perceptions of strategic compensation
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Running Head: PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION
Perceptions of Strategic Compensation
Rick Carter, Jennifer Dunlap, and Trey Holladay
Lipscomb University
December 7, 2015
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION ii
Approval Page
This Capstone Project, directed and approved by a Juried Review Committee, has been accepted by
the Doctor of Education Program of Lipscomb University's College of Education in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree.
Teachers' Perceptions of Strategic Compensation in the Rural Southeast School District
By
Rick Carter
Jennifer Dunlap
Trey Holladay
for the degree of
Doctor of Education (Ed. D.)
Tracey S. Hebert, Ph.D. Director, Doctor of Education
Carole glish, Ed. D. Ed.D. Capstone Faculty Advisor
4c-: t,/: ��Roger Wiemers, Ed.D.
-
Juried Revie mmittee Faculty Member
ar Catherine Sevier, J .D. Ju 'ed Review Committee Faculty Member
M·� t�Ed.D.
Juried Review Committee Faculty Member
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION iii
Acknowledgements
We are thankful to so many that have borne this journey with us, but first we thank our
families that have given up precious time to make this possible. We love you and know we only
made it through with God’s hand and your sacrifices. You all will find us better people for the
growth we experienced away from you. Our commitment to you and our future together is
stronger than ever. We would also like to thank our extended family, friends, and coworkers for
your support and encouragement. You made it possible to move forward during the tough times.
Next we would like to thank the director of schools, faculty, staff, and administration of
the Rural Southeast School District where we conducted our research. Their openness to share
during this process simplified our data collection. Your community is fortunate to have great
people taking care of their children.
We would also like to thank all of the faculty and staff of Lipscomb University. Our
professors that taught us throughout this doctoral program have gone above and beyond in their
mentorship and instruction. We would like to thank especially Dr. Carole English, Dr. Roger
Wiemers, Mrs. Mary Catherine Sevier, Dr. Debi Hoggatt and Dr. Trace Hebert. We want to
express our appreciation for your help, patience, and feedback over the last year of the project.
You all gave incredible advice and helped at inconvenient times. We will not forget your
support.
Last, we would like to express our love and gratitude humbly to all the members of the
Lipscomb University FA13-A Ed.D. cohort. The friendship, struggles, support and the journey
we shared will always be with us even when we are not together. We are all better people for the
time we shared and the relationships built with you. We will cherish this period of our lives long
after our professional careers are over.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION iv
Abstract
This project explored perceptions of teachers in the Rural Southeast School District concerning
their newly adopted strategic compensation plan. The district implemented the compensation
model for all newly hired faculty and allowed current faculty to opt in or out. The district was
able to extract quantitative statistics from student assessments and teacher evaluations but
desired qualitative data to inform its examination of the plan. The purpose of this study was to
inform the superintendent and school board of teachers’ perceptions of the strategic
compensation model, specifically, if teacher behaviors changed because of the plan and if the
plan affected their decision to remain in the district.
The researchers examined the perceptions of 59 elementary, middle, and secondary teachers and
administrators who currently served in the district. The study employed questionnaires,
individual interviews, and focus group interviews as the basis for answering the research
questions.
Through this project, the researchers found many similar themes revealed through other studies
on teacher merit pay. Teachers believed there was a high weight of student achievement in
determining their value but did not necessarily know the criteria utilized for the determination.
Teachers believed that achievement data was important when deciding effectiveness in teaching.
However, teachers desired more input on how that effectiveness was determined. Finally, the
effect of the plan on teacher recruitment and/or retention in the district according to teachers’
perceptions was unclear.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION v
Table of Contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………... iv
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………. v
List of Tables and Charts……………………………………………………………………….. viii
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Topic, History, and Background .................................................................................................. 3
Problem Statement ....................................................................................................................... 7
The Strategic Compensation Plan ................................................................................................ 7
Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................................. 17
Conceptual Framework .............................................................................................................. 18
Research Questions .................................................................................................................... 22
Significance of the Study ........................................................................................................... 23
Delimitations .............................................................................................................................. 25
Definitions .................................................................................................................................. 25
Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………….. 27
Performance-Based Pay ............................................................................................................. 27
Benefits of Performance-Based Pay .......................................................................................... 37
Drawbacks of Performance-Based Pay ...................................................................................... 39
Teacher Perceptions of Strategic Compensation ....................................................................... 49
Changes in Teacher Behaviors ................................................................................................... 53
Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................................... 61
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………. 63
Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................................. 63
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION vi
Research Questions .................................................................................................................... 63
Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 63
Populations ................................................................................................................................. 65
Demographics of Teacher Participants ...................................................................................... 66
Interview and Focus Group Participants .................................................................................... 71
Description of Research Instrumentation ................................................................................... 72
Variables in the Study ................................................................................................................ 76
Procedures for Data Collection .................................................................................................. 77
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 79
Disposition of Data .................................................................................................................... 80
Findings and Analysis of Data………………………………………………………………….. 82
Organizational Summary ........................................................................................................... 82
Findings Related to RQ1 ............................................................................................................ 82
Findings Related to RQ2 ............................................................................................................ 92
Findings Related to RQ3 .......................................................................................................... 100
Conclusion and Discussion…………………………………………………………………….. 103
Summary .................................................................................................................................. 103
Interpretation of the Findings ................................................................................................... 104
Relationship to Previous Research ........................................................................................... 110
Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................................... 116
Recommendations for Practice ................................................................................................ 121
Limitations ............................................................................................................................... 124
Recommendations for Further Research .................................................................................. 125
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION vii
Reflections ............................................................................................................................... 126
References……………………………………………………………………………………… 130
Appendix A: Informed Consent Letter………………………………………………………… 141
Appendix B: Research Instrument……………………………………………………………... 144
Appendix C: Focus Group Questions………………………………………………………….. 148
Appendix D: Interview Questions……………………………………………………………... 149
Appendix E: Table 25………………………………………………………………………….. 150
Appendix F: Pilot Test…………………………………………………………………………. 151
Appendix G: MOU…………………………………………………………………………….. 153
Appendix H: NIH Certificates of Completion…………………………………………………. 158
Appendix I: IRB Approval……………………………………………………………………... 160
Appendix J: Team Member Biographies………………………………………………………. 161
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION viii
List of Tables and Charts
Table 1: Entry Level Salary Schedule………………………………………………………….....9
Table 2: Percentage of Annual Base Pay Award………………………..…………………..…...10
Table 3: Salary Schedule for School-wide Awards……………………………………………...11
Table 4: Growth Score Awards.....………………………..……………………...…………........12
Table 5: Hard to Staff Positions Supplement….…….………...………………………...……….13
Table 6: Hard to Staff Positions Supplement….……..………..………………………...……….13
Table 7: Effective Principals Awards Schedule…....……...………..………………...………….14
Figure 1: Adams Equity Introduction……………………………………………………………19
Figure 2: Herzberg’s Motivational Theory………………………………………………………21
Table 8: Gender of Participants………………………………………………………………….67
Table 9: Years of Experience of Participants……………………………………………………68
Table 10: Licensure Level of Participants……………………………………………….………69
Table 11: Grade Level Taught by Participants……………………………………….………….69
Table 12: Tenure Status of Participants………………………………………………….………70
Table 13: Evaluation Level Scores of Participants…..…………………………………….….....71
Table 14: Strategic Compensation Participation of Participants…..…………………….………71
Table 15: Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 1…..……………….………75
Table 16: Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 2……...…….……………...75
Table 17: Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 3…..……………………….75
Table 18: Overall percentages of positive and negative perceptions in RQ1……..….………….83
Table 19: Overall percentages of positive and negative perceptions in RQ2…….……………...93
Table 20: Skewness and Kurtosis Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 in Relation to Strategic
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION ix
Compensation Participation...........................................................................................................97
Table 21: Skewness and Kurtosis Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 in Relation to No Strategic
Compensation Participation……………………………………………………………………...98
Table 22: P-Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 as generated by Levene’s Test………………….....99
Table 23: P-Values Associated with Independent T-tests……………...………………………..99
Table 24: Overall Percentages of Positive and Negative Perceptions in RQ3…………………100
Table 25: Individual Interview Question Responses…………………………………………...146
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 1
Introduction
A strong teaching force is necessary for the well-being of our country’s citizens and
society as a whole. Not only does education allow for individual success and achievement, but it
can also dictate the future stability of the country. Therefore, raising underperforming student
achievement levels is a focus throughout the United States today. In order to accomplish this
goal, there is also a focus on increasing teacher effectiveness. The belief that some teachers are
more effective than others in advancing student outcomes has led to an increasing interest in the
use of strategic compensation for teachers. Many supporters have proposed rewarding teachers
as a strategy for improving teaching, learning, and student outcomes.
Over the last 100 years, U.S. schools have primarily used a limited salary schedule based
on teachers’ degrees and years of experience in K-12 public education (Podgursky, 2007).
Personnel salaries dominate every school district's budget and influence the allocation of system
resources. This ultimately will shape the district's ability to achieve its overarching goal of
maximizing student learning (Battelle for Kids, 2010). Notwithstanding this common
characteristic in salary schedules, contemporary research has cast doubt on whether increased
years of experience and advanced degrees have a significant positive impact on student learning
(Harvey-Beavis, 2003). All of these factors combined with highly accessible performance data
and bipartisan political support for compensation reform have stimulated the growth of
compensation policy programs across the country.
Education Secretary Duncan (Jehlen, 2009) argued that his department’s highest priority
was performance-based pay for teachers. Moreover, the Obama Administration created the $4.3
billion Race to the Top fund to encourage states to implement performance-based pay systems
among other initiatives. Both President Obama and the U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 2
Duncan, had supported the push for performance-based pay. According to Gratz (2009), the
implementation of performance-based pay was a primary goal for them. Duncan, speaking at the
2009 National Education Association convention, argued that teachers would do well to support
performance-based pay and that “although test scores alone should never drive evaluation,
compensation, or tenure decisions, not including student achievement in teacher evaluation is
illogical and indefensible” (p.76). At the same time, the most controversial component of
performance-based pay systems has been payment based on standardized achievement test scores
of students.
In 2010-11, the State of Tennessee began the process of implementing an alternative
compensation model. Fourteen school districts across the state were the first to be part of a $501
million Race to the Top (RTTT) grant provided by the U.S. Department of Education (USDOE),
of which $36 million was designated to provide high-need districts with funding for
performance-based compensation. Tennessee also received two additional grants in the RTTT
funding that contributed to the initial pool of money the districts accessed, bringing the total
amount to over $50 million (TNCRED, 2011).
The Race to the Top grants and new state legislative laws that accompanied the $501
million statewide grant changed teacher tenure laws and provided incentive funds for these
innovative school districts to move away from the traditional salary schedule where teachers
were paid based on years of experience and degrees earned. This new pay system was referred
to as strategic compensation. In this reformed pay system, teachers were paid using a baseline
salary with potential bonuses determined by indicators focusing on student performance
(USDOE, 2010). Tennessee was one of only three states (including Texas and Florida) that had
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 3
taken the initiative to begin the transformation of policy regarding performance-based pay for
teachers.
In 2010, the Rural Southeast School District was awarded Innovation Acceleration Funds
(IAF) from the RTTT grant to organize a steering committee to design a strategic compensation
plan for the district. In 2011, this district was one of five school districts in the State of
Tennessee that was awarded an Innovation Acceleration Grant (IAG) of over $1 million as part
of the RTTT funding to move the school district to an entirely alternative-based compensation
model (TNGOV, 201l).
Topic, History, and Background
According to Gratz (2009), the first instances of performance pay occurred during the
mid-1800s in Britain. At this time, schools and teachers were paid based on test results. Over 30
years later, “the testing bureaucracy had burgeoned, cheating and cramming flourished, and
public opposition had grown dramatically. The practice was abandoned as a failure” (p. 76).
Gratz suggested that over the next fifty-plus years, there were two significant turns in
perceptions about performance-based pay. The first shift in perceptions occurred in 1907 from
Great Britain’s chief education inspector Edmond Holmes. Holmes believed that performance-
based pay devalued the process of teaching and learning because it placed a premium on test
scores. Teachers had shifted their focus from students to test scores so they could earn more
money. Holmes believed students were being mentally starved because of the focus on
regurgitating answers for exams instead of the in-depth mastery of content knowledge. As a
world education leader, his negative view on merit pay had an international effect. The second
paradigm shift happened in 1918 in the U.S. during the women’s suffrage movement, which led
the public to start considering fairness and gender inequalities. At that time, performance-based
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 4
pay began to be viewed as merit-based pay. The merit-based pay system was perceived to be
favorable to white male teachers. Because of the reality that women and minorities were treated
unequally to white males and the perception that merit-based pay was part of this inequality, the
public demanded a uniform pay scale. This new shift brought objectivity to a system that had
perpetuated a negative view on differentiated pay. A pay scale that was equalized by ensuring
teachers received the same pay for the education and experience brought a belief that all teachers
were treated equal regardless of gender or ethnicity. These beliefs would play out through the
next 50 years in the U.S. through the civil rights era. Leading up to the 1960s, 96% of school
systems across the country had a uniform pay scale.
In 1983, the U. S. Department of Education (USDOE) published A Nation at Risk, which
suggested that schools were becoming mediocre. President Ronald Reagan, a proponent of merit
pay, experimented with performance-based pay with negligible results. However by 1985, with
the promotion of Reagan’s idea that teachers should be rewarded for their merit and competence,
25 states had mandated incentive pay programs for teachers. Some districts during the era
experimented with incentive programs, management by objectives, and career ladder models or
differentiated staffing with little sustainability (Gratz, 2009; Harris, 2007).
By 1999, tying student achievement to teacher pay was being considered and even piloted
in some school districts. For example, the Denver, Colorado school board and teachers’
association jointly sponsored a new approach to performance-based pay focusing on student
achievement. The pilot study was successful overall; however, student performance was still
thought to be inadequate, suggesting that teachers were ineffective. According to Gratz (2009),
making the connection between the standard measures of students’ learning and teacher
performance was difficult to establish because the measurement being used was not applicable to
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 5
over half of the teachers in the district including teachers of the arts, as well as special education
teachers and those in untested grade levels. This particular model did not consider incentives for
those teachers working in difficult situations (such as exceptional needs), nor did it examine
incentives for those teachers that worked in non-tested subject areas. Additionally, teachers that
showed immense support for their school or attendance zone by taking on high-risk students or
serving at schools in high crime and poverty neighborhoods had no chance for monetary reward.
According to Gratz (2009), after four years of tremendous effort from teachers and
administrators, Denver expanded its definition of performance. They produced their most
effective performance-based pay plan with four different components used in evaluating the
effectiveness of the teacher- student academic growth, teacher skill and knowledge, professional
evaluation, and market incentives. The plan placed special attention to those teachers in hard-to-
serve schools or in hard-to-staff positions.
Gratz (2009) noted that when performance is broadly defined and all parties agree to the
plan, many educators agree that performance-based pay can be successful. During the past
decade, performance-based pay has been pushed to motivate teachers to increase achievement,
particularly in the context of student test scores. Thus, it can be asserted that modern
performance-based pay, which developed in part because of the No Child Left Behind Act,
increased standards required of schools over that same decade (USDOE, 2001).
Not all educators believe that performance-based pay can work. According to Terpstra
and Honoree (2008), if teachers see their peers earn bonuses for activities they completed during
the previous year, their perception of the system will likely change for the worse. Additionally,
Wragg, Haynes, Chamberlain, & Wragg (2002) stated that teachers may view a system as being
unfair if school goals are not aligned with those of the incentive system and result in preventing
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 6
teachers from receiving bonuses. However, Terpstra and Honoree also presented contrasting
research to these perceptions of unfairness within performance-based pay systems, asserting that
when merit pay distinctions were clearly demarcated at attainable levels, teacher motivation to
achieve each new level was much higher and the perceived fairness of the system was boosted.
Job satisfaction is tied closely to perceptions of compensation fairness. Teaching is a
uniquely difficult profession in which to judge individual effectiveness because of the large
number of intangible qualities and habits involved. Wragg et al. (2002) and Figlio and Kenny
(2007) found when teachers were judged based on criteria that they do not feel is representative
of the work that they were doing or that ignored important aspects of their perceived worth, they
often felt dissatisfied with the way they were rewarded. According to Lussier and Forgione
(2010), even within a fair and opaque system of evaluation, if record keeping was done sloppily
and resulted in incorrect payouts to teachers, confidence in the reward system could plummet
along with teachers' satisfaction with it.
According to Wragg et al. (2002), quotas on bonuses were another reason for decreased
satisfaction in schools using performance based-pay. In districts where teachers felt there was
too much competition for incentives, they were less likely to feel content with their system of
compensation. A study by Belfield and Heywood (2008) found that working under a
performance-based pay system showed no effect on career satisfaction among teachers and
resulted in a decreased satisfaction with their salaries.
Teacher perceptions of job motivation and satisfaction under merit pay systems seemed
to be decidedly negative based on previous research. One primary concern was that school
systems might be unable to fairly recognize and reward good teaching. Another concern was
that the school system might be financially incapable of meeting the budgetary needs for those
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 7
rewards. Similarly, quotas and unfair criteria for rewards can also deter teachers from placing
their confidence in merit pay.
Problem Statement
In 2011, the Rural Southeast School District implemented a strategic compensation plan
for all newly-hired faculty members with an option for existing faculty to join. The model
correlated with individual teachers’ effectiveness scores. Tennessee uses the Tennessee
Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM) to train and evaluate public school teachers and
administrators (TNDE, 2014a). The teacher effectiveness score was determined through TEAM
and included observations, professional development, and value-added scores from state-
mandated testing that show academic growth of students over time.
The major rationale for the district’s strategic compensation plan was based on the belief
that it provided faculty members with an incentive to improve teaching strategies and thereby
increase student achievement. The director of schools worked with a team of teachers,
administrators, and the board of education to create and implement the current performance-
based pay system used in the Rural Southeast School District. While the district had collected
quantitative data since the inception of the strategic compensation plan, they had not examined
the teachers’ perceptions of the model.
The Strategic Compensation Plan
Overview. In 2010, the Rural Southeast School District was awarded $50,000 from the
Competitive Supplemental Fund (CSF) of the Race to the Top (RTTT) grant to assist in the
planning and development of a strategic compensation model. A steering committee consisting
of the director of schools, system and school administrators, K-12 system teachers, and local
community leaders were charged with the task of designing the model. The committee’s work
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 8
was substantial enough to impress external evaluators and by January 2011 the district was
notified by the Tennessee Department of Education that they were one of four school districts in
the state to be awarded RTTT funds for alternative salary models. The district received over $1
million from the Innovation Acceleration Fund (IAF) to move the school district to the new
alternative based compensation model.
In the spring of 2011, the district’s Strategic Compensation Plan was approved by both
the local and state boards of education. The Commissioner of Education gave final approval and
special permission to implement the Strategic Compensation Plan in order to abolish the
traditional Basic Education Program (BEP) salary schedule in the district. The new plan was
implemented at the start of the 2011-12 school year.
Section A. The district plan for determining compensation was constructed of six
sections of which teachers could choose to be a part. Section A consisted of the entry-level
salary schedule that all employees hired during the initial year of implementation or after
received. The base line, entry-level salary was set at the time of initial employment and could
not change with experience or degree after the first year of employment. Table 1 shows the
entry-level salary schedule for teachers.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 9
Table 1
Entry-level salary schedule for teachers
Degree Years of Experience Salary
Bachelor Level 0 $30,876
1-5 $31,446
6-10 $34,066
11+ $37,461
Masters level 0-5 $34,291
6-10 $37,906
11+ 41,766
Section B. Section B of the plan provided the first performance pay incentive of the
strategic compensation model. This section was designated as the annual base pay schedule.
Base pay was determined by each teacher’s summative evaluation score and determined through
the 100th decimal place. The individual teacher’s Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System
(TVAAS) score and Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM) rubric score were utilized
to determine individual teachers’ summative evaluation scores for annual base pay.
According to the Tennessee Department of Education (2011), TVASS was designed to
measure how teachers and schools grow students academically. The evaluation was designed to
measure growth on state assessments and not necessarily the level of proficiency of the
individual student. TEAM scores were determined for teachers utilizing the 19-point criteria
rubric for teacher observations. The rubric was developed for educators to have constructive
conversations and to promote best practices for teachers to utilize in their classrooms. TVASS
growth scores and the TEAM observation score were combined for the summative evaluation of
section B of the strategic compensation model.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 10
Teachers with more than 19 years of experience and who elected to move to the strategic
compensation plan could not receive a base pay award. Additionally, any employee with over 30
years of experience could not receive a base pay award. The two groups of teachers’ salaries
exceeded the maximum benefit for determining base pay and therefore would have caused those
groups to receive an unfair increase through the new compensation model. Table 2 shows the
percentage increments that were awarded for evaluation scores.
Table 2
Increments awarded for evaluation scores
Evaluation Scores Percentage of Annual Base Pay Award
< 3.49 0%
3.5 – 3.99 1.45%
4.0 – 4.49 1.70%
4.5 – 4.74 1.95%
4.75 > 2.20%
Section C. Section C of the plan designated the criteria for teachers to receive school-
wide bonuses. Each teacher could receive a school-wide bonus, but it could not exceed $2,500.
The bonuses were determined by the percentage of benchmarks achieved by the school during
the academic year. A benchmark rubric was established to determine school-wide awards.
Table 3 shows the salary schedule for school-wide awards.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 11
Table 3
Salary schedule for school wide awards
Benchmarks Met Percentage Award Stage 1 50%
Stage 2 80%
Stage 3 100%
11 100 $2,500 1,250 2,000 2,500
10 91 $2,272 1,136 1,818 2,272
9 82 $2,045 1,023 1,636 2,045
8 73 $1,818 909 1,454 1,818
7 64 $1,590 795 1,272 1,590
6 55 $1,363 682 1,090 1,363
5 45 $1,136 568 909 1,136
4 36 $909 455 727 909
3 27 $681 341 545 681
2 18 $454 227 363 454
1 9 $227 114 182 227
Section D. Section D was aligned to student performance for individual teachers. In
kindergarten through fifth grade, student assessment data for reading was used to award teachers
for Level 4 and 5 student averages. Additionally, student average assessment scores for fourth
and fifth grade math received monetary awards for Level 4 and 5. Middle school teachers for
fifth, sixth, and eighth grades with student assessment scores of Level 4 or 5 in math, science,
English, and social science could also earn monetary awards. Finally, high school teachers who
teach Algebra I or II; English I, II, or III; or U.S. History could earn monetary awards for Level 4
or 5 scores. Table 4 shows each grade level with the monetary award for subject area growth
through assessment level average.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 12
Table 4
Monetary award for subject area growth through assessment level average
Grade Performance Level Award
Kindergarten 1st grade Reading >
Predicted $750
1st grade Reading Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
2nd grade Reading Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
3rd grade Reading Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
4th grade Reading Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
5th grade Reading Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
4th & 5th grade Math Level 4+ $750
Middle School
(Math, ELA, Science, Social Studies)
Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
High School
(Algebra I & II, ELA I, II, & III, US History)
Level 5
Level 4
$1,500
$750
Section E. Hard to staff positions made up Section E of the compensation plan. The
hard to staff positions were defined as areas that had a critical shortage of available teachers.
Severe special education and high school math received the highest compensation rates.
Moderate special education, high school chemistry/physics, foreign language, and high school
language arts teachers also received stipends. Teachers that taught out-of-field only received
50% of their stipend until they received proper licensure. Table 5 shows the compensation
schedule for hard to staff areas.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 13
Table 5
Compensation schedule for hard to staff areas
Hard to Staff Positions Monetary Compensation Amount
Special Education Moderate $1,000
Special Education Cognitive $2,000
High school Math $2,000
High School Chemistry/Physics $1,500
High School Foreign Language $1,500
High School Language Arts $1,000
Section F. The fifth section in which classroom teachers were provided extra monetary
compensation was based on leadership roles. High school department heads, elementary and
middle school grade level chairpersons, and Stage 3 academic intervention coaches could all earn
stipends for their additional work. Table 6 shows the positions and compensation levels.
Table 6
Positions and compensation levels
Extra Duty Positions Supplement Amount
High School Department Heads (Math, Science, ELA, Civics) $1,500
Elementary and Middle School Grade Level Chairpersons $1,500
Stage 3 Coaches (2 per school) $1,750
Section G. The last monetary bonus offered under the strategic compensation plan was
for principals and assistant principals. The section labeled Effective Principals allowed
principals to receive an annual school-wide bonus award up to $5,000 based on the TEAM
evaluation score. There was a 20% reduction for each score drop below Level 5. Additionally,
principals and assistant principals could earn awards based on the school-wide benchmark rubric
score following each academic year. Table 7 shows the compensation schedule for principals
and assistant principals based on the school-wide benchmark rubric.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 14
Table 7
Compensation schedule for principals and assistant principals
Benchmarks Percentage Award Level 1
20%
Level 2
40%
Level 3
60%
Level 4
80%
Level 5
100%
11 100% $5,000 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 $5,000
10 91% $4,545 909 1,818 2,727 3,636 $4,545
9 82% $4,090 818 1,636 2,454 3,272 $4,090
8 73% $3,636 727 1,454 2,182 2,909 $3,636
7 64% $3,181 636 1,272 1,909 2,545 $3,181
6 55% $2,727 545 1,091 1,636 2,182 $2,727
5 45% $2,272 454 909 1,363 1,818 $2,272
4 36% $1,818 364 727 1,091 1,454 $1,818
3 27% $1,363 273 545 818 1,090 $1,363
2 18% $909 182 364 545 727 $909
1 9% $454 91 182 272 363 $454
The district also had guidelines in place for all certified school-based employees. The
guidelines were put in place during the initial year of implementation and remained in place with
minor edits and changes. The following were the district guidelines.
District Alternative Compensation Eligibility Rules:
1. To be eligible to participate in the Alternative Compensation program all teachers and
principals must meet all of the following general eligibility requirements.
2. Requirements may change annually. All educator inquiries/issues with requirements
shall be reviewed by the Steering (Design) Committee, which consists of teachers,
principals, board members, community members, and the Director of Schools and
approved annually by the Board of Education.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 15
3. All new employees entering the district will participate in the Alternative Compensation
Plan.
4. No employees hired prior to July 25, 2011, shall have the ability to join the alternative
compensation plan after the July 30-August 3, 2012 enrollment window.
5. Current employees with the district who joined with 20 or more years of teaching
experience are not eligible for increases to annual baseline pay in any year but shall be
eligible for all bonus and incentive awards.
6. Employees as of SY 2011-12 who joined with 19 or less years of teaching experience
shall be eligible for increases to annual baseline pay for up to 30-years of teaching
experience at which time annual baseline increases shall no longer continue. Employees
who joined with 20 or more years of teaching experience as of SY 2011-12 shall be
eligible for all bonus and incentive awards based on program funding.
7. Employees must be employed in a campus-assigned position within the first 20 days of
school.
8. Central office staff, substitute teachers, or student teachers are not eligible. Hourly
employees are not eligible to participate in the alternative compensation program.
9. Eligible employees must hold a valid teaching license from the State of Tennessee to be
eligible to receive bonus awards.
10. Employees must be supervised and evaluated by the principal or his/her designee of the
campus where they are serving students. (This does not apply to Principals)
11. For applicable employees: employees must review instructional-linkage and assignment-
verification information for accuracy (Teachers are responsible for claiming their
students' individual scores).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 16
12. Employees must attend 94.44% or 170 days of the 180 instructional days identified in the
"instructional school calendar" to receive their school-wide bonus, individual teacher
performance, teacher leader incentive, or principal bonuses. This means that employees
cannot be absent for more than 10 days. Employees who miss more than 10 days will,
however, be eligible for their annual baseline pay increase per annual teacher evaluation.
The following types of leave will be held harmless (not count as days absent) and match
the Board's current policies and term definitions: military leave, FMLA - family medical
leave (must be authorized through the Central Office), assault leave, jury duty, and off-
campus duty (such as professional development opportunities or activities approved by
the District).
13. Bonuses and incentive awards are not ensured to occur every year. They are contingent
upon program funding. Only increases to annual baseline pay increase are guaranteed.
14. Employees must be continuously employed in a tested position until the last day of
school to receive the Individual Teacher Performance bonus.
15. Employees must be in "good standing" to receive any bonus. "Good standing" means
that all paperwork/certifications are up to date.
16. Bonuses for employees who transfer from one bonus-eligible position to another bonus-
eligible position during the school year shall be determined on the basis of the bonus-
eligible position held for the majority of the school year.
17. Employees who are involuntarily transferred to another school within the district may
permanently "opt out" of the Alternative Compensation Plan. The employee shall return
to the present BEP salary schedule for the corresponding years of experience and
degree(s) held by the employee. The employee shall not be entitled to any payments
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 17
within the scope of the Alternative Compensation Plan in the school year for which they
"opt out". The employee can never return to the Alternative Compensation Plan once
such option is exercised.
18. Employees will not be eligible for bonuses that transfer from a bonus eligible position to
a non-bonus eligible position.
19. Employees who work at multiple schools will receive awards determined by the school
for which they are evaluated.
20. Employees who voluntarily elect (except for retirement) not to return to the district in the
following year for which bonuses are rewarded shall not be eligible any bonus award
payments except Hard to Staff, Department Head, Grade Level Chairperson, and Stage 3
Coaching duties.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the teachers’ perceptions of the strategic
compensation model and its influence on teachers in the district. More specifically, the study (1)
investigated the perceptions of faculty members concerning the strategic compensation plan; (2)
identified perceived changes in teacher behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation plan;
and (3) examined whether the teachers’ perceptions of the strategic compensation plan affected
decisions to continue or discontinue employment in the district. For purposes of this study, the
dependent variables were individual faculty members with consideration of gender, years of
teaching experience, licensure status, tenure, evaluation rank, and participation in the plan. The
independent variables were the faculty participants’ perceptions of traditional and non-traditional
payment plans.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 18
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for this study was based on two significant models that have
been utilized for the past few decades to study how workers perceive their jobs. These theories
crossed all lines of the public and private sectors, as well as the blue-collar versus white-collar
view of how people perceive job worth and satisfaction. The framework models illustrated
relevance for those inside and outside of educational institutions.
Because teacher perception of strategic compensation was the basis for this study, the two
theoretical frameworks used were equity and motivation. These theories were chosen because of
their qualitative values and descriptors. The researchers utilized these theories in the
development of the research instruments used for this study. Both theories have unique
paradigms that show how employees can have opposing perceptions in response to the same
question even when they have similar jobs. The researchers analyzed the teacher perceptions
from the questionnaire, focus group, and individual interview responses, and afterwards,
compared and contrasted them with the theories of equity and motivation.
Adams Equity Theory. Equity theory (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987) proposed
that as a result of the distress of either over-reward or under-reward, inequitably rewarded
individuals should experience lower levels of job satisfaction than equitably rewarded
individuals. Figure 1 shows the balance needed for employees to perceive that job satisfaction
experiences are generally seen as a positive experience. It also illustrates the importance of the
balance of the scales, specifically, that input and output ratios are crucial pieces of the theory and
not simply a rendering of whether or not rewards are appropriate for efforts.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 19
Figure 1: Adams Equity Theory.
Adapted from “Adams Equity Theory” by Alan Chapman, 2015, Retrieved from http://www.businessballs.com/adamsequitytheory.htm. Copyright Businessballs 2015. Reprinted with permission.
Adams first introduced his equity theory in 1963 as cited in Huseman et al. (1987). He
suggested that a motivational tension was created when a worker sees a sense of inequity when
comparing a worker’s job inputs and outcomes (rewards) with other workers. He postulated that
if one perceived this inequity he or she would feel either anger or guilt. However, in practice,
equity theory presents a number of challenges (p. 222). When applied to performance-based pay
systems in a school setting, teachers could question the comparative fairness or procedural
justice of the rewards at their campuses based on several factors including student assignment to
classes, the difficulty level of the content taught, and the relative support given to teachers. A
performance-based pay system that rewards teams rather than individual teachers may address
some of these potential equity issues.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 20
Herzberg’s Motivational Theory. Frederick Herzberg’s (1968) motivation-hygiene
theory was developed from research that indicated that there was a separate and distinct
difference between job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction. For example, when workers were
asked about what factors contributed to job satisfaction, they tended to answer with
characteristics such as achievement, recognition, and the work itself. When asked about what
factors contributed to job dissatisfaction, they tended to answer with characteristics such as
supervision, relationships, work conditions, and salary. Herzberg noted that the characteristics
that produced job satisfactions were intrinsic motivators and that the characteristics that
produced job dissatisfaction were extrinsic to the job itself. Herzberg called these extrinsic
characteristics hygiene factors in contrast to motivation factors. Figure 2 represents Herzberg’s
visual of hygiene and motivation. This differentiation shows the effect of hygienic factors on
motivation.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 21
Figure 2: Herzberg’s Motivational Theory. Adapted from “Job Satisfaction” by Brian Redmond, 2015, Retrieved from https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/11.+Job+Satisfaction. Copyright 2015 Pennsylvania State University
Herzberg (1968) described his theory in contrast to three general philosophies of
personnel management: organizational theory, industrial engineering, and behavioral science.
Rather than concentrating on work efficiency, Herzberg’s theory suggested that the work be
enriched in order to maximize effective use of personnel (p. 58-59). The systematic approach of
motivating employees through manipulating the motivator factor was known as job enrichment.
Job enrichment provided the opportunity for the employee’s psychological growth (p. 59).
Herzberg concludes with the following:
The argument for job enrichment can be summed up quite simply: If you have
someone on a job, use him. If you can’t use him on the job, get rid of him, either
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 22
via automation or by selecting someone with lesser ability. If you can’t use him
and you can’t get rid of him, you will have a motivation problem. (p. 62)
The theoretical frameworks influenced the survey instruments (Appendices B-D) used for
data collection and were designed to produce participants’ perceptions of strategic compensation,
teacher behaviors, and the recruitment and/or retention in Rural Southeast School District. These
frameworks also assisted the researchers in their data analysis and were used to organize the
qualitative data related to questionnaire responses, focus group responses, and interview. The
theories were further utilized to understand the motivational benefits of a performance-based pay
system in the elementary, middle, and high school and determine teachers' perceptions of the
strategic compensation program, specifically during the data interpretation phase. Finally, the
concepts of equity and motivation in a school setting guided the conclusions drawn from this
study.
Research Questions
The researchers sought to answer the following questions through this mixed methods
research study:
1) What are the teachers’ perceptions of strategic compensation in Rural Southeast
School District?
2) What teacher behaviors have been affected as a result of the strategic compensation
plan in the Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
3) How has strategic compensation affected teacher recruitment and/or retention in Rural
Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 23
Significance of the Study
The significance of this study centered on the need to identify teachers’ perceptions of the
strategic compensation program in Rural Southeast School District. In January 2010, the state of
Tennessee became one of the first states to apply for Race to the Top (RTTT) funding from the
U.S Department of Education. Tennessee finished second to Delaware in the nationwide
competitive grant application score, but was the top winner in funding for Phase 1 with a $500
million award. The RTTT grants asked states to show how they would advance public education
reforms in four specific ways; adopting college and career ready standards and assessments, data
systems that show growth and success, teacher development and retention, and turning around
low-performing schools (USDOE, 2015b). The Tennessee First to the Top program was
established by the state legislature immediately after receiving the USDOE notification of the
RTTT award. Tennessee has invested a substantial amount of the RTTT grant money into pilot
programs, and the validation of successful implementation could expedite the education reforms
outlined under state and federal legislation (TNGOV, 2010).
Implementing a successful strategic compensation program requires teachers’
involvement. School districts benefit from teachers playing an active role in the process of
creating and implementing future programs. This research attempted to provide the perceptions
of Rural Southeast School District’s teachers toward the implementation of their strategic
compensation program. Knowing how these teachers perceived the compensation program as
well as understanding how they believed their behaviors had changed as a result could be very
beneficial to Rural Southeast School District, as well as other districts in and outside of
Tennessee. Additionally, local and state officials throughout Tennessee will benefit from the
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 24
findings regarding how strategic compensation affected teacher recruitment and/or retention
according to teachers’ perceptions.
This study is also beneficial because it encourages teachers to collaborate with one
another to improve student outcomes. One of the most important rationales for using strategic
performance-pay is to encourage and motivate teachers to perform at their best. Therefore,
stakeholders in the educational system (including students themselves) should be interested in
whether or not strategic performance-pay motivates their teachers.
The factors relating to performance-based pay are also significant. According to Harvey-
Beavis (2003), there are many possible facets to strategic compensation plans based on the needs
of the district. For example, performance measures can be based on the performance of each
school as a whole or each teacher as an individual unit, and may or may not involve monetary
incentives. Some strategic plans include measures such as school or individual sanctions for
poor performance, whereas others are designed with tiered levels of rewards for positive
performance above a given baseline expectation.
Finally, there are a wide variety of options for compensation or incentives in strategic
compensation plans based on the needs of each district, as each district can elect whether to
reward with bonus pay, compensatory days, or other benefits. Not only do districts have the
ability to design the measures and types of incentives given, they may also adjust the scope of
those benefits to match the needs and capabilities of the system. Because strategic compensation
can be implemented in such a variety of ways, studying the type of program implemented in
Rural Southeast School District could lead to a greater understanding for other districts as they
seek to create their own strategic compensation plans.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 25
Delimitations
The Rural Southeast School District served more than 1,200 students in Tennessee. The
Tennessee Department of Education designated the district as an exemplary school district.
Three schools (one elementary school, one middle school, and one high school) comprised the
district.
This study was delimited to certified, school-based instructional and administrative
personnel employed by Rural Southeast School District. The district was chosen because in the
2011 - 2012 school year it implemented a merit-based pay component as a part of its overall
compensation plan. Any inferences beyond this group should be drawn only after careful
consideration of the target population.
Definitions
TVAAS - According to the Tennessee Department of Education (2014b), “The Tennessee
Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) measures the impact schools and teachers have on
their students’ academic progress. TVAAS measures student growth, not whether the student is
proficient on the state assessment” (para. 1). The data collected by TVAAS is used strategically
to help educators make informed decisions about what is best academically for their students.
TVAAS data is also factored into the teachers’ overall evaluation scores. For teachers who are
in tested subject areas and grade levels, TVAAS data counts as 35% of their overall evaluation
score. For teachers in non-tested grade levels and subjects, TVAAS data counts as 25% of their
overall evaluation scores (TNDE, 2014a).
Strategic Compensation - For the purpose of this study, strategic compensation was
defined as any performance-based or merit pay that is awarded to teachers as the result of
excellent student achievement and teacher evaluations. Strategic compensation also may be paid
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 26
to teachers who are recruited to fill hard-to-staff positions.
TEAM - The Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM) is the evaluation model
that is used to train and evaluate public school teachers and administrators in Tennessee (TNDE,
2011a). TEAM evaluations incorporate frequent observations both announced and unannounced
and constructive feedback for educators. Using the TEAM rubric, educators work together with
administrators (TNDE, 2011b). The goal of TEAM is to identify what is working well in the
classroom (Area of Reinforcement), where there is room for improvement (Area of Refinement),
and options for professional development to support continued growth (TNDE, 2011a).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 27
Literature Review
In this chapter, the review of past research looks at studies conducted and the
deliberations that must be considered when implementing a strategic compensation program. In
the first section, the review examines different types of performance-based pay and how they
have been implemented in the past. The second section focuses on the benefits of performance-
based pay for teachers. Past positive outcomes for districts, teachers, and students as well as
other stakeholders will be discussed. The third area for review is drawbacks of performance-
based pay.
The fourth section of this chapter will review how teachers perceive strategic
compensation. Understanding how teachers have viewed performance-based pay is essential,
especially when school districts plan to use financial rewards to motivate teachers. The fifth
section will explore past literature regarding changes in teachers’ classroom behaviors following
performance-based pay implementation. Research findings on classroom behaviors are
discussed first, focusing on subsequent areas of teaching performance, expectations, and student
achievement. The final section of this chapter will examine hiring and retention practices of
school districts following the implementation of performance-based pay. There is also a brief
discussion of why teachers may be drawn to a system that is performance-based and whether
such a plan would cause employees to want to leave the system.
Performance-Based Pay
In a study conducted by the Center for American Progress, Brenneman (2014) noted that
even after gaining experience, most teachers were not likely to see major salary gains. The
United States offers low salaries for teachers and provides few salary growth opportunities,
unlike other developed countries. Japan and Korea, for example, have increased the salaries of
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 28
elementary school teachers by almost 80% in the past 15 years. The United States, in
comparison, had only increased the salaries of elementary school teachers by approximately 25%
in the past 15 years (Brenneman, 2014; Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2014). According to Brenneman (2014), there were only four states (Connecticut,
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York) that allow the highest pay scale for teachers to exceed
$60,000. New York offered the highest maximum salary of $90,700; however, New York also
had a relatively high cost of living.
While other professions may have the opportunity to earn many types of additional pay or
bonuses, there are usually only two options available for teachers to increase their salaries –
performance pay and professional development (PD) pay. According to Brenneman (2014), both
of these options allowed high performing teachers to earn bonuses in addition to their regular
salaries. In many cases, teacher bonuses were dependent on students’ test scores. This bonus
plan was undesirable to teachers because they believed it to be flawed.
Even though teachers are concerned with how performance-based bonuses are calculated
and the impact test scores may have, they understand the need for improving their salaries and
being recognized as professionals. Teacher accountability continues to dominate the current
educational discourse as attention is focused on the role teachers’ play in affecting student
achievement as measured by test scores and dropout rates. Consequently, the effectiveness of
teacher strategic compensation pay has become an issue of increasing importance.
Harvey-Beavis (2003) suggested that performance-based pay plans can have a wide range
of frequency and duration; checkpoints may be set up for multiple measures during a school
year, annually, or multi-year depending on the needs of the system. Likewise, incentives may be
given at each checkpoint or spread out, occurring at fixed points such as every three years with
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 29
experience-based scheduled salary increases. In addition to duration and focus, there were also
many options for the measures and incentives themselves. Districts may decide to utilize
principals or other internal groups to measure performance or use an outside service or counsel
to assess performance. Performance itself can also be defined in many ways and strategic plans
can take into account many different measures to generate a perception of success or failure.
According to Harvey-Beavis (2003), some common teacher-centered measures, whether
alone or in combination, included classroom observations, state teacher assessments, evaluation
of teacher qualifications, National-Board style teacher portfolios, and professional growth of
teachers through training or further education. Teacher-centered measures were often coupled
with student-centered measures as well, which frequently involve comparison of standardized
assessments to ascertain whether students are making gains, defined as group increases in overall
average score, from year to year or course to course. Each plan has the potential to measure
goals that are customized to the needs of the district, whether related to faculty retention and
recruitment or student performance.
Goldhaber, Dearmond, and Deburgomaster (2011) recognized that there was not
sufficiently researched evidence about the effects of differential monetary incentives in
education (pp. 441-442). Typically, researchers have made inferences about the level of
incentives by observing teachers in a traditional compensation system that was based on the
experience and education levels of teachers rather than on their performance. Direct analysis of
incentive reforms can be difficult to find. Goldhaber et al. sought to survey and examine
teachers in order to identify their views on strategic compensation plans in Washington.
Goldhaber et al. (2011) analyzed teacher attitudes and perceptions about compensation
reform using the Washington State Teacher Compensation Survey (WSTCS), an original survey
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 30
sent to 5,238 teachers in Washington during the spring of 2006 (p. 446). This survey asked
teachers the following question:
How much do you favor or oppose giving extra compensation to the followng
types of teachers?
a) teachers who specialize in hard-to-fill subjects, such as science and
mathematics;
b) teachers who work in tough neighborhoods with poorly performing schools;
c) teachers whose students make greater gains on standardized tests than similar
students taught by other teachers;
d) teachers who receive accreditation from the National Board of Professional
Teaching Standards (NBPTS), a voluntary program of national certification.
(pp. 446-447)
The purpose of their study was “to highlight important distinctions among teachers and
schools that have generally been ignored in prior research and that have important implications
for (incentive-based) reform implementation” (p. 442).
Goldhaber et al. (2011) found that teachers who related to and put more trust in their
colleagues were less likely to support merit pay, while those who build strong connections to
their administration were more likely to do so. This division in teacher attitudes was an indicator
of some of the other perceptions of fairness or unfairness associated with incentive pay in
schools. Whether or not teachers support salary reform largely depends on whether they feel the
system will reward all individual teachers fairly. If a system favored some teachers over others
when the unrewarded teachers felt they did the same amount or more work, job satisfaction for
those teachers who do not receive rewards decreased drastically. Discussions of these two
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 31
issues, fairness and job satisfaction, were found in much of the research on incentive pay and
teacher perceptions.
The analysis associated with the study of Goldhaber et al. (2011) treated the various
incentive plans as if they were separate from each other, but suggested that future research may
need to be centered on analyzing combinations of incentives (p. 460). The results from their
study also suggested that secondary school teachers might be more likely to support merit pay.
The researchers noted that teacher opinions about compensation reform implementation needed
to be examined further in order to understand how those perceptions shape the workforce. They
further noted that teacher opinions prove to be a complicated analysis as these opinions involves
their attitudes and all the aspects that influence these attitudes. Their findings seemed to
illustrate the relationship between teacher attitudes toward merit pay and professional norms and
collegiality. These findings appeared to suggest altruistic concerns related to collegial trust
among teachers, and this is consistent with Lortie’s (2002) research. In other words, teacher
opposition to merit pay may be related to the egalitarian ethos of the profession (Lortie, 2002).
Goldhaber et al. (2011) felt that the findings of their study also left many complicated issues
unaddressed, such as the successful adoption of compensation reform depending on the
relationship between districts and union officials.
Lavy (2007) described two primary performance-based pay schemes (p. 89). He noted
that these pay schemes could compensate teachers: 1) based on their individual performance, or
2) based on team/group performance whereas the total team incentive payment is divided among
all team/group members regardless of individual performance (p. 89). He also noted that some
performance-based pay systems involved sanctions for substandard performance. This means
that performance-based pay schemes can incorporate financial penalties for subpar performance.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 32
Lavy (2007) described three main prototypes of performance-based reward programs:
merit pay, knowledge- and skill-based compensation, and school-based compensation (p. 90).
He also noted that merit pay “generally involves individual incentives based on student
performance” (p. 90). However, knowledge- and skill-based compensation usually involved
payment to individual teachers based on teacher performance in the classroom rather than
student outcomes on standardized tests. He further noted, “Knowledge- and skill-based pay
differs from merit pay because it provides clear guidelines on what is being evaluated” (p. 90).
Lastly, he described school-based compensation as pay that involved school-wide bonuses based
on student performance. This last form of compensation would be measured through student
outcomes on standardized assessments overall. In buildings with non-tested grade levels and
subject areas, school-based compensation may be a way for additional teachers to qualify for
performance-based pay.
Performance-based versus outcome-based systems. According to Wisconsin Center
for Education Research (2008), frequently there are misunderstood limitations associated with
performance-based pay systems. They defined two types of strategic compensation as follows:
Performance-based systems (also known as behavior-based systems) tie some
portion of salary to observable teacher behavior, such as demonstration of a
specific pedagogical technique. Outcome-based systems (also known as pay for
performance) link compensation to student performance, such as test scores and
attendance. (Wisconsin Center for Education Research, 2008, p. 1)
According to the Wisconsin Center for Education Research (2008), the most common
merit pay systems are performance-based and outcome-based. Both systems offer incentives for
teachers to continue ongoing professional development to enhance teaching techniques that will
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 33
affect student outcomes as well as for aquiring advanced degrees. They also may encourage
teachers to remain in education for the duration of their careers. Even though there are
advantages to both merit pay systems, with outcome-based systems there is also concern that
teachers may focus solely on necessary actions to earn the rewards, which may have a negative
impact on their students.
Subject-area pay. Subject-area pay is used to provide teachers serving in hard-to-staff
subject areas additional pay for their expertise. Goldhaber et al. (2011) noted the research of
Cohen, Walsh, and Biddle who found that 30% of states offer subject-area incentives. Subject-
area incentives vary based on the needs of the state and could include math, science, special
education or any other area of high-need or hard-to-staff positions. Goldhaber et al. (2011)
found that teachers who showed more support for a particular incentive (e.g. subject-area
incentives) were also more likely to say a larger dollar amount was a “fair” incentive in that area
(p. 449). The researchers noted, “As with the merit pay findings, veteran and female teachers are
less supportive of subject-area incentives whereas Hispanic teachers are more supportive” (p.
453). While this finding was noted, the study did not offer any explanation as to why some
teachers are more receptive to particular forms of performance pay. The researchers found that
teachers with middle and high school assignments in mathematics and science were more
supportive of subject-area bonuses. This finding did not surprise them because teachers of
subjects that offer bonuses would naturally favor receiving additional pay for continuing to teach
that subject. They further noted, “When it comes to the trust factors, it appears that a teacher’s
support for subject-area incentives is not systematically related to impressions of his or her
coworkers” (p. 453). The teachers who favored subject-area pay did so knowing that other
teachers in the district would be ineligible for the same bonuses they received.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 34
Combat pay. Goldhaber (2009) described pay incentives designed to entice teachers to
teach in high-needs schools as combat pay (p. 15). The combat pay expression is utilized as a
comparison between teachers who agree to work in low performing schools in much the same
way that the military gives combat pay to soldiers who serve in war zones (Wickham, 2011).
Goldhaber et al. (2011) found that when given the choice between merit-pay, subject-area pay,
combat-pay, and NBPTS incentives, teachers prefered combat pay. The researchers theorized
that combat pay may have been preferred because all teachers in the school were eligible for
earning the bonus, whereas the other incentives were more exclusive. The reasearchers indicated
that with the exception of certain variables (experience, student poverty, and mathematics
performance), support for combat pay is not systematically related to indvidual or workplace
characteristics (p. 454).
Goldhaber et al. (2011) found that teachers in schools with higher math scores appear to
be less supportive of combat pay. They further noted that teachers in schools with higher
reading scores are more supportive of combat pay. The researchers were surprised by this
finding and did not offer an explanation as to why the reading teachers were more supportive of
combat pay. As a means of summarizing their findings in relation to secondary school teachers,
Goldhaber et al. stated, “When it comes to types of reform, teachers are more supportive of
combat pay and least supportive of merit pay” (pp. 459-460).
NBPTS incentive. Goldhaber et al. (2011) collected data related to the incentive pay of
teachers who are certified by NBPTS (p. 454). The USDOE provides $5,000 for NBPTS
certification. The researchers found that teachers already receiving that incentive were
supportive of the extra pay given to teachers with NBPTS certification. They also found that
teachers who feel more trust and respect toward their principal are more supportive of NBPTS
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 35
incentives (p. 454). The researchers further noted that “teachers who identify themselves as
members of teachers’ unions are more supportive of incentive pay for NBPTS certification after
controllling for school district effects and the clustering of teachers within schools” (p. 454).
Goldhaber et al. (2011) acknowledged that their findings left many complicated issues
unadressed such as why the teachers receiving the NBPTS incentives felt more trust toward their
administration or why members of unions prefered that incentive.
Individual and peer group compensation. These compensation classifications are
beneficial in their own way. Regardless of the differences, they are both based on value-added
measures. These measures are defined as “growth measures used to estimate or quantify how
much of a positive (or negative) effect individual teachers have on student learning during the
course of a given school year” (The Glossary of Education Reform, 2013, para. 1). These
measures can be applied to individual teachers or peer groups.
The Tennessee Department of Education (2014b) defines growth scores under the
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) model. The model measures individual
student learning progress through annual state assessments. The data collected by TVAAS was
utilized in two strategic ways in school systems. The first utilization of TVASS data was to
make educational decisions that are best for students and student outcomes. The second
utilization of the data was for the evaluation of individual teachers. TVAAS data counts between
25-35% of their overall evaluation score in the teacher’s annual evaluation.
Monetary earnings, reducing teaching load, promotions, or public recognition. Lavy
(2007) stated, “Although monetary rewards are the most common incentive in performance-
related pay, other incentives can include reduced teaching load, promotion, and public
recognition of outstanding teachers” (p. 89). He noted that rewards could be one-time events or
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 36
ongoing events that have the potential to yield permanent increases in salary (p. 89). He further
noted that a reward could be based on: 1) a relative criterion such as the average test score gain
of a teacher’s class relative to the classes of other teachers, or 2) an absolute criterion such the
class average test score being higher than a predetermined threshold (p. 89). In relation to the
monetary value of awards/incentives, he indicated that awards/incentives could: 1) come in fixed
amounts that are equal for all winners, or 2) increase with winners’ levels of achievement (p. 89).
The different types of compensation used by school systems are unique and designed to
appeal to different teachers. For example, a teacher with a family to support may appreciate
monetary earnings as a reward for his or her work. Monetary bonuses may not be as motivating
to some teachers as other incentives. At the same time, a mid-career teacher may appreciate
promotions or public recognition more. Veteran teachers with immense experience may
appreciate reducing teaching loads the most. Both Caillier (2010) and Wragg et al. (2002) found
that rewards, such as paid time off, were seen as more valuable to teachers. Working conditions
including administrative and psychological support and parental involvement were more likely to
motivate better quality instruction.
Lavy (2007) believed, “tying teachers’ pay to their classroom performance should
improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and
retaining the most productive teachers” (p. 87). His study sought to thoroughly explore
performance-based pay and the challenges and difficulties associated with its implementation.
The researcher stated, “In the teaching profession, earnings are based primarily on input (that is,
skills and time worked), rather than on output” (p. 88). Pay systems based on input are based
solely on level of degree (skills) and years of experience (time worked).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 37
Lavy (2007) advocated for a salary structure that was results-oriented (p. 88). He stated,
“Moving to an earnings structure that ties pay—at least partially—to some performance
indicators should thus improve the current [pay] system” (p. 88). Performance-based pay
typically involved some objective assessments of schools’ or teachers’ effect on student
outcomes to determine success. In other words, performance-based pay is a pay structure
denoted by its linkages to measurable performance indicators.
Benefits of Performance-Based Pay
There are many benefits to performance-based pay implementation. As noted in earlier
studies, incentive pay schemes did not damage teacher collaboration in schools and may have
even increased teacher cooperation (Jones, 2013; Wells, 2011; Yuan et al., 2013). This section
of the literature review will examine researched benefits of performance-based pay including the
following subsections: increased group work, increased accountability, and stakeholder benefits.
Increased group work. Wisconsin Center for Education Research (2008) stated:
Group-based rewards recognize the collaborative nature of any school’s
effectiveness and reward teachers for their collective effort. Group-based
systems are generally less costly to administer than their individual-based
counterparts. However, it is hard to screen out effects of the district, prior
schools, parents, and the community. (para. 14)
This suggests that performance-based systems may be beneficial by increasing innovation
among groups of teachers. Professional development programs are important to assist teams of
teachers as they strive to increase their knowledge and skills collaboratively.
Increased accountability. Performance-based programs may lead to an increase in
classroom recordkeeping. This is done to accommodate the differences in teaching methods,
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 38
which may increase compensation benefits. For example, Lavy (2007) noted increased
recordkeeping "requires school principals to monitor closely the quality of their teachers’ work”
(p. 91). The increase in accountability could lead to better quality teaching. Although these
results may be inadvertent, their residual effects provide an appealing influence of performance-
based pay.
Stakeholder benefits. Lavy (2007) discussed several benefits associated with
performance-based pay programs. He first stated, “Rewarding teachers or schools on the basis of
an agreed metric aligns incentives directed at teachers or schools with those directed at students
and potentially the entire society” (p. 90). The researcher indicated that performance-based pay
programs have the potential to motivate teachers and/or schools to intentionally “take into
account the social returns to education when making choices about their work” (p. 90). For
example, if a student were considering dropping out of school, a teacher who was considering
the benefits to society as a whole may work harder to encourage the student to persevere
knowing how much the community benefits from having educated citizens as well as how much
the student could benefit in the future from completing his or her education.
Lavy (2007) further stated, “Individual performance-based pay schemes improve
efficiency by helping correct distortions in a teacher’s effort that might result from gaps between
[his or] her preferences and those of [his or] her students” (p. 90). One example of this could
occur when a teacher avoids giving homework because she does not want so spend additional
time grading papers even though she knows the extra assignment would benefit her students’
learning. Performance-based pay systems offer incentives to teachers for doing what is right.
Lavy (2007) noted that basing performance on pay has the potential to attract and retain
the most productive teachers. He stated:
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 39
Even if teachers are unable to alter their own behavior to enhance performance, as
measured, say, by students' test scores, some people are still inherently better than
others at affecting test scores. Basing pay on output also tends to discourage
teachers who cannot enhance their students' performance from remaining in the
profession. A related point is that output-based pay will create a market for
teaching quality that will help teachers move to schools where their talent is most
highly valued. Equalization between productivity and wages will result, with
poorly performing teachers receiving reduced wages and lower probabilities of
promotion, and more capable teachers commanding better options. (p. 91)
Lavy (2007) suggested that performance-related pay based on individual or school wide
schemes could also improve school productivity by inducing better governance (p. 91). This
benefit implies that principals will be required to more closely monitor the quality of their
teachers’ work as well as provide consistent information, feedback, and guidance (p. 91). Many
critics of traditional education pay systems charge that rewarding teachers for formal
qualifications rather than performance is unfair to exceptional teachers who work harder and
show more effort. Because performance-based pay rewards teachers for how well they meet
expectations rather than rewarding for degrees and years of experience, it may increase support
for public education from politicians and members of the general public (p. 91).
Drawbacks of Performance-Based Pay
While performance-based pay is meant to motivate teachers to achieve at high levels,
there have been some unintentional negative consequences following strategic compensation
implementation. This section of the literature review will examine negative issues that have
resulted from the use of performance-based pay. The following subtopics will be discussed:
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 40
student-to-teacher ratio, measurement problems, teaching to the test, negative effects on
motivation and collegiality, unintended consequences, cost of performance-based pay, union
opposition, and non-monetary motivation.
Student-to-teacher ratio. Some performance-based pay systems consider the student-
to-teacher ratio when assigning compensation awards. However, this is not always considered as
a fair method. For example, those teachers with special needs students may have fewer students,
yet have more taxing jobs due to the extra help that these students need. Therefore, since
“compensation investments too often are based on factors unrelated to student achievement,
states and districts should re-examine compensation structures to better support and drive
effective teaching” (USDOE, 2015a, para. 1).
Measurement problems. Research has suggested, “teachers generally want to be held
accountable and supported by a fair evaluation system” (Homeroom, 2010, para. 3). As a result,
it can be concluded that a fair evaluation process measures the accountability of the teacher.
Therefore, teachers that focus on accountability and measure their success through that of their
students’ achievements may be better served through a fair evaluation process, especially if they
show improvements in students’ progress. The compensation program design may not be
effective. For example, those programs that are based solely on test scores may find themselves
at a disadvantage because the awards are not equitable. There are strong arguments suggesting
that student test scores are not reliable indicators of the efficacy of the teacher.
Lavy (2007) noted that performance measurement poses two separate problems for
performance-based pay: 1) agreeing on goals, and 2) evaluating progress towards goals (p. 91).
The researcher stated, “Agreeing on goals is particularly difficult in education because
competition between public schools is rare” (p. 91). He believed that when parents and students
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 41
were unhappy with the choices and options that their local school gave them, they would choose
to move to other schools in the area. Some residents would choose private schools and others
may choose neighboring school districts. However, this choice is too costly for many and not an
option for struggling families. In relation to evaluating progress towards goals in a fair and
accurate manner, Lavy noted that problems arise because the evaluation systems have been based
on proxies, such as self-reported effort and motivation. This study pointed out that it was
extremely challenging to know what an individual teacher contributes to improving student
outcomes (p. 91).
Student testing is also not necessarily effective for teacher evaluations. The emphasis on
student test scores became exaggerated with the No Child Left Behind Act. As a result, teacher
evaluations are commonly based on these scores. If the student exam is ineffective, then the
teacher evaluation will be ineffective as well. For example, “standardized tests are narrow,
limited indicators of student learning. They leave out a wide range of important knowledge and
skills. Most states assess only the easier-to-measure parts of math and English curricula” (Fair
Test, 2014, para. 1).
According to some opponents, there is immense unfairness in basing “teacher personnel
decisions on student test scores [because] students have different levels of ability and
commitment and different experiences outside the classroom, [suggesting that] no two students
get exactly the same amount of parental support” (Kane & Darling-Hammond, 2012, para. 3). It
has also been argued that the test scores be merely starting points as to the efficiency and
effectiveness of the teacher, suggesting that the link is over-emphasized between teacher
appraisals and student assessments. According to some studies, “the right approach to feedback
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 42
and evaluation is to combine student achievement gains with other measures, such as systematic
classroom observations and student surveys” (Kane & Darling-Hammond, 2012, para. 15).
This same study suggests that “teachers working with a large contingent of new English
learners or special education students scored lower than when they taught more-advantaged
classes of students. Even teachers of gifted classes were penalized, because their students had
already maxed out on the tests,” emphasizing the over-weighting of student assessments on
teacher appraisals (Kane & Darling-Hammond, 2012, para. 21). While gifted students tend to
have high achievement scores, they may be unable to show high growth scores because they
have already scored as advanced in the past. Moving students that are within the top 10% of the
assessment score is extremely challenging. The National Research Council and the Educational
Testing service emphasized this challenge of moving gifted students, concluding
Ratings of teacher effectiveness based on student test scores are too unreliable—
and measure too many things other than the teacher—to be used to make high-
stakes decisions. Test score gains can reflect a student's health, home life, and
attendance; schools' class sizes and curriculum materials; and the influence of
parents, other teachers, and tutors. Because these factors are not weighed,
individual teachers' scores do not accurately reveal their ability to teach.
(Kane & Darling-Hammond, 2012, para. 24)
Teaching to the test. Guisbond et al. (2012) found that evaluations based on test scores
can harm educational quality because the evaluations influence a teacher’s career, which may
intensify “incentives to narrow the curriculum and teach to the test” (p. 2). Thus, less
consideration is provided for teacher collaboration and creativity. As a result, this type of
evaluation does little to stimulate the imagination of either the teacher or student.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 43
Under a performance-based system, teaching methods may change. This is especially
true if the compensation is based on student test scores. An example of unwanted teacher
behavior may be a focus on test taking rather than on the curriculum. This is commonly blamed
on the No Child Left Behind Act (Walker, 2014). Thus, as Walker (2014) points out:
The law is uniformly blamed for stripping curriculum opportunities… imposing a
brutal testing regime that has forced educators to focus their time and energy on
preparing for tests in a narrow range of subjects... For students in low-income
communities, the impact has been devastating (p. 2).
Therefore, in the quest to achieve higher test scores, students are unprepared for
life and higher education opportunities. Because of the focus on test scores, Walker
(2014) continues:
Schools …have been reduced to mere test prep factories, where teachers and
students act out a script written by someone who has never visited their classroom
and where ‘achievement’ means nothing more than scoring well on a bubble test
(p.3)
Many teachers and administrators assert that the No Child Left Behind Act has
“corrupted what it means to teach and what it means to learn … Teachers have to teach in
secret and hope they don’t get into trouble for teaching to the Whole Child instead of
teaching to the test” (Walker, 2014, p. 3).
Lavy (2007) also suggested that basing teacher pay on test scores in certain
subjects might cause the focus of elective courses (viewed as non-core subjects) to
narrow. This may also encourage teaching to the test, which involves honing in on skills
in the classroom that are in direct alignment with the test being used to measure student
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 44
performance and/or growth, as well as teacher performance (p. 92). Linking
compensation to test scores may cause teachers to sacrifice the nurturing of curiosity and
innovative thinking to teaching the skills tested on standardized exams, forfeiting all
other curriculum standards. When preparing for exams, teachers focus on the material
that is likely to be found on the exam, such as reading and math, excluding other
curriculum needs, such as the arts and physical education. This may prohibit students
from learning other necessary core skills that would benefit them as they further their
education or enter the workforce.
Figlio and Kenny (2007) also report an increase in teachers using class time to “teach to
the test,” as did Podgursky and Springer (2007). Lavy (2007) describes teaching to the test as
“[sacrificing] the nurturing of curiosity and creative thinking to teaching the skills tested on
standardized exams” (p. 92). For example, a business manager may need to have creative
thinking skills to motivate employees or entice customers to earn a profit. If courses only focus
on standardized testing, then creative and critical thinking skills are not as emphasized during
class. As a result, students have less time for creativity and the opportunity to develop creative
thinking skills. In some schools, test prep takes place during time that would otherwise have
been spent on physical education or music, extra-curricular subjects that students need in order to
gain a well-balanced education (Wragg et al., 2002).
Negative effects on motivation and collegiality. Lavy’s (2007) findings suggested that
providing financial incentives may demoralize teachers, resulting in decreased effort. When
faced with compensation gains, teachers may experience decreased loyalty to their schools and
students. For example, if another school offers a more beneficial compensation plan, teachers
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 45
may be more likely to leave their current school in favor for the new school with the increased
compensation plan. However, remaining teachers may experience increased resentment.
Lavy (2007) further noted that performance-based pay has the potential to create
unhealthy competition among teachers. He emphasized that performance-based pay has the
potential to undermine collaboration among teachers. He also noted that the evaluation system
associated with performance-based pay has the potential to negatively impact teacher motivation
by questioning their levels of competence (p. 92). Further, he stated, “Evaluation may also
create new hierarchies by giving administrators an additional source of power over teachers and
the curriculum” (p. 92). This additional source of power would mean that principals would
influence teachers’ pay. Whereas in a traditional pay system teachers are rewarded based on
their level of education and years of experience, in a performance-based pay system principals’
evaluations may be the deciding factor in determining whether teachers receive bonus pay.
Unintended consequences. Lavy (2007) discussed the unintended consequences
associated with potentially unethical behavior (p. 92). He stated, “Unintended consequences
may also arise if teachers ‘game play’ and develop responses that generate rewards contradicting
the profession’s spirit. In other words, measuring student output may stimulate teachers to
participate in inappropriate or deviant behavior such as cheating” (p. 92). The research of Jacob
and Levitt (as cited in Lavy, 2007) indicated that cheating occurred frequently after changes in
teacher incentives. They detected cheating in approximately 4% to 5% of the classes within their
research sample (p. 92).
Lavy (2007) suggested that providing financial incentives to improve performance may:
1) demoralize teachers, and thereby promote reduced work effort, and 2) undermine intrinsic
motivation, which is the sense of duty and satisfaction that motivates coming to work (p. 93). He
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 46
also noted that teachers might devote a disproportionate amount of time to “bubble students”—
those students who are most likely to improve their test scores (p. 93). He further stated, “The
highest- and lowest- performing students may consequently be neglected because they do not
promise adequate returns on investments of teachers’ quality time” (p. 93).
Cost of performance-based pay. Lavy (2007) stated, “The risks posed to teachers by
performance-based pay could lead them to demand high compensation, which could in turn raise
the cost of education” (p. 93). Most public school systems have limited sources of tax-based
income and would be unable to provide higher levels of pay for local teachers unless the state or
federal government provided grants. He noted that performance-based pay exposes employees
to earnings variability beyond their control such as changes in pay as a result of a poor testing
year. The teachers cannot control how well the students perform on the assessments. They can
only control how well they teach.
Lavy (2007) further stated, “If teachers, like other workers, are risk averse, inducing them
to accept a risky compensation packages will entail higher average pay overall” p. 93). The
researcher emphasized that implementing performance-based pay is easier in small organizations
than in large organizations, such as public school systems with sizeable teaching staffs. He
found that adequately evaluating each teacher would be costly and require substantial resources,
if conducted routinely.
Lavy (2007) found “improved productivity in the private sector can generate added
income to help mitigate budget problems, but enhancements to productivity in public schools has
no such effect” (p. 94). This means that a business has the potential to grow additional income
because of higher productivity; however, school systems, which are funded through tax dollars,
do not receive additional funds as a direct result of higher productivity. In summary,
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 47
performance-based pay programs have the potential to incur high average costs over the long run
because of multiple variable financial risk factors.
Union opposition. Ramirez (2010) found unions commonly oppose different
compensation packages. In fact, “unions are skeptical about promises of extra bonus money
because they realize that money is in short supply. They know that teachers' salaries function in
an almost zero-sum environment” (p. 57). This opposition may be attributed to understanding
that “awarding bonuses usually means diminishing cost-of-living raises for the entire teaching
corps” (p. 57).
Furthermore Ramirez (2010) noted, “The union understands that many of its good
teachers will lose out” when money for salaries in performance-based pay systems becomes
insufficient (p. 57). When faced with a new pay structure in Denver, the union was able to
negotiate an understanding that it would not take effect until voters passed a $25 million tax
increase to fund the plan (p.57).
Lavy (2007) suggested that teacher unions worldwide strongly oppose performance-
based pay. He stated, “Unions view wage differentiation on the basis of subject taught, as well
as any sort of subjective evaluation of teachers, as threats to their collective bargaining strategies
and therefore reject them [wage differentiation and subjective teacher evaluation] outright” (p.
93). He also noted that union objections appear to reflect the direct opposition voiced by
teachers. He further stated, “Teachers see performance-based pay supported by unfair
evaluation, as a threat to their autonomy” (p. 93).
Non-monetary motivation. Non-monetary motivators can include achievement,
recognition, and responsibility. They are intrinsic and provide long-lasting employee
satisfaction, are less costly, and generate a desire to succeed. Conversely, hygienic factors are
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 48
extrinsic to the job and include security, wages, and working conditions. Herzberg (as cited in
Cummings, 1975) called these "hygienics'' because their application merely "cleans up" the work
environment. Their efforts are temporary, more costly, and lacking in true motivational value (p.
35). Lavy’s (2007) work supported the assumption that teachers are often movtivated intrinsicly.
He explained that teachers frequently had a desire to work with children and see them succeed,
placing value on their success and growth, which led to connections and relationships, an aspect
that performance-based pay may not measure in its evaluation of teacher performance (p. 93).
Lavy (2007) stated, “A frequent criticism of performance-based pay is that teachers, as
professionals relatively immune to motivation by pecuniary rewards, will not respond to
financial incentives” (p. 93). In other words, he is suggesting that teachers are more influenced
by intrinsic factors, such as purpose and a love for students and teaching rather than financial
gain. He suggested that because teachers are not primarily motivated by financial incentives,
monetary rewards have the potential to “inflame resentment toward management [administrators]
and decrease employee loyalty, both of which could reduce productivity” (p. 93). He further
suggested that nonmonetary rewards, such as additional holidays or time off, might serve as
better motivators than financial incentives.
What drove teachers to update and improve were other non-salary factors like their
vacation schedules, parent and principal support, and the availability of professional
development. As Herzberg’s theory suggests (Cummings, 1975), teachers’ job satisfaction may
not be contingent on salary itself, but rather more on achievement and recognition. Herzberg’s
hierarchy of motivators and hygiene factors reveals that factors producing job satisfaction
(motivators) are separate and distinct from the factors that lead to job dissatisfaction (hygienics).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 49
Teacher Perceptions of Strategic Compensation
When teachers are asked to give an opinion on performance-based pay, their responses
are invariably mixed. Growing contingents of teachers feel that pay-for-performance schemes
could be a means of motivating teachers to achieve and to reward their efforts. Others maintain
that such programs only lead to more work, more stress, and less job satisfaction. Several key
issues play into whether or not teachers support performance incentives. This section of the
literature review will examine past research that illustrates the range of teacher perceptions of
performance-based pay. The teacher perceptions of strategic compensation is this section
include perceptions of teachers with different demographic backgrounds, job satisfaction,
competition among teachers, lack of confidence in the compensation system, and reasons for
becoming a teacher.
Perceptions of teachers with different demographic backgrounds. When attempting
to discern teacher perceptions towards merit pay, demographics play a key role. Researchers
have noted several characteristics of teachers that make them more or less likely to support
incentive systems. Teachers who are older, have more years of experience, have more years of
training, and those who started their careers at a higher base salary are all less likely to support
merit pay (Jones, 2013; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). Additionally, teachers who are
young and/or female also respond less favorably to pay-for-performance incentives, possibly due
to fears of unfair recognition (Goldhaber et al., 2011). Conversely, survey results have shown
that Hispanic teachers, male teachers, and teachers employed by lower-SES schools/districts are
more likely to support incentive programs (Goldhaber et al., 2011). One study surveyed four
such high-poverty schools and found that within those schools 70% of teachers agreed with the
notion of more pay for more work and 67% supported elevated salaries for teachers working in
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 50
“hard-to-staff” schools (Wells, 2011). While these statistics specifically refer to teachers in
high-poverty, urban schools, the phenomenon is not completely isolated.
Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski (2002) found that teachers working under a pilot
incentive program in Kentucky reported that their system gave them a clear set of attainable
goals, focus in their curriculum, and accountability for their performance. Similarly, the faculty
of the Ladue School District in suburban St. Louis is glad to be part of one of the longest running
merit pay systems in the United States. In response to a 2001 survey, 79% of Ladue's teachers
responded with a positive remark when asked if the incentive system motivated them to improve
their teaching (Morice & Murray, 2003).
Unfortunately, within the research available, negative teacher perceptions of
performance-based pay are still more prevalent. The largest concern teachers have regards the
means by which their performance will be judged and subsequently rewarded. Many teachers
fear the stud ent achievement data will become the most important factor in their incentive
awards, which is viewed as invalid, unfair, and thus inappropriate (Wells, 2011; Wragg et al.,
2002; Yuan, et al., 2013). One of the reasons teachers feel thus is that circumstances beyond
their control, such as students' home lives, parental support, tardiness and/or truancy, have a
significant impact on student academic achievement. If teachers are judged based on a
culmination of factors that may have nothing to do with their teaching ability, then they fear their
reward will be similarly invalid (Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Yuan et al., 2013). Surveyed teachers
also reported concern over certain teachers receiving additional awards due to their association
or friendship with the administration. In effect, teacher’s worry faculty bootlickers will receive
more than their share of incentives while hard-working, deserving teachers go unnoticed
(Clabaugh, 2009; Marsden & Belfield, 2006).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 51
Job satisfaction. Related to these perceptions, studies have shown that teachers do not
feel any increase in job satisfaction when working under an incentive system (Abd-El-Fattah,
2010). Some of this lack of enthusiasm may have to do with the way the pay-for-performance
can turn teaching into a competition among teachers. According to one study, stress is high and
morale is low for many teachers within the U.S. (Strauss, 2013). In fact, due primarily to these
two factors, “their level of satisfaction has dropped 23 percentage points since 2008 and is at its
lowest in 25 years” (Strauss, 2013, para. 1). This dissatisfaction is further increased due to
modern reforms aimed at increasing student achievement. For example, the Common Core
Standards are believed to increase student achievement by only 17% of teachers (Strauss, 2013).
These teachers assert that “modern school reform — with its emphasis on getting rid of bad
teachers, assessing teachers by student standardized test scores, and rewriting tenure and
collective bargaining laws - essentially demonizes them,” which decreases morale even further
(Strauss, 2013, para. 3). Part of this is due to stress. According to reports, 51% of teachers
report feeling under great stress several days a week, an increase of 15% over 36% of teachers
reporting that level in 1985 (Strauss, 2013).
The increasing rate of job dissatisfaction among teachers is alarming for a myriad of
reasons. For example, “teachers are arguably the most important group of professionals for our
nation’s future” (Bishay, 1998, p. 149). Therefore, an increase in dissatisfaction suggests that
they may not be as effective at their jobs.
Bishay (1998) utilized a 1985 study conducted by Sylvia and Hutchinson that concluded
teachers were motivated through autonomy. The freedom to create and explore new ideas of
teaching, coupled with intrinsic motivational elements, were much more productive than merit
pay. Bishay’s (1998) findings were similar concerning overall teacher motivation and job
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 52
satisfaction. He stated, “Based upon the findings, it appears that gratification of higher-order
needs is most important for job satisfaction” (p. 147).
Competition among teachers. Goldhaber et al. (2011) found that some teachers feel
uncomfortable trying to better themselves to receive compensation that may not be awarded to
their peers. The idea of incentive pay is contrary to the traditionally egalitarian nature of
teaching, in which colleagues cooperate and collaborate to work toward the same goals.
According to research, “winning means diminishing the opponent's chances of getting any
rewards” (Nichols & Sullivan, 2009, para. 7). However, Royal Economic Society (2013) wrote:
The performance of teachers in this competitive environment was no different for
men and women; nor did women’s performance vary with the gender mix of the
teaching staff … Women teachers improved their performance in the competitive
environment relative to the non-competitive one. However, women were also
more pessimistic about the effectiveness of performance pay for teachers and
more realistic than men about their likelihood of winning bonuses. (para. 2)
Therefore, experimentation is needed regarding “incentives and competition in
educational systems to improve performance” (Royal Economic Society, 2013, para. 3). These
types of incentives may only be beneficial in the short-run. It has been suggested “in the longer
term, a performance pay scheme may have an effect on the composition of teaching staff.
Women may be more likely to leave the teaching profession under such schemes” (Royal
Economic Society, 2013, para. 3). As a result, overall, collaboration among teachers has
decreased due to performance-based systems.
Lack of confidence in the compensation system. An additional negative perception
was observed in teacher attitude surveys; namely, a skepticism of the longevity of the incentive
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 53
program and a feeling that such systems are used solely to extract more work from teachers.
Several researchers found that while teachers enjoyed the bonuses they received in one year, they
did not feel confident those funds would still be available to them in the next. Teachers felt that
budget cuts and incentive quotas lessened the chance of their being awarded bonuses on a regular
basis (Kelley et al., 2002; Marsden & Belfield, 2006; Yuan et al., 2013). Such lack of
confidence in the system can translate into a lack of teacher buy-in, rendering the program
ineffectual. One author even found teachers who went so far as to believe that incentive pay
schemes were just a way for districts to get more work out of teachers for less money (Marsden
& Belfield, 2006).
Reasons for becoming a teacher. Few prospective teachers cite performance-based pay
as a reason they would consider entering the teaching profession (Kyriacou & Coulthard, 2000).
There are many other reasons to become a teacher. Commonly, teachers focus on encouraging
the dreams of their students. As a result, teachers help these students make lasting impressions
on the world and humanity in general. Furthermore, teachers commonly feel a sense of purpose
through teaching. This feeling is related to the impartation of knowledge. In fact, it is found
through research that teachers have opportunities to “build a student's self-concept, help shape a
dream, provide redirection, and impart knowledge and wisdom” (Fried, 2013, p. 4). Teachers
typically find utilizing innovative solutions to assist students is very rewarding.
Changes in Teacher Behaviors
Under the traditional school pay scheme, teachers' compensation increases at largely the
same rate based on the level of education and years of experience in the field. This places all
instructors on the same ladder of progression. However, under an incentive pay scheme teachers
may earn more or less based on their performance. Because of the potential for earning
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 54
additional pay, teachers who serve under strategic compensation plans may change certain
teaching behaviors. Both positive and negative changes in teacher behaviors have been reported
following participation in performance-based pay systems. This section of the literature review
will examine how teacher behaviors can change because of participation in performance-based
pay programs. The teacher behaviors that will be examined include changes in teaching
methods, dishonest data reporting, disagreeable behaviors, decrease of participation in school
activities, and teacher absences.
Changes in teaching methods. In performance-based pay systems, many teachers may
also experience increased stress and pressure to perform. According to Wisconsin Center for
Education Research (2008), this may be because “whatever the means of assessment, the focus
of performance-based compensation is always on the teacher, not the students. This assumes
that, as teacher performance changes, student learning will increase” (p.2). Quality teaching may
be sacrificed as teachers feel greater pressure to perform. In outcome-based compensation
systems, student outcomes are at the forefront, rather than focusing solely on rewarding teacher
behaviors.
Teacher compensation systems that focus on student outcomes emphasize results,
rather than teacher behavior. A focus on student outcomes allows teachers to use
their professional expertise to decide the best way to reach particular students.
Another advantage is that outcome-based systems encourage teachers to seek
assistance in weak areas: Teachers can openly discuss their shortcomings and
work with colleagues and administrators on improving, since doing so will make
receiving incentive pay more likely. (Wisconsin Center for Education Research,
2008, p. 2)
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 55
Dishonest data reporting. Not only does an emphasis on test scores lead to an
imbalance of school time, but in some schools, it can also result in dishonest data
reporting. Podgursky and Springer (2007) found that schools may cheat or bend the rules
when it comes to test scores by incorrectly classifying students as special needs or
English language learners, disciplining low-performing students to ensure they are absent
on test days, or misreporting test data. Lavy (2007) cites evidence of cheating as an
unintended consequence of performance-based pay from Chicago public schools in 1996;
researchers found that cheating became more prevalent in low-achieving classrooms,
suggesting that the more prominent testing became among students, the greater their
desire to perform well (pp. 92-93). It is unknown whether teachers allowed such
cheating.
One of the most common reasons for teachers to alter test scores is increasing pressure to
perform. For example, Gabriel (2010) reported “educators had distributed a detailed study guide
after stealing a look at the state science test by ‘tubing’ it — squeezing a test booklet…to form
an open tube so that questions inside could be seen and used in the guide” (para. 3). It has been
found by experts that “the phenomenon is increasing as the stakes over standardized testing
ratchet higher — including, most recently, taking student progress on tests into consideration in
teachers’ performance reviews” (Gabriel, 2010, para. 4).
According to Miller (2010), “paying employees to perform better can enhance their
productivity but can also entice them to cheat” (para. 1). Although other types of businesses may
lose revenue, schools may lose funding due to altered test scores. Miller found that the closer
teachers are to earning the performance-based compensation, the more likely they may be to
cheat.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 56
Disagreeable behaviors. There are also disagreeable teacher behaviors that fall into
residual, unintended results. Unfortunately, the literature shows a higher number of negative
behaviors resulting from the implementation of performance pay in schools. For example, both
Figlio and Kenny (2007) and Goodman and Turner (2013) found that while working under a
group incentive system, some teachers engaged in free-riding, and/or felt a lack of responsibility
for the schools' award status, and therefore, made no improvements to their teaching. Such
teachers contribute nothing to earning an incentive but may still receive one as the result of their
peers' efforts.
Further research shows a wider lack of improvement to teaching practices under such
systems. Indeed, teachers working under group incentives did not increase their use of group
activities, project or essay assignments, tutoring, or homework (Goodman & Turner, 2013;
Terpstra & Honoree, 2008; Wragg et al., 2002).
Decrease of participation in school activities and teacher absences. According to
several studies, the additional stress and pressure teachers feel while working under
performance-pay systems may result in a decrease of participation in additional school activities.
The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for Education
Statistics showed teachers being less likely and less willing to serve in unpaid leadership
positions, such as department chair, while earning incentive pay (Jones, 2013). Other teachers
may go even further and neglect some of their teaching duties to focus solely on those behaviors
that are rewarded with incentives (Wragg et al., 2002).
Even without taking on extra duties or even dropping some of their previous tasks,
teachers surveyed by Kelley et al. (2002) reported higher levels of stress and worked more hours
following the implementation of a pay-for-performance scheme. Some miscellaneous and
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 57
neutral shifts in teacher behaviors were also found when performance-paying schools were
surveyed. Teacher absences, which have been found to have significant impacts on student
learning, did not decrease with the implementation of performance-based pay (Glewwe, Ilias, &
Kremer, 2003; Goodman & Turner, 2013).
Recruitment, Retention, and Compensation
Covey (2009) focused her research on recruitment, retention, and compensation for
effective teachers. The primary purpose of the study was to identify the perceptions that
Arkansas teachers hold about performance-based pay structures and teacher evaluation systems.
The Teacher Evaluation Profile (TEP), Performance Pay Survey (PPS), and Teacher Survey on
Performance Pay (TSPP) were used to gather qualitative data from participants. Teacher
selection for participation in the study was limited to public educators and the willingness of the
administrators selected to send the survey to their staff. Although Arkansas had approximately
245 public school districts with 34,000 certified teachers, only 502 certified teachers who had at
least one-year experience in the Arkansas public school system participated in the study.
Covey’s (2009) survey responses used a 5-point Likert scale measuring the perceptions
and attitudes of teachers toward the teacher evaluation process currently being used at their
school. The survey intended to capture perceptions of preference for one type of performance-
based pay over another, preference for a performance-based pay system over the traditional steps
and lanes salary schedule, and teachers’ views on performance-based pay and their school
environment.
Covey (2009) found the majority of the teachers who responded to questions related to
years of experience had been teaching for 16 or more years; however, 76 participants did not
answer the question at all, resulting in an inconclusive average. The average participant was an
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 58
elementary school teacher. After conducting a Wilcoxon test, results showed participants
preferred pay for knowledge and skills as opposed to paying for individual performance. Pay for
knowledge and expertise were also preferred over pay for team performance (preferring no
performance-based pay over team performance-based pay). Overall, teacher preference for no
performance-based pay system compared to pay for individual performance was not statistically
different. Data collected also suggests the longevity of teaching experience within the district
makes teachers uncomfortable with the new cutting-edge curriculum. They were not interested
in changing their pay structure due to security, and they did not want to be rewarded or penalized
individually. Those involved noted the importance of the aura of the school environment.
Responses were consistently positive to teacher evaluation when bonus payouts were tied to
exemplary individual performance as determined by parents, administrators, colleagues, and self.
Covey (2009) concluded that state education policy makers should investigate
performance-based pay options, taking into consideration funding sustainability and program
development, and look for ways to implement new forms of teacher pay. However, she did not
give any conclusive data other than teacher questionnaire responses. For additional studies
conducted, she suggested distinguishing between urban and rural responses, applying the same
research design in other states, and setting up a pilot district.
According to Goldhaber et al. (2011), hiring new enthusiastic teachers to maintain and
improve the teacher workforce is a crucial role of administrators. Without replacements for the
aging teacher population, schools would lack the necessary manpower to operate. Young
teachers are one of the teaching demographics most sensitive to salary inequities and as such
may be prone to higher rates of attrition. Pay-for-performance systems have in some cases been
shown to be less popular with novice teachers—particularly female novices—but studies have
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 59
found that incentive pay programs account for fewer recruitment and retention issues than
previously thought. Wragg et al. (2002) found when novice teachers encounter schools or
districts utilizing a variation of performance-based pay, some problems may arise. Under a
“threshold” award system, new teachers may be ineligible to apply for pay raises and may feel
disheartened by their comparably lower pay.
Once installed in a position where their salary is directly affected by their achievements,
new teachers may also feel short-changed (as it were) if their system is poorly designed and/or
improperly carried out (Terpstra & Honoree, 2008). In the worst-case scenarios, the failure of
their school to recognize and award their efforts can cause teachers to feel bitter and mistreated,
resulting in their leaving the school (Wragg et al., 2002).
Wells (2011) reported this phenomenon in his study regarding teacher responses to pay-
for-performance policies. According to Wells, 24% of teachers surveyed admitted to thinking
about changing schools or districts more often after the implementation of a performance-based
pay system than they did before.
Other studies have reported contrary results, however. Lavy (2007) argues that
performance-based pay plays a vital role in attracting and maintaining the most productive
teachers. He also shares that a performance-based pay model will assist in measuring (or more
attentiveness to) productivity. This system, he says, can garner support for the marketability of
teachers, creating a push for teachers to be recruited for their abilities and placing them in
schools where they would be most highly valued (p. 90-91). Creating such a market for teachers
may result in positive outcomes for all parties. These markets have the potential to drive morale
while allowing schools to identify their needs in the job market. They also allow schools to seek
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 60
novice teachers qualified to match the ambition of their schools early on, creating a system that
would initiate teachers to excel in their profession.
When teachers seek the rewards of performance-based pay early on in their careers, it
allows districts to deter attrition and appeal in the forefront of the job market for teachers.
Lavy’s (2007) study shows that “if teachers are able to improve their classroom performance,
linking compensation to performance will provide all teachers incentives to improve through
professional development, which will, therefore, induce still further productivity gains” (p. 91).
Professional development opportunities can also add to the market value of teaching jobs, and
paired with performance-based pay, they offer another positive mark for attraction and retention
of teachers.
Goodman and Turner (2013) found that group-based incentive programs did not result in
higher teacher turnover rates. Jones (2013) reported a significant decrease in teachers' agreement
with the statement “I definitely plan to leave as soon as I can” following the implementation of a
performance incentive system (p. 159). To ensure all teachers feel a sentiment of remaining in
their current position, novice and veteran alike, schools can offer higher starting wages. This
practice leads to a higher likelihood of attracting better quality applicants (Wragg et al., 2002).
Once hired, novice teachers may feel overwhelmed and fall short of administrator expectations.
Under a performance-based system, these struggling teachers can get the professional
development and support they need to be successful, which decreases the likelihood of them
leaving their position (Caillier, 2010).
Teacher perception of the benefits of merit pay, especially as it concerns recruitment and
retention, is mixed. Much depends on the particular system of reward and the manner in which it
is carried out. Novice teachers are especially sensitive to issues of equity and may be
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 61
disenchanted with programs that do not benefit them from the beginning. However, in a
comparable number of studies teachers reported positive views of performance-based pay. In
many cases, incentive systems were not cause for attrition, as demonstrated by Jones (2013),
who found that of the teachers who left their positions during the course of his study, only 6%
listed performance-based pay as a major reason for their decision.
Chapter Summary
This review of research discussed past studies of strategic compensation programs.
While there is growing interest in performance-based pay programs in education, Goldhaber et
al. (2011) recognized that there has not been significantly researched evidenced of the effects of
differentiated monetary incentives for teachers. Performance-based pay offers teachers the
opportunity not only to earn greater income, but also to be viewed more professionally in
society. Lavy (2007) noted that when teacher pay was based solely on years of experience and
level of education, there was criticism from stakeholders because there were no incentives for
performance or doing well. Differentiation of pay allows those teachers who perform at high
levels to be rewarded based on outcomes.
Although performance-based pay offers benefits, there were concerns about
implementation based on past research. Those concerns stem from determining how
performance is measured as well as some unintended consequences of past implementation.
Teachers perceive strategic compensation through many lenses. Perceptions vary widely and
depend on many factors. In districts that have implemented performance pay, teachers’
classroom behaviors have changed. Not all of the changes in teacher behaviors were viewed as
positive. Finally, hiring and retention practices of school districts using performance-based pay
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 62
were examined. Because performance-based pay has not been widely implemented, it is difficult
to assess the affects it has had on recruitment and retention of quality educators.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 63
Methodology
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the teachers’ perceptions of the strategic
compensation model and its influence on teachers in the Rural Southeast School District. More
specifically, the study: 1) investigated the perceptions of faculty members concerning the
strategic compensation plan, 2) identified perceived changes in teacher behaviors as a result of
the strategic compensation plan, 3) evaluated changes in teachers’ TEAM level of effectiveness
scores over three years, and 4) examined whether the teachers’ perceptions of the strategic
compensation plan impacted decisions to continue employment in the district.
Research Questions
The researchers sought to answer the following questions through this mixed methods
research study:
1) What are the teachers’ perceptions on strategic compensation in the Rural Southeast
School District?
2) What teacher behaviors have been affected as a result of the strategic compensation
plan in the Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
3) How has strategic compensation affected teacher recruitment and/or retention in the
Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
Research Design
Research phases. This was a mixed methods qualitative-dominant study with a focus on
perceptions of teachers within the Rural Southeast School District. It was conducted in four
sequential phases:
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 64
Phase 1 – A questionnaire was used to collect information on the perceptions of the
current and former teachers of the district (Appendix B). The questions focused on their
experiences within the district and how their experiences with the strategic compensation
plan related to their perceived and actual effectiveness.
Phase 2 – Focus group discussions were conducted with volunteer strategic
compensation plan participants and non-participants. The researchers assigned a number
to every teacher and then used a number generator to randomly select a mix of current
elementary, middle, and high school level teachers to be a part of the focus group.
Phase 3 – Interviews were conducted at a pre-set time with volunteer teachers willing to
give greater insight into their perceptions of the strategic compensation model. The
researchers assigned a number to every participant and non-participant teacher volunteer
and then used a number generator to select three teachers from each of the three schools.
This phase was used as an opportunity to gain further insight into the effectiveness of the
strategic compensation plan for the Rural Southeast School District.
Phase 4 – Quantitative data related to teachers’ TEAM scores was obtained from the
district. The researchers used this data to perform independent t-tests in order to
determine if significant differences existed in the TEAM scores of teachers who
participated in the strategic compensation plan versus those who did not participate.
Qualitative design. To gather the data needed to address the research questions,
researchers of this study took a phenomenological approach, attempting to explain the district
strategic compensation plan’s effectiveness through the eyes of the teacher. In his explanation of
phenomenology, Groenewald (2004) stated:
To arrive at certainty, anything outside immediate experience must be ignored,
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 65
and in this way the external world is reduced to the contents of personal
consciousness. Realities are thus treated as pure ‘phenomena’ and the only
absolute data from where to begin. (p. 4)
In relation to phenomenological research, Groenewald (2004) noted “the aim of the
researcher is to describe as accurately as possible the phenomenon, refraining from any pre-given
framework, but remaining true to the facts” (p. 5). Welman and Kruger (as cited in Groenewald,
2004) further noted “phenomenologists are concerned with understanding social and
psychological phenomena from the perspectives of people involved” (p. 5). The use of the
surveys, individual interviews, and focus group interviews served as the primary basis for
collecting qualitative data.
Quantitative design. The researchers analyzed the quantitative data using independent t-
tests. A t-test is used when comparing two independent samples or populations.
In relation to this study, the two independent populations were teachers who participated
in the strategic compensation plan and teachers who did not participate in the strategic
compensation plan. The researchers used JMP Pro 11, a statistical analysis computer software,
to perform the independent t-tests and obtain the related p-values that would determine if there
were significant differences in the means of: 1) the change in TEAM level of effectiveness
scores of teachers who participated in the strategic compensation plan, and 2) the TEAM level of
effectiveness level of effectiveness scores of teachers who did not participate in the strategic
compensation plan.
Populations
Target teacher population. The population invited to participate in this study consisted
of 92 current and 17 former teachers of the Rural Southeast School District, all of whom were
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 66
employed during the 2013-2014 school year. The total teacher population was 109. The
teachers were identified through the selected district’s human resources department. The
demographic data were utilized for indicating the participants’ gender, number of years teaching
experience, licensure status, grade level taught, tenure standing, and employment compensation
plan.
Everyone included in this study was a current or former employee of the district. These
participants had experience with the strategic compensation model used in the district. Because
of their experience, they were better able to provide information about their perceptions of
changes in their classroom behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation model. They were
also able to explain the impact that the strategic compensation model had on whether they chose
to remain employed by the district. The teachers’ perceptions were useful in making
generalizations that could be applied to other public school districts in Tennessee as well as other
locations.
Demographics of Teacher Participants
Gender. Fifty-nine of the 92 current teachers participated in this research study. As
shown in Table 8, 42 of these 59 teacher participants were female and 17 were male. The
researchers feel that this sample of teachers provided a reasonable representation of the faculty
population based on percentage.
Table 8
Gender of Participants
Gender Frequency Percentage
Female 42 71.2
Male 17 28.8
Total 59 100.0
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 67
Experience. The teachers participating in the study represented a broad range of
experience in education, with representation from first-year teachers through career veterans.
The ranges of teaching experience were grouped in three to four-year intervals (0-3, 4-7, 8-10,
11-15, 16-20, 20 or more). The four-year intervals made six groupings of teachers with a
balanced distribution. The first two groups consisted of nine new or apprentice teachers and 12
tenured young career teachers, respectively. The second two groups consisted of 10 teachers in
their eighth to 10th year and 13 in their 11th to 15th year, respectively. The last two groups
made up the veteran teachers consisting of eight in the 16th to 20th-year group and seven with
more than 20 years of experience, respectively. Table 9 provides a summary of the years-of-
experience represented in the study.
Table 9
Years of Experience of Participants
Experience Frequency Percentage
0 – 3 years 9 15.3
4 – 7 years 12 20.3
8 – 10 years 10 16.9
11 – 15 years 13 22.0
16 – 20 years 8 13.6
20 or more years 7 11.9
Total 59 100.0
Licensure. There are two basic license types for Tennessee teachers, apprentice (initial)
and professional (advanced). Apprentice teachers are those who have just completed their
teacher education training and are in their first three years of teaching in Tennessee. The
certification is a fully vested licensure and is valid for five years as a traditional clear and
renewable certificate. To gain a professional license, teachers must complete five steps. First,
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 68
they must be recommended by the employing school district. Second, a TEAM trained
administrator must evaluate them. Third, they must hold a valid apprentice license. Fourth, they
must have taught for a minimum of 25 months. Fifth, their current assignment must match their
apprentice level license (TNDE, 2011d).
Twelve of the 59 teachers participating in the study were considered apprentice-licensure.
The remaining 47 teachers were already classified as Professional Educators, meaning they had
already completed their initial years of teaching and evaluation. The primary difference between
an apprentice and professional educator is years of total classroom experience. Table 10 showed
the breakdown of participating faculty based on their status as apprentice or professional-
licensure educators.
Table 10
Licensure Level of Participants
Licensure Frequency Percentage
Apprentice 12 20.3
Professional 47 79.7
Total 59 100.0
Grade level taught. Teacher participants represented all grade levels from kindergarten
through twelfth grade. Twenty-one teachers taught early elementary education (PK-4), 18
teachers taught intermediate grades (5-8), and 20 teachers taught secondary grades (9-12). Table
11 provided the breakdown of teachers at each grade level.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 69
Table 11
Grade Level Taught by Participants
Grade Level Frequency Percentage
K – 4 21 35.6
5 – 8 18 30.5
9 – 12 20 33.9
Total 59 100.0
Tenure status. In 2011, the state of Tennessee enacted a new tenure law changing the
tenure term from a three-year period to a five-year period, in which teachers are probationary
employees. Teachers may gain tenure after five consecutive academic years of employment,
during which they are on probation. For tenure to apply, a teacher must score a 4 or 5 on his/ her
district’s summative evaluation and be recommended by the district. This system measures
teachers in their planning, teaching, classroom environment and student achievement. The Rural
Southeast School District utilized the TEAM summative evaluation model when granting teacher
tenure. The new tenure law also added that tenured teachers could lose that status if they score
Level 1 or Level 2, deemed below expectations, for two consecutive years (TNDE, 2011d;
Wesson, 2012). Table 12 highlighted tenured and non-tenured teachers who participated in this
study. Of the teachers who elected participation in this study, two-thirds (n=39) held
classifications as tenured teachers and the remaining one-third (n=20) were non-tenured. Tenure
provides teachers with additional protection within a district, providing continued employment to
those whole hold it, so long as they continue to act appropriately within their scope of duties
(Cheshier, 2014).
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 70
Table 12
Tenure Status of Participants
Tenure Frequency Percentage
Non – Tenured 20 33.9
Tenured 39 66.1
Total 59 100.0
Evaluation. In Tennessee, teachers are evaluated on student achievement, planning,
teaching, and their classroom environment. Under TEAM, the administration must evaluate each
teacher for at least one hour during the year. Evaluation scores consist of numbers from 1 to 5,
with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest score. The grouped numbers (1-2, 3, and 4-5)
represent three patterns for communicating the teacher’s appraisal. Teachers scoring a 1 or 2 do
not meet expectations for those areas. Teachers scoring a 3 are meeting expectations. Teachers
that score 4 or 5 are above expectations in any given area (TNDE, 2011c). Of the teachers
participating in the study, half were not considered “leveled” teachers, meaning their evaluations
were Level 3 or below. Of the remaining half, 16 were Level 4 and 14 were Level 5,
representing teachers who are going above and beyond expectations in their classrooms in one or
more of those four areas with consistency. Table 13 provided the breakdown of the number of
teachers who did not meet or just met expectations and those exceeding expectations.
Table 13
Evaluation Level Scores of Participants
TEAM Score Frequency Percentage
Level 3 or Below 29 49.2
Level 4 16 27.1
Level 5 14 23.7
Total 59 100.0
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 71
Strategic compensation participation. Participants in this study either participated or
did not participate in the strategic compensation plan. Those teachers who were employed prior
to the implementation of the program were given the option either to participate or not to
participate. Those teachers hired after the plan’s implementation was not given a choice; they
were required to participate in the strategic compensation plan.
Fourteen of the 59 teacher participants indicated that they were not participating in the
strategic compensation plan. Forty-four of the 59 teacher participants were participating in the
program, and one failed to respond to the question related to participating in the strategic
compensation plan. Overall, three-fourths of teachers surveyed (74.6%) either had elected to
participate or were hired into the strategic compensation plan. Table 14 demonstrates the
breakdown of involvement in the strategic compensation plan.
Table 14
Strategic Compensation Participation of Participants
Participation Frequency Percentage
Non – participating 14 23.7
Participating 44 74.6
Did not answer 1 1.7
Total 59 100.0
Interview and Focus Group Participants
There were a total of 13 different employees interviewed. Twelve were teachers, and one
was an administrator. Four participated in the focus group only, nine participated in individual
interviews, and three of the nine participated in both. Overall, interviews included: four
elementary teachers, four middle school teachers, four high school teachers, and one
administrator. The participants’ teaching experience ranged from one year to 22 years.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 72
Description of Research Instrumentation
Equity theory. During the data analysis process, principles from equity theory were
used to organize and evaluate the qualitative data related to questionnaire responses, focus group
responses, and interview feedback of both current and former teachers. The theory was utilized
to understand the motivational benefits of a performance-based pay system in the elementary,
middle, and high schools. Determining teachers' perceptions of the strategic compensation plan,
specifically during the data interpretation phase, and the results of the data are paramount for
understanding the context of the participants’ satisfaction. Equity theory (Huseman et al., 1987)
proposed that, as a result of the distress of over-reward or under-reward, inequitably rewarded
individuals should experience lower levels of job satisfaction than equitably-rewarded
individuals (p. 228).
Motivation theory. Frederick Herzberg (1968) noted human beings are goal-oriented
and impacted by motivation. There were two distinct fields within the theory; process
motivational theories, such as Equity Theory mentioned above, which considered how people are
motivated, and content motivational theories, such as Incentive Theory, that focused on which
things impact motivation. A combination of both process and content motivational theory was
utilized to best examine perceptions of a strategic teaching plan in the Rural Southeast School
District. The desire to understand what events or incentives impact human motivation or goals
are an important part of understanding and impacting productivity in any setting. Since
individuals who are motivated tend to be more engaged than others, it is the task of the
motivational theorist to determine what and how intrinsic and extrinsic factors impact motivation
and use that information to improve practice.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 73
Questionnaire. The research instrument of choice used within this study was a
questionnaire made up of 50 questions (Appendix B). The questionnaire was used as the main
data-gathering instrument for this study to determine the perceptions associated with the strategic
compensation model. Upon receiving permission to conduct this research, teachers were
contacted to participate in a questionnaire that assessed perceptions related to the strategic
compensation plan. The researchers informed the consenting teachers of their rights and the
purpose of the research project. The questionnaire was designed to obtain: 1) teaching
demographics including years of experience, class level, tenure, grade level, and status of
certification; 2) thoughts on the perception of the strategic compensation plan’s positive and
negative aspects; 3) perceptions and attitudes related to changes in workload; and 4) other
insights and opinions as assessed by the questionnaire’s open-ended questions.
Description of sections. The questionnaire is divided into three sections designed to
gather as much information as possible about the respondents and their perceptions of the
strategic compensation plan. Interviews were conducted and the interview questions
(Appendices C and D) were developed based on the original questionnaire. The interview
questions were designed to facilitate broader response from the participants based on the
theoretical frameworks of motivational theory and equity theory. The first section of the survey
was used to gather the demographic characteristics of the respondents who were participating in
the study.
The second section of the survey assessed teacher perceptions regarding teacher
behaviors, recruitment, and retention. Within this section, teachers were given a Likert scale
response for each statement, and participants either: indicated their level of agreement or
disagreement with the statement, or rated the degree of implementation associated with each
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 74
statement. These statements assisted in identifying the perceived advantages and disadvantages
of their affiliation or non-affiliation with the strategic compensation model.
The third section of the survey included six open-ended questions. These questions were
designed to allow the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of teacher perceptions, as well as
to allow participants the opportunity to volunteer any additional information that they deemed
important. The questions and Likert scale statements from all three sections were designed to
reveal: A) teachers’ opinions and suggestions regarding the implementation of the strategic
compensation plan; B) the teacher behaviors associated with the strategic compensation plan;
and C) the aspects of the strategic compensation plan that are not favored by teachers in general.
The questions from the survey, the Likert scale statements, as well as the six open-ended
questions, were entered into REDCap (Harris et al., 2009).
Linking the questionnaire to the research questions. Table 15 shows the correlation
of the questionnaire (Appendix B) to Research Question 1.
Table 15
Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 1
Research Question 1 Correlated Likert Statements
What are the teachers’ perceptions on strategic
compensation in the Rural Southeast School
District?
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q9,
Q10, Q11, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q18, Q19,
Q20, Q21, Q22, Q23, Q24, Q25, Q35,
Q36, Q37, Q38, Q39, Q41
Table 16 shows the correlation of the questionnaire (Appendix B) to Research Question 2.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 75
Table 16
Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 2
Research Question 2 Correlated Likert Statements
What teacher behaviors have been affected as a
result of the strategic compensation plan in the
Rural Southeast School District according to
teachers’ perceptions?
Q12, Q13, Q14, Q26, Q27, Q28, Q29,
Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33, Q34
Q36, Q40
Table 17 shows the correlation of the questionnaire (Appendix B) to Research Question 3.
Table 17
Correlation of the Questionnaire and Research Question 3
Research Question 3 Correlated Likert Statements
How has strategic compensation impacted teacher
recruitment and/or retention in the Rural Southeast
School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q9,
Q10, Q11, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q18, Q20,
Q21, Q22, Q23, Q25, Q37, Q38
Pilot study. Following IRB approval, a pilot study was conducted on a sample of
teachers in a school district with demographics and academic characteristics similar to in the
Rural Southeast School District. The district’s superintendent approved the pilot study before
pilot study participants received questionnaires from the research team. The pilot school
district’s individual school principals selected teacher participants within their school for the
study. The pilot study was conducted utilizing the same research design that was planned for the
formal study. In addition, a scenario (Appendix H) was used to explain the background story of
TCS characteristics and the issues under study without divulging the actual location, employees,
and students.
The purpose of the pilot study was to determine if participants had problems with
interpreting questions, the wording in the questionnaire, or misunderstandings of questions and
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 76
statements often found in online survey items. Additionally, the researchers sought pilot study
participants’ feedback regarding their knowledge and understanding of strategic compensation
plans. The feedback and comments about the online survey design and strategic compensation
were collected, and the pilot study was completed within one week. There were no problems
associated with interpretation, wording, or misunderstanding of questions and/or statements. The
pilot study participants showed sufficient knowledge and understanding to express meaningful
opinions about strategic compensation plans.
Variables in the Study
Qualitative variables. For the purpose of this study, the qualitative dependent variables
are the perceptions of participating and non-participating district faculty members. The
qualitative independent variables included each faculty member’s professional rank, gender, age,
educational level, traditional payment plan, and non-traditional payment plan. In determining
the answers to the research questions, the researchers took a phenomenological approach,
attempting to explain the effectiveness of the Rural Southeast School District’s strategic
compensation plan through the eyes of the teacher.
Quantitative variables. The following quantitative variables served as nominal
variables within this study: TID, ST, and PP. Variable TID identified the code name associated
with each teacher participant. Variable ST identified whether a teacher participant worked within
an elementary school (ES), middle school (MS), or high school (HS) setting. Variable PP
identified if a teacher participant participated in the district’s strategic compensation plan.
The following quantitative variables served as continuous variables within this study:
TS12, TS13, TS14, CS1, CS2, and CS3. Variable TS12 represented teacher participants’ TEAM
level of effectiveness scores from the 2011-2012 academic year. Variable TS13 represented
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 77
teacher participants’ TEAM level of effectiveness scores from the 2012-2013 academic year.
Variable TS14 represented teacher participants’ TEAM level of effectiveness scores from the
2013-2014 academic year. Variable CS1 represented the change in each teacher participant’s
TEAM level of effectiveness score from 2011-2012 to 2012-2013. Variable CS2 represented the
change in each teacher participant’s TEAM level of effectiveness score from 2012-2013 to 2013-
2014. Variable CS3 represented the change in each teacher participant’s TEAM level of
effectiveness score from 2011-2012 to 2013-2014.
Procedures for Data Collection
The researchers followed these procedures for data collection:
1. Prior to data collection, the researchers submitted the research proposal to the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Lipscomb University. Data collection did not begin
until IRB approval was received.
2. Following approval from the Lipscomb University IRB, the teachers at the participating
schools received an email invitation from the research team provided by the school
district requesting that they participate in the study and complete a questionnaire. The
email included a brief explanation of the purpose of the questionnaire, data utilized, and
how the results of the study could improve future endeavors for strategic compensation
plans. The consent statement was placed at the very beginning of the questionnaire.
Teachers were informed that participation in the survey was completely voluntary and
responses were completely anonymous. To gain maximum participation, the
questionnaire was delivered during times that were less busy according to the school
calendar. The participants were given two weeks to complete the questionnaire. Within
one week after the first notification for participation was sent, all participants received a
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 78
follow-up email as a reminder for those who may not have completed the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was sent via e-mail to all current employees of the Rural Southeast
School District. The employees that had left the district but were employed during the
2012-13 or 2013-14 school years received their questionnaire links and explanation of the
study through postal mail. As the participants responded to the questionnaire, the
research team collected data for analysis.
3. The research team conducted a focus group in which open-ended questions derived from
the questionnaire were designed to prompt participants to share their stories. The
researchers specifically sought data in regards to teacher motivation, the compensation
plans’ strengths and weaknesses, defined areas of the compensation structure, and
projected future outcomes. The designed open- and closed-ended questions were used
for participants to share their perceptions of the strategic compensation model.
Participants for the interviews and focus groups were gathered by sending an email to all
previous questionnaire recipients asking for volunteers. The interviews and focus groups
were recorded using various electronic recording devices.
4. Following facilitation of interviews and focus groups, the researchers transcribed all of
the resulting qualitative data. Furthermore, all teacher interviews and focus groups were
transcribed using Microsoft Word.
5. The researchers obtained de-identified data from the Rural Southeast School District.
The school district provided the researchers with the following information related to 95
of the district’s teachers: the type of school where the teacher worked (elementary,
middle, or high); whether or not the teacher participated in the strategic compensation
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 79
plan; and TEAM level of effectiveness scores for the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-
2014 academic years.
Data Analysis
The researchers followed these procedures for data analysis:
1. Qualitative data derived from the questionnaire were coded and categorized to construct
themes. This initial analysis was done four times, and the results were shared with the
research team. This initial round of coding and categorizing was further analyzed and
discussed by the research team, which led to the first identified set of potential themes.
Researchers then looked for trends among perceived perceptions as a result of the
implementation of a strategic compensation model within the Rural Southeast School
District. Finally, the trends were coded by the perceptions of strengths and weaknesses
of the strategic compensation model.
2. The researchers then transcribed and coded focus group and interview responses for
similar themes.
3. Researchers used responses to explain and elaborate on the perceptions of the strategic
compensation model. Using a grounded theory framework, which entails a constant
comparison approach, the researchers coded and categorized the transcriptions. Through
using constant comparison, theory is developed, allowing for connections in relation to
the theories attempted to be explained. Glaser and Strauss (1967) showed that the
constant comparison procedure involves: 1) the identification of the phenomenon of
interest; 2) the identification of concepts and features of the phenomenon of interest; 3)
making decisions based on the initial data and based on the researcher’s understanding of
the data and theory emergence; 4) engaging in theoretical sampling, allowing for
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 80
purposeful and relevant sampling decisions; and 5) determining the rationale for selecting
comparison groups that will foster the development of emergent categories or themes (p.
28-52).
4. The categorized data was then analyzed to determine trends, patterns, and embedded
themes.
5. After trends, patterns, and embedded themes were identified; the data was further
combined and refined into emergent themes.
6. The researchers analyzed the quantitative data using paired t-tests. The researchers
performed independent t-tests using JMP Pro 11 in order to determine if there were
significant differences in the means of: 1) the change in TEAM level of effectiveness
scores of teachers who participated in the strategic compensation plan and 2) the change
in TEAM level of effectiveness scores of teachers who did not participate in the strategic
compensation plan.
Disposition of Data
Unless they contacted the researchers requesting to be informed of the study’s results, the
participants remained anonymous throughout the data collection and data analysis processes.
Those who contacted the researchers and asked to be informed of the study’s results received an
abstract and information about accessing the study. Every effort was made by the researchers to
preserve confidentiality. Data were secured in a password-protected site on a secure web-based
server (Dropbox and REDCap). Additionally, individual participant confidentiality was
accomplished through a series of steps as outlined below:
1. Assigned code numbers for participants were used on all researcher notes and documents.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 81
2. Only the researchers and the members of the researchers’ committee reviewed the
collected data.
3. Information from this research was used solely for the purpose of this study and any
publications that may result from this study.
4. Each participant was provided the opportunity to obtain a transcribed copy of his or her
interview.
5. Participants indicated to the researchers if a copy of the interview was desired.
6. Materials were destroyed one year after the research is concluded.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 82
Findings and Analysis of Data
Organizational Summary
This chapter is dedicated to describing the findings of the three research questions and
related discoveries. Several themes emerged throughout the responses to the questionnaires and
during the interviews. Unless specified, the reported themes were present in the data collected
from all three contexts. Because the responses were derived from the perceptions of participants,
the themes were organized first by their relationship and relevance to each research question and
then categorized by common themes, which had emerged through the data analysis process.
Findings Related to RQ1
Questionnaire, interview, and focus group findings related to RQ1. The
questionnaire first assessed overarching teachers’ perceptions in relation to the Rural Southeast
School District’s strategic compensation plan. The teachers provided various comments and
responses that described the perceived effect of the strategic compensation plan on the school
district as a whole. Those comments and responses were coded and refined into the following
subheadings: academics and achievement, positive perceptions of the district, student
achievement as a measure of effectiveness, student grouping and grade level, validity of grade-
level testing, student capacity for learning, perceptions of strategic compensation, teachers as
ancillary participants, teacher perceptions about salaries, collaboration, and intrinsic motivation.
Table 18 displays the percentage of the participants’ positive perception, negative perception,
neutral response, or no response for each theme revealed in Research Question 1.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 83
Table 18
Percentages of respondents’ positive and negative perceptions by theme in RQ1
Research Question
Theme (n) % Pos. (n) % Neut. (n) % Neg. (n) % No Response
RQ1
Academics and Achievement
94% 1.8% 4.2% 0%
Positive perceptions of the district
84.5% 9.8% 5.7% 0%
Student achievement as a measure of effectiveness
84% 2% 14% 0%
Student grouping and grade level
6.9% 0% 0% 93.1%
Validity of grade level testing
0% 0% 22.4% 77.6%
Student capacity for learning
28% 0% 8.2% 63.8%
Perceptions of strategic compensation
0% 0% 63.7% 36.3%
Teachers as ancillary participants
0% 0% 23% 77%
Teacher perceptions about salaries
0% 0% 82% 18%
Collaboration 47.8% 0% 27.6% 24.6%
Intrinsic motivation 89% 0% 0% 11%
Notes. N=59.
Academics and achievement. Teacher interviews revealed that teachers felt that
accountability for student learning was important. Ninety-four percent of the questionnaire
participants agreed that student achievement is an important measure of effectiveness in
teaching; however, there were different perceptions about the means for measuring student
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 84
performance and the weight that student achievement holds in relation to teacher evaluations for
the strategic compensation program. Teacher comments included the perception that students
achieve on different levels, extrinsic factors impact achievement (home life, peers, test anxiety),
and test scores do not always represent student performance. For example, Teacher Respondent
12 stated,
I believe that growth in students is the main thing [we] should be focused on. Not every
student is going to make proficient or advanced on a test, but every student can grow with
the right guidance from the teacher.
Positive perceptions of the district. As revealed by the questionnaire results, 84.5% of
the teachers who participated have positive perceptions of the school district. Interviews and
focus group interviews further supported the perceptions of the school, students, teachers, and
system in general as being positive. Positive perceptions of teachers regarding the strategic
compensation plan reflected a passion for teaching, recognition of positive traits in teachers, and
expectations of teacher effectiveness. The district is positively perceived for being focused on
academics and achievement for students and effectiveness in their teachers. Teacher Respondent
29 stated: “Our school is a high performing school in academics, and the strategic compensation
plan has been a reward for the teachers’ hard work.” Teachers perceived that accountability for
student learning was important and they perceived their jobs as being about the students.
Prevalent positive descriptors that were used by teacher respondents included words such as
comfort, support, encouragement, collaboration, and success. Reflection on progress, use of
feedback, formative assessment for continuous improvement, and working to build life skills,
such as confidence and competence in their students were prevalent positive comments
expressed by various teacher respondents.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 85
Student achievement as a measure of effectiveness. Eighty-four percent of participants
agreed that emphasis on student achievement within the compensation plan has had influence on
teacher effectiveness. Additionally, 20.7% of teacher respondents were in support of
achievement as a measuring factor in the plan. However, 5.2% of teachers wanted to give input
regarding the measures chosen for the plan. During focus group interviews teachers noted that
they believe multiple years are needed versus yearly measurement of achievement related to the
compensation plan. Teacher Respondent 21 noted:
It can be discouraging for a teacher who works hard all year and does not get
recognized for it strictly because the students do not score well or it is difficult to
show growth in their subject area. There needs to be a multiple year average.
Additional comments supporting this theme came from teacher interviews where Respondent 5
stated, “teachers should be held to a standard that all students have the capability to gain in their
learning year.”
Forty-seven percent of teachers noted that the strategic compensation plan was unclear
and inconsistent in how achievements were to be measured and in how value was to be added.
Additionally, three focus group respondents agreed that many teachers in their schools felt they
didn't really understand how the strategic compensation plan worked or how they would be
assessed. Respondent 7 stated, “I am participating because I have to. However, I don’t really
know how any of it works. All I know is it’s about my student’s scores.”
Student grouping and grade level. In regards to student achievement, 6.9% of teacher
respondents commented on student grouping and grade level. During interviews several teachers
noted that gains could be a problem in lower-performing as well as higher-performing students.
Low performers often maintain the same test percentiles from year to year, and this is not
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 86
indicative of growth or gain. High performing students may max out the test, and therefore be
unable to show growth. Perhaps the greatest point of contention for participants was the use of
yearly test scores as the measure of student growth. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents
agreed that while student achievement is important, more data are needed to measure students’
gains and growth, rather than only using the state assessment. Eighty-three percent of teachers
expressed little confidence that a single test could measure student performance and
achievement. Specifically, 15.5% of respondents believed that multiple yearly achievement
scores should be used rather than just one year at a time for the strategic compensation plan.
Teacher comments indicated that defining a year of learning by a single score was not
representative of student learning or ability, especially in light of beliefs that bias is inherent to
standardized testing.
Validity of grade-level testing. Some 22.4% of respondents perceived that not all grade-
level testing was reliable in teacher evaluations. Specifically, 10.4% of teachers perceived tests
as subjective, such as those given in language arts classes. Teacher Respondent 27 stated:
Another reason I don't think it's [the evaluation system is] fair is because the ELA
standards and test are mostly subjective for the grade that I teach, plus there are
not any resources to teach those subjective skills with. Teachers should not be
deemed 'effective or not effective' based on scores on a test that is subjective and
based on growth from previous year where the test is mostly concrete.
Lower grade levels, specifically K-2, were another area that teachers identified as
problematic due to lack of state testing in these grades. Teacher Respondent 14 noted, “Grades
3-5 take tests geared to the standards they teach. Grades K-2 does not. As a new teacher, not
understanding the situation, or having a concern for scope and sequence, it might not sound very
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 87
promising.” Even with common assessments, the presence of factors outside of teachers’ control
played a prominent part in the discussion. Teachers revealed through interviews that some
students just do not test well. Additionally, the focus group agreed that students may have
learned and shown considerable growth over the course of the school year, but for a wide variety
of reasons outside of teachers’ control, these students may not perform well on the state
standardized test.
Student capacity for learning. Twenty-eight percent of teachers also noted that student
capacity was another key factor in teacher behavior. Teacher Interview Respondent 5 stated,
“Teachers should be held to a standard that all students have the capability to gain in their
learning year.” However, 8.2% of the respondents stated that some students come already at
capacity. Specifically, Respondent 8 during interviews stated, “some students hit their max
learning ability in or before high school.”
Although 8.6% teachers expressed the belief that all students are capable of learning,
some teachers added students could reach learning capacity during or before high school.
Teacher Interview Respondent 2; shared this comment:
By fifth grade and especially middle school, I believe that most kids have reached
their full potential in learning. I am not saying they won't learn any more. What I
mean is that they have reached their maximum potential whether it's advanced,
proficient, or basic. There might be a few exceptions, but for the most part, I feel
that the students have peaked, and for the next year's teacher to follow that and
get scores is impossible.
There was a teacher belief expressed during focus group interview that not all students
are capable of learning on the same levels. Some 28.3% of respondents felt that despite their
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 88
ability to teach, student growth capacity was a factor. Only 16.6% of teachers believed that
differences in student growth and academic gains past a certain threshold should be a factor in
determining pay as a part of teacher compensation plans.
Negative perceptions of strategic compensation. Perhaps the most interesting theme in
the analysis of questionnaire responses was the strength of negative perception by many teachers
in relation to the strategic compensation plan. The questionnaire revealed that 63.7% of the
participants’ communicated negative expressions related to the strategic compensation plan.
Prevalent negative descriptors that were used by teacher respondents included words such as
unfair, fear, anger, stress, distrust, and pressure. Seventy-nine percent of teachers also expressed
concern that there were not equal opportunities for all teachers to earn bonuses. During
interviews, over half of the respondents felt that another person’s performance should not impact
their value. In addition, 44.7% of teacher responses indicated that they felt the strategic
compensation plan increased their stress level while increasing their workload. As many as
49.7% of the teachers explained that their jobs were busier and more stressful than in the past.
Focus group teachers noted they are expected to grind out more work for less pay and meet
increasingly higher expectations each year. The following is one of the most critical teacher
testimonies from interviews in relation to the negative impact of the strategic compensation plan.
Interview Respondent 4 stated:
I know of several more teachers that are already seeking positions in other
districts at this time. You will notice in your findings that our educators are very
young, and we are seeing a huge overturn of the young [teachers] leaving after 1-
3 years to go elsewhere and make more money.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 89
Teachers as ancillary participants. An additional concern that 23% of teachers reported
was the notion that teachers who are not tied to a particular student group, such as inclusion
teachers and instructional coaches, have no ability to be measured using standardized test data.
These teachers are considered ancillary participants in student learning and, therefore, they do
not have scores that represent their impact on student achievement. Questionnaire participants
indicated that classes with multiple teachers across the same subject area should not be a basis
for evaluating individual teachers. This included teachers such as instructional coaches, special
education teachers, and those tasked with student interventions for students in fluctuating groups.
Teacher perceptions about salaries. Eighty-two percent of teacher respondents
expressed concern about the fairness and low starting salaries of the compensation system.
Fifty-seven percent further noted that a primary negative factor within the Rural Southeast
School District’s strategic compensation plan was the fact that salaries within the school district
were lower than the baseline salaries in surrounding county-school districts. With the exception
of a negative focus on salary as being lower than the salary baselines in surrounding counties,
77% of the participants said the plan was not clear and understandable.
During focus group questioning Teacher Respondent 5 summarized what several other
teachers reflected by stating: “...many educators leave the district due to the lack of competitive
salaries with neighboring counties. The extra compensation still doesn't make up for the lack of
benefits and salary increases of surrounding counties.”
Teacher Respondent 8 noted in the interview, “I think base pay hurts—not the strategic
compensation plan.” Teacher Interview Respondent 9 relayed the following belief: “I do not feel
my pay should be based on how another individual performs.” Some other comments from four
various Teacher Interview Respondents included: “The baseline starting pay is too low (Teacher
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 90
Respondent 11);” “The ability to receive a baseline pay raise is too difficult to obtain (Teacher
Respondent 2);” and “Our pay scale [is]...lower than any county around us (Teacher
Respondent1).”
Nearly 76% of teacher participants expressed positive attitudes about the inclusion of
incentives as a reward for obtaining academic gains with students. Focus group respondents
noted they would like to receive incentives in the form of salary increases and monetary bonuses.
In addition, 17.2% further emphasized that they would like to see a progressive pay scale with a
focus on increasing their pay from year to year. There was a high emphasis on support and
recognition of teachers. In addition to compensatory incentives, teachers want to be
acknowledged for the great things they were doing for students. The teacher respondents further
commented on wanting to receive recognition for excellence in teaching. Teacher Respondent
31 shared this commentary in relation to program incentives:
The incentive to receive a bonus is a major factor for me staying in this system;
if the bonus were to be taken away, I would be forced to entertain the idea of
teaching at a different school. The amount of work/pressure expected of me and
other teachers is too much to be compensated for so little.
Teacher Respondent 49 added, “Teachers who have ‘growth’ within their classrooms need to be
compensated for their work. Students do not grow in terms of TVASS overnight; it is the hard
work of the teachers and their students that does this.”
In addition to monetary bonuses and salary increases, teachers also focused highly on
support for ongoing learning for both teachers and students. Only 6.9% of teachers expressed a
need to receive support and funding for professional development as well as support and funding
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 91
for field trips and other real-world learning experiences for their students. Teacher Interview
Respondent 5 shared this commentary:
Money drives the plan along with student performance. Student performance
would be enhanced by real world situations; in return, the educators would get a
better [achievement] gain, as well as [a] raise. With that being said, a field trip
budget giving real world experiences to the students would be a great plus.
Allowing the students to experience history, plays and many other facets of the
community around us.
Some 22.4% further noted that they wanted support in the craft of teaching. They noted
that this could be accomplished by providing them with meaningful feedback on their
performance and giving them opportunities to take on greater responsibilities and leadership
within the school setting. Teacher Interview Respondent 5 also stated, “There are not many
opportunities for new teachers to gain leadership positions. They are not afforded the maximum
amounts in the compensation plan.” In addition, Teacher Interview Respondent 8 said, “more
compensation for 'extra' duties at the building other than what is already in place.”
Collaboration. In relation to a broad reflection of school values, 47.8% of questionnaire
participants mentioned that collaboration was a positive factor that needed to be further
emphasized in order to increase teacher success and motivation. About 27.6% of teachers felt
that the strategic compensation plan worked against collaboration. The questionnaire data
revealed that some teachers believed that the strategic compensation plan failed to encourage and
reward collaboration. During interviews a number of respondents went as far as to say that the
strategic compensation plan was a source of isolation, discouraging teachers from collaborating
with one another and fostering a culture of competition among faculty members. Specifically,
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 92
Teacher Interview Respondent 4 noted, “the program causes competitiveness, not collaboration
and that in itself promotes isolation from collaboration.”
Intrinsic Motivation. Eighty-nine percent of teachers also expressed a willingness to go
the extra mile and do whatever they needed to do to help their students achieve success, even if
doing so did not result in receiving an incentive or raise.
Twelve percent gave responses that indicated that they were clearly focused on the
students rather than themselves. They believed it was their job to be good teachers regardless of
incentives. Teacher Interview Respondent 12 effectively stated:
Becoming a teacher obviously isn't about the money you make; it is about influencing a
child in a positive way. Students need to leave the high school able to function on their
own and to take care of their family.
Findings Related to RQ2
Questionnaire, interview, and focus group findings related to RQ2. The teachers
presented a vast array of comments and responses that spoke to how the strategic compensation
plan has impacted their behaviors (and attitudes). Those comments and responses were coded,
categorized, and refined into five overarching themes: teacher motivation, going the extra mile,
monetary award, high-quality teaching, and teaching to the test. Table 19 displays the
percentage of the participants’ positive perception, negative perception, neutral response, or no
response for each theme revealed in Research Question 2.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 93
Table 19
Percentages of participants’ positive and negative perceptions by theme in RQ2
Research Question
Theme (n) % Pos. (n) % Neut. (n) % Neg. (n) % No Response
RQ2
Teacher Motivation 68% 0% 29% 3%
Going the Extra Mile 22% 0% 0% 78%
Monetary Award 62% 0% 0% 38%
High-Quality Teaching 59% 35% 6% 0%
Teaching to the Test 0% 0% 8.6% 91.4%
Notes. N=59.
Teacher motivation. The comments and responses shared by teacher respondents
indicated that teacher motivation was the most prevalent theme that emerged in relation to the
strategic compensation plan affecting teacher behaviors. Sixty-eight percent of the participants
agreed they would change their professional practices for the compensation plan. Teacher
Respondent 41 said, “if it means staying after hours, prepping additional assessments, or adding
additional professional development to my calendar, yes, I will do it.” In addition, 29% of
comments and responses from teachers indicated they would not change their professional
practices for the strategic compensation plan.
In relation to the compensation plan motivating teachers to excel so that students progress
academically, Teacher Interview Respondent 4 noted, “For the teachers that do have room to
grow, or even ones that don't have room to grow, it is motivation.” Teacher Interview
Respondent 8 further stated, “There are teachers here who have been here fewer years than me
that make close to $800 more than me a month just because they had that chance to make the
extra money. So I do think it's a big motivational piece.” Lastly, Teacher Interview Respondent
6 rationalized how the strategic compensation plan motivated teachers’ behaviors by providing
revenues of reward and incentives. She added, “I think teachers should be rewarded for growth
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 94
for doing our job. I think our job is to teach and put students first and if they're showing that
piece, there's where their reward should be.”
The entire focus group was clearly focused on the students rather than themselves, noting
their job was to prepare students for the world after graduation. Focus Group Respondent 2
added,
Your motivation should be the children, not the reward. I mean, the reward is the
children, not the reward that is the monetary. I mean, we all like money, of course, but
we're not doing what we do every day for this alternative compensation, for the bonus or
the extra. We're doing this for the children.
Going the extra mile. Twenty-two percent of respondents revealed positive perceptions
about being rewarded for doing extra for students while 78% offered no response. Specifically,
Teacher Interview Respondent 1 noted, “I believe that the compensation plan model gives
teachers a little extra because we go the extra mile to make sure students succeed.” Additionally
they stated, “It [strategic compensation plan] can weed out ineffective teachers”. Teacher Focus
Group Respondent 4 further stated, “yes, I work hard all year to teach my students the standards,
prepare them for assessments, and give them the confidence they need to achieve. I feel that my
students will reflect my hard work through their achievements.”
Monetary reward. Sixty-two percent of teacher respondents agreed that incentives and
bonuses were incentive enough to motivate teachers to change how and what they do in the
classroom. It gave them a since of appreciation for their efforts. Teacher Interview Respondent
7 explained how the strategic compensation plan motivated teachers to succeed in their craft by
providing means of incentive/reward. She stated, “teachers need a reason to want to succeed,
and the compensation plan allows teachers to be rewarded for their efforts.”
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 95
High-quality teaching. The comments shared by teacher interview and focus group
respondents indicated that high-quality teaching was another prominent theme that emerged in
relation to the strategic compensation plan affecting teacher behaviors. Fifty-nine percent of
questionnaire teacher respondents agreed that the strategic compensation plan held teachers to a
higher standard of teaching. Fifty–six percent of the respondents indicated that the strategic
compensation plan promoted an atmosphere of high-quality teaching within the district.
Teaching to the test. The comments and responses shared by 8.6% teacher respondents
indicated that “teaching to the test” was a final prevalent theme that emerged in relation to the
strategic compensation plan affecting teacher behaviors. In relation to the view that the strategic
compensation plan has introduced the “teaching to the test” mentality within the school district,
Teacher Interview Respondent 8 simply stated, “what gets measured gets done.” Teacher
Interview Respondent 4 further added, “in my grade level, our test is norm-referenced, and if we
teach to the test, we have less time to really teach our standards well.” Lastly, in relation to
miscommunication about which academic standards get measured Teacher Interview Respondent
3 noted, “there should be more communication with faculty about the specific criteria to be
measured.”
Quantitative findings related to RQ2. In connection with the qualitative data associated
with Q2, the quantitative findings served as a complimentary data piece. These findings revealed how
participating or not participating in the strategic compensation plan affected teaching behavior as
evidenced by TEAM level of effectiveness scores.
Description of the dataset. The following variables served as the nominal variables of
this study:
TID – a variable that identifies the code name associated with each teacher participant.
ST – a variable that identifies the type of school where each teacher participant worked.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 96
PP – a variable that identifies if a teacher participant participated in the strategic
compensation plan.
The following variables served as the continuous variables of this study:
TS12 – a variable that identifies the TEAM level of effectiveness score of each teacher
participant during the 2011-2012 academic year.
TS13 – a variable that identifies the TEAM level of effectiveness score of each teacher
participant during the 2012-2013 academic year.
TS14 – a variable that identifies the TEAM level of effectiveness score of each teacher
participant during the 2013-2014 academic year.
CS1 – a variable that represents the change in each teacher participant’s TEAM level of
effectiveness score from 2011-2012 to 2012-2013. It was used within the dataset to
determine if there is a significant difference between the change in TEAM level of
effectiveness scores of teachers who participated in the strategic compensation plan and
the change in TEAM level of effectiveness scores of teachers who did not participate in
the strategic compensation plan.
CS2 – a variable that represents the change in each teacher participant’s TEAM level of
effectiveness score from 2012-2013 to 2013-2014. It was used within the dataset to
determine if there is a significant difference between the change in TEAM level of
effectiveness scores of teachers who participated in the strategic compensation plan and
the change in TEAM level of effectiveness scores of teachers who did not participate in
the strategic compensation plan.
CS3 – a variable that represents the change in each teacher participant’s TEAM level of
effectiveness score from 2011-2012 to 2013-2014. It was used within the dataset to
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 97
determine if there is a significant difference between the change in TEAM level of
effectiveness scores of teachers who participated in the strategic compensation plan and
the change in TEAM level of effectiveness scores of teachers who did not participate in
the strategic compensation plan.
Resolving assumptions for variables CS1, CS2, and CS3. Because the sample consisted
of 95 teachers from various schools within the Rural Southeast School District, the assumption
of independent random data was satisfied for all three variables. In order to resolve the
assumption that all three variables had fairly normal distribution in relation to participation in the
strategic compensation plan, the researchers examined the skewness and kurtosis values as
summarized in Table 20. Fairly normal distribution is satisfied when: 1) skewness values are
within the range of -1 and 1 and/or 2) kurtosis values are within the range of -2 and 2. In relation
to participation in the strategic compensation plan, all three variables (CS1, CS2, and CS3)
satisfied the assumption of fairly normal distribution. Satisfying the assumption of fairly normal
distribution tells us that nonparametric analysis is not needed.
Table 20
Skewness and Kurtosis Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 in Relation to Strategic Compensation
Participation
Variable Skewness Kurtosis
CS1 -0.144 -0.152
CS2 0.049 -0.221
CS3 0.003 0.080
In order to resolve the assumption that all three variables had fairly normal distribution in
relation to no participation in the strategic compensation plan, the researchers examined the
skewness and kurtosis values as summarized in Table 21. Fairly normal distribution is satisfied
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 98
when: 1) skewness values are within the range of -1 and 1 and 2) kurtosis values are within the
range of -2 and 2. In relation to no participation in the strategic compensation plan, all three
variables (CS1, CS2, and CS3) satisfied the assumption of fairly normal distribution. It is
important to note, that although the kurtosis value for variable CS3 in relation to no strategic
compensation participation fell outside the range of -2 to 2, fairly normal distribution could still
be assumed because: 1) the skewness value (0.162) fell within the appropriate range of -1 to 1
and 2) the kurtosis value (2.325) was only slightly outside of the appropriate range of -2 to 2.
Table 21
Skewness and Kurtosis Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 in Relation to No Strategic Compensation
Participation
Variable Skewness Kurtosis
CS1 -0.445 -0.126
CS2 0.383 0.230
CS3 0.162 2.325
In order to resolve the assumption of equal variances, the researchers performed the
following three bivariate fits: CS1 (change in TEAM level of effectiveness scores from 2011-
2012 to 2012-2013) by PP (program participation), CS2 (change in TEAM level of effectiveness
scores from 2012-2013 to 2013-2014) by PP (program participation), and CS3 (change in TEAM
level of effectiveness scores from 2011-2012 to 2013-2014) by PP (program participation). The
researchers then performed Levene’s test in order to determine equal variance. If the p-value
associated with Levene’s test is greater than α=0.05, the assumption of equal variance is
satisfied. The p-values as generated by Levene’s test for each continuous variable are listed in
Table 22. Being that all p-values are greater than α=0.05, the assumption of equal variance is
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 99
satisfied for variables CS1, CS2, and CS3. Satisfying the assumption of equal variance tells us
that nonparametric analysis is not needed.
Table 22
P-Values for CS1, CS2, and CS3 as generated by Levene’s Test
Variable p-value
CS1 0.756
CS2 0.668
CS3 0.662
Quantitative analysis via independent t-tests. The researchers first created bivariate
plots of the following variable pairings using JMP Pro 11: CS1 by PP, CS2 by PP, and CS3 by
PP. Being that the assumption of equal variance was satisfied for variables CS1, CS2, and CS3,
the researchers decided to run the “Means/Anova/Pooled t” JMP function for each bivariate plot.
Running this function produced the p-values associated with each independent t-test (bivariate
plot). The resulting p-values are listed in Table 23.
Table 23
P-Values Associated with Independent T-tests
Bivariate Plot p-value
CS1 by PP 0.962
CS2 by PP 0.963
CS3 by PP 0.927
Note. *p<.05 denotes statistical significance
Since all p-values were greater than .05, the quantitative data suggested that there were no
statistically significant differences in the means associated with the changes in TEAM level of
effectiveness scores for the conditions of strategic compensation plan participation and non-
strategic compensation plan participation.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 100
Findings Related to RQ3
Questionnaire, interview, and focus group findings related to RQ3. Only 43.1% of
the teachers surveyed were in the district prior to the implementation of the strategic
compensation plan. Eighty-five percent of the teachers interviewed were employed in the system
prior to the implementation of the program, with only a few being hired in the first year of
implementation. Overall, 79.3% of the teachers presented a multitude of comments and
responses that highlighted how the strategic compensation plan has impacted teacher recruitment
and/or retention. Those comments and responses were reported under the following
subheadings: teacher recruitment and teacher retention. Table 24 displays the percentage of the
participants’ positive perception, negative perception, neutral response, or no response for each
theme revealed in Research Question 1.
Table 24
Percentages of participants’ positive and negative perceptions by theme in RQ3
Research Question
Theme (n) % Pos. (n) % Neut. (n) % Neg. (n) % No Response
RQ3
Teacher Recruitment
0% 89% 0% 11%
Teacher Retention Awareness
18.7% 0% 79.3% 2%
Notes. N=59.
Teacher recruitment. Eighty-nine percent of teachers who participated in the strategic
compensation plan during their first year of employment noted that the plan was not specifically
a draw for them, but that the prospect of bonus pay did not hurt their perceptions prior to
employment. Teacher Interview Respondent 3 stated, “I'm not aware of the beginning teacher
benefits. However, the enticement of a yearly bonus would be a benefactor that would aid in
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 101
recruitment.” Teacher Respondent 1 simply further emphasized, “People naturally like the idea
of earning more income.” Those Teacher Interview Respondents who have served in the district
for a number of years noted that the opportunity for rewards might be an incentive for younger
teachers to join the program or come on to the staff. Teacher Interview Respondent 7 stated,
“For younger teachers it [the strategic compensation plan] provides opportunity for growth out of
the gate.”
Incentivized hard-to-staff positions might be particularly attractive, but focus group
respondents did not feel that the strategic compensation plan inherently added to the recruitment
draw. Teacher focus group respondent 2 reiterated this point by noting, “While there is doubt
that teacher recruitment relies solely on the compensation plan, it is an extra incentive to a career
as a teacher.” Most often the reason that was given for coming to the district was the reputation
for academics, the draw of a small community, and the location. Teacher Interview Respondent
9 added to this notion by stating:
[The district] has a reputation of having student success. Part of the strategic
compensation plans focuses on goals for each school based on student
achievement. It doesn't take a good teacher long to realize that those student
groups meeting those goals are working with some great teachers. Who wouldn't
want to be a part of that?
Teacher Focus Group Respondent 3 went on to say:
I honestly don't think it [the strategic compensation plan] helps with recruitment at all.
We had nearly 25 teachers leave last year [the 2014-2015 school year]. Most went 15-20
minutes to make $10,000 more on salary and pay out $3,000 less in health insurance costs, not to
go with the 'Win Or Else' mentality. I am all about educating kids, but test scores are only a
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 102
small fraction of the definition of education. We are focused on winning “the test-score state
championship” and when asked about how another school or system does things [to improve
achievement], the answer is “We have better scores!” We have a high turnover rate in teachers.
Most [teachers] are not from here. They drive in from out of town, and taking a job here is more
out of necessity than the compensation plan.
Teacher retention awareness. When addressing teacher retention, 79.3% of teacher
respondents were highly aware of the recent turnover and what they perceived to be low rates of
teacher retention in the schools. They equated low retention with low baseline salaries, which
they reported being less than those of surrounding counties. Specifically, 77% of teacher
respondents did not attribute the turnover to the program itself, but rather to low baseline
salaries, which they reported to be less than that of surrounding counties, and lack of reasonable
benefits, such as affordable health care. Teacher Interview Respondent 4 stated, “Lower base
salary is a stumbling block for many teachers.” In addition, focus group respondents also noted
that the lack of reasonable benefits such as affordable health care also contributed to high
turnover/low retention. Teacher Interview Respondent 8 shared this commentary:
I feel that somehow at least a part of the state pay raise should be given for cost of living.
Health care benefits should be addressed, not sure how but it is a contributing factor to
educators leaving our school district to teach in other districts.
The lack of safety and comfort in light of increasing cost of living was a driving factor
for those teachers seeking employment elsewhere. However, 18.7% of teachers expressed that
those leaving seemed to be leaving for career advancements or because they struggled to meet
the expectations of the district. Two percent of respondents had no comment.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 103
Conclusion and Discussion
Summary
This study examined the perceptions of teachers employed in the Rural Southeast School
District concerning their newly adopted Strategic Compensation Plan. The district implemented
a strategic compensation model in the fall of 2011 for all newly hired faculty and allowed current
faculty to opt in or out. The district desired qualitative data to inform its examination of the plan.
The purpose of this study is to determine the teachers’ perceptions of the strategic compensation
model and its influence on teachers in the Rural Southeast School District, specifically, if teacher
behaviors changed because of the plan, and if the plan affected their decision to remain or leave
the district.
In order to fulfill the purpose of the study, the researchers designed the following
research questions:
1) What are the teachers’ perceptions on strategic compensation in the Rural Southeast
School District?
2) What teacher behaviors have been affected as a result of the strategic compensation
plan in the Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
3) How has strategic compensation affected teacher recruitment and/or retention in the
Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions?
These research questions were developed on the basis of the conceptual frameworks of
equity theory and motivational theory. After collecting data, the researchers focused on finding
similarities and patterns in the responses that were given. In the following sections of this
chapter, the findings are reviewed, conclusions are drawn, and the implications of the findings
are discussed.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 104
Interpretation of the Findings
Research question 1. The first question we sought to address in this study was what are
the teachers’ perceptions on strategic compensation in the Rural Southeast School District?
Regarding this issue, we found that teachers have mixed perceptions about the various facets of
this question. Of the 11 emerging themes, percentages from five conveyed overall positive
perceptions and 6 showed overall negative perceptions, including some strongly worded negative
perceptions.
The teachers’ overall perceptions of the school system were positive, as 84.5% reported
having positive perceptions of the district. However, there was ambiguity in the perception of
the district in relation to the strategic compensation plan. For example, 94% of teacher
participants felt that although student achievement measures are important, these measures are
not necessarily synonymous with teacher performance. Eighty-four percent believe student
achievement scores measure teacher effectiveness, and although 20.7% support these scores as a
measure of effectiveness, 5.2% would like input as to which measures are used.
The uncertainty expressed by teachers in the strategic compensation plan continued in the
area of fairness of teacher assessment. Specifically, four areas of concern were student grouping
and grade level, validity of grade level testing, ancillary teacher participants, and student
capacity for learning. Most teachers, 67%, agreed that student achievement scores are important
data; however, 15.5% reported the belief that multiple years of assessment data are a more
accurate measure of student achievement. In addition, 22.4% doubted the validity of using grade
level testing as a measure of teacher effectiveness. The validity was further questioned by the
notion of teachers as ancillary participants. Specifically, 23% of teachers question how teacher
effectiveness can be measured when some teachers are not tied to a specific group of students.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 105
Additionally, 28% of teachers reported that student capacity for learning is a key factor in
behavior. However, 8.6% believe that although students can still learn they have essentially
reached capacity before high school, thereby questioning the connection between student scores
and teacher effectiveness. These findings show teachers' equivocality of the strategic
compensation plan.
There were three areas of negative focus shown in the findings: perceptions of the
strategic compensation plan, teacher salaries, and collaboration. Most teachers, 79%, felt the
plan did not provide equal opportunities for teachers. Fifty-seven percent expressed concern on
the starting salary being lower than other surrounding districts, even though the success of the
school system and its good reputation continued to give teachers a reason to join and remain in
the system. Concerning teachers’ perceptions on strategic compensation in the selected the Rural
Southeast School District, 77% of the focus group participants expressed that the compensation
plan was not clear and needed continuous explanation. There was a belief among teachers that
there was a high weight of student achievement in determining their value as teachers, but they
did not necessarily know the criteria utilized for the determination. Teachers also reported that
the strategic compensation plan created a competitive environment, which worked against the
collaboration found essential in teaching, as reported by 47.8% of teacher participants. Overall,
49.7% of teachers reported that the strategic compensation plan has caused them to be busier and
has caused more stress than before its implementation.
Overall, teachers were supportive of the concept of earning various bonuses as a reward
for exemplary teaching. The positive perceptions of the plan, the researchers felt, were reflective
of the positive teaching and learning beliefs demonstrated by the teachers. The teachers wanted
to be effective, they wanted to help their students learn, and they were invested in making
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 106
changes to help that happen. They did not have any negative perceptions of achievement as a
measure if applied fairly. Most teachers were willing to take on the additional workload in
return for additional pay.
However, there were negative perceptions surrounding how the bonuses were
determined. Additionally, there were other negative perceptions noted on options to participate
or not participate in the strategic compensation plan. There was also a lack of teacher
participation in the process of determining goals and standards for excellence in teaching. The
negative perceptions of the program tended to be geared more toward perceptions of fairness in
the program. For example, teachers wanted to have a say in the evaluation and rating processes,
have clarity in how they are assessed, and have a measure that would be fair to all teachers. It
appeared the changes in pay for those teachers who opted not to participate in the plan made
teachers have more negative perceptions as well.
For this research question, we found that teachers perceived the strategic compensation
plan to cause more stress and increased workload as opposed to not having the plan in place.
Teachers recognized that the standards for effectiveness are set high. They must meet criteria in
a range of performance areas to earn the strategic compensation plan bonuses, and doing so may
require that they change teaching strategies and increase student outcomes. Teachers in the
district had to determine best practices for meeting student learning styles to meet a broad range
of students effectively.
Research question 2- qualitative findings interpretation. The second question we
examined was what teacher behaviors have been affected as a result of the strategic
compensation plan in Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions? The
emphasis placed on student achievement by the compensation plan has influenced teacher
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 107
behaviors. However, in regard to future teacher behaviors, Teacher Respondent 4 noted: “I don't
believe that a single year should be the sole deciding factor, rather a three or five year average.”
This belief was supported by the results of this study, specifically that 67% of respondents
believed more data was needed to determine teacher effectiveness and 15.5% believed multiple
year assessments were a better measure of teacher effectiveness. This suggests that the average
performance should be considered before enforcing teaching method changes.
However, teacher behaviors may decline as morale decreases, evident in Teacher
Respondent 9: “How a student performs should have nothing to do with a teacher's worth.” The
validity of testing may affect teacher behavior, noted by teacher respondent: “Most teachers in
my PreK-2 grade band would agree that student achievement should be included as a component
of the plan. However, many would also argue the SAT-10 test we currently use is not a true
identifier and that an alternative test should be administered in its place.”
In other cases, teachers note requirements and necessities of ‘teaching the test,’ evident in
Teacher Respondent 4, “In my grade level our test is norm referenced and if we teach to the test,
we have less time to really teach our standards well.”
On the other hand, Teacher Respondent 8 believes, “What gets measured gets done.”
Regarding intrinsic motivation respondent states: “I think that your best teachers would still be
your best teachers whether they are receiving compensation or not. Their motivation comes
from within.” However, according to Respondent 4: “Teachers are afraid of not being able to
produce good test scores.” This may prompt negative behaviors, such as cheating.
Based upon the participant perceptions, teacher behaviors have been affected as a result
of the strategic compensation plan in the selected Rural Southeast School District. Across
participants, it was agreed that student achievement data is an important measure of effectiveness
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 108
in teaching. Teacher Respondent 8 felt, “the more teacher led in its developing obtainable goals
set each year (still striving for improvement, but not so much to where the teachers feel as if they
cannot succeed), and compensation for 'extra' duties at the building other than what is already in
place” would change teacher behaviors to increase buy-in and best practices.
Research question 2- quantitative findings interpretation. In regard to the
quantitative analysis of the second research question, the findings were analyzed in order to
determine how participating or not participating in the strategic compensation plan affected
teaching behavior as evidenced by teachers’ TEAM level of effectiveness scores. Because all p-
values were greater than .05, the quantitative data suggested that there were no statistically
significant differences in the means associated with the changes in TEAM level of effectiveness
scores for the conditions of strategic compensation participation and no strategic compensation
participation. The researchers interpreted this to show the strategic compensation plan was not
having a statistically significant impact on TEAM level of effectiveness scores, and therefore
changes in teacher behaviors, as related to the strategic compensation plan, were not shown to
directly impact changes in TEAM level of effectiveness scores for teachers in the Rural
Southeast School District.
Research question 3. Our final question was how has strategic compensation impacted
teacher recruitment and/or retention in the Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’
perceptions? According to teachers’ perceptions, the impact of strategic compensation on
teacher recruitment and/or retention in the Rural Southeast School District was conflicting. A
majority of the teachers surveyed were employed in the system prior to the implementation of
the program. Many teachers reported being unsure of the effect on recruitment, which could
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 109
mean that candidates are unaware of the compensation plan or on how new teachers to the
system feel about the plan.
Those in the program during their first year of employment noted that the plan was not
specifically a draw for them but that the prospect of bonus pay did not hurt their perceptions
prior to employment. Those who had been in the system noted that the opportunity for bonuses
might serve as an incentive for teachers to join the program or come on to the staff. Teachers in
hard-to-staff positions may especially be interested, but current teachers in the district did not
feel that the program inherently added to recruitment draw. Most teachers agreed the plan itself
is not a drawing factor in recruitment. Most new hires explained that they did not know about
the plan until they were interviewed or hired for the position. The most common reasons given
for coming to the system were the reputation for academics, the draw of a small district, and the
location of the system.
In terms of retention, this was an area where there were strong feelings about several
aspects of the strategic compensation plan. Many teachers felt that the program was the main
contributor to high teacher turnover and low retention in the system. Those teachers believed
that after implementation of the plan, many teachers left due to the loss of salary and benefits.
While some faculty participating in this study saw a connection between the strategic
compensation plan and the rate of turnover at the schools, there was a broad spectrum of
responses and perceptions noted. Teachers were highly aware of the turnover and what they
perceived to be low rates of teacher retention in the school. However, not all attributed the low
retention rate to the strategic compensation plan, but rather to low baseline salaries, which they
reported being less than that of surrounding counties, and lack of reasonable benefits such as
affordable health care. A prevalent note to mention was the teacher belief that base starting
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 110
salaries in the system are much lower than the surrounding counties. This belief might have a
counter-effect on how teachers perceive the program itself.
Finally, 6% of teacher participants perceived the loss as representative of those teachers
not willing to work harder to meet the new standards or be effective in the practice. Adding to
that frustration was the level of difficulty required to make gains with some student groups.
Finally, the researchers believe that a variety of factors outside of the actual plan impacted
teacher retention.
Relationship to Previous Research
Performance based pay, or strategic compensation, has come to the forefront of
discussion as a means of improving effective teaching strategies and student achievement in K-
12 education. As noted in the literature review, the existing research on strategic compensation
plans in education has seen mixed results and has left many questions as to effectiveness,
perceptions, and application. A handful of studies conducted across the United States provide
limited data linked to the impact of these plans on teachers. Many of the results of those studies
are contradictory in nature. Limited qualitative studies on teacher perceptions tend to show
negative findings, while most quantitative research on student test scores tied to strategic
compensation show positive results. The broad and variable nature of strategic compensation
plans may cause this contradiction. Adding to this contradiction is the diversity of school culture
and population, teacher unions, and state agency oversight (Goldhaber et al., 2011; Kelley et al.,
2002; Lavy, 2007). There are studies available to explain what strategic compensation plans
represent and how they have impacted student and school outcomes (Lavy, 2007). However,
there is limited research available to examine the impact on teachers, especially their perceptions
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 111
of the compensation plans, workload, and teacher retention and recruitment (Covey, 2009;
Goldstein et al., 2011).
Previous research related to research question 1. First, we sought to examine
perceptions of the plan, asking, what are the teachers’ perceptions on strategic compensation in
the Rural Southeast School District? We found that, similar to existing research, teachers in our
study had mixed feelings about strategic compensation or incentive plans. Lavy (2007) reported
similar findings and found there were a variety of drawbacks identified with incentive plans.
They included areas, such as teaching assignment rotations and a fair way of determining what
progress looks like in courses that are different from one to another. In some cases, patterns
were present within certain demographic groups and perceptions shared at a high rate. However,
other areas revealed perceptions were present across groups. We will begin our discussion by
addressing those perceptions within certain demographic groups of teachers.
In our study, there was a visible divide between secondary and elementary level teachers
very much like that reported by Goldhaber et al. (2011). Secondary teachers were more
supportive of the plan than their lower-grade-level peers. In our survey, this was due primarily
to the lack of standardized measures in kindergarten through second grade, special education,
and resource classes that impact the ability to make gain comparisons. Because most strategic
compensation plans or merit pay utilize teacher assessment scores, the divide mentioned above is
due to a lack of student assessment integration into teacher evaluations. Similar patterns were
present within grade level groupings. Teachers not affixed to a student grade-level group, such
as those in academic coaching roles or where testing was subjective in nature as in ELA courses,
were also less supportive.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 112
In addition to grade level centered perceptions, there were also perception patterns among
teachers based on their level of experience. Much like findings reported by Lortie (2002), we
found that more experienced teachers were less likely to have positive perceptions of incentive
plans. This pattern has been consistent in the literature and represents an area where tensions are
high surrounding strategic compensation (Jones, 2013; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011).
Furthermore, the participants meeting similar demographic description echoed the findings of
these studies in specific details. Veteran teachers reported a fear of their financial security. They
also had concerns about the impact on collaborative culture in the school and anger at the
immediate effect the plan had on their pay if they did not sign up to participate (Covey, 2009).
Lortie (2002) talked about the nature of the very culture of education as a sort of great equalizer
wherein all are taken to teach, and teachers earn their way up equally. The discomfort caused by
this culture shift is apparent in the experienced teachers who would no longer be able to rely on
experience level based pay scales that were equal among colleagues (Jones, 2013). In regards to
stress, the greatest factor was a fear tied to feelings of uncertainty regarding their annual pay.
This was also present in the literature, where it was reported that even teachers who had received
incentives were fearful that they would not receive the same incentive the following year (Kelley
et al., 2002; Marsden & Belfield, 2006).
Across levels, the area that garnered the most comment was the use of achievement in
determining teacher effectiveness. Our study showed that teachers of all levels, both participants
and non-participants of the strategic compensation plan as defined by the questionnaire, had
concerns about the clarity of assessment for determining who would receive incentives for their
teaching. The greatest point of concern was the use of measures, such as student achievement
for determining teacher effectiveness. Students often come to the table with varying levels of
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 113
ability and are impacted heavily by factors that teachers cannot overcome in the classroom.
Poverty, hunger, emotional and psychological stress, and a lack of support at home are all noted
factors that contribute to educational outcomes. Unlike findings reported by Figlio and Kenny
(2007) where teachers believed that their rewards were invalid, teachers in our study did not
strongly support the use of achievement as one of many measures of teaching effectiveness.
However, the Rural Southeast School District teachers participating in this study want to have a
say in the weight of those actions and means of equalizing the field for an equal opportunity to
earn incentives.
Previous research related to research question 2. Another question addressed by our
study was what teacher behaviors have been affected as a result of the strategic compensation
plan in the Rural Southeast School District according to teachers’ perceptions? A key concern
our teachers reported was the effect of the strategic compensation plan on teacher relationships
and school culture and community (Covey, 2009). Parts of the strategic compensation model in
the district utilize the evaluation and rating of teachers as individuals. Therefore, this model
eliminates some of the concerns and problems of grade-level or teacher team compensation
awards demonstrated in other studies where there were teachers who were habitually not willing
to rise to the challenge of being effective in their practice.
Several teachers in this study noted that the culture was already changed by the plan in
that teachers who were unwilling to work or grow were being “weeded out” by the practice of
strategic teaching, opening the way for those more willing to work harder for their students. This
sentiment was mirrored in the study of a long-standing incentive system in Missouri conducted
by Morice and Murray (2003), who also reported that teachers perceived the plan to be a positive
impact on the level of effectiveness in their schools. On the negative side, the focus on
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 114
individual teachers can also lead to perceptions of isolation and negative competition among
teachers, which aligns with existing research (Abd-el-Fattah, 2010).
In our research, teachers talked about a change in the nature of their interactions with
their peers. They went on to explain, that because of the high expectations put on them by the
strategic compensation plan they spend less time collaborating and working with others and
more time worried about test scores and other measures of achievement. This is contrary to
statistical analysis by others that showed no actual damage to teacher cooperation or
collaboration (Jones, 2013; Wells, 2011). It is noted that some positive comparisons were
documented in the findings. Unlike findings by Clabaugh (2009) and Marsden and Belfield
(2006), none of the teacher participants reported feeling that other factors, such as friendship
with the administration or brown-nosing were an issue that could negatively impact their
assessment in the plan. The teachers’ responses consistently had positive perceptions about the
school, academics, loyalty and reputation overall.
Whereas Jones (2013) and Wragg, et al. (2002) reported the increase in documentation as
a positive side effect of the program from an administrative standpoint, our respondents in this
study felt the opposite, that the escalation in documentation was impacting an already heavy
workload. In addition to the summative culture of the school, teachers participating in the study
felt that their workload and stress levels were also impacted by the compensation plan. Contrary
to other studies, participants in this study, although concerned about the focus of the program on
testing, did not report any changes in behavior geared toward specific groups and away from
others (Lavy, 2007). Luckily, unlike findings reported by Wragg et al. (2002), none of the
teachers in this study reported dropping their previous engagements (department head, clubs,
etc.) as a result of the plan, suggesting that in these early stages of implementation, time
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 115
management and learning to balance responsibilities and expectations has been the preferred
route.
In some cases, our teachers, like those in the study by Wragg et al. (2002) felt varying
levels of negativity about the support, incentives, practices, and recognition they received from
their schools. There were concerns about clarity, trust, and expectations connected with the
compensation plans that made the teachers less excited about their job situation and the school
system and made them feel more burdened. Additionally, there was not an overwhelming
perception of support and unity, which Callier (2010) found to be a mitigating factor when
teachers weigh the benefits of incentive systems over new employment. Interestingly, unlike
Wragg et al. (2002) who reported that new teachers were more troubled by issues of threshold
pay, our respondents in the study were the bearers of this burden, explaining that they faced
drops in their pay and were upset that new teachers in the system could make more than they
could, and without any experience. These were all reasons the teachers perceived as causative
agents for the high rates of turnover they felt were occurring in the Rural Southeast School
District and were parallel to existing studies that suggested similar impact (Wells, 2011).
Previous research related to research question 3. Our final research question was how
has strategic compensation affected teacher recruitment and/or retention in the Rural Southeast
School District according to teachers’ perceptions? In regards to recruitment, very few teachers
felt that the incentive plan was a big factor in recruitment of new teachers, including new
teachers who were asked whether the plan was a consideration in their decision to come to the
district. It is noted that many, both regarding retention and recruitment, attributed this more
toward other factors, such as low base salaries and location, rather than the plan itself and
perhaps the plan had too much to overcome to draw applicants specifically. These findings are
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 116
similar to findings by Wragg et al. (2002) who found similar problems and that they could be
remedied with a higher base salary in addition to the compensation incentives.
According to Holcombe (2010), for a compensation plan to be effective in recruitment, it
must be clear enough to be explained in a minute or less. Participants in this study frequently
pointed out that the plan put in place was lacking in clarity, a factor likely to negatively impact
perceptions. An absence of clarity can prevent teachers from buying in to the system due to
confusion, fear, or misunderstanding. Holcombe (2010) also laid out key elements of planning
for strategic compensation that included clear goals for retention and recruitment over a span of
years of implementation. Although goals were not specifically mentioned by participants, their
disconnect between perceptions of the compensation plan and retention demonstrate a need for a
clear vision and goal to be shared to make retention and recruitment possible. Overall, the
concerns noted regarding both retention and recruitment appear to be intertwined with other
themes of discontent and concern throughout the data, and it would be interesting to see through
further study, whether other solutions, not directly related to strategic compensation, might alter
the perceived impact on both.
Discussion and Conclusions
Discussion of research question 1. We found that teachers have mixed perceptions
about the strategic compensation plan. The positive perceptions of the strategic compensation
plan, we felt, were reflective of the positive teaching and learning beliefs demonstrated by the
teachers. In looking at the participation levels and perceptions, most of those involved in the
plan had positive perceptions, whether they opted in or were mandatorily placed on the plan at
employment.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 117
Those perceptions suggest that having an insider understanding of the design through
participation might impact perception. In other words, some of the negative perceptions of the
plan might be based on extrinsic factors that are limited or have nothing to do with the
effectiveness of the compensation scheme in place in the Rural Southeast School District. One
of the common negative perceptions was in regard to the low starting salary and the high cost of
health insurance for teachers. These perceptions, while important, do not necessarily reflect
poorly on the strategic compensation plan. Rather, they show that even with the possibility of
earning bonus performance-based pay, teachers still want and need a competitive starting salary.
Another implication of this research is that the compensation plan was not clear to
teachers and needed continuous explanation. There was a belief among teachers that there was a
high weight of student achievement in determining their value as teachers, but they did not
necessarily know how that criteria was utilized for the determination of receiving performance-
based pay. We believe that the district teachers need to be given the opportunity to truly
understand the compensation plan’s design, goals, and outcomes so that they can fully benefit
from the available performance-based pay.
Discussion of research question 2. We believe based on analysis of the data that
teachers in the district perceive the strategic compensation plan as a motivational factor to work
harder for the students in order to provide high quality teaching and advance student
achievement. Teacher respondents recognize that the standards for effectiveness are set high and
that they must meet criteria in a range of performance areas to earn the plan bonus, which
requires that they change how they teach in some cases, work with students to make gains
instead of maintaining the status quo, and examine their practice to become more productive
with a broad range of student outcomes.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 118
The quantitative findings for Research Question 2 shows that the strategic compensation
plan was not having a statistically significant impact on TEAM level of effectiveness scores,
which showed participation in the strategic compensation plan did not affect those teacher
behaviors which resulted in a change in TEAM level of effectiveness scores. There are several
possible factors that might explain the gap between the plan and TEAM level of effectiveness
scores. First, it is always possible that there has not been enough time between the
implementation of the compensation plan and the measures of performance on TEAM level of
effectiveness. With any program, it is necessary for teachers to have enough time to grow and
adjust to new expectations. Second, there is also the consideration of assessment. It is possible
that since the TVAAS measures student growth and not proficiency on state assessments, the
objectives of the TEAM level of effectiveness score and the strategic compensation plan are not
aligned close enough for accurate comparison. Finally, it is possible that a blanket approach to
teacher development does not provide the teachers with the individual support and learning
opportunities required to build on their areas of need. For this, data collection and clarity of
expectations are required on the part of the school system.
Discussion of research question 3. There were a broad range of responses and
perceptions noted when we asked participant teachers how they felt the strategic compensation
plan has affected recruitment and retention. Most teachers seem to agree that the plan itself is
not a drawing factor in recruitment, with even new hires explaining that they did not know about
the plan until they were interviewed or hired for the position. A persistent belief is that teachers
perceive the general salaries in the system to be lower than the surrounding counties, which
might have a counter-effect on the interest garnered by the program itself. Teachers noted that
regardless of level or years of service, their base salary would not change. Their perceptions are
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 119
that although they may earn bonuses, other teachers in surrounding districts are rewarded for less
effort and results. These perceptions appear to demonstrate Adams Equity Theory through the
belief that job satisfaction decreases when employees perceive an inequity of reward (Huseman
et al., 1987, p. 222). Teachers within the system felt that the overall reputation of the system for
academics, plus the location in the region, were more influential factors in recruiting teachers
than the strategic compensation plan.
For some, the loss of fellow teachers was more representative of those teachers not being
willing to work harder to meet the new standards or be effective in the practice. For others, the
reduction in pay for those who opted out, the lack of benefits to supplement the plan, frustration
at the difficulty in making gains with some student groups, or being measured in an alternative
position were driving factors. Summarily, it is likely that a variety of factors outside of the
actual plan are impacting teacher retention. Clearly the faculty participating in this study sees a
connection between the strategic compensation plan and the rate of turnover at the schools.
After analyzing the questionnaire responses and coding the interview and focus group
discussions, it is clear to the researchers that teachers in the selected district take great pride in
their work. Several teachers had chosen to stay in the district after being offered better paying
teaching jobs in surrounding counties. Those teachers chose to stay because they were satisfied
with their jobs. An important consideration in light of these responses is that of extrinsic versus
intrinsic motivation. According to Herzberg (1968), some people are more driven by external
factors such as benefits, pay incentives, and other bonuses; however, others are intrinsically
motived, valuing personal pride in their work and work settings over outside reward. For the
teachers assessed in this study, the reward for their hard work seemed to be found in student
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 120
success and moments of achievement, and they appeared to be more positive, willing to go
further, and more dedicated to their work regardless of incentives.
Discussion of other findings. The data revealed much about the teachers themselves, as
well as the concerns that the district will need to address. Teachers want assurance that the plan
is equitable, well supported, and that they have what they need in order to ensure their students
can succeed. There is no perfect system; however, balancing the teacher needs and concerns
along with stakeholder needs and concerns will improve the opportunity for a successful plan.
These findings could be related to Adam’s Equity Theory, which proposes that as a result of the
distress of either over-reward or under-reward, inequitably rewarded individuals should
experience lower levels of job satisfaction than equitably rewarded individuals (Huseman et al.,
1987). When teachers’ needs and concerns are met, their sense of equity is increased.
Rewarding those who go above and beyond seems fair and equitable. Moreover, this will
encourage the positive teacher behaviors and outcomes, regardless of experience or education
level.
We want to make sure that we note that we did not find evidence that teachers who have
positive perceptions about performance-based pay are better teachers. Opinions about
performance-based pay vary widely. As previously stated, teachers tend to have an egalitarian
view of their role as educators. Whether a teacher has a favorable view of strategic
compensation has no bearing on that teacher’s ability to be an excellent educator. As
researchers, we want to be careful that we are not implying through this study that good teachers
favor strategic compensation and poor quality teachers do not. That is not our sincere belief.
Pay schemes and designs vary widely, which makes any performance pay system hard to
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 121
compare with others. A teacher’s negative perceptions about performance-based pay do not
mean that he or she is a less quality educator.
Recommendations for Practice
In this study, the researchers investigated the teacher perceptions of the strategic
compensation plan. Based on the findings from the questionnaire, focus groups, and interviews
we have four recommendations for practice. The first recommendation is for Rural Southeast
School District to do a book study and/or professional development workshop on perception or
paradigm shift of change. The work of Carol Dweck (2014) on fixed mindset versus growth
mindset offers a framework to allow teachers to see possibilities instead of challenges. The
Rural Southeast School District, like any people-centered organization, would benefit from the
growth mindset research and work of Dweck. Additionally, Dweck’s framework for growth
could be paralleled with Herzberg’s Motivational Theory to develop an understanding of how
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation work. The implementation of a professional learning
community (PLC) in which teachers could discuss and develop an understanding of
stakeholder’s expectations on public schools would allow the PLC members an outlet for
expressing their fears and frustrations. In turn, the PLC facilitator could utilize Dweck’s work of
growth to help teachers build a communication plan that teachers could use when talking with
parents, speaking with the public, and most importantly, when discussing the implementation
and refinement of the strategic compensation plan. The PLC work could satisfy both the internal
and external motivator’s defined by Herzberg and empower teachers to feel they were in control
of their future.
Understanding that striving to continuously learn and develop new skills improves their
intelligence as well as the students they teach. Because of the growth mindset that the strategic
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 122
compensation plan offers to the organization, the researchers believe the study could offer segue
for teachers to see the need for the change. This paradigm shift is valuable for the teacher in the
classroom as well as an employee of the organization, which leads us to the second
recommendation.
Our second recommendation is for the Rural Southeast School District to consider
professional development regarding the Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM).
Several teachers indicated that they did not have clarity as to how their evaluation scores were
tied to the strategic compensation plan. Understanding TEAM could help teachers not only
better understand the evaluation process, but also provide clarification to help teachers fully
understand how the strategic compensation plan works and how they can earn additional pay
through their performance during teacher evaluations.
The researchers’ third recommendation is for the Rural Southeast School District, or any
district interested in putting into place a strategic compensation system, to meet openly with
teachers. The team believes that building the strategic compensation model with teacher input is
critical for success. The process could utilize a framework that will allow the leadership to
facilitate the conversation and build community and teacher capacity. The following
collaborative outline and timeline is an example of building a strategic compensation model
during a school year to be implemented the following year:
1. Community Engagement Meeting and Surveys (November/December) – invite 30 to 40
community stakeholders for input and feedback on building a strategic compensation
plan. Include parents, teachers, business owners, government officials, industry leaders,
etc. to explain the project and gain feedback. This type meeting will allow teachers to
hear from stakeholders outside the organization. This is valuable knowledge for teachers
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 123
and educational leaders to understand public expectations when allocating taxpayer
resources. Conduct a survey for all teachers to participate in for direct feedback.
2. Focus Group Meetings (January/March) – the focus groups should be 10 to 12 people
made up of teacher-leaders, school/system leaders, and one or two key members of local
government that are tied to school funding. The focus group will develop the primary
bonuses and supplements to be implemented based on feedback from the community
engagement and teacher survey feedback. The group would meet two to three times
based on need and development of plan.
3. Plan Building Team (April/May) – the group would be made up of three to five leaders
of the system that would build the strategic compensation plan and implementation
timeline. The group should have at least one teacher and one building level leader. This
would be the final step before the director provided the plan to the board for approval.
4. Annual Review (April/May) – the research team believes a team of three to five school
personnel and at least one community member should review the plan for needed
changes and to ensure that the plan goals are being met.
Giving teachers clear expectations, requirements, and benefits of participating in a
strategic compensation plan will enhance its success. Also, it would be to the advantage of the
system to maintain the annual review and dialogue with teachers. Having continuous open
dialogue that includes teacher input is in alignment with the research of Holcombe (2010) as well
as Lussier and Forgione (2010), and the researchers agree that sustainability and longevity of the
strategic compensation plan would be the result.
The researchers believe it is important that teachers be supported, encouraged, and
empowered. Collectively, all of these areas form the underpinning of a successful strategic
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 124
compensation plan that inspires buy-in from the teachers. Additionally, approaching the school
district as a community of learners strengthens teacher efficacy. When including students,
teachers, administrators, and district stakeholders in the development of rewards, a synergy is
formed to ensure that teachers meet their goals from year to year.
Our fourth recommendation is that the district creates a strategic compensation guide.
The researchers received good teacher feedback from the questionnaire, interviews, and focus
group conversations, which revealed that many teachers had lingering questions about the
strategic compensation plan and how it works, even after several years of implementation.
During our interviews, several teachers indicated that there is value in understanding how the
strategic compensation plan works. Their comments further indicated that potential new teachers
to the district would be curious about how the strategic compensation plan works. In relation to
this evidence, the researchers feel that a strategic compensation guide would be a useful tool in
clarifying the philosophy, design, goals, terms, and benefits associated with the strategic
compensation plan. Such a guide would prove beneficial to current teachers, future teacher
recruits, other school districts, and state/national figures interested in learning more about the
strategic compensation plan.
The researchers believe that the Rural Southeast School District will have greater success
in retention and recruitment of successful teachers, if these recommendations are put into
practice.
Limitations
This study had several limitations associated with the research. The researchers limited
the survey questions to current and former Rural Southeast District teachers and administrators.
The number of professional staff in the district, which totals 88 as well as the 17 former faculty
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 125
members, limited the researchers. Access to individuals completing the surveys and interviews
was limited to participants who voluntarily completed and returned the questionnaire.
Several characteristics of the research limit its application to other settings as well as
interpretation. The primary limitation is that of sample size. Since this study took place in one
district with a sample that was convenient and only representative of the district's population, the
results are limited in respect to comparing to other research samples or populations. New
teachers were not given the same option to participate or not participate that was given to the
teachers employed before the plan’s implementation. The interviews themselves, while
informative, do not always address every element of a problem or research question that might
be meaningful. While the researchers attempted to account for these limitations with open-ended
questions and by recognizing the limits of our sample, there is also a realization that they are
present and may impact the research project. Finally, strategic compensation plans differ widely
from district to district. They are typically customized based on the needs of a district and the
funding available. Because of this, the nature of the strategic compensation itself is a limiting
factor as no two plans can be directly compared to one another. Therefore, any inferences
beyond this group should only be drawn after careful consideration of the target population.
Recommendations for Further Research
Because of this study, we recommend additional research to understand further teacher
perceptions surrounding strategic compensation. First, further study is needed that addresses the
sample limitations of the present study. The research would involve conducting additional
research on a wider scale representing school systems in the region and the state of Tennessee.
This extension of the research would allow for greater generalization and application of the
findings of this study and allow confirmation or addition to the conclusions. Since strategic
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 126
compensation is a growing trend in education, it would be beneficial for districts considering
such plans to put in place pre- and post- assessments for gaining teacher reflection and feedback.
Utilizing teacher feedback with strategically placed change may very well make the plan
sustainable for the district.
Moreover, we recommend focus groups to determine what is important to their faculty,
what their concerns may be, and a continuous re-evaluation to ensure that the plan does not
stagnate year to year. Finally, we feel that it is important to assess whether strategic
compensation plans are having an overall positive impact on student achievement, teacher
retention/recruitment, and teacher effectiveness. As these are the primary goals of any strategic
compensation plan, it is imperative that plans be continually monitored to ensure they are
successful. A correlative study on teacher perception and student achievement that utilizes the
qualitative and quantitative findings may offer a clearer picture for school leaders that have
interest in strategic compensation value. Additionally, evaluations are necessary to ensure that
any plan put in place meets the goals and outcomes intended.
Reflections
Through our research we have gained insight into how teachers perceive strategic
compensation as well as how they perceive their current role as educators. Teachers are typically
motivated to serve the greater good and, while they desire to be compensated well through
financial and other benefits, overall they tend to be more intrinsically motivated. This was true
in our research as well with multiple teachers expressing that they desired to have positive
feedback from administrators and to know that they were doing well as they performed their
jobs.
It is noted that salary is connected to the strategic compensation plan so even if there
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 127
were no perceived impact of the plan directly on retention, it was at least an indirect factor in
retention rates. Teachers are professionals in terms of education and licensure and feel they
have a reasonable expectation of security and some comfort for themselves and their families
when it comes to pay and benefits. The lack of this security and comfort in light of increasing
cost of living was a driving factor in their desires to seek employment elsewhere and their
perceptions of teachers whom they feel are leaving the system at a high rate.
It was also interesting to see that teachers feel burdened by the current focus on
assessments as the primary measure of the success of teachers, students, and schools. While they
want their quality teaching to be validated through good test scores, the current level of emphasis
on testing can be overwhelming and at times discouraging.
Building relationships with educators and administrators in the Rural Southeast
Tennessee District was beneficial to the researchers. Seeing how the district was able to reward
teachers for a job well done was enlightening. None of the researchers currently work in districts
that offer performance-based pay, so the conversations in the interviews and focus groups were
extremely interesting and provided insights that we were able to bring back to the school districts
in which we are employed.
Through our collection and analysis of data, we were able to learn to be thorough and
patient. Both of these traits are crucial for educators today. We wanted to be certain that we
clearly told the story of these teachers’ perceptions of performance-based pay. They had
entrusted us with their honest view of the compensation plan, and we sought to accurately
analyze and discuss their perspectives. Taking time to review and code responses was time
consuming, but we wanted to make sure that we understood the teachers’ points of view.
Quality, balanced research can be difficult to locate, and we hope that as this study is read and
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 128
cited by others in the field and that they will find our study to be beneficial as they seek to find
new ways of rewarding teachers for a job well done.
In reflecting on our research team, it was very apparent that each team member brought a
distinctive dynamic that added to the team’s effectiveness. However, this effectiveness was
developed over time and realized during the last three to four months of our work. Our team
worked extremely hard over the last year fulfilling our program requirements, but working hard
does not equate to working smart. Our capstone project has enabled each teammate to develop
and grow their collaborative skills and processes of team collaboration. Each of us had to lean
on our colleagues and place our unconditional trust in them. This last year we all have had “life”
struggles, but it has been through these struggles that we became dependent on each other but
most importantly, comfortable and accountable.
Initially, time became a constraint in which we all had to learn to prioritize. As the
capstone project developed and committee feedback was given, the pressure of working within
the collaborative environment became the next factor of learning with the team. If anyone ever
had the idea that writing a dissertation within a team would be easier, forget it, it’s not! It’s just
different, and that difference is valuable because it teaches accountability to the team. Any of us
might have quit had it not been for our commitment to our teammates and we all became more
dependent on each other. As we entered the last stretch, the temperature of the project rose as we
faced finality of the timeline. It was during the last month of the project that a metamorphism
took place where our team, our committee, and our cohort supporters became a family. As we
reflect, we remember at the beginning that our program director stating that although the journey
will be hard, we would always have support to see us through. It was just as he stated!
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 129
Our team experienced many highs and lows with some sizable obstacles along the way
like many of our cohort counterparts. However, we pulled together and accomplished what few
thought possible given our timeline for completion. With many long and late hours of writing
and rewriting, we accomplished our goal with the words “you have successfully defended your
research, congratulations.”
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 130
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Letter
Strategic Compensation Model Study
You are invited to participate in a research study investigating teachers’ perceptions of
changes in classroom behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation model in the Rural
Southeast School District. This study is being conducted by Lipscomb University doctoral
candidates/researchers Rick Carter, Trey Holladay, and Jennifer Lancaster under the
supervision of Dr. English, a faculty member in the Department of Teacher Education and
Assessment. Please read this form and ask questions before you agree to be in the study.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to determine the teachers’ perceptions of changes in classroom
behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation model in the Rural Southeast School District.
Approximately 95 people are expected to participate in this research.
Procedures:
If you decide to participate, we will conduct a survey with you. The survey will include
questions about your job, the hours you work, how much you earn, the number of classes you
teach in the Rural Southeast School District, and how much you time you spend preparing and
planning to perform your job. The survey will take about 15 minutes to complete.
Risks and Benefits of being in the study:
Participating in this study may not benefit you directly, but it will help us learn the teachers’
perceptions of changes in classroom behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation model in
the Rural Southeast School District. You may find answering some of the questions upsetting,
but we expect that this would not be different from the kinds of things you discuss with family or
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 142
friends. You may skip any questions you do not want to answer and you may end the survey at
any time.
The benefits to participation are that the Rural Southeast School District will be able to build
a collection of information from the teachers’ perspective of changes in classroom
behaviors as a result of the strategic compensation model. This collection of information could
be used for potential adjustments and/or possible modifications of the compensation model.
Confidentiality:
Any information obtained in connection with this research study that can be identified with
you will be disclosed only with your permission; your results will be kept confidential. In any
written reports or publications, no one will be identified or identifiable and only group data
will be presented. Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have
access to the records. If we record the interview, we will destroy the recording after it has been
transcribed, which we anticipate will be within two months of its recording.
We will keep the research results in a locked file cabinet in Alabama and only the researchers
named in this form and our advisor will have access to the records while we work on this
project. We will finish analyzing the data by February 2015. We will then destroy all original
reports and identifying information that can be linked back to you.
Voluntary nature of the study:
Participation in this research study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate
will not affect your future relations with the Rural Southeast School District and Lipscomb
University in any way. If you decide to participate, you are free to stop at any time without
affecting these relationships.
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New Information:
If during course of this research study we learn about new findings that might influence your
willingness to continue participating in the study, we will inform you of these findings.
Contacts and questions:
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the researchers conducting this study.
Rick Carter, Trey Holladay, or Jennifer Lancaster. You may ask questions now, or if you have
other questions or concerns regarding the study and would like to talk to someone other than
the researcher(s), you may also contact Dr. Roger Wiemers, chair of the Lipscomb University
Institutional Review Board, roger.wiemers@lipscomb.edu.
You may keep a copy of this form for your records.
Statement of Consent:
You are making a decision whether or not to participate. Your signature indicates that you
have read this information and your questions have been answered. Even after signing this
form, please know that you may withdraw from the study at any time.
I consent to participate in the study.
Signature of Participant Date
Signature of Researcher Date
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Appendix B: Research Instrument
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Appendix C: Focus Group Questions
Focus Group Questions
1. What do you find most rewarding about teaching?
2. What changes, if any, do you think should be made to the current evaluation tools used
for the Rural Southeast School District’s Compensation Plan?
3. What changes in the compensation plan would you like to see?
4. Have you seen a change in teacher motivation since the Rural Southeast School District’s
Compensation Plan was implemented? Please explain.
5. Is there anything else you want to add?
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
Interview Questions
1. How long have you been a teacher?
2. What is your overall opinion of the Rural Southeast School District’s Compensation
Plan?
3. In your opinion, what is/would be the worst aspect of the Rural Southeast School
District’s Compensation Plan?
4. In your opinion, what is/would be the best aspect of the Rural Southeast School District’s
Compensation Plan?
5. How has strategic compensation impacted your decision to retire/remain in the Rural
Southeast School District?
6. Should Student achievement be included in your evaluation? Please explain.
7. Is there anything else you want to add?
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Appendix E: Table 25
Table 25
Individual Interview Questions Overall Themed Response by Grade Level
How long have you been a teacher?
Elementary Middle High
3rd, 22nd, 7th 3rd, 16th, 8th 5th, 18, 1st
What is your overall opinion of the Rural Southeast School District’s Compensation Plan?
Elementary Middle High
It’s a good thing Good Good, more info needed
In your opinion, what is/would be the worst aspect of the Rural Southeast School District’s Compensation Plan? Elementary Middle High
It is based on student scores There are a lot of misconceptions Lack of information
How has strategic compensation impacted your decision to retire/remain in the Rural Southeast School District? Elementary Middle High
Has not made a difference in decision Has not affected me staying Has not affected my decision
Should student achievement be included in your evaluation? Please explain.
Elementary Middle High
Yes, with modification of the plan Yes, with modification of the plan Yes
Is there anything else you want to add?
Elementary Middle High
Not at this time Good for everyone and motivates people No
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Appendix F: Pilot Test
Lipscomb University College of Education
Doctor of Education in Learning Organizations and Strategic Change
FA13 Capstone Projects Scenario for Pilot Study
Your Help/Part: We are asking for your assistance in vetting our instrument by completing the
survey attached by the link below. Please act as if you are a teacher in the Fictitious Schools
District as you take this survey. Please use your current demographic data. Ex. If you are a
second year teacher with your current system, reflect the same information for the Fictitious
Schools District. Our goal is to make sure our survey is clear and understandable by you the
survey respondent. In the end you will be asked for feedback on the survey and any
recommendations you feel might better clarify or improve the survey. Below you will find
information that better explains the scenario background information. If you have any questions
please email me at rcarter@jcsboe.org
Scenario Description: Fictitious Schools District is a small district located about 50 miles east
of a large city. The Fictitious County Board of Education serves more than 1,200 students. It
was the recipient of the federal Race To The Top grant and is designated as an exemplary school
district by the State Department of Education.
The Problem or Issue to be studied: The Fictitious Schools District implemented a strategic
compensation model (merit pay) for all newly hired faculty and allowed current faculty to opt in
if they desired. The model is based on each teacher’s individual effectiveness score. The model
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utilizes the following data points on individual teacher performance criteria to surmise a rating
for each teacher’s effectiveness and correlating total score:
o Student test scores o Participation in school professional development o Hard to staff areas
Fictitious Schools District’s Purpose for the Research Project: The Fictitious Schools District
has quantitative data that measures the effectiveness of the program in attracting and retaining
high performing teachers, but it needs qualitative data or how teachers feel about the program to
inform its analysis of the model. The Fictitious Schools District wishes to know what motivates
teacher behavior related to the compensation model. These behaviors and motivations cannot be
explained by quantitative data alone. This project will be primarily qualitative, and it will rely
on data gathered from individual faculty members. Quantitative data such as student
achievement, teacher effectiveness scores, and faculty survey data will be provided by the
district.
You may open the survey in your web browser by clicking the link below:
Strategic Compensation Questionnaire
If the link above does not work, try copying the link below into your web browser:
https://survey.lipscomb.edu/surveys/?s=4KLgyM
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Appendix G: MOU
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN LIPSCOMB UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
AND THE RURAL SOUTHEAST SCHOOL DISTRICT’S BOARD OF EDUCATION
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes the relationship and guidelines
between the above parties regarding the research partnership described below.
The College of Education (COE) of Lipscomb University offers the Doctor of Education
(Ed.D.) degree in Learning Organizations and Strategic Change. This degree is focused on
preparing leaders for public and private organizations and academic settings. The program
culminates with a practical, collaborative capstone research project with a partner organization,
the selected Board of Education, ("The Client") that has requested a Capstone Team to address
a real research need in an authentic setting. Successful completion of this capstone project will
fulfill part of the requirements for completion of the Doctor of Education degree.
The Rural Southeast School District serves more than 1,200 students. It was a recent recipient
of the SCORE Prize and is designated as an exemplary school district by the Tennessee
Department of Education.
The College of Education at Lipscomb University and the Client are entering into an operating
under this MOU for a research partnership and agree to the following.
I. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
The Client has submitted a Request for Assistance (RFA) outlining the following research
need:
What are the qualitative factors, which lead teachers to be high performing? Specifically, how
effective is the strategic compensation program used by the Rural Southeast School District in
motivating teachers to be high performing teachers under the plan's parameters?
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 154
II. PROJECT PARAMETERS
The COE will supervise and direct a team of two to four doctoral students who will frame and
conduct the research, and form recommendations for the client's research need.
The COE will provide the training for the Ed.D. students to complete the requested research
project through its curriculum and capstone project support structures. This training and
support includes but is not limited to quantitative and qualitative research techniques,
instrument design, and development of specific timelines, benchmarks, and processes pertaining
to conducting research, and the assignment of a capstone faculty adviser who will oversee the
team throughout the research project.
The Client will provide quantitative data as necessary including student achievement data and
teacher effectiveness data. This data will have no identifying factors other than, randomized
identifiers. The Client will provide qualitative access to administration board members,
teachers, staff and community stakeholders.
III. PROJECTED RESEARCH TIMELINE
The Client will present a 10-minute presentation (including Q & A) of the RFA to the Fall 2013
Cohort on Client Presentation Day, which is scheduled for the evening of Monday, June 2, 2014.
∼ June 2, 2014: Client Presentation Dinner. The Client will present a 10-minute presentation (including Q & A) of this project to the Fall 2013 Cohort.
∼ June 6, 2014: cohorts return ranking sheets
∼ June 9, 2014: Teams assigned
∼ June 30, 2014: Teams should have met with Client
∼ September 8, 2014: deadline for project proposal to Client
∼ September 15, 2014: deadline for Client approval or revision request of proposal
∼ September 22, 2014: deadline for project proposal submission to Lipscomb IRB. Substantive changes requested by the IRB will be discussed with the Client prior to implementation. Pilot testing of instruments and official collection of data may not begin until approval has been received by the IRB.
∼ January 30, 2015: deadline for submission of first three chapters to the Juried Review Committee. The Capstone Team will submit a draft of the first three chapters of their research manuscript and any applicable research instruments to their juried Review
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 155
Committee. Chapter three should include a description of pilot testing of research instruments if applicable. The Juried Review Committee and the Client must approve the final research instrument(s) before official data collection begins.
∼ TBD, November 2014- January 2015: Upon receiving approval from the IRB, the Capstone Team will formally begin the research.
∼ June 1, 2015: target date for completion of data analysis
∼ July 15-October 15, 2015: window for presentation of research to Client and Juried Review Committee
∼ Client will complete evaluation of the analysis and the project experience one week after presentation
∼ July- November 2015: team completes technical review and uploads to ProQuest electronic copy sent to Client for use at Client's discretion.
∼ December 12, 2015: (tentative) graduation
IV. LIPSCOMB UNIVERSITY'S INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB)
Capstone students are required to gain approval from the Lipscomb IRB prior to conducting
research involving human subjects. All capstone students will submit a research proposal to the
IRB. This is to be an electronic submission to the chair of the IRB at irb@lipscomb.edu with a
cc. to the faculty capstone advisor, Dr. Hebert, tshebert@lipscomb.edu, and Dr. Wiemers,
roger.wiemers@lipscomb .edu. The research proposal will be submitted to and approved by the
Client prior to submission to Lipscomb's IRB.
V. FUNDING
The Capstone Team, the COE, and the Client will make every reasonable effort to minimize
costs associated with this project.
As of the date of the signing of this document, the project presented by the client is
expected to require no funding by either the COE or the Client.
Capstone Team members are expected to be responsible for normal and customary costs
associated with doctoral students engaging in doctoral research (i.e. cost of mailings printing,
paper, envelopes, postage, transportation, phone calls, email, etc.). However, should the
Capstone Team members identify what they consider to be an out-of-the- ' ordinary funding
need, then the team members should seek funding from the Client during development of their
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 156
project proposal and prior to submission of the proposal to Lipscomb's IRB. Regardless of
when the funding need is realized, written approval and agreement to provide funding should
be received from the Client prior to any expenditure being made. Expenditures incurred
without expressed written approval from the Client will be the responsibility of the Capstone
Team members. Team members will be provided a copy of this MOU.
Lipscomb University shall indemnify and hold harmless the Client, its officers, agents, and
employees from any and all claims, losses, damages or liability, including attorney's fees,
resulting from or attributable to the acts of Lipscomb University its employees or agents.
IX. AUTHORIZATION
On behalf of the Lipscomb University College of Education and the Client, the undersigned
agree to the above stipulations and pledge that the organizations will strive to the best of their
abilities and in good faith to complete these objectives.
Further, we pledge that should the need for modifications arise, we will in good faith
attempt to make such changes or additions as the situation dictates and as are further
detailed in subsequent mutually agreed upon addendums to this document.
X. MISCELLANEOUS TERMS
The following terms shall apply in the interpretation and performance of this MOU:
Relationship of the Parties- This MOU shall not be construed to create a relationship of
partners, brokers, employees, servants or agents as between the parties.
A. Advertising and Publicity- Neither party shall use the other's name, or any name that is likely to suggest that it is related to the other institution, in any advertising, promotion or sales literature without first obtaining the written consent of the other party. Any publications regarding this MOU must be reviewed and approved by the parties.
B. Governing Law: Forum -This MOU shall be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of Tennessee, which shall be the forum for any lawsuits arising from an incident to this MOU.
C. Waiver- A waiver of any breach of any provision of this MOU shall not be construed as a continuing waiver of said breach or a waiver of any other breaches of the same or other provisions of this MOU.
D. Non-Assignment - This MOU may not be assigned by either party without the advance written consent of the other.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 157
Severability- In the event one or more clauses of this Agreement are declared illegal, void or
unenforceable, that shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Agreement.
<The signatures have been purposefully deleted to maintain the anonymity of the Client. >
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 158
Appendix H: NIH Certificates of Completion
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Appendix I: IRB Approval
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Appendix J: Team Member Biographies
Rick Carter
Rick Carter is a fifteen year public school educator; eleven as an administrator. He holds a B.S., M.Ed., and Ed.S. from Jacksonville State University and is presently in defense of his Doctorate in Educational Leadership and Strategic Change from Lipscomb University. He has served as a principal for over seven years earning Alabama’s Principal of the Year in 2013 and the Council for Leaders in Alabama Schools (CLAS) Leadership Award for Alabama in 2013. He also led his school in a transformational one to one initiative with Apple earning his school system the National Apple Distinguished System title in 2014-15 while adding Apple Distinguished Principal to his list of honors. Mr. Carter speaks frequently on school improvement, school culture, and technology integration on both the national and state levels. He serves as a mentor for new principals and assistant principals for the Alabama State Department of Education. He received his mentor certification from The National Association of Elementary School Principals. His other experiences include assistant principal, athletic director, elementary teacher, secondary teacher, and coach. Mr. Carter has been married to his wife, Shannon Carter for more than seventeen years They have four children, Helen Grace, Katelyn Marie, Sarah Jo, and Megan Sally.
Jennifer Dunlap
Jennifer Dunlap graduated in 2001 with a bachelor’s degree in Integrative Studies from the University of Memphis. She taught seventh and later fifth grade as she pursued a M.Ed. in Gifted Education, which she attained in 2006 from Northeastern Illinois University. While teaching fourth grade in the Clarksville Montgomery County School System, she has served as grade level team leader and is currently one of three elementary math lead teachers for the district’s twenty-seven elementary schools. In addition to teaching her students, her duties include leading district-wide staff development sessions as well as articulating curricular connections within and across content areas. She currently teaches fourth grade math and science at Barksdale Elementary School in Clarksville, TN. She has a passion for being challenging and engaging in her lessons so that her students are able to make real world connections through STEM integration.
W. L. ‘Trey’ Holladay III
Trey Holladay is a thirty-year veteran public school educator with twenty-seven years spent in educational leadership. He holds a B.S.Ed. from Athens State University in social science, a M.Ed. from the University of West Alabama in educational leadership, an Ed.S. from Lincoln Memorial University in educational leadership and presently in defense of his Doctorate in Educational Leadership and Strategic Change from Lipscomb University. He is in his third-year as superintendent of the Athens City Schools system. His experiences include system-wide administrator, high school principal, elementary principal, assistant principal, athletic director, classroom teacher, and head football coach in the state of Alabama.
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC COMPENSATION 163
Trey has been a frequent speaker on best practices in continuous school improvement and special education on both the national and state levels. He has spoken at the Consortium of School Networking in Atlanta, Georgia; the National Association of State Special Education Directors in Williamsburg, Virginia; The American Society of Quality in Education in St. Louis, Missouri; and the Alabama State Department of Education’s Mega Conference and Alabama Transitions on best practices in special education models. He has served as a mentor for new principals and assistant principals throughout the state. In the past, he served as the president of the state principals’ association and was selected as the Alabama Secondary Principal of the Year. He believes in life-long learning and frequently attends continuing education conferences on instructional leadership and business improvement. He has been married to his wife, Deborah, for twenty-eight years. They have two children: Will, a recent graduate of Auburn University and arborist and Mary Kate, a freshman at the University of Alabama.
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