intro to law reviewer 2012 (1)
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DAY1
OVERVIEWOFTHECOURSE(PowerpointPresentation)
THECONCEPTOFLAW
Positivelawsarethosethatmaybepromulgated,passed,adopted,orotherwiseposited
byanofficialorentityvestedwithauthoritybythegovernmenttoprescribetherulesand
regulations for a particular community or otherwise they are the written rules and
regulationsenactedbygovernment.
Natural lawis purportedlybasedonuniversallyacceptedmoralprinciples,"God'slaw,"
and/or derived from nature and reason. It is the unwritten body of universal moral
principlesthatunderlietheethicalandlegalnormsbywhichhumanconductissometimes
evaluatedandgoverned
Divinenaturallawrepresentsthesystemofprinciplesbelievedtohavebeenrevealedor
inspiredbyGodorsome othersupremeand supernaturalbeing.Thesedivineprinciples
aretypicallyreflectedbyauthoritativereligiouswritingssuchasScripture.
Humanlawemanatesfromhumanreasonprovidedthatit hasthefollowingrequisites:
Thelawmustbeameasureofthings,andsuchmeasuremustbecertain.Also,apersons
participation in eternal law is not perfect. It involves a certain level of mode and
individuality. This imperfection is mitigated by humanreason, such as providing legal
sanctions
LEGALPROCESS
Municipal lawis the national, domestic, or internallawof asovereignstatedefined in
oppositiontointernationallaw.Municipallawincludesnotonlylawatthenationallevel,
butlawatthestate,provincial,territorial,regionalorlocallevels.
International law is the body oflegalrulesgoverning interaction betweensovereign
states(Public International Law) and therightsanddutiesof thecitizensof sovereign
states towards the citizens of other sovereign states (Private International Law).
DworkinsInterpretativeTheory
A. RulesandPrinciples:TheIdeaofFit Legalinterpretation,when properlycarriedout,willrequirethe
makingofmoraljudgments
o Morality is intertwined with and will have a greatinfluenceontheinterpretationoflaws
Laws are rules not just confinedto the written codes,judicialdecisions and official documents or a mere product of power
struggles and politics. Rather, they are a reflection of an
underlyinggovernmentphilosophy.
o Govtphilosophy =moral principleson thepurposeofgovernment+relationsofthegovtandtheindividual
Moralprinciplesbehindthelawsthenserveasthebasisinfindinganswersforhardcases,ifthedirectsolutioncannotbefoundin
thewrittenlawsthemselves.
Howdoes one determine themoral principlesbehind the lawsbeingadoptedbyacommunity/groupofpeople?
o Bylooking atthe DEGREE OFFIT betweenthe moralprinciplesandlaws/rules
DEGREEOFFITismeasuredbylookingat:1. Logicalconsistencytotalconsistencyis
impossible, expression (through the
rules/laws) is the outcome of
consistency
2. Powertohelpprovidearationalecanexplain why most of the rules being
followed and adopted are the good
ones
B. Fittingthe4thAmendment(oftheUSA):PRIVACY USConstitution,4 thamendment:Rightofpeopletobesecurein
theirpersons,homes, papers, andeffects against unreasonable
searchesandseizures
o Searchforevidenceinoneshomerequirestheofficerstohaveasearchwarrantfortheofficerstogetone,
theyhavetopursuethejudgethattheyhaveprobable
causethatthe person tobe searcheddid commit the
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crime.Ifnosearchwarrantwasobtained,theevidence
collectedwillbetreatedtobeinadmissibleincourt.
Theprotectionofprivacyfitsthe4thAmendmento Itis amoral principlewhichplacesrestrictionson the
governmentinimplementinganti-criminalmeasures
o Privacy others maynot intrude (thehomes, papers,person/body) without the owners consent; right to
non-disclosureofinformationthatmaybeusedtoharm
theperson
o Restrictions may not be absolute, it should find abalance betweeneffectiveimplementationof the law
and respect for the r ights of the people by the
governmentandtheothercitizens
Caseinpoint:OlmstedvUnitedStates This case involved the wiretapping of a
suspected criminals phone by the
governmentwithoutasearchwarrant
Becausetechnologywasnotyetapparenttothosewhowrotethe 4
thamendment,they
only imagined physical intrusion as an
invasionofprivacy
The court decided that this was not av iolation because i t only served the
governmentagatheringofinformation,not
a direct physical invasion of the criminals
personoranyofhisproperty.
o BUT, in using the fit theory ofDworkin,we canconcludethat this
isaviolationofthe4th
Amendmento Because,again,thereare 2aspects
to privacy: physical and
informational
o More correct conclusion:wiretapping without a search
warrant is a VIOLATION ofthe 4th
Amendment
o Asasupportforthe4thamendment,therighttoprivacycan stillbe interpreted indifferentways. Some may
actually thinkthat wiretappingis a violation,but the
randomdrugtestingforemployeesisnt.Whileothersthinkthatprivacy stretchesto most,oralmostall the
intimatechoiceswemake,suchasusingcontraceptives
or not.Althoughthey areall varying perspectiveson
theconcept,theyarestilllogicallyconsistent,theyare
stillfittogivethe4thamendmentarationale.But,if
weare tomake a choice amongall,how are weto
choose?Atthispoint,MORALITYstepsin.
C. TheRoleofMorality Inchoosingamongthefitprinciples,onehastochoosewhichisthe
bestmorally.
Forexample,amorerestrictedprivacyprinciple(righttochoosetousecontraceptivesor getan abortion)maynot bemorallyupright, then
thebroaderprinciple(rightagainstintrusion),whichis moral,canbe
treatedaspartofthelaw.
Again, byhaving these principles,which provide a rationale to thewritten laws,we can actuallyconsult these principles if weare to
resolve hard cases whose answers cant be found directly in the
writtenlaws.
Todecidewhichoneismoralisanindividualchoice.Althoughacasehasbeendecidedincorrectly,itstillbearsthegoodfaithofthejudge
whowentthroughthe processof pickingout which ismoralor not,
consultinghisownvaluesatthat.
Itismorality,whichgivesthelawmoreauthorityandintegrity,morallawsare not justa product of coercion,authoritarianism or rather,dictatorship. It is a set of laws, which has been adopted by a
community because they believe that those laws stand for their
personalvalues.
D. TheChallengeofSkepticism Moral lawsare thosewhichhave themost roomfor disagreements
andsecond-guessing,andthisinvitesadeepskepticisminthelaw
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Although disagreement may weaken the fit principle of Dworkin(thattellsusthatwrittenlawsarebackedupbyprinciples),byleading
topointthatreallytherearenorightanswersonwhicheveryonecan
agreeon(becauseagain,moralchoicesaretobemadeindividually)o BUTDworkintellsusthat,itdoesntmeanthatweargueso
much, thatwecantarriveat acorrectanswer,thereisno
correctansweratall.
2kindsofskepticism:o Externalskepticismholdsthatthereisnothingobjectivein
the world which can make a statement about our moral
obligationstrueorfalse
It poses the possibility that everyone has their ownbiases,sonotonecansaythathisviewismoreaptthan
theother,becausetheirstandardsarenotthesame.
Simply put, there is no standard ruler for moralquestions as compared to the determination of
someones height (which uses the metric/English
system)
BUT,Dworkincountersthisquestioningbysayingthatmakingmoralchoicesarefarfromthemethodsofthe
objectiverealm,onedoesnotusearigidruler.Instead,
moralquestions and answers are as varied as those
individualswhoposethem
Makingmoraldecisionsdoesnothavetobebasedonfactswhichareperceivablebythe
senses
It is an exercise of REASON rather thanempiricaljudgments
BUT,BUT theauthortells usthat Dworkinsview stillhasloopholes,bettertoputitinawaythatinsteadof
moraldecisions not having a standard rule, itis the
modeofargument(ormodeofarrivingattheanswer)
whichisvarying
o Internalskepticism this view actually trashes thewholefittheoryofDworkin,ittellsusthattherearenoprinciples,
whichbackupthelaws.Lawsarejustaproductofaleaders
whims and will,mere exercise ofpowerby theone who
controlsthegovernment
That politics is unjust and oppressive, that the lawscoming fromthe government favor thosewho ruleit(thewealthyandthepowerful)
E. AssessingDworkin UnlikeAquinas,Dworkinthatdoesnotholdthatunjustrulesare
invalidlaws
UnlikeFuller,Dworkinbelievesthatlegalityofthelawsdoesnotobligethepeopletoactuallyfollow
o Locatesthefoundationoflawsintheintegrityofit His views, althoughitseemslike, does notgive the judgesthe
authoritytojustwhimsicallydecidethecases(becausehowthey
willresolveitwilldependentirelyontheirmoralbeliefs)rather,
thesejudgesarehighlyencouragedtolookattheotherdecisions,
because thesedecisions,especially ifthey decide asa majority,
reflects themoralityof a bigger population,the morality ofa
society.
Criticsassertthatitisfaultytolookatmoralityasthesourceofauthority of the law, rather there is a superior theory, Legal
positivismwhichposesamoreaptexplanation
LEGALPOSITIVISM
Thisviewrejectsthe traditionalnaturallawtheorythatgenuinelawsarenecessarilyjustlaws.
Thisviewalsorejectsthe necessarylinksbetweenmoralityand laws(rejectsDworkin)
A. JohnAustinsTheoryofLaw LawasaCommand
o Laws are laid down by the rulers (or a sovereignindependentpoliticalsociety),tobefollowedbythosewho
areunderthem.
Sovereigntycanonlybedefinedbypower,notbyanyotherstandardsuchasmoralityorjustice
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Though might does not make right, it can beimpliedthat(forAustin)mightmakessovereignty,
andso,mightmakespositivelaws
Noneedtothinkofthecommongood,notatallo Theselawsimposeobligationstothefollowers,andifthey
fail toabideby it,theywillfaceundesirableconsequences
(sanctions)
o Lawsareconsideredgeneralcommands Theydontstopattellingyoutodoaspecificthing
ataspecifictime,butittellsyoutoactinacertain
wayallthetime,continuously
o Divine laws: God creatures; Positive law: rulers followers,constituents
o Positive morality those rules accepted informally by agroupofpeople(i.e.club,organization)
o Though,notalltheviolationsoftheselawsmaynotamounttopunishment,theymayjustreceivealowlytreatmentfrom
theothermembersofthegrouporthesociety
o Austins theory answers the question What is law? asdistinguishedfromWhatoughtthelawbe?
o For our legal obligations, we owe allegiance not to thehigherbeingbeyondtheempiricalworld,buttotherulerof
theterritoryweoccupyinthisworld.
o CondemnsthenaturallawtheorythatifalawgoesagainsttheDivinelaw,itisnotbinding
It is an abuse of language, because this is allnonsense
If a person obliged by some positive law andviolatedsomeofitgoesbythisreasoning,judgesshould treat this as an inconclusiveness of
reasoningandshouldbepunished
Mayalsolead toanarchy,tyrannyandhostilitiesbecause traditionalnatural law is tooidealand
preachy
Morality is not entirely set aside, because thedecisionoftherulersinadoptingthelawsisstilla
reflectionofhisownmoralityandthemoralityof
thesocietyhebelongsto.Itsjustthatthetheory
tellsusthatnoindividualcanexempthimselffrom
the rule of law just because he believes that it
doesnotgowiththeDivineLaw.Becauseagain,in
obeyingthelawsofthesovereigntyoftheterritoryyouoccupy isdifferentfrom obeying theDivine,
whichisthesourceofallsovereignty.
B. AssessingAustin Clearcutexplanationinapproachingthenaturallawtheory Althoughitsaysyesandgivesreasonstoitsanswerstothequestion
If alawenforcedby thecourtsis contrarytomoralityandDivine
laws,is itstill validlaw?,thesereasons are not strong enough to
convincesomeonewhosaysno.
Thatthe adoption ofjust traditional lawmay invite anarchy is alsoquestionable,becausetheapplicationofalawtoasocietymaybetoo
practical;itcanberejectedbysometheorists.
o Moralprogressthroughtherejectionofunjustlawsmaybeachieved,butwhatAustinassertsisthattheremaybealot
of moral standards, which could inevitably amount to
confusion.
o TakenotethatAquinaslivedinamedievalworlddominatedbyjustoneChurch,while Austin livedin amodern world
withcompetingcreedsandbeliefs.
o Butthen again,moral argumentationmay actuallylead togenuinemoralprogress.
H.L.A.Hart:LawasPrimaryandSecondaryRules
Hartis consideredas oneof themost prominentpositivist criticsof
Austin
A. TypesofLegalRules ForHart,Austinprovidesforagoodstartforthepositivisttheoristsbut
histheoryisnotadequateenoughtocoverallkindsoflaws
o Itmaybegoodtocovercriminallawsandtaxlaws(becausetheselawsprohibitor commandsomeoneto act)butNOT
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forcontractlaw(whichempowersthepeople,assertsrights
andobligesthosewhohaveanestablishedduty)
Laws l ike the contract law are called power-conferringlaws
Although these rules can also be likened to acommand:they arewrittento alter somethingin
theworldratherthandescribeit.Itempowersthe
persontodosomethingthattheymaynotbeable
to do without the law. While command laws
changetheworld byrequiringthatpersonto do
something, otherwise he will face undesirable
consequences.
Declarationsofthesovereign(power-conferring)::Commandsofthesovereign(Commandlaws)
B. Legalobligation:GovernmentandGunman HartcriticstheanalogyofAustinthatforthepeopletofollow,tohave
asenseofmoralobligation,theyshouldbeinformedofthepossibility
ofapunishment,ofanegativeconsequencewhichcanhappenifthey
failedtoabide.Andthisapproach,asHarttellsusdoesnotdistinguish
thegovernmentfromagunman.
Foravictimofagunman,theobligationthatarisesfromthecommanddoesnotsourcefromanymoralconvictionthatifthevictimfollows,
heisdoingwhatisgoodforhimself,forthegunmanandforeveryone
else.But,heisabidingbythecommandsjustbecauseofthepossibility
ofanegativeconsequenceorapunishment(i.e.,torture,death).
Hart asserts that governments should differentiate itself from agunmanbecauseathreatenedfollowingdoesnotcreateanyobligation
atall(moral,legaletc). Todothat,Hartexplainstheideaofanobligationthroughtheideaofa
rule.
o Aruleexistsifgenerally: Peopleactinacertainway,AND People regard deviations from the way as
somethingtobecriticized
o Conditionis: Externalifitinvolvesoutwardbehavior
Internalifitinvolvestheattitudepeopletakeo Hart thinks that the attitude present in the people (that
deviationfromtheruleisareasontocriticizeaviolator)in
followingthe ruleis essentialbecausewithoutit,it isas ifthesepeople are justfollowingregularities/routineswhich
theycanperceive,thusthereisnoruleatall.
o Thereisaruleifthereisasocialobligationexertingpressureontheindividualtoactuallyabidebyit.
That wouldimprintvalue and importance totherule,tothe pointthatthefollowermayset aside
self-interesttogiveprioritytoit
o Notallsocietiesimposelegalobligationsbecausenotall ofthemhavelegalsystems.
I. PrimaryandSecondaryRulesPrimaryRules:Rulesthatimposesobligations.
Secondary Rules:Not consideredas unimportantbutratherin thesense
thatthey could notexist unless therewereother kindsofrules,namely,
rulesthatimposeobligations.
1strule-RuleofRecognition:Asocietywithlegalsystemthathasarulethatsinglesouttherulesthatimposeobligationsinthesociety.Therulehelps
peoplerecognizetheexistingrulesunderwhichtheywillbeheldofficially
accountable.
2ndrule-Asocietymusthaverulesthatspecifyhowlegallyvalidrulescanbechanged.Thiscouldhelp thesocietyadoptto thechangingconditionsby
makingitpossibletoeliminateoldrulesandenactnewones 3rd rule-A society must have rulesthatempowerspecificindividuals to
enforce andapply societyslegallyvalid rules. Thishelps society ensure
moreeffectivelytheobligationsitimposesonitsmembersaremet.
II. Legalsystem Asystem thatbringstogetherboth primaryand secondaryrules.In any
functioningsystem,thepeoplemustgenerallycomplywiththelegallyvalid
primaryrules,andpublicofficialsmustacceptthesecondaryrulesandthe
primaryrulesidentifiedbytheruleofrecognition.
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A unionof primary andsecondaryrules makesit questionable whetherinternational law, at least at the time the Nuremberg defendants
committedtheiratrocities,constitutedagenuinelegalsystem.
III. HartsViewofLegalSystem
Peoplecomplytorulesfromfearofpunishmentthatmightbeinflictedonthem.
People generallyperceivevalid primary rulesas commandbacked upbythreats.
Existence ofa legalsystem isa matter ofdegree, not anall-or-nothingaffair.Buttheabsenceofsecondaryrulescoveringtheenforcementofthe
primaryrulesseemstobearatherlargegap.
TrialoftheNurembergdefendantswasthebestfeasiblewaytopromotetheestablishmentofInternationalruleofLaw.
IV.
AssessingHart IdeaoflegalObligation:Todrawalinethathasgovernmentsoperatingby
secondary rules on the one side, and both gunmen and arbitrary
governmentsontheother.
HartssecondaryrulesareverymuchlikeFullersinnermoralityoflaw:bothHart and Fuller are providing accounts ofwhat is for a government to
operateundertheruleoflaw.However,Fullergoesontocontendthata
government abiding by his inner morality creates a prima facie moral
obligation to obey laws, while Harts resists the conclusion that a
government ruling through a system of primary and secondary rules
necessarilycreatesanysuchobligation.
HartsInternationalLaw
I. SourcesofDoubt
IsInternationallawreallylaw? Theabsenceofaninternationallegislature,courtswithcompulsoryjurisdiction,
andcentrallyorganizedsanctions haveinspiredmisgivings, at anyrate in the
breastsoflegaltheorists.
Theabsenceoftheseinstitutionsmeansthattherulesforstatesresemblethat
simple formof social structure,consisting onlyof primaryrules ofobligation,
which,when wefind itamong societiesof individuals,weare accustomedto
contrastwithadevelopedlegalsystem.
Internationallawnotonlylacksthesecondaryrulesofchangeandadjudicationwhichprovideforlegislatureandcourts,butalsoaunifyingruleofrecognition
specifying'sources'oflawandprovidinggeneralcriteriafortheidentificationof
itsrules.
Twoprinciplesourcesof doubtconcerningthe legalcharacterofinternationallaw:Botharisefromanadversecomparisonofinternationallawwithmunicipal
law,whichistakenastheclearstandardofwhatlawis.
o First.Lawasfundamentallyamatterofordersbackedbythreatsandcontraststhecharacteroftherulesofinternationallawwiththoseof
municipallaw.
o Second.Statesarefundamentallyincapableofbeingsubjectsoflegalobligation,andcontrastthecharacterofthesubjectsofinternational
lawwiththoseofmunicipallaw.
II. ObligationsandSanctions
Whatismeantbysayingofawholesystemoflawthatis'binding'?Theruleinquestionisavalidrule,andunderitthepersoninquestionhassomeobligation
orduty.Whetheronelegalsystemoranotherappliestoaparticularperson.
How can international law be binding? A question like this expresses doubtaboutthegenerallegalstatusofinternationallaw.'Cansuchrulesasthesebe
meaningfullyandtruthfullysaidevertogiverisetoobligations?'
One source ofdoubton thispointissimplythe absence fromthe systemofcentrally organized sanctions. This is one point of adverse comparison with
municipallaw,therulesofwhicharetakentobeunquestionably'binding'andto
beparadigmsoflegalobligation. Toarguethat internationallawis notbindingbecause ofitslack oforganized
sanctionsistacitlytoaccepttheanalysisofobligationcontainedinthetheory
thatlawisessentiallyamatterofordersbackedbythreats.Thisidentification
distorts the role played in all legal thought and discourse of the ideas of
obligationandduty
Itistruethatnotallrulesgiverisetoobligationsorduties;anditisalsotruethattherules,whichdosogenerallycallforsome,sacrificeofprivateinterests,and
aregenerallysupportedbyseriousdemandsforconformityandinstantcriticism
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ofdeviations. Yetonce wefree ourselvesfrom thepredictiveanalysis andits
parentconceptionoflawasessentiallyanorderbackbythreats,thereseemsno
goodreasonforlimitingthenormativeideaofobligationtorulessupportedby
organizedsanctions The sceptic may point out that there are in a municipal system, certain
provisionswhicharejustifiablycallednecessary;amongtheseareprimaryrules
ofobligation, prohibiting thefree useof violence,and rulesprovidingfor the
officialuse offorce asa sanctionfor theseand otherrules.If suchrulesand
organizedsanctionssupportingthemarein thissensenecessaryformunicipal
law,aretheynotequallysoforinternationallaw?
Theanswer totheargumentinthisformis tobefoundinthose elementarytruths about human beings and their environment, which constitute the
enduring psychological and physical setting ofmunicipal law. In societies of
individuals,approximately equal inphysical strength andvulnerability, physical
sanctionsarebothnecessaryandpossible.
Aggressionbetweenstatesis veryunlikethatbetweenindividuals.The useofviolencebetween statesmustbe public,and though thereis nointernational
police force, there can be very little certainty that it will remain a matter
betweenaggressorandvictim,asamurderortheft,intheabsenceofapolice
force,might.
Toinitiateawaris,evenforthestrongestpower,toriskmuchforanoutcome,which is rarely predictable with reasonable confidence. On the other hand,
becauseoftheinequalityofstates,therecanbenostandingassurancethatthe
combined strength of those on the side of international order is likely to
preponderateoverthepowerstemptedto aggression.Hencetheorganization
anduseofsanctionsmayinvolvefearfulrisksandthethreatofthemaddlittleto
the natural deterrents. Against this very different background of fact,
internationallawhasdevelopedinaformdifferentfromthatofmunicipallaw.
III. ObligationandtheSovereigntyofStates
Oneofthemostpersistentsourcesofperplexityabouttheobligatorycharacterofinternationallawhasbeenthedifficultyfeltinacceptingorexplainingthefact
thata statewhichis sovereignmay alsobe 'bound'by, orhave anobligation
under,internationallaw.
Theexpression'astate'isnotthenameofsomepersonorthinginherentlyor'bynature' outside the law; it is a way of referring to two facts: first, that a
populationinhabitinga territorylivesunderthat formoforderedgovernment
providedbyalegalsystemwithitscharacteristicstructureoflegislature,courts,
andprimaryrules;andsecondly,thatthegovernmentenjoysavaguelydefined
degreeofindependence. It is possible to imagine manydifferent forms of international authority and
correspondinglymany differentlimitations onthe independenceof states. To
recognizethattherearemanypossibleformsanddegreesofdependenceand
independence,is astep towards answeringthe claim thatbecausestatesare
sovereignthey'cannot'besubjecttoorboundbyinternationallawor'can'only
beboundbysomespecificformofinternationallaw.
Therulesofinternationallawareindeedvagueandconflictingonmanypoints,sothatdoubtabouttheareaofindependencelefttostatesisfargreaterthan
thatconcerningtheextentofacitizen'sfreedomundermunicipallaw.
Thequestionformunicipallawis:whatistheextentofthesupremelegislativeauthorityrecognized in this system? For international law it is: what is the
maximumareaofautonomy,whichtherulesallowtostates?
Thereisnowayofknowingwhatsovereigntystateshave,tillweknowwhattheformsofinternationallawareandwhetherornottheyaremereemptyforms.
Shouldconsidertheoriesofinternationallawknownas'voluntarist'ortheoriesof'auto-limitation.Theseattemptedto reconcilethe (absolute)sovereigntyof
states withthe existence ofbindingrules ofinternationallaw, bytreatingall
internationalobligationsasself-imposedliketheobligation,whicharisesfroma
promise.
Suchtheories are the counterpartin international law of the social contracttheories of political science. The latter sought to explain the facts that
individuals,'naturally'freeandindependent,werevetboundbymunicipallaw,
bytreatingtheobligationtoobeythelawasonearisingfromacontractwhich
thoseboundhadmadewitheachother,andinsomecaseswiththeirrulers.
Threefoldargumentagainstthevoluntaristtheoriesofinternationallaw.
1. Thesetheoriesfailcompletelytoexplainhowitisknownthatstates'can'only be bound by self-imposed obligations, or why this view of their
sovereignty should be accepted, in advance of any examination of the
actualcharacterofinternationallaw.
2. There is something incoherent in the argument designed to show thatstates, because oftheir sovereignty,can onlybe subject to orbound by
rules,whichtheyhaveimposeduponthemselves.
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o A statemay impose obligations on itself by promise, agreement,ortreaty is not, however, consistent with the theory that states are
subjectonlytoruleswhichtheyhavethusimposedonthemselves.
o In any society, whether composed of individuals or states, what isnecessary and sufficient, in order that the words of a promise,
agreement, or treaty should give rise to obligations, is that rules
providing for this and specifying a procedurefor these self-binding
operat1onsshouldbegenerally,thoughtheyneednotbe universally,
acknowledged.
o This most voluntary form of social obligation involves some rules,whicharebindingindependentlyofthechoiceofthepartyboundby
them, and this, in the case of states, is inconsistent with the
supposition that their sovereignty demands freedom from all such
rules.
3. Therearethe facts.We mustdistinguishthea prioriclaimjust criticized,thatstatescanonlybe boundbyselfimposedobligations,fromtheclaim
thatthoughtheycouldbeboundinotherwaysunderadifferentsystem,in
factnootherformofobligationforstatesexistsunderthepresentrulesof
internationallaw.
Adetailedscrutinyoftheclaimthatallinternationalobligationarisesfromtheconsent of the party bound, cannotbe undertakenhere but two clear and
importantexceptionstothisdoctrinemustbenoticed.Thefirstisthecaseofa
newstate.Whenanew,independentstateemergesintoexistence,itisbound
bythegeneralobligationsofinternationallawincluding,amongothers,therules
that give binding force to treaties. Here the attempt to rest the new
states'internationalobligationsona 'tacit'or 'inferred'consentseemswholly
threadbare.
Thesecondcaseisthatofastateacquiringterritoryorundergoingsomeotherchange,whichbringswithit,forthefirsttime,theincidenceofobligationsunderruleswhichpreviouslyithadnoopportunityeithertoobserveorbreak,andto
whichithadnooccasiontogiveorwithholdconsent.
IV. InternationalLawandMorality
Sometimesinsistencethattherulesgoverningtherelationsbetweenstatesareonly moralrules, is inspired by theold dogmatism, that any form ofsocial
structurethatisnotreducibletoordersbackedbythreatscanonlybeaformof
morality.
In theparticular case of international law, there are a numberof differentreasonsforresistingtheclassificationofitsrulesas'morality'.Thefirstisthat
statesoftenreproacheachotherforimmoralconductorpraisethemselvesorothersforlivinguptothestandardofinternationalmorality.
Characteristicsofsocialmorality:onewasthedistinctiveformofmoralpressurebywhichmoralrulesareprimarilysupported.Thisconsistsnotofappealstofear
or threats of retaliation or demands for compensation, but of appeals to
conscience,madeintheexpectationthatoncethepersonaddressedisreminded
ofthemoralprincipleatstake,hemaybeledbyguiltorshametorespectitand
makeamends.
Claimsunderinternationallawarenotcouchedinsuchtermsthoughofcourse,asinmunicipallaw,theymaybejoinedwithamoralappeal.
No doubtin the relationsbetween statesthere arehalfwayhouses betweenwhatisclearlylawandwhatisclearlymorality,analogoustothestandardsof
politenessandcourtesyrecognizedinprivatelife.
A more important ground of distinction is the following. The rules ofinternationallaw,likethoseofmunicipallaw,areoftenmorallyquiteindifferent.
Arulemayexistbecauseitisconvenientornecessarytohavesomeclearfixed
ruleaboutthesubjectswithwhichitisconcerned,butnotbecauseanymoral
importanceisattachedtotheparticularrule.
We conceive of morality as the ultimate standard by which human actions(legislativeOr otherwise)areevaluated.Thecontrastwithinternationallawis
clear.There isnothinginthe natureor functionof internationallaw,whichis
similarlyinconsistentwiththeideathattherulesmightbesubjecttolegislative
change;thelackofalegislatureisjustalack,whichmanythinkofasadefect
onedaytoberepaired.
Certainrulesareregularlyrespectedevenatthecostofcertainsacrifices;claimsareformulatedbyreferencetothem;breachesoftherulesexposetheoffendertoseriouscriticismandareheldtojustifyclaimsforcompensationorretaliation.
These,surely,arealltheelementsrequiredtosupportthestatementthatthere
existamongstatesrulesimposingobligationsuponthem.
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DAY2
PHILIPPINELEGALHISTORY:RELEVANTJURISPRUDENCE
CASES:
(ColonialSetting)Rubiv.ProvincialBoardofMindoro[39PHIL660]
Facts:
Thisisanapplicationforhabeascorpus, infavorofRubiandtheotherManguianes,who
wereallegedlydeprivedoftheirlibertybytheprovincialofficialsofMindoro. Rubiandhis
companionswere heldon the reservationestablished at Tigbao against theirwill,and
Dabaloswas heldunderthe custodyof theprovincialsheriffin Calapanfor having run
awayfromthereservation.
TheywereheldfollowingtheadoptionofResolutionnumber25oftheProvincialBoard,
authorizing the provincialgovernorto direct non-Christian inhabitants to takeup their
habitation on unoccupied sites selected by him in the interest of law and order.
FollowingtheBoardResolution,GovernorMorenteissuedan orderspecifyingtheareas
wherethe Manguianesshould stay. AnyManguianwho shall refuseto comply willbe
imprisoned.
ThebasisoftheBoardResolutionisSec2145oftheAdministrativeCodewhichprovides
thatprovincialgovernors,withtheapprovalofthedepartmenthead,maydirectthenon-
Christianinhabitantstotakeuptheirhabitationinunoccupiedpubliclandstobeselected
byhimandapprovedbytheprovincialboard.Thisresolutionwaspassedtoprotectthe
publicandtheforestswheretheyroamedandteachnon-Christianscivilizedways.
Issues:
1. Whetherornottheresolutionwasavaliddelegationoflegislativepower2. Whetherornottheresolutionamountedtoreligiousdiscrimination3. Whetherornottherewasdenialofequalprotectionofthelaws4. Whetherornottheresolutionwasreasonable
Held/Ratio:
Petitionersarenotunlawfullyimprisonedorrestrainedoftheirliberty.Habeascorpuscan,
therefore,notissue.
1. YES.Sec2145oftheAdminCodemerelyconfersdiscretionaryauthority(tothelocalofficials)astotheexecutionofthelaw.Anexceptiontothe generalrule,
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislativepowersto local authorities. ThePhilippine Legislaturehas
hereconferredauthorityupontheProvinceofMindoro,tobeexercisedbythe
provincial governor and the provincial board. As officials charged with the
administrationof theprovince, andthe protectionof itsinhabitants,who but
theyarebetterfittedtoselectsiteswhichhavetheconditionsmostfavorablefor
improvingthepeoplewhohavethemisfortuneofbeinginabackwardstate?
2. NO.Thereisnodiscrimination,merelyaclassificationofinhabitantsaccordingtoreligious belief. The term "non-Christian" refers to natives of thePhilippine
Islandsofalowgradeofcivilization.
3. NO.Thepledgethatnopersonshallbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelawsisnotinfringedbyastatute,whichisapplicabletoallofaclass.Theclassification
musthaveareasonablebasisandcannotbepurelyarbitraryinnature.
4. TheManguianes,arenot free,ascivilizedmenare free,andthey arenot theequalsoftheirmorefortunatebrothers.True,theyarecitizens,withmanybut
notalltherightswhichcitizenshipimplies.Butjustassurely,theManguianesare
citizensofalowdegreeofintelligence,andFilipinoswhoareadraguponthe
progressoftheState.InsofarastherelationoftheManguianestotheStateis
concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting thelaw, and of the
executivebranchinenforcingit,areagainplain.SettlersinMindoromusthave
theircropsandpersonsprotectedfrompredatorymen, orthey will leavethecountry.It isno argumentto saythat suchcrimesarepunishedby thePenal
Code,becausethesepenaltiesareimposedaftercommissionoftheoffenseand
notbefore.Ifimmigrantsaretobeencouragedtodeveloptheresourcesofthe
greatIslandofMindoro,andits,asyet,unproductiveregions,theGovernment
mustbeinapositiontoguaranteepeaceandorder.Wastelandsdonotproduce
wealth.Wastepeopledo notadvancethe interest ofthe State. Illiteracyand
thriftlessnessarenotconducivetohomogeneity.TheStatetoprotectitselffrom
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessityis allconvincing.Whenonly thevalidityof thelaw is
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generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the
Governmentintheaccomplishmentofitslaudablepurpose.
(WarPeriod)CoKimChamv.ValdezTanKeh[75PHIL113]
Facts:
PetitionofMANDAMUSofwhichpetitionerpraysthattheRESPONDENTJUDGE, DIZONof
thelowercourtbeorderedtocontinuetheproceedingsincivilcaseno.3012ofsaidcourt,
which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
establishedduringtheJapaneseMilitaryoccupation.
ReasonsofDizonforREFUSALtotakeCOGNIZANCEofandCONTINUEtheproceedingsin
said case: That the PROCLAMATION issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Douglas
MacArthurhadthe effectofinvalidatingand nullifyingthe JUDICIALPROCEEDINGSand
JUDGMENTS of the courts of the Philippines establishedduring the Japanese Military
Occupationand thattheLOWERCOURTShaveno jurisdictionto takecognizanceofand
continue judicialproceedings pending inthe courts of theDEFUNCTREPUBLICOF THE
PHILIPPINES. Also, Judge Dizon claims that the GOVERNMENTS during the Japanese
occupationwereNOTDEFACTOGOVERNMENT.
History
OnJanuary2,1942,theImperialJapaneseForcesoccupiedtheCityofManilaandthenext
day, theirCommander-In-Chief proclaimed: theMilitary Administration underMartial
Law over the districts occupied by the Army.So far as theMilitary Administration
permits,all thelawsnow inforceof theCommonwealth,aswell, asthe executiveandjudicialinstitutions, shallcontinue tobe effectivefor thet imebeing asin thepast.all
publicofficials shallremainin theirpresentpostsandcarryon faithfullytheirdutiesas
before.
ThePhilippineExecutiveCommission,whichisacivilgovernment,wasformedwith Jorge
B.VargasastheChairman.HeissuedOrdersno.1andno.4orderingSC,CA,Courtsof
FirstInstanceandotherjusticestocontinuewiththeirsamejurisdictioninconformitywith
theproclamationoftheCommander-In-ChiefoftheJapanese.
October24,1944,GeneralDouglasMacArthurreleasedaproclamationthatpeopleofthe
Philippines arefree fromenemyoccupationand control;ExistinglawsandStatutesare
binding and THAT ALL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCESSES OF ANY OTHER
GOVERNMENTINTHEPHILIPPINESTHANTHATOFTHESAIDCOMMONWEALTHARENULLANDVOIDANDWITHOUTLEGALEFFECTINAREASOFTHEPHILIPPINESFREEOFENEMY
OCCUPATIONANDCONTROL
Issues:
1. Whetheror notthe judicialactsand proceedingsofthe courtsexistingin thePhilippinesunderthePhilippineExecutiveCommissionandtheRepublicof the
Philippinesweregoodandvalidandremainedsoevenaftertheliberationofthe
reoccupationofthePhilippinesbytheUnitedStatesandFilipinoForces
2. Whether or not the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by GeneralDouglasMacArthurhasinvalidatedalljudicialactsandproceedingspendingof
thesaidcourt
3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by saidproclamation,whether or not the present courts of the Commonwealthmay
continuethoseproceedingspendinginsaidcourtsatthetimePhilippineswere
reoccupiedandliberatedbytheUSandFilipinoforces,andtheCommonwealth
ofthePhilippineswasreestablishedintheislands
Held/Ratio:
WiththeforegoingConclusionsbelowitfollowsthatthe COURTSOFFIRSTINSTANCEof
MANILAhasJURISDICTIONtoCONTINUETOFINALJUDGMENTTHEPROCEEDINGSINTHE
CASES,ANDTHATTHERESPONDENTJUDGEOFTHATCOURT,HAVINGREFUSEDTOACT
ANDCONTINUETHESAIDPROCEEDINGS,WHICHTHELAWSPECIFICALLYENJOINSHIMTO
DO AS DUTY RESULTING FROM HIS OFFICE AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THAT COURT,
MANDAMUSISTHESPEEDYANDADEQUATEREMEDYINTHEORDINARYCOURSEOFLAW,
SPECIFICALLYTAKINGINTOCONSIDERATIONHEREININVOLVEDDOESAFFECTNOTONLY
HISPARTICULARCASEBUTMANYOTHERCASES.
ORDERINGHIMTOTAKECONGNIZANCEOFANDCONTINUETOFINALJUDGMENTTHE
PROCEEDINGSINCIVILCASENo.3012.
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1. YES. Itis a legal truism inpolitical and international law that ALL ACTS andPROCEEDINGSoftheLEGISLATIVEandEXECUTIVEandJUDICIALdepartmentsof
aDEFACTOGOVERNMENTareGOODandVALID.
ThreeKindsofDEFACTOGOVERNMENT:
GovernmentdefactoinLEGALSENSE,isthatthegovernmentthatgetspossessionand controlof therightfullegalgovernmentandmaintains
itselfagainstthewillofthelatter.
Government de facto ESTABLISHED and MAINTAINED BY MILITARYFORCESwhoinvadeandoccupyaterritoryoftheenemyinthecourseof
warandwhichisdenominatedagovernmentparamountforce.
GovernmentdefactothatisESTABLISHEDasINDEPENDENTGovernmentbyinhabitantsof acountrywho riseininsurrectionagainstthe parent
state.
PHILIPPINESatthetimeoftheJAPANESEOCCUPATIONfallundertheSECOND
KINDofdefactogovernment.Thepowersanddutiesofdefactogovernmentof
thisdescriptionare regulatedin SECIII ofthe HagueConvention1907. The
authorityofthelegitimatepowerhavingactuallypassedintothehandsofthe
occupant,thelattershalltakeallstepsinhispowertoreestablishandinsure,
asfaraspossible,publicorderandsafety,whilerespecting,unlessabsolutely
prevented,thelawsinforceofthecountry.
Theycansuspendalllaws,makenewones,amendothersaslongasitwillstill
respectthemunicipallawsbuttherighttoASSEMBLY,BEARARMS,FREEDOMOF
THEPRESSandothersaresuspended.Inpractice,thelocalordinarytribunalsare
authorizedto continueadministeringjusticeandthe judgesandother judicial
officersarekeptintheirpost.
Inviewoftheforegoing,itisevidentthatthePhilippineExecutiveCommission,
which was organized by Orders No. 1, issued on January 23, 2942, by the
CommanderoftheJapaneseforce,wasaCIVILGOVERNMENTESTABLISHEDBY
THE MILITARY FORCES OF OCCUPATION AND THEREFORE A DE FACTO
GOVERNMENTOFTHESECONDKIND.
Thegovernments bythe PhilippineExecutiveCommissionandthe Republicof
the Philippines during the Japanese Military occupation being a DE FACTO
GOVERNMENT,itnecessarilyfollowsthattheJUDICIALACTSandPROCEEDINGS
ofthe courts ofJUSTICEof thosegovernments,whichare notof aPOLITICAL
COMPLEXION,wereGOODandVALIDandbyvirtueofthewell-knowprinciples
ofpostliminy,remainedGOODandVALID.
2. NO. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrasePROCESSESOFANYOTHERGOVERNMENTasusedintheaboveproclamation
ofGeneral ArthurMacArthur. Whether it isthe intentionof thegeneral to
annul andavoid thereby alljudgmentsand judicialproceedings ofthe courts
establishedinthePhilippinesduringtheJapaneseoccupation.
Thephraseprocessesofanyothergovernmentisbroadandmayrefernotonly
to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative aswell asthe
constitutionalprocessesoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesorothergovernmental
agenciesestablishedintheislandsduringtheoccupation.
Takingintoconsiderationthefactthataccordingtothewell-knownprinciplesof
international law all judgments and judicial proceedings of the de factogovernmentare GOODandVALIDbeforeand remainedso after theoccupied
territoryhad comeagainintothe powerofthe titularsovereign,it should be
presumedthatITWASNOTandCOULDNOTHAVEBEENtheINTENTIONofthe
General to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
internationallaw.
The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that IT REFERS TO
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES OTHER THAN JUDICIAL PROCESSES OR COUR
PROCEEDINGS for according to a well-known rule of STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION,a statute oughtneverto beconstruedto violatethe lawof
nationsifanyotherpossibleconstructionremains.
LOGIC: froma contraryconstruction,greatinconvenienceand public hardship
wouldresult for disputes orsuitsalready adjudged wouldhave tobe again
settled.
3. YES.Althoughintheory,theauthorityofthelocalcivilandjudicialadministrationissuspendedasamatterofcourseassoonasmilitaryoccupationtakesplacein
practice,theINVADERdoesnotusuallytaketheadministrationofjusticeintohis
ownhands,butCONTINUEStheordinarycourtsortribunalstobeadministered
bytheordinarytribunalssubstantiallyastheywerebeforetheoccupation.
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The commander in chief of the Japanese military, at the time they were
occupying the Philippines, declared that all laws now in force in the
Commonwealth as wellas the executive andthe legislativeinstitutions,shall
continuetobeeffectiveforthetimebeingasinthepastandallpublicsofficialsshallremainintheirpresentpostsandcarryfaithfullytheirdutiesasbeforeand
when the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts continued with no
substantialchangeintheorganizationandjurisdictionthereof.
Taylor:A stateor othergovernmentalentity,upontheremovalof aforeign
military force, resumes its old place withits right and duties substantially
unimpaired.
LegalMaxim: Law onceestablished continues until unchangedby someby
some competent legislative power. It isnot changed merely by change of
sovereignty.
(PeoplePowerRevolution)Republicv.Sandiganbayan,Josephus[GR104768,
July21,2003]
Facts:
ThePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment(thePCGG),throughthe AFPAnti-
GraftBoard (theBoard),investigated reports of unexplainedwealth involvingMajor
General Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the CommandingGeneral of the Philippine Army
duringthetimeofformerPresidentFerdinandMarcos.Pursuanttosaidinvestigation,the
ConstabularyraidingteamservedasearchandseizurewarrantonthepremisesofRamas
allegedmistressElizabethDimaano.
Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the
warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several
thousandsof cashin pesosandUSdollars, werealsoseized.In itsResolution,the AFP
Boardreportedthat(1)DimaanocouldnothaveusedthesaidequipmentwithoutRamas
consent;and(2)Dimaanocouldnotbetheownerofthemoneybecauseshehasnovisible
sourceofincome.
TheBoardthenconcludedwitharecommendationthatRamasbeprosecutedforviolation
ofR.A.3019,otherwiseknownastheAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesActandR.A.1379,
otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.
Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines(theRepublicorPetitioner)filedaComplaintagainstRamasandDimaano.
On18November1991,theSandiganbayandismissedthecomplaintonthegroundsthat
(1)thePCGGhasnojurisdictiontoinvestigatetheprivaterespondentsand(2)thesearch
andseizureconductedwasillegal.
Issues:
1. WhetherornotthePCGGhasthejurisdictiontoinvestigateandcausethefilingof a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth
underRANo.1379.
2. WhetherornotSandiganbayanerredindismissingthecasebeforecompletionofthepresentationofpetitionersevidence.
3. Whetherornotthepropertiesconfiscatedareillegallyseizedandinadmissibleinevidence.
a. WhethertherevolutionarygovernmentwasboundbytheBillofRightsofthe1973Constitutionduringtheinterregnum,(aftertheactualand
effectivetake-overofpowerbytherevolutionarygovernment).
b. Whether or not the protection accorded to individuals under theInternationalCovenanton CivilandPoliticalRights (Covenant) and
theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(Declaration)remainedin
effectduringtheinterregnum.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.PCGGhasnosuchjurisdiction.ThePCGGcreatedtheAFPBoardtoinvestigatetheunexplainedwealthandcorrupt
practicesofAFPpersonnel,whetherintheactiveserviceorretired.IttaskedtheAFP
Boardtomakethenecessaryrecommendationstoappropriategovernmentagencies
ontheactiontobetakenbasedonitsfindings.ThePCGGgavethistasktotheAFP
Board pursuant to thePCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposesofthisorder.
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ThePCGG,throughtheAFPBoard,canonlyinvestigatetheunexplainedwealthand
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulatedill-gottenwealthduringtheadministrationofformerPresidentMarcosbybeingthelattersimmediatefamily,relative,subordinateorcloseassociate,taking
undueadvantage oftheir public office orusing theirpowers,influence or(2) AFP
personnel involved in othercases of graft and corruptionprovided the President
assignstheircasestothePCGG.
Petitionerargues thatRamas wasundoubtedly a subordinateof former President
MarcosbecauseofhispositionastheCommandingGeneralofthe PhilippineArmy
and claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive ordersdirectly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President
Marcos.
WeholdthatRamaswasnotasubordinateofformerPresidentMarcosinthesense
contemplatedunderEONo.1anditsamendments.MerepositionheldbyamilitaryofficerdoesnotautomaticallymakehimasubordinateasthistermisusedinEO
Nos.1,2,14and14-Aabsentashowingthatheenjoyedcloseassociationwithformer
PresidentMarcos.
Itdoesnotsuffice,asinthiscase,thattherespondentisorwasagovernmentofficial
oremployeeduringtheadministrationofformerPresidentMarcos.Theremustbea
primafacieshowingthattherespondentunlawfullyaccumulatedwealthbyvirtueof
hiscloseassociationorrelationwithformerPres.Marcosand/orhiswife.
RamaspositionaloneasCommandingGeneralofthePhilippineArmywiththerank
ofMajorGeneraldoesnotsufficetomakehimasubordinateofformerPresident
MarcosforpurposesofEONo.1anditsamendments.ThePCGGhastoprovidea
primafacieshowingthatRamaswasacloseassociateofformerPresidentMarcos,in
thesamemannerthatbusinessassociates,dummies,agentsornomineesofformer
PresidentMarcoswereclosetohim.This,thePCGGfailedtodo.
Petitionerassertsthat thereis apresumption thatthe PCGGwas actingwithin its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that
Ramas wastruly a subordinateof the former President.However,the sameAFP
Board Resolutionbeliesthiscontention. Althoughthe Resolutionbeginswithsuch
statement,itendswiththerecommendationthatRamasbeprosecutedforviolation
ofRA 3019.Thus,althoughthe PCGGsoughtto investigateand prosecuteprivate
respondentsunderEONos.1,2,14and14-A,theresultyieldedafindingofviolation
ofRepublicActsNos.3019and1379withoutanyrelationtoEONos.1,2,14and14-
A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal topetitionerscase.EONo.1createdthePCGGforaspecificandlimitedpurpose,and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited
purpose.
Moreover,theresolutionoftheAFPBoardandeventheAmendedComplaintdonot
showthat thepropertiesRamasallegedlyownedwere accumulated byhim inhis
capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely
enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these
propertiesweredisproportionateto hissalaryandotherlegitimateincomewithout
showing that Ramasamassed them because ofhis close associationwith former
PresidentMarcos.
ThePCGG stillpursuedthiscase despite theabsenceof aprimafacie findingthatRamaswas asubordinateofformerPresidentMarcos.Thepetitionforforfeiture
filedwiththeSandiganbayanshouldbedismissedforlackofauthoritybythePCGGto
investigaterespondentssincethereis noprimafacieshowingthatEONo.1andits
amendments apply to respondents. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended
Ramas case tothe Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigationofordinaryunexplainedwealthandgraftcases.
2. NO.Petitionerhasonlyitselftoblamefornon-completionofthepresentationofitsevidence.
First,thiscasehasbeenpendingforfouryearsbeforetheSandiganbayandismissed
it.Petitionerhad almost twoyearsto prepare itsevidence.However, despite this
sufficienttime,petitionerstilldelayedthepresentationoftherestofitsevidenceby
filingnumerousmotionsforpostponementsandextensions.TheSandiganbayangave
petitionermorethan sufficienttimeto finishthe presentationofits evidence.The
Sandiganbayan overlooked petitionersdelays and yet petitioner ended the long-
stringofdelayswiththefilingofaRe-AmendedComplaint,whichwouldonlyprolong
evenmorethedispositionofthecase.
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3. YES.Theseizureoftheseitemswasvoid.Thesearchandseizurewarrantcouldnotbeusedasbasistoseizeandwithholdtheseitemsfromthepossessor.The
itemsshouldbereturnedimmediatelytoDimaano.
a. NO.Anindividual isnotboundby theBillof Rightsduringthistime.
However,theprotectionaccorded toindividualsunderthe Covenant
andtheDeclarationremainedineffectduringtheinterregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because noconstitution limited the
extentandscopeofsuchdirectivesandorders.Withtheabrogationofthe
1973Constitutionbythesuccessfulrevolution,therewasnomunicipallaw
higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government.Thus,duringtheinterregnum,apersoncouldnotinvokeany
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explainedinLetterofAssociateJusticeReynatoS.Puno:
Arevolutionhasbeendefinedasthecompleteoverthrowoftheestablished
governmentinanycountryorstatebythosewhowerepreviouslysubjectto
itorasasudden,radicalandfundamentalchangeinthegovernmentor
political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence.InKelsen'sbook,GeneralTheoryofLawandState,itisdefinedas
thatwhichoccurswheneverthelegalorderofacommunityisnullifiedand
replacedbyaneworder...awaynotprescribedbythefirstorderitself.
ItwasthroughtheFebruary1986revolution,arelativelypeacefulone,and
morepopularlyknownasthe people powerrevolutionthattheFilipino
peopletorethemselvesawayfromanexistingregime.Thisrevolutionalso
sawtheunprecedentedrisetopoweroftheAquinogovernment.
Fromthenaturallawpointofview,therightofrevolutionhasbeendefined
asaninherentrightofapeopletocastouttheirrulers,changetheirpolicy
oreffectradical reformsin theirsystemofgovernmentor institutions by
force ora generaluprisingwhenthe legal andconstitutionalmethodsof
makingsuchchangehaveprovedinadequateoraresoobstructedastobe
unavailable.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionarygovernmentboundbyno constitution.Noonecouldvalidly
questionthesequestrationordersasviolativeoftheBillofRightsbecause
there was noBillof Rights during theinterregnum. However, upon theadoptionoftheFreedomConstitution,thesequesteredcompaniesassailed
thesequestrationordersas contraryto theBillof Rights ofthe Freedom
Constitution.
Theframersofboth theFreedomConstitutionandthe 1987Constitution
werefullyawarethatthesequestrationorderswouldclashwiththeBillof
Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific
languagerecognizing thevalidityofthe sequestrationorders.Despitethe
impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment
excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26,ArticleXVIIIof the1987Constitution. Theframersofthe Constitution
werefullyawarethat absent Section26, sequestration orders would notstandthetestofdueprocessundertheBillofRights.
Thus,to rulethatthe BillofRightsof the1973 Constitutionremainedin
forceduringtheinterregnum, absent aconstitutionalprovisionexcepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even
duringthe interregnumtheFilipinopeoplecontinuedtoenjoy,underthe
CovenantandtheDeclaration,almostthesamerightsfoundintheBillof
Rightsofthe1973Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
government,assumed responsibilityforthe Statesgood faith compliance
withthe Covenant towhich thePhilippines is a signatory.UnderArticle
17(1)oftheCovenant,therevolutionarygovernmenthadthedutytoinsure
that[n]ooneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryorunlawfulinterferencewith
hisprivacy,family,homeorcorrespondence.
TheDeclaration,towhichthePhilippinesisalsoasignatory,providesinits
Art ic le 17(2) that [n]o one shal l be arbi trar ily deprived of h is
property.AlthoughthesignatoriestotheDeclarationdidnotintenditasa
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
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interpretedtheDeclarationaspartofthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesof
international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the
rightsofindividualsundertheDeclaration.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directivesandordersissuedbygovernmentofficerswerevalidsolongas
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionarygovernment.Thedirectivesandordersshouldnothavealso
violatedthe Covenantor theDeclaration.In thiscase,therevolutionary
governmentpresumptivelysanctionedthewarrantsincetherevolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant,issued bya judge upon
proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrantisthusvalidwithrespecttotheitemsspecificallydescribedinthe
warrant.
However,the Constabularyraiding teamseizeditemsnot includedin thewarrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team
confiscated items not included in the warrant.It is obvious from the
testimonyofCaptainSebastianthatthewarrantdidnotincludethemonies,
communicationsequipment,jewelryand landtitlesthatthe raidingteam
confiscated.Thesearchwarrantdidnot particularlydescribetheseitems
andtheraidingteamconfiscatedthem onits ownauthority.Theraiding
teamhadno legalbasisto seizetheseitems withoutshowingthatthese
itemscouldbe thesubjectofwarrantlesssearchandseizure.Clearly,the
raidingteamexceededitsauthoritywhenitseizedtheseitems.
Decision of the Court: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The
questionedResolutionsoftheSandiganbayanareAFFIRMED.
SEPARATEOPINIONS
J.VITUG(CONCUR)
A revolutionis defined byWestern politicalscholars asbeing a rapid fundamental and
violent domestic change in the dominant values andmyths of a society in itspolitical
institutions,socialstructure,leadership,andgovernmentactivityandpolicies.Arevolution
resultsinacompleteoverthrowofestablishedgovernmentandoftheexistinglegalorder.
NotableexampleswouldbetheFrench,Chinese,Mexican,Russian,andCubanrevolutions.
Revolution,it ispointed out,is to be distinguished fromrebellion, insurrection, revolt,
coup, and war of independence. A rebellion or insurrection may change policies,leadership,andthepoliticalinstitution,butnotthesocialstructureandprevailingvalues.
Acoupdetatinitselfchangesleadershipandperhapspoliciesbutnotnecessarilymore
extensiveandintensivethanthat.Awarofindependenceisastruggleofonecommunity
againsttherulebyanaliencommunityanddoesnothavetoinvolvechangesinthesocial
structureofeithercommunity.
Theeffectsoftherevolutionmaynotbecomparedingoodsubstancewiththoseofthe
great revolutions. While a revolution may be accomplished by peaceful means, it is
essential,however, thattherebean accompanyingbasictransformationin politicaland
socialstructures.TherevolutionatEDSAhasnotresultedinsuchradicalchangethoughit
concededly could have. The offices of the executive branch have been retained, the
judiciary has been allowed to function, the military, as well as the constitutional
commissionsandlocalgovernments,haveremainedintact.Itisobservedbysomeanalyststhattherehasonlybeenachangeofpersonalitiesinthegovernmentbutnotachangeof
structuresthatcanimplytheconsequentabrogationofthefundamentallaw.Theefficacy
ofalegalordermustbedistinguishedfromthequestionofitsexistenceforitmaybethat
theefficacyofalegalordercomestoalowpointwhichmay,nevertheless,continuetobe
operativeandfunctioning.
Theproclamationsissued,aswellasthe ProvisionalConstitutionenactedbytheAquino
administration shortly after being installed, have revealed the new governments
recognitionof andits intentionto preserve theprovisions ofthe 1973Constitutionon
individual rights. Proclamation No. 1, dated 25 February 1986, has maintained that
sovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.It
hasexpressedthatthegovernmentwouldbe dedicatedto upholdjustice,morality and
decencyingovernment,freedomanddemocracy.ThroughProclamation2ofMarch1986,
thesuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpuswaslifted.AquinoissuedProclamationNo.3
asanacknowledgmentofthecontinuedexistence,subjecttoits exclusions,ofthe1973
Charter.
Atbottom,theBillofRights(underthe1973Constitution),duringtheinterregnumfrom26
February to24 March 1986 remained in force and effect not only because it was so
recognizedbythe1986PeoplePowerbutalsobecausethenewgovernmentwasboundby
internationallawtorespecttheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(proclaimingthat
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basic rights andfreedomsareinherentandinalienable toeverymemberofthe human
family.Oneoftheserightsistherightagainstarbitrarydeprivationofonesproperty.)
Innumerouscases,theSupremeCourthasadvertedtotheenumerationintheUniversalDeclarationinupholdingvariousfundamentalrightsandfreedoms.
J.TINGA(CONCUR)
Apparently,themajorityadherestothelegalpositivisttheorychampionedbynineteenth
centuryphilosopherJohnAustin,whodefinedtheessenceoflawasa distinctbranchof
moralityorjustice.HeandtheEnglishpositivistsbelievedthattheessenceoflawisthe
simpleideaofanorderbackedbythreats.
OntheothersideisJusticePunosespousalofthenaturallawdoctrine,which,despiteits
numerousformsandvarieddisguises,isstillrelevantinmoderntimesasanimportanttool
in politicaland legal thinking.Essentially, it has afforded a potentjustificationof the
existing legal orderand the social andeconomicsystem it embodies, forby regardingpositivelawasbasedonahigherlawordainedbydivineornaturalreason,theactuallegal
systemthusacquiresstabilityorevensanctityitwouldnototherwisepossess.
Whilethetwophilosophiesarepolesapartincontent,yettheyaresomehowcognate.To
illustrate,theBillofRightsintheConstitutionhasitsoriginsfromnaturallaw.Likewisea
naturallaw documentis theUniversalDeclaration.In the case atbar,inthe ultimate
analysisbothjurisprudentialdoctrineshavefoundapplicationinthedenouementofthe
case.TheBillofRightsintheConstitution,theUniversalDeclarationandtheInternational
Covenant,greatdocumentsoflibertyandhumanrightsall,arefoundedonnaturallaw.
It was the unmistakable thrust ofthe Freedom Constitutionto bestow uninterrupted
operabilitytotheBillofRightsinthe1973Constitution.Foronething,thetitleitselfof
ProclamationNo.3whichordainedtheFreedomConstitution,aswellasone ofthevital
premisesorwhereasclausethereof,advertstotheprotectionofthebasicrightsofthe
people.Foranother,theFreedomConstitutionin Article1,Section1mandatesthatthe
BillofRightsandotherprovisionsoftheFreedomConstitutionspecifiedthereinremainin
forceandeffectandareherebyadoptedintotoaspartofthisProvisionalConstitution.
Ofcourse,evenifitissupposedthattheFreedomConstitutionhadnoretroactiveeffector
itdid notextendthe effectivityofthe BillofRightsin the1973Constitution,stillthere
wouldbenovoidinthemunicipalordomesticlawatthetimeasfarastheobservanceof
fundamentalrightsisconcerned.TheBillofRightsinthe1973Constitutionwouldstillbe
inforce, independently ofthe FreedomConstitution, orat leastthe provisionsthereof
proscribing unreasonable search andseizureand excludingevidencein violationof the
proscription.
Markedlydepartingfromthetypical,therevolutionarygovernmentinstalledbyPresident
Aquino was a benign government.It had chosen to observe prevailing constitutional
restraints. An eloquent proof was the fact that through the defunct Philippine
Constabulary,it appliedfor asearchwarrantandconductedthe questionedsearchand
seizure only after obtaining the warrant. Furthermore, President Aquino definitely
pledgedinher oathofofficeto upholdanddefendtheConstitution,whichundoubtedly
wasthe1973Constitution,includingtheBillofRightsthereof.
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DAY3
LAWINCONTEXT
Self-determination:ChallengestoExistingLegalRegimes
IndigenousPeoples,AncestralDomainandtheEnvironment
Cruzv.SecofDENR,[GR135385,Dec.6,2000]
Facts:
IsaganiCruzandCesarEuropa(thepetitioners)assailtheconstitutionalityofthefollowing
provisionsofRepublicAct8371,otherwiseknownastheIndigenousPeoplesRightsActof
1997(IPRA),anditsImplementingRules,onthegroundthattheyamounttoanunlawful
deprivationoftheStatesownershipoverlandsofthepublicdomainaswellasmineralsandother natural resources therein, in violationof theRegaliandoctrineembodiedin
Section2,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution:
(1)Section3(a)whichdefinestheextentandcoverageofancestraldomains,
andSection3(b)which,inturn,definesancestrallands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domainsincluding inalienable publiclands,bodiesof water,mineraland
otherresourcesfoundwithinancestraldomainsareprivatebutcommunity
propertyoftheindigenouspeoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
compositionofancestraldomainsandancestrallands;
(4)Section7whichrecognizesandenumeratestherightsofthe indigenous
peoplesovertheancestraldomains;
(5)Section8whichrecognizesandenumeratestherightsoftheindigenous
peoplesovertheancestrallands;
(6)Section57whichprovidesforpriorityrightsoftheindigenouspeoplesin
the harvesting,extraction, development or explorationof minerals and
other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoplesfor thedevelopmentand utilization ofnatural resourcestherein
foraperiodnotexceeding25years,renewablefornotmorethan25years;
and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portionsthereofwhicharefoundtobe necessaryforcriticalwatersheds,
mangroves,wildlifesanctuaries,wilderness,protectedareas,forestcover
orreforestation.
Further,the petitionerscontendthatbyprovidingfor anall-encompassingdefinitionof
ancestraldomainsandancestrallandswhichmightevenincludeprivatelandsfound
withinsaidareas,Sections3(a)and3(b)ofIPRAviolatetherightsofprivatelandowners.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the relevant portions of the IPRA law being contested areunconstitutional
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.The constitutionalityofthe IPRALawwassustainedby thecourt.The SCdeliberateduponthematter,and afterthefirstdeliberations,theyvoted and
reacheda7-7vote.Theyconductedaseconddeliberationandthevotingagain
resulted in a 7-7 vote. As there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed.Ancestraldomainsmaythusincludenaturalresources,whichisina
wayaviolationtheRegaliandoctrine.
SALIENTPOINTSOFTHESEPARATEOPINIONS:
VITUG,J:
ThepetitionseeksadeclarationbytheCourtofunconstitutionalityofcertainprovisionsof
RepublicAct No.8371, a law that obviously isyet incapableof exact equation inits
significancetothenationanditspeoplenowandinthegenerationsyettocome.Republic
ActNo.8371,(theIndigenousPeoplesRightsActof1997("IPRA"),isapparentlyintended
to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and
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development"andcommandstheState,"subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionand
nationaldevelopmentpoliciesandprograms,"toprotecttherightsofindigenouscultural
communitiestotheirancestrallandsinordertoensuretheireconomic,social,andcultural
well-being.
AmongtheassailedprovisionsinIPRAisitsSection3(a)whichdefines"ancestraldomains"
to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprisinglands, inland waters,
coastal areas, andnatural resources " including "ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposableorotherwise,"overwhichindigenousculturalcommunities/indigenouspeoples
("ICCs/IPs")couldexercisevirtualownershipandcontrol.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would
comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-
governanceoverthecurved-outterritory.ThisconceptiselaboratedinSection7ofthe
lawwhichstatesthatthe"rightsofownershipandpossessionofICCs/IPstotheirancestraldomainsshall be recognizedand protected,"subsumed underwhichwouldencompass
theright of ownership(paragraph a);the right to develop, control and use lands
andnaturalresources,including"therightto negotiatethetermsandconditionsforthe
exploration ofnatural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customarylaws;"(par.b);therighttostayintheterritories(par.c);therighttoreturnto
their abandoned lands in case of displacement(par. d);the right to regulate entry of
migrants(par.e);therightto claim partsofancestraldomainspreviouslyreserved(par.
g);andtherighttoresolvelandconflictsinaccordanceprimarilywithcustomarylaw(par.
h). Concurrently, Section 57 statesthat ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the
harvesting,extraction, development or exploitation of anynatural resourceswithinthe
ancestraldomains."TheseprovisionsofIPRA,intheirtotality,are,inmyview,beyondthe
context ofthe fundamental lawandvirtually amountto anunduedelegation,if notan
unacceptableabdication,ofStateauthorityoverasignificantareaofthecountryandits
patrimony.
ArticleXIIofthe1987Constitutionexpressesthatall"landsofthepublicdomain,waters,
minerals,coal,petroleum,andothermineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,
forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andothernaturalresourcesareownedbythe
State,"and,withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,shallnotbealienated."Itordainsthat
the"exploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshallbeunderthefull
controlandsupervisionoftheState."
ThedecisionoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinCariovs.InsularGovernment,holdingthataparceloflandheldsincetimeimmemorialbyindividualsunderaclaimofprivate
ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the
application of the Regalian doctrine, cannot override thecollective wil l of the
peopleexpressedintheConstitution.Itisinthemthatsovereigntyresidesandfromthem
thatallgovernmentauthorityemanates.Itisnotthenforacourtrulingoranypieceof
legislationtobeconformedtobythefundamentallaw,butitisfortheformertoadaptto
thelatter,anditisthesovereignactthatmust,betweenthem,standinviolate.
KAPUNAN,J.:
Petitioners,ascitizens,possessthe"publicright"toensurethatthenationalpatrimonyis
notalienatedanddiminishedinviolationoftheConstitution.Sincethegovernment,asthe
guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos withoutdistinctionastoethnicity,itfollowsthatacitizenhassufficientinteresttomaintainasuit
toensure thatany grantof concessions covering thenationaleconomyand patrimony
strictlycomplieswithconstitutionalrequirements.Thus,thepreservationoftheintegrity
andinviolabilityofthenationalpatrimonyisapropersubjectofacitizen'ssuit.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of
ownershipoverancestrallandsandancestraldomainsbyvirtueofnativetitle.Theterm
"ancestral lands" underthe statute refers tolandsoccupied byindividuals,familiesand
clanswhoaremembersofindigenousculturalcommunities,includingresidentiallots,rice
terracesorpaddies,privateforests,swiddenfarmsandtreelots.Theselandsarerequired
tohavebeen"occupied,possessedandutilized"bythemorthroughtheirancestors"since
timeimmemorial,continuouslytothepresent."Ontheotherhand,"ancestraldomains"is
defined asareasgenerally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, includingancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communitiesbut towhich theyhad traditional access,particularly thehome ranges of
indigenouscultural communitieswho arestill nomadicor shiftingcultivators.Ancestral
domainsalsoincludeinlandwaters,coastalareasandnaturalresourcestherein.Again,the
samearerequiredtohavebeen"heldunderaclaimofownership,occupiedorpossessed
byICCs/IPs,bythemselvesor throughtheir ancestors,communallyor individuallysince
timeimmemorial,continuouslytothepresent."UnderSection56,propertyrightswithin
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theancestraldomainsalreadyexistingand/orvesteduponeffectivityofsaidlaw"shallbe
recognizedandrespected."
OwnershipisthecruxoftheissueofwhethertheprovisionsofIPRApertainingtoancestrallands, ancestraldomains,and naturalresourcesare unconstitutional.The fundamental
questionis,who,betweentheStateandtheindigenouspeoples,aretherightfulownersof
theseproperties?
AproperreadingofCariowouldshowthatthedoctrineenunciatedthereinappliesonly
tolandswhich havealwaysbeen consideredas private,and notto lands ofthe public
domain,whetheralienableorotherwise.Adistinctionmustbemadebetweenownership
of landunder native titleand ownership by acquisitiveprescription against the State.
Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial.The landisnot acquiredfromthe State, thatis,Spainorits successors-in-
interest,theUnitedStatesandthePhilippineGovernment.Therehasbeennotransferof
titlefromtheStateasthelandhasbeenregardedasprivateincharacterasfarbackasmemorygoes.Incontrast,ownershipoflandbyacquisitiveprescriptionagainsttheState
involvesaconversionofthecharacterofthepropertyfromalienablepubliclandtoprivate
land,whichpresupposesatransferoftitlefromtheStatetoaprivateperson.Sincenative
titleassumesthatthepropertycoveredbyitisprivatelandandisdeemednevertohave
been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title
underCarioappliesonlyto landsof thepublicdomainis erroneous.Consequently,the
classificationof lands of the public domain intoagricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks under the Constitutionis irrelevant to the application of
theCariodoctrinebecause theRegaliandoctrinewhichvestsintheStateownershipof
landsofthepublicdomaindoesnotcoverancestrallandsandancestraldomains.
TheIPRAprovidesthatindigenouspeoplesshallhavetherighttomanageandconserve
thenaturalresourcesfoundon theancestral domains,to benefit fromandshare inthe
profitsfromtheallocationandutilizationoftheseresources,andtonegotiatetheterms
andconditionsfortheexplorationofsuchnaturalresources.Thestatutealsograntsthem
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
anynaturalresourceswithin the ancestral domains. Before the NCIP can issue a
certification for therenewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease,or for the
perfectionofanyproduction-sharingagreementthepriorinformedwrittenconsentofthe
indigenouspeoplesconcernedmust be obtained.Inreturn, theindigenous peoples are
giventheresponsibilitytomaintain,develop,protectandconservetheancestraldomains
orportionsthereofwhicharefoundtobe necessaryforcriticalwatersheds,mangroves,
wildlifesanctuaries,wilderness,protectedareas,forestcover,orreforestation.
In addition to the means of exploration, development and uti lization of thecountry'snaturalresourcesstatedinparagraph1,Section2ofArticleXII,theConstitution
itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law,
allowsmall-scaleutilization ofnaturalresourcesby its citizens.Further,Section 6,Article
XIII, directsthe State,in thedispositionandutilizationofnaturalresources,to apply the
principlesofagrarianreformorstewardship.Similarly,Section7,ArticleXIIImandatesthe
Statetoprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermentothepreferentialuseofmarineand
fishingresources.C learly, Section 2,Article XII, when interpreted inview of the pro-
Filipino,pro-poorphilosophyof our fundamental law,and in harmony withthe other
provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,cannot be
construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization
ofnaturalresourceswithouttheState'sdirectparticipation.
ThechallengedprovisionsoftheIPRAmustbeconstruedinviewofsuchpresumptionofconstitutionality.Further,theinterpretationoftheseprovisionsshouldtakeintoaccount
thepurposeofthelaw,whichistogivelifetotheconstitutionalmandatethattherightsof
theindigenouspeoplesberecognizedandprotected.
MENDOZA,J.:
ThissuitwasinstitutedtodeterminetheconstitutionalityofcertainprovisionsofR.A.No.
8371,otherwiseknownastheIndigenousPeoplesRightsAct.Petitionersdonotcomplain
ofanyinjuryasaresultoftheapplicationofthestatutetothem.Theyassertarightto
seekanadjudicationofconstitutionalquestionsascitizensandtaxpayers,upontheplea
thatthequestionsraisedareof"transcendentalimportance."
Theonlyinstancewhereafacialchallengetoastatuteisallowediswhenitoperatesintheareaoffreedomofexpression.Insuchinstance,theoverbreadthdoctrinepermitsaparty
to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not
unconstitutionalbutitmightbeifappliedtoothersnotbeforetheCourtwhoseactivities
areconstitutionally protected.Invalidation of the statute "onits face" rather than"as
applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of
expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional,courtswilldecreeonlypartialinvalidityunlesstheinvalidportionissofar
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inseparable from the rest ofthe statute that a declarationof partial invalidity isnot
possible.
FortheCourttoexerciseitspowerofreviewwhenthereisnocaseorcontroversyisnotonlyto actwithoutjurisdictionbutalsoto runthe riskthat,in adjudicatingabstractor
hypotheticalquestions,its decisionwillbebasedonspeculationratherthanexperience.
Deprivedoftheopportunitytoobservetheimpactofthelaw,theCourtislikelytoequate
questionsofconstitutionalitywithquestionsofwisdomandisthuslikelytointrudeinto
thedomain oflegislation.Constitutionaladjudication,it cannot betoo oftenrepeated,
cannottakeplaceinavacuum.
Todecline,therefore,theexerciseofjurisdictionwherethereisnogenuinecontroversyis
nottoshowtimiditybutrespectforthejudgmentofacoequaldepartmentofgovernment
whoseacts,unlessshowntobeclearlyrepugnanttothefundamentallaw,arepresumed
tobe valid.The polestarofconstitutionaladjudicationwasset forthbyJusticeLaurelin
theAngaracasewhenhesaidthat"thispowerofjudicialreviewislimitedtoactualcases
andcontroversiesto beexercisedafterfullopportunityofargumentbythe parties,andlimitedfurthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedortheverylismota,presented."For
theexerciseofthispowerislegitimateonlyinthelastresort,andasanecessityinthe
determinationofreal,earnest,andvitalcontroversybetweenindividuals.Until,therefore,
anactual caseis brought to testthe constitutionality of theIPRA, thepresumption of
constitutionality,whichinheresineverystatute,mustbeaccordedtoit.
PANGANIBAN,J:
Ourfundamentallaw mandates theprotection ofthe indigenouscultural communities'
right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to theprovisions of this
Constitution."I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs)maybeaccordedpreferentialrightstothebeneficialuseofpublicdomains,as
wellaspriorityintheexploration,developmentandutilizationofnaturalresources.Suchprivileges,however,mustbesubjecttothefundamentallaw.
Consistentwiththesocialjusticeprincipleofgivingmoreinlawtothosewhohavelessin
life,Congressinitswisdommaygrantpreferencesandprerogativesto ourmarginalized
brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be
respected.Ipersonallybelieveinaccordingeverybenefittothepoor,theoppressedand
the disadvantaged, in order to empower them toequallyenjoy the blessings of
nationhood.Icannot,however,agree tolegitimize perpetualinequalityof accessto the
nation'swealthortostamptheCourt'simprimaturonalawthatoffendsanddegradesthe
repositoryoftheveryauthorityofthisCourttheconstitutionofthePhilippines.
RA 8371,which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communitiesand indigenouspeoples,admittedlyprofessesalaudableintent.Itwasprimarilyenactedpursuanttothe
state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development."Thoughlaudableandwell-meaning,thisstatute,however,hasprovisions
thatrundirectlyafoulofourfundamentallawfromwhichitclaimsoriginandauthority.
Morespecifically,Sections3(a)and(b),5,6,7(a)and(b),8andotherrelatedprovisions
contravenetheRegalianDoctrinethebasicfoundationoftheState'spropertyregime.
Verily, as petitionersundauntedly pointout, fourhundred yearsof Philippinepolitical
historycannotbesetasideorignoredbyIPRA,howeverwell-intentioneditmaybe.The
perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by
conceding the nation's resourcesto their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more
privilegedsimplybecausetheyhavechosentoignorestatelaws.Forhavingchosennottobe enfoldedby statutes onperfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintaintheir
ownershipoflandsanddomainsbyinsistingontheirconceptof"nativetitle"thereto.It
wouldbe plaininjustice tothemajorityof Filipinos who have abidedbythe law and,
consequently,deserveequalopportunitytoenjoythecountry'sresources.
RespondentNCIPclaimsthatIPRAdoesnotviolatetheConstitution,becauseitdoesnot
grantownershipofpublicdomainsandnaturalresourcestoICCs/IPs."Rather,itrecognizes
andmandatesrespectfortherightsofindigenouspeoplesovertheirancestrallandsand
domainsthathadneverbeenlandsofthepublicdomain."Isay,however,thatsuchclaim
findsnolegalsupport.NowhereintheConstitutionisthereaprovisionthatexemptssuch
landsanddomainsfromitscoverage.Quitethecontrary,itdeclaresthatalllandsofthe
publicdomainandnaturalresources"areownedbytheState";and"withtheexceptionof
agriculturallands,alltheirnaturalresourcesshallnotbealienated."
In otherwords,the "owner" is notan individual. Rather, it is a tribal communitythat
preservesthepropertyforthecommonbutnonethelessexclusiveandperpetualbenefitof
its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition.This
concept,however,stillperpetuallywithdrawssuchpropertyfromthecontroloftheState
andfrom itsenjoymentby othercitizensof the Republic.The perpetualand exclusive
characterofprivaterespondents'claimssimplymakesthem repugnantto basic fairness
andequality.
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Private respondentsand intervenorstrace their"ownership" of ancestraldomainsand
landstothepre-Spanishconquest.Ishouldsaythat,atthetime,theirclaimstosuchlands
anddomainswerelimitedtothesurfacesthereofsincetheirancestorswereagriculture-
based. Thismust be thecontinuing scopeof theindigenousgroups'ownershipclaims:limitedtoland,excludingthenaturalresourcesfoundwithin.
Section5,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution,provides:
"SEC.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment
policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheir
ancestrallandstoensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.
"TheCongressmayprovide forthe applicabilityof customarylaws governing property
rightsandrelationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain."
Clearly,therearetwoparametersthatmustbeobservedintheprotectionoftherightsof
ICCs/IPs:(1)theprovisionsofthe1987Constitutionand(2)nationaldevelopmentpoliciesandprograms.
Indigenouspeoplesmay havelong beenmarginalizedin Philippinepolitics andsociety.
This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the
Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
thempriorityintheuse,theenjoymentandthepreservationoftheirancestrallandsand
domains.Buttograntperpetualownershipandcontrolofthenation'ssubstantialwealth
tothem,totheexclusionofotherFilipinocitizenswhohavechosentoliveandabideby
ourpreviousandpresentConstitutions,wouldbenotonlyunjustbutalsosubversiveof
theruleoflaw.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law,Congress is effectively
mandating"reversediscrimination."Inseekingtoimprovetheirlot,itwouldbedoingsoattheexpense of the majority ofthe Filipinopeople. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generositywillspreadtherootsofdiscontentand,inthelongterm,fanthefiresofturmoil
toaconflagrationofnationalproportions.
Peacecannot beattainedby brazenlyand permanentlydeprivingthe manyin orderto
coddlethefew,howeverdisadvantagedtheymayhavebeen.Neithercanajustsocietybe
approximatedbymaimingthehealthytoplacethematparwiththeinjured.Norcanthe
nationsurvivebyenclavingitswealthfortheexclusivebenefitoffavoredminorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of
opportunities andprivileges thatare opento alland by preventingthe powerfulfrom
exploitingandoppressingthem.Thisistheessenceofsocialjusticeempoweringand
enabling the poor to be able to compete with therich and, thus, equally enjoy theblessingsofprosperity,freedomanddignity.
PUNO,J.:
IndigenousCulturalCommunitiesor Indigenous Peoples referto a groupof people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied,possessed and utilized theirterritories underclaim of ownership sincetime
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiatedfromtheFilipinomajority.ICCs/IPsalsoincludedescendantsofICCs/IPswho
inhabitedthecountryatthe timeofconquestorcolonization,whoretainsomeor alloftheirown social, economic, cultural and politicalinstitutions but whomay havebeen
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestraldomains.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinctkind of ownershipover ancestraldomains and
ancestrallands.However,it should be notedthat ancestrallands arenot thesame as
ancestraldomains.
Ancestraldomainsareall areas belongingto ICCs/IPsheld undera claim ofownership,
occupiedorpossessedbyICCs/IPsbythemselvesorthroughtheirancestors,communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequenceof governmentprojectsor anyother voluntarydealingswith government
and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters,coastalareas,andnaturalresourcesthereinandincludesancestrallands,forests,
pasture,residential,agricultural,andotherlandsindividuallyownedwhetheralienableor
not,huntinggrounds,burialgrounds,worshipareas,bodiesofwater,mineralandother
naturalresources.Theyalsoincludelandswhichmaynolongerbeexclusivelyoccupiedby
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditionalactivities,particularlythehomerangesofICCs/IPswhoarestillnomadicand/or
shiftingcultivators.
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Ancestrallands are lands heldby the ICCs/IPs underthe sameconditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupiedandpossessedbutarealsoutilizedbytheICCs/IPsunderclaimsofindividualor
traditionalgroupownership.Theselandsincludebutarenotlimitedtoresidentiallots,riceterracesorpaddies,privateforests,swiddenfarmsandtreelots.
OwnershipoverthenaturalresourcesintheancestraldomainsremainswiththeStateand
the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them for future
generations, benefit and share the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration for thepurpose of en
top related