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The Return of the Consuls: Islamic networks and foreignpolicy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Eldar Sarajli!
Paper presented at the conferenceAfter the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, politics and internationalnetworks in the BalkansEuropean Studies Centre, University of Oxford
December 2010
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Paper presented at the conference
After the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international
networks in the Balkans
European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, June 2010
The Return of the Consuls: Islamic networks and foreign policy
perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina
E l d a r S a r a j l i !
Cen t r a l Eu ro p ea n Un i v e r s i t y Bu d a p e s t
e l d a r s a ra j@ho tm a i l . c o m
I n t r o d u c t i o nBy the time the Bosnian writer Ivo Andri!finished one of his most famous books, The Days of
the Consuls, concerning the endless intrigues of Western diplomats in late Ottoman Bosnia,
most of them had already left the country. A new era of the countrys historical development
had begun. The year was 1945 and the Second World War had just ended. Besides securing
much needed peace in a turbulent region, the end of the war brought a new social and politicalsetting for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a period of relative prosperity, but also a period in
which, for the first time in modern history, Bosnians ruled themselves. There were no viziers,
consuls or foreign occupiers. Legitimated by the antifascist resistance and communist ideology,
Bosnians joined their Slavic brothers in the creation of Yugoslavia, a socialist and independent
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country that would exist for almost half a century and leave an indelible mark on European
history.
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early nineties, however, came an end to the regions
relative independence from great power intervention. Andri!s consuls came back, driven not
only by geopolitical interests but also by the pressing need to tame the outbursts of ethnic
conflict that had spread through the region, and particularly through Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Shortly after it had declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, the country was set ablaze
by violent conflict between its constituent peoples, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats and
Serbs. After almost four years of fighting and several unsuccessful attempts of the European
Union (EC prior to 1993) to negotiate peace, the war was brought to an end by decisive US
involvement and a peace deal reached in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, under President Bill
Clinton.
The end of socialist Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Socialist bloc and the instability of the
region left Bosnia and Herzegovina exposed to external influences, both from the East and the
West. The vacuum that was created by the breakdown of the entire social fabric in the region
was filled with activities of external actors and their local proxies. The countrys exposure to
external influence also provided a leeway for many Islamic players to exert their influence and
power. Many of them were driven by a sense of solidarity with their newly discovered Muslim
brethren in the heart of Europe, but some of them also tried to shape the course of (geo)political
events in this country in the direction of their desire. Some of them accompanied humanitarian
assistance teams to help the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina during wartime, while many
others set out to win the hearts and minds of Muslim Bosnians for their own vision of global or
regional Islam. The time of Muslim consuls had begun.
A decade and a half later, Bosnia and Herzegovina still seems to be dependent on global and
regional actors for their survival. The country is on a slow but determined path to become a part
of the European Union and NATO. The large majority of the population sees the future of
Bosnia and Herzegovina within Western political and military frameworks. Although not as
visible as during wartime and the immediate postwar period, various Islamic networks, with
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sponsors from Muslim countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, are still present. However, there
is also a network of many new players, with various overlapping and conflicting interests and
activities that give shape to a completely new situation on the ground.
The aim of this chapter is to gain a deeper understanding of this new situation and analyze the
emerging relations of power between various Islamic networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
their foreign policy perspectives. It will seek to determine the most active Islamic networks and
the most influential Islamic players that affect foreign policy choices and perspectives in Bosnia,
and explore the main points of interaction and contestation between them. My working
hypothesis is that there is a new quality of the agency of Islamic networks in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in which the direct humanitarian/missionary approach of Arab networks,
characteristic of the immediate postwar period, is being replaced with a more nuanced and
Turkish-dominated web of activities aimed at promoting a new vision of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, of Islam, and of their position within a broader European framework. It also
suggests that these networks activities strongly interact with the local Islamic Community,
contesting or reinforcing its social and political role in shaping some foreign relations outcomes.
This interaction and contestation contributes to a process of re-negotiation of Islams presence
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its role in Bosnian Muslims lives, as well as the countrys regional
and global position.
Tracing the plurality of Islamic networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a way of studying
different embodiments of Islamic identity in this country. As is the case with other diverse
societies exposed to the effects of globalization, the spectrum of Islamic identities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is in no way limited to a narrow and dichotomized division between local and
foreign Islamic elements. As I will try to show, Islam in Bosnia exhibits a patchwork of micro-
identities that are far from homogeneous and cannot be aggregated into simple categories. Most
of these identity embodiments have a foreign policy dimension that is expressed in interactions
with centres beyond the country itself.
On a methodological note, this paper defines an Islamic network as any organized group or
network of people that holds certain Islamic value(s) as the main reference point. It hence has a
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wider scope than studies which look at organizations that are explicitly involved in religious
Islamic affairs. This may include straightforward religious organizations or groups of
individuals active in the public domain, but also those with more mundane identities and
activities who justify or legitimize some of their activities within Islamic values or norms. In a
similar vein, foreign policy perspectives are broadly understood as visions, choices and acts
aimed at positioning Bosnia and Herzegovina within a particular geopolitical framework, not
necessarily activities confined to institutions and individuals in charge of the countrys foreign
policy.
Before setting out to analyze the main Islamic actors in the country and their foreign policy
implications, I will outline the background situation, crucial for understanding of Islam in
Bosnia, points of contestation between local and foreign Islamic actors, as well as channels
through which this contestation takes place.
1 . B a c k g r o u n d : t h e p o s t C o m m u n i s t c o n d i t i o n a n d r i s e o f I s l a mi n B o s n i a
Talking about the foreign policy perspectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of
formal and non-formal networks circumventing the state opens up a number of questions. First,
it assumes that the state ceased to be the sole player in the realm of foreign policy. Togetherwith the decline of universal narratives and the end of international Communism, liberalism
brought an end to the ultimate relevance and authority of the state (see Wallerstein, 1995: 87;
and Jacoby, 1999). The modern exclusivity of the state to determine the basis of foreign policy,
highly revered during much of the 20th century, was replaced with the emergence of many other
subjects of global politics who started competing for dominance and power. But, who were
those new contestants to the state and its political supremacy?
The rise of the global network society has brought identity politics to the forefront of new
political struggles in the world (Castells, 2004). Various groups, organized around their cultural
identity as the ideological substance, started contesting state authority in determining regional
and global politics. The character of these groups varied from religious and regional to ethnic
identity organizations and parties struggling to find their place under the sun. Such a setting was
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particularly conducive for organizations acting on behalf of religious values and identities.
Various Islamic groups have been especially salient in this regard (Castells, 2004: 13-23; see
also Haynes, 1997). Together with ethnic groups that have entered world politics fighting for
their rights and political sovereignty at the end of the 20th century, Islamic groups have also
emerged as new subjects of international politics. The fact that a covert and non-institutionalized
network such as al-Qaidawas able to steer the course of global politics on the eve of the new
millennium confirms the existence of a new reality, shaped not only by states, but many non-
state actors (Kepel, 2002).
Furthermore, the end of international Communism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which
coincided with the global rise of identity politics, have provided a new battleground for various
organized identities, including those acting under the flag of Islam. The local setting in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was especially fruitful due to the presence of a large group of Muslims
involved in the conflict itself, in addition to the tensions of ethnic identity that initiated the
conflict in the first place.
The Bosnian Muslim1historical experience has provided a particular frame for Islamic identity-
based politics. Considered by their non-Muslim neighbours as a remnant of Ottoman invaders,
caught between the two established ethno-nationalisms of Croats and Serbs, and subsequently
constrained under half a century of Communist rule, the community of Bosnian Muslims has
passed several phases of development before it reached its present cohesiveness and
independence (see Pinson, 1993). In this historical course, the period of socialist Yugoslavia and
Bosnias emergence within it (1943-1992) was crucial. Unlike other nations that have formed
the Yugoslav socialist union after World War II, Bosnian Muslims had not developed into a
distinct and internationally recognized national community. Yet, Bosnia and Herzegovina was
organized as one of the constituent Yugoslav republics, and Bosnian Muslims have participated
in the public life both of the republic and the federation. Bosnian Muslims, however, remained
recognized as solely a religious community, not a distinct, ethnic one, until the beginning of the
1Though considered to be synonyms, the terms Bosniak and Bosnian Muslim are treated with a slightdistinction in this paper, with a more ethnic (and secular) meaning attached to Bosniak and a more religious oneto Bosnian Muslim. The reason Bosnian Muslim will be used throughout the paper is because of its Islamicreference, crucial for the papers central focus. However, essentially, both terms refer to the same ethnic group.
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1960s. In other cases, they were considered to be members of the Serb or Croat nations of
Islamic faith (Banac, 1993:144; see statistical data in Dyker, 1972: 240-241). The change
brought by their recognition as a distinct and equal ethnic community gradually enabled them to
formulate a distinct ethnic and political identity, with Islam at its centre. Groups and actors who
promoted Islam as the foundation of Bosnian Muslims ethnic distinctiveness and political
development already started to emerge in the late 1970s, reconstituting the pre-Second World
War ideology of the Pan-Islamist Young Muslims(Mladi Muslimani) group (Bougarel, 2003).
The key figures in this movement, later convicted for anti-state activity by Communist rulers,
eventually became the leaders of the Muslims of Bosnia and drivers of Bosnias independence
in the beginning of the 1990s.
The I s l a m i c Co m m u n i t y a s t h e r ep o s i t o r y o f Bo s n i a n Mu s l im i d en t i t y
The Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica, IC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina played a
particularly important role in the development of Bosnian Muslim identity. Lacking the cultural
institutions Serbs and Croats had established before and during the period of socialist
Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims invested most of their social and cultural capital into the Islamic
Community, which had become the repository of the communitys identity since its inception in
1882 under Austro-Hungarian rule.
During the socialist period, the IC encompassed and regulated Muslim religious affairs in all of
Yugoslavia. This included Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the ICs main office was
based, but also Muslims in other Yugoslav republics such as Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia and Kosovo. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the IC splintered along ethnic lines.
The Sarajevo-based IC became the Islamic organization of Slavic-speaking Muslims who
identified themselves as Bosniaks, spreading territorially to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Slovenia and the Sand"ak region in Serbia and Montenegro. The break-up of the IC,
paradoxically initiated by the Pan-Islamist current in the Bosnian Muslim political and religious
elite, brought to the front two phenomena. First, the IC gained a distinctly political role. The
break-up of a pan-Yugoslav Islamic community was undertaken by individuals and groups close
to the emerging Bosniak political elite, organized around the Party of Democratic Action
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(Stranka Demoratske Akcije, SDA) and led by Alija Izetbegovi!, a member of the Mladi
Muslimani (Young Muslims) and Bosnias first post-independence President. There was a
significant overlap between religious and political circles: the SDA and IC shared similar
visions and concerns over the fate of Bosnian Muslims. The line between religious and political
domains was blurred, and both groups acted under the same umbrella of interests, with political
leaders trying to steer the wheel of the IC into their desired direction. This strategy won the
overwhelming support of the Muslim population. In the first years of Bosnia and Herzegovinas
independence and Bosnian Muslims emergence as sovereign political actors, the relations
between the IC and the state (or its Bosnian Muslim part) resembled those of Turkeys
Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet,as a state-driven and controlled religious institution.
In this sense, there was continuity with the Communist period, when the IC had also been under
direct control of state authorities. The only difference was that this time, the state was
characterised by distinct Bosnian Muslim features. When the end of the war brought power-
sharing arrangements with Serb and Croat parties, the institutional links between SDA and the
IC significantly deteriorated, but the IC remained one of the most influential institutions in
Bosniak social and political life.
Secondly, the role of the IC in the development of Bosnian Muslim identity and its relation to
politics indicate that the rise of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina had a distinctly ethnic role.
Thus, many authors claim that what has usually been considered the Islamization of Bosnian
Muslims during the 1990s was rather an ethnification of Islam under the particular Bosnian
cap (Bougarel, 2003: 14)2. This development was confirmed even by the apparent paradox of
Bosnian Pan-Islamists efforts to detach the IC from its wider Yugoslav base and transform it
into an exclusively Bosniak religious community.
In that sense, the overall rise of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the dawn of the new
millennium needs to be understood as a broader and more complex phenomenon, which is not
only related to the rise of Islamic politics elsewhere, but also to the post-Communist context of
the region and its inherent logic of ethnic politics. In its local embodiment, it was much more an
2 Xavier Bougarel speaks of the nationalization of Islam in Bosnia, but I think that ethnicization is a moreappropriate term, given Islams role in building Bosniak ethnicidentity, rather than its national(state) institutions.
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ethnic than an exclusively religious phenomenon. Here, Islam served as a tool of identity
building of an ethnic community, rather than as a final destination of identity politics. The
religious authority of the IC would only be challenged later, when individuals and groups from
various Islamic countries started creating networks of their own in Bosnia. The Islamic
Community was transformed into an ever more stringent defender of authentic Bosnian
Muslim identity and into an active player in the field of international relations.
2 . D o m a i n s o f c o n t e s t a t i o n : W h o s p e a k s f o r I s l a m i n B o s n i a ?The Islamic Community drives a significant part of Bosnia and Herzegovinas foreign policy,
especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the Western Balkans, as I will show later.
However, the wartime and postwar arrival of various organizations, state and non-state actors
from Islamic countries, has posed a challenge for the Islamic Community on a number of
grounds and created a basis for a re-negotiation of Bosnias foreign policy position. The points
of contestation between the local Islamic authority and transnational Islamic organizations were
thus of both external and internal nature, ranging from interpretative to administrative domains,
but in the end reflected the core issue at stake: who speaks on behalf of Islam in Bosnia and
what is its relation to regional and global politics? Three of those domains of contestation can be
especially highlightedthat of interpretative authority, administrative authority, and that of therepresentation of Islam.
The d o m a i n o f i n t e rp re t a t i v e a u t ho r i t y
The interaction between local and foreign Islamic actors has resulted in frictions along the
ideological dimension of Islamic self-understanding. The present Constitution of the Islamic
Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, last revised in 1997, provides that the IC is, among
other things, in charge of protecting the authenticity of Islamic norms and the assurance of
their interpretation and application. Additionally, Article VIII provides that the interpretation
and performance of Islamic rituals and practices will follow the principles of the Hanafi school
of thought, ormadhhab(Aliba#i!, 2003: 5).
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The arrival of many other Islamic players, belonging to other schools of thought and practice
within Islam, has brought these in conflict with the local Islamic practices and produced
conflicts along the interpretative dimension of Islam in Bosnia. Given the ICs emphasis on the
specific Islamic tradition of Bosniaks, also shared with some intellectual circles in the country
(Moe, 2007: 383), this is an important fault line. Essentially, it is a matter of a particular
ideological vision outlining the orthodoxy and orthopraxis of Islam in Bosnia. It is related to a
broad spectrum of faith-related issues ranging from forms of religious practice to gender roles,
media and education. The fissures become apparent in debates on the wearing of niqab; the
details of prayer; the conduct of religious celebrations; and the display of popular piety.
Nevertheless, when it comes to interpretative authority, the IC is not as homogeneous as it tends
to appear to outside observers. The discourse on the dichotomy of local versus imported Islam in
Bosnia is, to a large extent, an oversimplification. Though the IC is institutionally trying to be
the sole interpreter of Islam in Bosnia, the views of its members very often differ significantly.
As I will show in more detail, many IC officials were educated abroad and do not always share
the same ideological outlook with their colleagues from the Community. The discrepancies
inherent in these understandings affect the capacity of the IC to deliver a homogeneous
ideological message while contributing to the overall complexity of the Bosnian Islamic setup.
The d o m a i n o f a d m in i s t r a t i v e a u t ho r i t y
The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also the administrative authority for
Bosnian Muslims. Mosques, religious schools (madrasas) and other distinctively Islamic
institutions are under direct rule and control of the IC. As in the case of the interpretative
domains, however, the administrative exclusivity of the IC is also challenged and contested by
the presence of other Islamic actors and networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their activities,
ranging from the running of educational institutions and the administration of networks to the
provision of information and advisory content (usually online), contests the ICs authority in
administering the everyday social lives of Muslims in Bosnia.
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A particularly important administrative domain is related to the financial dimension of Islamic
networking. The declining international aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including that coming
from Islamic countries, positions the remaining Islamic players in a setting in which they have
to compete over financial support from abroad. This is often the case when it comes to funding
as activities like publishing, reconstruction and building of mosques and madrasas.
The administrative contestations within the Islamic sphere in Bosnia also pertain to the job
market. Both the global and local rise of interest in Islam, as well as an educational interchange
between Muslim countries, has produced a significant number of Islamic studies graduates, from
high-school to university level. The opening of several new madrasas in Bosnia and frequent
student exchanges with Islamic countries have further contributed to this trend. As a result, there
seems to be a certain saturation of the job market with cadres educated in Islamic affairs (see
Mach$ek, 2007: 422 for a similar interpretation). If one adds the dire economic situation in the
country to the equation, this particularly mundane type of contestation between Islamic actors in
Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes apparent.3
The d o m a i n o f r ep re s en t a t i o n o f I s l a m
Although Bosnian Muslims, as already noted, belong to a particular branch of Islam, theHanafi
madhhab, these recent developments have challenged the view that the Hanafi branch is the
only and exclusive style of practicing Islam in Bosnia. The main reasons for this are the increase
of the visibility of various alternative (mainly Neo-Salafi) activists and networks across the
country and similar developments indicative of a different situation on the ground. The current
existence of Islamic actors in Bosnia that contest the practice and interpretative traditions of the
local Hanafimainstream attest to the challenge posed against the ICs representative power of
Islam.
3Paradoxical as it may seem, this very often lies behind many de-secularization processes in the country, especiallyin terms of the establishment of religious education courses in primary schools and kindergartens in Bosnia andHerzegovina.
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In this sense, the question of who represents Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina still remains
contested (see Moe, 2007: 391). Though the IC tends to dominate the representative domain, the
issue is seldom as straightforward and easy to control as its self-representation would lead us to
believe.
3 . C h a n n e l l i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e : t h e n o d e s o f I s l a m i c n e t w o r k i n gi n B o s n i a
Depending on the nature of contestation, Islamic actors rely upon a variety of nodes to exert
their influence and promote their particular vision of Islam in Bosnia. The local Islamic
authority tends to use traditional ways and methods of exerting influence on the domestic level,
while alternative Islamic groups and networks rely on more innovative channeling methods. The
following are the most frequent nodes of Islamic networking in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
mosques, schools, non-governmental organizations, embassies and cultural centres, education
abroad, publications and the cybersphere.
Mo s q u e s
The control of mosques throughout the country yields probably the strongest influence for
Islamic actors. Especially in rural areas, where the mosque is the key community institution, thisinfluence is particularly strong. Although one might assume strong IC control over the
communities, this is not always the case. Namely, given the large number of local preachers
who have studied abroad and the local presence of various alternative Islamic actors, such as
Islamic NGOs, the interpretative authority over local mosques throughout the country can be
dispersed over a number of alternative Islamic actors.
Sc ho o l s
The same could be said for Islamic educational institutions in the country. Currently, there are
more than 1,700 maktabs (informal elementary Islamic schools, organized in six regional
groups), eight madrasas (Islamic high-schools, six of them in Bosnia itself, plus one in Zagreb,
Croatia, and one in Novi Pazar, Serbia) two Islamic pedagogical academies and one faculty of
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Islamic Studies4 (see Aliba#i!, 2003: 7 for details). Although all of these fall under the
administrative umbrella of the IC who controls the curricula and staff, some act almost
independently from the IC. Several authors pointed out that this autonomy is rooted in the fact
that the teaching or managing staff employed at the local level have been educated at Islamic
universities in the Muslim world where different Islamic schools of thought and practice are
applied (see Moe, 2007: 384; also Mach$ek, 2007: 401, 416). One should also note a number
of other schools and educational institutions, not necessarily Islamic in character, which affect
the diversification of Islamic self-understanding and agency in the country. Many private
schools and institutions (such as various Turkish schools) in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been
established by Islamic actors since the end of the war in 1995.
No n -g o v e rnm en ta l o rg a n i z a t i o n s
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with a large number of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), both local and international. The immediate years after the war have seen a steep rise
of the number of NGOs in the country. In just a four-year period, between 1994 and 1998, the
number of foreign humanitarian NGOs working in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose from 50 to 332,
while the number of local organizations rose from 130 to 200.5 A significant number of the
international organizations have their headquarters in Muslim countries or among Muslim
immigrant populations in the UK. While most of them left with the stabilization of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the end of their humanitarian missions, a few of them stayed on. To the
number of foreign Islamic NGOs in the country should be added a still-rising number of local
NGOs concerned with similar Islamic affairs, in both their religious and secular dimensions,
such as Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims), Novi Horizonti (New Horizons), AIO (Active
Islamic Youth) or women organizations such as Nahla, Kewser and similar. Given the broad
network of NGO activities in the country, the points of their contestation may be numerous, just
as the grounds for channeling their influence.
4More information on the names, location and capacity of these institutions can be found at:http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3685&Itemid=1 5See more at http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/?id=529 .
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Em b a s s i e s a nd c u l t u ra l c en t e r s
The discovery of Bosnian Muslims by their Islamic brethren during the 90s led many Muslim-
majority states to open permanent diplomatic representative offices, such as embassies and
cultural centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Iran and Saudi Arabia were among the first,remaining diplomatically active through such institutions ever since. Unlike the wartime years,
when they provided military assistance and material support, their current scope of work (see
Bougarel, 2005: 16) has shifted to cultural exchange, the dissemination of books, the provision
of funds for various local actors and activities, as well as the organization of cultural and
promotional events. These actors have the systematic financial support of their home states,
which empowers them vis--vis local actors. However, their formal and diplomatic character
can also constrain their ability to interact with and shape local actors.
Ed u c a t i o n a b ro a d
The practice of Bosnian Muslims studying at universities in the Islamic world predates recent
developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia lacked
higher educational institutions between 1945 and 1977, a number of Bosnians studied at some of
the universities acclaimed for Islamic studies, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt.6 However, with
notable exceptions, their impact on the local Islamic scene was limited, and they were
eventually eclipsed by more successful scholars and Islamic leaders educated at the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in Sarajevo, founded in 1977 (Aliba#i!, 2003: 13).
The wartime and the immediate postwar period brought another generation of students to
universities in the Muslim world. In recent years, the number of students who graduated in
Sarajevo equaled those who graduated in other Muslim countries, from Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Egypt and Jordan, to Pakistan, Turkey and Iran (Aliba#i!, 14). Given the postwar need for
Islamic cadres in the mosques and madrasasof the country, many of them easily found local
employment7, thus representing a potential channel for exerting influence by the countries
6There are no records of Bosnian students embarking on higher education studies between 1940 and 1950. The firstgroup of Bosnian students went to Al-Azhar in 1962. See more in Aliba#i!, 2003: 13.7 The ratio of local- vs. foreign-educated imams in local mosques throughout the country is said to be 60:40.Source: interview with an IC official in Sarajevo.
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where they had received their education8. The IC, however, has a strategy for limiting this type
of influence by setting up norms for employment at its local institutions, such as those providing
that only a person with high-school education from one of the IC madrasasin the country can
be employed.
Pu b l i c a t i o n s
The missionary activity of many of the Islamic networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the
end of the war in 1995 included significant efforts at publishing various Islamic materials, from
religious literature aimed to instruct on Muslim rites to translations of famous historical Muslim
authors. In the first postwar years, the majority of these efforts aimed at educating the
population about the basic tenets of Islamic faith; besides the IC, the Saudi government and non-
government networks pioneered this process. They have published dozens of books on thehistory of Islam and the Prophet9, distributed the Saudi authored and printed translation of the
Koran (500,000 copies are claimed to be distributed), as well as other publications aimed at
promoting their vision of Islam. Most of the authors whose books found their way to Saudi
distribution in Bosnia had a distinct Salafi inclination, with few exceptions in cases of local
authors whose views had not diverged from the Salafi norm. One of the most renowned
publishing efforts of the High Saudi Committee was the so-called Family Library that had
included some 20 titles, including the shortened version of Ibn Khatirs Tafsir, and the complete
translation of Bukharis Sahih (see Aliba#i!, 2003: 12-13). All of these publications have been
distributed free of charge.
Later developments saw an increase in alternative Islamic actors publishing activities. Among
those, Sufi circles have had a noticeable presence, with translations of Sufi authors such as
Nazim Haqqani and Bediuzzaman Said Nursi distributed across the country. However, the most
prominent actor remains the IC, with its official publications, but many other organizations
participate actively, notably the Iranian government and its local representatives, providing a
8This is not to say that every student coming from abroad to his or her home country necessarily represents a potentchannel for the foreign countrys political or social influence. Rather, it is meant to indicate to the potential of suchindividuals to act as cultural, social and even political bridges between two countries. Such bridging can always beutilized for channeling particular influence.9Such is theZape!a"eni d#ennetski napitak, HSC, Sarajevo, 1996.
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number of journals and book translations. The ICs most prominent publications are the weekly
Preporod (Renaissance) paper, a journal with the longest tradition and the widest circulation in
Bosnia (around 60,000 copies), theNovi Muallim (New Teacher), and the almanac Takvim. The
Iranian networks publish more academically-oriented journals, aimed at promoting Gnostic and
Sufi studies, such asZnakovi vremena (Signs of the Times) journal.
C y b e r s p h e r e
In addition to traditional published materials, recent years have witnessed an increase in online
activities of various Islamic actors. Unlike the print publication domain, the online sphere is
dominated by non-state actors and organizations, which are moderately influential and active.
The cybersphere very often replaces traditional means of communication and interaction and
provides an alternative Islamic guidance to readership, from fatwas to other counseling andadvising assistance. Most of them are run by Bosnians, both in the country and abroad. Some of
the most prominent ones are the IslamBosna.ba and Bosnjaci.net.
4 . T h e I s l a m i c S p a c e : M a i n n e t w o r k s a n d t h e i r i n f l u e n c eAfter the collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina once again became the playground of
global and regional powers. Just as in Andri!s novel, foreign powers are contesting not onlyhost actors but also other players on the ground. The contestation among foreign actors affects
internal politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it also shapes the foreign policy domain,
influencing the position and perspectives of the country within larger frameworks. In these
terms, there are three levels of regional interaction that are strongly related to the interplay of
Islamic actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the immediate neigbourhood of the Balkans, the
immediate regional context of Europe, and the global level. The focus of different actors varies
along these levels, but what they all share in common is the prolific foreign policy dimension of
their actions, which we will explore in this section.
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The I s l a m i c Co m m u n i t y o f Bo s n i a a nd He rz eg o v i na a s r eg i o na l a c t o r
There is little doubt that the IC is now one of Bosnias major Islamic foreign policy actors, a
reflection of the emergence of Bosnian Muslims as autonomous political actors (see Bougarel,
2003: 4). However, the ICs transformation from a communal organization to a political actor isnot a recent phenomenon. Its development can be traced to the late 1960s, when Bosnian
Muslims slowly transformed from a religious community to a political (or ethnic) one.
Especially indicative of this shift was the change in the official title of the IC in 1969. Namely,
following the official recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a distinct ethnic (instead of religious)
community by the Yugoslav Communist authorities in 1961, the IC changed its name from the
Islamic Religious Community(Islamska vjerska zajednica)to theIslamic Community (Islamska
zajednica) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This change indicated a clear tendency to transform the
IC into a national institution of Bosnian Muslims that would fill the absence of Bosnian
Muslims cultural institutions in socialist Yugoslavia. Indeed, the IC eventually became the
national church of Islam in Bosnia (Moe, 2007: 382; see also Filandra 2010: 29).
It could be argued that its organizational nature makes the IC an effective player capable of
influencing foreign policy outlooks. Namely, the IC in Bosnia likes to think of itself as an
independent organization, free of state and political control. Since the end of communism the IC
has been managing its own affairs: it exerts institutional control over all mosques, educationalinstitutions and waqfs(foundations) in the country. It tends to assert not only administrative, but
also interpretative authority, through the institutionalization of the fatwa authority in 2005, and
attempts to require all formal Islamic groups in the country to submit their programs to IC for
review (Moe, 2007: 383).
In addition to the administration and control of local mosques and its staff, it has branches in the
neighbouring countries and diaspora, with power to appoint and supervise the administrative
and managing staff, though contestations between the Sarajevo-centred IC and the local
branches can occur.
As an ethnic institution in a diverse region, where ethnic boundaries do not necessarily overlap
with state ones, the IC has developed a natural inclination towards a regional political role.
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Given the complex political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the states dependence on
the political consensus between opposed ethnic parties, the IC has taken on a significant
regional political role. This has become particularly explicit in the ICs role in mediating the
recent inclusion of a Bosniak minority into the new Croatian Constitution and in the challenge
to ICs authority in neighbouring Serbia.
As I argued earlier, since the dissolution of the Yugoslav IC in 1993 to its ethnic constituents,
the Slavic-speaking community of Muslims in Serbia has been administered by the Bosnian
Riyaset (headquarters of the IC). The majority of Serbias Muslims live in the southwestern
Sand"ak area that stretches across the border between Serbia and Montenegro, and the Sarajevo-
based IC has been in charge of the Bosnian Muslim minority in that area, but also beyond,
including Serbia proper. However, in 2007, a group from the Me$ihat (regional IC office) inBelgrade embarked upon forming a separate Islamic organization to administer the Islamic
affairs of all Muslims in Serbia, including Albanians, Turks and most importantly, Slavic-
speaking Bosniaks. The Riyasetresponded angrily and accused Serbia of political involvement
and manipulation of the Muslim community. The situation generated frictions between different
groups, including minor armed conflicts between pro-Sarajevo and pro-Belgrade Muslims in
Sand"ak, only to end up in a status quo ante, with two separate Islamic authorities existing in
Serbiathe newly formed Islamic Community of Serbia10and the regional office (Me$ihat) of
theIslamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia11.
In addition to the opposition to what they saw as the division of Bosnian Muslim minority in
Serbia, the Riyasetof Bosnia and Herzegovina extended strong support to its official proxy in
Serbia, trying to win the allegiance of Sand"ak Muslims. This included a symbolic support in
the form of public statements, but also official visits of the Grand Mufti Mustafa ef. Ceri!, the
leader of the Bosnian Muslim community. This was not the first time that leaders of the Bosnian
Riyasetand the Grand Mufti Ceri!tried shaping the course of regional political events. At times
when official state relations between Bosnia and Serbia were significantly low (in 2008), the IC
organized high-level meetings with Serbias political leaders. Similarly, shortly after Kosovos
10See more at http://www.rijaset.rs .11See more at http://www.islamskazajednica.org .
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declaration of independence in 2008still not recognized by the Bosnian governmentthe
Grand Mufti Ceri!visited Pri#tina and met local Islamic authorities in a show of solidarity with
the former Serbian province.
The IC in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also active at the regional and global levels. The European
level seems to be particularly important for the Mufti Ceri!. The head of IC is the only Balkan
religious leader participating in European Islamic forums, such as the European Council for
Fatwa and Research, indicating his commitment to European integration and the
Europeanness of the Bosnian Muslim community (see Bougarel, 2005: 25). This was also
obvious from theDeclaration of European Muslimscalling for the institutionalization of Islam
in Europe, whichMuftiCeri!has been promoting Europe-wide since 2005 (Moe, 2007: 376-
382). Although the Declaration has received some criticism, its networking and promoting role
for the IC in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been relatively successful (see Sarajli!, 2009: 53-79;
and Moe, 2007 for criticism). Mustafa Ceri!is a frequent guest of political events on Islam in
Europe and a sought-after speaker on Europe-Muslim relations. Some European decision-
makers consider him a good representative of the moderate Muslim tradition, and hence a
partner in negotiations. This provides some space for Ceri! to promote his vision of Islam in
Europe and help position Bosnia and Herzegovina on the regional and geopolitical world map.
More importantly, this provides the IC with the forum to promote its vision of the institutional
culture of Islam in Europe.
Another significant networking tool for the IC is the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in the world.
This predominantly pertains to the diaspora in Europe and the US, since relations with emigrant
Bosnian Muslims in Turkey are relatively of a different kind, regardless of the fact that a large
number of Bosnian emigrants now live in Turkey.12The IC administers official Bosnian Islamic
institutions in North America and many European countries, with power to appoint or recall
official representatives. Bosnian Muslims living in the Europe, however, are seen as relatively
invisible when compared to other Muslim communities. Despite some exceptions, such as
Senaid Kobilica, the Bosnian imam leading Norways Islamic Council, these groups are rarely
involved in European Islamic affairs (see Moe, 2007: 391).
12According to some estimates, nearly 7 million descendants of Bosnian refugees live in Turkey alone.
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Ara b a nd Neo - Sa la f i n e two r k s
Since September 11, 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina has repeatedly been branded a hotbed of
Islamic terrorism in Europe. It is true that up to 4,000 Muslim mujahid (jihadi fighters) from
Arab countries and Afghanistan fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, andsome of them had links withAl-Qaida(see Bougarel, 2005: 16-18; Kepel, 2002: 248). Although
the majority of those Muslim mujahidleft Bosnia following the signature of the Dayton Peace
Agreement, around 1,300 of them acquired Bosnian citizenship and remained in the country. In
the course of several years following the end of the war, state authorities revoked the citizenship
of most of these people on the grounds of fraudulent acquisition, while many others migrated to
European countries. Today, no more than 200 of the former mujahidsare recorded as residing in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and most of those who are are married to Bosnians (see Sarajli!, 2010:
21-23 for more details). However, the image of Bosnia as a safe haven and launching pad for
Jihadi terrorists has been firmly established in European mainstream media, and perhaps in the
minds of many decision makers.
The failure of global Jihad and the transnational Islamic networks to change the course of
events in wartime Bosnia drove most radical Islamist actors out of the country (Kepel, 2002:
237-254). However, some networks, following the Salafi tradition, remained relatively active
and visible. Most of these actors are foreign or local non-governmental organizations andinformal networks without formal links to any Muslim country, even though they may receive
occasional state grants and donations, such as the Active Islamic Youthand similar networks and
organizations. To a large extent, this reflects the fact that most Muslim states were reluctant to
push for action in wartime and postwar Bosnia due to their geopolitical alliances. Some of these
countries, like Indonesia and Libya were part of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was
traditionally close to Belgrade, and thus more likely to support the old ally, or at least stay
inactive. In the context where some Muslim states refrained from direct action, the space for
non-governmental and non-formal agency opened up and many of these actors acted to fill it.
The result was increased activity of Islamic NGOs and informal networks concerned with the
destiny of Bosnian Muslims; these organisations pushed for action (Kepel, 2002: 238).
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Some of the activities were of a humanitarian nature, following the involvement of Saudi Arabia
and its contribution of around 150 million USD in the first year of the war, but other forms of
intervention clearly aimed at changing the content and practice of Islam in Bosnia. Networks of
former mujahedins werejoined by local Muslims, who had been educated abroad and felt close
to Salafiphilosophy. Some of these have been shut down after a few years, but others remained
active, like Active Islamic Youth and New Horizons. Initially, some of these organisations
enjoyed support from the embassies of Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia and its High
Saudi Committee for Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina (HSC), but soon after September
11, 2001, and media reports concerning alleged links to international terrorism, Saudis withdrew
their support, which led to the closure of a number of these organizations, likeFurqan (Aliba#i!,
2003: 8).
The official Islamic Community was not particularly welcoming to Saudi-leaning NGOs, nor
was it explicitly opposed to them, even though its interpretative and administrative authority
somewhat suffered from the presence of contending institutions. I would suggest that the reason
behind the ICs mild response to its potential rivals is the ICs desire to prevent a fragmentation
of the Islamic front in the country, which might have endangered the smooth flow of Saudi
resources that provided support for both the NGOs and the IC itself13. The High Saudi
Committee contributed significantly to the ICs institutional structure, rebuilding more than 200
mosques and constructing several new ones, including the massive King Fahd Cultural Centre
and an adjacent mosque in one of Sarajevos residential areas.
This aid, however, came at a price, and the IC still faces challenges to its interpretative authority
from Salafigroups that were heavily influenced by Saudi Arabian networks. Religious literature
donated by the Saudi government tends to reflect Neo-Salafi views, while the mosques and
cultural centers usually employ Salafi-leaning local staff and preachers, ultimately heralding a
split of the Islamic community. To a certain degree, a rapprochement between Salaficircles andthe official IC has occurred, resulting in a more moderate outlook on the part of Salafiactors. In
13 According to some estimates, Saudi Arabias contribution to the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovinaculminated at 560 million USD, which was employed in the reconstruction of infrastructure as well as in thepromotion of different cultural and educational activities.
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the media, these actors are represented through magazines such as Saff14and Novi Horizonti15
and online portals such as IslamBosna.ba.
I r a n i a n n e t w o r k s
Unlike Arab and Salafis, Iranian networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina are almost exclusively
linked to the Iranian embassy. Their activities began during the wartime, when Iran was one of
the first Muslim countries to provide aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in terms of humanitarian
assistance as well as arms (Bougarel, 2003: 16). Furthermore, Iran sent a number of training
staff for the Bosnian army, took care of the wounded, assisted refugees and aided in the
countrys reconstruction. Irans approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war helped in
winning the hearts and minds of many Bosnians; at the end of the war, more than 86 per cent of
Bosnian citizens held favorable views of Iran (Kepel, 2002: 247).
The relative success of Iranian networks has stemmed from a balanced, well planned and
comprehensive approach, reaching beyond exclusive humanitarian and missionary domains. The
Iranian Cultural Center was opened as early as 1994, during the siege of Sarajevo, and since
then has initiated cultural exchange between Iran and Bosnia through various activities ranging
from academic and professional visits to publishing and language courses.
Among the current Iranian (officially) non-state actors, two are especially important. The Ibn
Sina Institute16, opened in 1996, focuses on academic exchange between the two countries and
the promotion of Iranian thought. The Institutepublishes the Signs of the Times (Znakovi
vremena), an academic journal edited by local scholars on issues of philosophy, culture and
society. Similar to Ibn Sina is the Mulla Sadra Foundation17, an organization centered on the
promotion of Islamic and Gnostic studies and eastern philosophy. It translates and publishes
books by Iranian authors and organizes public events and lectures. Though both of these are
nominally non-state actors, the links with official Iranian representatives in Bosnia are very
strong.
14See more at http://www.saff.ba.15See more at http://www.novihorizonti.ba.16See more at http://www.ibn-sina.net.17See more at http://www.mullasadra.com.
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Iranian influence is particularly effective thanks to local Muslim intellectuals and Islamic
studies professors in Sarajevo who have come to promote Irans cultural values and ways of
thinking. Many of these intellectuals, who participate in the academic exchange with Iran, write
and edit publications by Iranian NGOs in Bosnia, and are influential in local communities, such
as Re#id Hafizovi!and Adnan Silajd"i!, amongst others. At the same time, many of them are
frequent critics of Salafiactors and of the official IC establishment and fervent defenders of the
traditional fabric of Bosnian Islam (Hafizovi!, 2006). Via such local supporters who seem to
advocate an autochthonous vision of Islam in Bosnia (related to Shia philosophy through
Bosnian Sufi tradition), the Iranian actors contribution to Bosnias Islamic constellation is
significant. Being limited to intellectual circles and expressed only in limited media outlets,
however, the overall impact if this influence has been rather mild.
Tu r k i s h ne two r k s a nd t h e i r im p a c t
Although the Turkish state has been active in war and postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina through
refugee assistance, reconstruction aid and peace-building, the bulk of Turkish presence in
todays Bosnia is represented by non-state groups and organizations. Besides internal rifts and
shifts in the last decade spanning the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries,
Turkeys official bid to the EU and its membership in NATO have significantly framed its
official approach to post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bougarel, 2003: 19; Bulut, 2004: 2;
Gangloff, 2005: 4). Turkish religious policy, while active in other Balkan countries through the
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet %&leri Ba&kanl'), has only limited impact in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. With the AKP electoral victories in 2002 and again in 2007, semi-state actors
entered the picture, aiming to capitalise upon the welcoming atmosphere in Bosniak parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote their cause. Some variation of the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis that has displaced secular nationalism as the state ideology is hence to be found in the
outlook of both state and non-state Turkish actors in the Balkan region (Solberg, 2007: 434,
Bulut 2004: 8).
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The Glen movement has so far been the most influential Turkish non-state actor in the Western
Balkans, with more than 20 educational institutions in the region. They have been active in
Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1998, when the first framework organization was established, the
Bosnia Sema Educational Institution18
. TheBosnia Sema is the umbrella organization for seven
educational institutions, including a university, three colleges and three primary schools
throughout the country. Primary schools and colleges attract a number of students, mostly from
Bosnia and Herzegovina but also from Turkey and other neighbouring countries, including the
children of members of the diplomatic corps. The working language in these schools is English
and most of them are branded as international educational institutions. Unlike the primary
schools and colleges, the majority of students at the International Burch University19 are
Turkish, with less than 15 per cent being local Bosnian students. The large majority of both
groups appears to be derived from the middle and upper middle class.20 Most of the
administrative staff is local, while the overwhelming majority of the faculty is Turkish.
Although the character of these institutions, from curricula to the overall appearance, is secular,
there are a number of elements that indicate the presence of Islamic references and norms. First
of all, hizmet (service) is considered to be key motivation among both the local staff and
Turkish faculty, providing a clear link to similar neo-Sufimovements and networks dedicated to
the service to Allah and humanity, such asNurcusand Sleymancis(Solberg, 2007: 441). The
Nurcu ideology of blending religion and science in service to God seems to be especially
present in most of their activities. Secondly, a gender separation exists at the college level, with
girls and boys institutions being physically separated from one another. Thirdly, prayer
facilities have also been established, from separate rooms to a mosque on the newly built Burch
University campus in the outskirts of Sarajevo. Finally, a large majority of female students
(more than 70 per cent) wear hijab, indicating a socio-cultural profile of the entire
organizational system.
18See more at http://www.bosnasema.com.19See more at http://www.ibu.edu.ba.20The university fees are moderately expensive, compared to the Bosnian standard, with fees of 10,000 Euros for afour-year university level education.
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Another education-focused network of Turkish actors in Bosnia is organized around the
Sarajevo Education Development Foundation (SEDEF) which runs theInternational University
of Sarajevo (IUS)21, founded in 2004. The group of people behind this organization consists of
Turkish businessmen and Bosnian intellectuals close to the Deniz Feneri, Erenky and AMHV
(Aziz Mahmud Hdayi Foundation) charity organizations, but also to the official AKP
establishment (Solberg, 2007: 451). The IUS is of international character, with English as the
main language of instruction, while the majority of students are from Turkey, with a significant
number of hijab-wearing female students. The newly built campus was opened in early 2010
and was honored by a high-profile visit from Turkey, headed by the Turkish Prime Minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdo%an.
The Turkish state has recently become an active participant in Balkan politics, mainly because
of the strategic change brought by Ahmet Davuto%lus appointment as the countrys Foreign
Minister in 2009. His vision of the strategic depth of Turkish foreign policy is based on a
shared heritage in the Balkans under Turkish regional leadership, a fact that became obvious
during a visit to Sarajevo in October 2009. Again, though symbolically, this act drew Bosnia
and Herzegovina back into Turkeys foreign policy orbit and raised local spirits around the
concept of neo-Ottomanism. Even beyond rhetorical gestures at conferences, Turkeys new
policy has achieved some practical success in mediating relations between countries in the
Western Balkans, particularly between Bosnia and Serbia. The tripartite Istanbul Declaration
signed by the heads of respective states foreign ministries in April 2010 calls for mutual
cooperation, respect and stability in the region. The signing of the Declaration comes on top of
a series of earlier meetings on a trilateral level spearheaded by the Turkish Foreign Minister and
the ruling AKP administration. To Davuto%lus credit one may also assign the recent adoption
of the Srebrenica Resolutionby the Parliament of Serbia, which represented a significant step
towards regional reconciliation. Clearly, Turkeys role in this process was crucial and reflected
its self-perception as a regional leader in the Balkans.
The agency of Turkish state and non-state actors seems to converge on several strategic points
which might give them a competitive advantage over other foreign Islamic networks. First, both
21See more at http://www.ius.edu.ba.
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groups of actors promote a leading role for Turkey among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
through references to common heritage, Ottoman past and shared emotions with the local
population. Indeed, popular sentiment is often very receptive to such references, as one can infer
from the expression of solidarity and common belonging among Bosniaks towards Turkey. The
celebrations of a Turkish football victory against neighbouring Croatia in Sarajevo on 20 June
2008, or the public lecture of Grand Mufti Ceri!on the Turkish origin of Bosniaks, also during
2008, are only two such cases. Secondly, both non-state and state actors push for a progressive
modernization, in social and economic terms, through educational, trade and development
activities that, as a result (if not necessarily always intention), bring Bosnia and Herzegovina
closer to Europe. Thirdly, and most interestingly, the way both actors approach Bosnia and
Herzegovina circumvents the need for state-related religious activities. Furthermore, the role of
the Diyanet in the country is very weak. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only Balkan country
without an officialDiyanet representation office. This does not mean that religion plays no role
in both actors activities, but that any agency that refers to Islam in some way is free of Turkish
state control. This is particularly striking in the case of the cooperation with the Bosnian Islamic
Community, which appears to be closer to non-formal Turkish Islamic networks than to the
institution ofDiyanet.
This may not be surprising, given the self-perception of the IC in Bosnia and the potential
competition between the Bosnian state-independent IC and the Turkish regionally influential
state-related network (see Solberg, 2007: 454; Korkut 2009: 124-126). Hence, the IC is
affirmative of the growing influence of non-state Islamic actors from Turkey, if very critical of
any Turkish religious state institution. Turkish Islamic networks dismay of Salafi influences
and the affirmation of Hanafi tradition that unites Bosnian and Turkish Islamic mainstream
traditions further contribute to the creation of a common Turkish-Bosnian front against external
pressures on the local Islamic outlook.
This cooperation, however, does not represent a full harmony between various Turkish actors in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conflicts and contestations between them do exist, in most cases
reflecting the rifts in Turkeys internal political and religious landscape as well as slightly
diverging visions of leadership. Difficulties in institutional cooperation between actors within
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the same domain, such as education, are indicative of such fissures. For example, although
located in the same neighbourhood, sharing common public facilities and coming from the same
country, there is virtually no institutional cooperation between the International University of
Sarajevoand theInternational Burch University, and besides few courtesy visits, no interactions
on the management or faculty levels exist.22 Clearly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other
things, represents an additional ground for the interplay of Turkish politics between internal
actors and the export of conflict-ridden issues, such as the education of hijab-wearing students,
who are not allowed onto University campuses in Turkey. The mirror to Turkish internal
dynamics and their foreign reverberations was reflected in recent events around Israels raid on
Turkish humanitarian ships heading to Gaza, in which Sarajevo, similar to Istanbuls Taksim
Square, saw organized demonstrations with hundreds protesters flying Turkish and Palestinian,
if not Bosnian, banners.23
O t h e r I s l a m i c n e t w o r k s
Besides the most influential local, Turkish, Iranian and Arab networks, there are smaller actors
who take Islam as reference. Most of them are not influential alone, but they do serve as useful
links with the local population or other foreign actors and organizations. The example of the
International Forum of Solidarity (EMMAUS)24, a humanitarian organization with a local
branch in Bosnia whose representative was on board at the Mavi Marmara at the time of the
Israeli raid, is a case in point.
Among other actors, two types are particularly important. First, the non-formal Sufi circles,
organized in loose groups around charismatic leaders, are relevant to the point of their members
integration in other webs of power and influencefrom politics, high society, and university to
the domains of culture and the media. They provide necessary links between religious and
secular domains, contributing thus to the build-up of group influence in society.
Notwithstanding their non-formal nature, the networking potential of these groups is significant
22The case is even more interesting given the fact that Sarajevo is one of the two cities outside of Turkey that hoststwo Turkish universities. To the authors knowledge, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) is the other case.23See more at http://www.sarajevo-x.com/bih/sarajevo/clanak/100603104 .24See more at http://www.mfs-emmaus.ba.
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since most of their members belong to the higher or upper-middle class with strong links to the
countrys institutions of power, from political parties to state institutions.
Secondly, the alumni organization of former students of theInternational Islamic University in
Malaysia (IIUM) has many members in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are highly influential in
Bosnian society and hold many important posts in business, education and diplomacy. One such
group is organized around the Center for Advanced Studies (Centar za napredne studije, CNS)25
and coordinates academic exchange, research, publishing and cultural events. The groups links
to Turkish and other Islamic networks are strong and rooted in the fact that some of the
members have studied at the IIUM under the professorship of Ahmet Davuto%lu or have
connections with businessmen from the Islamic world. One of these members is Mr. Amer
Bukvi!, the head of the Bosnia Bank International (BBI)26, an Islamic-capital bank that hasoperated in the country since 2000, while the other, Mr. Emir Had"ikaduni!, after working as
the Secretary of theInternational University of Sarajevo, was appointed to serve as Ambassador
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Tehran. Moreover, this groups Center for Advanced Studieswas
the organization that provided a forum for Davuto%lus Sarajevo lecture in which he espoused
the neo-Ottoman strategy of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans.
5 . C o n c l u s i o n : R e n e g o t i a t i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n B o s n i a a n dH e r z e g o v i n a a n d t h e T u r k i s h f a c t o r
The final outcome of the interaction between different Islamic actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is important in terms of the countrys foreign policy for a number of reasons. First, the very
presence of Islamic actors and networks and the level of their visibility sets the context for
Bosnias relation with its neighbours. For instance, it could be said that one of the most explicit
consequences of Islamic non-state actors involvement in the war has limited Bosnias ability to
lift the stringent visa regime imposed by European and Western states, especially after 9/11 and
the publication of alleged links between al-Qaida and Islamic fighters in wartime Bosnia. By
25See more at http://www.cns.ba.26See more at http://www.bbi.ba.
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many Europeans, Bosnia still appears to be seen as linked to potential Islamic terrorist
organizations.
However, the concerted efforts of Turkish actors might shift this perception in another direction.
Education-based activities and projects undertaken by Turkish NGOs and businessmen in the
country could contribute to a new symbolic constellation and build a new vision of Islam, which
is espoused by Muslims in the EUs immediate neighbourhood. This is likely, especially given
Turkish actors comparative success in building networks throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina
and throughout the Balkans that have replaced and surpassed the activities of other Islamic state
or none-state organizations, from Iran to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, regardless of current
internal difficulties, Bosnian foreign policy is likely to follow a Turkish orientation, both on the
regional and global levels of politics. Also, Bosnia and Herzegovinas political development and
EU integration will depend on regional reconciliation and cooperation in the Western Balkans.
An increased and well-played role for Turkey in mediating regional cleavages and providing
partnership relations will further strengthen this orientation, already demonstrated via the states
mediation efforts in temrs of Bosnian-Serbian relations. Future developments of in Turkeys
internal politics will also significantly impact the interplay between Turkish networks in Bosnia,
local institutions and other actors on the ground, especially in terms of religion and its role in
public affairs.
Secondly, the interaction between Islamic actors in Bosnia can contribute to the debate on the
most sensible institutional set up for the management of Islamic affairs, both in the EU and
beyond. The BosnianIslamic Communityprovides an organizational model of independence vis-
-visthe state and might be an object of desire by many non-state actors from Muslim countries.
An independent status of their organization is what enables Bosnian IC representatives to play a
significant foreign policy role and affect the course of development in the region. However,
exactly because of this independent character and promotion of their institutional model in
Europe, conflicts on certain grounds may arise. Namely, unlike the fragmented immigrant
Muslim communities in the EU who require a particular type of institutionalization of Islam
mainly related to the regulation of family law and similar issues, and the Turkish state-related
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Islamic community, Bosnian IC is an independent political player and its institutional model
primarily reflects this fact. Thus, attempts at grafting this specific institutional model of Muslim
representation in Bosniaforged under Austrian-Hungarian sovereignty, Yugoslav dominance,
and finally through the ethnicisation of Bosnian identityonto Europe is destined to meet
immense challenges.
In the immediate region, similar conflicts are already taking place, as the case with Serbias new
Islamic Community shows. The unwillingness of the Mufti Ceri! to come to terms with the
independence of Serbian Muslims from Sarajevo indicates the distinct ethnic and political role
assumed by Bosnian Islamic leadership. This role is also indicated by the conflict between two
different institutional cultures of Islamone independent and politically sovereign, and the
other dependent and state-related. In the time to come, this conflict may develop further and
influence foreign policy choices of the respective countries.
Even the relations between the Islamic Community and Turkey, in the Bosnian as well as the
European framework, are not free from potential conflict along the lines of institutional culture.
Close relations between the IC and Turkish non-state actors and networks might pose a
significant challenge to the future relations between the Islamic communities of the two states.
Conversely, these relations can also provide new ground for the creation of alliances that cross
institutional boundaries and involve both state and non-state actors in promoting a common
Islamic cause. In this event, the role of the Bosnian IC will be significant, not only in providing
a case model for similar relations elsewhere, but also providing links and networks of other
actors promoting similar aims.
What remains certain is the fact that the situation dominating the initial postwar years in Bosnia
and Herzegovina has nowdramatically changed. The missionary and humanitarian era of the
Muslim worlds support to Bosnia is long gone. New interactions and activities are now shaped
by more nuanced approaches of actors and networks no longer concerned with the basic survival
of the Bosnian Muslim community. The aims of these actors are business opportunities and
cultural exchange that can yield long-term benefits for the countries and groups involved in
terms of political and economic influence. The space for Islamic actors activities in the country
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will continue to change, both reflecting and influencing wider trends in international politics.
Two key players are likely to dominate the time to come: the local Islamic authority, embodied
in the ethnic Islamic Community of Bosnian Muslims, and the variety of Turkish state and non-
state actors in areas of education, business and diplomacy. Depending on the global and regional
political context, these might reinforce or contest one another in the process of negotiating the
Islamic identity in Bosnia and its place in Europe.
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