1978. Booklet. 32 pages. Published by SNP Publications, West Calder, West Lothian. NLS. Shelfmark: QP4.79.92.30 Sillars, Jim. “Independence in Europe.” Scottish National Party. June 1989. NLS: QP4.92.3.31 “McIntyre for Europe.” 1979. Published by Jean McCormack, election agent in Grangeside, Middlebank, Errol, Perth. Printed by Sunprint in Perth. Car Display sheet. NLS. Shelfmark: QP4.85.2191.

32

of scholarship has shown at this point that small states, and even smaller regional parties, have

great reason to believe they will benefit in from EU membership and institutional structures.

And, finally, the point the SNP will belabor, regardless of context, is the “naturalness”

and potential of independence. As a constitutional change that will bring more governing power

to a more localized body, independence represents the values of democracy as well as unknown

impacts. The SNP has always believed in this change as having potential—economically,

socially on a range of policy areas, and in terms of realizing Scotland’s full capabilities. These

points will remain hard to dispute—and this notion of potential and aspirations has become the

emotional aspect driving the SNP’s civic nationalism—which long ago, at the party’s founding,

replaced an older, more ethnically-based understanding of nation.

At the same time, if the Brexit negotiations in fact lead to a softer outcome, as appears to

be the case, the SNP stands to gain much less from its usual frames and positions but still can

claim a victory in having protected Scottish interests under the conditions. While the arguments

concerning the desire for Scotland to have full representation in all EU institutions will remain

continuous along with the comparisons to other small European countries, the SNP will be left

with a less motivational message about needing to increase Scotland’s power over policy. This

narrative is both more complex and more mundane; it does not have the same emotive impact as

its claims to too little representation in EU institutions. Likewise, the SNP will probably try to

turn this scenario into one similar to the lost independence referendum—and push for more

powers as well as the protection of already devolved areas of competency.

Greater than these weaker frames, the SNP would be faced with voter fatigue concerns

should a second Brexit vote actually be taken. It is no surprise that Sturgeon has denounced any

such calls, as it is against SNP’s interests to vote again. The SNP feels it already has a mandate

33

on this issue in Scotland—a second vote is only likely to make the topic less clear as Scotland’s

vote for Remain was so overwhelming. Additionally, given the SNP would like to see another

independence vote, they also know that yet another referendum on Europe will mean pushing

back any timeframe for an independence vote.

Conclusion

All told, the SNP is an extreme case among regional-separatist parties in Western Europe and its

current membership numbers and resources suggest it is as strong as ever despite losing the 2014

referendum on independence. The SNP rose to this position by taking advantage of moments of

political opportunity especially in the form of major party accommodation and potential

constitutional change. With final Brexit terms looming, the SNP stands to gain most by a

counter-intuitive result—a hard Brexit—which looks increasingly unlikely, as this outcome

would allow the SNP to capitalize on its most emotive frameworks in support for independence.

Instead, the SNP will most likely be facing a situation of a soft exit—which will leave the party

with a short-term political victory with regards to having protected Scottish interests under the

conditions but also with a future process of continuing to pursue stances that will protect

Scotland’s relationship with Europe. This situation will probably weaken the immediate case for

a second independence referendum. However, due to the SNP’s ability to tie independence to

potential and aspirations, the push for independence seems unlikely to fade—leaving a

probability of a second independence referendum but a lower probability that it will happen soon

(as compared to a hard Brexit). The two main U.K. parties should be particularly careful about

accommodating a second independence referendum as historically these opportunities have

benefited the SNP. Finally, it is worth noting, forebodingly, that the SNP has been particularly

skillful when presented with second chances: it took two devolution referendums to get a

34

Scottish Parliament, a second round of a large SNP parliamentary experience to launch the SNP

into a governing coalition, and a second campaign in Scotland with attention to garnering the

First Minister position to be the party of government. Considering these historical precedents in

sum, it is worth being quite wary of another independence referendum not just based on expense

and voter fatigue but also on the fact that underestimating the SNP in conditions of major party

accommodation and potential constitutional change in the past has led to the nationalists’ most

significant breakthroughs.

Appendix A: Regional Parties in Western Europe and Canada

Found-dissolved

Contested Elections*

Held Seats

Ideology on self-government**

BelgiumFlanders Lijst Dedecker (List

Dedecker, LDD) 2007- N: 2007-2014 N, R Federalist

Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N-VA)

2001- N: 2003-2014 N, R Separationist

Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc, VB) Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB)

1979-2004 N:1991-2003 N, R Separationist

2004- N: 2007-2014 N, R Separationist

Volksunie (People’s Union, VU)

1954-2001 N: 1954-1999 N, R Federalist (50s-70s) Ambiguous (80s) Separationist (90s)

German region

Pro Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft (ProDG)

2008- R: 2009-2014 R Federalist

WalloniaFront Démocratique des Francophones (Democratic Front of Francophones, FDF)

-renamed twice: 2010 and 2015. Now is DéFI

1964- N: 1968-1991(then as coalition)

N:2015

N, R

N, R

Federalist

Federalist

Rassemblent Walloon 1968- N:1968-1981 N Protectionist (60s)

35

(Walloon Rally, RW) Federalist (70s-80s)CanadaQuebec Action democratique, AD 1994-2012 ---; R:1994 R Ambiguous

Bloc Québécois, BQ 1991- N: 1993-2015 N SeparationistParti Nationaliste du Quebec, PNQ

1983-1987 N: 1984 --- Separationist

Parti Quebecois, PQ 1968- ---; R: 1970-2008

R Separationist

Quebec Solidaire, QS 2006- ---; R: 2008-2014

R Separationist

Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, RIN

1960-1968 R: 1966 R Separationist

Union Nationale, UN 1935-1989 --; R: 1970-1985 R Federalist (1940-50s, 70s-80s) ambiguous 1960s

Western Canada

Western Canada Concept, WCC

1980-2009 ---; R: 1981-2009

R Separationist

DenmarkSouthern Jutland

Slevigske parti-Schleswigsche Partei (Schleswig Party, SLE)

1920- N:1950-1964; 1968-1971

N-Municipal

only since 1973

Protectionist/ ambiguous

Faroe Islands

Fólkafklokkurin (People’s Party, FF)

1939- R: 1940-2015 R Federalist (40s-90s)Separationist 2000s

Tjóôvedldi (Republic, E) 1948- N:1973-2015 N, R SeparationistFramsokn (Progress, F) 2011- 2011-2015 R SeparationistNytt Sjálvstryri )(New Self-Government, SSF)(Sjálvstýrisflokkurin, Home Rule)

1906- 1945-1953, 1971-1973,1977-2015

R Federalist (40-90s) Separationist 2000s

Greenland Inuit Ataqatigiit (Community of the People)

1976- 1979-20015 R Separationist

FinlandÅlands Framtid (Future of Aland, AF)

2001- R: 2001-2015 R Separationist

South-western Finland

Svenske Folkpartiet (Swedish People’s Party, SFP)

1906- 1951-2018 N Protectionist (cultural)

FranceAlsace Aldace d’abord (Alsace

Frist, ADA)1989- --- R Protectionist

Brittany Union Démocratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union, UDB)

1964- 1986, 2012,2015 in coalition

N, R Protectionist (70s-80s)Federalist 2000s

Corsica Union di u populu corsu (Union of Corsican People, UPC)Di a nazione Corsa (UPC-PNC)

1977-2002

2002-

1986

R: 2002-

R Protectionist (70s-80s)

Federalist (1990s-2000s)

Accolta Nacionalista Corsa (Corsican Nationalist Alliance, ANC )

1989-2009 1993-2002 --- Ambiguous

36

Corsica Nazione, CN 1992-2008(?)

R: 1998-1999 R Separationist

Savoy Ligue Savoisienne, LS 1995-2012 1998 --- SeparationistGermanyBavaria Bayernpartei (Bavarian

Party)1946- 1953, 1969,

1987-2013N, R Separationist

Schleswig-Holstein

Südschleswigscher Wählerverband-Sydslevigsk vælgerfoerning (South Schleswig Voters’ Union, SSW)

1948- 1953-1957 R Protectionism

ItalyNorthern Italy

Lega Nord, inc. Liga Veneta and Lega Lombarda (Northern League, LN)

1983/1991-

1983-2008 N, R(96-99 period)

Protectionist (80s) Federalist 1992-95, 2000sSeparationist 1996-1999

Sardinia Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sadinian Action Party, PSd’Az)

1921- 1946-1969; 1983-2001; 2001-2018

N, R Protectionist (40s-60s) Federalist (70s, ’94-97) Ambiguous ’79-93 and since ’98Separationist 2000s

Independtia Repubrica de Sardigna (Separationist Republic of Sardinia, iRS)

2002- R: 2004-2010 --- Separationist

Partito del Popolo Sardo-Fortza Paris, PPS-FP

2004- N: 2008 ---- Federalist

Lega Sarda, LSar 1940s R: 1946 ---- SeparationistSicily Movimento per le

Autonomie, MpA2005- 2008-2013

(coalition: 2018)N, R Protectionist

Southern Italy

Lega d’Azione Meridionale (League for Southern Action, LAM)

1992- 1992-2001 N, R

-municipal only 2017

Protectionist

Moviemento per le Autonomie (Movement for Autonomies, MpA)

2005- 2008-2018 N, R Federalist

South Tyrol Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People’s Party, SVP)

1945- 1953-2018 N, R Protectionist (’48-’56) Federalist (’57 onward)

Die Freiheitlichen (The Freedomites, DF)

1992- 2006-2013 ---- Ambiguous

Sud-tiroler Freiheit (South Tyrolean Freedom, S-TF)

2007- R: 2008 --- Separationist

BügerUnion für Südtirol (Citizens’ Union for South Tyrol, BUfS—was Union für Südtirol, UfS)

1989- 1996-2008 --- Separationist

Tiroler Heimatpartei, THP 1963-1968 N: 1963 R ProtectionistTrentino Partito Autonomista

Trentino Tirolese (Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party, PATT)

Partito Popolare Trentino

1988- Coalition w/ SVP

Federalist

1948-1982(folded into PATT)

R:1973-1978 --- Protectionist

37

Tirolese (Trentino Tryrolean People’s Party, PTTT)

Trieste Associazione per Trieste (Association for Trieste, APT)

1976-2006 1979-1983 N Federalist

Valle d’Aoste

Autonomie Liberté Démocratie (Autonomy Liberty Democracy, ALD)-coalition

2006-2018 2006-2013 N, R Federalist

Union Valdôtaine (Valdostian Union, UV)

1945- 1958-1963, 1972-1987, 1994-2008

N, R Federalist

Vallée d’Aoste Vive (Lively Aosta Valley, VAV)

2005-2010 2006 (coalition) --- Federalist

Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (Valdostian Union, UVP)

2013- 2013-2018 (in coalition)

--- Federalist

Fédération Autonomiste, FA 1998-2014 1998-2013 (coalition) Protectionist

Rassemblement Valdôtaine, RV

1963-1973 1973 R Protectionist

NetherlandsFriesland Fryske Nasjonale Partij

(Frisian National Party, FNP)

1962- ---; R: 1970-2015

R Protectionist

SpainAndalusia Partido Andalucista

(Andalusian Party, PA)1965-2015 1989, 1996-2004 n/a Protectionist (70s-80s)

Federalist (90s-2000s)Partido Socialista de Andalucía (Socialist Party of Andalusia, PSA)

1979-1984 1979 n/a Federalist

Aragon Chunta Aragonesista (Aragonese League, CA or CHA)

1986- 1996-2008 R Protectionist (80s-’94) Federalist (’95-2000s)

Partido Aragones Regionalista (Aragonese Regionalist Party, PAR)

1978- 1979, 1986-1993, 2000

N, R Protectionist

Asturias Partíu Asturianista (PAS) 1985- 1989-2004 (in coalition)

--- Protectionist (Cultural)

Unión Renovadora Asturiana (Asturian Renewal Union, URAS)

1998- R R (once) Protectionist

Balearic Islands

Progressistes per les Illes Balears (Progressives for the Balearic Islands, PIB)

2004-2004 2004 --- Separationist(temporary coalition)

Partit Socialista de Menorca (Socialist Party of Menorca, PSM)- from merge of PSM-EM and PS-Me)

1977- 1979-2004 --- Separationist

Unió Mallorquina (Majorcan Union, UM)

1982-2011 1993-2008 R Protectionist (80s-92) Federalist (’93-2000s)

Basque Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque 1986- 1989-2008 R Separationist

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Country Solidarity, EA)Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Left, EE)

1977-1993 1977-1993 n/a Separationist

Aralar (AR) 2000-2017 2004-20017 N, R SeparationistHerri Batasuna (United People, HB)

1978-2001 1979-1996 N,R Separationist

Partido Nationalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV)

1895- 1977-2008 N, R Ambiguous (1970s and 2000s); Federalist (1980s-1990s)

Partido Comunisto de las Tierras Vascas, EHAK

2002-2008 R: 2005 R Separationist

Canaries Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (Canarian Independent Groupings, AIC)

1985-1993 1986-1989 N Protectionist

Coalición Canaria (Canarian Coalition, CAN or CC)

1993- 1993-2016 N, R Protectionist (90’s-04) Federalist (’04-on)

Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People, UPC)

1979-1986 1979 N, R Separationist

Centro Canaria, CCN(into CC)

2008?-2008

2008 n/a Protectionist

Cantabria Partido Regionalista de Cantabria, PRC

1978- 1993 R Protectionist

Catalonia Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party, PDeCAT)

2016- R: 2016 R separationist

Convergència i Unió, inc. PDC and UDC (Convergence and Union, CiU)-now PDeCA

1978-2015 1977-2008 N, R Federalist (70s-98; ’02-07)Ambiguous (’98-’02 and post 2007)Separationist 2014

Coalición electoral esquerra de Cataluna (Electoral Coalition of Left in Catalonia, CEEC)

1977-? 1977 ---- Separationist

Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left in Catalonia, ERC)

1931- 1977-2016 N, R Ambiguous (70s-86) Separationist (’89-’96; ’08 onward)

Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy, CUP)

1986- 2012-2015 R Separationist

Initiative for Catalonia (IC) now Iniciativa per Cataluyna Verds, ICV

1988- 1988, 2000-2011 N, R Federalist

Extremadura Coalicion Extremena, CEX 1993- 1996 R (coalition)

Protectionist

Partido Regionalista Extremeño, PREX

1990-1996(into coalition)

1993 ---- Protectionist

Extremadura Unida (EU) 1980-2007 (into coalition)

R: 1983-1997, 1999-2003

R Protectionist

Galicia Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (Galician Nationalist Bloc,

1982- 1996-2008 N, R Separationist (70s-1986) Federalist

39

BNG) (since ’87)Navarre Union del Pueblo Navarro

(Union of the Navarrese People, UPN)

1979- 1979-2016*

*w/ PP

N, R Federalist

Convergencia Demócrata de Navarra (Democratic Convergence of Navarre, CDN)

1995-2011 1996 R Federalist

Nafarroa Bai (Yes to Navarre, NB)

2003-2011 2004-2008 N, R Separationist

Rioja Partido Riohano 1982- 1993-2016 R ProtectionistValencia Union Valenciana

(Valencian Union, UV)1982- 1986-2000 R Protectionist

SwedenSkane Skånepartiet (Scania Party) 1979- ----; R: 2002-

2014 --- Separationist

SwitzerlandTicino Lega dei Ticinsesi (Ticino

League)1991- 1991-2007 N,R Federalist

U.K.Cornwall Mebyon Kernow (Sons of

Cornwall, MK)1951- 1970-1983,

1997-2010R Federalist

Northern Ireland

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

1970- 1974-2010 R, N Irish unification

Irish Separationist Party (IIP)

1977-1985 1979 ---- Irish unification

Nationalists and independents (N)

1950-1951, 1966 --- Irish unification

Republican Labour (RS) 1964-1970 --- Irish unificationRepublicans (REP) 1950, 1964-1966 --- Irish unificationRepublican Clubs (RC) 1974-1979 --- Irish unificationSinn Féin 1950, 1955-

1959, 1983-2017Irish unification

Scotland Scottish National Party (SNP)

1934- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist

Scottish Labour Party (SCLP)

1976-1981 1979 N Separationist

Scottish Militant Labour (SML)

1991-1998/2001

1992 ---- separationist

Scottish Socialist Alliance (SSA)

1996-1998 1997 ---- Separationist

Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)

1998- 2010-2015 R Separationist

Scottish Green Party 1990-- 2001-2017 R SeparationistWales Plaid Cymru (Party of

Wales, PC)1925- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist (since

2003)Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (Welsh Republican Movement, MGC)

1949-1966 1950 ---- Separationist

*national only listed—then regional if national is not available.*based on Massetti and Schakel-2016 where possible; italicized means author changed their categorization based on party’s web page or other secondary literature; underlined means the party was not included in their study

40

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