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8/14/2019 Group of 30 Reforms - Volcker
1/2930Group of Thir
Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability
ebrgd fr rs t 11:00 eST Jury 15, 2009
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About the Authors
The views expressed in this paper are those of the Working Group on
Financial Reform and do not necessarily represent the views of all of
the individual members of the Group of Thirty.
ISBN I-56708-146-0
Copies of this report are available for $49 from:
The Group of Thirty
1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 331-2472 Fax: (202) 785-9423
www.group30.org email:info@group30.org
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability
30 Group o Thirty
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acRonyms and abbReviations
CCP Centralcounterparty[clearing]
CDO CollateralizeddebtobligationCDS Creditdeaultswap
CLO Collateralizedloanobligation
CRMPG CounterpartyRiskManagementPolicyGroup
FDIC FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation
FVA Fairvalueaccounting
GSE Government-SponsoredEnterprise
NAV Netassetvalue
NRSROs NationallyRecognizedSecuritiesRatingsOrganizations
OTC Over-the-counter
SEC SecuritiesandExchangeCommission
SIV StructuredInvestmentVehicle
TARP TroubledAssetRelieProgram
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FoRewoRd
InJuly2008,theGroupoThirty(G30)launchedaprojectonnancialreormunderthe
leadershipoaSteeringCommitteechairedbyPaulA.Volcker,withTommasoPadoa-SchioppaandArminioFragaNetoasitsViceChairmen.Theyweresupportedbyother
G30memberswhoparticipatedinaninormalworkinggroup.Allmembers(apartrom
thosewithcurrentandprospectivenationalocialresponsibilities)havehadtheopportu-
nitytoreviewanddiscusspreliminarydrats.
TheReportistheresponsibilityotheSteeringCommitteeandrefectsbroadareaso
agreementamongtheparticipatingG30members,whoparticipatedintheirindividualca-
pacities.TheReportdoesnotrefecttheocialviewsothoseinpolicymakingpositionsor
inleadershiprolesintheprivatesector.Wheretherearesubstantialdierencesinemphasis
andsubstance,theyarenotedinthetext.
TheG30undertookthisprojectastheglobalnancialcrisisentereditssecondyear.
Theanalysishasbeeninormedbytheextremeeventslaterin2008,whichrockedthevery
oundationotheestablishednancialsystemandwhichledtounprecedentedandmassive
governmentinterventionbothintheUnitedStatesandinmanyothercountriestocontaina
spreadingnancialpanic.
TheReportdoesnotaddresstheneedortheseorpossibleurtheremergencyactions.
Dicultquestionsoweaningmarketsandnancialinstitutionsromocialliesupport
aresuretoarise.Whiletheanalysisandrecommendationsdealinsomeinstanceswiththe
needorlegislation,regulation,andsupervision,theReportisnotdirectedtowardques-
tionsabouttheappropriateocusandnatureonationaladministrativearrangements.Theseare,inanyevent,infuencedbytheparticularconstitutional,legal,andadministra-
tivetraditionsoindividualnationsandregionalarrangements.
TheReport,rather,ocusesonhowthenancialsystemmightreasonablybeorganized
oncethepresentcrisishaspassed,tobetterassureareasonabledegreeostability.Policy-
makers,centralbankers,andnancialregulatorswillnecessarilyremainocusedondealing
withimmediatethreatstotheeectiveunctioningomarkets.However,intakingwhat
areineectemergencymeasures,aconsensusonthedesirableandlastingelementsoa
reormedsystemcanbeuseul,andevennecessary,tospeedrestorationocondencein
sturdy,competitive,andecientnancialarrangementsservingbothnationalandinter-
nationalmarkets.TheReport,benettingromtheexperienceandbroadperspectiveo
G30members,isintendedtohelpinormtheneededdebateamongpolicymakersandthe
internationalnancialcommunityontheseissues.TheReportaddresses:
a.Thepolicyissuesrelatedtoredeningthescopeandboundariesoprudential
regulation;
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b.Reormingthestructureoprudentialregulation,includingtheroleocentralbanks,
theimplicationsortheworkingsolender-o-last-resortacilitiesandotherele-
mentsotheocialsaetynet,andtheneedorgreaterinternationalcoordination;
c. Improvinggovernance,riskmanagement,regulatorypolicies,andaccountingprac-ticesandstandards;and
d.Improvementsintransparencyandnancialinrastructurearrangements.
Twonalnotesareinorder.
First,thisReportisintendedtobeuseultopolicymakersinallthecountrieswhose
nancialsystemshavebeendisruptedinthiscrisis.Forthisreason,mostrecommendations
areramedintermsthatshouldpermitconsiderationindierentcountriesinaashionthat
takesaccountoparticulareaturesotheirnationalsystems.However,sincethiscrisishas
beenrootedindevelopmentswithintheUnitedStates,andgiventheparticularimportance
oreormstotheU.S.nancialsystemintermsoitssizeandglobalimpact,severalothe
issuesandrecommendationshaveadirectU.S.ocus.
Second,theocusothisReportisonthesaetyandsoundnessaspectsonancial
regulation.Therearemanyotherimportantaspectsonancialregulationthataretouched
uponhereonlytotheextentthattheybearonnancialstability,includingcompetition
policies,customerandinvestorprotection,marketpracticesoversight,andnancialraud
andcrimeprevention.Also,totheextentdistinctionsaredrawnbetweenregulationand
supervision,theormerencompassesthesettingopolicies,principles,rules,andstandards,
whilethelatterencompassesthejudgmentalapplicationothosepoliciesandstandardsto
particularinstitutions.
Thekeyissueposedbythepresentcrisisiscrystalclear:Howcanwerestorestrong,
competitive,innovativenancialmarketstosupportglobaleconomicgrowthwithoutonce
againriskingabreakdowninmarketunctioningsosevereastoputtheworldeconomies
atrisk?
Thesearchorviableanswerstothatquestionneedstobegin.
PaulA.Volcker
Chairman of the Trustees
The Group of Thirty
JacobA.Frenkel
Chairman
The Group of Thirty
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Acknowledgements
On behal o the entire Group o Thirty (G30), I would like to express appreciation to
those whose time, talent, and energy have driven this project to successul ruition.In particular, we acknowledge the leadership o the Steering Committee, chaired by Paul
Volcker and Vice Chairmen Arminio Fraga Neto and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. Their
collective understanding o the nature o the nancial crisis and insights as to the necessary
reorms are invaluable.
Special recognition must also go to those members o the G30 who actively participated
in the working group project deliberations and discussions.
Crating a thoughtul report that addresses many dicult supervisory, regulatory,
market, and other matters requires considerable knowledge o the issues and an ability to
synthesize the views o numerous individuals. We particularly appreciate the work o Ste-
phen Thieke, who served as principal dratsman o the report, who brought extraordinary
experience and accomplishment to that role and to our deliberations.
We would also like to thank a number o experts who advised the Steering Group and
participated in our deliberations. In particular, thanks go to Mark Walker, Alan Beller, and
Mayree Clark. Several institutions provided valuable in-kind support to the project including:
Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, Promontory Financial Group, and RiskMetrics.
Thanks also to the editor, Diane Stamm, and the designers, Sarah McPhie and Katie
Burgess, or their dedicated eorts and fexibility when working on this project.
Finally, the coordination o this project and the many aspects o report production had
their logistical center at the oces o the Group o Thirty. This project could not have beencompleted without the eorts o Executive Director Stuart Mackintosh, Sviatlana Francis,
and Nicole Firment o the Group o Thirty.
Jacob A. Frenkel
Chairman
The Group of Thirty
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Financial ReFoRm woRking gRoup
Steering Committee
Ch
Paul A. Volcker
ChairmanotheTrustees,TheGroupoThirty
FormerChairman,BoardoGovernorsotheFederalReserveSystem
Vc Ch
Arminio Fraga Neto
FoundingPartner,GaveaInvestimentos
FormerGovernor,BancodoBrasil
Vc Ch
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
FormerMinisteroEconomyandFinance,Italy
FormerChairman,InternationalAccountingStandardsCommittee
FormerMemberotheExecutiveBoard,EuropeanCentralBank
FormerChairman,CONSOB,Italy
Pjc DcStephen Thieke,RiskMetrics
Wethanktheollowingmembers,whoparticipatedintheprojectintheirindividualcapaci-
ties.Theviewsexpresseddonotnecessarilyrefectthoseotheinstitutionswithwhichthey
arealiated.
Jacob A. Frenkel
Chairman,GroupoThirty
Vice-Chairman,AmericanInternational
Group
FormerGovernor,BankoIsrael
Geoffrey L. Bell
ExecutiveSecretary,GroupoThirty
President,GeoreyBell&Company
E. Gerald Corrigan
ManagingDirector,GoldmanSachs
Group,Inc.
FormerPresident,FederalReserve
BankoNewYork
Andrew D. Crockett
President,JPMorganChaseInternational
FormerGeneralManager,Bankor
InternationalSettlements
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Richard Debs
AdvisoryDirector,MorganStanley
FormerPresident,MorganStanley
InternationalFormerCOO,FederalReserveBank
oNewYork
Jacques de Larosire
Counseiller,BNPParibas
FormerPresident,EuropeanBank
orReconstructionandDevelopment
FormerManagingDirector,International
MonetaryFund
FormerGovernor,BanquedeFrance
Gerd Husler
MemberotheBoardoDirectorsand
SeniorAdvisor,RHJInternational
FormerCounsellorandDirector,
InternationalMonetaryFund
FormerManagingDirector,DresdnerBank
John G. Heimann
SeniorAdvisor,FinancialStabilityInstitute
FormerU.S.ComptrollerotheCurrency
William R. Rhodes
SeniorViceChairman,Citigroup
Chairman,President,andCEO,
CiticorpandCitibank
Ernest Stern
PartnerandSeniorAdvisor,
TheRohatynGroup
FormerManagingDirector,
JPMorganChase
FormerManagingDirector,WorldBank
David Walker
SeniorAdvisor,MorganStanley
International
FormerExecutiveDirector,Bank
oEngland
FormerChairman,Securitiesand
InvestmentsBoard,U.K.
exps
AlanBeller,ClearyGottliebSteen&Hamilton,LLP
MayreeClark,AetosCapital
MarkWalker,ClearyGottliebSteen&Hamilton,LLP
StuartP.M.Mackintosh,TheGroupoThirty
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appendix
LiSt o reCommenDationS
Core reCommenDation i
gps d wksss h cv pdl l d spvs
s b ld. Allsystemicallysignicantnancialinstitutions,regardlessotype,
mustbesubjecttoanappropriatedegreeoprudentialoversight.
Pdl rl d Spvs Bk ozs
rcd 1:
a. Inallcountries,theactivitiesogovernment-insureddeposit-takinginstitutionsshouldbesubjecttoprudentialregulationandsupervisionbyasingleregulator(thatis,con-
solidatedsupervision).Thelargestandmostcomplexbankingorganizationsshould
besubjecttoparticularlycloseregulationandsupervision,meetinghighandcommon
internationalstandards.
b.Large,systemicallyimportantbankinginstitutionsshouldberestrictedinundertak-
ingproprietaryactivitiesthatpresentparticularlyhighrisksandseriousconfictso
interest.Sponsorshipandmanagementocommingledprivatepoolsocapital(that
is,hedgeandprivateequityundsinwhichthebankinginstitutionsowncapitalis
commingledwithclientunds)shouldordinarilybeprohibitedandlargeproprietary
tradingshouldbelimitedbystrictcapitalandliquidityrequirements.Participation
inpackagingandsaleocollectivedebtinstrumentsshouldrequiretheretentionoa
meaningulpartothecreditrisk.
c. Ingeneral,government-insureddeposit-takinginstitutionsshouldnotbeownedand
controlledbyunregulatednon-nancialorganizations,andstrictlimitsshouldbe
imposedondealingsamongsuchbankinginstitutionsandpartialnon-bankowners.
d.Toguardagainstexcessiveconcentrationinnationalbankingsystems,withimplica-
tionsoreectiveocialoversight,managementcontrol,andeectivecompetition,
nationwidelimitsondepositconcentrationshouldbeconsideredatalevelappropri-
atetoindividualcountries.
Csldd Spvs n-Bk cl iss
rcd 2:
a. Forthosecountrieslackingsucharrangements,arameworkornational-levelcon-
solidatedprudentialregulationandsupervisionoverlargeinternationallyactiveinsur-
ancecompaniesshouldbeestablished.
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability
b.Anappropriateprudentialregulatorshouldbedesignatedorthoselargeinvestment
banksandbroker-dealersthatarenotorganizedasbankholdingcompanies.
my mk ml ds d Spvsrcd 3:
a.Moneymarketmutualundswishingtocontinuetooerbank-likeservices,such
astransactionaccountservices,withdrawalsondemandatpar,andassuranceso
maintainingastablenetassetvalue(NAV)atparshouldberequiredtoreorganizeas
special-purposebanks,withappropriateprudentialregulationandsupervision,gov-
ernmentinsurance,andaccesstocentralbanklender-o-last-resortacilities.
b.Thoseinstitutionsremainingasmoneymarketmutualundsshouldonlyoeracon-
servativeinvestmentoptionwithmodestupsidepotentialatrelativelylowrisk.The
vehiclesshouldbeclearlydierentiatedromederallyinsuredinstrumentsoeredbybanks,suchasmoneymarketdepositunds,withnoexplicitorimplicitassurancesto
investorsthatundscanbewithdrawnondemandatastableNAV.Moneymarketmu-
tualundsshouldnotbepermittedtouseamortizedcostpricing,withtheimplication
thattheycarryafuctuatingNAVratherthanonethatispeggedatUS$1.00pershare.
ovsh Pv Pls Cpl
rcd 4:
a.Managersoprivatepoolsocapitalthatemploysubstantialborrowedundsshould
berequiredtoregisterwithanappropriatenationalprudentialregulator.There
shouldbesomeminimumsizeandventurecapitalexemptionsromsuchregistration
requirement.
b.Theprudentialregulatorosuchmanagersshouldhaveauthoritytorequireperiodic
regulatoryreportsandpublicdisclosuresoappropriateinormationregardingthe
size,investmentstyle,borrowing,andperormanceotheundsundermanagement.
Sinceintroductionoevenamodestsystemoregistrationandregulationcancreate
aalseimpressionolowerinvestmentrisk,disclosure,andsuitabilitystandardswill
havetobereevaluated.
c.Forundsaboveasizejudgedtobepotentiallysystemicallysignicant,theprudentialregulatorshouldhaveauthoritytoestablishappropriatestandardsorcapital,liquid-
ity,andriskmanagement.
d.Forthesepurposes,thejurisdictionotheappropriateprudentialregulatorshouldbe
basedontheprimarybusinesslocationothemanagerosuchunds,regardlesso
thelegaldomicileotheundsthemselves.Giventheglobalnatureothemarketsin
whichsuchmanagersandundsoperate,itisimperativethataregulatoryramework
beappliedonaninternationallyconsistentbasis.
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability10
gv-Spsd epss (gSes)
rcd 5:
a.FortheUnitedStates,thepolicyresolutionotheappropriateroleoGSEsinmort-
gagenanceshouldbebasedonaclearseparationotheunctionsoprivatesector
mortgagenanceriskintermediationromgovernmentsectorguaranteesorinsurance
omortgagecreditrisk.
b.Governmentalentitiesprovidingsupportorthemortgagemarketbymeansomarket
purchasesshouldhaveexplicitstatutorybackingandnancialsupport.Hybridso
privateownershipwithgovernmentsponsorshipshouldbeavoided.Intime,existing
GSEmortgagepurchasingandportolioactivitiesshouldbespunotoprivatesector
entities,withthegovernment,iitdesires,maintainingacapacitytointerveneinthe
marketthroughawhollyownedpublicinstitution.
Core reCommenDation ii
th qly d cvss pdl l d spvs s
b pvd. Thiswillrequirebetter-resourcedprudentialregulatorsandcentralbanks
operatingwithinstructuresthataordmuchhigherlevelsonationalandinternational
policycoordination.
rly Sc
rcd 6:
a.Countriesshouldreevaluatetheirregulatorystructureswithaviewtoeliminatingun-
necessaryoverlapsandgapsincoverageandcomplexity,removingthepotentialor
regulatoryarbitrage,andimprovingregulatorycoordination.
b.Inallcases,countriesshouldexplicitlyrearmtheinsulationonationalregulatory
authoritiesrompoliticalandmarketpressuresandreassesstheneedorimproving
thequalityandadequacyoresourcesavailabletosuchauthorities.
rl h Cl Bk
rcd 7:
a.Wherenotalreadythecase,centralbanksshouldacceptaroleinpromotingand
maintainingnancialstability.Theexpectationshouldbethatconcernsornancial
stabilityarerelevantnotjustintimesonancialcrisis,butalsointimesorapid
creditexpansionandincreaseduseoleveragethatmayleadtocrises.
b.Incountrieswherethecentralbankisnottheprudentialregulator,thecentralbank
shouldhave:(i)astrongroleonthegoverningbodyotheprudentialandmarkets
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability 11
regulator(s);(ii)aormalreviewrolewithrespecttoproposedchangesinkeypruden-
tialpolicies,especiallycapitalandliquiditypoliciesandmarginarrangements;and(iii)
asupervisoryroleinregardtothelargestsystemicallysignicantrms,andcritical
paymentandclearingsystems.c. Asharpdistinctionshouldbemaintainedbetweenthoseregulatedbankingorganiza-
tionswithnormalaccesstocentralbankliquidityacilitiesandothertypesonancial
institutionswhoseaccess,iany,shouldbelimitedtoextremeemergencysituationso
criticalsystemicimportance.
d.Centralbankemergencylendingauthorityorhighlyunusualandexigentcircum-
stancesshouldbepreserved,butshouldinclude,bylaworpractice,supportbyap-
propriatepoliticalauthoritiesortheuseosuchauthorityinextendingsuchcreditto
non-bankinstitutions.
e. Centralbankliquiditysupportoperationsshouldbelimitedtoormsthatdonot
entaillendingagainstortheoutrightpurchaseohigh-riskassets,orotherormso
long-termdirectorindirectcapitalsupport.Inprinciple,thoseormsosupportare
moreappropriatelyprovidedbydirectlyaccountablegovernmententities.Inpractice,
totheextentthecentralbankistheonlyentitywiththeresourcesandauthoritytoact
quicklytoprovidethisormosystemicsupport,thereshouldbesubsequentapproval
oanappropriategovernmentalentitywiththeconsequentrisktransertothatentity.
il Cd
rcd 8:
a.Nationalregulatoryauthoritiesandnanceministersarestronglyencouragedto
adaptandenhanceexistingmechanismsorinternationalregulatoryandsupervisory
coordination.Theocusoneededenhancementsshouldbeto:(i)bettercoordinate
oversightothelargestinternationalbankingorganizations,withmoretimelyand
openinormationsharing,andgreaterclarityonhomeandhostresponsibilities,in-
cludingincrisismanagement;(ii)movebeyondcoordinatedrulemakingandstandard
settingtotheidenticationandmodicationomaterialnationaldierencesinthe
applicationandenorcementosuchstandards;(iii)closeregulatorygapsandraise
standards,whereneeded,withrespecttooshorebankingcenters;and(iv)develop
themeansorjointconsiderationosystemicriskconcernsandthecyclicalityimplica-tionsoregulatoryandsupervisorypolicies.Theappropriateagenciesshouldstrength-
entheiractionsinmembercountriestopromoteimplementationandenorcemento
internationalstandards.
b.Giventherecurringimportanceoexcessiveleverageasacontributingactorto
nancialdisruptions,andtheincreasinglycomplexwaysinwhichleveragecanbe
employedonandobalancesheets,prudentialregulatorsandcentralbanksshould
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability1
collaboratewithinternationalagenciesinaneorttodeneleverageandthencollect
andreportdataonthedegreeoleverageandmaturityandliquiditymismatchesin
variousnationalsystemsandmarkets.
c. Totheextentnewinternationalregulatoryorganizationsareultimatelyneeded,theinitialocusshouldbeondevelopingmoreormalregionalmechanisms,suchasinthe
EuropeanUnion,butwithcontinuedattentivenesstotheglobaldimensionomost
signicantnancialmarkets.
Core reCommenDation iii
isl plcs d sdds s b shd, wh pcl
phss sdds vc, sk , cpl, d lqdy.
Regulatorypoliciesandaccountingstandardsmustalsoguardagainstprocyclicaleects
andbeconsistentwithmaintainingprudentbusinesspractices.
rly Sdds gvc d rsk m
rcd 9:
Regulatorystandardsorgovernanceandriskmanagementshouldberaised,withparticu-
laremphasison:
a. Strengtheningboardsodirectorswithgreaterengagementoindependentmembers
havingnancialindustryandriskmanagementexpertise;
b.Coordinatingboardoversightocompensationandriskmanagementpolicies,with
theaimobalancingrisktakingwithprudenceandthelong-runinterestsoand
returnstoshareholders;
c. Ensuringsystematicboard-levelreviewsandexercisesaimedatestablishingthemost
importantparametersorsettingthermsrisktoleranceandevaluatingitsriskpro-
lerelativetothoseparameters;
d.Ensuringtheriskmanagementandauditingunctionsareullyindependentand
adequatelyresourcedareasotherm.Theriskmanagementunctionshouldreport
directlytothechieexecutiveocerratherthanthroughtheheadoanotherunc-
tionalarea;
e. Conductingperiodicreviewsoarmspotentialvulnerabilitytoriskarisingromcreditconcentrations,excessivematuritymismatches,excessiveleverage,orunduereli-
anceonassetmarketliquidity;
. Ensuringthatalllargermshavethecapacitytocontinuouslymonitor,withinamat-
terohours,theirlargestcounterpartycreditexposuresonanenterprisewidebasis
andtomakethatinormationavailable,asappropriate,toitsseniormanagement,its
board,anditsprudentialregulatorandcentralbank;
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability 1
g.Ensuringindustrywideacceptanceoandactiononthemanyspecicriskmanage-
mentpracticeimprovementscontainedinthereportsotheCounterpartyRiskMan-
agementPolicyGroup(CRMPG)andtheInstituteoInternationalFinance.
rly Cpl Sdds
rcd 10:
a. Internationalregulatorycapitalstandardsshouldbeenhancedtoaddresstendencies
towardprocyclicality.Benchmarksorbeingwellcapitalizedshouldberaised,given
thedemonstrablelimitationsoeventhemostadvancedtoolsorestimatingrmwide
risk.
b.Thesebenchmarksshouldbeexpressedasabroadrangewithinwhichcapitalratios
shouldbemanaged,withtheexpectationthat,aspartosupervisoryguidance,rms
willoperateattheupperendosucharangeinperiodswhenmarketsareexuberantandtendenciesorunderestimatingandunderpricingriskaregreat.
c. Theexistinginternationaldenitionsocapitalshouldbereevaluated,lookingtoward
closealignmentonnationaldenitions.
d.Capitalandriskdisclosurestandardsshouldbereevaluatedtoprovideahigherdegree
otransparencyoarmsriskappetite,itsestimatedneedsorandallocationoeco-
nomiccapital,anditsvaluationpractices.
Sdds Lqdy rsk m
rcd 11:
a.Base-levelliquiditystandardsshouldincorporatenormsormaintainingasizable
diversiedmixolong-termundingandanavailablecushionohighlyliquidunen-
cumberedassets.Oncesuchstandardsaredeveloped,considerationshouldbegivento
whatisthepreerredmixoseniorandsubordinateddebtinbankcapitalstructures.
b.Supervisoryguidanceorliquiditystandardsshouldbebasedonamorerenedanaly-
sisoarmscapacitytomaintainampleliquidityunderstressconditions,including
evaluationothequalityandeectivenessoitsliquiditymanagementpoliciesand
contingencyundingplan.
c. Liquiditydisclosurestandards,buildingonthesuggestedpracticesintheBaselCom-
mitteePrinciples,shouldcomplementthesuggestedimproveddisclosurepracticesor
capitalandriskproleinormation.
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability1
Vl acc
rcd 12:
a. Fairvalueaccountingprinciplesandstandardsshouldbereevaluatedwithaview
todevelopingmorerealisticguidelinesordealingwithlessliquidinstrumentsand
distressedmarkets.
b.Thetensionbetweenthebusinesspurposeservedbyregulatednancialinstitutions
thatintermediatecreditandliquidityriskandtheinterestsoinvestorsandcreditors
shouldberesolvedbydevelopmentoprinciples-basedstandardsthatbetterrefectthe
businessmodelotheseinstitutions,applyappropriaterigortovaluationandevalu-
ationointent,andrequireimproveddisclosureandtransparency.Thesestandards
shouldalsobereviewedby,andcoordinatedwith,prudentialregulatorstoensure
applicationinaashionconsistentwithsaeandsoundoperationosuchinstitutions.
c. Accountingprinciplesshouldalsobemademorefexibleinregardtotheprudential
needorregulatedinstitutionstomaintainadequatecreditlossreservessucientto
coverexpectedlossesacrosstheirportoliosoverthelieoassetsinthoseportolios.
Thereshouldbeulltransparencyothemannerinwhichreservesaredeterminedand
allocated.
d.AsemphasizedinthethirdreportotheCRMPG,underanyandallstandardso
accountingandunderanyandallmarketconditions,individualnancialinstitutions
mustensurethatwhollyadequateresources,insulatedbyail-saeindependentdeci-
sion-makingauthority,areatthecenterothevaluationandpricevericationprocess.
Core reCommenDation iV
cl ks d pdcs s b d sp, wh b-
ld sk d pdl cvs. th sc spp sch
ks s b d ch bs d ss pl ls
v l fcl ss.
rs Cfdc Sczd Cd mks
rcd 13:
a.MarketSupervision:Extensiveinnovationinthecapitalmarketsandtherapidgrowth
osecuritizationmakeitimperativethatsecuritizedandotherstructuredproductand
derivativesmarketsbeheldtoregulatory,disclosure,andtransparencystandardsat
leastcomparabletothosethathavehistoricallybeenappliedtothepublicsecurities
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability 1
markets.Thismayrequirethatabroaderrangeomarketsbemonitored,thatthere
beadequatetransparencyastotransactionvolumesandholdingsacrossallproducts,
andthatbothcreditandleverageelementsoeachproductbethoroughlyunderstood
andmonitored.b.CreditUnderwritingStandards:Thehealthyredevelopmentosecuritizedcreditmar-
ketsrequiresarestorationomarketcondenceintheadequacyandsustainabilityo
creditunderwritingstandards.Tohelpachievethis,regulatorsshouldrequireregu-
latednancialinstitutionstoretainameaningulportionothecreditrisktheyare
packagingintosecuritizedandotherstructuredcreditproducts.
c. O-Balance-SheetVehicles:Pendingaccountingrulechangesortheconsolidation
omanytypesoo-balance-sheetvehiclesrepresentapositiveandneededimprove-
ment.Itisimportant,beoretheyareullyimplemented,thatcareulconsiderationbe
giventohowtheserulesarelikelytoimpacteortstorestoretheviabilityosecuri-
tizedcreditmarkets.
r acy rs
rcd 14:
RegulatorypolicieswithregardtoNationallyRecognizedSecuritiesRatingOrganizations
(NRSROs)andtheuseoratingsshouldberevised,preerablyonaninternationallycoordi-
natedbasis,toachievetheollowing:
a.Usersoriskratings,mostimportantlyregulatedusers,shouldbeencouragedtore-
storeoracquirethecapacityorindependentevaluationsotheriskocreditproductsinwhichtheyareinvesting.
b.RiskratingsissuedbytheNRSROsshouldbemademorerobust,torefecttherisk
opotentialvaluationlossesarisingnotjustromdeaultprobabilitiesandlossinthe
eventodeault,butalsoromtheullrangeopotentialriskactors(includingliquid-
ityandpricevolatility).
c. Regulatorsshouldencouragethedevelopmentopaymentmodelsthatimprovethe
alignmentoincentivesamongtheprovidersoriskratingsandtheirclientsandusers,
andpermituserstoholdNRSROsaccountableorthequalityotheirworkproduct.
th ovsh Cd Dl Swps (CDS)
d ov-h-C (otC) mks
rcd 15:
a.Much-neededplannedimprovementstotheinrastructuresupportingtheOTCderiva-
tivesmarketsshouldbeurthersupportedbylegislationtoestablishaormalsystem
oregulationandoversightosuchmarkets.
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability1
b.Giventheglobalnatureothemarket,itisessentialthattherebeaconsistentregula-
toryrameworkonaninternationalscale,andnationalregulatorsshouldshareinor-
mationandenterintoappropriatecooperativearrangementswithauthoritiesoother
countriesresponsibleoroverseeingactivities.
a rsl mchs cl iss
rcd 16:
a. Incountrieswherethisisnotalreadythecase,alegalregimeshouldbeestablishedto
provideregulatorswithauthoritytorequireearlywarning,promptcorrectiveactions,
andorderlyclosingsoregulatedbankingorganizations,andothersystemicallysigni-
icantregulatednancialinstitutions.IntheUnitedStates,legislationshouldestablish
aprocessormanagingtheresolutionoailednon-depositorynancialinstitutions
(includingnon-bankaliateswithinabankholdingcompanystructure)comparabletotheprocessordepositoryinstitutions.
b.Theregimeornon-depositorynancialinstitutionsshouldapplyonlytothoseew
organizationswhoseailuremightreasonablybeconsideredtoposeathreattothe
nancialsystemandthereoresubjecttoocialregulation.
c. Aregulatorybodyhavingpowerscomparabletothoseavailableortheresolution
obankinginstitutionsshouldbeempoweredtoactasareceiverorconservatoro
aailednon-depositoryorganizationandtoplacetheorganizationinliquidationor
takeactiontorestoreittoasoundandsolventcondition.
d.Thespecialtreatmentaccordedtovariousormsonancialcontractsundercurrent
U.S.lawshouldbeexaminedinlightorecentexperience,withaviewtowardresolv-
ingclaimsunderthesecontractsinamannerleastdisruptivetothenancialsystem.
ipv tspcy Scd Pdc mks
rcd 17:
a.Thedisclosureanddisseminationregimeorasset-backedandotherstructuredxed-
incomenancialproducts(includingsecuritiesandothernancialproducts)inthe
publicandprivatemarketsshouldbeenhanced.
b.Theappropriatenationalregulatorshould,inconjunctionwithinvestors,determinewhatinormationismaterialtoinvestorsintheseproductsandshouldconsideren-
hancingexistingrulesoradoptnewrulesthatensuredisclosureothatinormation,
orbothasset-backedandsyntheticstructuredproducts.
c. Theappropriatenationalregulatorshouldconditiontransactionsintheprivateand
wholesalemarketsonsatisactionoappropriateinormationdisclosurestandards.
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Financial ReFoRmA Framework for Financial Stability 1
Sh mk acvy d Vl i
rcd 18:
Eortstorestoreinvestorcondenceintheworkingsothesemarketssuggestaneedtore-
visitevaluationsothecostsandbenetsoinrastructureinvestmentsthatwouldacilitate
amuchhigherlevelotransparencyaroundactivitylevels,tradedprices,andrelatedvalua-
tions.Partothecostsosuchchangesistheimpactonrm-specicconcernsregardingthe
privatenatureotheirmarketactivity.Theseconcerns,anddirectinvestmentcosts,needto
beweighedagainstthepotentialbenetsohigherlevelsomarkettransparency.
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1
membeRs oF the gRoup oF thiRty
Paul A. Volcker
ChairmanotheBoardoTrustees,GroupoThirtyFormerChairman,BoardoGovernorsotheFederalReserveSystem
Jacob A. FrenkelChairman,GroupoThirtyViceChairman,AmericanInternationalGroupFormerGovernor,BankoIsrael
Geoffrey L. BellExecutiveSecretary,GroupoThirtyPresident,GeoreyBell&Company,Inc.
Montek S. Ahluwalia
DeputyChairman,PlanningCommissionoIndiaFormerDirector,IndependentEvaluationOce,InternationalMonetaryFund
Abdulatif Al-HamadChairman,ArabFundorEconomicandSocialDevelopmentFormerMinisteroFinanceandMinisteroPlanning,Kuwait
Leszek BalcerowiczChairmanotheBoard,BruegelProessor,WarsawSchooloEconomicsFormerPresident,NationalBankoPolandFormerDeputyPrimeMinisterandMinisteroFinance,Poland
Jaime CaruanaFinancialCounsellor,InternationalMonetaryFundFormerGovernor,BancodeEspaaFormerChairman,BaselCommitteeonBankingSupervision
Domingo CavalloChairmanandCEO,DFCAssociates,LLCFormerMinisteroEconomy,Argentina
E. Gerald CorriganManagingDirector,GoldmanSachsGroup,Inc.FormerPresident,FederalReserveBankoNewYork
Andrew D. CrockettPresident,JPMorganChaseInternationalFormerGeneralManager,BankorInternationalSettlements
Guillermo de la Dehesa RomeroDirectorandMemberotheExecutiveCommittee,GrupoSantanderFormerDeputyManagingDirector,BancodeEspaaFormerSecretaryoState,MinistryoEconomyandFinance,Spain
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1
Mario DraghiGovernor,BancadItaliaChairman,FinancialStabilityForumMemberotheGoverningandGeneralCouncils,EuropeanCentralBank
FormerViceChairmanandManagingDirector,GoldmanSachsInternational
Martin FeldsteinProessoroEconomics,HarvardUniversityPresidentEmeritus,NationalBureauoEconomicResearchFormerChairman,CounciloEconomicAdvisers
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.ChieExecutive,TIAA-CREFFormerChairman,SwissReAmericaHoldingCorporationFormerViceChairman,BoardoGovernorsotheFederalReserveSystem
Stanley Fischer
Governor,BankoIsraelFormerFirstManagingDirector,InternationalMonetaryFund
Arminio Fraga NetoPartner,GaveaInvestimentosFormerGovernor,BancodoBrasil
Timothy F. GeithnerPresidentandChieExecutiveOcer,FederalReserveBankoNewYorkFormerU.S.UndersecretaryoTreasuryorInternationalAairs
Gerd HuslerMemberotheBoardoDirectorsandSeniorAdvisor,RHJInternational
FormerCounsellorandDirector,InternationalCapitalMarketsDepartment, InternationalMonetaryFundFormerManagingDirector,DresdnerBank
Philipp HildebrandViceChairmanotheGoverningBoard,SwissNationalBankFormerPartner,MooreCapitalManagement
Mervyn KingGovernor,BankoEnglandFormerProessoroEconomics,LondonSchooloEconomics
Paul KrugmanProessoroEconomics,WoodrowWilsonSchool,PrincetonUniversityFormerMember,CounciloEconomicAdvisors
Guillermo Ortiz MartinezGovernor,BancodeMexicoFormerSecretaryoFinanceandPublicCredit,Mexico
Tommaso Padoa-SchioppaFormerMinisteroEconomyandFinance,ItalyFormerChairman,InternationalAccountingStandardsCommitteeFormerMemberotheExecutiveBoard,EuropeanCentralBankFormerChairman,CONSOB
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0
Kenneth RogoffThomasD.CabotProessoroPublicPolicyandEconomics,HarvardUniversityFormerChieEconomistandDirectoroResearch,IMF
Tharman ShanmugaratnamMinisteroFinance,SingaporeFormerManagingDirector,MonetaryAuthorityoSingapore
Lawrence SummersCharlesW.EliotUniversityProessor,HarvardUniversityFormerPresident,HarvardUniversityFormerU.S.SecretaryotheTreasury
Jean-Claude TrichetPresident,EuropeanCentralBankFormerGovernor,BanquedeFrance
David WalkerSeniorAdvisor,MorganStanleyInternational,Inc.FormerChairman,MorganStanleyInternational,Inc.FormerChairman,SecuritiesandInvestmentsBoard,UK
Zhou XiaochuanGovernor,PeoplesBankoChinaFormerPresident,ChinaConstructionBankFormerAsst.MinisteroForeignTrade
Yutaka YamaguchiFormerDeputyGovernor,BankoJapanFormerChairman,EuroCurrencyStandingCommission
Ernesto ZedilloDirector,YaleCenterortheStudyoGlobalization,YaleUniversityFormerPresidentoMexico
Senior memBerS
William McDonoughViceChairmanandSpecialAdvisortotheChairman,MerrillLynchFormerChairman,PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoardFormerPresident,FederalReserveBankoNewYork
William R. RhodesSeniorViceChairman,CitigroupChairman,PresidentandCEO,CiticorpandCitibank
Ernest SternPartnerandSeniorAdvisor,TheRohatynGroupFormerManagingDirector,JPMorganChaseFormerManagingDirector,WorldBank
Marina v N. WhitmanProessoroBusinessAdministration&PublicPolicy,UniversityoMichiganFormerMember,CounciloEconomicAdvisors
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1
emerituS memBerS
Lord Richardson of Duntisbourne, KGHonoraryChairman,GroupoThirty
FormerGovernor,BankoEngland
Richard A. DebsAdvisoryDirector,MorganStanleyFormerPresident,MorganStanleyInternationalFormerCOO,FederalReserveBankoNewYork
Gerhard FelsFormerDirector,InstitutderdeutschenWirtschat
Wilfried GuthFormerSpokesmenotheBoardoManagingDirectors,DeutscheBankAG
Toyoo GyohtenPresident,InstituteorInternationalMonetaryAairsFormerChairman,BankoTokyo
John G. HeimannSeniorAdvisor,FinancialStabilityInstituteFormerUSComptrollerotheCurrency
Erik HoffmeyerFormerChairman,DanmarksNationalbank
Peter B. Kenen
SeniorFellowinInternationalEconomics,CouncilonForeignRelationsFormerWalkerProessoroEconomics&InternationalFinance, DepartmentoEconomics,PrincetonUniversity
Jacques de LarosireConseiller,BNPParibasFormerPresident,EuropeanBankorReconstructionandDevelopmentFormerManagingDirector,InternationalMonetaryFundFormerGovernor,BanquedeFrance
Shijuro OgataFormerDeputyGovernor,BankoJapanFormerDeputyGovernor,JapanDevelopmentBank
Sylvia OstryDistinguishedResearchFellowMunkCentreorInternationalStudies,TorontoFormerAmbassadororTradeNegotiations,CanadaFormerHead,OECDEconomicsandStatisticsDepartment
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publications oF the gRoup oF thiRty
since 10
SPeCiaL rePortSTheStructureoFinancialSupervision:ApproachesandChallengesinaGlobalMarketplace G30 Financial Regulatory Systems Working Group. 2008
Global Clearing and Settlement: Final Monitoring ReportGlobal Monitoring Committee. 2006
Reinsurance and International Financial MarketsReinsurance Study Group. 2006
Enhancing Public Confdence in Financial ReportingSteering & Working Committees on Accounting. 2004
Global Clearing and Settlement: A Plan o ActionSteering & Working Committees of Global Clearing & Settlements Study. 2003
Derivatives: Practices and Principles: Follow-up Surveys o Industry PracticeGlobal Derivatives Study Group. 1994
Derivatives: Practices and Principles, Appendix III: Survey o Industry PracticeGlobal Derivatives Study Group. 1994
Derivatives: Practices and Principles, Appendix II: Legal Enorceability:Survey o Nine JurisdictionsGlobal Derivatives Study Group. 1993
Derivatives:PracticesandPrinciples,AppendixI:WorkingPapers Global Derivatives Study Group. 1993
Derivatives: Practices and PrinciplesGlobal Derivatives Study Group. 1993
Clearance and Settlement Systems: Status Reports, Autumn 1992Various Authors. 1992
Clearance and Settlement Systems: Status Reports, Year-End 1990Various Authors. 1991
Conerence on Clearance and Settlement Systems;London, March 1990: SpeechesVarious Authors. 1990
ClearanceandSettlementSystems:StatusReports,Spring1990 Various Authors. 1990
rePortS
SharingtheGainsromTrade:RevivingtheDohaRound Study Group Report. 2004
KeyIssuesinSovereignDebtRestructuring Study Group Report. 2002
ReducingtheRisksoInternationalInsolvency A Compendium of Work in Progress. 2000
Collapse:TheVenezuelanBankingCrisiso94 Ruth de Krivoy. 2000
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TheEvolvingCorporation:GlobalImperativesandNationalResponses Study Group Report. 1999
InternationalInsolvenciesintheFinancialSector Study Group Report. 1998
GlobalInstitutions,NationalSupervisionandSystemicRisk Study Group on Supervision and Regulation. 1997
LatinAmericanCapitalFlows:LivingwithVolatility Latin American Capital Flows Study Group. 1994
DeningtheRolesoAccountants,BankersandRegulatorsintheUnitedStates Study Group on Accountants, Bankers and Regulators. 1994
EMU Ater MaastrichtPeter B. Kenen. 1992
Sea Changes in Latin America
Pedro Aspe, Andres Bianchi and Domingo Cavallo, with discussionby S.T. Beza and William Rhodes. 1992
The Summit Process and Collective Security: Future Responsibility SharingThe Summit Reform Study Group. 1991
Financing Eastern EuropeRichard A. Debs, Harvey Shapiro and Charles Taylor. 1991
The Risks Facing the World EconomyThe Risks Facing the World Economy Study Group. 1991
tHe WiLLiam taYLor memoriaL LeCtureSThe Credit Crisis: The Quest or Stability and Reorm
E. Gerald Corrigan. 2008
Lessons Learned rom the 2008 Financial Crisis
Eugene A. Ludwig. 2008Two Cheers or Financial Stability
Howard Davies. 2006
Implications o Basel II or Emerging Market CountriesStanley Fisher. 2003
Issues in Corporate GovernanceWilliam J. McDonough. 2003
Post Crisis Asia: The Way ForwardLee Hsien Loong. 2001
Licensing Banks: Still Necessary?Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. 2000
Banking Supervision and Financial StabilityAndrew Crockett. 1998
Global Risk ManagementUlrich Cartellieri and Alan Greenspan. 1996
The Financial Disruptions o the 1980s: A Central Banker Looks BackE. Gerald Corrigan. 1993
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oCCaSionaL PaPerS78.TheG30atThirty Peter B. Kenen. 2008
77.DistortingtheMicrotoEmbellishtheMacro:TheCaseoArgentina Domingo Cavallo, Joaqun Cottani. 2008
76. Credit Crunch: Where Do We Stand?Thomas A. Russo. 2008
75. Banking, Financial, and Regulatory ReormLiu Mingkang, Roger Ferguson, Guillermo Ortiz Martinez. 2007
74. The Achievements and Challenges o European Union Financial Integrationand Its Implications or the United StatesJacques de Larosiere. 2007
73. Nine Common Misconceptions About Competitiveness and GlobalizationGuillermo de la Dehesa. 2007
72. International Currencies and National Monetary Policies
Barry Eichengreen. 200671. The International Role o the Dollar and Trade Balance Adjustment
Linda Goldberg and Cdric Tille. 2006
70.TheCriticalMissionotheEuropeanStabilityandGrowthPact Jacques de Larosiere. 2004
69.IsItPossibletoPreservetheEuropeanSocialModel? Guillermo de la Dehesa. 2004
68.ExternalTransparencyinTradePolicy Sylvia Ostry. 2004
67.AmericanCapitalismandGlobalConvergence Marina v. N. Whitman. 2003
66.Enronetal:MarketForcesinDisarray Jaime Caruana, Andrew Crockett, Douglas Flint, Trevor Harris, Tom Jones. 2002
65.VentureCapitalintheUnitedStatesandEurope Guillermo de la Dehesa. 2002
64.ExplainingtheEurotoaWashingtonAudience
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. 2001
63.ExchangeRateRegimes:SomeLessonsromPostwarEurope Charles Wyplosz. 2000
62.DecisionmakingorEuropeanEconomicandMonetaryUnion Erik Hoffmeyer. 2000
61.ChartingaCourseortheMultilateralTradingSystem: TheSeattleMinisterialMeetingandBeyond Ernest Preeg. 1999
60.ExchangeRateArrangementsortheEmergingMarketEconomies Felipe Larran and Andrs Velasco. 1999
59.G3ExchangeRateRelationships:ARecapotheRecord andaReviewoProposalsorChange Richard Clarida. 1999
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58.RealEstateBoomsandBankingBusts:AnInternationalPerspective Richard Herring and Susan Wachter. 1999
57.TheFutureoGlobalFinancialRegulation Sir Andrew Large. 1998
56.ReinorcingtheWTO Sylvia Ostry. 1998
55.Japan:TheRoadtoRecovery Akio Mikuni. 1998
54.FinancialServicesintheUruguayRoundandtheWTO Sydney J. Key. 1997
53.ANewRegimeorForeignDirectInvestment Sylvia Ostry. 1997
52.DerivativesandMonetaryPolicy Gerd Hausler. 1996
51.TheReormoWholesalePaymentSystemsandImpactonFinancialMarkets
David Folkerts-Landau, Peter Garber, and Dirk Schoenmaker. 199650.EMUProspects Guillermo de la Dehesa and Peter B. Kenen. 1995
49.NewDimensionsoMarketAccess Sylvia Ostry. 1995
48.ThirtyYearsinCentralBanking Erik Hoffmeyer. 1994
47.Capital,AssetRiskandBankFailure Linda M. Hooks. 1994
46.InSearchoaLevelPlayingField:TheImplementation otheBasleCapitalAccordinJapanandtheUnitedStates Hal S. Scott and Shinsaku Iwahara. 1994
45.TheImpactoTradeonOECDLaborMarkets Robert Z. Lawrence. 1994
44.GlobalDerivatives:PublicSectorResponses James A. Leach, William J. McDonough, David W. Mullins, Brian Quinn. 1993
43.TheTenCommandmentsoSystemicReorm Vaclav Klaus. 1993
42.Tripolarism:RegionalandGlobalEconomicCooperation Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. 1993
41.TheThreatoManagedTradetoTransormingEconomies Sylvia Ostry. 1993
40.TheNewTradeAgenda
Geza Feketekuty. 199239.EMUandtheRegions Guillermo de la Dehesa and Paul Krugman. 1992
38.WhyNow?ChangeandTurmoilinU.S.Banking Lawrence J. White. 1992
37.AreForeign-ownedSubsidiariesGoodortheUnitedStates? Raymond Vernon. 1992
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36.TheEconomicTransormationoEastGermany:SomePreliminaryLessons Gerhard Fels and Claus Schnabel. 1991
35.InternationalTradeinBankingServices:AConceptualFramework Sydney J. Key and Hal S. Scott. 1991
34.PrivatizationinEasternandCentralEurope Guillermo de la Dehesa. 1991
33.ForeignDirectInvestment:TheNeglectedTwinoTrade DeAnne Julius. 1991
32.InterdependenceoCapitalMarketsandPolicyImplications Stephen H. Axilrod. 1990
31.TwoViewsoGermanReunication Hans Tietmeyer and Wilfried Guth. 1990
30.EuropeintheNineties:ProblemsandAspirations Wilfried Guth. 1990
29.ImplicationsoIncreasingCorporateIndebtednessorMonetaryPolicy
Benjamin M. Friedman. 199028.FinancialandMonetaryIntegrationinEurope:1990,1992andBeyond Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. 1990
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Group of Thirty
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